Understanding the Egyptian regulatory state : independent regulators in theory and practice
Date
2011
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Publisher
Aston Centre for Critical Infrastructure and Services (ACCIS), Aston University, Birmingham, GB
Abstract
This paper looks at the rise of the regulatory state in Egypt. It attempts to answer three questions: why the Egyptian government delegates its regulatory powers to Independent Regulators (IRs)? How these regulatory models were diffused in Egypt? And how IRs work in practice in Egypt? The regulatory governance literature, particularly in Europe, provides different theories that explain why and how such agencies were created. These theories are important but not sufficient to explain the same phenomenon in the context of the developing countries including Egypt wherein socio-economic, legal and political environments are different. Adopting an institutional framework of analysis, and based on a qualitative in-depth analysis of governmental documents and interviews with decisions-makers and senior regulatory member staff, the paper investigates the creation and diffusion of IRs in Egypt with special focus on the telecoms sector. The underlying assumption is that the differences at the contextual level between Egypt and the Western European countries in which the IR models have been originated may lead to different rationalization for the creation and diffusion of such a model in Egypt and the way it works in practice. The examination of the regulatory state in Egypt shows that the creation of the IRs in the telecommunications sector was very much instrumental. That means, it can be understood on functional and practical grounds rather than any other factors of democratic governance or political uncertainties. The findings also highlight the important role of coercive mechanisms in diffusing this regulatory model compared to the role that other voluntary mechanisms such as policy learning and policy transfer may play in this regard. Finally, the paper also shows that IRs can survive and work in divergent environments under authoritarian regimes.
Description
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Working Paper
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Keywords
TELECOM REGULATIONS, REGULATORY STATES, INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES, POLICY TRANSFER, INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM, TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY, REGULATIONS, GOVERNMENT POLICY, GOVERNANCE, AUTHORITARIANISM, REGULATIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS