Delay and corruption : a simple model with empirical tests

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dc.contributor.authorLeo, Lorenzo Aldeco
dc.contributor.authorKaplan, David S.
dc.contributor.authorSadka, Joyce
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-25T14:36:03Z
dc.date.available2014-08-25T14:36:03Z
dc.date.issued2014-01
dc.description.abstractMid and low-level bureaucrats are the mechanism through which institutional improvement or legal reforms are implemented. Delay and corruption are two most systematic problems found across countries and legal systems. There are incentives for bureaucrats to engage in deliberate or strategic delay: the higher the valuation of the user for the service they need, the more likely a side payment will be offered to the bureaucrat. This paper presents a mathematical model able to characterize the relationship between delay, side payments to bureaucrats, and efficiency, and which provides testable implications consistent with data analysis. Setting workload priorities may reduce corruption.en
dc.formatTexten
dc.format.extent1 digital file (10 p. : ill.)en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10625/53064
dc.language.isoen
dc.subjectPUBLIC SERVICESen
dc.subjectCORRUPTIONen
dc.subjectBUREAUCRACYen
dc.subjectLABOUR LAWen
dc.subjectMEXICOen
dc.subjectNORTH AND CENTRAL AMERICAen
dc.subjectLATIN AMERICAen
dc.subjectECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTen
dc.subjectACCOUNTABILITYen
dc.subjectPUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONen
dc.subjectADMINISTRATIVE LAWen
dc.titleDelay and corruption : a simple model with empirical testsen
dc.typeJournal Article (peer-reviewed)en
idrc.dspace.accessOpen Accessen
idrc.project.componentnumber106762001
idrc.project.number106762
idrc.project.titleImproving Labour Courts in Mexico: The Case of Cuautitlanen
idrc.recordsserver.bcsnumberIC01-4990-35
idrc.rims.adhocgroupIDRC SUPPORTEDen

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