Can co-management improve governance of a common-pool resource? : lessons from a framed field experiment in a marine protected area in the Colombian Caribbean
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Date
2008
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Latin American and Caribbean Environmental Economics Program (LACEEP), Turrialba, CR
Abstract
Complexities associated with the management of common pool resources (CPR) threaten
governance at some marine protected areas (MPA). In this paper, using economic experimental
games (EEG), we investigate the effects of both external regulation and the complementarities
between internal regulation and non-coercive authority intervention—what we call comanagement—
on fishermen’s extraction decisions. We perform EEG with fishermen inhabiting
the influence zone of an MPA in the Colombian Caribbean. The results show that comanagement
exhibits the best results, both in terms of resource sustainability and reduction in
extraction, highlighting the importance of strategies that recognize communities as key actors
in the decision-making process for the sustainable use and conservation of CPR in protected
areas.
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Working Paper
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Keywords
GOVERNANCE, COMMON POOL RESOURCES, CO-MANAGEMENT, EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMIC GAMES, FISHERIES, LATIN AMERICA