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**Aid for Education: The Political
Economy of International Cooperation
in Educational Development**

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AID FOR EDUCATION:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
IN EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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INTRODUCTION

Objectives of the Study

This study reviews a number of issues which are critical for the present and future role of education in international development assistance. This review is guided by a certain number of preoccupations which stem from observing the interaction between economic and political factors both in educational development policies in the Third World under conditions of increasingly severe resource constraints, and in the policy decisions of international, and especially bilateral, development assistance agencies. This study focuses primarily on this latter set of concerns, i.e., about the future of development assistance in the field of education. These concerns derive from some of the more skeptical assessments of the future of "official development assistance" (ODA) in general (OECD 1981a, 82; 1982, 61-66), but are exacerbated by what at least some observers see as a more specific skepticism about education in general, and of its role in the context of national development, in particular (Husen 1979; Weiler 1978). Many of these concerns are shared by the World Bank which, in its most recent Sector Paper on education, raises a number of questions about the present and likely future level of assistance for education as well as about the nature and the effect of many assistance programs in education (1980a, 73-77).

On the face of it, it thus seems as if a number of problems

compound each other: (a) resource and priority problems with regard to education at the level of national decision-making in a number of Third World countries; (b) uncertainties and concerns about the future of development assistance in general; and (c) questions about the relative place and importance of education within the total international development effort.

Obviously, the task of analyzing this entire set of problems would go considerably beyond the scope of even a particularly ambitious study, especially in view of the wide variety of conditions both across different parts of the Third World and across different agencies and arrangements of international development cooperation. Such doubts as there may exist about either the effectiveness of aid or about the developmental utility of education will vary considerably in nature and intensity as between, say, Sahelian Africa and the countries of the ASEAN group. What, in spite of this diversity, this study has attempted to do, however, is (a) to develop a first "inventory" of the kinds of problems and preoccupations which seem to have emerged in some parts or other of the international development assistance community, and (b) to derive from this inventory a more explicit set of questions which, in this author's view, require further probing and clarification if we want effectively to cope with some of the emerging problems of international assistance in the field of education.

The Information

Any analysis of the present and any assessment of the likely

future situation in educational assistance requires a certain amount of information on the patterns that have developed over the past ten or twenty years. It is here that the data situation regarding international development assistance in the field of education is particularly confusing. While a serious effort has been made in this study to review, validate, and augment information available in this area, a much more thorough and systematic effort would be necessary in order fully to reconstruct both the global picture of educational aid and its various distributional characteristics over the period 1960 through 1980, especially prior to 1973 when OECD began to show separate figures for education in its annual overview of ODA commitments.

Much of the difficulty in arriving at a valid data base for international assistance to education has to do with widely varying modes of classification and computation. Many times, the data provided through the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD differ substantially from those provided by individual national donor agencies. Thus, for example, the DAC data for the United States show that the share of education as a percentage of total bilateral assistance had more than doubled between 1975 and 1980, while a recent statement from the Foreign Assistance Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives claims that "AID's education budget has declined significantly as a percent of its total budget, from a level of 15.2 percent in fiscal year 1974 to the current level of 8 percent" (USAID

1981, 1). The explanation of these kinds of discrepancies lies in the adoption of different classification procedures which, in more recent years, had led to a number of training programs for development projects in other sectors being counted as part of the "education" category for DAC purposes (cf. Creative Associates 1981, 60-62 and passim). Similarly confusing differences occur where distinctions between "capital aid" (for purchase of equipment and material), "program aid", and "technical cooperation" are involved (as in the discrepancy between the data reported by the British Overseas Development Administration (1982, 27) and the DAC data in the 1981 review (OECD 1981a, 202-203)).

For comparative purposes across countries and over time, this paper has mostly relied on the OECD data, with due annotations to these data where other evidence provided additional or divergent information. As a basic reference, Table 1 has been compiled from the breakdown of ODA commitments by sector in the annual DAC reviews (for the latest such review, see OECD 1982).

Similar and, in many ways, even more complicated problems arise in talking about educational financing in countries of the Third World. In this paper, these data have only played a secondary role as a point of reference for describing certain long-term trends. Any more thorough analysis of patterns of educational expenditures over time and across countries would do well, however, to heed the very thoughtful set of methodological observations which are included in a recent study by Eicher and Orivel (1980, 6-8).

Summary of Findings

With all due allowance for the considerable diversity that characterizes the international development scene, a certain core of issues keeps coming up in the course of this review and appears to reflect a trend which I will argue is of critical importance to the future of international cooperation in education. By way of a brief summary at the outset, these trends have to do with the following issues:

- (a) Overall, and with notable exceptions, both the domestic financing of education in countries of the Third World and the contribution of international assistance to this financing appear to gravitate towards what is at best a "steady state" situation, where expenditures and aid are staying barely ahead of inflation, and where there seems little or no probability of any major increases in real terms for the foreseeable future;
- (b) This situation becomes even more serious by virtue of the fact that a number of important and politically very salient educational objectives have not yet been achieved in many countries of the Third World (notably in such respects as universal primary education, the improvement of educational quality, and a more equitable distribution of educational opportunities) and would require for their achievement substantial additional financing beyond the pattern of steady state which is likely to prevail;
- (c) Beyond questions of resource limitations, a number of political factors contribute to constraints which a number of national

assistance agencies seem to face as a result of trends in their own political environment and in terms of their relationship with countries in the Third World;

(d) While there are clear indications of widespread disillusionment with public education in a number of advanced Western countries, the evidence of a similar skepticism developing in countries of the Third World or in the international assistance community is less conclusive, but seems to warrant careful further observation;

(e) Against the background of these developments, the future of educational financing in developing countries, in general, and of international assistance to education, in particular, is likely to be characterized by:

- i. a higher level of conflict and contention as between different objectives and priorities over more limited increases in resources;
- ii. a reconsideration of some of the criteria and modalities for funding educational projects; and
- iii. a much higher salience of the political aspects of educational investment and international cooperation.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FINANCING FOR EDUCATION: THE PROSPECTS OF STEADY STATE

The principal contention in this section of the study is that,

to judge from recent trends and from an initial assessment of possibilities in the near future, the financing of education in many countries of the Third World as well as the bulk of international development assistance for education is in the process of gravitating towards a pattern of much more modest increases than in the past or, more likely, a "steady state" situation in terms of real growth. While this may be preoccupying enough in and of itself, the prospect of steady state creates a particularly problematic situation at a time when many developing countries still face a substantial agenda of policy objectives to which they are politically committed but which are only feasible with major additional financing beyond what is needed for maintaining the status quo.

Patterns and Prospects of Educational Financing in Developing Countries

In one of the more thorough and comprehensive recent studies of educational financing around the world, Eicher and Orivel have identified some of the overall trends in educational expenditures over the 1960s and 1970s (1980; cf. also Eicher 1982 for a summary of their findings). While, on a world-wide scale, the effort in public support for education (as expressed by the percentage share of educational expenditures in the gross national product) has increased considerably from 3.7 percent in 1960 to 5.7 percent in 1976, the rate at which these expenditures have increased from year to year has shown a rather significant slowdown (from an average of 10.9 percent increase per

year in the 1960 to 1965 period to a 3.3 percent increase per year from 1974 to 1976) (Eicher and Orivel 1980, 63). Across different regions or groups of countries in the world, however, this rate of increase from year to year has varied quite considerably. Using "degrees of elasticity" (i.e., increases in public expenditures on education divided by the rise in GNP) as a more reliable measure, the decline in the rate of increase is particularly pronounced (apart from advanced Western countries generally and North America, in particular) in Latin America and in non-OPEC Africa. By contrast, the Asian region and all OPEC countries show an upward trend in their rates of increase.

Table 2 reflects the fact that the slowdown in rates of increase was particularly precipitous during the "crisis" period of 1970 to 1974, during which developing countries as a whole had an increase in educational expenditure which was less than their rate of GNP growth, as reflected in an elasticity coefficient of .92. For the period 1974-76, the most recent period for which we have processed data available, there is a marked upswing in the rate of increase, notably for Africa and Asia (2.81 and 2.12, respectively), with exceptionally low rates registered for North America (-1.62) and Latin America (.60). Even for that period, however, if one leaves members of OPEC aside, the countries of the Third World as a whole showed an increase which was only slightly (1.35) beyond the (relatively modest) rate at which their GNP grew during the same time. In addition, it should be noted that the variation in public expenditure for education as a percentage of GNP, which was decreasing until 1974, seems to be

showing an increasing tendency again since 1976 (*ibid.*, 13, 16), suggesting that after a period of increasing similarity, countries are now moving further apart again in their respective financial efforts for education.

At this point, we can only speculate about developments since 1976. The raw data on educational expenditure compiled in Unesco's Statistical Yearbook (1981) carry us, for most countries, through 1978; the picture which emerges from these data is mixed, with roughly equal numbers of developing countries showing an increase, a decrease, and no change in educational expenditure as a percentage of GNP (see also Lewin et al. 1983, Appendix 1). Given the largely modest and decreasing rates of GNP growth -- or even the actual decline of GNP -- in developing countries in recent years, this picture does not seem to reflect an overall surge in the rate at which educational expenditures increase from year to year (note Eicher's point (1982, 59) that the growth rate of GNP best explains the growth rate of public expenditure for education). Furthermore, if the experience of the "slump" period of the international economy in the early 1970s is any indication, we might expect a similar, but much more depressing effect to result from the current and much more severe international crisis.

With all due caution, and recognizing the substantial amount of variation across countries, it thus seems reasonable to conclude that the most optimistic scenario for educational expenditure in the larger part of the Third World is one in which educational expenditure rises at or barely above the rate at which the economy, i.e., GNP,

grows. Given the increasingly precarious economic situation of many, especially non-OPEC, developing countries, as reflected in stagnation or even negative growth rates (see OECD 1982, 19, 27), such a situation would not allow for more than, at best, rather modest increases in financial resources for education in real terms and, at worst, for an actual decline in such resources.

This prospect for educational financing in countries of the Third World has a number of implications which may well be a cause of concern beyond just the anticipated level of increase or decrease in resources. Once again generalizing across a rather wide and varied range of situations in individual countries, it seems fair to observe that these rather discouraging financial prospects coincide with a situation in which:

(a) a number of major items on the educational policy agenda of many countries remain far from accomplished, notably in such areas as universal primary education (see Smyth 1982), the improvement of educational quality or, at least, instructional technology (in the broadest sense), providing greater equality of educational opportunity along rural-urban, social class, and regional dimensions, and introducing new and, presumably, more appropriate instructional and structural elements into the educational system (cf. Eicher 1982, 60-61);

(b) social demand for the expansion and improvement of educational services continues to be high in most countries, reflecting a continuing belief (borne out by a limited, but apparently sufficient number of cases) that education does provide an effective means for

social mobility and the improvement of one's life chances;

(c) existing educational systems have already expanded to a point where they tend to drive up, at a rate substantially higher than inflation, the recurrent cost of maintaining the educational status quo (as illustrated by the fact that, at least to judge from data for India, Kenya, and Nigeria, teacher salaries have risen in the last five to ten years at a substantially faster rate than the Consumer Price Index in these countries; cf. Coombs and Choudhury 1981, 48); and

(d) demographic pressure for more educational capacity at all levels is likely to continue to rise substantially, with school age populations projected to double (Asia) or even to triple (Africa, Latin America) over the period 1960-2000 (Unesco data quoted by Coombs and Choudhury 1981, 6).

The formidable task which many of the poorer developing countries face in politically as delicate and volatile an area as living up to the mandate of universal primary education is well exemplified by projections of the cost of accomplishing this particular objective in Africa. A study undertaken by the Educational Financing Division of Unesco (Smyth 1982) concludes that, for the twelve African countries where the "gross enrollment ratio in first level education" is below 60 percent (as of 1978), a financial effort of major and, by all accounts, unrealistic dimensions would be needed in order to achieve universal primary education by the year 2000 -- even on the assumption, which seems similarly unrealistic, of a 2.5 percent real growth rate in GNP per capita (*ibid.*, 14-16). In fact,

between 1960 and 1978 the twelve African countries in question had an average annual growth rate of their GNP per capita of just about 1 percent per year. Even on the assumption that this rate of growth could be maintained for the next twenty years, the projections (see Table 3) show that these countries will have to double, triple or in some cases even quadruple the percentage of their GNP which they would allocate to recurrent expenditure in primary education if universal primary education were to be achieved by the year 2000. In some instances, these projected financial needs for primary education even exceed the share of GNP that is presently expended for all levels of education (cf. Eicher and Orivel 1980, 14). The trouble with even these projections, however, is that they are highly unrealistic as far as the underlying assumptions about economic growth of even a modest proportion are concerned. Already, projections by the World Bank for the 1980s anticipate for all of Sub-Saharan Africa, except for the OPEC countries, a situation which ranges "from stagnation in per capita GDP to a 10 percent decline" (OECD 1982, 27).

The future is, of course, predictable only to a rather limited extent, and forecasting the probable share of education in a future national budget requires not only the analysis of all of the components of the budget, but also a sense of what the political priorities in a given country are likely to be at a future point. In other words: even though the (relatively high) share of educational expenditures in the overall pool of national resources has been fairly steady for most developing countries over the last one or two decades, shifts in national priorities either away from or towards education

may well affect the complexion of this relationship in years to come. We will have to return to this question of the political "weight" of education in a different context later on.

Aid to Education: Trends and Patterns in International Development Assistance

Within the total pool of resources which developing countries devote to financing their educational systems, external aid is on average a modest, but far from trivial factor: The World Bank estimates that 9 percent of the total education budget of the developing countries is covered by external aid (World Bank 1980a, 73); my own calculations, based on educational expenditure (Eicher and Orivel 1980) and concessional aid figures for 1976 (extrapolated from OECD 1977), put this rate somewhat lower, at about 6.4 percent of the total public expenditure for education in the developing countries of the world. Over time, this rate appears to have remained relatively stable, except that, for a while in the early 1970s, a relative decline in the share of aid from DAC countries seems to have been made up by the increased role of bilateral funds from OPEC countries, which has since about 1975 decreased again (World Bank 1980b, 140-141).

While this, in strictly quantitative terms, external assistance on average does not loom very large in the financing of education in the Third World, its importance is, under certain circumstances, a good deal greater than the mere averages suggest:

(a) Many, especially among the poorer countries, depend on external aid for the financing of educational systems to a much higher degree than the averages discussed above would suggest. In some African countries, for example, well over half of the education budget is derived from one form or another of external funding (for a vivid account of the problems resulting from this kind of situation, see Damiba 1980, 57-74);

(b) for countries where national currency is not freely convertible, foreign assistance in education as in other areas constitutes a source of foreign exchange valuable beyond its face amount; and

(c) since a considerable portion of international assistance in the field of education covers programs of technical assistance, educational aid makes available not only funds but also various kinds of expertise.

At the same time, however, the traditional argument that external assistance was particularly well-suited to stimulate new developments (through a "multiplier" effect) is rapidly losing weight as the capacity of many developing countries to assume the often considerable follow-up costs of such "multiplication" decreases.

Beyond the general observation that "the present level of aid for education is inadequate" (World Bank 1980a, 77), it is important to inquire into recent trends and patterns in international assistance to education in an attempt to project likely future developments. The data reflect a situation in which the degree of involvement of

developed countries in financially supporting education in the developing world has been remarkably stable over time in terms of the share of their overall ODA effort that has gone to educational purposes. While the published figures for the sector allocation of ODA commitments do not specifically single out education prior to 1973, developments since 1973 show that the share of education in the total bilateral commitment of the members of OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has ranged between 9 and 14 percent (see Table 4). Obviously, these averages conceal a tremendous amount of variation; in particular, this percentage is heavily influenced by the data for France which, over the past nine years, has devoted some 35 percent of its bilateral aid to educational programs; if France were left out of our computations in Table 4, the average share of educational aid as a percentage of bilateral ODA for all other DAC countries would drop to an average percentage of 5.9 for the period 1975 through 1979.

In order to capture the overall pattern of assistance to education from DAC member countries, I have summarized the data since 1973 in Table 1. It will be noted that the pattern varies considerably from one donor country to another; overall, however, the trend is for the educational share of the overall bilateral aid package to remain relatively constant; a few trends emerge, but variations over time in the percentage of educational aid would seem largely to be accounted for by lags in the cycles of negotiation, commitment, and disbursement of aid.

By and large, the overall share of educational aid in the

total bilateral aid package has thus remained relatively constant over time. We need, therefore, to return to the question of the size of that overall package of aid in an attempt to gauge the past and likely future role of the international assistance component in helping the development of education in the countries of the Third World.

As little as a year ago, the annual DAC review of international assistance spoke of "a reasonably fair achievement" of official development assistance over the decade of the 1970s (OECD 1981a, 81); at that time, the anticipated growth of assistance in the foreseeable future was qualified as "modest" and as hovering slightly above the expected modest growth in donor country GNP. Already the expectation was, in other words, one of substantial slowdown in the growth of aid.

Since then, the situation has deteriorated substantially under the impact of economic and political developments, notably inflationary recession in the OECD countries and the impact of a new administration in the United States. The 1982 review of the DAC admits that, while 1980 had been "a disappointing year for the cause of development cooperation", 1981 "was worse" (1982, 13). Here again, of course, the composite projections conceal more than they reveal with widely varying patterns of projected development in aid for different donor countries, ranging from indications and predictions of substantial increases for countries like France, Canada, West Germany and Japan, to decline in real terms for aid from the United States, Belgium, and the United Kingdom (OECD 1981a, 82-83, 91-108). While the overall

volume of ODA from OECD countries had already stagnated in real terms since 1978, it actually decreased even in nominal terms in 1981, from 27.3 to 25.6 billion dollars, in the process bringing the share of ODA as a percentage of donor country GNP back to .35, where it had been hovering since 1978, except for a brief surge to .38 in 1980 (OECD 1982, 199). This, incidentally, has to be seen in the context of a longer-term process of decline which, in 1960, had started at .51 percent of donor GNP (World Bank 1980b, 140-141).

In addition to these rather dim prospects for the growth of overall aid from Western donor countries (with no indication that any slack is likely to be made up by either OPEC or Eastern European countries), there are also clear indications that a number of national donors are increasingly concerned "to insure that their aid has beneficial effects on exports and domestic employment" (OECD 1981a, 82). Altogether, therefore, "it will be increasingly difficult for aid donors to respond to urgent new needs and priorities, including greater priorities for least developed and other poorer countries, growing needs and opportunities in the areas of food and energy production. Slow overall aid growth will also make it more difficult to maintain momentum in the expansion of multilateral programs" (ibid.).

Indeed, the anticipated slowdown in the growth rate of official development assistance is likely to affect the balance between multilateral and bilateral assistance quite considerably. After the concessional contributions by DAC members to multilateral

aid institutions and agencies had risen much faster than their total official development assistance all through the 1970s, OECD now records "a widespread impression, aggravated by questions about the multilateral agencies raised by the new United States administration and in the United States Congress, that a painful crunch is coming wherein an unsustainable growth in multilateral programs will have to be reconciled, not only with lower total ODA growth but with the determination of donors to reinforce their bilateral efforts" (OECD 1981a, 19). A closer look at the data shows that contributions by DAC countries to the multilateral agencies have already begun to slow down, not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of donors with very high previous records of multilateral contributions -- such as Sweden (down from 36 percent of total ODA in 1976/77 to 30.1 in 1980/81), Netherlands (23 percent to 17 percent), Canada (46.5 to 38 percent), West Germany (25 to 19 percent), and the United Kingdom (36 to 19.5 percent) (OECD 1982, 73). It may be open to some speculation whether these shifts in the direction of bilateral aid may or may not be to the advantage of education and other parts of the "social sector"; traditionally, the social sector has received a considerably higher share of bilateral assistance (28.4 percent in 1978/79) than of the concessional resources allocated by international financial institutions (19.4 percent) which have, in their turn, been more favorably disposed towards assistance in such fields as agriculture (OECD 1981a, 134).

Against this background of an overall development in ODA that has in recent years tended to level off and, most recently, to decline

even in nominal terms, it becomes understandable why the annual increase in bilateral ODA for education comes to no more than an average of 12.8 percent (in nominal terms) over the period 1975 through 1981 (see Table 4). If one takes into account inflationary pressures over this same period of time, this level of growth is indeed unlikely to have stayed ahead of inflation, confirming what the World Bank already observed for the period 1970 to 1975 (World Bank 1980a, 74). If one adds to that the fact that assistance from other bilateral donors has either remained relatively constant (Eastern Europe and USSR) or decreased (OPEC), and that multilateral sources of assistance are barely keeping their level of development funding constant (OECD 1982, 52-53), it becomes obvious that international assistance for the field of education is in no position to even begin to pick up the slack created by the economic and fiscal problems of developing countries themselves.

There is, of course, a much greater degree of complexity on this issue once one leaves the relatively simple level of aggregate indicators, and one would have to become much more fully involved in disentangling this complexity in order to tell the full story of the patterns in development assistance in general, and in assistance for education, in particular. The overall pattern, however, is stark and clear enough: Our assessment and projection for overall aid sees at best a level of growth that might be capable of sustaining a "steady state" in assistance funding, i.e., of keeping up with inflation. This prospect seems somewhat more likely for bilateral than for multilateral aid, at least on the concessional side. Within this

general context, there is no reason to assume that education is going to do any better (or, for that matter, any worse) than any other sector of aid activity. This situation will substantially reduce donor agencies' and recipient governments' degrees of freedom in view of the relatively heavier burden of existing commitments on current budgets. As for aid in general, both bilateral and multilateral assistance is heavily affected by the further course of the development assistance policy of the United States, where neither recent trends nor current political philosophy appear to provide overly encouraging indicators.

If we start putting the pieces of this picture together, the assumption of a "steady state" situation with regard to the financing of educational development in the Third World appears to be, if anything, on the optimistic side. The best estimate we can make at this point with regard to available financing for educational development in the Third World from both national sources and from international assistance seems to fall within a range where keeping up with inflation is about the most we can expect, and where we may face some more or less dramatic decrease in real terms. It is quite possible, in other words, that educational financing in the Third World faces a double jeopardy in times of international economic crisis. As we have seen, public funding for education tends to go down in periods of depression (as a percentage of an already shrinking GNP); the figures on aid seem to show a similar pattern in terms of ODA as a percentage of shrinking donor country GNP.

At the same time, both recent trends and a realistic

appreciation of the continuing political salience of social demand for education (cf. Carnoy et al. 1983) suggest that most countries in the Third World will continue to devote substantial and increasing shares of their national resources to education. However, this prediction is moderated by a slowing down or even stagnation of the relative rate of increase in budgetary resources for education, due (a) to fiercer competition for scarcer resources from other sectors and, here and there, to emerging doubts about the effectiveness and utility of educational investments, and (b) to the shrinking of the size (or the substantial decline of increase in the size) of the total pool of available national resources as a result of the deteriorating economic and fiscal situation of many Third World countries.

Assessing the effects of a situation of steady state is, of course, radically different in the context of a developing country from what it is in the context of educational financing in North America and Western Europe. While the task of building and consolidating viable and (by whatever standards) reasonably effective systems of national education at all levels has by and large been completed in the advanced industrial societies of the West (so much so that demographic declines create overcapacity), major development objectives, sometimes of the most basic kind, remain unaccomplished in the educational systems of many developing countries. Here, once again, we have to be cognizant of the tremendous variation within the Third World; for many African and a number of Asian countries, universal primary education of any kind is far from achieved and, against the background of our analysis, associated with virtually

prohibitive financial burdens. For other countries in all of the regions of the Third World, social and political pressure is mounting for broadening the often extremely narrow channels of transition from primary to post-primary education, and for providing more equitable access to educational opportunities at all levels of the educational system. Furthermore, in virtually all countries, and on a variety of grounds, there is substantial concern with qualitative aspects of the educational system, ranging all the way from the availability and quality of instructional material to the initial and continuing qualification of the teaching staff. It may well be that these qualitative concerns will end up taking second place to the overriding political pressure for quantitative expansion at either the primary or the post-primary level, but they are there nonetheless, and their relative position on the political agenda in different countries bears watching.

Adequately coping with these tasks requires major financial resources considerably beyond the amounts which even our most optimistic projections of increase in educational financing from either domestic or external sources are likely to yield. The cost of maintaining existing educational systems is already a major burden on the fiscal capacities of many developing countries, partly as a result of the considerable follow-up cost associated with earlier, externally financed development projects, and partly as a result of the fact that the high share of personnel cost in total educational cost tends to make education expenditures rise a good deal faster than the average rate of inflation.

THE POLITICS OF AID

The assessment of educational financing in developing countries and of the present and likely future resource situation of international development assistance to education forms an important element in the analysis of the political economy of international development cooperation; it does not, however, tell the whole story. Behind the statistical representation of resource flows and percentages lies a field of political contention and decision which, while less easily quantifiable, plays a key role in determining the patterns of governmental behavior which are ultimately reflected in the statistics and which one needs to understand as one looks to the future of international cooperation in the development of education.

Each aid agency, someone once said, "marches to two different sets of drums": one set which is played in the agency's own domestic political environment, and another one which is played by the political leadership of the "recipient" country with which aid agreements are concluded. There is, of course, a good deal more noise in this area than just two sets of drums: other bilateral donors, international organizations inside and outside the UN system, donor conglomerates such as the European Development Fund (EDF), and increasingly the World Bank all contribute the sound and rhythm of their own drums to the relationship between the assisting and the assisted country.

This multitude of influences notwithstanding, however, it seems useful to pursue our attempts to "map" the political scenario of development assistance in the field of education by identifying the kinds of considerations and constraints which the agencies themselves, the political leadership in the donor country, and the political leadership in the "recipient" country bring to the task of working out assistance arrangements for educational development. The assertions and theses which will be presented, in rather brief form, in this section are based on a good deal of observation of the international assistance scene and on a careful perusal of its documented record. Nonetheless, they are presented here as a rather tentative set of impressions on which criticism is invited.

While development policy has always been an integral part of the donor country's political fabric, there are indications that the decision processes in aid policy in a number of Western countries have come increasingly under the influence of a new and more specific set of political considerations. These currents affect different countries in different ways, but the following seem to stand out as being particularly noteworthy:

(a) The general trend towards more conservative or middle-of-the-road political configurations in a number of Western countries (the U.S., West Germany, Britain) has brought with it (or better perhaps reflected) a general decline in political support for redistributive policies at the national as well as at the international level. While this loss of political momentum for

redistributive policies is particularly pronounced in the United States, the political justification of foreign assistance on the grounds of distributive justice (as distinct from more pragmatic rationalizations) seems in general to carry less political weight than it used to.

(b) On the other side of what may well be the same coin, there is an obvious tendency on the part of many donor countries towards a more explicit and effective utilization of their foreign assistance for their own foreign policy purposes and objectives as well as their economic self-interest. Here again, the United States has to be placed at one end of the continuum, given the present administration's tendency to view questions of development assistance largely under the auspices of the East-West conflict, or rather its particular interpretation of it, its emphasis on private sector involvement, and its more long-standing propensity for tying an exceptionally large proportion of its aid to domestic procurement (OECD 1982, 226-227). However, under the pressure of deteriorating domestic economic conditions, it seems that a number of other donor countries (e.g., West Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada) also show a greater inclination to judge development assistance decisions more explicitly from the point of view of generating domestic employment opportunities and enhancing foreign trade. The particular implications of these trends for aid to education are somewhat ambiguous. On the whole, however, they would tend towards a greater role of defense-oriented and/or productivity-oriented kinds of aid rather than towards enhanced attention to assistance in the social sector.

(c) A rather general tendency in the policy process of most

advanced Western countries seems to be a move towards greater and much more pervasive "accountability" in the use of public resources. This is probably the result of both greater scarcity of resources at a time of increasing claims on the state and of an increasing concern on the part of governments over their credibility and legitimacy in the use and management of public resources. This trend has particular implications for the area of development assistance where there is now much greater emphasis on demonstrating the utility and "assessability" of assistance projects and on monitoring as well as questioning the "performance" of recipient countries in the management of both their own economies and assistance funds ("policy conditioning" in recent DAC jargon; cf. OECD 1981a, 23-24). For education, which of all social sectors probably has the greatest inherent difficulty of proving its "utility" or "effectiveness", this trend has already become, and is likely to become even more, consequential. Where accountability in a relatively narrow and technical sense becomes a key element in the assessment of development assistance proposals, education (burdened as it is anyway with a legacy of inflated claims as to its instrumental effectiveness) has a particularly hard time competing with such areas as agricultural production, public health, or infrastructure development.

(d) While there is still widespread popular and official support for the United Nations system throughout the Western world, a considerable erosion of this support has taken place in several countries over the recent past. Some countries and some agencies of the UN system have been involved in this erosion more than others (as in the disputes between the United States and both Unesco and the

ILO), but the phenomenon seems to have become more widespread in recent years. This is not only due to a certain degree of political alienation of several Western countries over such issues as the new international information order or the question of Israel, but also to the realization that the rather considerable increases in the resource needs of the UN system are more and more difficult to reconcile with the industrialized world's own perceptions of its ability to meet these needs while at the same time maintaining a viable resource base for each country's own bilateral assistance efforts (cf. OECD 1981a, 138, where "a recent further hardening of donor attitudes" towards the funding of UN activities is described).

(e) Domestic constituencies have always played a certain role in determining the shape and direction of official development assistance. For a number of reasons, the role of these constituencies may well be in the process of becoming more important in a number of donor countries. In some instances, this has to do with domestic economic problems such as unemployment, underutilization of productive capacities, etc. In a number of countries, notably the United States and the United Kingdom, there also seems to be considerable pressure from institutions of higher education which, in the absence of an adequate flow of domestic students, have become increasingly keen on recruiting larger numbers of foreign students under the auspices of development assistance programs. Related to this is a more directly political perspective which sees the development and consolidation of domestic constituencies as an important task for the development assistance establishment in an attempt to counter or anticipate political challenges to development assistance in times of greater

resource constraints.

(f) In some of my other work (e.g., Weiler 1982) and under the influence of such perceptive observers of the international scene as Husen (1979; 1982) and Eicher (1982), I had begun to become impressed with the degree to which in recent years a number of advanced industrialized countries (notably the United States and West Germany, but others as well) had seen a substantial erosion of public confidence in their educational systems. I had therefore speculated that some "spillover" from this "crisis" may have also affected the attitudes of these countries' aid agencies towards education in the context of international development assistance. Without a good deal of further inquiry, however, I find it impossible at this point to sustain that speculation, even though I have encountered instances where a certain amount of disillusionment with education seemed to play a role in declining enthusiasm for education as a priority in development aid. It does seem, however, that the exasperation reflected in the 1971 DAC review ("there is so much wrong with education that it is hard to know where to start", OECD 1971, 16) is not universally shared in the international assistance community.

An even more difficult question is, of course, to ascertain with any validity the extent of skepticism about education among masses and/or elites in the Third World. Eicher (1982, 60) speaks of a "reduction in the priority accorded to education" in both developed and developing countries, and there is a widespread impression that, in a more general sense, political power is moving away from rather than towards ministries of education. Indeed, a plausible case could

be made for why politicians in Third World countries, if they have not yet started turning their back on education, will soon begin to do so -- in frustration over the combined effects of expansion creating demands for more expansion, mounting public debts for something as precarious as education, and the political unrest and commotion that tends to originate more and more in and around educational institutions. At the same time, it could be argued that the provision of more educational services to a population claiming tangible social improvements may still be one of the more economical and -- given the popular esteem in which education is held -- effective means of legitimizing political regimes which find the solution of other social problems such as unemployment or massive poverty totally or largely beyond their reach.

ISSUES AND CONCERNS

As a way of summarizing and interpreting some of the observations made in this study, I would like to focus in this last section on a few major themes which would seem to play a particularly important role in any attempt to project the present situation into the foreseeable future.

Resources: Needs and Supply

Our review of the financing of education in the Third World

and of the present and likely future development of international assistance to education has projected a scenario in which public expenditures for education are likely to remain barely, if at all, ahead of inflation, and probably decreasingly so. The vast majority of these resources will be consumed by the cost of sustaining existing educational systems and to cover cost increases, especially in the category of personnel expenses, which are likely to rise faster than inflation. To the extent that this prediction is correct, only an extremely limited amount of resources will remain available to satisfy at least three major needs in the educational systems of Third World countries: (a) the further quantitative expansion at different levels, notably primary and secondary; (b) an effort to enhance the quality of the educational process through such measures as teacher training and the provision of appropriate instructional materials; and (c) facilitating access to educational opportunities for certain sub-populations (in underprivileged regions or social groups) in the interest of greater equity. Given the limited and possibly decreasing nature of resources available for these tasks, there is likely to be substantial competition, both between and within these objectives; this competition is likely to emerge around the following issues:

- (a) Conflicts between quantitative expansion and qualitative improvement (with quantitative expansion likely to have more political clout);
- (b) Conflicts, especially where there is not yet universal primary education, as in large parts of Africa, between the expansion of

primary and that of post-primary education -- with more privileged and influential social strata seeking the latter in the interest of their childrens' advancement beyond primary school;

(c) More intense dispute (and demands for better evidence) on the importance of cost-relevant factors in educational quality (e.g., class size, length of school attendance, different forms of teacher training, etc.); and

(d) more searching reviews of critical cost factors (e.g., teacher salaries) with a view toward alternative arrangements (volunteers, part-time staff, etc.).

Aid agencies are already involved in some of these controversies, and are likely to be more involved in them as the overall resource situation in education becomes tighter at both ends of the aid relationship.

As far as the supply of financial resources for education is concerned, it is rather unlikely that, a few exceptions in some rapid-growth, newly industrialized countries notwithstanding, national budgets in the Third World will yield notable increases in real terms over what is presently available for educational financing. It seems at present at least as unlikely that a major new resource pool will become available from within the system of concessional international development assistance -- with the possible exception of the World Bank, although the present situation of IDA funding would not seem to augur too well for such a prospect on the concessional side. Apart from these two options, possibilities for improving or economizing on the supply of financial resources for education are limited; among the

possibilities most actively explored and discussed by both international agencies and developing country governments are the following:

- (a) The increasing use of volunteers and part-time instructional staff for educational programs;
 - (b) measures to reduce overhead and to increase the internal efficiency of the educational system (see Stromquist 1982);
 - (c) schemes to increase or introduce contributions to the cost, especially of secondary and post-secondary education, by its beneficiaries, their families, or communities (see Smyth 1982, 8); and
 - (d) increasing the participation of local communities in the provision of construction and other services for educational programs.
- While some of these measures are being (or could be) utilized successfully, their overall impact upon the resource situation in education is likely to be, for practical and/or political reasons, rather modest.

In terms of the role of international assistance for education, the combined effect of resource constraint in the Third World and in the international assistance community as well as the preempting effect of existing commitments is likely to impose even more difficult choices upon both sides of the aid relationship in seeking and agreeing upon priority areas for cooperation and support. The considerations which are likely to loom large in these choices (at least on the part of the assistance agencies) include the following:

- (a) An increased attention to the maintenance and, if possible,

improvement of programs started in earlier aid cycles, as compared to the initiation of major new projects;

(b) a particularly careful scrutiny of projects involving major capital investment and leading to substantial and often unpredictable or underestimated follow-up recurrent costs;

(c) greater care in the initiation of "multiplier" programs where funding of the multiplication process is not assured;

(d) stressing the relative advantage of involving assistance agencies in "campaign" type programs (of the literacy campaign model) which would have a limited time, objective, and cost and would not be left open-ended as an invitation to constantly increasing recurrent costs; and

(e) a greater "regionalization" of development efforts in education (as elsewhere) of the kind discussed, with special reference to Africa, by both OECD (1981a, 41-50) and the World Bank (1981). In general, the regionalization of international development assistance is argued on the grounds of better adjustment to regional needs and more effective coordination among different sources of assistance. For the field of education, especially in higher education, regional or sub-regional strategies could result in considerable efficiencies as well as in enhanced opportunities for the exchange of ideas, experiences and practices across national frontiers.

Coming to Terms with the "Age of Skepticism"

Recent years have seen a veritable wave of statements claiming

increased "skepticism" about, or even a major "crisis" of, education (Husen 1979), including some by this author (Weiler 1978; 1982). While a good deal of this writing may well be either exaggerated or applicable only to a limited number and kind of societies, it seems prudent to take the phenomenon seriously, at least to the extent of trying to identify some of its major aspects. For purposes of this study and the kind of discussion it hopes to generate, three points seem to be particularly relevant.

The role of education in development: Skepticism as realism

From the heights of belief in education as a panacea for development -- the "omni-capable school" -- in the early 1960s, thinking about education in both international organizations and national governments has undergone a steady process of adjustment which I have described elsewhere as a transition from "the age of innocence to the age of skepticism" (Weiler 1978). The process of arriving at a more realistic and, thus, more modest assessment of how much difference education in and of itself can make in bringing about significant changes in the social, economic, and political fabric of developing as well as advanced societies now seems to have run its course. Even though there is evidence that more education is associated with economic advancement at both the individual and the collective level (see Carnoy et al. 1982), what used to be rather high expectations about the strength and durability of that relationship have been scaled down to much more modest proportions. In this sense, skepticism about education has been a basically healthy force, moving

agencies and governments towards a more realistic perception of what education can and cannot achieve in the overall development process, including a fuller realization of the contingent nature of even those effects which education has been shown to have.

Skepticism and the crisis of confidence in education

The second variant of skepticism which has affected education is derived from observable trends in a number of advanced industrialized countries where public confidence in education appears to have declined consistently and considerably over the past ten years or so (for an analysis of data on the United States, see Weiler 1982). There is some debate on the nature, extent, and causes of this rather striking phenomenon, and some evidence to suggest that the decline of confidence in education is in large part a reflection of a much more widespread loss of confidence in the public authority of the state and the institutions it sponsors.

There is as yet little evidence that a similar process of declining confidence in education is occurring in the countries of the Third World. On the contrary, it seems that social demand for education continues to be rising, fostered by the experience that, at least for some of the people some of the time, education does provide the kind of social advancement which people around the world have come to associate with education. Given the economic situation and prospects for many countries in the Third World, however, these

rewards are bound to be finite and quite possibly limited to an ever decreasing percentage of those who have access to formal education. If this global projection should turn out to be correct in the long run, it is quite conceivable that a point will be reached where frustration is likely to set in on a large scale and erode the kind of public prestige which education still enjoys in most parts of the Third World. Public attitudes towards education, in other words, deserve careful further attention.

Aid agencies and education: Skepticism or exasperation?

There is a third variant of "skepticism" with regard to education which is occasionally found in development assistance agencies, though mostly outside the ranks of those who are professionally involved in education programs. With all due care not to overgeneralize, it appears that this kind of skepticism tends to arise more often with regard to education than to most other fields of development cooperation. This may be so for a number of reasons:

1. Of all the sectors of development cooperation, education is usually the most susceptible to charges of interventionism, dependence, cultural domination, etc.; agency staff consider it a particularly annoying obligation to have to defend educational aid against charges of this kind;

- ii. education, by its very nature, has proven particularly hard to fit to the standards and criteria of accountability; it tends to be a rather difficult area for which to show "results", especially when one goes beyond the narrow and more questionable indices of

cognitive achievement as measures of educational "success"; by comparison, results are much more easily to demonstrate where the application of fertilizers in agriculture or the use of inoculations in public health are concerned; and

iii. notable exceptions notwithstanding, education projects tend to be particularly difficult to administer, implement, complete, and assess.

However widely this kind of organizational exasperation with education projects may be spread, it is important to distinguish it clearly from genuine doubts about the benefits and effectiveness of educational programs in developing countries. It is quite possible that, at least in some agencies, "skepticism" about education and development is nothing more than thinly disguised frustration over the kinds of complications and difficulties which, in as complex and delicate a field as education, are only normal.

Education Between Utility and Autonomy

Elsewhere in this report, I have described what I see as considerable pressure towards greater accountability in development assistance in general, and in educational assistance, in particular. For the general thinking about education in the international assistance community, this has meant even more of an emphasis on demonstrating the utility of educational projects in terms of measurable or otherwise demonstrable effects, preferably on

developments and improvements in other sectors such as agriculture, health, etc. It is a striking sign of this trend that the interesting, but rather limited findings on the effects of education in terms of farmers' productivity and mothers' child care are given such prominence in just about every World Bank publication having to do with education over the last several years (e.g., World Bank 1980b, 48-50).

While all of this is understandable enough against a background of diminishing resources and more careful scrutiny of public expenditures, it is in an important way highly unfortunate that this massive drive towards reaffirming the instrumental utility of education coincides with the growing recognition (or rediscovery) that education is a valuable process in its own right and does not have to derive its raison d'être necessarily or entirely from its demonstrated utility for the achievement of other social and economic purposes. The claim that there is great dignity, importance, and value in education in its own right is fragile enough, susceptible as it is to being crushed between, on the one hand, the overwhelming pressures for accountability and, on the other hand, the (understandable) suspicion that this claim is just another ploy to distract attention from the frustrations among the increasing number of those who find their hopes for employment or other "rewards" at the end of their educational labors unfulfilled.

All of these hazards notwithstanding, it is nonetheless true that thinking of education not just as a "tool" to achieve better

health or more productivity, but also as a source of human enrichment, emancipation, communicative ability, critical world view, and political sophistication, opens up a wide range of new and important perspectives for filling what more and more people perceive as a "conceptual void" in education. In that sense, there is a profoundly liberating quality about education regardless of its immediate economic utility. Education may not, and in and of itself will not, serve as a very powerful lever to overcome poverty, inequality, or oppression. But education may very well, if given a chance, help make people more cognizant of why there is poverty, inequality, and oppression, and thus help them take an important first step towards getting to the real causes of their problems.

Educational Assistance and Regime Legitimacy

One of the indisputable accomplishments of overcoming "the age of innocence" was the realization that educational development, educational financing, and educational assistance are an intensely political matter, reaching right into the core of the state's value system, legitimacy and, indeed, survival. To recognize that development assistance in education as in other areas is an important and delicate part of the political fabric between donor and recipient country is only telling part of the story, even though it is important to note that that fabric faces increasing pressure from the divergence of political and programmatic agendas as between aid agencies and developing country governments. This divergence of agendas has a

substantive side (as in the emphasis on different policy objectives, e.g., between equity and productivity), and a procedural side, which has to do with "acceptable" degrees of intervention, performance assessment, assistance prerequisites, etc. -- the "policy conditioning" part.

There is, however, an even more critical element to the political nature of development assistance, and this applies particularly to education. Governing elites in developing countries, lacking in many cases adequate means to satisfy popular demands for social betterment in more material or tangible ways, increasingly see their ability to satisfy popular demand for education as a necessary (though not always sufficient) condition for the political survival of their regime. If this notion of educational expansion and improvement as a surrogate source of gratifying social demand proves even partially correct, then educational aid assumes an important new and possibly quite controversial dimension: it becomes a form of indirect, but potentially rather effective assistance for the stability and survival of existing political authority in situations where, without foreign assistance, the country's own resources would not be sufficient to allow the government to satisfy popular demand for better and more education even at a relatively modest level.

If this is a realistic perspective (see Carnoy et al. 1982 for some evidence that it may well be), and if education and educational expansion do indeed have the capacity for what I have called elsewhere "compensatory legitimation" (Weiler 1981), then educational

assistance, perhaps even at a dramatically increased level, may become a political strategy that might rank rather high on the foreign policy agenda of those of the developed donor countries who have, for whatever reasons, a vested interest in seeing the political status quo in the countries of the Third World maintained.

Perhaps this perspective on aid, and especially educational aid, as a collaborative instrument of compensatory legitimization may also help to lay to rest the last vestiges of a particularly resilient myth about international development assistance: The myth that aid is an instrument, however imperfect, of redistribution on an international scale. For some time now, the myth has continued to lose its credibility, and understandably so: At a grand total, military aid included, of one third of one percent of an immensely rich and, even in times of "crisis", quite comfortable national product, it really becomes enormously difficult to speak of the rich countries' development assistance in terms of "redistribution".

This, of course, has been known for some time, but there has been a tendency to exempt aid in the field of education from this general verdict, and to see it as something apart from the political strategies that have tended to pervade and dictate other realms of foreign aid. If, however, our contention about the role of education and educational aid as an instrument of compensatory legitimization is correct, then educational assistance may well be contributing not to any genuine redistribution, but to maintaining a status quo that rather stands in the way of both national and international

redistribution.

The legitimacy of the state in contemporary society is a rather precarious matter indeed, even where, as in the advanced industrialized societies of the West, resource constraints are a relatively marginal matter, austerity rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding. Where genuine scarcity in public resources becomes an almost structural problem, as in many developing countries, this challenge to the legitimacy of political authority is liable to turn into a consuming preoccupation for the holders of power. Little wonder, then, that the search for new and remedial sources of legitimacy leads to the one item of public consumption that continues to enjoy almost indestructible appreciation in the eyes of a keenly and understandably mobility-conscious public. There is likely to be good political instinct behind the notion that investments in education, whatever their economic returns may or may not end up being under conditions of dependent economies, make eminently good sense from the point of view of shoring up the particularly fragile base of the state's legitimacy at the periphery of the international system. Redistribution, however, is a very different matter.

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Table 1: Bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) for Education by OECD/DAC countries, 1973-1981

Country	Bilateral ODA for Education (Yearly average, in US\$ million)			Total Bilateral ODA (Yearly average, in US\$ million)			Educational assistance as percentage of total bilateral ODA (Yearly average)		
	1973-76	1977-80	1981	1973-76	1977-80	1981	1973-76	1977-80	1981
Australia	35.7	20.1	43.7	355.7	471.7	590	10.0	4.3	7.4
Austria	1.2	17.9	19.0	31.5	124.7	265	4.0	14.4	7.2
Belgium	3.5	14.4	17.6	218.5	364.5	373	1.6	4.0	4.7
Canada	50.1	22.8	50.1	660.5	811.5	1,011	7.6	2.8	5.0
Denmark	6.7	13.0	13.4	114.2	274.5	225	5.9	4.7	6.0
Finland ^{1/}	1.7	2.1	2.0	33.0	63.7	111	5.1	3.3	1.8
France ^{2/}	689.7	1,150.6	1,146.8	2,062.0	3,059.3	4,429	33.5	37.6	25.9
Germany (FRG)	210.5	427.4	486.8	1,562.2	3,187.7	3,467	13.5	13.4	13.5
Italy ^{3/}		15.4	26.2		85.5	443		18.0	5.9
Japan	17.5	63.3	90.8	1,243.7	2,517.5	3,437	1.4	2.5	2.6
Netherlands	58.3	119.6	133.1	503.0	1,275.5	1,066	11.6	9.4	12.5
New Zealand	4.6	7.9	8.0	43.5	47.0	52	10.6	16.9	15.4
Norway	10.1	11.6	5.3	105.2	218.7	255	9.6	5.3	2.1
Sweden	36.3	53.4	63.7	362.0	622.0	615	10.0	8.6	10.4
Switzerland	3.4	9.5	23.4	62.0	128.0	253	5.6	7.4	9.2
United Kingdom	44.2	149.9	187.9	749.2	1,411.2	999	5.9	10.6	18.8
United States ^{4/}	84.0	185.1	277.9	4,645.5	4,900.0	5,136	1.8	3.8	5.4
Total DAC countries ^{5/}							10.1	11.6	11.4

Source: Compiled from annual reviews of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (OECD 1974 through OECD 1982)

Notes: ^{1/} no data for 1973; ^{2/} no data for 1980; ^{3/} no data for 1973, 1974, 1976;
^{4/} no data for 1973 and 1974; ^{5/} based on data for 1975 through 1979 only (see Table 4)

Table 2: Elasticity of Expenditure on Education in Relation to GNP
Between 1960 and 1976

Regions	Period			
	1960-65	1965-70	1970-74	1974-76
Developed countries	2.06	1.33	1.41	1.28
Developing countries	2.16	1.66	0.92	2.45
Developing countries (excluding OPEC Members)			0.97	1.35
Africa	2.30	1.60	1.49	2.81
Africa (excluding OPEC Members)			1.50	-1.50
African Member countries of OPEC			1.49	1.79
Northern America	2.45	2.26	0.87	-1.62
Latin America	2.57	1.11	1.22	0.60
Asia	1.45	1.14	1.34	2.12
Asia (excluding Japan and OPEC Members)			0.55	3.2
Asian Member countries of OPEC			0.78	2.90
Europe (including U.S.S.R.)	2.06	0.93	1.63	2.11
European countries with centrally planned economies			1.51	0.84
Oceania	1.73	1.92	2.72	1.20
WORLD	2.1	1.36	1.27	1.38

Source: Eicher and Orivel 1980, 38

Table 3: Percentages of GNP which Need to be Allocated to Recurrent Expenditure on Primary Education in the Year 2000 in Order to Achieve Universal Primary Education by that Date, Under Two Alternative Growth Rates for GNP per Capita, in Selected African Countries

Country	Per Cent of GNP Allocated in 1978 to Recurrent Expenditure on:		Per Cent of GNP Needed for Universal Primary Education in the Year 2000 Under Two Alternative Growth Rates for GNP per Capita		Mean Annual Growth Rate of GNP per capita 1960-1978
	Primary Education	All Levels of Education	Growth Rate of 1.0 Per Cent	Growth Rate of 2.5 Per Cent	
Malawi	1.2	2.9	1.8	1.3	2.9
Liberia	0.4	2.0	1.5	1.1	2.0
Benin	1.8	4.2	2.8	2.0	.4
Somalia	1.2	2.2	1.9	1.4	- .5
Senegal	2.0	5.1	3.8	2.7	- .4
Sierra Leone	0.9	3.1	1.9	1.4	.5
Guinea	1.2	4.1	2.8	2.0	.6
Mali	2.1	4.8	6.0	4.4	1.0
Mauritania	1.6	4.3	4.6	3.3	3.6
Niger	1.5	2.9	5.4	3.9	-1.4
Burundi	1.2	2.6	4.6	3.3	2.2
Upper Volta	1.1	3.4	5.5	3.9	1.3

Source: For columns 1-4, Smyth 1982, 15; for column 5, World Bank 1980b, 110-111

Table 4: Bilateral ODA to Education by all OECD/DAC countries, 1975-1981

Year	Bilateral ODA for education (in US\$ million)	Total Bilateral ODA (in US\$ million)	Educational Assistance as Percentage of total Bilateral ODA
1975	1,418.5	12,714	11.2
1976	1,278.0	14,067	9.1
1977	1,719.5	14,977	11.5
1978	2,088.1	18,661	11.2
1979	2,660.4	22,041	12.1
1980	3,394.8	24,375	13.9
1981	2,595.9	22,781	11.4

Source: As for Table 1

