Regulation through the back door : understanding the implications of institutional transplant

dc.contributor.authorDubash, Navroz K.
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-07T19:16:35Z
dc.date.available2013-03-07T19:16:35Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.description.abstractIndependent regulatory agencies have entered India through the back-door, little remarked upon and even less understood. Strongly promoted by international donor agencies, regulators have been viewed primarily as a mechanism to insulate decision making from politics. The paper focuses on the regulation of the electricity sector in India. It explores whether and how the manner of diffusion, and process of embedding regulatory agencies into national political economies can also shape the nature of the institutional outcome itself. As agents of depoliticization or as institutional sites for the re-articulation of political interests in locally specific ways, regulation and regulatory bodies vary across contexts.en
dc.format.extent1 digital file (16 p.)en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10625/50793
dc.language.isoen
dc.subjectADMINISTRATIVE LAWen
dc.subjectREGULATIONen
dc.subjectELECTRICITYen
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT REGULATIONen
dc.subjectPRIVATIZATIONen
dc.subjectCIVIL SOCIETYen
dc.subjectPOPULAR PARTICIPATIONen
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKen
dc.subjectSTATE INTERVENTIONen
dc.subjectINDIAen
dc.subjectSOUTH ASIAen
dc.titleRegulation through the back door : understanding the implications of institutional transplanten
dc.typeIDRC-Related Reporten
idrc.dspace.accessIDRC Onlyen
idrc.project.componentnumber105969001
idrc.project.number105969
idrc.project.titleGlobal Administrative Law and Developing Countriesen
idrc.rims.adhocgroupIDRC SUPPORTEDen

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