Sustainable peace

Internal Power Relations and the Weakening of Extremists in the Context of Civil War: Theoretical perspectives[1]

By

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Abstract

This dissertation is based on the following components: (a) extremists and/or moderate actors interact in the internal political arena; (b) those actors defend interests, the ones considered as divisible, the others viewed as indivisible; (c) definition and perception of interests in game, as well as interests themselves, change during the conflict; (d) the order of preferences of actors is variable; (e) international interventions neglect the configuration of balance of power, (f) there exist three types of international interventions: deterrence, protective and preventive interventions; (g) peace agreements as political pacts, which establish new rules of the game; (h) two sets of rules of the game can be established for the post-conflict regime: power-sharing institutions and liberal democratic institutions; and (i) there are two types of peace: precarious peace is linked to power-sharing regimes while sustainable peace is related to democratic institutions. The main hypothesis can be synthesized as follow: sustainable peace depends on an internal balance of power favorable to moderate actors, and on the implementation of an intervention strategy that seeks to weaken extremist actors.

Resumen

Esta investigación se basa en los siguientes componentes teóricos: (a) actores políticos extremistas y moderados interactúan en la escena política local; (b) estos actores defienden una serie de intereses, algunos considerados "indivisibles", otros conceptualizados "divisibles"; (c) la definición y la percepción de los intereses defendidos, así como los intereses en sí, cambian en el transcurso de un conflicto armado; (d) el orden de preferencias de los actores no es estático; (e) las intervenciones internacionales que buscan favorecer la resolución de conflictos ignoran elementos centrales, tales como las relaciones de fuerza entre los actores locales (f) existen tres tipos de intervenciones internacionales: las disuasivas, las protectoras y las preventivas; (g) los acuerdos de paz son pactos políticos, en el sentido comparativo del término; (h) dos tipos de instituciones son usualmente establecidas por los pactos de paz: las de *power-sharing* y las de las democracias liberales; (i) existen dos tipos de paz: la precaria, que está ligada a los regímenes de *power-sharing*, y la paz duradera, relacionada con las instituciones democráticas. La hipótesis central de esta investigación es la siguiente: la paz duradera es el producto de una relación de fuerzas favorable a los actores moderados y de la implementación de una estrategia de intervención dirigida a debilitar la influencia de los actores extremistas.

Résumé

Cette recherche se fonde sur les composants théoriques suivants: (a) des acteurs politiques extrémistes et modérés interagissent sur l'échiquier politique interne; (b) ces acteurs défendent une série d'intérêts, les uns considérés « divisibles », les autres conçus comme étant « divisibles »; (c) la définition et la perception des intérêts défendus, ainsi que les intérêts eux-mêmes, changent au cours du conflit armé; (d) l'ordre de préférences des acteurs n'est pas statique; (e) les interventions internationales visant la résolution de conflits sont négligent des éléments centraux, tel que le rapport de forces entre les différents acteurs locaux; (f) il existe trois types d'interventions internationales : les dissuasives, les protectrices et les préventives; (g) les accords de paix sont des pactes politiques, dans le sens comparatiste du terme; (h) deux types d'institutions politiques découlent généralement des pactes de paix : celles du partage de pouvoir et celles propres aux démocraties libérales; (i) il existe deux types de paix : la paix précaire, liée aux régimes de partage de pouvoir, et la paix durable, qui surgit des institutions d'ordre démocratique. La thèse principale de cette recherche est la suivante : la paix durable est le produit d'un rapport de forces favorable aux acteurs modérés et à la mise en place d'une stratégie d'affaiblissement des acteurs extrémistes.

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Sustainable peace

Internal Power Relations and the Weakening of Extremists in the Context of Civil War[3]

In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the amount of international intervention in conflict resolution. Despite the rise in scholarly attention devoted to the subject, there are few inter-regional, intra-regional, and longitudinal comparisons that offer integrated answers to the following questions: (a) why are some civil wars "easier" to resolve than others? And (b) why are some peace agreements more effective in preventing new waves of violence, when others fail with renewed eruptions of hostilities?[4] Building new theories and models connecting the effects of international interventions to local specificities is a crucial task for political scientists.[5] Civil war is one of the most important topics in the discipline as it relates not only to abstract violence but also to very concrete matters of human casualties, political crimes, and Human Rights' violations, as well as to the thorny issues of peace- and nation-building[6].

Applying a comparative politics approach to a subject usually studied in International Relations, this Ph.D. dissertation focuses on four cases of civil war (Angola, Colombia, El Salvador and Mozambique).[7] I propose to answer the two questions identified above by arguing that sustainable peace (dependent variable) depends on (a) an internal balance of power favorable to moderate actors (independent variable 1)

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[3] This text is an abstract of Chapters 1 and 2 of the Ph.D. Thesis *Paix durable. Rapport de forces et affaiblissement des extrêmes dans des contextes de guerre civile.*

[4] Usually, these questions are addressed separately. Studies that analyze the first question develop aspects such as the indivisibility of belligerents' interests (Posen, 1993; Kaufmann, 1996), and the emergence of *ripe moments* (Zartman, 1990; Clements, 1996; Mitchell, 1996). With respect to the second question, guarantees for belligerents (Walter, 1999) and spoilers' actions (Stedman, 1997) have been suggested as central points in the discussion. This research can be considered as an attempt to bridge the gap and answer both questions simultaneously.

[5] This academic agenda conveys a normative element. Even though Licklider (1995: 684-685) shows that the majority of peace accords break down and that military victory is a recurrent issue, negotiated peace, in general, is more advantageous for belligerents.

[6] For statistics on civil war causalities, see Deriennic (2001).

[7] This dissertation employs a comparative approach. In other words, I develop inter-regional, intra-regional, and longitudinal comparisons that link internal factors (balance of power) to external ones (international interventions). The comparison of the variables in the different cases will enable us to (a) compare differences and similarities of civil wars and peace processes in different regions; (b) identify differences and similarities within each region; and (c) compare success and failures of peace processes in each country.

Fernando A. Chinchilla / Université de Montréal

and (b) the implementation of a intervention strategy that seeks to weaken extremist actors (independent variable 2)[8].

More specifically, answering comprehensively the first question, as I propose in the first section, requires a re-conceptualization of civil wars as games in which each actor establishes a hierarchy of interests and defends the most important. When primordial interests are indivisible, civil wars are more difficult to resolve. When primordial interests are divisible, negotiations for peace become possible. In this view, the order of preferences of actors changes over the time.[9] To answer the second question, as explained in the second section, it is necessary to identify three types of international interventions, that is, deterrence, protective and preventive interventions. Each one of these interventions produces a different effect on the internal balance of power.[10] Finally, the third section gets a glance on the institutional effects of pacts of peace. Here, I link precarious peace to *power-sharing* institutions, and sustainable peace to liberal democratic institutions.

1. Why are some civil wars "easier" to resolve than others?

There are three ways to answer the question about the difficulty of conflict resolution. First, it is possible to establish what I call a "traditional dichotomy" between divisible and indivisible interests and conclude than resolving intra-state and ethnic wars is harder than ending inter-state and ideological wars. Second, if one adopts a rational choice perspective, one could argue that a conflict is ripe for resolution when benefits of

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[8] The dependent variable can take two forms: precarious or sustainable peace. Precarious peace could be distinguished, for example, by the threats of new eruptions of violence, the disrespect of peace agreements, and the necessity of international deterrence forces to maintain order. Sustainable peace could be measured by the institutional capacity to process political conflicts by peaceful means. Note that sustainable peace, based on liberal democratic institutions, does not imply the absence of conflict. As explained below, free and fair contestation and participation are based on the idea that conflicts are "normal" in political life. In democratic regimes, thus, conflict is managed, for example, through a change of political agendas by electing opposition political parties, through contentious collective action from individuals and through the achievement of political pacts between political elites.

[9] Primordial interests at one moment can become secondary interests at another moment, and new interests can emerge. All interest associated to huge costs in case of failure or large benefits in case of success would be considered by actors as primordial. On the contrary, interests related to weak costs or gains, would be defined as secondary goals. It is important to underline that, at the moment of fight, a strategic choice, constraint by external factors, is taken.

[10] Deterrence interventions boost the costs of confrontational strategies. Protective interventions increase the benefits of strategies of conciliation, create new interests through the establishment of guarantees of security, and favor peace process by reducing political uncertainty. Finally, preventive interventions rotate (or consolidate) the internal balance of power in the advantage of moderate actors. In other words, preventive interventions diminish the probabilities of success of peace processes' spoilers.

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peace are more important than costs of war. Finally, in a political economy perspective, civil wars motivated by greed (individualistic economic interests) could be less easier to end than civil wars motivated by grievance (demands of social, economic and/or political change). In this section I show that, even if these answers are not inaccurate, they cannot produce a comprehensive understanding of dynamics of civil wars. Indeed, these fragmentary analyses lead to limited conclusions. For this reason, I propose in the section 1.2. a comparative analytic frame that, in my point of view, avoids fragmentary analyses and limited conclusions.

1.1. Fragmentary analyses, limited conclusions

Why are some civil wars "easier" to resolve than others? The first research agenda establishes a "traditional dichotomy" between divisible and indivisible interests, that is, a static definition of the interests in game. This traditional view can produce two kinds of suggestions: on the one hand, it is possible to argue that inter-state wars turn around divisible interests while intra-state wars are confrontations between actors who defend indivisible interests. Because civil wars usually take the form of zero-sum games, that is, situations in which the gains of one group represent proportional loses for the other (Bell, 1972, 218; Modelski, 1964; Pillar, 1983; Zartman, 1993; 1995), inter-state wars are easier to resolve than intra-state wars (Curle, 1970: 24; Gelb and Betts, 1979; Pillar, 1983: 24; Iklé, 1971: 95).[11]

On the other hand, the static view of interests in game can also lead to the establishment of a link between the causes of wars and the degree of difficulty to resolve them. Here, the logic works as follow: identity factors that can produce ethnic wars, which are usually more difficult to resolve than ideological wars (Posen, 1993: 33; Kaufmann, 1996: 153-156; Licklider, 1995: 681). According to Stedman (1991; 4), the imposition of the interest of one group over another one can take the form of a zero-sum game. Because ethnic groups might see each other as a danger to their own interests, an "internal security dilemma" could be created, that is, a situation in which an increase in the security of an actor incites the others actors to improve their own security, causing

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[11] According to Stedman (1996: 346), the view of a civil war in terms of a zero-sum game can be explained by three factors. First, a civil war erupts usually after the refusal of the government to execute political changes. Then, the radicalized opposition chooses to use violence as the unique means to provoke change. Second, by choosing to reinforce political exclusion, the regime begins to be identified as representing a social class, a specific culture or an ethnic group. In other words, the regime becomes the cause of the civil war. Third, facing increasing critiques, the regime reinforces its monopolistic control of the power, generating a vicious circle characterized by a military escalation. Central American conflicts, especially those in El Salvador and Guatemala, can be explained in this manner.

a reduction of security for all (MacLeod, Dufault and Dufour, 2002: 39; Posen, 1993: 28; Kaufmann, 1996: 147; Walter, 1997: 337-340).[12]

With respect to the distinction between internal and external wars, statistics show that 33% of the civil wars have been resolved by negotiations, a result that contrasts to 66% in the case of inter-state wars (Pillar, 1983: 25). However, the fact that civil wars are more "difficult" to resolve than international wars does not mean that a peace accord is not a possibility in the former case. On the contrary, Licklider (1995: 681; 684) argues that 25% of civil wars have been resolved in a negotiated way. Therefore, by suggesting that sometimes it is possible to reach an agreement between fighters, Stedman (1991) argues that not all inter-state wars centre on indivisible stakes. Finally, recent studies on the political economy of civil wars link internal to external factors, thus erasing the dichotomy between internal and external variables. Without doubt, the validity of this differentiation is increasingly challenged.

In relation to the dichotomy between ethnic/ideological wars, four points must be made. First, it is not easy to establish a clear difference among ethnic and ideological factors.[13] Second, the relation between ethnic/ideological wars, on the one side, and divisibility/indivisibility of interests in game, on the other side, is not obvious[14]. Third, there is no consensus about the nature of ethnic identities in civil wars.[15] Finally, to suggest that ethnic wars centre on indivisible interests equals arguing that, by definition, any civil war can be resolved. In this view, social change is exogenous to the action of actors.

In sum, it is perfectly accurate to argue that some wars imply indivisible interests while others put in confrontation divisible stakes. However, to link the interests in game to the causes of civil wars or to the internal/external nature of the conflict produces static

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[12] Ted R. Gurr (2000: 5) defines an ethnic group as people who share a distinctive collective identity based on a belief of a common descent or shared experiences and cultural traits (communal and identity groups).

[13] For example, the Guinea-Bissau's "ideological" independence movement is also a *Baliant* movement. Similarly, the Mozambican anti-colonial army mobilizes the *Makondes*, an ethnic group based in the north of the country. It is important to underline that an ethnic identification can be used for political goals, as well as ethnicity could be a particular conception of a political or social group.

[14] While it is hard to imagine religious and political leaders like the Ayatollah Khomeini (Iran) and Abimael Guzmán (Peru) making concessions in a bargaining table, revolutionaries like Lenin (Russia) and Mao (China) recommended negotiations in some specific cases (Stedman, 1991: 11-13)

[15] Some approaches suggest that conflicts are a result of the subjective evaluation of actors. For example, Rothchild (1986: 87-93) identifies three kinds of perceptions (essentialist, pragmatic and recipro-active perceptions), which shape the dynamic of civil wars. In the same vein, Sisk (1996: 13) suggest that ethnicity is a social construct, more malleable and flexible than some researchers would admit.

views and traditional dichotomies that neglect the dynamic and fluctuant nature of civil wars.

The second way to answer the question about the difficulty of conflict resolution is focusing on the emergence of what is called "ripe moments". In its original formulation, a ripe moment emerges in situations of deadlock and deadline, in which parties who were predominant lost influence and other actors gained power. According to Zartman, a conflict is ripe for resolution when actors who prefer multilateral solutions are able to impose themselves over actors who prefer unilateral solutions (Zartman, 1990: 13). At this point, it is important to underline that ripe moments have been afterwards linked, in the rational choice research agenda, to strategic-military situations like hurting stalemates, imminent mutual catastrophes, and entrapments.[16] In these views, a ripe moment arrives when benefits of peace are more important than costs of war. What about the balance of power in the internal political spectrum? Rational choice studies have neglected the political dimension of the ripe moment concept.

In recalling that Polish leaders, in their efforts to re-legitimate the communist party, repressed political participation while Soviets, with the same goal, widened it, Stedman (1991: 4-5) argues that more than "objective conditions", (subjective) perceptions are central to explain strategic choices. In other words, the "objective" emergence of a ripe moment, measured in terms of an unhealthy stalemate or equilibrium/disequilibrium of military forces, among others, could or could not have an impact on the probabilities of conflict resolution.[17]   Finally, the rational choice agenda suffers from two main weaknesses: first, as indicated above, it neglects the political dimension of the concept of ripe moment; second, it supposes that objective conditions will be translated automatically in cost-benefit calculation.

Here again, it is perfectly accurate to argue that "objective" conditions could have an impact on strategic choices. However, to argue that strategic-military considerations are the only important variables and that these conditions explain exclusively strategic choices (confrontation versus conciliation) made by theoretical cost-benefit calculation is, at least, a simplified view.

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[16] For a detailed explanation, see Mitchell, 1996, and Masson and Fett, 1996.
[17] In this regard, Masson and Fett (1996: 549-552; 558-562) conclude that elements like equilibrium (or disequilibrium) of forces, the increase of costs of war or the type of civil war do not have incidence over the probabilities of conflict resolution. This result is in accord with the conclusions of Hartzell et al (2001: 188-190).

Why are some civil wars "easier" to resolve than others? The third way to answer this question focuses on the political economy of civil wars. In this perspective, fighters are conceptualized as actors with their own economic agendas.[18] According to this perspective, economic activities like the production of drugs (for example, cocaine and opium) and the exploitation of natural resources (timber, diamonds, oil, and others) (Ross, 2003: 53) would be conceived not only as tactics to permit the continuation of fighting (avoiding then hurting stalemate situations), but also as means to produce personal profits to the advantage of fighting elites.[19]

As a young research agenda, the first versions of the political economy of civil wars suffer from some weaknesses. On the one hand, studies have almost exclusively focused on the predatory behavior of opposition groups, neglecting some behaviors of governmental agencies (for example, corruption) and the presence of transnational criminal networks.[20] On the other hand, conceiving fighters as unitary actors impeded the analysis of differences between leaders and followers (Ballentine and Sherman, 2003: 7).[21] Finally, the place of economic interests remains under debate.[22] Despite that, this research agenda marks a turning point in the debate: interests in game in civil wars are not static. Put in another way, interests vary across time. Therefore, new interests could arise while others can become secondary.

Interests in game, the causes of civil wars, the strategic positions of fighters, their evaluations and perceptions about benefits and costs of both, confrontational and conciliation strategies, as well as the emergence of new interests and stakes, are all

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[18] According to the World Bank, economic considerations, and not sociopolitical grievances, catalyze violence. Economic considerations could also explain the degree of difficulty on the resolution of conflicts such as those of Angola, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone (Ballentine and Sherman, 2003: 2-3; 10).

[19] In Angola, the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) controls 72% of the production of diamonds since 1992. Similarly, in Liberia, the personal fortune of Charles Taylor directly linked to the war had attain US$ 400 millions from 1992 to 1996 (Berdal and Malone, 2000: 5).

[20] In the same vein, the impact of illegal groups activities on formal institutional is not studied. In Colombia, for example, illegal groups use several strategies to avoid or delay the administration of justice (Rubio, 1999: 98-99).

[21] This is not an exclusive problem of this research agenda. In reality, the postulate of unitary actors comes from rational choice perspectives. This view can be challenged by applying, for example, an instrumental view of identity, which could lead to the conclusion that, in some cases, ethnic identities mobilize people for a revolutionary struggle while the main motivation for fighting elites is economic greed.

[22] In Colombia, in despite of illegal economic activities of revolutionary and paramilitaries groups, Guáqueta (2003) argues that sociopolitical grievances remain the main cause of the conflict. In her view, even if economic interests do not explain the causes of the Colombian civil war, undoubtedly they contribute to complicate prospects for its resolution. At the methodological level, one can asks: what is the role of economic interests in the causes, prolongation and resolution of civil wars? Are they a cause of them, only a factor that contributes to explain their prolongation, or both?

central elements in explaining the dynamics of civil wars. However, studied separately, these variables only produce fragmentary analyses that lead to limited conclusions.

1.2. Extremism, moderation, and balance of power

This research is based on the following *sine qua non* premise: in a politically uncertain context, the rules of the game are fluctuating; specific political forces have their own interests and preferences which can influence opportunities for cooperation and/or create further conflict (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1988; Karl, 1990; Iklé, 1991; Przeworski, 1992; Chull Shin, 1994). First, the concept of political uncertainty refers to contexts in which the previous rules of political game are no more valid while the new ones are not yet defined. These contexts of "disorder" or (in an internationalist jargon) "anarchy" (Walter, 1997: 338-340) imply situations of absence of rules, where actors fight to gain influence over the process of establishment of rules that will determine winners and losers in a future regime (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1988: 20; Karl and Schmitter, 1991: 270). Second, the political arena is composed of two kinds of actors: extremist governmental and non-governmental actors (respectively *Hard-liners* and *Radicals*), and moderate governmental and non-governmental actors (respectively *Soft-liners* and *Reformers*).

The strategic meaning of extremism and moderation suggest that radical actors are willing to defend their interests by all necessary means (including hostilities) while moderate actors actively seek a negotiated settlement (Spears, 2000: 112).[23] The problem with this definition, according to Przeworski (1986: 53-54; 1992: 117; 143), is that actors change their strategies. For this reason, this author proposed a definition based on risk aversion Przeworski: 1986; 1992). While radical actors are insensitive to risks, moderates are much more careful. Thus, if a moderate were to interpret negotiation as a more dangerous option than, for example, prolonging war, this moderate would choose a bellicose strategy to defend its interests. This definition is essential to dissociate the "kind of actor" (extremist versus moderate) from the strategy employed (confrontation versus conciliation).

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[23] In its original definition, hard-liners are authoritarian leaders who oppose to change in the regime while soft-liners could tolerate some transformations in their attempts to retain power (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1988: 33). Authors like Iklé (1991) have proposed similar conceptual frames, identifying "hawkish" and "dovish" actors.

Przeworski's definition, however, is incomplete, because it presumes that interests are stable.[24] On this point, as indicated above, the literature on war economies (Mats et Berdal, 2000; Ballentine and Sherman, 2003) indicates that phenomena like civil wars are dynamic. Interests can and do change over time, and individualistic economic interests can become more important than political, social, or identity demands. Consequently, the weakness of the strategic definition of extremism and moderation is not its focus on interests in game, but the fact that it supposes that the actors' order of preferences is static. Here, it is important to underline that this question is not resolved by the Przeworski's proposition.[25]

Figure 1
Balance of power between extremist and moderate actors

Suppose two fighters, G and O, composed by four factions, A, B, C, D. G = A + B and O = B + D. In addition A and B are extremist factions while C and D are moderate actors. If A and B were able to impose themselves, respectively, over C and D, one obtains two radical actors, G and O, who define their interest as being indivisible. However, if C and D were successful in imposing themselves over A and B, the result is two moderate actors, G and O, who defend divisible interests. According to this model,

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[24] Przeworski (1986: 53) defines the interest of each group in the following terms: the army seeks to keep institutional autonomy; the economic elite want retain the control of both means of production and productive activities; the state, specially white and blue collars, try to assure their economic survival, and so on.
[25] Defining "risk" in order to explain strategic choices supposes a return to the questions of interests in game. Indeed, even if risk aversion were central for a moderate actor, if losses are massive in case of failure, it would choose a confrontational strategy. In this case, if probable loses represent huge risks, an actor would be moderate not vis-à-vis strategic choices, but with respect to interests and stakes defended.

in the "real" world, actors can radicalize or moderate their positions. In other words, G and/or O can favor indivisible interests at x and divisible interests at x + 1. [26] There is not reason to assume that orders of preferences are fixed. Consequently, I propose the following definition of extremism and moderation: an actor is radical when his order of preferences favors indivisible interests. Equally, an actor is moderate when divisible interests become more important than indivisible interests. In other words, actors are not extremists or moderates by "nature". Indeed, extremism and moderation must be defined in space and time.

Therefore, political actors do not act in a political vacuum. Indeed, they are conditioned by external constraints that determine which choices are possible (Karl, 1990: 6; Karl and Schmitter, 1991: 271; Mitchell, 1991: 41; Steinmo et al. 1992: 7; 9). In periods of order, certainty, stability or peace, political institutions work as instruments to make predictable actors' future actions (Levy, 1997: 25).[27] In the context of lacking rules of the game, such as the context of civil wars, strategic choices are usually conditioned by the balance of power. Even if soft-liners and reformers were ready to enter in a peace process, if balance of power favors hard-liners and radicals, the war will probably continue.

In theory, the internal balance of power can be favorable to extremist actors, to both extremist and reformist actors, or to moderate actors. The probability of reaching peace agreements varies as a function of the internal balance of power. If Hard-liners and Radicals prevail over Soft-liners and Reformists, war will probably continue, even if both the cost of war and probability of defeat increase. In this "winner takes all" scenario, the balance of power favors actors who defend indivisible interests (A vs. B in

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[26] Modeling equals simplifying, according to Licklider. In other words, this model is a simplification. For example, the civil component of the Lebanese conflict not only included the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Israeli state and several terrorist groups, but also at least six political factions, each one with her own malice (Diehl, 2001: 222). However, explain all the interactions between groups, with their own perceptions and interests' definitions could be a very complex task. In this sense, this model must be understood as a first step in recognizing the heterogeneity of groups involved in political interactions, and not as a definitive explanation of all interactions involved in civil wars. In fact, this perspective is completely different with respect to rational choice models, which are based on a dichotomy model opposing two unitary actors, G and O, with their own cost-benefits calculus, and which anticipate three possible results: a victory of G, a victory of O, and a negotiated solution (Masson and Fett, 1996: 547).

[27] Institutional rules can penalize, establish interdictions, inform, obligate, guide, allow, design and exempt actors. These rules are social because they apply to all members of society. Political institutions create both inclusion and exclusion. They define which actors, resources, goals, and strategies are accepted as valid in the decision-taking /process. They also influence the distribution of results and create rules of representation and aggregation of interest (Carey, 2000: 735; Knight, 1992: 2-3, 10, 54, 67-58; O'Donnell, 1994: 57-59).

the Figure 1) in a zero-sum game's logic.[28] Mixed balances of power (*A* vs. *D* or *C* vs. *B*) are uncertain and usually benefit extremist actors. Apart from a renewed wave of violence, three outcomes of what I call a *Momentum Effect* can be discerned.[29] Finally when Soft-liners and Reformist impose themselves over radical actors, a "ripe moment" emerges. Here, sustainable peace is possible.

Peace agreements between moderate actors are based on two central exchanges. First, Soft-liners accept to implement institutional reforms that bring military power under the "Rule of law". In exchange, guerrillas demobilize and agree to transform into a political party. On the one hand, in conceding the legalization of revolutionary actors, that is, in eliminating political exclusion, Soft-liners weaken Radical positions. The extremists lose their *Raison-d'Être*. On the other hand, when guerrilla Reformers decide to become civil political leaders, that is, when defending the *status quo* is no longer necessary, they lessen the legitimacy of Hard-liner positions. Secondly, concerning the leaders' selection process, Soft-liners agree to behave as Reformers if they lose elections and *vice*-versa. In other words, all actors agree to adopt moderation and avoid extremism, in spite of election results. Therefore, both Soft-liners and Reformers accept *ex ante* uncertainty, *ex post* irreversibility, and the repetitive character of the electoral democratic process.[30]

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[28] Conflicts such as Bosnia, Croatia, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Chechnya, Tajikistan and Sri Lanka are situations in which groups identify each other as a threat to their own survival (Kaufmann, 1996).

[29] First, radicals and moderates sign a peace agreement. Yet, this accord is probably closer to the radical interests than to the moderate ones. If moderate actors are ready to divide their interests while radical actors defend indivisible interests, it is reasonable to suppose that the first will do more concessions than the later to reach an agreement. This situation suggests a "negotiated victory" for radicals. Second, a mixed balance of power can allow radicals to manipulate the peace process by weakening moderate positions. The military triumph of Cambodian leader Hu Sen over the Prince Ranariddh and the democratic leaders of the *National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia* (FUNCIPEC), in 1997, give us an example of this outcome. The State of Cambodia victory was only possible after boycott threats from the Cambodian People's Party (CCP) after the FUNCIPEC's electoral triumph and the signature of a power-sharing arrangement (see definition in fn. 48) held by the United Nations (in which CCP was over-represented) (Stedman, 1997: 32-26). Finally, mixed balances of power could tend to weaken moderate positions and to reinforce radicals ones. In other words, high degrees of concessions from Soft-liners or Reformists can (a) corrode Soft-liners' positions (face to Hard-liners), and Reformists ones (face to Radicals) or (b) press on Soft-liners and Reformist to diminish the costs of peace by adopting a spoiler strategy. In Colombia, for example, the moderate government of President Andrés Pastrana decided in 1998 to launch an unilateral process of demilitarization in five municipalities as a strategy to reach a peace agreement with the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN) and the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas* (FARC). This unsuccessful strategy explains, at least in part, the political isolation of Pastrana by 1999 (Pécault, 1999) and the election of President Alvaro Uribe en 2002, who proposed the adoption of a more radical strategy against guerrilla groups.

[30] The peace agreement between the Salvadorian government and the FMLN guerrilla (*Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional*), which included deep structural reforms to the army and guarantees for the transformation of FMLN into a political party, illustrates this pattern; "...peacemakers from the warring parties can create informal alliances to combat extremists who oppose peace. In El Salvador, an unlikely tacit alliance emerged between ARENA (National Republican Alliance) and the FMLN to overcome widespread skepticism about the prospects for peace and opposition of Hard-liners" (Stedman, 1996: 357).

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On to the question "why are some civil wars more "easier" to resolve than others?" It is now possible to respond in the following manner: all attempts for conflict resolution between extremist actors is more difficult to execute than all effort to establish an agreement where the balance of power favor actors who defend interests considered as divisible. In theory, all actors can sign a peace agreement, that is, a political pact (Ducatenzeiler and Chinchilla, 2001: 149-150; Zahar, 2002: 9). However, what can be and what cannot be negotiated, as well as the characteristics of the future regime, depend on who bargains. This point is especially important if one defines a peace agreement as a pact. In effect, a pact of peace would not only indicate the end of war, but also the establishment of new rules of the political game for the post-conflict regime[31]; "...peace accords provoque a number of important transformations in the workings of polity, the economy and society" (Nasi, 2002: 20).

2. Why are some peace agreements more effective in preventing new waves of violence than others?

Why are some peace agreements more effective in preventing new waves of violence than others? The first section highlights some possible answers to that question. A pact of peace should not be conceived only as a means to stop war, but also a tool in establishing peace in the long run. In other words, peace agreements do more than simply stop the fighting; they establish the rules of the political game for the post-conflict period (Walter, 1997: 359). Subsequently, the success or failure in preventing new waves of violence depends, to an important extent, on the institutional framework created by the pact.

In point 2.1., I show that, at the practical level, international operations, in their effort to reach a pact of peace, do not take into consideration local constraints such as the internal balance of power.   At the theoretical level, multiple explanations of successes and failures of international interventions have been proposed. However, rather than clarifying this subject, these theoretical efforts have produced a proliferation of concurrent concepts and typologies. In point 2.2., I propose a new classification of international interventions based on their effects on the internal political arena.

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[31] In its traditional definition, a pact is a negotiated commitment between a limited number of actors who seek to redefine the rules of the political game, in establishing guarantees of protection for their respective self-interests. According to Kirshheimer (1969), pacts permit political adjustments while simultaneously preventing violent confrontations (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1988: 64-65).

Concretely, I identify deterrence interventions (which increase the costs of war), protective interventions (which reduce political uncertainty by providing security guarantees), and preventive interventions (which provoke a twist in the balance of power in favor of moderate actors, thus reducing the risk of spoiling).

2.1. Rudimentary analyses, incomplete conclusions

There are three ways to answer the question about the successes and failures of international interventions. First, challenging rational choice models of hurting stalemate, imminent mutual catastrophes, and entrapments, Mitchell (1996: 2) propose the enticiting opportunity model, based not in the augmentation of the costs of war, but in the increase of benefits from peace.[32] Second, scholars such as Collier, Hoeffer and Soderbom (1999) argue that only "balanced" or "neutral" interventions have high probabilities of success. Finally, there are several studies focused on the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions (for example, Diehl, 2001).

These academic efforts are not enough to generate a comprehensive reading of successes and failures of international interventions. For example, according to the logic of the entrapment model, one could ask which new interests could be created to incite fighters to try to reach an agreement? Unfortunately, the list of elements that could stimulate negotiated solutions is not systematically defined.[33] Rather than answer this question, this research agenda has only observed that the link between international interventions and conflict resolution is weak. Even more important, the probabilities of new waves of violence are higher in cases where international actors have been involved (Regan, 2002: 55-57).[34]

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[32] In this view, a ripe moment can be create by increasing the size of the cake and not only by negotiating its distribution. In other words, it can emerge when leaders identify new options and alternatives. Here, the source of social change is endogenous to the action of actors. In other words, this model supposes the action of national or international actors in order to increase benefits of peace; "Especially in complex, protracted negotiations, new information and interpretations may become available about the external environment and about the bargaining situation itself (the real interests, aspirations, and tactics of other participants; subjective probabilities of reaching different outcomes; as well as the likely costs in money, energy, and time required for a settlement). Thus, decision on the extent and intensity moves to affect alternatives should be conditioned by current assessments of the bargaining's future course" (Lax and Sebenius, 1986: 164).

[33] This "list" includes, among others, "the acceptation of new principles and concepts", the "elimination of obstacles to multilateral solutions", the "existence of means of communication among fighters", and the "existence of certain spaces of informal communication" (Mitchell, 1996: 6). Note that all of these elements are not concretely defined.

[34] For this reason, these studies have focused on several variables, such as the goals of international missions, the moment of intervention, the question of direction and peacekeeping missions, and the role of cooperation between fighters.

With respect to "balanced interventions", available analyses addressing this point are varied. For example, Soderbom (1999) suggests that only "balanced (or neutral) interventions", which do not favor any belligerents, can eventually succeed, while Regan and Stam (2000) conclude that diplomacy is important, but not necessary and possibly not sufficient to resolve civil wars. At the same time, Walter (2000) stresses that international intervention is useful only to protect agreements that have been concluded before the intervention. Therefore, Licklider (1993) suggests that the decision to negotiate results from "internal factors", which can be influenced by an international intervention, but remain independent of it. Finally Regan (2002: 57) points out that "under certain conditions", international interventions could make "more probable" the end of violence. A simple enumeration of possible variables affecting successes and failures of international interventions is not enough to establish a model able to make intelligible interactions between structural conditions, perceptions, and choices (Mitchell, 1991: 8). If the idea of an intervention was to reach sustainable peace, proposing to apply "sticks and carrots" (Zartman, 1990: 154; Rubin, 1991: 240-242) is insufficient. It is also necessary to determine which actor would receive sticks and which one must be rewarded.

In relation to studies focusing on the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions, they have approached the subject in three ways. First, peacekeeping can be viewed as an *ad hoc* technique. Even if researchers rarely defend this conceptualization, the existence of several case studies without a comparative basis suggests that this vision is widely used by the scientific community.[35] Second, international interventions have been linked to mediation efforts (Stedman, 1991; Featherson, 2004; Woodhouse, 2000). Here, it is argued that analyses on successes and failures of international operations must relate goals to deployed means.[36] Finally, the most used perspective consists to identify typologies of international interventions (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2004: 12-13).

Today, we are witnessing an explosion of concepts which aim to describe missions' mandates. For example, the UN's former General Secretary Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, identified four types of international interventions (preventive diplomacy,

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[35] For examples, see Durch (1994; 1997) Gordon and Toase (2001) and Weiss (1996).
[36] The evaluation of the effectiveness of international interventions must take into consideration the degree of difficulty of each mission. It is not the same to launch a peacekeeping mission in Cambodia (where 120 000 soldiers were deployed) than do the same thing in Guatemala (where only 1500 or 3000 soldiers, almost in a situation of military collapse, were present). In the same vein, resolving the Somali conflict, in an environment of state collapse, proliferation of militias and reticence face to the international intervention is not equal to assisting the Salvadorian peace process, where all parties requested the support of the United Nations to guarantee the execution of a peace agreement already reached (Downs and Stedman, 2002: 32).

peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuiding) in his *Agenda for Peace*.[37] Equally, Durch (1997: 8) distinguishes four categories, which are traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peace operations, peace enforcement, and humanitarian interventions. Meanwhile, Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004: 95-183) propose a typology constituted by five categories, and Demurenko and Nikiting (1997) find seven types of international interventions (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2004: 13).[38] At present, Diehl and Wall (1998: 38-40) and Diehl (2001: 217) offer the most comprehensive and clear taxonomy, constituted by twelve categories (traditional peacekeeping, observation, collective enforcement, election supervision, humanitarian assistance during the conflict, state/nation building, pacification, preventive deployment, arms control and verifications, protective services, intervention in support of Democracy, and sanctions enforcement).

Of course, the creation of new interests, the establishment of adequate means to accomplish missions, and an accurate definition of the international operations' mandates, are all essential tasks to increase the probability of success of international interventions. However, the proliferation of concepts leads to a theoretical confusion.[39] Therefore, few classifications focus on the impact of international interventions in variables such as the order of preferences of actors, the interests in game, or even the internal balance of power. For this reason, the taxonomy proposed here is based on the effects of international interventions on the local political arena. This classification is constituted by three categories: deterrence, protective and preventive interventions.

2.2. *Deterrence, Protection and Prevention*

Why are some peace agreements more effective in preventing new waves of violence than others? A comprehensive answer to this question requires taking into consideration the following arguments: (a) in general, the final goal of an international intervention is to reach a pact between *main* participants, thus reinforcing the balance

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[37] For a detailed explanation of the Agenda for Peace, visit the Web Site of the United Nations to the following address: http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html

[38] This is not an exhaustive list. For another classification, see Thakur and Schnabel (2001). The authors propose six generations of peacekeeping.

[39] Some researchers use the same names to refer to different mandates. For example, Doyle and Sambanis (2000: 779-782) define peacebuilding operations differently from Boutros-Ghali. According to the latter, observation missions, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, constitute peacebuilding. In the same vein, what Boutros-Ghali (1992) calls "peacebuilding" correspond, in the Diehl terminology, to " nation/state building" (2001), and to "managing transition" in the Bellamy, Williams and Griffin's (2004) analytical frame.

of power already present[40]; (b) like interests in game, balance of power also varies across time. Civil wars (like transitions to democracy) can be thought of as a "...logical tree, in which the knots are the particular conjunctures and branches represent the possibilities inherent in each conjuncture" (Przeworski, 1992: 106). In other words, the balance of power at x is not necessarily the same at x + 1; (c) peacekeepers are actors too (Touval and Zartman, 1985; Stedman, 1991: 24).[41]

Internal power relations are often glossed over by international interveners. In theory, this element should have an impact on the strategy employed and vice-versa. However, in practice, international interventions attempt to establish common ground between opponents while disregarding their respective preferences. Political actors, however—both internal and international—do not act in a political vacuum. Sustainable peace will result if the balance of power favors moderate actors. However, precarious peace will emerge if predominantly groups are radicals. In the first case, the intervention would be successful. In the second one, the probability of failure is significant.

To improve understanding of the impact of international interventions in conflict resolution, I suggest a typology composed of three types of interventions: *deterrence*, *protective*, and *preventive*.[42] First, deterrence interventions prevent the eruption of violence or its reactivation by increasing the cost of war (peace enforcement, sanctions enforcement, etc.).[43] Second, protective interventions create a political environment that encourages dialogue and agreement, thus reducing the costs of peace (peacekeeping, protection services, electoral supervision and electoral observation missions, etc.). This pattern is possible by establishing guarantees, that is, instruments of protection and security designed to reduce political uncertainty, favor peace negotiations, and change the order of preferences of fighting groups.[44] Third, preventive

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[40] In other words, if principal opponents were radicals, international interveners will reinforce this balance of power by institutionalizing their indivisible interests. Equally, if major fighters are moderates, international intervention will produce the same effect, that is, institutionalize divisible interests. However, establishing institutions that force division of indivisible interest is not equal to institutionalizing rules of the game in order to permit a competition between actors who defend divisible interests.

[41] In other words, in theory peacekeepers are also constrained by exogenous factors to their action, such as the balance of power.

[42] This classification is based on the typology proposed by Diehl (2001: 217).

[43] The objective here is not to push actors to sign a pact of peace, but to force the cessation of hostilities. Deterrence interventions can diminish violence and the casualties of civil wars. However, because balance of power favors radical actors, the establishment of sustainable peace is almost impossible in this case.

[44] According to Walter (1999: 134), several peace negotiations fail because of a lack of credible security guarantees. Indeed, peace negotiations implies the acceptance of a certain degree of vulnerability produced by the establishment of transitory governments, maintaining cease-fires, and the translation of private security forces in a single state body (Stedman, 1991: 15). In these conditions, an "inverse security dilemma" is created

interventions focus on preventing new waves of violence after the signing of a peace agreement, by instituting a *Rule of Law* that must be respected by all political actors, that is an inclusive and universal set of institutions that diminish the uncertainty. Here, state/nation-building, which includes a reinforcement of institutions such as the judiciary or the electoral mechanisms, etc., is a central task. Preventive interventions twist (or consolidate) a balance of power favorable to moderate actors, diminishing then the risks of spoiling.[45]

When extremist actors prevail over moderate actors, *deterrence*, even implying the use of force, can be necessary to establish a *precarious* peace. On the contrary, if the political context is favorable to moderate actors, protection can be sufficient to obtain the same goal. In all instances, sustainable peace implies *preventive interventions* (the only way to weaken extremists' positions).[46] If the balance of power favors this type of actor, an international intervention would not try to push them in this direction, even if it implies the acceptance of more modest goals. In Angola, Jonas Savimbi rejected the outcome of the 1992 elections. This failure has cost 300 000 lives in this country (Stedman, 1997: 5).

(Walter, 1999: 134). For this reason, the main challenge of a protective intervention is to identify the terms acceptable to all parties and establish a credible engagement to guarantee the execution of agreements (Spear, 1999: 7).

[45] Stedman (1997: 5) defines spoilers as "...leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it". Specifically, there are three types of spoilers (Stedman, 1997: 10-11): (a) "total spoilers", for which goals cannot be changed; (b) "greedy spoilers", that is, actors who attempt to increase benefits (form peace process) for they own interests; and (c) "limited spoilers", who defend non-contradictory interests toward the peace process. The distinction between internal and external *spoilers* expresses the actor's position (inclusion or exclusion) with respect to the agreement. If this framework is compared to the Hard-liners/Soft-liners and Reformists/Radicals' scheme, it is possible to hypothesize that "Hard-liners" and "Radicals" can become "total spoilers", whereas "Soft-liners" and "Reformists" could transform themselves in "limited (or greedy) spoilers" (if the peace process implies, for example, significant loss of power for them). In all cases, Stedman argues that preferences are fixed. *Limited spoilers*, for example, can be accommodated in the peace process not because they can "change their views", but because they are "limited spoilers". I argue that Hard-liners can become Soft-liners, as Reformists can be former Radicals. Preferences can and do change, as the Mozambican case shows. Interventions such as the decision to finance guerrilla transformation into political parties and the promise of investigating all electoral fraud can be useful tools in weakening or transforming extremist actors such as RENAMO (Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana).

[46] It is important to emphasize that deterrence is not tantamount to "weakening extremists". This is a central consideration, as it makes it clear that "weakening extremists" is not a military issue but a political one. In other words, "weakening extremists" is not about the strategic neutralization of military groups (this is deterrence). Weakening extremists rather implies a decrease of the political influence that actors who do not accept the peaceful rules of the game hold over the national agenda. This can be possible by executing actions such as establishment of *Truth Commissions*, reforms of military powers, etc. Reinforcing moderate agendas is likely to increase the chances for a sustainable peace; while weakening radicalisms constitutes an effort to reduce the probability of spoiling. Even more, both are necessary activities for peacekeepers, as strengthening moderate actors without weakening extremist ones could result in precarious peace.

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Figure 2
Deterrence, Protective and Preventive Interventions in a Peace Process

3. Sustainable and precarious peace: Balance of power, international interventions, and institutional effects of pacts of peace

Researchers in the field of International Relations have observed that civil wars are much less likely to be observed in democracies than in authoritarian regimes.[47] When they do occur within democracies, they tend to last for shorter periods (Krain and Myers, 1997: 4-5). For this reason, in recent years the international community has been searching for ways to establish sustainable peace based on democratic rules (Stedman, 1996: 355; Peceny and Stanley, 2001: 153; Downs and Stedman, 2002: 48; Putnam, 2002:

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[47] According to O'Donnell (1999: 10-11), the common element in the definitions of democracy of Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1990), Di Palma (1990), Huntington (1991), Przeworski (1992), Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992), and Sartori (1987), is the election of governmental leaders by free and fair elections, which are the result of inclusive and equitable vote. This is only possible in a context in which some civil and political rights, like the liberties of association, expression, and the access to alternative mass media, exist. In addition, elected leaders should finish their mandates, without constraints from non-elected persons.

244). Sustainable peace, however, is not the result of the institutionalization of peacekeeping mechanisms; rather, it is the outcome of institutionalizing instruments for conflict management.

Peace negotiations in political contexts favorable to one or more extremist actors have a propensity to the finish with the establishment of *power-sharing* institutions[48]. Extremist actors tend to demand more guarantees before conceding peace because they conceive their interests as being indivisible. In this context, *power-sharing* institutions set up a series of rules and norms that seek to eliminate political uncertainty. The norms guide actors on how to act in order to prevent conflicts. Two reasons may be invoked to explain why this path is conducive to precarious peace. First, the peace agreement is vulnerable to internal spoiling because it is extremists who are forced to settle. Second, there is an inherent tension between *power-sharing* institutions, which seek the preservation of peace, and the bellicose preferences of signatories.

When power relations favor moderate actors, peace negotiations are likely to produce sustainable peace. This kind of peace is based on a set of rules that allow actors to protect their interests in a context of political conflict and prevent any escalation that could end in military confrontation. These institutional norms, inherent to liberal democracies, are rooted in the idea that conflicts are normal and inevitable elements of political life. These sets of rules enable conflicts in which "actors don't kill themselves" (Pzreworski, 1992: 120).

Only international interventions that (a) implement protective strategies (before the pact) and preventive ones (after its signature) in order to reinforce the political positions of moderate actors; and (b) weaken the influence of actors who continue to prefer war to peace, are likely to foster sustainable peace. The first element is directed to strengthening actors who defend divisible interests. The second one looks for a reduction of the political influence of radicalisms.[49] It is important to note that even though

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[48] Power-sharing arrangements are associated with the establishment of what Arendt Lijphart calls a "Consociational Democracy", that is, a set of rules characterized by an ethnically-based principle of proportional representation, regional autonomy, veto powers, etc. For a discussion, see Kaufmann (1996).

[49] When extremists are forced to agree (for example, in a context in which there are no moderate actors) they could turn into "internal" spoilers. On the contrary, agreements between moderate actors tend to exclude extremists, making the pact more vulnerable to "external" spoiler actions. Thus, even though the risks of spoiling are different, in all cases the weakening of extremists should be regarded as an essential task for building sustainable peace. In Colombia, peace processes have been launched by moderate actors (for example, the Virgilio Barco governement's peace initiatives) but have failed. Even though internal power relations were

"precarious peace" is associated with power-sharing, and "sustainable peace" with liberal democracy, this does not mean that these types of peace are mutually exclusive. Introducing the idea of sequences, as showed in figure 2, it is possible to conceive precarious peace as a preliminary stage for sustainable peace. In contexts in which extremists are predominant, as happened in Angola, the establishment of sustainable peace can be difficult in the short term. In order to avoid total spoiler actions, power-sharing arrangements could be useful, and in some cases necessary.

In the same vein, "power-sharing" is not conceived as contrary to "democracy". As Zahar has shown, power-sharing arrangements are compatible with some levels of competition and contentious politics (Zahar, 2001: 5-10). Power-sharing and precarious peace, however, must be conceived as an intermediary stage in a transition from war to peace that should finish, at least in theory, with the establishment of sustainable peace.

Conclusions

Why are some civil wars "easier" to resolve than others? Why are some peace agreements more effective in preventing new waves of violence, when others fail with renewed eruptions of hostilities? In this research, I will answer both questions simultaneously. Moreover, this dissertation will allow me to provide theoretical answers to the following analytical questions and empirical puzzles: (a) why some international interventions in conflict resolution develop as expected while other peacekeeping missions end in failure; (b) why some peace processes are more vulnerable than others; (c) why internal power relations are an important variable in the establishment of sustainable peace fostered by the international community; (d) why power-sharing arrangements are a recurrent issue; (e) why the set of rules issued by power-sharing agreements may lead to precarious peace (and consequently to the threat of new eruptions of violence); and (f) why the weakening of extremist actors is an essential factor in achieving sustainable peace. From a comparative perspective, this work can contribute to the literature on transitions to democracy by studying regime transformations starting from the specific context of civil war. From an IR perspective, considerations regarding political regimes and the effects of different sets of institutions

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favorable to moderate actors at some historical points, in the absence of a weakening of extremisms, actors such as paramilitaries were able to derail the peace processes.

Fernando A. Chinchilla / Université de Montréal

on political interactions during the post-civil war period can be helpful in improving our knowledge about the topic.

My research findings can therefore be used to rethink international interventions. In this regard, the pertinence of research results for international governmental organizations like the United Nations, or for governments with an interest in and a commitment to peacekeeping is central. For peacekeepers, the findings for this research can be used to reform strategies of intervention. This point is especially important as "...human causalities of failed peace were infinitely higher than the casualties of war", as Angola (1992) and Rwanda (1994) have shown (Stedman, 1997: 5). Non-governmental organizations, like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, could also profit from the research findings. One of the main problems of international governmental and non-governmental interventions is lack of coordination.[50] In this sense, if the objectives and strategies of international interventions are clear, it is reasonable to expect an improvement in the coordination between different agencies. Yet, the research findings are expected, last but not least, to ensure more effective resolution of civil wars and thus the reduction of violence and casualties.

To summarize, this dissertation is based on the following components: (a) extremists and/or moderate actors interact in the internal political arena; (b) those actors defend interests, the ones considered as divisible, the others viewed as indivisible; (c) definition and perception of interests in game, as well as interests their self, change during the conflict; (d) the order of preferences of actors is variable; (e) international interventions neglect the configuration of balance of power, (f) there exist three types of international interventions: deterrence, protective and preventive interventions; (g) peace agreements are political pacts, that establish new rules of the game; (h) two set of rules of the game can be established for the post-conflict regime: power-sharing institutions and liberal democratic institutions; and (i) there are two types of peace: precarious peace is linked to power-sharing regimes while sustainable peace is related to democratic institutions.

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[50] For a similar argument, focused on the international coordination difficulties in managing the Somali crisis, see Ahmed and Green (1999: 121).

Fieldwork: A Methodological Overview

As indicated in the introduction, the dependent variable in this research is "sustainable (or precarious) peace" and the independent variables are the internal balance of power favorable to moderate actors, and the implementation of an intervention strategy that seeks to weaken extremist actors. Countries like El Salvador represent my core hypothesis. In addition, as showed in figure 3, this dissertation submits three additional propositions. First, the null hypothesis suggests that the probabilities of establishing a precarious peace are high when internal power relations favour at least one extremist actor and when there is an absence of extremist-weakening strategies (Angola). Second, a first sub-hypothesis argues that internal power relations favoring moderate actors coupled with the absence of a process weakening extremism lead to precarious peace (Colombia). Third, a second sub-hypothesis proposes that internal power relations favouring at least one extremist actor, coupled with an extremist-weakening strategy, produce sustainable peace (Mozambique). I disprove the second proposition and demonstrate all the others.[51]

Data collection through interviews and the review of archival records will allow us to test the hypotheses. Quantitative measures are not excluded. However, this research focuses on qualitative data. More specifically, the qualitative indicators chosen will allow us to (a) identify *Hard-liners*, *Soft-liners*, Reformists and Radicals in all four countries; (b) measure the transformation of their political preferences in relation to peace and war, at the same time as it will enable us to discern what is "radical" or "extremist" in a specific context (cross-regional differences could be important here);[52] (c) to define what constitutes precarious and sustainable peace in concrete terms; (d) establish an

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[51] Colombia allows us to falsify the first sub-hypothesis. Internal power relations in favor of moderate actors, in the absence of a weakening process of extremism, does not lead to precarious peace but to a new eruption of violence. In other words, Colombia shows that (a) internal power relations favorable to moderate actors are not a sufficient condition, and (b) weakening extremisms is necessary to achieve sustainable peace.

[52] These considerations do not answer how to define the balance of power in each strategic situation. A review of archival records, in combination with interviews, can allows us to find what Walter (1999: 136) calls "costly signals", for example unilateral disarmaments, cuts in military budgets, etc. Costly signals, which include what Ginkel and Smith (1999) call "accommodation" (from Repressive Governments to dissidents) can indicate a reinforcement of moderate positions over radical ones, which stress, in turn, a variation in the balance of power. The quantity and the degree of concessions made by actors compromised in a peace process, the leaders' disposition to continue (or stop) negotiations, and the insider and outsider criticisms about the process, tell us about the influence of radical and moderate factions and, subsequently, the configuration of the balance of power. More research, however, must be developed on this topic.

exhaustive classification of types of international interventions and their effects at the internal level; and (e) to observe "strategic swings" in international missions.[53]

Figure 3
Methodological Framework: A Comprehensive Overview

Core hypothesis
Sustainable peace depends on an internal power equilibrium that is favorable to moderate actors and seeks to weaken the positions of extremist actors.

Null hypothesis
The probabilities of establishing a precarious peace are high when internal power relations favor at least one extremist actor and when there is the absence of an extremist-weakening strategy.

Sub-hypothesis
Internal power relations in favor of moderate actors in the absence of a weakening process of extremism leads to precarious peace

Sub-hypothesis

Internal power relations favouring at least one extremist actor, coupled with an extremist-weakening strategy, can produce sustainable peace

Variable 1
Internal balance of power

Favorable to moderate actors

Favorable at least to one extremist actor

Variable 2
Weakening Strategy of extremist positions

Yes   No

Sustainable Peace

Precarious Peace

| Mozambique | | Colombia |
| El Salvador | Angola | |

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[53] For example, an UN "neutral" mission could turn in a military engagement favoring one of the belligerents (see, for example, UN actions against Mohammed Farah Aideed, in Somalia). Data such as leaders' declarations, official goals of UN missions, what Walter (1997) conceives of as "costly signals" (for example, unilateral disarmament, voluntary cuts in military budgets, etc.) are a starting point in the search for indicators. This work of conceptual clarification will be carried out throughout the writing process.

Figure 4
Schedule of Field Activities

	Phase 1: Latin America				A [2]	Phase 2: Africa			B [2]
Months	01	02	03	04		05	06	07	
Interviews and archival records (Colombia)	▨								
Interviews and archival records (El Salvador)		▨							
Processing Information and writing the Latin American chapters (Montreal)					▨				
Interviews and archival records (Angola)						▨			
Interviews and archival records (Mozambique)							▨		
Processing Information and writing the African chapters (Montreal)									▨

(1): Month 01 = September 2004; Month 05 = May 2005.
(2): A and B are periods of two months designed to process and classify all the information obtained.
    A = January – February 2005; B= August - September 2005.

As indicated in Figure 4, field activities are divided in two phases. The first one, which takes place in Latin America, will be accomplished during the fall 2004 term. The second phase, or the African phase, is scheduled in the course of the Summer 2005 term.

The findings will be used principally for scientific conferences and publications. I plan to complete five papers in the course of the period extending from January 2004 to December 2006. These tentative papers are: (a) "Deconstructing Civil War in Colombia"[54]; (b) "Preventing New Waves of Violence. Deterrence, Protection and Prevention: Assessing International Intervention in Angola and Mozambique[55]; (c) "Prevention, the Rule of Law and the Construction of Citizenship"[56]; (d) "What Kind of

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[54] This paper will be initiated during my fieldwork in Colombia. I plan to focus on the reasons that explain the prolongation of civil war in this country. In this sense, balance of power favorable to radical actors and a lack of both local and international intervention seeking to weaken extremists could explain the recent Colombian history. In sum, at the methodological level, this paper shows that even when moderates prevail over extremists, weaken radical actors is a necessary task as the balance of power can change throughout the conflict. In this regard, Przeworski's metaphor of "logical trees with knots" is especially pertinent.

[55] Through this paper, I expect to show why internal balance of power is a central point to understand success and failure of international interventions on conflict resolutions. At the methodological level, I will suggest and demonstrate that linking internal to external factors clarify when the administration of "sticks and carrots" is necessary.

[56] A preliminary version of this paper has already been presented in March 2003, under the title " Inclusión y exclusión en América Latina. Una reflexión preliminaria con respecto a la reforma y la revolución" (Inclusion and exclusion. Preliminary Considerations about Reform and Revolution in Latin America), at a student academic conference organized by Université de Montréal and Universidad de Matanzas (Cuba). Focusing on

Peace? The Rules of the Game in Post-Conflict Contexts"[57] and (e) "The Causes of Civils Wars: a War of Causes?"[58].

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Marshall's sociological distinction between civil, political and social rights, I plan to prove that "Prevention" is the only type of international intervention that reinforces civil rights, a core element of democratic regimes. At a methodological level, this article bridges comparative politics' literature on democracy and democratization with international relations' literature on conflict resolution.

[57] Currently, the political science literature does not make distinctions between different types of peace. I plan to address this issue and to explain the differences between "sustainable" and "precarious" peace. Adopting a comparative politics' perspective, I will link this topic to power-sharing and liberal democracy regimes, and then analyze international interventions on conflict resolution.

[58] This short paper is in reality a review of the literature on the causes of civil wars. I plan to compare the different perspectives in the mainstream literature, such as culturalism, path-dependency, rational-choice, and other approaches. This article will focus on the root causes of civil wars in the cases of Angola, Colombia, El Salvador, and Mozambique. This paper is the product of many research activities, in particular, of my review of the literature on the causes of civil wars, which constitutes a central component in my strategy to identify indicators. The inclusion of case studies will enable me to articulate the obtained information. This paper has a pedagogical goal: to bring an actualized francophone text on civil wars to French students. A translation to English, however, is not excluded.

Fernando A. Chinchilla / Université de Montréal

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