Leo, Lorenzo AldecoKaplan, David S.Sadka, Joyce2014-08-252014-08-252014-01http://hdl.handle.net/10625/53064Mid and low-level bureaucrats are the mechanism through which institutional improvement or legal reforms are implemented. Delay and corruption are two most systematic problems found across countries and legal systems. There are incentives for bureaucrats to engage in deliberate or strategic delay: the higher the valuation of the user for the service they need, the more likely a side payment will be offered to the bureaucrat. This paper presents a mathematical model able to characterize the relationship between delay, side payments to bureaucrats, and efficiency, and which provides testable implications consistent with data analysis. Setting workload priorities may reduce corruption.Text1 digital file (10 p. : ill.)application/pdfenPUBLIC SERVICESCORRUPTIONBUREAUCRACYLABOUR LAWMEXICONORTH AND CENTRAL AMERICALATIN AMERICAECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTACCOUNTABILITYPUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONADMINISTRATIVE LAWJournal Article (peer-reviewed)