Fiscal federalism and competitive bidding for foreign investment as a multistage game

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dc.contributor.authorJha, Raghbendra
dc.contributor.authorNagarajan, Hari K.
dc.contributor.authorNagarajan, Kolumum R.
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-06T18:59:30Z
dc.date.available2014-03-06T18:59:30Z
dc.date.issued2012-12
dc.description.abstractThis paper models the behavior of states in a federal country wising to attract foreign firms to locate within their own individual jurisdictions. The essential intertemporal character of this decision is modeled as a multi-stage game to attract such foreign investment in these states. It is found that, when states with unequal political or economic infrastructure compete, the resulting Nash equilibrium profiles are inefficient. Under certain conditions, states that have won once, can “allow” a rival to win in a subsequent stage. The resulting Nash Equilibrium is more efficient. If the option of “allowing” a rival to win is not available, then states may resort to “suicide” strategies defined as outcomes created by history of losses.en
dc.formatTexten
dc.format.extent1 digital file (39 p. : ill.)en
dc.format.mimetypeApplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10625/52493
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.ruralgov-ncaer.org/publications.php?cPath=2
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherNational Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), New Delhi, INen
dc.relation.ispartofNCAER working papers on decentralisation and rural governance in India; no. 17, December 2012en
dc.subjectFISCAL FEDERALISMen
dc.subjectMULTI-STAGE GAMESen
dc.subjectSUICIDE STRATEGIESen
dc.subjectCOMPETITIVENESSen
dc.subjectFOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTen
dc.subjectTAX INCENTIVESen
dc.subjectECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTUREen
dc.subjectECONOMIC LIBERALIZATIONen
dc.subjectDECENTRALIZATIONen
dc.subjectGOVERNANCEen
dc.subjectRURAL AREASen
dc.subjectINDIAen
dc.titleFiscal federalism and competitive bidding for foreign investment as a multistage gameen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
idrc.dspace.accessIDRC Onlyen
idrc.project.componentnumber105223001
idrc.project.number105223
idrc.project.titleBuilding Policy Research Capacity for Rural Governance and Growth in Indiaen
idrc.recordsserver.bcsnumberIC01-1339-32
idrc.rims.adhocgroupIDRC SUPPORTEDen

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