Delay and corruption : a simple model with empirical tests

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IDL-53064.pdf (270.3 KB)

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2014-01

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Abstract

Mid and low-level bureaucrats are the mechanism through which institutional improvement or legal reforms are implemented. Delay and corruption are two most systematic problems found across countries and legal systems. There are incentives for bureaucrats to engage in deliberate or strategic delay: the higher the valuation of the user for the service they need, the more likely a side payment will be offered to the bureaucrat. This paper presents a mathematical model able to characterize the relationship between delay, side payments to bureaucrats, and efficiency, and which provides testable implications consistent with data analysis. Setting workload priorities may reduce corruption.

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PUBLIC SERVICES, CORRUPTION, BUREAUCRACY, LABOUR LAW, MEXICO, NORTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA, LATIN AMERICA, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ACCOUNTABILITY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

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http://hdl.handle.net/10625/53064

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IDRC Research Results / Résultats de recherches du CRDI
2010-2019 / Années 2010-2019
Research Results (SIG) / Résultats de recherches (CPT)