Regulation through the back door : understanding the implications of institutional transplant
Date
2011
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Abstract
Independent regulatory agencies have entered India through the back-door, little remarked upon and even less understood. Strongly promoted by international donor agencies, regulators have been viewed primarily as a mechanism to insulate decision making from politics. The paper focuses on the regulation of the electricity sector in India. It explores whether and how the manner of diffusion, and process of embedding regulatory agencies into national political economies can also shape the nature of the institutional outcome itself. As agents of depoliticization or as institutional sites for the re-articulation of political interests in locally specific ways, regulation and regulatory bodies vary across contexts.
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IDRC-Related Report
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Keywords
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, REGULATION, ELECTRICITY, GOVERNMENT REGULATION, PRIVATIZATION, CIVIL SOCIETY, POPULAR PARTICIPATION, INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, STATE INTERVENTION, INDIA, SOUTH ASIA