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
The Prospects for Codetermination in the Textile Industry of Turkey

submitted by
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ABSTRACT

This study aims to draw the perceptual and attitudinal map of workers and managers towards participation in managerial decision making. Problematic areas in the implementation of codetermination are empirically studied using both formal questionnaires and informal interviews. The formal survey was conducted with 480 workers in a state-owned textile factory (Sümerbank) and 323 workers in a privately owned factory of comparable size (Altınyıldız). Having isolated 14 areas of participation which were *a priori* ranked along a dimension of personal to non-personal, results showed that workers were most likely to prefer participation in areas of personal importance. Attitudes toward participation were also compared for the two factories, revealing that workers from Sümerbank were more open to participation. The PERI “Psychological Symptoms Scale” was administered, with results showing that workers from Sümerbank had significantly higher psychological symptoms scores. Positive attitudes toward participation were not significantly associated to psychological symptoms level. The potential privatization of the Sümerbank is offered as a possible source of stress, thus accounting for the higher levels of psychological symptoms at Sümerbank. A framework for the implementation of codetermination is offered, and directions for future research are suggested.

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Informal interviews have been performed with numerous people, to whom we express our gratitude. We have been accepted with a warm welcome and provided with much crucial information. The list of these people can be found in the Appendix C.

For formal interviews, in which we have conducted an half-an-hour questionnaire, we would like to convey our warm regards to the labourers of Sümerbank and Altınyıldız enterprises. Without their patience and enthusiasm nothing could be undertaken. Finally, Turhan Akmanlı, Turgay Candan, Seyfettin Çelik, Şükrü Demiröz, Gürkan Dumlu, Gülşen Heper, and Çetin Yelken, the managerial person and the union representatives of both enterprises, were very kind and gave us their best hospitality.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

In contrast to the traditional managerial system in an enterprise, where the decisions taken by top management are successively decomposed through hierarchical layers until they are finally given as a command to the operational level, the system proposed by “codetermination” is defined as a process in which employees have some say or equal power in determining the outcome of decisions that affect them directly or indirectly. Although codetermination has many worldwide applications at the moment, Turkey has hitherto witnessed almost no attempt in that regard. Furthermore, theoretical/empirical studies conducted in Turkey investigating various aspects of implementing such a participatory decision-making process seem to be at an embryonic stage. Motivated by such an urgent need, the aim of this research is to draw the perceptual and attitudinal map of workers and managers toward problematic areas in the implementation of codetermination in Turkey. For that end, the textile industry has been chosen, as the major sector in Turkey, and it is aimed to form the said map by both formal and informal interviews as well as secondary materials. The formation of that map is believed to be functional in designing new forms of organisational structures which would enhance not only production efficiency but also political efficacy.

Although laden with problems of definition and of operationalisation, codetermination has been investigated, and implemented in various settings, over the past decades. The two well known and successful examples can be cited as that of Germany’s *Mitbestimmung* and that of Japan’s high level of participation at grass-roots in the form of “Quality Circles” and “Total Quality Management”. Such mechanisms surely have their own costs and risks, which should very carefully be assessed before any implementation, otherwise they may outweigh the benefits that one expects from the introduction of such a mechanism. A maldesign may, therefore, ruin an otherwise would be beneficial project, which explains the utmost need in conducting both theoretical and empirical research in that field. Furthermore, as codetermination has a multidisciplinary aspect, covering mainly economics, sociology and psychology, any research to be conducted in that regard should not overlook that very multidimensionality.

Even a quick *tour d'horizon* would enable us to safely claim that the prospects of codetermination are appealing. The increasing tendency in industrialised countries of passing from a "Fordist" technology to a "Post-Fordist" one, where the emphasis is to rely less extensively on comparatively simple mass production technology in favour of more specialised production where the knowledge, collective skills and expertise of workers become an important factor, definitely constitutes one of the most important reasons for giving increased attention to participatory mechanisms. This technological drive also happily coincides with a political environment which now seems to be much more fertile for such collaborative actions in contrast to the *laissez-faire* discourse of the 1980's.

The hope is that the findings of this research will provide vital information for Turkey, as a country with a high growth rate manifesting the need to restructure its managerial basis and with an ever increasing need and demand for political and economic pluralism. Once the problem areas in defining the boundaries of codetermination as a plausible system of management are crystallised, the research aims to better understand where the differences in mutual interests are arising, thus illuminating possible scopes of cooperation which otherwise would stay dormant. Although these findings will be (textile) industry-specific, some projections could certainly be made for general economic activities.

The concept of participation is a complex one. Often when we speak of participation it is difficult to agree upon what is understood by this evasive term. Furthermore, even if we agree upon a definition of participation there are differences in what people feel should be the criteria by which participation is granted. Another area of participation which is up for discussion is how beneficial participation will be. Will participation enhance the quality of life for the worker, and/or the quality of production above and beyond the costs that may be incurred by decentralising managerial decision-making? One of the general aims of this project will be to delineate the present attitudes and perceptions towards participation in the Textile Industry of Turkey. In this study we shall investigate three different aspects of participation. First, what are the attitudes and perceptions of textile workers in Turkey toward participation? Second, do these attitudes differ for workers who work in a State owned factory as opposed to those employed at a privately-owned

factory? Third, is there an association between positive attitudes toward participation and lower levels of “psychological symptoms”?

These specific issues reflect a realisation that the concept of codetermination is a complex one, and that only with substantial empirical research can controversial problems surrounding this issue be solved. This study keeps an open mind to both problems and positive contributions which accompany the sharing of power and decision making represented in various codetermination models. Furthermore, it is felt that each country will have to sculpt out its own form or model of codetermination based on the level of capital accumulation, industrial infrastructure, democratisation and cultural acceptance presently attained. No single solution appears to provide a grandiose model to organise managerial sharing. This in and of itself obligates that each country should investigate the attitudes and readiness of its workers and managers toward participation.

These three general areas of interest represent the grounds of our data collection. The data was collected from two separate factories wherein 803 textile workers have given complete responses. Initially taking the data set as a whole, with the general aim of delineating present attitudes and perceptions, we considered four sub topics: namely, i) what areas do workers want to participate in, ii) do they wish to personally participate or rather that a representative do so on their behalf, iii) when is participation seen as valid, and iv) is there an association between attitudes toward participation and various demographic variables for individuals? Initially, then, we sought to answer questions dealing with what areas workers wish to participate in. As the areas of participation are endless, we identified 14 areas ranging on a dimension of personal to macro, non-personal, issues of participation. These categories have been developed for the purposes of this research and do not represent a definitive and exhaustive classification. At the far personal end of this dimension we consider such areas of participation as wage negotiation. At the opposite non-personal end, we consider such issues as decisions on what products should be produced.

Another aim of this research is to probe how workers feel it would be most beneficial to their own interest to be represented. Would they prefer to participate personally or would they rather prefer a representative acting on their behalf. Furthermore, does the method of participation which the workers prefer differ in the different areas of

possible participation? With such information one could better develop a model of participation which would fit the needs of the workers of Turkey. This aspect of the research is important when we consider that participation in and of itself has a cost to the production unit as a whole in terms of time and resources. If the areas of representation are more precisely defined and the mode of participation delineated, then it will be possible to aim for a more efficient and functional model of participation wherein the needs of the workers and capital owners can be best satisfied.

When is participation seen as valid is another important question which we have confronted in this research. Furthermore, the question that how do workers feel about the right to participate is of equal importance in order to grasp the attitudes towards codetermination. We are also interested in the relationship between participation and the issues of ownership, seniority, knowledge and skills. We also pose the question whether merely working at the factory is reason sufficient enough to validate participatory rights. As the phenomenon of participation takes on different forms in different cultures and settings, in order to be able to serve for the best interest of workers and owners these parameters should be precisely defined.

Isolating more precisely the factors which facilitate the desire to participate will aid us in making decisions about codetermination. This study also examines the relationship between participation and the individuals' demographic data. How do characteristics such as gender, age, and education affect individuals' attitudes and perceptions towards codetermination? For instance, are workers from different educational backgrounds more eager to participate? As our goal is to set up codetermined production, to the extent we isolate more precisely the factors which facilitate the desire to participate our task will be reached more easily.

After attempting to generally delineate attitudes and perceptions about participation as we have outlined above, our second major aim in this study is to investigate a possible relationship between participation and factory ownership. With a major transformation taking place for the society in Turkey, one of the major issues has been the decentralisation of the State. Within this framework, the privatisation of State owned industries has been of primary importance. Privatisation, however, is a complex process involving not only economic issues but sociological and psychological ones as well. As industry in Turkey transforms to meet the

needs of modern production, an understanding of how workers perceive working for the state as opposed to workers working for the private sector gains importance. How do such sentiments translate into attitudes about codetermination? Do workers who work in a privately-owned textile factory feel more eager to participate than those in a State owned factory of a comparable size and structure? Do workers differ in areas of participation? How viable is participation perceived to be? It is felt that without considering such questions, healthy steps forward to transform the society and the industry in Turkey cannot be undertaken.

Finally, this study examines the relationship between participation and “psychological symptoms”. An important issue of codetermination is the value that participation adds to the workers’ quality of life. Participation in the workplace, and thus having some leverage over important events which may have decisive consequences, may add to the overall ability of the individual to build up resistance against stress. If such a tendency can be empirically validated, it is felt that the justification for codetermination will be decided upon more easily.

Within this context, this study investigates whether the urge one to control her/his social environment rather than be a passive actor destined by the decisions of others, provides grounds for a healthier personality. Does the urge to participate represent a willingness or capacity to cope with the changes that our social environment bring us face to face within our daily lives? If so, then, this should be reflected at the individuals’ level of psychological symptoms. To assess the respondents’ level of psychological symptoms, this study uses a psychological symptoms scale developed by Dohrenwend for use in normal population survey studies. The individuals’ psychological symptoms level is expected to be inversely associated with her/his positive attitudes toward participation.

In summary, then, in Chapter I we introduce the study and give a general outline of how the problem of codetermination is approached. In Chapter II we review the theoretical work in this area and attempt to provide a historical backdrop to the issue of codetermination. Here, the economic, socio-political and psychological dimensions of this study are discussed. In Chapter III we approach the problem of codetermination from the perspective of Turkey. A general outline of Turkey’s economic/political history is presented, with an account of industrial relationships, past attempts at codetermination, and the textile industry. In Chapter IV we review the aims of this study and present our method of

investigation in detail, discussing the measurement instruments used, the setting in which the research took place, and our sampling procedures. Results are presented in Chapter V. finally, in Chapter VI we discuss the findings and offer our suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF CODETERMINATION

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2.1. Defining the Traditional Paradigm of Hierarchy and the New Paradigm of Codetermination at Enterprise Level

In the traditional managerial system, decisions are taken by top management, and an implementation plan is successively decomposed through layers of management hierarchy until it is finally given as a command to the operational level. Aoki (1990), for example, characterises the traditional model of hierarchy by the following three basic attributes:

- i) every constituent unit is crystallised around a well-defined *specialised* function;
- ii) each constituent unit has one and only one immediate super ordinate to which it reports and coordination between any two (or more than two) constituent units is performed by the lowest super ordinate common to them;
- iii) there is only one unit (the central office) which is super ordinate to every other unit (p. 269).*

The departure from the subjection to the employer's authority in the workplace brings about employee participation in enterprise decision-making through different channels, which is called codetermination¹. Codetermination can thus be defined as a process in which employees have some say or equal power in determining the outcome of decisions which affect them, directly or indirectly.

The concept of codetermination is somehow, to use the Roca and Retour (1981) term, "bogged down," as the questions on the nature of participatory subjects, the level of application in an organisational structure, the subject-matter of participation, and the forms and areas of participation are subject to different interpretations and definitions. Nevertheless, the characteristic that belongs to the core of

* In quotations, throughout the research, all original italics are presented in italic form, our emphasis, however, is underlined.

¹ "Codetermination" and "participation" will be used interchangeably throughout this research.

codetermination can be given as “the capacity to influence, to exercise control, to have power, to be involved or to intervene actively in the decision-making of the organisation” – the intensity of any of these core capacities defining the degree of participation in the enterprise (Roca and Retour 1981: 2).

2.2. Conceptualisation of Codetermination

The introduction of a codetermined system would have important implications. These should carefully be analysed, and the pros and cons be thoroughly considered. To that end, the issue will be covered through four dimensions, namely sociological, political, economical and psychological. The term of reference will be the enterprise, although macro-level participation, and its interaction with micro-level codetermination, will not be left out of the picture.

2.2.1. The Economic and Socio-Political Dimension

For a proper treatment of codetermination it is necessary to take into account, from an economical and socio-political perspective, the costs and benefits of introducing a participatory mechanism. First, the benefits of codetermination are classified as follows:

1. There would be a reduction in labour disutility obtainable when workers participate in decision-making of the enterprises, as traditional management may have the tendency to under/misestimate (as they do not have any incentive to take into account) workers’ preferences about the specific uses to which their labour is put (Nuti 1987). To be more specific, Steinherr (1977) pinpoints that workers’ utility could be seen as “a positive function of participation itself, most likely with an S-shape” (p. 547). Similarly, managers may welcome codetermination, as this will satisfy their sense of justice and democracy (Steinherr 1977). Needless to remind, positive valuation of codetermination by managers may decrease after a certain intensity of codetermination due to a loss of managerial status and independence. These two aspects are also very interrelated with the psychological dimension, a topic that we shall discuss further along.

2. An increase in organisational effectiveness is expected due to codetermined relations. The introduction of such a scheme would eliminate strategic (game-theoretical) behaviour in bargaining and improve working conditions through better communication of power, since work relationship would be decided jointly as opposed to opportunistically. As Aoki (1990) clearly indicates, the real value of codetermination lies in the access it gives workers to accurate and credible information about the firm that would otherwise be confined to management, reducing the incentive for strategic bargaining behaviour.

Hence, the decrease of the number and intensity of conflicts in the enterprise would in turn bring about an increase in productivity and a reduction in monitoring costs and managerial slacks (see Steinherr (1977), Aoki (1984b), Barlett and Uvalic (1985), Bonin and Putterman (1987)).

3. Codetermination may facilitate the internalisation of external costs of enterprises, since the increased level of political pluralism has been interpreted as bringing about a long-term vision (Dahl 1985; Devine 1988; Adamson 1990). This might be detrimental in cases where the firm heavily pollutes the environment but is not held responsible for that fact due to either the lack of a functional juridical system or by the ability of the firm to by-pass the constraints set by such a system. In that regard, even some (Bullock 1977) have argued that the inclusion of a third party (as a way of representing the “community/local interest”) into the decision-making bodies of the enterprise is of prime importance – a topic that we shall discuss below.

4. Since workers, being employed by one single enterprise, cannot diversify their labour services among different enterprises, as opposed to shareholders who can diversify their portfolio and hence their risks (Fama 1977), there is an ethical reasoning that they must assume the right to share the control as they are bearing the risk of the firm at which they are working (see *e.g.* Schuller (1985)).

5. Participation in control of the firm through democratic processes is claimed to be a value in itself, distinct from any changes in the actual decisions made by the firm. Organisational conditions that discourage participation at work may also decrease interest and involvement in local

and national level participation. As Elden (1981) indicates, "industrial work resting on an undemocratic authority structure socialises people into passivity and political apathy" (p. 43). Codetermination should therefore be understood as a necessary condition for political education and democratic competence of the population, in the sense that it would stimulate greater participation and better citizenship in the government of the state itself, foster human development and enhance the sense of political efficacy (see *e.g.* Blumberg (1968), Pateman (1970), Dahl (1985), Hodgson (1984), Greenberg (1986), Held (1987), Keane (1988)).

The corollary of this fact is that economic success would often come more plentifully in cultures that place greater emphasis on norms of conduct quite different from that of narrowly defined self-interest maximisation (Morishima *et al.* 1982; Dore 1983).

6. Through codetermination it would be possible to articulate knowledge which would otherwise be hidden (Adaman and Devine 1994; Aoki 1990). The implicit assumption here is that employees possess valuable knowledge which can neither be objectified and codified nor transferred, and, therefore, can only emerge through their active participation in decision-making. The particularity of this local knowledge was first underlined by Hayek, the following quotation of whom expresses itself very neatly:

The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. (...) [The economic problem] is a problem of the utilisation of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality. (...) [P]ractically every individual has some advantage over all others because he possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to him or are made with his active co-operation (Hayek 1945/1949: 77-80).

After having stated the benefits, it is now the turn to refer to the possible costs of introducing codetermination:

Under such a scheme, information processing, meetings, and extensive discussions would require the allocation of some extra resources (in the form of time and money) (see *e.g.* Sartori (1987)). In addition to this,

these costs are expected to increase more than proportionately with higher levels of participation (Steinherr 1977).

Furthermore, the cost of codetermination may be aggravated by two reasons. First, the way of defining the internal structure of a codetermined management may prove problematic. As we shall see below, there are many ways of participating in the decision-making of firms, with variant intensities. The determination of the best combination of codetermination may be rather difficult to achieve, and in some cases this may probably require a *tatônnement* process, all of which would presumably increase the costs. Second, the practical application of codetermination may vary from industry to industry or technology to technology; specific types of industrial organisations or technological structures may prove more accessible to a codetermined managerial process whereas others may not be so responsive. In the lack of a uniform model for enhancing participation at the workplace, it would be very difficult indeed to find the optimal *menu*.

Having said this, however, a reservation to the alleged excessive cost of the time that is needed to be invested during the participatory process should be raised. There seems to be no doubt that, regarding a short-term and static perspective, the time invested needs to be treated as a cost (see e.g. Sartori (1987)); but should the perception be widened to take into account the educative element of this procedure, then categorically this time cannot be treated as a cost, as many scholars from Mill onwards have been arguing (see Cole (1920; 1938; 1950), Macpherson (1973), Pateman (1970), Greenberg (1986) and Held (1987)).

After having stated, in general terms, the pros and cons of implementing codetermination, it is now the time to raise the question whether the incorporation of profit sharing with codetermination would have any positive or detrimental effect on the efficiency level of the enterprise. At first sight, it may be argued that profit-sharing and participation should go hand in hand, as both would reinforce each other. Yet, a more closer investigation will reveal the opposite. From a theoretical perspective, it may be argued that a profit sharing firm will behave quite similar to the Labour-Managed-Firm which maximises the value-added per worker, and thus will duplicate the perversity aspect of it, the reasoning of which is presented below.

The tradition following the contributions of Ward (1958), Domar (1966), and Vanek (1970) takes as the point of departure the assumption that in the so-called Labour-Managed-Firms (LMFs) the aim is to maximise the dividend per worker-member, defined as the value-added per worker. More specifically, the LMF chooses inputs in the short and long run to maximise the value-added per worker:

$$v = V/L = [pQ(K,L) - rK]/L, \quad (1)$$

where the output, $Q(K,L)$, sold at a price p , depends both on labour input, L , and on the amount of K of capital goods employed, the latter being hireable at a rental r . The LMF's production function is assumed to be differentiable and exhibits positive and decreasing marginal products of capital and labour. In the case of the short-run (where capital is taken as fixed), the first order condition $\partial v/\partial L = 0$ of maximising the value-added per worker gives

$$p(\partial Q/\partial L) = v. \quad (2)$$

In the case of the long-run (where capital becomes a variable), the first order conditions $\partial v/\partial L = 0$ and $\partial v/\partial K = 0$ of maximising the value-added per worker give

$$(\partial Q/\partial L)/(\partial Q/\partial K) = v/r. \quad (3)$$

The consequence of the Ward-Domar-Vanek assumption regarding the behaviour of LMFs is that of inefficiency and perversity, which will be discussed below under the short run, long run and investment categorisation (for a general discussion see, for example, Bonin and Putterman (1987) and Kleindorfer and Sertel (1993)).

Short-run Problems of the LMFs:

The main three problems that are expected to arise when capital is assumed to be fixed can briefly be stated as follows:

1. LMFs will be smaller than their capitalist twins (equipped with the same production function Q and facing the same markets) if profits are positive. Note that if there is a positive profit, the profit that goes to shareholders in a capitalist twin firm would be divided among workers in an LMF, making the value-added per worker greater than the ongoing wage rate. Recalling that the marginal product of labour is decreasing, the LMF has to use, under the positive profit scenario, less labour in order to attain the optimality condition (2), bringing about inefficiency.

2. LMFs would behave perversely to autonomous shifts in the product price, by lowering (increasing) its labour force, and thus output, when the price goes up (down). The proof is given as follows (via Sertel (1987)):

Let Ω stand for $Q - L(\partial Q/\partial L)$, then the optimality condition (2) can be rewritten as

$$\Omega = K.r/p \quad (2')$$

It is clear that $\Delta p \Delta \Omega < 0$. In order to see the sign of $\Delta L \Delta \Omega$, we have to check the sign of $\partial \Omega / \partial L$, which is

$$\partial \Omega / \partial L = - L(\partial^2 Q / \partial L^2).$$

This is positive, as $\partial^2 Q / \partial L^2$ is assumed to be negative; we therefore get $\Delta p \Delta L < 0$.

3) If there is a positive profit and the value-added per worker differs among the LMFs in an industry, labour allocation in the LMF economy would not be Pareto optimal. Clearly, a reallocation of labour toward the LMF with the higher value-added per worker from the LMF with a lower one would increase total output in that economy.

Long-run Problem of the LMFs:

The main problem here is that in the long run if there is a positive profit, the maximised value-added per worker will exceed the ongoing wage rate, thus the choice of technique characterised in (3) would be more capital intensive than the optimal combination level.

Investment Problem of the LMFs:

The under-investment malady has long been attributed to LMFs: due to the anticipated finiteness of tenure of members who cannot fully appropriate the cash flow results of internal investment, members would adopt a higher effective discount rate and underinvest (Furubotn 1976). Furthermore, as Fehr (1992) noted, due to the fact that initial members of LMFs are subject to expropriation by newcomers there would be again an incentive to underinvest. In other words, incumbent workers cannot monopolise the benefits from growth, even if they bear the cost of growth.

The conclusion to be drawn is that the LMFs' design is fundamentally flawed; the main surprise, however, is that they have occupied, and still occupy, the attention of many economists to the existing extent (for a relatively recent contribution see, for example, Drèze (1989)). There have been many attempts to cure this flawed structure (for a review see Bonin and Putterman (1987)). Yet, none has been successful enough to be able to properly answer all the deficiencies; furthermore, the fact of the matter turns out to be that the Ward-Domar-Vanek framework prevents the emergence of such a proper answer (Kleindorfer and Sertel 1993). Only if the shares and capital structure of the workers' firm were valued and sold to both present and potential future employees, then the persistent perverse and inefficient character of the LMFs would evaporate.²

² This avenue was first explored by Sertel (1982), with further contributions along that line being in continuum (see Dow (1986), Sertel (1987), and Kleindorfer and Sertel (1993)). In Sertel's system (where the new term Workers' Enterprises (WE) is preferred to the old LMF), any expansion of the membership list requires the approval of both the newcomers and the current members, likewise any contraction can only be realised if both those who are to retire and those to stay give their mutual consent. Therefore, the WE unanimously agrees to adjust capital variable so as to maximise the value-added per worker, and the size of labor, i.e. the membership list, is itself subject to the worker-partnership market. As such, "[a] deed price at which no sellers can find buyers and no buyers can find sellers will not only be an equilibrium deed price, but will also correspond to a rest point in the formation of the firm and to an equilibrium firm size" (Sertel 1987: 1621).

The conclusion to be drawn, from our point of view, is that should profit sharing be incorporated into a codetermined organisation, then workers would have the tendency to reveal similar behaviour to LMFs, thus creating inefficiencies. A related issue is that codetermination may impart "syndicalistic" characteristics to enterprise behaviour, bringing about a loss of flexibility, and thus inefficiency, to the firm since hiring and firing would no longer be easily executed should workers have a strong influence over the determination of that issue (Bonin and Putterman 1987). These two points, valid from a pure theoretical framework but not rigorously supported empirically (on this, see below), should be kept in mind in designing any mechanisms which are alternative to the traditional management system. This brings about, once again, the importance of the design problem that we face with, since codetermination has a lot positive points, but not without any drawbacks.

The efficiency implications of codetermination has been extensively tested empirically, and the result of the results is that usually, but not always, codetermination brings about an efficiency increase (Cable and FitzRoy 1980; Streeck 1984; Bonin and Putterman 1987; Fitzroy and Kraft 1993).

2.2.2. The Psychological Dimension

It goes without saying that individuals' willingness and readiness to take part in codetermination may have an important role in determining psychological symptom levels. For that end, it would be necessary to set out a theoretical framework which would explain this correlation.

The detrimental effects of an unstable social environment on the individual has dominated stress related research for decades. In 1939 Faris and Dunham (1939) disclosed findings that there were proportionally higher rates of first admissions to psychiatric hospitals for schizophrenia from the poverty stricken areas of center city Chicago. Similar findings were found by Hollingshead and Redlich (1958) in their New Haven study. Srole *et al.* (1962) showed that the findings were similar for a non-treatment population. These findings set off a chain of research which still persists today. Two major theoretical approaches developed, one claiming that psychological symptoms occurred due to the rampant conditions that lower class individuals were exposed to (social causation theories) and another approach which has come to be referred

to as “drift theory”. Drift theorist claimed that it was not the conditions that were causally important in explaining the higher rates of mental illness in the lower classes but rather that individuals who were in some way afflicted with mental illness drifted to the lower levels of the class structure due to their incapacitating conditions. This drifting down of mentally incapacitated individuals was seen as responsible for the inflated rates at the lower class levels.

In later years it was established that not only were rates higher for lower class individuals but for women and blacks as well. It appears that the most important underlying factor to this non proportional share of psychological ailments is that the vulnerable group lies at the disadvantaged end of some power dimension. Be it gender, race, or social status, it appears that individuals lying at the disadvantaged end of the power scale are more vulnerable to the effects of a stressful environment. In other words, given equal amounts of stress, usually measured in terms of life events³, individuals from disadvantaged social groups are more apt to breakdown with psychological symptoms.

Within the framework of the social causation theory, various modes of explanation have been put forth to explain these empirical findings. The most obvious is the claim that individuals in the lower class have less material resources to cope with the effects of stress. Others have approached the problem in terms of social support and/or coping skills buffering the effects of stress either prior to the event, during, or after the event. Such intervening variables have been found to partially explain the differential vulnerability experienced by disadvantaged groups, however the explanatory power of these isolated variables has been weak.

Mandalinci (1995) in a recent study in Turkey made use of a new intervening variable in an attempt to bring a theoretical explanation to the phenomenon of differential vulnerability. The variable of “predictive capacity”, defined as the individuals ability to predict before hand what will transpire socially as a result of ones actions prior to acting, has found empirical support. The general idea is that individuals are active players in defining and determining what transpires in the social arena and that

³ Life events are any events, either positive or negative, which require that the individual adapt in some form or another. Usually life events are measured using a checklist where changeful events are read to the respondent and asked if such an event has occurred to the individual in the past year (*i.e.*, death of a child, divorce, marriage).

their ability to socially map, and to understand the social forces which determine their interests, largely depends on their ability to “predictify” their social environment. “Predictification” is a sustained quality of knowing, within some probabilistic range, what will transpire under given conditions and actions. “Predictification” of one’s social environment is obtained through interaction and participation in information rich social phenomenon. The idea is closely related to the symbolic interaction theory and represents what may be called a measure of “generalised other”. As Mead (1934/1962) says, the self is seen as developing through the acquisition of social roles wherein the individual develops through social participation and understanding of him/herself through generalised estimations of others’ behavior.

Within this theoretical framework the explanation of vulnerability to stress is spelled out in terms of the groups having been denied access into information rich areas of social interaction, where social meaning is derived and accumulated. With limited access to such “predictifying” interaction the individual is limited in the development of “predictive capacity” with which to manipulate social events and thus lessen the possibility of psychological breakdown given stress. Here stress or a life event is seen as a catalyst which begins a chain of efforts which work toward the resolution of an event. When the individual lacks “predictive capacity” s/he knows not how to act in his/her best interest. Non-action can be as detrimental as wrong action.

When events are not resolved and return to consciousness repeatedly for a resolution, adaptive energy, which is mobilized by the body during times of stress, is rapidly depleted. We refer to such situations as “stress loops”. The persistence of a “stress loop” for a prolonged period of time increases the probability of psychological damage. The concept of “stress loops” is essential to the “predictive capacity” hypothesis. As an individual “predictive capacity” increases the probability of avoiding a “stress loop” initially and the probability of breaking out of a “stress loop” should one occur is increased. Individuals with low levels of “predictive capacity”, in other words, those individuals who lack the capacity to predict how their actions will play out in social relationships prior to acting, will have increased their probability of entering a “stress loop” and a lesser chance of exiting a loop should one occur. In short, a prolonged “stress loop” with no foreseeable resolution

of the event rapidly depletes adaptive energy as Selye (1956/1978) offers and psychological damage onsets.

Given that “predictive capacity” is gained through participation in social interactions wherein role accumulation and inside information about the functioning of the system are gained, then we would assume that those individuals who have an urge to participate in the management of their work place would have higher levels of “predictive capacity”. Within this context then the “predictive capacity” hypothesis would hold that individuals who see the importance of and/or have the urge to participate in the management of their work place, thus having higher levels of “predictive capacity”, should also have lower levels of psychological symptoms. Here the assumption is that individuals with higher levels of “predictive capacity” are more apt to avoid and or exit “stress loops” which may occur and thus would have lower levels of psychological symptoms.

In summary, then, given the assumption that positive attitudes toward participation are positively associated with “predictive capacity”, then we would expect that positive attitudes toward participation taken as an indicator of “predictive capacity” would be inversely related to the individual level of psychological symptoms. The higher an individual reveals the need to participate the less psychological symptoms they should currently have.

Most studies of stress have employed the use of “life event check lists” as a measure. The development of these various check lists date back to Adolf Meyer’s use of “life charts” as a clinical tool. His observation was that prior to the onset of mental illness, there appeared a clustering of eventful incidents in the individuals’ life history. Holmes and Masuda (1974) began developing life events check lists back in 1949. Life events were later rated by individuals to develop a “Social Readjustment Rating Scale”. From this, each event was assigned a weight representing the amount of readjustment the event required. The association between the number of life events experienced by the individual and her/his psychological symptoms level has been well established. The idea that the lower classes might be experiencing more life events than those in the upper classes and that this might provide an explanation to higher rates of mental illness in the lower classes was fostered but empirical research proved this not to be the case. Differential exposure to stress was proven to be unsubstantiated.

In the present study we do not have a measure for level of stress, usually measured by a life events check list. Here then we assume that the level of stress is constant. Stress is mediated by an individuals capacity to understand and manipulate the social environment in his/her own interest. While doing so we claim that the degree to which the individual can assess how to adapt or adjust depending on a knowledge of how the social processes function will allow the individual to avoid "stress loops". As we have stated "stress loops" are situations wherein the individual is pressured by the pressing and reappearing need to resolve an event with no viable alternative to do so. The continuing depletion of adaptive energy, as the event returns to consciousness for resolution, leads to psychological breakdown.

In short, then, in this study we take an individuals' positive attitudes toward participation as an indicator of his/her level of "predictive capacity". As "predictive capacity" increases the level of psychological symptoms should decrease. Thus we expect an inverse linear relationship between an individual's positive attitude toward participation and his/her psychological symptoms level.

2.3. The Two Prerequisites of Participation – Democratic Commitment and Capability of Taking Part in Decision-Making

The first prerequisite of an effective codetermination is the democratic commitment, in which individuals would have to follow democratic rules in order to enhance participation. These democratic rules must include, *inter alia*, equal voting, and enlightened understanding and control of the political agenda (see *e.g.* Dahl (1985)). In order for this democratic structure to be fully functional, Held visualises that

individuals should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives; that is, they should enjoy equal rights (and, accordingly, equal obligations) in the specification of the framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others (Held 1987: 271).

Thus, there seems to be a perfect understanding that in order for participatory decision-making processes to be fully functional, they must be based in principle on democratic rules. Obviously, at this stage, the

ways by which decisions are to be finalised within participatory processes assume great importance. as any voting mechanism, apart from the unanimity rule, would bring about a bias (“voting paradox”)⁴, thus highlighting the importance of the selection of the voting agenda. But, an expectation can be made that in such a decision-making process, in which all those affected participate, a dynamic towards consensus and compromise would emerge.

Democracy brings about the right to participate; but whether individuals are capable of fully participating obviously depends on their potentialities to take part in such decision-making processes. This requires, as a second prerequisite for effective participation, the elimination of differentiation and hierarchy among employees in the workplace, which gives some consistent advantages over others. For a social organisation in which everybody is entitled to access on an equal basis to the essential resources for effective participation in economic decision-making, pleasant and unpleasant work, and conceptual and administrative work, need to be shared; individuals, in this regard, need to rotate through some sequence of tasks so that no one enjoys consistent advantages over others. A collective responsibility to promote the ability of everyone to participate in decision-making processes requires that the enterprise is organised in such a way that the resources needed for people’s self-development are available (Adaman 1993; Bahro 1978; Devine 1992).

2.4. Models of Participation

Any attempt to implement participation should identify who participates, over whom those who participate exert influence, and finally, on what areas and in what ways participate will take place. In this section an attempt will be made to sketch a map of the areas and forms of participation.

2.4.1. The Areas of Participation within the Enterprise

The areas of participation within the enterprise are needless to say very numerous, in the sense of covering all the areas of decision-making

⁴ See *e.g.* Mueller (1979).

related with enterprise activities. Therefore, it would be convenient to collect all the basic decisions under 14 headings (as it would be used in our questionnaire) and classify them in order to facilitate the articulating and ranking of the areas of participation according to their importance and weight. One such an approach is illustrated below (fig. 2. 1.), which is a slightly modified adaptation of the one that has been used in "Industrial Democracy in Europe Revisited" by the Industrial Democracy in Europe, International Research Group (1993: 5).⁵ Rows are separated according to the length of the decision's effect, into "short", "medium" and "long" terms. Here, although we do not want to specify an exact length of time, it should be conceivable to think short term as up to one year, medium term as between 1 and 5 years, and long term as more than 5 years. The columns indicate the three different areas of participation: "work/social conditions", "personnel" and "economic aspects".

AREAS OF PARTICIPATION TIME PERSPECTIVE	<i>Work & Social Conditions</i>	<i>Personnel</i>	<i>Economic Aspects</i>
<i>Short Term</i>	*TASK ASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFERS *PERSONAL EQUIPMENT *WORK CONDITIONS *WORKING HOURS AND HOLIDAYS	*WORK EDUCATION AND TRAINING COURSES	
<i>Medium Term</i>	*WAGE LEVELS AND WAGE DIFFERENTIATION	*DISCIPLINE AND DISMISSALS *HIRING PROCEDURES *APPOINTMENT OF OWN SUPERVISOR, NEW DEPARTMENT HEAD	*MARKETING, PRICE DETERMINATION
<i>Long Term</i>	*WELFARE FACILITIES		*NEW INVESTMENTS *NEW PRODUCT *TECHNOLOGY

figure 2. 1.

⁵ The modification maintained by adding two new items (namely Welfare Facilities and Marketing) into the chart and by merging several related items into one.

Yet, an alternative classification, regarding the functional level of the *power sharing*, as depicted at the following chart (fig. 2. 2.) can also be constructed.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL PARTICIPATION	STRATEGIC LEVEL PARTICIPATION
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *TASK ASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFERS *PERSONAL EQUIPMENT *WORKPLACE CONDITIONS *WORKING HOURS AND HOLIDAYS *HIRING PROCEDURES *WORK EDUCATION AND TRAINING COURSES 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *NEW INVESTMENTS *NEW PRODUCT *TECHNOLOGY *MARKETING, PRICE DETERMINATION *WELFARE FACILITIES *DISCIPLINE AND DISMISSALS *WAGE LEVELS AND WAGE DIFFERENTIATION *APPOINTMENT OF OWN SUPERVISOR, NEW DEPARTMENT HEAD

figure 2. 2.

This classification is heavily inspired by Aoki's (1990) approach, in which the distinction between *strategic* decision-making and *operational* decision-making has been proposed. Operational level participation (OLP) covers the decisions regarding the daily routines of a workplace and the production process of a plant. Strategic level participation (SLP), on the other hand, "is concerned with those decisions of the firm (corporate organisation) which structure the basic framework of its operations" (Aoki 1990: 268). Very broadly speaking, we also notice that operational level decisions usually do not require major expenditures, and, therefore, are less risky from the management point of view; the strategic level decisions on the contrary require major expenditure, and for that end are risky.

Strategic decisions such as the scheming of new investments and new products, deciding on technology renewal or marketing and price determination were easier to classify. The same thing can also be said for the decisions regarding practical and *operational* issues, such as task assignments and transfer of workers from one unit to another, or problems relating with the choice/assignment of personal equipment. Yet, it should perhaps be explicitly stated that even in this classification the demarcation line is not very clear-cut. For example, in the short run, welfare facilities might not be strategically important for the productivity of the firm; yet, in the long run, when one considers the impact of such facilities on the workers' motivation, and in turn on the firm's

productivity, one may well wish to classify it as a strategic decision. Another example could be given among the decisions regarding the betterment of the workplace conditions; such decision-making surely does not require (generally speaking, of course) major efforts or expenses and consequently there seems to be no reason as not to classify it under OLP. A final example might be the decision regarding the appointment of a new department head. Such a decision – despite that fact it is not financially binding- might be seen as strategic because sharing power with the employee in electing a managerial body requires an important amount of hierarchical earthquake and change of perception.

Finally, a third categorisation can be invented. There is the possibility of classifying all the 14 items along a “personal” and “non-personal” spectrum – a path that will be explored later on.

2.4.2. The Forms of Participation

The most conventional way of classifying the forms of participation is to make the distinction between *direct* and *indirect participation*. According to Heller (1992), *direct participation* means to give “each employee the opportunity to take part in discussion, consultation and decision-making, usually in small groups”. Consequently, *indirect participation* implies participation through a process of electing representatives. Although there is *no* one to one correspondence, while strategic level participation tends to be *indirect* in the form of board representation, operational level participation is usually undertaken *directly* through councils, committees, or circles.

At this point, the distinction between *voluntary, management-led* and *juridical/corporatist-led* participative structures could be mentioned. The *voluntary* form of participative structures are those structures in which both the management and employees of an enterprise unanimously agree to share decision-making power; in the *management-led* form, the managerial positive attitude towards codetermination dominates the organisational form. *Juridical* and *corporatist* participative structures are those which are backed up with detailed laws and come to function as a consequence of a mutual agreement at the macro level between the social partners, namely the government, capital and labour. The empirical evidence indicates that, on the one hand, voluntary and management-led

structures do not commonly tend to have any juridical backing and do not usually function as a mean for any significant amount of power sharing; on the other hand, juridical/corporatist-led structures aim at encompassing national, industry wide, enterprise based, and workplace level decision-making processes, in all areas, with a variety of committees, boards, and councils.

The inclusion of third parties into workers' representatives is still an unsettled issue. In that regard argue the necessity of including trade union members who are not employed at the enterprise, as otherwise particularistic tendencies of the enterprise may not be so easily controlled, and the link between the enterprise, industry and the whole economy might be loose (Briefs 1989). Some others underline the necessity of including a "neutral part" into the decision-making process. The Bullock Report (1977) of the United Kingdom is an interesting example in that regard: the report underlines the importance of the third party's function, and advocates the "2x+y" formula, in which the "y", which is to be less than one third of the total board, consists of co-opted directors who are selected by both the employees and the employers, and "x" is the workers' and investors' representatives. The co-opted group is aimed to have a dual function of mediating between the investors and workers and to bring wider experience and considerations to bear. The Bullock Report did not want to propose any restriction as to eligibility for co-option, other than the agreement of a majority of each of the other two groups, but explained their view that this might be made up of senior personnel from other companies, experts, and trade unions who are not employees of the enterprise.

In practice we have been observing many different forms of codetermination, in many different countries; a *potpourri* of these applications are presented as "Case Studies," which appear in the Appendix A.

2.5. An Historical Account of Codetermination vis à vis the Ideological, Technological and Cultural Plasma

Ideological, cultural and technological dimensions are to be considered for discussing and assessing the prospects and possibilities of codetermination.

First, it would be useful to understand how different ideologies may handle and approach codetermination with respect to the changing political climate of the era. Different social classes and groups according to the changing socio-politic and politico-economic *milieu* would give different responses towards this multi-faceted issue.

Second, technological changes and transformations that occur in the production process in relation to the changing market circumstances demand a re-organisation of the existing organisational structure. Consequently, this re-organisation will demand a serious consideration of codetermination if it is to be handled with a long-term perspective.

And, finally, cultural aspects are quite crucial in understanding the demands and potentialities of different social partners (*i.e.* workers and investors) since one of the determinants of their attitude towards codetermination will be the historical and cultural heritage of that particular society.

2.5.1. Ideological Aspects

A classical dichotomy dominates the ideological sphere: individualism versus collectivism. Generally speaking, individualism sacrifices cooperation and participation for the sake of competition and the hierarchical dominance of the fittest. Collectivism's approach to codetermination, on the other hand, is not always a welcoming one: a paternalistic version of it, for example, would reject any participatory mechanisms.

Within the twentieth century context, the general approach towards codetermination has varied. In the Western European context, when the expansionary Keynesian policies were providing a favourable environment for labour, in the post 1950 era, the attitude towards codetermination was reasonably positive (Allen 1990). The Keynesian consensus of the tripartite system provided codetermination at the societal (macro) level with the participation of the government and top institutions of labour and capital. On the other hand, at the enterprise (micro) level, this period saw extensive adaptation of "experimental" forms of codetermination. But, since the technology used in production throughout the post-World War II era was not very compatible with, or receptive towards, participative activities, these models could not translate the democratic atmosphere created in the societal level into the hierarchical

atmosphere of the workplace. Furthermore, a paternalistic state vision was accepted without much discussion. Hence, these forms of codetermination could not alleviate the alienation of the masses from the “formal” democracy and from the hierarchic organisational structure. As a result, this alienation caused a reactionary shift from the collectivist 60s and 70s towards the individualist and liberal 80s, rather than towards more articulated and participative democratic structures. During the 1980s, as a result of the ideological hegemony of the individualism, the corporatist structures of the macro level were abandoned and only micro level forms of codetermination which do not disturb the hierarchy of the firm began to be promoted and allowed to attend (Marsh 1992).

In this *milieu* the attitude of trade unions also played an important role; some, for example, shifted to a more defensive strategy and chose a conflictual relationship with the capital, while others opted for looking for some compromises in return for their compliance to the hegemony of the capital.

2.5.2. Technological Aspects

At the plant level, the crisis of Fordism and Taylorism determines the real circumstances that necessitates the re-organisation of the production process and the introduction of codetermination. Fordism, as a system of production, is aimed at mass markets and being undertaken in mass production with product specific machinery. Taylorism, on the other hand, is an organisational structure in which semi-skilled workers are engaged in routine occupations. It is argued that these technological and organisational forms of production, faced with the changing parameters of the international competition at one hand and developing technology at the other, are bound to be re-structured and re-organised. The analysis of Piore and Sabel (1984) defines *post-fordism* or, to use their terminology, *flexible specialisation*, as a system aiming at producing a variety of customised goods for diversifying markets, with multi-purpose machinery, conducted by skilled and innovative workers. Roobeek (1987),⁶ in that regard, outlines the following two reasons in explaining the transition to the post-fordist era: First, the inflexibility of Fordist production technologies and the incompetence of Taylorist organisational

⁶ Via (Greig 1992).

structures were preventing industries from producing the optimal amounts and variety of products in response to localised and diversified markets, hence causing *structural over capacity*. Second, the saturated markets of the after-Keynesian, monetarist period necessitated high quality and capital intensive products for competing in a highly competitive environment. Capital intensive and high quality production requires human capital and workers' involvement. Yet, the deskilling Taylorised organisational structures and hierarchic work relations, which were failing to provide the required positive environment for worker involvement, had lead to the problem of *poor quality*. A similar and complementary explanation comes from Allen (1990):

The new international division of labour has forced producers in the advanced industrialised states to rely less extensively on comparatively simple mass production technology in favour of more specialised production. The option for industries in the industrialised world to continue to rely on the postwar mass production strategies is increasingly diminishing. The essence of these arguments is that workers may be able to recapture some of their lost craft skills precisely because employers will need to rely on the skill base of their work force to remain internationally competitive. [...] Workers are being asked to concern themselves with more than just distributional (wage and benefits) issues. They are being asked to use their skills to deal with questions of production, precisely at a time when employers feel vulnerable to the onslaught of low wage, mass production industries in the newly industrialising countries. In short, employers [...] may be increasingly dependent on the collective skills and expertise of their workers –and their workers' unions– to remain internationally competitive (Allen 1990: 263-4; two footnotes are omitted)

Changing and diversifying markets, combined with incompetent technology, resulted therefore with two problems: structural over capacity and poor quality control (Nielsen 1991). Attempts have been made to solve these two problems. A first approach was to introduce newer technology and to modify the production objectives with respect to globalised competition and diversifying market niches without altering the hierarchical Taylorist organisational structures. That attempt, which is called the *neo-fordist* ways out of the crisis, proved to be inadequately hopeless (Mathews 1989a: 1989b).⁷ It has forcefully been argued that, to transcend both Fordist and Taylorist limitations, and to address the core of the problem, a firm should make a paradigm shift towards

⁷ Via (Greig 1992).

participation. This is a corollary of the fact that human capital is the most fundamental requirement for the highly computerised and diversified production technology, as local knowledge assumes greater importance. In this perspective, it is argued that, only a *post-fordist* strategy underlines the importance of giving labour responsibility, in addition to arguing the need for process variability and product innovation. These points are schematised in the below figure.

	PROCESS VARIABILITY	PRODUCT INNOVATION	LABOUR RESPONSIBILITY
FORDISM	(-)	(-)	(-)
NEO-FORDISM	(+)	(+)	(-) ⁸
POST-FORDISM	(+)	(+)	(+)

figure 2. 3.

*adopted from the three dimensional model of production system
by Badham and Mathews (1989).*

2.5.3. Cultural Aspect

Cultural aspects and cultural heritage are also highly influential in determining the prospects of codetermination. In the Japanese context, for example, it is argued that the experience of *Total Quality Management* is heavily moulded with the paternalistic and solidaristic aspects of this Eastern society.

In an era of technological transformation, codetermination at enterprise level requires human capital, and this is found in industrialised countries more easily, due to the high amount of educated people, as compared to less developed countries. From this perspective, it can be argued that the prospects of codetermination are better in developed countries than in less developed countries. Yet, despite the possible impotency of worker representatives in the decision-making process, due to their lacking of necessary training, managerial skills, or experience, a training programme that is moving parallel with the introduction of codetermination, on the one hand, and the election of more experienced

⁸ One can talk of a very limited, operational level participation which neither hinders the existing hierarchical structures nor leads to a decentralisation of power.

members of the workforce as representatives, on the other, might help a lot (Hansmann 1990; Heller 1992). Also as Heller (1992) underlines, independent institutions such as *Norwegian* and *Swedish Work Research Centres* would be very useful as consultants in giving their academic and technical support to these individual worker-representatives. In that regard, codetermination, as a structure of interaction and knowledge articulation, should perhaps be perceived as a mean for creating the necessary human capital for the hi-tech industries of today.

Finally, workers, mostly of developed countries, are on the eve of redefining their objectives from the pure economic gains of the post-war Trade Union movement to the formation of democratic workplaces and creative jobs in which they can alleviate alienation, to the adoption of efficient technology through which they can have more free time, and the acknowledgment of the flexibility of jobs in which they can learn and practice a variety of skills and occupations (Gorz 1982). This move, however slow it might be in reality, clearly indicates the workers' association, stronger than ever, with codetermination.

2.5.4. Reassessing the Historical Account with respect to the Ideological Climate, Technological Change and Cultural Heritage

The tradition of Quality Circles and Total Quality Management

During the transition from the Fordism to the Post-Fordist era, *quality circles* (QCs) have been highlighted as an important tool for delivering product innovation and process variability into production. QCs are small groups of five to ten voluntary employees and their supervisor, who by receiving training in problem analysis and statistical techniques, are expected to contribute to the identification of work-related problems and to propose solutions addressing these problems (Barrick and Alexander 1992). Management, which retains the responsibility to accept, modify, or reject these proposals, holds the authority for decision-making while a certain form of worker participation comes to life (Marsh 1992). These QCs ceased to exist by the end of the eighties, however, due to lack of interest among employees. Lawler and Mohrman (1985) even argued that QCs were seen as a transitional mechanism which would become non-functional once its mission was completed. When QCs were implied in

firms, as they are voluntary and not all workers agreed to participate into such programmes, they created a dual structure alongside the conventional organisational forms. Furthermore, once certain production problems were solved, there did not remain any rational for the continuing activities of QCs. Additionally, as QCs lacked any sort of implementary power they lost their desirability for the workers. Hill (1991) rather illuminatingly underlines that QCs were doomed to cease not because they were a transitional mechanism but because they were only a part of a complete paradigm, i.e., Total Quality Management (TQM).

TQM, on the other hand, as its theoretical advocates Deming (1986), Ishikawa (1985), and Juran (1988) argue, provides a complete culture of overall quality improvement through inner-firm planning with *horizontal* and *vertical* coordination. Horizontal coordination implies the intra-firm “customer-supplier” relationship (*i.e.* inter-departmental input-output relationship) being handled according to high quality criteria. Vertical coordination implies opening up the hierarchical organisational structure to more communication and greater involvement (Hill 1991).

The tradition of European Codetermination

The western European tradition of codetermination has a distinctive feature of the QCs and TQM. While QCs and TQM have been largely implemented as an answer to the crisis of the fordist production, and in that regard have been initiated by the management, the Codetermination and Works Councils (WCs) tradition of Europe is largely a gain for the labour movement and the corporatist culture of these economies. Codetermination in the European context has aimed to build the two dimensions of *micro-level participation* and *macro-level participation*. Macro-level participation implies a democratic corporatist structure where the representatives of the top institutions of the Social Partners (workers’ and investors’ top union federations) negotiate over macroeconomic and social issues. As for the micro-level, it implies enterprise level participation through *direct* involvement in works councils or *indirect* representation in supervisory and managerial boards. Yet, Allen (1990) argues that the link between *micro* and *macro-level participation* was not strong enough to preserve the European model of Codetermination and to dominate the industrial democracy scene of the

80s. It can be argued that, a more participative and decentralised system of codetermination, which would provide larger autonomy to the councils of direct participation, could be a remedy for the alienatingly rigid nature of the European tradition of corporatist Codetermination.

CHAPTER III

A BRIEF OUTLOOK AT THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF INDUSTRY IN TURKEY WITH A SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE TEXTILE SECTOR

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A BRIEF OUTLOOK AT THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF INDUSTRY IN TURKEY WITH A SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE TEXTILE SECTOR

In this Chapter, our aim is to give an account of industrial relations in Turkey within the context of her industrialisation effort. In doing so, the attempt will be to understand the economic development not only in itself but within the context of social and political change. To that end we will start with an examination of the economic and political history of the industrialisation drive in Turkey from the early days of the birth of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 until today, with an emphasis given to the post-1980 period. Afterwards, the attention will be turned to the investigation of the history of relations between the state, labour and business in Turkey, and to the depiction of a picture of industrial relations. Following this, a brief account of the theoretical and empirical studies which have been undertaken over the field of codetermination in Turkey will be outlined, and the applications of codetermination, as of yesterday and today, will be discussed. Finally, the role and significance of the textile sector in manufacturing industry, which constitutes the environment of our empirical research, and its organisational structure, will be highlighted.

3. 1. An Economic and Political History: The Framework of Industrialisation until 1980

An examination of Turkey's economic and political history in relation to economic development should begin with the years of the foundation of the Republic. Immediately after the war of independence (1919-1923), the leading cadres, guided by Mustafa Kemal, took a clear position that the establishment of the political independence of a newly born nation state be very closely connected with her commitment to industrialisation and to creating the conditions conducive to that. This commitment is easily understood when one recalls the motto of the First İzmir Congress of Economics in 1923 (held even before the foundation of the Republic in

1923): “National sovereignty could only be achieved through economic independence.” Along this perception, the period following the foundation of the Republic witnessed the passing of major economic measures that were backed by many political, cultural and social reforms. Within the context of Kemalism, industrialisation was defined as the key objective and project of the Kemalist state, along with the need of a major transformation of the society of Turkey toward a westernised and industrial society. This view was then clarified as the choice of an *étatist* approach toward industry (as the private capital accumulation and human capital were almost nil); after that the state made her move in actively participating in economic activity via the establishment of Sümerbank and Etibank in the respective sectors of textiles and apparel, and metallurgy and mining, during the early 1930s. In this manner, and also through the enforcement of the isolatory international environment of the post-1929 Crisis, *étatisme* entered the dictionary of the state as the key concepts and remained popular until the 1950s. This *étatist* order was designed to achieve a set of interrelated targets: building an infrastructure; producing various intermediary/capital goods; creating human capital; dealing with regional imbalances; and bearing risk in the sense of confronting the typical uncertainties of newly opened markets. For the first three decades these targets can be said to have met with success. (See Adaman and Sertel, 1995, and references cited therein.)

The 1950s signified a new approach toward the economy and society after the Democrat Party (DP) were elected when Turkey accepted a multi-party representative democratic system. This new approach was characterised by the priority given to agriculture, initiatives toward private enterprise as a locomotive of industrialisation, and by the winds of liberalisation in foreign economic relations – also complemented by a move toward gaining international recognition via participating in major international institutions, such as NATO and GATT. Even though the DP initiated some liberal domestic and foreign trade policies, such policies became subject to change towards interventionist ones as economic difficulties arose (Boratav 1990; Keyder 1987). Generally speaking, during the period 1950-1960, the economic policy could mainly be labeled as “inward looking”, but this with an *ad hoc* character and a lack of coordination (Baysan and Blitzer 1990). On the whole, the foreign trade regime of the time was highly restrictionist, and controls, regulations and multiple exchange rates were often subject to government

changes. In 1960, owing much to the economic crisis and socio-political instability, the military cadres, supported by intellectuals and students, halted the DP government.

A new constitution was later prepared (officially passed in 1961) under the guidance of military leaders, again with the contribution of intellectuals, within which planning was defined as a vitally important part of the strategy of the State in Turkey towards industrialisation (as a reaction to the liberal discourse of the DP period). This formed the basis for the establishment of the State Planning Organisation (SPO). Hence, the period after 1960 is usually known as the period of “planned industrialisation” coupled with “import substituting accumulation strategy” – both of which were objectified in the five-year plans. Thereby, economic growth, structural change towards industry, and the diversification of the export base to finance the increasing import-need of the economy, all emerged as the main objectives. The basis of such an accumulation strategy was the development of import-competing production lines under the state’s provision of a protective umbrella, and of guidance through its direct participation in the economy and overall support to industrial activity and exports. This drive was then conducive to a double-sided strategy: both private enterprise and the state would play crucial roles in realising the industrialisation attempt – within the official rhetoric of “the mixed economy principle”. It should also be noted that industrial labour with strong unions (which quickly emerged thanks to the new constitution of 1961) constituted the third arm of this new coalition, in which the bureaucracy and the urban industrialists were the other two. The state, in this framework, became a supporter, organiser and regulator of economic activity, as well as an actor itself (Keyder 1987).

In this context, the first phase of the Import-Substitution regime, which aimed at replacing the imports of non-durable goods (food processing, textiles (especially yarn), etc.), was successfully implemented between 1963 and 1973, despite the fact that the country was then experiencing a socio-political turbulence which constituted the rationale for yet another military intervention in 1971. But, owing much to the changing international climate and external shocks, the attempt at the second phase of the Import-Substitution strategy, which, generally speaking, aimed at the import substitution of consumer durable goods, intermediate (steel, refined products, petrochemicals, etc.) and investment goods, failed – an important explanation being that these products were

basically capital-intensive, requiring high technology and skilled/technical labour for their production, which could not be met in the case of Turkey at that time (Akder *et al.* 1987).

The years preceding the 1980 adjustment program, generally known as the “crisis years”, were mainly characterised by macroeconomic instability, and by social and industrial clashes. The country experienced very high rates of inflation, debt crisis and negative growth rates – where the oil shock and the consequences of Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974 both played decisive roles. That period was also marked by political turmoil and industrial disputes as well. Faced with such a deteriorating economic situation, the government made an attempt to “revitalize” the economy by the reform program (of 24 January 1980) which was formed by the direct participation of the World Bank and the IMF. The country was then subjected to a *coup d’état* in September of that year, and the military junta suppressed and sometimes terminated all oppositional groups and acted as a protector/guarantor of the 24 January economic program.

3. 2. Economics and Politics in Turkey in the 1980s and in the First Years of the 1990s

In the short-term, the structural adjustment programme of 24 January 1980 essentially aimed at removing the immediate obstacles to the existing capital accumulation strategy. This meant that the burning problem of the availability of imported inputs into industry and foreign exchange had to be solved. Towards this end, the policy package included devaluation, a minimum of import liberalisation, and export promotion measures. At the same time, industrial and social conflict that exercised the most serious threat on the existing order was addressed by a political project that aimed to “discipline” workers’ organisations (and other oppositional groups). In this respect, Turkey’s approach to structural adjustment had two broad initial economic objectives: stabilisation cum export-led recovery, and liberalisation of the economy of Turkey. The former was addressed, first, by a tight monetary programme that was a “popular” response to economic difficulties (of low or negative growth rates, rising inflation and the deteriorating current account position) around the globe in the period under question, and, second, by measures directly targeting exporters in order to overcome the foreign exchange problem (Öniş

1993). The process of liberalisation, on the other hand, featured the following sequence: i) deregulation of industrial prices; ii) removing controls on the financial markets through an interest rate reform; iii) trade liberalisation in successive stages; and, iv) partial decontrol of the capital account of the balance of payments. This liberal discourse was later coupled with a strong appeal in favour of full-scale privatisation, an issue which has been on the agenda since then but with no major realisation (Adaman and Sertel 1995).

Stabilisation policies that were put into practice during the 1980s can be regarded as the primary failure of this grandiose economic project, with inflation averaging 60-70 percent and the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) rising to 12-15 percent annually. The era of the junta government (1980-1983) can be seen as an exception to this performance, during which restrictive monetary targets and fiscal restraints were strongly pursued to restrain domestic demand and, along that path, to curb inflation. Declining government budget expenditures, low public investment in health and education, on the one hand, and declining real wages of public workers and civil servants, and reduced support prices to agriculture, on the other, meant controlled budget spending and less need for credit expansion – and all these at a period in which large amounts of foreign funding were readily available. The rise of the Motherland Party to power in 1983, however, brought with it high levels of investment in the infrastructure, and lucrative incentives to trade and business. That, in turn, gave rise to an increasing need for a greater money supply and/or domestic and external financing of such spending, although the wage income was further lowered in real terms throughout the 1980s (Boratav 1991b). Also, the presence of, what may be called, “election economics,” put an enormous strain on the government budget; as a result, PSBR rose above the levels of other high-debt countries in a way to characterise inflation as “chronic” in the context of Turkey through out the 1980s.

After 1983, under heavy budget deficits, executive cadres of governments of Turkey have shown a tendency to shift low cost foreign borrowing initially obtained from World Bank, IMF and the OECD Consortium, first into high cost, short-term domestic borrowing, and, then, in 1991, after the formation of the coalition government, proceeding the Motherland government, into high cost, short-term foreign borrowing, with a significant contribution from municipal governments

and the private sector. In this context, the high levels of public sector debt have created the conditions supportive of rent-seeking behaviour. Tax-free government bonds and treasury bills, which carried substantial real returns, have been a way of obtaining large rents for commercial banks as well as other economic interests, such as industrial capital and other rentiers (ICI 1993). In this respect, the crisis that dominated the economic field in 1994 is claimed to be the first of its kind experienced in Turkey, as it chiefly originated from the financial sector – needless to mention the role of the state's fiscal and debt crisis as the starting point of the crisis – which opted for “open positions” in their accounts by heavily borrowing in international financial markets and using such borrowing as a means of obtaining bills and bonds. The development that led to the crisis in the short term was the revision of the creditability rates of Turkey (by the watchdogs of the international financial capital such as the EIU and Standards and Poor), which implied that the financial sector needed the funds quickly (which were converted into Turkish Lira (TL) valued bonds), as they were not going to be able to replace them with newer foreign funds. This rush for foreign exchange also had an important implication for the productive sector in the sense that credits extended to the latter were requested back before their maturity, and this with higher interest rates. This situation continued until the financial centres put their houses into order and/or after they obtained excess loanable funds with high interest rates.

On the liberalisation front, on the other hand, it is to be noted that the 1980s witnessed frequently changing measures regarding trade policy. Generally speaking, it may be seen that nominal and effective protection of industry was increased, with the official proposition that the large dispersion of effective protection in the manufacturing industry may have been a source of strong political pressures, rent-seeking behaviour and lobbying (OECD 1991). More specifically, throughout the 1980s, export industries remained somewhat more protected than other industries. This refers us to the significant and increasingly “double-edged” role extra-budgetary funds have come to play in this field. On the one hand, they have been mainly financed by protective levies on trade; and, on the other, they have been a source of various export incentives to firms. In this respect, in addition to an undervalued currency and protection of industry, major incentives such as export tax rebates (which led to fictitious exporting), preferential credits, foreign exchange allocations,

retained foreign exchange earnings and exemptions from corporate taxation, all signified the state's commitment to exporting and to exporters in the short run.

One of the overriding characteristics of industry in Turkey throughout the 1980s and in the first years of the 1990s was that the level of productive investment in the private sector fell by record percentages – and could not even reach their level during the so-called crisis years of 1977-80.¹ The nature of exporting in the 1980s is also illustrative of the extent of structural change in the industry and of its “new” (and consciously implemented) mode of articulation with the world economy: i) the composition of exports remained discouraging, and the tremendous export performance achieved in the 1980s was simply based on labour-intensive, simple-technology (textiles and apparel, processed agricultural products, forestry, leather, etc.) products that have a low sophistication and poor quality character (OECD 1991); ii) the export boom of the 1980s was largely supported by two factors: the provision of extensive export incentives and dispersion of effective protection, and the massive growth of Middle Eastern markets; and, iii) there was not (and there is still no indication of) a broadening of the industrial base related to exporting, and massive exports were largely based on existing capacity created before 1980 which was expanded through productivity increases. In this context, the important point is that the rapid increase in exports simply meant a massive transfer from the domestic markets to the world economy, and this mainly due to high incentives given to exporters. In other words, the export boom in the 1980s was not based on structural change and a broadening industrial base, but on existing capacity and transfers out of the economy (Öniş 1993).

Finally, it is nowadays widely acknowledged that financial reform has not brought about what it initially aimed for: First, the savings rate has not risen, indeed it has fallen, mainly as a result of the fact that private disposable income was mostly used for consumption to achieve the high, albeit unstable, growth rates during the 1980s. Furthermore, as already pinpointed by Akyüz (1990), the private savings rate, although possibly rising since 1984, has been no greater during recent years than in the late 1970s, even though real interest rates, financial savings and per

¹ Although there has been an increase in the total amount of private sector investment undertaken during the 1980s, the bulk of it took place in the housing sector.

capita income have been substantially greater. Here, too, the unstable growth rates imply that the high growing performance of the economy was not based on a broadening industrial base, but on the increased use of existing capacity, triggered by rising domestic and external demand. Second, although the primary objective of financial liberalisation was claimed to be to increase the resources available to the productive sector, the high public sector deficit led to a situation in which basic credits extended to the manufacturing sector declined in real terms between 1979 and 1990. Despite the observation that the structural adjustment programme of the 1980s involved no major restructuring for industry (Wolff 1987), the economy lived through certain stages of financial liberalisation, which reached its highest stage after the legislative changes toward the full convertibility of TL. This issue became such a critical one during the early 1990s that the full convertibility decision and legislative changes in 1989 did bring about a situation which supported rent-seeking behaviour at the expense of productive investments.

As one may easily predict, the consequence of such an economic environment on income distribution has been severe. In 1987 a research regarding the Personal Income (i.e. Size) Distribution depicted that since 1973 a very unequal income distribution continued with the gap between the rich and poor slightly widening: the share in the National Income of the lowest 40% of the population declined even further to 11% from an already astonishing figure of 12.6%, whereas the richest 20% continued to enjoy 55% of the whole cake (DIE 1987; DPT 1976). Daily observations furthermore indicate that the economy of Turkey has been moving from "formal" to "informal" activities, where it is generally known that the labour's value added is underpaid, labour's insurance and retirement benefits are half-given, and working conditions are insufficient; yet the magnitude of informalisation, and its effects on income distribution, is hard to judge in the absence of any comprehensive study on Turkey (see Özar, Ş. (1994a)). According to another research which has been undertaken on a Functional basis, the share of Agricultural Income and Wages continued to decline throughout the decade, while the share of Non-Agricultural Non-Wage Income in the National Income was boosted to 57.6% by the end of the eighties whereas in 1979 it used to be 42.4%. If one looks for a comparison between Non-Agriculture Wage Incomes (as in agriculture of Turkey there is a widespread petty commodity production) and the Others (including

Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Non-Wage Income), the share of Others in overall total arrived at a spectacular 69.67% at 1994, whereas in 1979 it was approximately 59% (Özmucur 1994).

3. 3. A Brief Description of the History of Relations between State, Labour, and Business in Turkey

To start with, it may be worthwhile to restate that the main objective and project of the Republic of Turkey was to climb the ladder of industrialisation as a means for national sovereignty. This perception on the part of the state implied the creation and, later, the sophistication of a group of industrialists who were (hopefully) supposed to start the industrialisation drive – a discourse which was clearly stated by the leading cadres (especially by Mustafa Kemal himself) in the early days of the Republic (*İşveren*, various issues). This attitude, which even continued during the *étatist* and the mixed economy periods, was nevertheless accompanied with a determined willingness on the part of the state to preserve its strong presence in the economy (Buğra 1994).

In this context, the foundation and sophistication of “capital groups,” with increasing interlocking between industrial, financial and commercial capital, was the major institutional development of the post-1960 period. In addition, the increasing participation of foreign capital, mainly in collaboration with these groups (though in different ways of partnership) in the manufacturing of a range of products predominantly for the internal market, brought a different dimension into the picture.

The birth of employers’ and workers’ unions coincided with the historical development of industry of Turkey of the period mentioned above, and this *ipso facto* reflects the impact of the state on industrial relations. As noted above, the state, based on the principle of mixed economy, emerged not only as an organiser, supporter and regulator of economic activity, but also as an economic actor itself. Within this framework, the state decided to get involved in the employee-employer relationship, again within a westernised perception, by introducing legislative and constitutional clauses which would later initiate the establishment of workers’ unions. This establishment was a “created or induced” one, in the sense that a major grassroots workers’ movement was virtually absent at that time (Erdut 1992). In that regard, and after the introduction of the relevant clause in 1947, the Confederation of Turkish

Workers' Unions (CTWU) was the first confederation to be established in 1952, on the basis of a principle of shop-floor union organisation. The Confederation of Turkish Employers' Union (CTEU), on the other hand, was formed in the early 1960s with a need to counter the workers' organisation. These confederations were later followed by the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions (CRWU) and Confederation of Nationalist Workers' Unions (CNWU). The 1961 constitution, prepared under the direct auspices of the military, made it clear that the state's role in industrial relations was crucial, in the sense of safeguarding the wide range of newly designed legislative and constitutional clauses that extended the basic rights of the working population. In this context, the workers and civil servants were given the opportunity to organise themselves into unions and to have the right to strike for basic rights as well as for wages. The 1971 pronunciamiento, however, took a step back and limited certain rights for workers, removing the legal ground for the political organisation of civil servants.

The crisis years (1977-80), on the other hand, emphasised an increasingly ideological side of the unions, paralleling the general political polarisation of the society along the lines of revolutionarism and nationalist-fascism. This was also the mechanism in which social strife in society in general was reflected in industrial enterprise, and, only in this context can one interpret the requests of the business community for economic and social stability and peace (*TÜSIAD*, various issues). These years also led to fierce competition among unions, which in 1978 reached the number of 912, in obtaining high wage settlements as a way of gaining new members. The growing power of (especially leftist) unions in uniting workers behind their ideological tenets, and the ongoing social and political strife, however, would bring about a significant reflection on the industrial relations in Turkey in the coming decades.

At the frontier of state-society-economy relations, the 1980s were also the years of restructuring. Indeed, during the 1980s, the working class suffered considerable welfare losses, as well as major setbacks in their basic rights, which are outlined in the 1982 constitution and related clauses of the law. To start with, looking in retrospect at the pre-1980 events, the business community and military officials had a basic understanding regarding the restructuring of the socio-economic life of Turkey, and this was born in mind in the preparation of the 1982 constitution. In parallel to the restriction of basic rights, strikes were

banned for some time, union organisation was rendered more difficult (many leading figures having been jailed anyway), unions' expenses and activities were monitored quite closely, and the organic relationship of unions with political parties were disallowed from the outset. At the same time, the military introduced a ban on worker layoffs in both public and private enterprises. Furthermore, during the years of the Motherland Party (1983-1991), such constitutional and legislative clauses were reinforced by the introduction of a basic martial code, under which a special police brigade was formed to tackle "unlawful" strikes and "unlawful activities" during strikes – "unlawful" referring to the existence of strikes out of the economic reasoning, or for political and ideological reasons and even for basic rights (like safety at work). This meant a strict confinement of strike activity to wage bargaining in the case of disagreement between the parties, and this of course on an unequal footing.

With the industrial and social strife of the late 1970s in retrospect, it seemed that the industrialists put top priority in the post-1980 period on establishing "consensus and dialogue" with the workers' organisations. With the other rights of workers almost totally restricted, however, this meant a concentration on the wage issue and its linkage with worker productivity and/or inflation at the bargaining table. Interestingly, this move necessitated supporting a strategy of powerful unions and confederations, implying that the confederation open to dialogue, i.e. CTWU, was to be supported, while the "ideological" one, i.e. CRWU, outlawed. However, such strategies for removing the working class out of its historical-ideological context were not effective and a stage of consensus and confidence-building was not possible for most of the 1980s onwards, and, *ipso facto*, the late 1980s witnessed major workers' movements. Such a stage of consensus and confidence-building in the absence of democratic rights could become, however, a possibility after the recognition by the workers' unions of deindustrialisation as a potential threat. In this context, interestingly, during the last couple of years it is possible to witness, albeit not at a full-scale level, the interlocking of the long-term interests of the industrialists and workers' unions against the threat posed to industrial firms by the increasing domination of financial markets.

Within this context, during the rule of the Motherland Party, the 1980s brought a new understanding to the role of wage and labour

flexibility as a means of creating international competitiveness which still seems to be continuing. This was a clearly stated strategy of articulating the industry of Turkey into the world economy by means of utilising abundant and cheap labour resources. This also signified that Turkey would “open up” to international markets through its labour-intensive and simple-technology sectors, specifically textiles – an issue which will be taken up later on. Up to this stage, however, it was reasonably clear that industry and the working population were quite complementary to each other within the context of a growing, inward-looking industry, with the latter’s role being significant within the consumer-producer relationship for import-competing, not export-competing, products.

The 1980s can also be categorised as a period in which attempts were made, with some success, to form a corporatist structure, with CTWU as the third party to economic policy making. This, however, does not mean that CTWU was consulted at all levels of decision-making or policy implementation via formal or informal mechanisms, but that it was a confederation which emphasised national unity. In this sense, it was kept from dissenting first by its General Secretary becoming Social Secretary for the state and later by its presence at the economic bargaining table after years of being banned from union activity and wage bargaining. It was only after 1986 that CTWU realised the degree of erosion not only in their basic rights but also in real wages, when they then started raising their voices against this situation. However, the growing labour movement and the demands and achievements of real wage increases attracted a bitter response from employers in the form of large scale labour shedding in the post-1990 period.

In relation to the field of industrial relations, the 1980s also witnessed the establishment of public employers’ unions, which later became members of CTEU. For the state this meant a change of tactics in the field of wage settlements in the formation of a mechanism through which the state could effectively regulate the labour market at a decentralised and “de-politicised” level, with a *façade* behind which governmental (political) decisions could be hidden. In the public sector this mechanism was also utilised for spelling out the separation of workers and civil servants, and was executed in State Economic Enterprises through categorising large numbers of workers as civil servants, with the implication of constituting a barrier to union movement in that sector.

Within the context of industrialisation, and the relations between state, labour and business, the approach of each side to the issue of workers' participation at the workplace was quite indicative of the way industrial relations in Turkey developed and was influenced by the state. The state was again the initiator, at least discursively, of such a participation taking place in the industry with a view of the Western model in mind. Apart from some earlier moves in that regard which were of minor importance, as can best be exemplified with the decision, taken in mid-1960s, of including a "workers' representative" with no major power at all onto the board of directors of state economic enterprises, the successive Ecevit Governments of the late-1970s took the issue up and had a positive, and in many sense radical, attitude towards that issue. With its strong popular basis, the Ecevit team tried to implement a "democratic left" programme aiming at "self-management by the people". At the beginning, the implementation of codetermination was promising, but later it became clear that this project was bound to be restricted to a limited number of public enterprises (Boratav 1991; Uca 1979). Although CTWU member unions were quite keen on pursuing the initiative even outside the public sector and volunteered to have a say in the running of the enterprises in which they worked, the response of the CTEU was exclusionary from the outset. It seemed that the CTEU was against any notion of participation with the fear that this might involve the decrease of authority and decision-making power within the enterprise (İşveren; informal interviews). On the workers' side, CRWU with its strong devotion towards class struggle and a conflictual industrial relationship was also quite hostile towards any type of codetermination other than collective bargaining (Uca 1983; informal interviews). As the coalition governments of Ecevit came to an end, and especially after the *coup d'état* of 1980, the notion of codetermination evaporated from the discourse for over a decade (Boratav 1991; Buğra 1994; Uca 1979).² The socio-political milieu of the 1970s, however turbulent it may have been, proved to be instrumental in motivating some academic research in that area. Below several studies undertaken during that era will briefly be considered.

² In passing, we should note that a legislation to advance workers' participation was prepared, but then subject to a veto of the Ecevit cabinet (see Sertel 1982),

Fişek's study (1977), in that regard, was based on a questionnaire conducted at 28 state economic enterprises, where the subjects were participatory organs in their hierarchical structures, with 149 managerial committee and board members including workers' representatives: the research was aimed to understand how the existing situation was considered and perceived by the population on hand and to work out the attitudes of this sample population towards codetermination. The results of the questionnaire indicated that the determination of wages, extra payments, hiring and firing procedures, were all perceived to be crucial as the areas of participation; workplace conditions, transfers and promotions, and discipline issues were found to be of secondary importance. Among the remaining decisions the least important of all was said to be the capital retrieval. The corollary of these results can be interpreted as that from codetermination the given population understood participation to be on issues relating to work and social conditions, that is to say, personal rather than economic issues. As for the relationship of causality between participation and efficiency, 38.41% of the population argued that there was *no* causality between these two concepts: 22.22% of the worker representatives were among the ones who denied this causality. Of the population, 27.54% held the belief that there were certain advantages of adopting codetermination for responding to new technologies, production methods, and so on. The belief in the qualities of codetermination regarding its consensus-inducing effects over conflictual capital-labour relationships, such as strikes and slowing down of work, was 25.36%. All of the worker representatives thought that participation was useful, whereas 31.53% of the rest of the population answered this question as 'not useful'.

This very last issue was in line with the results of an earlier research, the one that had been undertaken by the Milli Prodüktivite Merkezi (*National Productivity Centre*) (1970) in 19 public and private enterprises which employed more than 1000 workers. The questions were directed to the employer (manager or owner) of the firm and the union representative of the employees working in that firm. The research results indicated that while employees were ready for full and decisive participation, employers were opting for a gradual introduction of this procedure. Employers, while answering the questionnaire, were in complete agreement that if one wants to participate in decision making, s/he should take all the financial responsibilities of those decisions. Three

quarter of employers furthermore thought that it was too early to introduce such an issue into the agenda, while another two thirds of the same sample insisted that participation in decision-making should be a right that is related to the ownership of the firm.

Dicle's study (1980) was based on an extensive survey of the country studies and a comprehensive outlining of different forms of codetermination implementations. Işıklı (1980), in his study, discussed the theoretical background of codetermination and self-management going back to Owen and Proudhon and undertook an extensive investigation of the Yugoslavian experience. Uca (1983), in the early eighties, made an attempt to understand the trade union attitudes toward codetermination. As already said, at that time most trade unions were indicated a negative attitude towards any forms of participation.

Although the issue largely remained dormant during the 1980s, it was reintroduced when some business communities discovered the needs in implementing *Quality Circles* and *Total Quality Management*. The response of the leading unions' confederation (CTWU and CRWU) to the issue of Japanese style management and labour relations techniques, on the other hand, is quite revealing: both consider this as a *façade* through which the worker is led to believe that s/he is involved in taking decisions which affect the running of the enterprise, but, overall, what s/he is asked to do is to increase productivity and quality at a very micro-level. They also add that they are ready to welcome a worker's participation scheme at board level; however, although they say this (which is a move, at least for some, from their pro-1980s' standpoint), it does not seem that they have taken the issue seriously (CTWU [TÜRK-İŞ] Bulletin; CRWU [DİSK-AR] Bulletin; Özkaplan 1994; informal interviews). One should also recall the fact that, as briefly outlined above, the informal activities have assumed great importance in Turkey in terms of both the value-added produced and the number of workers employed. Needless to mention, if one cannot speak of the right of unionisation, of social security, of job guarantee, one can hardly mention the prospects of codetermination in that field. It might be the case that workers' unions may want to give emphasis on that line.

Despite this, there are also some academic research flourishing in Turkey regarding the theory of such micro-level participative models. A leading figure, Kavrakoğlu (1994a; 1994b), theorises the Total Quality

Management as an efficiency inducing, participative, innovative, and competitive form of organisational structure. In his book, *Total Quality Management* (1994b), he underlines that motivation has positive effects over the efficiency of the worker, and participation and responsibility are two of several motivation inducing elements.

A very recent study by Aşçıgil (1994) aims to reveal the impact of work-related beliefs over the expected outcome from participation. The scope of the study covers a total of 630 personnel of the largest 500 firms in Turkey. The personnel were classified into three main groups: high ranking managerial personnel (214), medium ranking managerial personnel (322), and finally blue collars (94). The study considers participation as a consequence of a certain belief system, or an ethical problem, rather than considering it as an efficiency-inducing organisational system. Therefore, the costs of participation are not considered as a part of the determinants of participation. According to the results of the survey, while medium ranking managers are willing to protect their status against any sort of organisational change, high ranking managers seem to be more humanistic and receptive towards participation, a fact which also revealed itself in the informal interviews we have conducted. Even more protective are the blue collars who only demand sincerity. This survey indicates a softening of the attitudes of the (at least the high ranking) employers, yet again one should be cautious that the sample only consists of the largest firms and, most probably, the more modernised section of the economy

Having shed some light on the socio-economic history of Turkey and the industrial relations, we will now focus on the textile industry.

3. 4. The Role and Weight of the Textile Industry in the Economy of Turkey

The textile industry (including the clothing industry) is the largest sector of the industry of Turkey in terms of production, employment and exports. Because its production capacity has reached a significantly high level and also it is a prime example of how to make a leap forward in foreign economic relations via exporting (with its experience with yarn exporting during the 1970s) it is regarded as *the* locomotive industry of overall industrialisation and exportation of Turkey. In 1992, its share was 36.6% of total exports (as opposed to 5.4% of total imports); in 1988, its contribution to the total value added in the manufacturing industry was 14.2%; and, again in 1988, its share of employment stabilised at around 17% of total manufacturing employment (with a parallel decline to that in the OECD area (OECD 1992)).

The following gives a very brief history of the textile industry in the Republican era. After the initial establishment of Sümerbank in the early 1930s, private investment in textile mills and weaving emerged during the 1950s. Starting with the late 1960s and early 1970s, the sector lived through two stages of intensive investment in yarn production. By the mid-1970s, the sector's emphasis was moved to establishing large-scale weaving and knitting production units, as well as clothing factories. The crisis of the late 1970s, however, limited the extent of such investment expenditures, especially in the weaving, dyeing-finishing-processing and clothing areas, which then delayed the restructuring of the industry – with an implication of a lack of focusing on the right product configuration *vis-à-vis* foreign markets (especially the EC market). The sector started the 1980s, after the foreign exchange crisis of the late 1970s, with favourable conditions, which were based on high state support. However, towards the end of the 1980s, direct subsidies were to come to an abrupt end, with the signing of the GATT Subsidy Code and with increasing pressure from the EU and USA. This was accompanied by a reversal of policies on the exchange rate in 1989 (as outlined above) and by increasing pressure on wages by the leading Workers' Union (CTWU). At the same time, however, the 1980s also presented the textile sector with the new problem of cotton. Cotton producers' cooperatives were obtaining foreign exchange by exporting their products; however, exporting came to mean that cotton was being imported for domestic

industrial use, and, of course, at prices above the price of exports. This implied the presence of a power structure against the textile chain, in which the (three) cotton producers' cooperatives had oligopolistic control over cotton. Another important point to mention is the fact that in Turkey energy costs for the industry were and still are well above the average of the OECD countries in the area. In this context, it may be true to conclude that, throughout the 1980s, although the textile chain enjoyed factor benefits – such as receiving substantial subsidies and credits, coupled with limited wage costs and exchange rates – it also faced problems in cotton, energy costs and undervalued foreign exchange rates (Yaşar 1994).

The factors summarised above (along with protectionist measures taken against exporters of Turkey by the EC) implied the orientation of the sector more towards the already accepted strategy of increasing the value added per item, which, at the end, dictated the move towards the clothing sector in the industry, which then seized domination of the sector. Within this sector, the strategy was again based on increasing the value added per item and collections and brand-creation (as price competitiveness was no longer possible on standard products *vis-à-vis* NICs) and on subcontracting (to by-pass the unionisation problem, and direct and indirect wage costs). Although the two objectives seemed at odds with each other, the implicit character of organisation between the main firm and subcontractors via a long-term relationship based on trust seems to have produced the much-needed quality standards.

The issue of human rights, or, rather, the lack of them, seems to be the main factor behind the sector's survival strategy *vis-à-vis* increasing international competition, and domestic economic conjuncture and policy outcomes in the 1980s. This statement is valid to the extent of our understanding of the forms of production organisations in the sector, which can be categorised under 5 headings: i) firms working only on the basis of subcontractors, where design and preparatory and finishing processes are undertaken by the main firm, with quality control mainly left to the subcontractors' discretion; ii) firms both having their production units as well as getting into subcontracting arrangements to create some sort of a "supply and labour flexibility"; iii) (very large) firms which decided to become smaller and create a subcontracting network, as a crisis, or survival, management strategy; iv) firms working only on the basis of their production units, for whom creating a brand

image and top quality production are the overriding concern; and, v) firms trying to develop their own networking organisation, by dictating and assisting the formation of a subcontractor production unit, a major characteristic of which is the limiting of the outlet channels of such units. On this basis, we can clearly state that the sector's dominant form of organisation is in the initial category, which approximately accounts for 80% of all firms. In this sense, one can speak of a "human rights issue" in the sector, as non-unionised, uninsured, cheap —or, flexible— labour forming the basis of such organisations. Indeed, in the other categories as well, strategies toward subcontracting or getting an agreement with workers at firm level without the involvement of the union are stated to be a result of i) the lessons drawn from the late 1970s' environment of industrial and social strife, ii) the need to control direct and indirect wage payments, and iii) establishing a form of supply-flexibility and differentiation. However, whether this form of organisation would continue to be the dominant one in the near future is a question open to discussion. At this point, one has to account for the interplay of the two strategies of the sector: on the one hand, to increase the value added per item along with the quality of products and processes (to escape increasing competition on standard products and eliminate EU based protection on such products), and, on the other hand, to be prepared for a new era of protectionism in "Fortress Europe" of "social and environmental dumping" (an example of its encapsulation being the ISO 9000 quality standards) (TCMA 1993). Here, the key notion is social dumping, as it is clear that the sector has established a strategy of using cheap labour, without much consideration for human rights, in order to be able to differentiate itself from its competitors (TCMA 1993).

With the developments in the sphere of economy, especially trade liberalisation, the clothing sector managed to reach the stage of "globalisation" in terms of resourcing and marketing policies. Furthermore, it seems that, with its closeness to the much required foreign exchange, this sector did far better in creating the surplus and investing in technological modernisation (as well as other fields of foreign exchange earning activities, such as tourism) than the other sectors of the manufacturing industry, especially after the import liberalisation of 1990 in preparation for the customs union with the EC.

The sector's position in relation to state-labour-industry relations has always been in the forefront of industry of Turkey. Actually, the

sector, throughout the 1980s, obtained the lowest wage increases and initiated an approach towards establishing consensus on the bargaining table with workers' unions (*İşveren*, various issues). Indeed, it is interesting to see that the leaders of the most important workers' and employers' unions confederations have actually been the leaders of the unions organised in the textile sector. These basic contextual advantages, however, were also accompanied by difficulties for the CTEU in keeping the members under the union rubric against the threat of subcontracting and, thus, "de-unionisation".

The sector's relations with state institutions have also been quite effective from the sector's point of view. The presence of a very active para-statal institution in the sector, the priority ascribed to the sector by the state as the prime example of "opening up," and the existence of a very active and conscientious business organisation in the sector, have all created the conditions for an established relationship with the state. This relationship was not only confined to the joint preparation of five-year plans, organisation of trade fairs, or foreign business travels; it was also manifested within the common understanding of the production of cotton, in which the textile chain, and especially the clothing sector, was subject to pressures to bring the domestic price of cotton to the world price level – as described above.

This discussion ends our summary of the history of the industrialisation of Turkey within the context of her political and economic development and of industrial relations, as well as a brief account of the history and organisation of the textile industry of Turkey.

CHAPTER IV

THE AIMS AND METHOD OF THE RESEARCH

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4.1. The Aims of the Research

The aim of this study is to better understand the issue of codetermination, which has been discussed and applied in many countries over the past 5 decades, in the textile context of Turkey. In that regard, it is hoped that such a study will shed light on the state of industry in Turkey for those who would like to consider codetermination as a plausible system.

The study attempts to make it clear for the case of Turkey what is meant by participation, what values are attached to it, and what areas workers most wish to participate in. While doing so we also probe how such participation should proceed.

Our second general aim is to investigate the relationship between participation and the workplace. It is believed that working in a State Factory as opposed to a Private Factory can alter individuals' views on the values and possibilities of participation. The answers to these questions are of importance, as Turkey transforms its industrial base it will need to be accompanied by innovative managerial systems.

Finally, our last aim in this study is to bring data to bare on the hypothesis that participation taken as an indicator of "predictive capacity" will allow the individual to cope better and control a changing and adaptation requiring world. With this enhanced coping skill, it is expected that participation will be inversely related to psychological symptoms. In other words, as individuals' positive attitudes toward participation increase then we would expect that individuals' level of psychological symptoms decrease.

4.2. The Method of the Research

4.2.1. The Preparation of the Questionnaire and the Pilot Study

Once the aim of the questionnaire was set as how to investigate the perceptions and attitudes of workers towards the idea of codetermination, we proceeded with the design of the questionnaire. To start with, two

major problems with the interview were foreseen: the workers' lack of experience regarding any sort of participation, bringing about the difficulty of explaining the concept itself, and the time needed to undertake such a lengthy questionnaire to be addressed to hundreds of subjects.

The hypothetical nature of the questionnaire was an important problem in maintaining a dialogue with the individual-worker. Since the subjects had never (or very seldomly) experienced a participatory decision-making scheme, we thought that the questionnaire should begin with a clear definition of that term and its applicability areas. In that regard the need for a clear-cut description of the areas and forms of participation assumed great importance. After having decided the 14 areas of participation (see Section 2.4.1.), with due consideration devoted to previous researches, several pilot studies were undertaken with a variety of employees in different firms and establishments, in order to finalise the best way to explain them to workers.

In the first attempt, we put forward two different sets of questions in order to make a distinction between the types of participation (direct or through representatives) and the tension of the participation demands. For the latter, there was a scale ranging from no time to 60 minutes a week to be allocated for participation in each item of participation area (in the form of: 1) no time, 2) 15 min., 3) 30 min., 4) 45 min., 5) 60 min.). The answer would indicate the intensity of the subjects willingness to participate in that area (time allocation denoting an opportunity cost). Yet, pilot studies showed that this method had certain abstraction problems. The subjects of the pilot studies were very eager to overvalue their will for participation, and had a tendency to choose 60 or 45 minutes (fifth and fourth items of the answer scale) for most of the 14 participation areas. But after summing up these allocated times, one would come up with a sum of (approximately) ten hours a week allocated for codetermination activities. Each subject then realised that this aggregate time was rather too much, and therefore opted for a reconsideration of his/her answers, demanding an extra amount of time. The other set of questions, which were aimed to clarify whether the participation would be undertaken directly or through representatives for each of the 14 items, also turned out to be time consuming. Given the lengthy nature of the questionnaire, therefore, a restructuring of the

questionnaire proved to be inevitable. Thus resulting with the first part of the questionnaire.

The pilot studies made it clear that a couple of questions in the second part of the questionnaire were of an offending and culturally incompatible nature. We therefore either eliminated or reworded them, which made the questionnaire run smoothly and less lengthy.

The final version of the questionnaire was given to the polling company “TRIO” who implemented data collection. There, the questionnaire was rearranged into a comprehensive pattern, making it convenient and easily implementable. The final version of the questionnaire along with its translation used in this research project can be seen in the Appendix B.

4.2.2. Measurement Instruments

The survey consists of four parts: namely, the areas of participation, attitudes and perceptions, psychological symptoms, and demographic information. Let us consider each of them in details.

1. In the first part of the survey, workers were asked to place themselves in a hypothetical world, where they would be actively participating in the decision-making process. Although the areas of participation are numerous, we had already classified them under 14 headings (see Section 2.4.1.). The objective is therefore to measure the workers’ willingness to participate in those 14 areas. One method would be to ask each worker whether or not s/he wishes to participate in each area. The 14 items could then be ranked according to the summation of their participation votes. Yet this mechanism would not reveal the intensity of their choices. One solution to this, would be to ask people to indicate their intensities as well – as the so-called “Borda” system entails.

In the Borda system, items to be chosen are ranked, a number of points are given to each position on the scale, these points are added up, and then the candidate with the highest score is chosen. The Borda method is fine tuned, and the so-called “weighted-Borda” system provides an even further calibration. In that, a number of points are distributed before the voting takes place, and individuals are asked to allocate these points among the items as they see fit. This mechanism uses ranking information fully.

The “weighted-Borda” system was chosen in this research in determining the areas of participation. This would give us not only a high calibration of ranking information, but also be an easy and feasible questionnaire technique. It allows the voter to express the intensity of rankings on the one hand, and to express the same degree of preference if this were the case. To facilitate the implementation of the questionnaire, an icon-table (see the Appendix B), representing these 14 items, was prepared. With the icon-table, where the 14 areas of possible participation placed in front of the respondent, workers were asked to place a total of 20 poker chips in any number and in as many squares as they wished. After the chips had been arranged, the interviewer went back and asked the respondent for each square within which poker chips were placed if they wished to represent themselves personally for that area or if they wished that a representative do so on their behalf. This was repeated for each square which contained votes (poker chips).

It should however be noted that such a voting procedure, as many others that rely in one way or another on information regarding individuals’ preference ordering, is vulnerable to strategic-voting, where individuals may prefer not to reveal their genuine preferences. Furthermore, the second drawback of the Borda counting is the fact that the dropping of an option that was not in contention could make a difference to the result, which is known as the violation of the “independence of irrelevant alternative” (Mueller 1979). It was felt that in our survey these two drawbacks would not constitute a serious problem, as the probability of workers acting strategically to manipulate the outcome would be nil, and that the dropping of an option would not be the case.

The reader should in passing be reminded that no procedure which adds up individuals’ preference orderings and calls the result “social orderings” can satisfy a set of important requirements. Thus, any voting procedure will have some drawbacks (known as the “Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem”).

To extract information regarding the amount of time the subjects were willing to allocate to codetermination activities a single question was used: “Now that you have chosen the areas that you want to participate, how many hours would you devote for codetermination in these areas per week?”

2. The second part of the survey deals with respondents' attitudes and perceptions towards codetermination. Questions were designed to understand workers' point of view regarding the rights to participate, the relationship between codetermination and social equality/productivity increase/workplace harmony, the implementation of a profit-sharing mechanism, the inclusion of a third party into the decision-making procedure, and the timing of the implementation of codetermination in Turkey.

3. The third part of the survey aims to measure the psychological symptoms of individuals. Psychological symptoms were measured using the "Psychiatric Epidemiology Research Interview" (PERI, revised edition (1984)), with the permission of Bruce Dohrenwend from the Social Psychiatry Research Unit at Columbia University. This instrument has been previously used outside of the United States in Israel (Shrout *et al.* 1986) as a first-stage screening device administered by non clinicians. In the second stage, detailed diagnostic assessments were made by clinicians. Using only 7 of the 18 PERI scales 94% of the patients were correctly classified as psychiatric cases and 84% of the well community respondents were correctly classified as non cases (Shrout *et al.* 1986: 318).

When requirements such as quickness and ease of administration, and appropriateness for general population administration, are considered a relatively small number of instruments can be determined. Most of these instruments are descendants of the Psychosomatic Scale of the Neuropsychiatric Screening Adjunct developed by the U.S. Army during World War II (Star 1950 cf. Shrout 1986: 315). Two such prominent instruments are the 22-item instrument from the Midtown Study (Langner 1962) and the Health Opinion Survey (HOS) developed by the Stirling County researchers (Macmillan 1957 cf. Shrout *et al.* 1986: 315). Acknowledging their brevity, reliability and applicability to the general population, Link and Dohrenwend (1980) and Seiler (1973) question their unidimensionality. With this in mind, Dohrenwend *et al.* (1980) felt that the general demoralisation dimension which these scales seemed to measure should be augmented with other scales specific to individual psychological disorders. The PERI fixed response, interview-administered questionnaire with 18 diverse scales of psychological disorder was developed in response (cf. Shrout 1986: 315). In developing

the item pool for the PERI they relied on previous research as well as adapting items from the MMPI, the World Health Organization research on schizophrenia and the Robins' approach to measuring antisocial personality (Dohrenwend *et al.* 1980: 1230). Aiming to develop an instrument applicable to diverse social and cultural backgrounds, they used Puerto Ricans, blacks and advantaged ethnic groups in their initial analysis (Dohrenwend *et al.* 1980: 1231). Initially starting with 33 item groupings, 25 survived their clinical and psychological scrutiny. They have shown that 25 (PERI) symptom scales are reliable in groups of different social and cultural backgrounds in the general population as well as isolating 8 of these 25 scales as measures of nonspecific distress and differentiated from the other 17 scales (Dohrenwend *et al.* 1980: 1234).

How applicable is the PERI for research in Turkey? Are nonsociological categories valid, and can the reliability ratings established in America be generalised to Turkey (a quasi-European, prominently Islamic State)? There is reason to believe that nonsociological categories are universal, although how mental illness is perceived can vary with cultural differences influencing both its rate of prevalence as well as its institutional treatment. Varying methods of statistical collection present yet another problem. Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend (1974) agree, with caution, with the conclusion of Phillips and Drags (1971) that given the controversy, "[t]he majority of the field holds that diagnostic categories are universal in representation, though different in distribution" (Phillips and Dragus 1971: 469 cf. Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend 1974: 431), and add that "[w]herever psychiatric epidemiologists have attempted to conduct studies in non-Western societies marked by their own distinctively different traditions and a relative absence of modern technology, one of their main goals has been to see whether Western psychiatric classifications are applicable. We know of no instance in the 'true' prevalence studies where investigators have attempted to use Western classifications in non-Western societies and felt them to be inapplicable" (p. 431).

Although such questions are beyond the scope of this research, we have compared two sets of findings published by Dohrenwend *et al.* (1980) on the reliability of the PERI. In Table 1 below, Dohrenwend isolates a group of 11 scales that appear to be strongly inter-correlated relative to their reliabilities. Although scales are expected to measure common attributes, for scales to have classifying utility, they must also

capture something different. To the extent that this is not the case two scales measure the same thing, and the use of both contributes no additional information. In looking at the reliabilities of differences between pairs of scales in the Dohrenwend data, we see that the first 8 scales are not often greater than .50, the acceptable level (Dohrenwend *et al.* 1980: 1232).

Table 1: Reliabilities of Difference Scores Between 11 PERI Scales based on Dohrenwend Data

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1 Dread											
2 Anxiety		.43									
3 Sadness		.32	.15								
4 Helplessness Hopelessness		.35	.29	.25							
5 Psycho- physiological Symptoms		.41	.27	.45	.34						
6 Perceived Physical Health		.46	.43	.51	.49	.29					
7 Poor Self esteem		.42	.36	.40	.29	.29	.39				
8 Confused Thinking		.56	.51	.43	.49	.41	.51	.44			
9 Somatic Problems		.56	.60	.49	.58	.33	.31	.45	.60		
10 Enervation		.65	.65	.58	.63	.48	.45	.47	.45	.59	
11 Guilt		.53	.50	.41	.35	.45	.56	.53	.50	.66	.66

The reliabilities in boldface are less than .50, the acceptable level.

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The PERI symptoms scales used in this study are given below:

Active Expression of Hostility
Antisocial History
Anxiety
Confused Thinking
Conversion
Crown Marlow
Cyclothymic Personality
False Beliefs and Perceptions
Demoralization
Dissociation
Distrust
Dread
Drinking Problems *
Drinking Reasons *
Enervation
Guilt
Helplessness-Hopelessness
Insomnia
Manic
Obsessive-Compulsive
Perceived Physical Health
Perception of Hostility
Poor Self-Esteem
Psychophysiological Symptoms
Sadness
Suicidal (within last month)*
Suicidal (within last year)*
Schizoid Personality
Sex Problems*
Somatic Problems

* Not included in the analysis.

* These sub-scales were not used in the global measure of psychological symptoms since it was found that over 95% of the females did not use alcohol and thus the questions were irrelevant for half our population.

Each sub-scale category was scored according to the PERI instructions. Individual response values were added and divided by the total number of items. For the purpose of this study, some items had to be removed due to a time restraint placed by the factory authorities. The sub-indexes drinking problems and drinking reasons were not included since 95% of the female population did not drink alcohol. Drinking or not drinking in the case of females is not a question of preference, but rather it is influenced by religious tradition and the gender specific stigma attached to drinking. Sexual problems were not asked due to the inability to match the gender of the respondent and interviewer. The nature of the workplace lacked privacy to some extent and it was felt better to drop those questions (and in addition pilot studies gave some clues along that line).

4. Finally, workers were asked for demographic information such as age, education, experience, sex, birth place, and marital status.

4.3. The Setting

4.3.1. Sümerbank

Sümer Holding Bakırköy Ready-Made Textile Production Corporation is a state-owned, export-oriented, competitive firm. The firm was established in 1850 as a privately owned textile plant. Later, during the *étatist* period of the young Republic of Turkey, it was nationalised and reorganised as a modern plant, undertaking every activity, from the production of fabrics to the tailoring of end-products. In 1986, it was once again modernised into an end-product industry, as the old fashioned and ecologically problematic technology had to be restructured.

There are three main departments in the plant; Shirt production, Casual Wear production, and finally, Coat and Suit production. In 1994 there were 1208 employees working in these three sections, of which 691 were female. Over 1000 of the 1208 workers were married and 90% of them had more than two children. The firm's export figure for 1993 was approximately 8.000.000 Dollars. It is situated on a very valuable piece of property, in the heart of the city, along the coast of the Marmara Sea.

Although the firm is being included in the "privatisation package," the workers of the plant are strictly against its privatisation. Through a

union report, several alternatives for privatisation are being proposed. The report argues that, a liquidation of redundant assets such as the now dysfunctional hospital within the factory, the housing provided for only 36 high-ranking employees and the Guesthouse which is located on a very valuable piece of property, along the seafront, would provide the revenue required to cover the deficits of the firm, accrued from expensive credit payments. Other alternatives include moving the plant to a less valuable site and selling off the valuable property on which the plant is now situated. Another alternative is the workers' proposal for retaining the ownership of the firm.

4.3.2. Altınyıldız

Altınyıldız began operations in a 14.000 sq. plant in İstanbul's Eyüp district in 1952. The firm undertook its first exports of fabrics in 1959. In 1971 Altınyıldız moved into ready-made clothing industry with the *Beymen* brand. In 1977, the factory had moved from Eyüp to Yenibosna where it is now situated. The factory in 1994 was employing 869 workers.

In 1994, Altınyıldız exported 11.5 million Dollars worth of goods. This export figure in 1994 accounts for about 25% of its total production of 4,900 thousand meters of cloth. The enterprise has a distinct character and is devoting the necessary attention towards fashion trends. In other words, it is aiming to create a brand of its own, a *niche* in the highly competitive international markets. Hence, a great deal of attention is being given to design and styling. Furthermore, quality is another aspect of serious consideration for the Altınyıldız plant; their published material often contain rhetoric which echoes the discourse of TQM.

4.4. Sampling

In Sümerbank, 492 interviews were implemented, of these 480 complete responses were obtained and used in the study. Survey respondents were chosen randomly. Among this population only 7 of them were not members of the union. In Altınyıldız, 331 interviews were implemented, of these 323 complete responses were obtained and used in the study. Again the survey respondents were chosen randomly. Among this group 30 were not member of the union. In Altınyıldız 39.3% (N=127) of the

group were women, whereas in Sümerbank the females constituted 51.6% (N=248). In Altınyıldız 75% were married and 23% single; the figures were similar for Sümerbank, where 84% were married and 14.5% single. The remaining small percentage were both divorced or widow.

In Sümerbank there were only 16 workers (roughly 4%) who had been working in the plant for less than five years, whereas in Altınyıldız approximately 20% percent of the sample had been working in the plant for less than five years. The turnover rate at Altınyıldız appears to be higher than that of Sümerbank. Approximately 71% of the Sümerbank sample had been working in that plant for more than six and less than 8 years, whereas for the same range in Altınyıldız there were only 103 workers (*i.e.* 31.9%). On the other hand, 44% of the workers at Altınyıldız had been working for more than 9 years, whereas at Sümerbank only 25% of the workers had been working for more than 9 years.

Although, most of the parents of workers had at best managed to complete a primary school (for mothers 38.7% never attended, 8.2% could not finished, 49% finished; for fathers 19.3% never attended, 7% could not finished, 64.4% finished), workers themselves had at least finished primary school or did better (49.8% of the group completed primary school, whereas the remaining 46.7% did manage to go on further).

Most of the workers were not natives of İstanbul. A significant fact was that for Sümerbank approximately half of the group and for Altınyıldız approximately 40% of the group was originated from the Black Sea region.

4.5. Procedure

Interviewers set up stations in offices located in different parts of the factories. Foremen were requested to cooperate, by top managers, by randomly channeling workers to the offices a few at a time. The questionnaire was executed during lunch breaks and at the convenience of workers by the TRIO research company, with an interviewer contingency of 30 people. For each plant it took a week to complete the questionnaire. The duration of the questionnaire was around 30 minutes. In Altınyıldız there were three different lunch hours which facilitated the implementation of the questionnaire. It can easily be said that there was a

convenient and friendly environment for the successful implementation of the questionnaire in both plants.

In Sümerbank people were more friendly, and the workplace was less disciplined. The manager-worker relations were in a paternalistic manner. On the other hand, in Altinyıldız, the manager-worker relationship appeared more universalistic and with a modernised detachment. People were less friendly and more concerned with the production process and more disciplined. The workplace in Altinyıldız was cleaner and tidier than the Sümerbank workplace.

Each questionnaire was filled out by the interviewer on a pre-coded form. Respondents were given an iconic representation of the areas of participation and 20 poker chips which they placed as their votes for participation. After completion of the voting, they were asked to indicate which areas in which they had voted they would prefer to represent themselves personally or have a representative do so on their behalf. Next, various questions dealing with their attitudes and beliefs about participation and their psychological symptoms were probed. During each set of questions, a 6x10 card with large figures showing the possible responses were appropriately shown to the respondents along with the verbalisation of each option.

CHAPTER V

RESULTS

CHAPTER V

RESULTS

The idea of workers participation in industrial decision-making and management is new to Turkish society. In addition to this, the historical accumulation of Turkey's industrial infrastructure is fairly recent. If concerns such as efficiency, quality control, maximum utilisation of resources, come with long effort and time, then it may be that Turkey is on the threshold of fine-tuning its industrial relationships. Prior to this overdue transformation, this study holds claim to the importance of empirically investigating the issue of codetermination. It is held that a healthy transformation of Turkish industry will depend on a proper analysis of its human resource potential. This study is an attempt to begin such a task by investigating the current attitudes and beliefs that Turkish workers and managers hold toward the idea of participation.

The major aims of this research and the results to be disclosed in this section can be summarised under three broad categories: namely, i) general attitudes and beliefs about participation, ii) the relationship between participation and factory ownership being private (Altinyıldız) compared to state ownership (Sümerbank), and iii) the relationship between the desire to participate and the level of psychological symptoms for the individual.

Initially, under "general attitudes and beliefs about participation" we shall attempt to delineate the general aspects of participation as is seen by Turkish textile workers. This will include their views on who they feel has the right to participation, under what conditions participation should be granted, in which areas they are willing to take part in decision-making, which forms of participation they are preferring, and what they feel will be gained from workers participation in management. Second, while looking at the relationship between participation and factory ownership, we consider the importance of questions dealing with the privatisation of state industries. We seek to answer the question whether workers in a state owned textile factory are more or less conducive to seek participation rights when compared to those workers in a private textile factory of comparable size. Finally, we look at the relationship between the desire to participate and psychological symptoms.

Our major goal here is to bring data to bear on the hypothesis that individuals who have a need to actively establish control over their social environment will be better equipped to cope with stressful events, thus becoming less vulnerable to the detrimental effects of change which manifest in psychological symptoms. We assume then that those who are ready to actively participate rather than passively accept others' decisions will be less vulnerable to stress and thus have lower rates of psychological symptoms as a result, given the assumption that there is always enough stress.

5.1. General Attitudes and Beliefs about Participation

As we have stated, our aim here is to delineate the specific dimensions of participation for Turkish textile workers. Here, a set of questions on the attitudes and behavior towards codetermination was directed to employees of both firms. A sentence is read, and then the worker is asked to indicate how much s/he would be in agreement, by pointing out one of the five alternatives viz. (strongly agree) (agree) (neither agree nor disagree) (disagree) (strongly disagree), with that statement.

The first set of questions deals with the issue of who has the right to take decisions in plant. The questions and the answers given to them by the workers of both enterprises are presented below (Table 1).

Table 1: *Response percentages to the statements indicated for textile workers in both privately and state owned factories (N= 803).*

K. 34. "The rights to manage a factory belong only to the owner or those people whom they appoint."

strongly agree	agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree	strongly disagree
5.4%	29.7%	7.8%	44%	12.8%

K. 35. "Those working in a factory have the right to participate."

strongly agree	agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree	strongly disagree
18.6%	70.8%	5.6%	4.4%	0.4%

K. 36. "The right to manage a factory depends on the individuals level of knowledge and skills."

strongly agree	agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree	strongly disagree
12.3%	71.8%	5.5%	8.4%	1.9%

K. 37. "The right to manage a factory depends on the seniority level of the individual."

strongly agree	agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree	strongly disagree
7.3%	53.8%	8.8%	25.4%	4.6%

K. 38. "Workers who participate in management should share in both cost and profit."

strongly agree	agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree	strongly disagree
9.5%	52.9%	13.7%	17.8%	6.1%

The answers given to the first question [K. 34] clearly indicate that the majority of the workers (*i.e.* over 56.8%) do not agree with the statement that the rights to manage a factory belong only to the owner or those people whom they appoint. Workers in general feel that the right to

manage is not reserved by ownership. Our second question [K. 35] deals with whether those working in a factory have the right to manage. The responses to this question are overwhelmingly positive, an outcome which echoes the first questions' answer. Over 90% agree that workers should have a right to participate merely due to the fact that they work in that factory.

In the next question [K. 36], employees were asked to express their attitudes towards the statement that "the level of knowledge and skill" should be taken as a criterion for the right to participate. 84% of the respondents agreed with the statement. "Seniority" as a right to participation [K. 37] was also agreed to, but only by 61% of the respondents.

In general, then, an average 90% of the workers feel that it is their right to participate. Of the 3 factors which we probed as criteria for participation we found that the least important factor was seen as seniority. Merely working in a factory appeared to be necessary and sufficient to give the individual the right to participate. Workers in addition seem to be in agreement that seniority, although important, cannot be held as equally important as skill and knowledge. To the final question [K. 38] of this set, that workers who participate in management should share in both cost and profit, the respondents did not give strong support, which will be confirmed by the following question.

Our next question [K. 39] was designed with the aim of getting an information by means of establishing a real situation in which the individual would have to make a personal choice. This choice it was assumed will reflect the individuals' desire to share in the consequences of participation. For participation to be lasting, positive efforts should be reciprocated. The question was:

Table 2: *Preference of workers of both privately and state owned firms regarding profit sharing (N=803).*

[K. 39] "Imagine that you are participating in management. You have a choice; you can either receive an average pay, or chose to receive a low wage + a premium from profit. Which one would you chose?"

Average Wage	Low Wage + Premium from Profit
424 (52.8%)	379 (47.2%)

As can be seen above, the responses to this question are almost split half and half. There appears to be no serious preference to participate in a share of wages. This result may be a function of various underlying dimensions. One probable dimension is that individuals lack trust toward management. They may be suspicious about how such calculations will be made and how these profit shares are to be distributed. They may, on the other hand, believe that the factory will not profit, thus would prefer to get an average wage, feeling that the amount received from profit share would not compensate the low wage option. A third alternative may be that workers are in such a critical wage wise situation, in a “barely making do” sense, that they cannot afford to risk a higher return. In other words, the cost of the risk (*i.e.* a possible drop in wage levels) is seen as too high.

Our next set of questions deals with what workers feel can be gained from a participatory scheme. The frequencies for these questions are given in Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3: <i>Response percentages to the statements indicated for textile workers in both privately and state owned factories (N= 803)</i>				
[K. 40.] “Imagine that local citizens are being affected by a factories production. Even if the local peoples demands fall contrary to your interests, these people should have a right to participate in decisions which concern them.”				
strongly agree	agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree	strongly disagree
11.4%	61.1%	9.5%	13.8%	3.9%

As can be seen, 72% of the workers feel that codetermination as in the case with the rights of locals to participate is a right which should be granted even if they may suffer from the consequences as individuals.

Table 4: *Response percentages to the statements indicated for textile workers in both privately and state owned factories (N= 803)*

[K. 41.] "The participation of workers like me in management will increase the profitability of the factory."

strongly agree	agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree	strongly disagree
16.9%	69.8%	8.7%	4.1%	0.4%

[K. 42.] "The participation of workers like me in management will increase social equality."

strongly agree	agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree	strongly disagree
19.8%	66.4%	9.1%	4.2%	0.5%

[K. 43.] "The participation of workers like me in management will increase harmony in the workplace."

strongly agree	agree	neither agree nor disagree	disagree	strongly disagree
21.9%	67.6%	7.3%	2.9%	0.25%

As for the benefits of participation, workers agree overall that a codetermined factory will be more profitable (87%), add to social equality (86%) and increase harmony at the workplace (89%). When workers were forced to rank order the three possible assets in terms of contribution the following order was revealed (Table 5).

Table 5: *Rank order of the contributions that codetermination may have on the workplace (N=803)*

	N=	%
Workplace Harmony	342	37
Increase Profit	319	34
Social Equality	252	27

Note: The number of workers that chose this category as having primary importance.

Workers perceive “workplace harmony” as the most important contribution that a codetermined system will bring about.

The next question deals with the timing of codetermination. It is possible that one would expect important contributions from an innovative managerial reform while at the same time feel that such a system was untimely given the present conditions. The below question [K. 47] probes this possibility (Table 6).

Table 6: *Frequencies of choices made between 3 questions regarding the timing of codetermination by workers (N= 803).*

	N=	%
1. The time for Turkish workers to join in management is overdue.	587	73
2. It is the right time for Turkish workers to join in management.	178	22
3. It is still early for Turkish workers to join in management.	38	5

Note: Each respondent made one choice among the 3 alternative statements.

Turkish Textile workers overwhelmingly feel that the time for workers to join in management is well overdue. 95% felt it was either overdue or just the right time, with only 5% feeling it is still early. Workers do appear to want to join in the management of the workplace. However, the alternative to different schemes of managerial participation are vast. For a participatory scheme to function properly it is important that the system be well defined and boundaries well drawn. Managerial systems left ambiguous with lax definitions of responsibility and authority may do more harm than good.

Another area of interest for this study was what areas of management workers wish to participate in. To investigate this aspect, a simple method to probe various areas of possible participation was developed. As discussed earlier (section 4.2.2.) initially, in the first pilot study 14

areas of possible participation were formulated, and to give participation a cost respondents were asked how much time they would spend meeting for the particular area of participation. Time spent in meetings to solve various issues pertaining to the 14 areas of participation appeared to be a simple and obvious cost which could be used. Probing each area and asking respondents to allocate a specific amount of time they were willing to spend turned out to be inefficient. The process took too much time, and was difficult to understand. It became clear that many workers were not familiar with the idea of “meetings” in the sense that individuals meet and discuss a problem. A process that they were familiar with, however, was voting. It was thus decided to represent the 14 areas with icons, give each worker 20 poker chips and ask them to allocate their votes according to which areas they felt it was most important for them to participate in. As it turned out the process worked very quickly and efficiently.

Below we see the total number of votes placed for the different areas by the workers (Table 7).

Table 7: *Frequency of votes by respondents of both factories for possible areas of participation.*

	N	%
1. Education of workers	1224	10
2. Disciplinary action and firing	876	7
3. New investments for the factory (opening new sections, buying new machines).....	720	6
4. Working hours, overtime, hours per shift, holidays, total hours of work per week.....	1011	8
5. Problems dealing with machinery that workers use.....	575	4
6. What products should be produced.....	509	4
7. Working environment and conditions (lighting, noise control, air circulation).....	1162	10
8. Work assignments and departmental transfers.....	581	5
9. Hiring procedures.....	562	4
10. The assignment of foremen and group leaders.....	610	5
11. Wage Levels and Wage Differentiation.....	2061	17
12. Product pricing and marketing decisions.....	410	3
13. Nursery, preschool, infirmary, transportation and food services.....	1142	9
14. Decisions on what type of technology to use.....	623	5

Note that the total chips allocated is less than the total chips available, as some workers preferred not to use all of his/her 20 chips.

The above scores represent the total amount of votes each of the participation categories received. As a matter of interest it was speculated that respondents would prefer to participate in areas that were more personal than those which were not. The above 14 categories were rank ordered by 4 judges in terms of how personal the items appeared to be. The interjudge reliability score was $r=.87$, thus the ranks were *a priori* accepted. These *a priori* ranks were then used to assess whether respondents were more apt to choose personal issues of participation (see Table 8). The Spearman Correlation Coefficient was significant for the rank orders at .78 ($Z=2.84$, $N=803$). The ranks are given below in Table 8.

Table 8: *Rank orders for areas of participation based on an a priori ranking on a dimension personal vs non-personal, compared to a rank order based on the sum of the respondents votes for a willingness to participate in that area.*

	<i>a priori</i> rank for personal dimension	Rank based on votes for participation
11. The determination of wages.....	1	1
2. Disciplinary action and firing	2	6
1. Education of workers	3	2
7. Working environment and conditions (lighting, noise control, air circulation).....	4	3
8. Work assignments and departmental transfers.....	5	10
13. Nursery, preschool, infirmary, transportation and food services.....	6	4
4. Working hours, overtime, hours per shift, holidays, total hours of work per week.....	7	5
10. The assignment of foremen and group leaders.....	8	9
9. Hiring procedures.....	9	12
5. Problems dealing with machinery that workers use.....	10	11
3. New investments for the factory (opening new section, buying new machines).....	11	7
14. Decisions on what type of technology to use.....	12	8
12. Product pricing and marketing decisions.....	13	14
6. What products should be produced.....	14	13

Another aspect of concern to this study is how respondents may vary upon how they want to be represented. Will they prefer to represent

themselves or have a representative do so on their behalf? Might this vary with the nature of the area of participation?

The most obvious analysis is to look and examine whether the choices of participation correspond with an urge to participate and thus in association with a dimension of personal vs non-personal. This is presented below in Table 9.

Table 9: *Rank orders for areas of participation based on an a priori ranking on a dimension personal vs non-personal, compared to a rank order based on the sum of the respondents votes for a willingness to participate in that area and a rank based on the frequency that respondents indicated that they wished to personally represent themselves in that area.*

	<i>A priori rank for personal dimension</i>	<i>Rank based on assigned participation</i>	<i>Rank personal representa- tion</i>
11. The determination of wages.....	1	1	1
2. Disciplinary action and firing	2	6	5
1. Education of workers	3	2	2
7. Working environment and conditions (lighting, noise control, air circulation).....	4	3	3
8. Work assignments and departmental transfers.....	5	10	10
13. Nursery, preschool, infirmary, transportation and food services.....	6	4	4
4. Working hours, overtime, hours per shift, holidays, total hour of work per week.....	7	5	4
10. The assignment of foremen and group leaders.....	8	9	7
9. Hiring procedures.....	9	12	12
5. Problems dealing with machinery that workers use.....	10	11	9
3. New investments for the factory (opening new sections, buying new machines).....	11	7	6
14. Decisions on what type of technology to use....	12	8	8
12. Product pricing and marketing decisions.....	13	14	13
6. What products should be produced.....	14	13	11

Here we look at the three rank orders together. Comparing the 3 samples with 14 cases, each using the Friedman nonparametric test, we have 8 tied groups giving us a Chi-Square of 4.536. The three dimensions do run significantly parallel. This indicates that Turkish workers prefer to participate in areas which have a personal significance to them as well

as choosing to represent themselves personally as opposed to a representative doing so on their behalf particularly in these areas.

5.2. Participation and its Association to Workplace

Our second set of general aims deals with participation and workplace. How does one's workplace affect his/her urge to participate? Does working for the state facilitate one's urge to take part in the management of the factory? Does the idea of an almost overwhelming body seen as the owner alienate one from the idea of participation? Is individuality trampled under the idea of State ownership? Or does the idea of State ownership foster feelings that the factory is to begin with common property thus more opportune to shared management?

Often the meaning of working for the State in Turkey, intuitively speaking, translates into consistent and stable employment. On the other hand, one would expect that the private sector would represent the profit motive, risk and the possibility of quick mobility. As will be recalled, to [K. 39], which asked workers if they would prefer an average wage or a low wage + share of profit scheme, the respondents seemed to be split. Taking this as an indicator of participation, the analysis of the respondents in terms of workplace revealed the following results. As was mentioned, dimensions of trust and perceptions of how stable and profitable the firm will be, are important factors.

To help clarify some of these possibilities several demographic variables were initially controlled. Gender differences were one such variable which may give us clues to the nature of this relationship. Of the 52.8 % who said they would prefer an average wage 51% were females and 49% were males. Of those who preferred low wage + share in profit 41.6% were females and 58.3% were males. Gender differences and thus possible differences in risk taking do seem to be an important factor when it comes to preferring low wages + share in profit.

In explaining variance to [K. 39], a multiple regression analysis shows us that Gender ($\beta = 0.131$, $p = 0.0005$) and place of occupation ($\beta = 0.13$, $p = 0.0004$) are significantly associated (see Table 10) to whether an individual chooses average wage of a low wage and share in profit. Age, education, marital status, and seniority which were also statistically controlled for are not associated.

Table 10: Regression model for Gender, Age, Place of Occupation, Education, Marital Status, and Seniority regressed on Choice of Wage Type. (average wage= 1; low wage + share of profit=2)

Multiple Regression Y1; Column 39 6 X Variables

DF:	R:	R ² :	Adj. R ² :	Std. Err.:
802	.17	.29	.022	.494

Analysis of Variance Table

Source	DF:	Sum Sq.:	Mean Sq.:	F- Test:
Regression	6	5.814	.969	3.97
Residual	796	194.305	.244	p=.0006
Total	802	200.12		

No Residual Statistics Computed

Beta Coefficient Table

Parameter	Value:	Std. Err.:	Std. Value:	t-Value:	Probab.:
Intercept	1.068				
Gender	.131	.038	.131	3.47	.0005
Age	-.025	.02	-.058	1.265	.2062
Factory	.13	.037	.127	3.546	.0004
Education	.013	.023	.02	.561	.5748
Marital Sta.	.029	.048	.023	.601	.5477
Seniority	.006	.017	.016	.37	.7115

Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table


Parameter 95% lower: 95% upper: 90% lower: 90% upper: Partial F:

Parameter	95% lower:	95% upper:	90% lower:	90% upper:	Partial F:
Intercept					
Gender	.057	.205	.069	.193	12.04
Age	-.063	.014	-.057	.007	1.6
Factory	.058	.201	.069	.19	12.572
Education	-.032	.057	-.025	.05	.315
Marital Sta.	-.065	.123	-.05	.108	.362
Seniority	-.028	.041	-.022	.035	.137

Note: The variables for education and seniority are positively coded so that higher scores indicate higher education and seniority. The remaining variables are coded as such; Gender (1=F, 2=M), Place of Occupation (1=Altinyıldız, 2=Sümerbank), Marital Status (1=married, 2=single, divorced, widow), Choice of Wage Type (1=average wage, 2=low wage + share of profit).

The results show that the answer to this question is largely a function of trust. Gender as we suspected is significantly associated as well as the factory wherein one is employed. Males are more willing to participate in a low wage + share of profit wage structure. In addition, those employed at Sümerbank, a state owned factory, are also more inclined to participate in a low wage + share of profit scheme than those working at the privately-owned Altinyıldız factory. Considering the factors, which such a choice may be a function of, we see that both risk and trust are empirically supported. It appears that those at Sümerbank either have more trust in management or believe that Sümerbank will be more profitable than Altinyıldız (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: *Percentile comparison of workers who select normal pay over low pay + share of profit by work place (N=803)*



This aspect will be reconsidered in our discussion section. In short, we should consider the meaning for individuals of working for the State. Concepts gain meaning in social context. The phrase “Devlet Güvencesi” (Government Security) has a meaning above and beyond what is understood in its translation for the Turkish people. The phrase is culturally loaded with what has come to be accepted by citizens over time about the security provided by working for the State, often referred to as “Devlet Baba” (Our Father State), to express an almost sense of omnipotent trust and security. The positive association between working for a State factory and inclination to prefer a wage scheme which includes low wages plus a share in profit should be considered under this light. As a measure of positive attitudes toward participation a participation index is designed¹. In the following analysis, positive attitudes toward participation are taken as the dependent variable and the effect of workplace along with various control variables, are examined (Table 11).

¹ The index was devised by summing responses to questions 33, 34,35, 41-43, + 47 coded to give smaller values for positive attitudes towards participation and then dividing by 7.

Table 11: Regression analysis of variables Marital Status, Age, Gender, Seniority, Education and Place of Work regressed on the participatory index.

Multiple Regression Y_1 : PARTICIPATION INDEX 6 X Variables

DF:	R:	R ² :	Adj. R ² :	Std. Err.:
802	.185	.034	.027	.472

Analysis of Variance Table

Source	DF:	Sum Sq.:	Mean Sq.:	F- Test:
Regression	6	6.246	1.041	4.677
Residual	796	177.19	.223	p=.0001
Total	802	183.436		

No Residual Statistics Computed

Beta Coefficient Table

Parameter	Value:	Std. Err.:	Std. Value:	t-Value:	Probab.:
Intercept	2.589				
Marital Sta.	.045	.035	.047	1.28	.201
Age	.011	.018	.028	.616	.5384
Gender	-.085	.036	-.089	2.364	.0183
Seniority	.012	.017	.031	.725	.4684
Education	-.032	.022	-.052	1.462	.1442
Factory	-.137	.035	-.14	3.939	.0001

Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table

Parameter 95% lower: 95% upper: 90% lower: 90% upper: Partial F:

Intercept					
Marital Sta.	-.024	.115	-.013	.104	1.637
Age	-.025	.047	-.019	.042	.379
Gender	-.156	-.014	-.145	-.026	5.589
Seniority	-.021	.045	-.015	.039	.526
Education	-.074	.011	-.067	.004	2.137
Factory	-.205	-.069	-.194	-.08	15.517

Note: The variables for education and seniority are positively coded so that higher scores indicate higher education and seniority. The remaining variables are coded as such; Gender (1=F, 2=M), Place of Occupation (1=Altinyıldız, 2=Sümerbank), Marital Status (1=married, 2=single, divorced, widow), Choice of Wage Type (1=average wage, 2=low wage + share of profit).

As is very evident, the place where one works shows a very significant association with his/her level of positive attitudes toward participation ($\beta = -.137$, $p = .0001$). The negative sign indicates that working for Sümerbank fosters positive attitudes for participation, since Sümerbank is coded 2 and positive values for participation are indicated by smaller numbers. Similarly, we see that Gender is also significantly associated, although not as strongly as place of work ($\beta = -.085$, $p = .018$), but does represent another important variable that affects an individual's attitudes towards participation.

Interestingly, even with Gender being controlled and thus absorbing a great deal of variance, the place of work is a highly significant determinant of an urge to participation. Quite contrary to the idea that innovation will come from private industry workers, state-owned facilities have more positive views toward an innovative new managerial arrangement. The explanations for these findings can be complex and will need to be discussed in more detailed analysis which should include descriptive non-quantitative data.

5.3. Relationship Between Participation and Psychological Symptoms

An individual's willingness to grasp and have control over her/his workplace in this study, as will be recalled, represents a proxy for "predictive capacity" and thus is expected to be inversely associated with psychological symptoms. In Table 12 a regression model, which includes control variables of Gender, Age, Seniority, Place of Work, and Education along with a participation measure regressed on psychological symptoms, indicates that participation is not significantly associated with psychological symptoms. As would be expected gender is significantly associated to psychological symptoms ($\beta = .1$ $p = .0001$) and surprisingly workplace is as well ($\beta = -.153$, $p = .0001$).

Table 12: Regression analysis of variables Age, Place of work, Education, Gender and Participation regressed on the psychological symptoms index.

Multiple Regression Y₁; PSY. SYM. INDEX 5 X Variables

DF:	R:	R ² :	Adj. R ² :	Std. Err.:
802	.297	.088	.082	.332

Analysis of Variance Table

Source	DF:	Sum Sq.:	Mean Sq.:	F- Test:
Regression	5	8.46	1.692	15.393
Residual	797	87.603	.11	p=.0001
Total	802	96.063		

No Residual Statistics Computed

Beta Coefficient Table

Parameter	Value:	Std. Err.:	Std. Value:	t-Value:	Probab.:
Intercept	3.643				
Age	.01	.011	.034	.951	.3417
Factory	-.153	.024	-.217	6.275	.0001
Education	-.015	.015	-.034	.998	.3187
Gender	.1	.025	.144	4.003	.0001
Participation	.036	.025	.05	1.46	.1447

Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table

Parameter	95% lower:	95% upper:	90% lower:	90% upper:	Partial F:
Intercept					
Age	-.011	.031	-.007	.028	.905
Factory	-.201	-.105	-.193	-.113	39.371
Education	-.045	.015	-.04	-.01	.995
Gender	.051	.149	.059	.141	16.027
Participation	-.013	.085	-.005	.077	2.131

Note: The variables for education and seniority are positively coded so that higher scores indicate higher education and seniority. The remaining variables are coded as such; Gender (1=F, 2=M), Place of Occupation (1=Altinyıldız, 2=Sümerbank), Marital Status (1=married, 2=single, divorced, widow), Choice of Wage Type (1=average wage, 2=low wage + share of profit).

The data indicate that females have significantly higher psychological symptoms scores than do male, and that workers working at Sümerbank have significantly higher levels of psychological symptoms than those working at Altinyıldız.

The reason why psychological symptoms are not associated with participation may be due to a lack of eventfulness within which to assess the affects of stress and herein the buffering factor expected of predictive

capacity. Another explanation may be that the shortened version of the PERI psychological symptoms scale may have lost its sensitivity, especially in situations where the level of change or stress on the individual is unknown.

Another shortcoming may be with our measure of participation. Only one of the items in the measure probe participation semi-directly in a hypothetical case of allocating time. It may be that a behavioral rather than an attitudinal measure of participation may be required to understand the relationship between participation and psychological symptoms. More research on the data set may also reveal a more complex relationship which at present is non-apparent.

In short, the results show that the variables of gender and workplace are strongly associated to an individuals' level of psychological symptoms, that workers feel it is time to participate and that they are more willing to participate in areas of management which have a more direct personal consequences on their lives. Their preference of the form of participation is direct, especially when the areas of participation deal with personal issues.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION

CHAPTER VI DISCUSSION

The innovative transformation of managerial systems in the textile industry of Turkey, although in its rudimentary stages, is long awaited by workers. Looking at the idiosyncratic qualities of each country in this process is undoubtedly the most efficient way to proceed. The journey toward better products and a higher quality of life for those who produce them is a long one. This study hopes to have shed light on some of these issues, the consideration of which will hopefully ease such a transformation.

In light of the empirical findings, it is easy to say that the textile workers of Turkey from both a state-owned plant and a private plant are very anxious to participate in managerial decision making. A large majority of workers feel that it is their right to participate and that this right grows out of the mere fact that they work at the factory. They however also agree to the importance of knowledge and experience in the validation of a right to participate. Regardless of the seniority of a worker, they feel that participation should be granted in some form or another to all those who are affected by the consequences of the production process. This they claim should be the rule even if their personal interests are at jeopardy.

One problem with asking questions with socially prescribed answers is that often one receives as results not the empirical truth but the socially most acceptable. There is little that researchers can do to avoid a social response bias since the nature of our world by constitution is socially constructed. What is important to realize is that the results should be taken within the social context validating it.

The utilisation of participatory management will only move along as workers and managers can conceptualise the value of such a system. Information gathered from workers indicates that the most valuable aspect of worker participation will be in promoting workplace harmony. When one considers the expenses associated with high turnover rates in an age where skill and information play a dominant role, then workplace harmony becomes an important asset.

Interestingly, informal interviews with top management and government officials indicate that workplace harmony and the

articulation of employees' knowledge are the most important benefits to be reaped from a codetermined workplace.

How ready is the textile industry of Turkey to share in management? Looking at the information revealed from the two factories we see that workers are ready to allocate unpaid time to participate in managerial decision making. 40% of the workers claimed that they would allocate 1-2 hours a month of unpaid time, 24% 3-4 hours, 15% 5-6 hours, 8% 7-8 and finally 12% 9-10 hours. As will be noticed, the figures indicate that there is an extreme group which is willing to allocate 9-10 hours of unpaid time a month to participate. How realistic are these figures and for how long would such unpaid participation persist given that no immediate rewards were gained from this participation other than perhaps workplace harmony?

Although we have no way of empirically answering this question, the experiences of other countries indicate that when participation goes without a share in profit, participation dwindles. On the other hand, as we have discussed in Chapter II, when profit sharing schemes are introduced economic inefficiencies are to be expected. Optimal solutions appear to be culturally mandated and transient. In Japan, being honored, may serve as a higher reward than one could attain from material gifts, where and at present, Turkish workers may be satisfied with workplace harmony but at a latter date such attitudes may change.

As will be recalled, in Figure 1 in the Results Chapter, only half of the workers were willing to participate in a low wage + share of profit as opposed to a normal wage. What was more interesting was that when the data was looked at by factory those at Sümerbank were more ready to take a low wage + share in profit option. As was discussed, the factors involved are various and complicated. When concepts such as trust and expectations enter into the formula one has to be very cautious about making generalizations. An additional piece of information which needs to be considered in attempting to explain these results is that Sümerbank was considered for privatization shortly before our research was conducted. Workers may have interpreted our research as part of a larger scheme to asses the feasibility of selling the factory shares to the workers, an offer which the union leaders mentioned they had made. In such a case they may have felt that it would be in their interest to answer questions toward participation in a positive manner.

Looking at t-Test scores for the significance in differences in the mean of the participation measures, we see that Sümerbank workers scored significantly ($p=.0017$, $t= -3.163$) more positive in their willingness to participate when compared to the mean of the whole sample. Likewise, those workers at Altinyıldız scored significantly lower than the population mean (sig. at a $p= .0001$ level, $t= 4.397$) on the participation measure. These findings can be interpreted as either supporting a conspiracy theory of workers at Sümerbank on the verge of privatization or as a genuine facilitation of state ownership toward participation.

Another valuable finding of the study was the preference of personal areas of participation in the workplace. As will be recalled, 14 areas of possible participation were isolated and represented on an iconic-table for respondents who placed poker chips in various squares representing their choice of participation areas. These areas were then rated along a dimension of personal to non-personal. The results showed that respondents preferred to allocate participation votes in areas of personal concern. The less personal the subject of participation the less attention it received.

Considering the cost of participation for both the worker and management it is important to devise an optimal balance where workers receive fulfillment from participation and the production unit is not bogged down by cumbersome decision making processes. Furthermore, it was revealed that workers prefer to represent themselves more so on issues which are of importance to them personally and leave non-personal areas of participation to representatives. This information, it is felt, will aid in our endeavor to optimise participation.

Our final discussion deals with the results that psychological symptoms were not seen as associated to positive attitudes toward participation. Furthermore, what little association there was, appeared in the opposite direction as was hypothesized, such that higher levels of psychological symptoms were associated with low levels of desire to participate.

There are various explanations for these findings. First, it may be that an urge to participate reflects an individuals' present level of stress with the workplace. As was mentioned shortly before, the study the Sümerbank factory was put up for privatization. The workers appeared to be concerned about the future of their jobs. It could be that those

most concerned about their future were those who were most likely to express a strong degree of positive attitude toward having a say so in what appeared to transpire outside of their governance.

One way that such a claim could be controlled for, would be to separate the data set by factory. If workers at Sümerbank are experiencing high levels of stress due to the possibility of losing their jobs their psychological symptoms scores should be higher than that of the total sample. Looking at t-Test for differences in the mean psychological symptoms scores of workers at Sümerbank, we see that their scores are significantly higher than those of the total sample ($n=490$, $t= -4.629$, sig. at a $p=.0001$ level). This highly significant finding is matched on the other end by workers at the Altinyıldız factory, whose psychological symptoms scores are significantly lower than those of the sample mean ($n=323$, $t= 5.476$, sig. at a $p= .0001$ level).

This supports the possibility that an important probable life event, the lose of job through privatization wherein the work force would expectedly be drastically reduced, may have increased the psychological symptoms levels of the workers at Sümerbank. The nature of the life event being that of privatization with the possibility of selling or turning over shares to workers, workers may have thought the mission of the research was to establish those workers who might be fit to hold shares, thus giving an association between desire to participate and psychological symptoms.

Another possibility is that either our participation measure is measuring something else or our psychological symptoms measure is not a valid measure. One clue to the validity to the measure of our psychological symptoms index is that the level of psychological symptoms for females is significantly higher as in other research (*e.g.*, Mandalinci 1995). This indicates that the measure is reliably performing when compared to other research in Turkey.

Looking further into our measure of participation, as will be recalled, the areas of participation were divided along a dimension of personal to non-personal. Here participation is represented not by attitudinal questions but rather the area of participation. Will the area of participation which one was most frequently to desire on a dimension of personal to non-personal reveal an association with psychological symptoms? After controlling for various demographic variable the

analysis shows that a choice to participate in more personal areas is associated with psychological symptoms. The more one participates in personal areas the more likely he/she is to have more psychological symptoms. The findings are similar to the other participation measure. The total personal measure was developed by adding the number of votes that the individual allocated to the *a priori* chosen 4 personal areas.

This is further support that the psychological symptom scale is reliable. Further analysis of this data set is needed to bring more clarity to the present results. The findings are important in that they reflect how a historical event may have enough impact to disturb the psychological well-being of such a large group of people. Participation hence may be valuable as an effort to buffer the results of any major event. Respondents' efforts to seek opportunities to participate may have ran simultaneously to the ill effects of the major event. Thus giving us a positive association between poor mental health and participation.

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APPENDIX A

EXAMPLES OF CODETERMINATION IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES

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This appendix presents codetermination applications at country level in order to understand better the way that concept has crystallised in different socio-political and economic environments. As a prefatory remarque, it should explicitly be stated that it has no claim whatsoever in being a fully comprehensive and complete survey; rather it aims at presenting different countries' experiences, in order to indicate the wide range of the applicability of codetermination.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The US Industry in the late 1970s got into a deep crisis, loosing its competitiveness against the newly industrialised South East Asian countries and the Japan. This crisis, coupled with the conservative policies of the Reagan Era, forced Trade Unions (TUs) to step back in their income-distribution related struggle. This was understandable, once one recalls that capital owners were then strongly arguing that "lowering labour costs was by far the cheapest 'solution' in the short run" (Barber and Towers 1989: 24). However, when one takes a longer perspective one notice that, while the relocation of industries to the peripheral and semi-peripheral countries and the employment of immigrant labour who were ready to accept lower wage offers were both used as measures for by-passing industry-related problems, the application of re-industrialisation schemes in enhancing overall productivity was also implemented by industrialists to re-establish the competitiveness of the US economy in general (see *e.g.* Barber and Towers 1989; Strauss 1989).

Within this framework, therefore, several types of workers participation models have increasingly been designed and applied. While TUs were apathetic and incapable in coming up with an alternative, the managerial side proposed some "highly controlled forms of worker participation" at operational level (Barber and Towers 1989: 24), somewhat similar to the Japanese models of participation, under the banner of the "Quality of Work Life" programmes (QWL) (Barber and Towers 1989).

QWL programmes are known to be divisible into “operational level participation” and “strategic level participation” (Barber and Towers 1989; Strauss 1989), both of which are summarised below.

A. Operational Level Participation Forms of QWL:

More practical, on-the-job, task-related participation models are covered under these Quality of Work Life programmes, and can be subdivided as follows:

1. Job Enrichment: It combines separate job classifications into one, where the management’s motivation is to break down job demarcation lines, with the aim of using its work-force more flexibly, even though there might be some resistance from workers to such a scheme. To give an example, at the NUMMI industrial site, California, 50 different unskilled job classifications were combined into one.

2. Autonomous Work Groups: These are operating teams that come together regularly in order to discuss production-related problems, such as the introduction of new machinery, inspection, materials handling, housekeeping and repairs, and to implement necessary changes. They also review the pay system along with the costs and revenues associated with the work area in order to make some suggestions.

3. Quality Circles (QCs): QC is a group of workers, usually from the same department, led by a supervisory foreperson, meeting at regular intervals (*e.g.* once a week) to solve specific problems arising from the production process. QCs can only recommend changes to their superiors, and thus they do not have any implementary powers; and in that sense they are voluntary. Historically attention was first given to quality problems, but then it moved on to the working conditions and the issues of productivity. In the US context, QCs sometimes even tread on areas normally reserved for collective bargaining. One of the implications of the last fact is that QCs have usually been seen as a potential threat by the TU leadership.

4. Scanlon Plan: This plan evaluates workers’ ideas for increasing productivity by ways of combining participation with financial incentives. Evaluation is made by the workplace and plant-wide committees. Savings due to increased productivity are shared among workers and the company. The main aim is to create a cooperative environment between the employee and the employer.

Management has certain goals in adopting QWL schemes such as increasing productivity through enhanced job satisfaction, and thus to deal with worker alienation on the one hand and avoiding TU existence on the other.

But a radical perspective such as that of Barber and Towers (1989: 27) clearly lays down that, “with QC, the strategy is still divide and conquer, but its application is more subtle and sophisticated”. This quote reveals that from the managerial point of view participation is not seen as a method that will bring, say, a more democratic decision-making process into the firm, but as a method of evaluating employees’ ideas and contributions within the hierarchical structure. TUs had basically become inefficient and useless for the labour force. The overall economic crisis, the anti-union atmosphere, the alienation of TUs towards workers had caused dramatic falls in union membership. Unions were forced to have a positive attitude towards QWL because of the simple fact that unions may only survive if their employers survive (Barber and Towers 1989).¹

B. Strategic Level Participation:

There seems to be no generalised form of codetermination at a strategic level in USA. The following two forms, however, are adopted as particularistic achievements of TUs by profiting from the financial difficulties of some firms.

1. Board representation of employers: All of these disadvantages of the anti-unionism, decentralisation and the weakening of the collective bargaining power of unions, forced the TUs to become involved in some certain particularistic methods in order to regain power. In that regard, union representatives have therefore managed to get a few places on the boards of some financially unhealthy companies (*e.g.* Chrysler and American Motors, Pan American Airlines, Western Airlines and Wilson

¹ In his book 'Democracy at Work' Turner (Turner 1991) gives two criteria for defining the state of the trade unions in the last two decades with a special emphasis on US experience: i) whether the labour is integrated or not into the managerial decision making process and ii) the socio-political environment of the country and more specifically the approach of the government. These two criteria are very much in parallel with the above mentioned reasons (Goll 1993).

Foods). Such *board-member representation* has lead the union leaders into the apparent conflict of interest on certain occasions. Faced with the crude reality that they would have to take the responsibility for making difficult production and investment decisions, involving lay-offs, some mechanisms were designed to prevent these conflictual situations (Strauss 1989):

- a. An outsider worker representative has chosen.
- b. A key union representative, once selected, is to resign from her\his union role.
- c. A key union representative as to absent him/herself from the board during discussion of the collective bargaining strategy.

2. Company Control: One step beyond the board member representation is the union struggle for complete company control. The following list is a selection of some methods in achieving a complete control (Strauss 1989):

- a. Unions may force a change in management through refusing concessions until their demand is realised.
- b. They may agree to make discriminative concessions during a takeover.
- c. By utilising their stock ownership, they may takeover the firm.
- d. They may use their political power in favour of one set of buyers.²

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The British Forces in Germany in the post-World War II period were aiming “to break the social patterns which were thought to have produced National Socialism and the need to create a strong but independent labour movement capable of resisting political extremism of the right or the left” (Turner 1989: 65). According to the Allied Forces the “excessive consensus” and the corporatist structure of German industrial relations was quite dangerous. The German tradition was clearly in contrast with the British tradition of conflict in industrial relations; so the British

²Some unionists also argued that stock ownership gave workers the illusion of ownership without any real control and that it was chiefly a management technique to make unions unnecessary or to cut wages.

Forces neglected all the demands of co-determination fearing that it would be crucial tool for building consensus-based industrial relations. However, after the British pulled out, the Germans did not wait long before reincarnating codetermination.

In 1951, after the British Forces left the scene, the Adenauer Government gave a start for the construction of the juridical codetermination system in Germany in the Iron, Steel and Coal Industries (*Montanmitbestimmung*) (Turner 1989). This construction resulted with the **Co-determination Act of 1951** and the **Work Constitution Act of 1952**. This legal framework was then fine tuned by the **Works Constitution Act of 1972** and the **Codetermination Act of 1976**, which constitutes today's picture. The application of codetermination has two dimensions; namely strategic and operational level participation.

Strategic level participation is generally applied at board-level, with the juridical context of the two-tier system which is constituted of a management board and a supervisory board. Operational level participation, on the other hand, is widely accepted as plant level participation through Works Councils. Our task, here, is to outline the main characteristics of the prototype codetermination model of the 1951-1952 and the modifications that were made to this particular model in the 1970's.

A. Strategic Level Participation:

"Strategic Level Participation" of workers' and trade union representatives in the decision-making of firms take place principally on management and supervisory boards. In the application of the Codetermination Act of 1951 the following dimensions were drawn (Briefs 1989):

a. Management Board: A "works director" is included as a regular member of the management board. This "works director" functions as a personnel administrator and personnel planner, and also deals with health and safety issues.

b. Supervisory Board: This board, which exercises financial control over the management board, consists of equal representation of shareholders and workers. (The number of the board, and therefore each party's share, changes according to the size of the company, such as five plus five or ten plus ten.) Worker representatives include several TU members, but it is always assured that a possible TU dominance among

the representatives be avoided. As an additional member, there exists a **Neutral Person**,³ usually proposed by employee representatives, playing a role in the case of indeterminate voting. On the other hand, for a counter balance, the Supervisory Board's President is usually nominated by shareholders' representatives.

This only applied to the iron, steel and coal industry (*Montanmitbestimmung*), however. For the rest of the economy, the 1951 Law made it mandatory that firms with more than 500 employees were to be represented (on the Supervisory Board) with the proportion of 1/3. With the **Co-determination Act of 1976**, the legal framework was modified such that the 1/2 share became a legal constraint for all the firms in the economy with 2000 and more employees, keeping the 1/3 rule intact for firms with more than 500 and less than 2000 employees.

Further deviations of the 1976 Law from that of 1951 can be cited as follows:

- a. Powered with a second vote right in cases of indecisiveness, the President took over the functions of Neutral Person, who ceased to exist as a result of the new legislation;
- b. The President will be among shareholders' representatives;
- c. Among workers' representatives there must be a management employee, who is dependent, directly, to the Management Board (Briefs 1989).

B. Operational Level Participation:

The existence of **Works Councils** (WCs) is designed as a counterweight to managerial institutions of decision-making. They are almost universal for the representation of workers' interests in the firms. In Germany they must be functional in every firm with more than five employees. They have a basic set of rights to information, consultation and codetermination. Their functions can be categorised as follows (FitzRoy and Kraft 1993):

- a. Discussing the wages (though they are prohibited from participating in collective bargaining), the working environment and rules, new recruitments and internal transfers with their superiors;

³ To avoid discrimination we have renamed "neutral man" as "neutral person".

- b. Trying to solve every kinds of problem between the managers and employees, controlling the implementation of the works laws, and improving the social life in the workplace;
- c. Collecting the necessary information in advance regarding the plans for lay offs and plant closure.

Yet, as Briefs (1989) underlines, these WCs' power is limited in many ways, which can be put forward as follows;

- a. WCs cannot prevent dismissals, shut-downs, and neither initiate nor prevent investments;
- b. WCs have limitations in their rights of access to information regarding major strategic decisions.

It can be argued that, initially, WCs were designed to create competition or a counterweight against TUs. Structurally, this could be maintained through creating a duality in the representation of workers' interest. On the other hand, while the mediative functioning of the basic mechanisms of codetermination decreases the militancy of the union members, its highly juridical procedures undermine TU activities in plants. But now, despite all these negative aspects it is observed that unions are becoming more and more active in WCs (Briefs 1989; Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993).

UNITED KINGDOM

The actual situation for the UK is such that the Conservative Party dominance over a decade seems to have swept away the post-war welfare state tradition which was executed by successive Labour Governments. Concomitantly, these political and economic factors have not sustained a favourable climate for new developments in industrial democracy to surface, let alone flourish. (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993).

The British industrial structure was constructed over a conflictual relationship. Furthermore, the malevolent atmosphere of the Thatcher years was a major factor that caused a conflictual and harsh industrial relationship. Having said this, however, it should also be noted that, at operational level, several forms of participatory models have been introduced in order to increase productivity and product quality (Hill 1991). Yet, at the strategic level, there is a clear lack of a legal

framework in the British case, compared, for example, to the German example that has been outlined above. Although there were some attempts from the Labour Government in the 1970s to introduce a legal framework towards establishing a “strategic level participation”, TUs categorically rejected those attempts (Neal 1987).

A committee (Bullock) was held in the 1970's in order to examine more closely the German and other European experiences of codetermination, and to submit proposals for the UK case. This Committee, first, echoed the orthodox view that collective bargaining is the most effective mechanism for giving workers the right to representation in decisions affecting their working lives; and, second, made propositions which could enhance participation. Based on the view that industrial democracy in UK was far from being sufficient and that there were increasing demands for more participation in the workplace, the Committee worked out a blueprint. According to that, the Management Board (or Board of Directors) should include a certain number of workers' representatives in order to have productive management and functional participation. This board should have absolute effectivity without being by-passed by an owner or a board of owners. The Managerial Board must have power regarding economic, hierarchical and strategic decisions.

The “2x+y” formula was proposed for companies with 2000 or more employees. This report, however, never saw the light of day. (Bullock 1977).

SWEDEN

The classical Swedish Model is characterised by a relatively few, well organised and strong employers' associations and unions. TUs rely upon the government to pursue an active labour market policy in order to absorb technological and structural unemployment. But the **decentralisation** process has forced central bargaining to be diverted into industry-wide bargaining (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993).

Two areas are of importance in the case of the Swedish industrial democracy debate:

- a. work organisation and individual influence over job.
- b. union influence over the top management by means of collective bargaining and board representation.

These two topics could also be re-classified as operational level participation and strategic level participation respectively.

A. Operational Level Participation:

Works Councils were first established in the **1967 Contract**. These Councils were aimed at increasing productivity through considering workers' proposals about increases in productivity and maintaining workplace security. "An agreement has been reached between the employers and the labour side about co-operating in finding ways in incorporating new technology into the production" (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993: 56).

B. Strategic Level Participation:

According to the Swedish **Codetermination at Work Act of 1977** the employer has a duty to consult unions before any important decision, such as technological renewals. In firms with more than 25 employees two local union based directors can belong to the boards (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993).

It should also be noted that the **Swedish Centre for Working Life**, as a support institute, was established in 1977 in order to promote a quality of working life experimentation on a very wide range. Although controlled by the labour force, it is financed from levies on the employers (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993).

It is clear that the overdeveloped Swedish corporatist structure at the national level has not been translated into the firm level codetermination as extensively as the German Model suggests. Yet the decentralisation process points towards a deconstruction of the corporatist structure and its replacement with a more local, firm level codetermination.

NORWAY

The economic crisis of the eighties caused an emphasis shift from corporatism towards developing strategies for learning, improving performance and utilising external resources (Qvale 1989), and codetermination assumed great importance in that regard.

According to Brundtland (1989), the Prime Minister, democracy in the workplace means: having security of employment, having a healthy work environment, being able to influence their situation, learning as working, not confronting any race or gender discrimination, taking part in decision-making, having a share of the wealth created, and being able to maintain a balance between working and private lives. This long list of definitions includes job security, power sharing and profit sharing in more economic terms. Yet it is an important point of inquiry whether what Social Democratic Prime Minister describes rather neatly exists in the real life.

A. Strategic Level Participation:

The Company Act of 1973 secured 1/3 of the seats on company boards for the employees.

B. Operational Level Participation:

The Work Environment Act of 1977 aims at employee empowerment and firm development. It stipulates individual workers' opportunity for self-determination, and takes into account their professional responsibility. **The Work Environment Act of 1977** represents a break with the legal tradition (in that it usually deals with the problem of health and safety seriously), in the sense of bringing in worker participation into the decision-making process of such issues (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993). Before this act such decisions used to be made through negotiations between the top institutions.

As support institutions, it was suggested that TUs and NAF (employers associations) started a joint action research programme on the issue of industrial democracy (*i.e.* a centre), and **The Centre for a Better Working Life** was established in the early 1990s. The Centre's function is to release general information and networking, initiate local development, and finally organise and finance support activities (Brundtland 1989).

As such, a slow but quite a steady move towards more flexibility in industrial relations together with a higher degree of employee participation can now be observed in Norway.

DENMARK

The right-wing coalitions through the 1980s were in favour of the managerial demands for a higher degree of labour flexibility. Yet the amount of organised workers is still quite high: Male 90-95%; Female 75%. On the other hand, increasing part-time employment seems to decrease the involvement of workers in their jobs.

A. Strategic Level Participation:

The Company Act of 1973 secured 2 seats for employees on the company's board. **The Company Act of 1980** developed the previous Act by reserving 1/3 of the board for employee membership in companies with more than 50 employees (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993).

B. Operational Level Participation:

With the **Agreement of 1986**, co-operation committees are held for firms with 35 or more employees, if one of the parties raises such a demand. Previously the limit was fifty employees. These co-operation committees have increased their information retrieval rights about technological renewals and made labour representatives on the boards more responsible towards them (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993).

BELGIUM

As is the case in most of the European countries, the decentralisation process can be increasingly observed, with the obvious result that regional governments are gaining more initiatives.

Social Partners (workers and employers federations) usually participate in macro economic and social decisions. But as a result of decentralisation fewer agreements are reached at national level, unless they are forced to do so by the government (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993). At a more local level, Works Councils constitute the basic mechanism for both strategic and operational level participation.

In firms with 150 and more employees these councils are mandatory. In those with 50 to 149 employees, they are voluntary. Representative numbers vary with the size of the company (*e.g.* 500-1000 workers mean 4 representatives, 1001-2000 workers mean 10 representatives, etc). Council president is usually the employer and

chooses the employer representatives (Dicle 1980). WC and TU delegations are informed about new technology changes beforehand; however, employees have no right to negotiate about those changes.

During the eighties informative and consultative roles of Works Councils were extended. A new role was introduced: controlling the effect of recovery measures at the firm level. Managerial personnel were represented at the Works Council as well.

ISRAEL

An exceptional economic crisis during the 80s, with 450% inflation, led to a Tripartite Agreement and after that TU incorporation into the macroeconomic decision-making process; and with the joint efforts of the three social partners inflation has been reduced to 20% (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993).

Collective Bargaining takes place at 3 levels, viz. national, industry, and plant levels. There seems to be a shift of emphasis from the industry level towards plant level (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993). The governments seem to be reluctant in initiating attempts at participation. This reluctance has led to voluntary forms of participation rather than more legalised forms.

Such productivity aimed voluntary forms can be classified as Operational Level Participation forms. The *shop steward committee* is the body that confronts management at the plant level. From the mid-eighties the growing popularity of *Quality Circles* can be observed in the private, government and *Histradut* (workers' economy) sectors. They are usually initiated by management, and Shop Steward Committees are generally consulted and frequently incorporated formally.

Joint Productivity Councils, that are also spreading, are based on a parity principle in which decisions can be taken by the majority of each of the two parties. Mostly these councils concentrate on work methods and incentive payments (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993).

To draw an overall picture, decentralisation reveals itself in the Israel context with an observable increase in the number of autonomous, voluntary forms of plant level employer-employee confrontation. A shift of emphasis from industry to plant level collective bargaining is also an indicator of decentralisation.

THE NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands Government has been playing a very central role in economy and bureaucratic administration. Everything has been very centralised and under government control. The weakness of TUs due to the hegemony of right ideology is easily observable, as is a trend towards decentralisation and fragmentation. TUs are offered a role in negotiating the outlines of the collective agreement while Works Council handle the rest of the work within the firm. This was accepted, and the general quality of operational and strategic level of participation has been increasing (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993).

As it has been mentioned above, the decentralisation process is dominant in the Dutch industrial system, leading especially to an intensification of consultation practices at company level. TUs have therefore found themselves in a dilemma; either to contribute to participation but become decentralised and ineffective as a collective labour movement, or reject to participate and have no say in the decision-making even though the nature of the new technology demands participation (Looise 1989: 278-279). A participative structure of equal partners is therefore dependent on the lasting support of the unions.

As for the legal structure of participation, with the **Works Council Act of 1979** firms with employees more than 100 were obliged to establish WCs with an extension of autonomy (exclusion of managers from these councils) and domain of advises (issues relating to transfer of control of the company, co-operation with another company, closing down of the company). WCs can also veto issues regarding social matters or can appeal to the court where necessary. They have a certain amount of initiative power and they are regularly informed about the economic situation of the firm (Looise 1989).

Two years later with the **100-Law (1981)** the range of the participatory legislation was extended to all organisations. Firms with employees of less than 100 and more than 35 are obliged to have WCs. Yet these WCs are only slightly less powerful than the firms with 100 or more employees (Looise, 1989).

And, finally, **The 1980 Work Environment Act** concerns the health, safety, and well-being of employees. Influenced by the Norwegian Work Environment Act of 1977, it demands the participation of the

employees in health and safety issues (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993).

FRANCE

At the beginning of the eighties the freshly arriving Socialist government came up with **The Auroux Act (1982)**, imposing obligations for managerial bodies to make yearly negotiations with local union branches about wages and working hours. The Act also secures direct and collective expression rights for workers about work conditions and organisations. The workers' right of expression is defined in two ways as *direct* and *collective* in order to keep two different doors open (Borzeix and Linhart 1989). The former is the right of expression without intermediaries, without elections and without delegates, while the latter is the right of coming together in groups to express themselves in firms with more than 200 employees (Borzeix and Linhart 1989).

A certain amount of decentralisation of decision-making accompanied with the transformation of traditional institutional practices can be underlined as the positive aspects of recent developments. It should also be noted that, generally speaking, participation in France has developed as a solution to the organisational constraints imposed on firms, for economic and technological reasons, and not as a result of any labour challenge to management nor of any threat to its control (Borzeix and Linhart 1989).

JAPAN

First Quality Circles have been established in Japan despite the fact that they were primarily initiated at a theoretical level by Americans (*e.g.* Shewhart, Deming, Juran, and Drucker. See Kavrakoglu (1994a)). Yet the main objective in the Japanese context seems to be *being competitive* rather than *maintaining industrial and economic democracy*. Operational level participation is the dominant form, and there are several basic practical types of workers' participation forms:

1. Joint Consultation System: In JCS, representatives of employees at each level of a company meet once a month with their counterparts in management, to obtain information about the company's policies and production schedule (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993).

2. Ringi System: Ringi means submitting a proposal to one's superior for approval. "A policy proposal is drafted by a junior member of a section.[...] It then goes to the vice-chief of the section, the section chief, department chief, and may, even on quite minor matters, reach an executive at head office" (Marsh 1992). The Ringi system is a highly hierarchical model that is aimed to articulate the small pieces of knowledge that the lower ranks of the hierarchy possesses.

3. Quality Control Circles: QCC are voluntary groups who are organised at the plant level in order to contribute to and be responsible for *local* problem solving and to give quick responses to local as well as system shocks (Aoki 1990).

4. Total Quality Management: TQM is an overall project, aiming at perfection in all levels and areas of production, based on mutual understanding and extended communication between the managerial personnel and the employee. TQM is a broader participatory management system which incorporates all the employees of an enterprise and utilises Quality (Control) Circles as an apparatus of direct and on-the-point intervention into the problematic issues in production (Hill 1991). The system has rigorous techniques for problem solving activities and has a tendency of decentralising the responsibility at the lower levels of hierarchy (Juran 1988). The usual methods like *job enlargement* and *job enrichment* (see USA section) are used for creating 'semi-autonomous' shop-floor groups (Hill 1991).

As for the collective bargaining, a certain part of TUs are in need of a pre-bargaining system (*i.e.* JCS) that can provide the necessary feedback to the collective bargaining process.

On the other hand, some of the TUs think that JCS deals with issues of mutual interest between the managers and the employees, while Collective Bargaining deals with issues of a conflicting nature (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993). Consequently, such TUs, uneasy with this contradiction, choose a cautious attitude towards JCS in particular, and operational level participative forms in general.

And, finally, some "aggressive TUs" criticised the JCS for being only consultational and having no decision-making powers.

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE AND ICON-TABLE

Q.1. In an enterprise various decisions, such as employment, investment, working conditions, technology, are undertaken by the management. We have classified them under fourteen headings. Imagine a situation where you, the employees, are asked to participate into the decision-making of these areas.

Assuming that you have 20 points which you are free to allocate among these areas. Use the white ones to indicate that you want to take part directly, and the red ones to indicate that you rather prefer your representative to take part on behalf of you.

		Number Of Votes		Direct	Indirect
1	*WORK EDUCATION AND TRAINING COURSES	K.5	K.19	1	2
2	*DISCIPLINE AND DISMISSALS	K.6	K.20	1	2
3	*NEW INVESTMENTS	K.7	K.21	1	2
4	*WORKING HOURS AND HOLIDAYS	K.8	K.22	1	2
5	*PERSONAL EQUIPMENT	K.9	K.23	1	2
6	*NEW PRODUCT	K.10	K.24	1	2
7	*WORKPLACE CONDITIONS	K.11	K.25	1	2
8	*TASK ASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFERS	K.12	K.26	1	2
9	*HIRING PROCEDURES	K.13	K.27	1	2
10	*APPOINTMENT OF OWN SUPERVISOR, NEW DEPARTMENT HEAD	K.14	K.28	1	2
11	*WAGE LEVELS AND WAGE DIFFERENTIATION	K.15	K.29	1	2
12	*MARKETING, PRICE DETERMINATION	K.16	K.30	1	2
13	*WELFARE FACILITIES	K.17	K.31	1	2
14	*TECHNOLOGY	K.18	K.32	1	2

Q. 2. Now that you have chosen the areas and forms of your ideal participation in decision-making. Such decision-making requires certain time. How many hours you are willing to devote from extra-work time in a month for participating the decision-making talks and negotiations.

K.33	
1	1-2 HOURS
2	3-4 HOURS
3	5-6 HOURS
4	7-8 HOURS
5	9-10 HOURS
	OTHER.....

Q.3 How much would you say you agree with the following question...

		Strongly agree	somewhat agree	neither agree or disagree	somewhat disagree	strongly disagree
The rights to manage a factory belong only to the owner or those people whom they appoint.	K.34	1	2	3	4	5
Those working in a factory have the right to participate.	K.35	1	2	3	4	5
The right to manage a factory depends on the individuals level of knowledge and skills.	K.36	1	2	3	4	5
The right to manage a factory depends on the seniority level of the individual.	K.37	1	2	3	4	5
Workers who participate in management should share in both cost and profit.	K.38	1	2	3	4	5

Q.4. Imagine that you are participating in management. You have a choice, you can either receive an average pay, or chose to receive a low wage + a premium from profit. Which one would you chose?

K.39	
1	NORMAL WAGE
2	LOWER WAGE + PROFIT SHARING

Q.5. How much would you say you agree with the following question...

		Strongly agree	somewhat agree	neither agree or disagree	somewhat disagree	strongly disagree
Imagine that local citizens are being affected by a factories production. Even if the local peoples demands fall contrary to your interests, these people should have a right to participate in decisions which concern them.	K.40	1	2	3	4	5
The participation of workers like me in management will increase the profitability of the factory.	K.41	1	2	3	4	5
The participation of workers like me in management will increase social equality.	K.42	1	2	3	4	5
The participation of workers like me in management will increase harmony in the workplace.	K.43	1	2	3	4	5

Q. 6. Codetermination will be more useful to... Please rank order.

	1° K.44	2° K.45	3° K.46
Workplace Harmony	1	1	1
Increase Profit	2	2	2
Social Equality	3	3	3

Q. 7. Choose the sentence you agree the most.

K.47	
1	The time for Turkish workers to join in management is <i>overdue</i> .
2	It is the <i>right</i> time for Turkish workers to join in management.
3	It is still <i>early</i> for Turkish workers to join in management.

Q.8. Everybody from time to time get angry and become aggressive. Think about the events that made you crazy, during the past year.

During the past year,		very often	fairly often	some times	almost never	never
when you have gotten angry, how often did you hide your anger, try not to show it	K.48	1	2	3	4	5
when you have gotten angry in the past year, how often have you yelled or shouted	K.49	1	2	3	4	5
when you have gotten angry in the past year, how often have you tried to calmly explain your feelings or opinions	K.50	1	2	3	4	5
when you have gotten angry in the past year, how often have you just stopped talking, avoided arguing and started to do something else	K.51	1	2	3	4	5
when you have gotten angry in the past year, how often did you take out your anger by kicking things, like a chair, giving a door a good slam, punching the wall, or looking for something to throw or smash	K.52	1	2	3	4	5
when you have gotten angry in the past year, how often have you hit someone	K.53	1	2	3	4	5

Q.9. A. Since the time you were about 12 years old, have you been in a physical fight with someone?

K.54	
1	YES
2	NO

---CONTINUE
---PROCEED TO Q.10

Q.9. B. Did you ever hurt a person you were fighting with pretty badly?

K.55	
1	YES
2	NO

Q.10. How often did you skip school or play hooky--would you say...

K.56	
1	Very often
2	Often
3	Almost never
4	Never

Q.11. How often you felt like...

During the last year		very often	fairly often	some times	almost never	never
how often have you had personal worries that get you down physically, that is make you physically ill	K.57	1	2	3	4	5
when you have gotten angry, how often have you felt uncomfortable, like getting headaches, stomach pains, cold sweats and things like that?	K.58	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you had frightening dreams?	K.59	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you feared being robbed, attacked, or physically injured?	K.60	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you felt confused and had trouble thinking?	K.61	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you had trouble concentrating or keeping your mind on what you were doing?	K.62	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you had no feeling in one or another part of your body?	K.63	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you lost your voice when you didn't have a cold or sore throat?	K.64	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you felt you were bothered by all different kinds of ailments in different parts of your body?	K.65	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you been bothered by feelings of sadness or depression-- feeling blue?	K.66	1	2	3	4	5
in general, how satisfied have you been with yourself?	K.67	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you felt useless?	K.68	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you feared going crazy; losing your mind?	K.69	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you had times when you couldn't help wondering if anything was worthwhile anymore?	K.70	1	2	3	4	5
how often has your appetite been poor?	K.71	1	2	3	4	5

Q. 12. Which sentence defines your ideas about yourself the best?

You are the kind of person.....		strongly agree	somewhat agree	neither agree nor disagree	some what disagree	disagree
who feels he has much to be proud of.	K.72	1	2	3	4	5
who is the worrying type--you know, a worrier.	K.73	1	2	3	4	5
who feels that he is a failure generally, in life.	K.74	1	2	3	4	5
who feels either high or low, but not in the middle.	K.75	1	2	3	4	5

Q.13. How often did the following events happen to you.

During the last year...		very often	fairly often	some times	almost never	never
how often have you felt that a part of your body did not belong to you?	K.76	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you felt as if you were in a dream even though you were awake--would you say?	K.77	1	2	3	4	5
how often have familiar surrounding seemed unreal to you, as if you were watching a movie or a play?	K.78	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you felt that you were physically cut off from people?	K.79	1	2	3	4	5

Q.14. Which of the following sentences describes your ideas regarding yourself.

You are the kind of person....		Strongly agree	somewhat agree	neither agree or disagree	somewhat disagree	strongly disagree
who believe that most people are honest.	K.80	1	2	3	4	5
who feels that most people can be trusted.	K.81	1	2	3	4	5
who feels that when it comes right down to it, most people can be counted on to do the right thing.	K.82	1	2	3	4	5

Q.15. How often did the following events happen to you.

During the last year...		very often	fairly often	some times	almost never	never
how often have you had attacks of sudden fear or panic.	K.83	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you feared crowds?	K.84	1	2	3	4	5

Q.16 Do you use alcohol?

K.85		
1	YES	— — CONTINUE
2	NO	— — PROCEED TO Q. 21

Q.17 You are the kind of person who has arguments with his family or friends because of his drinking.

K.86	
1	STRONGLY AGREE
2	SOMEWHAT AGREE
3	NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
4	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
5	STRONGLY DISAGREE

Q.18 During the past year, how often have you had bad reactions or bad effects from alcohol--like DT's, shakes or other bad reactions.

K.87	
1	VERY OFTEN
2	FAIRLY OFTEN
3	SOMETIMES
4	ALMOST NEVER
5	NEVER

Q.19 Wanting to forget everything, was that...

K.88	
1	VERY IMPORTANT
2	FAIRLY IMPORTANT
3	NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT

Q.20 Because you needed to drink when tense and nervous...

K.89	
1	VERY IMPORTANT
2	FAIRLY IMPORTANT
3	NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT

Q. 21 How often did the following things happen to you?

		very often	fairly often	some times	almost never	never
how often have you been troubled by having a hard time getting going when you wake up?	K.90	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you been bothered by tiring out very easily.	K.91	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you felt unable to get things done.	K.92	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you heard things that other people say they can't hear.	K.93	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you felt that your unspoken thoughts were being broadcast or transmitted, so that everyone knows what you were thinking.	K.94	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you thought that you were possessed by a spirit or devil.	K.95	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you had visions or seen things that other people say they cannot see.	K.96	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you felt that there were people who wished to do you harm.	K.97	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you felt you had special powers.	K.98	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you blamed yourself for everything that went wrong.	K.99	1	2	3	4	5
how often have felt you deserved to be punished.	K.100	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you felt that nothing turns out for you the way you want it to.	K.101	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you felt completely hopeless about everything.	K.102	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you felt completely helpless.	K.103	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you had trouble in falling asleep	K.104	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you had trouble with waking up too early and not being able to fall back to sleep.	K.105	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you had periods when you could go for days at a time needing little sleep or rest.	K.106	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you had periods of several days or weeks when you were feeling so irritable and easily annoyed that you were clearly different from your usual self.	K.107	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you had times when exciting new ideas and schemes occurred to you one after another.	K.108	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you been afraid that you would do something seriously wrong against your will.	K.109	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you done things over and over again because you weren't sure you had done them right.	K.110	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you cleaned or arranged things over and over again although there was no need for it.	K.111	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you felt that people were trying to pick quarrels or start arguments with you.	K.112	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you felt that people were talking about you behind your back.	K.113	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you felt that people were trying to cheat you.	K.114	1	2	3	4	5

Q. 22 During the past year, would you say your physical health in general has been...

K.115	
1	excellent
2	good
3	fair
4	poor
5	very poor

Q. 23 You are the kind of person who feels he has much to be proud of.

K.116	
1	STRONGLY AGREE
2	SOMEWHAT AGREE
3	NEITHER AGREE OR DISAGREE
4	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
5	STRONGLY DISAGREE

Q. 24 You are the kind of person who feels that he is a failure generally, in life.

K.117	
1	STRONGLY AGREE
2	SOMEWHAT AGREE
3	NEITHER AGREE OR DISAGREE
4	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
5	STRONGLY DISAGREE

Q. 25 In general, how satisfied have you been with yourself in the last year...

K.118	
1	VERY SATISFIED
2	SOMEWHAT SATISFIED
3	SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED
4	VERY DISSATISFIED

Q. 26. How often did the following things happen to you?

During the past year,		very often	fairly often	some times	almost never	never
how often have you had trouble with headaches or pains in the head.	K.119	1	2	3	4	5
how often did your hands tremble enough to bother you.	K.120	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you been bothered by acid or sour stomach several times a week.	K.121	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you been in very low spirits.	K.122	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you felt like crying.	K.123	1	2	3	4	5

Q. 27. Which sentence defines your ideas about yourself the best?

You are the kind of person...		Strongly agree	somewhat agree	neither agree or disagree	somewhat disagree	strongly disagree
who keeps personal problems to himself rather than talking them out with someone else.	K.124	1	2	3	4	5
who daydreams a lot.	K.125	1	2	3	4	5
who seldom visits people or calls them on the phone.	K.126	1	2	3	4	5
who likes to do things by himself rather than with others.	K.127	1	2	3	4	5
who makes friends easily.	K.128	1	2	3	4	5

Q. 28. How often did the following things happen to you?

During the past year,		very often	fairly often	some times	almost never	never
how often have you had chest pains.	K.129	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you had trouble with your heart beating hard when you were not exerting yourself.	K.130	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you had high blood pressure.	K.131	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you had dizziness.	K.132	1	2	3	4	5
how often have you had shortness of breath when you were not exerting yourself.	K.133	1	2	3	4	5

DEMOGRAPHY

D. 1. SEX

K.135	
1	Female
2	Male

D. 2. REGION OF ORIGIN

K.136	
1	MARMARA
2	BLACK SEA
3	INNER ANATOLIA
4	AEGEAN
5	MEDITERRANEAN
6	SOUTH EAST ANATOLIA
7	EAST ANATOLIA

D. 3. YEAR OF BIRTH

K.137	
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D. 4. MARITAL STATUS

K.138	
1	MARRIED
2	SINGLE
3	DIVORCED
4	WIDOW

D. 5. THE OCCUPATION OF THE PARENTS OF THE SUBJECT

MOTHER K. 139	FATHER K.140	
1	1	WORKER
2	2	FARMER
3	3	CLERK
4	4	TEACHER
5	5	SOLDIER
6	6	HOUSEWIFE
7	7	

D. 6. THE EDUCATIONAL STATUS OF THE SUBJECT AND OF HIS/HER PARENTS

THE SUBJECT K.141	MOTHER K. 142	FATHER K.143	
1	1	1	NONE
2	2	2	WITHDRAWN FROM PRIMARY SCHOOL
3	3	3	GRADUATED FROM PRIMARY
4	4	4	WITHDRAWN FROM SECONDARY
5	5	5	GRADUATED FROM SECONDARY
6	6	6	WITHDRAWN FROM HIGH
7	7	7	GRADUATED FROM HIGH
8	8	8	WITHDRAWN FROM UNIVERSITY
9	9	9	GRADUATED FROM UNIVERSITY

D. 7. JOB IN THE PLANT

K.144	
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D. 8. FOR HOW MANY YEARS HAVE THE SUBJECT BEEN WORKING FOR THIS ENTERPRISE

K.145	
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D. 9. FOR HOW MANY YEARS HAVE THE SUBJECT BEEN WORKING

K.146	
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D. 10. STATUS OF UNION AFFILIATION

K.147	
1	MEMBER OF UNION
2	NOT A MEMBER OF UNION

**FABRİKA
SORU FORMU**

Anket no :
Anket tarih :
Anketin başlama saati : . . .
Anketin bitiş saati : . . .

İyi günler. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Ekonomi ve Sosyoloji Bölümleri adına bir anket yapıyoruz. Size bazı sorularımız olacak. Bu bilimsel bir çalışma olup, araştırmanın sonuçları bilgisayarla değerlendirilecektir. Araştırmaya katılanların isimleri hiçbir şekilde belirtilmeyip gizli tutulacak, sonuçta kimin hangi soruya ne cevap verdiği kesinlikle belli olmayacaktır.

S.1. Fabrikalarda işverenler ve yöneticiler çeşitli kararlar alırlar. Örneğin; kim işe alınsın, iş koşulları nasıl olsun, yeni bir teknoloji uygulansın mı, kreş açılsın mı, vb. Biz bu panoda karar alınan konuları 14 grupta topladık.

PANO'YU GÖSTERİN; KUTULARIN BAŞLIKLARI OKUYUN.

Farzedin ki, yöneticiler çalışanların da bu kararlara katılmalarını istiyor. Her çalışanın 20 oy hakkı olduğunu düşünün. Bu oyları istediğiniz gibi kutulara yerleştirmenizi isteyeceğiz. Hangi konular sizin için önemliyse, yani o konuda alınan kararlara katılmak istiyorsanız, o gruba daha fazla oy kullanın. Konunun sizin için önemi yoksa o gruba oy kullanmayın.

KENDİŞİNE DAĞINIK OLARAK 20 BEYAZ PUL VERİN. KUTULARIN BAŞLIKLARINI HATIRLATIP KENDİSİ İÇİN ÖNEMLİ GÖRDÜĞÜ ALANLARDA KUTULARA PULLARI YERLEŞTİRMESİNE YARDIMCI OLUN. TÜM PULLARINI YERLEŞTİRDİKTEN SONRA GEREKİRSE YENİDEN AYARLAMA YAPABİLECEĞİNİ HATIRLATIN. İŞLEMİN BİTMESİNİ BEKLEYİN.

Şimdi oyunuzu değişik alanlarda kullandınız. Böylece sizi ilgilendiren konularda alınan kararlara katılmaya karar verdiniz. Bazı konularda kararlara katılmak için kendi yerinize bir temsilci de seçebilirsiniz. Konulara bir daha bakın. Sizin yerinize temsilcinin katılmasını istediğiniz kararları söyleyin.

TEMSİLCİNİN İŞARETLENDİĞİ KUTULARA BİRER SİYAH PUL KOYUN.

	OY SAYISI			KENDİSİ	TEMSİLCİ
Çalışanların eğitimi	K.5		K.19	1	2
Disiplin ve işten çıkarma	K.6		K.20	1	2
Fabrikanın yeni yatırımları ör; yeni bir bölüm açılması, makina sayısının arttırılması	K.7		K.21	1	2
İşe giriş çıkış saatleri, fazla mesai, vardiya süreleri, haftalık toplam iş saati ve tatil zamanları	K.8		K.22	1	2
Çalışanların kullandığı alet edevat ve iş makinaları ile ilgili sorunlar	K.9		K.23	1	2
Üretilecek ürünler	K.10		K.24	1	2
İş ortamı ve iş koşulları ör; ışık düzeni, gürültünün denetlenmesi, havalandırma	K.11		K.25	1	2
İş yerindeki görev dağılımı ve çalışanların bir bölümden bir başkasına transfer edilmesi	K.12		K.26	1	2
İşe alınacak işçilerin seçimi	K.13		K.27	1	2
Ustabaşı ve amirlerin atanması	K.14		K.28	1	2
Maaşların tespiti	K.15		K.29	1	2
Ürünlerin hangi fiyatla kime satılacağı	K.16		K.30	1	2
Kreş, anaokulu, revir, servis ve yemekhane hizmetler	K.17		K.31	1	2
Ürünün üretilmesinde kullanılacak teknoloji	K.18		K.32		

S.2. Biraz önce fabrikada alınan kararlara katılmak istediğiniz konuları seçtiniz. Bu kararları almak belli bir zaman gerektiriyor. Arkadaşlarınızla ya da temsilcinizle biraraya gelip konuşarak bu kararları almak üzere mesai saati dışında karşılığında ücret almadan her ay kaç saatinizi ayırabilirsiniz ?

K.33	
1	1-2 Saat
2	3-4 Saat
3	5-6 Saat
4	7-8 Saat
5	9-10 Saat
	Diğer

S.3. Şimdi size bazı cümleler okuyacağım. Kartta yazanlardan hangisi bu cümleler hakkındaki düşüncelerinizi en iyi şekilde ifade eder ?
Önce bir örnek yapalım. Size şu cümleyi okusam "Bence çocukları hergün dövmeli" ne dersiniz ?
KART 1'İ GÖSTERİN. ANLADIĞINA EMİN OLDUKTAN SONRA DİĞER CÜMLELERİ OKUYUN.

		COK DOGRU	DOGRU	KARAR SIZIM	DOGRU DEGİL	HIC DOGRU DEGİL
Fabrikayı yönetmek sadece ve sadece fabrika sahiplerinin ya da atadıkları yöneticilerin hakkıdır	K.34	1	2	3	4	5
Fabrikada çalışanların da yönetime katılmak hakkıdır	K.35	1	2	3	4	5
Yönetime katılmak çalışanların bilgi düzeyine ve yeteneğine bağlı bir haktır	K.36	1	2	3	4	5
Yönetime katılmak o işyerinde ne kadar süre çalışmış olduğuna bağlı bir haktır	K.37	1	2	3	4	5
Yönetime katılan işçiler hem zarara hem kara katılmalıdır	K.38	1	2	3	4	5

S.4. Yönetime katıldığınızı düşünün. Bir seçiminiz var. Ya normal ücret alacaksınız, ya da düşük ücret + kardan pay alacaksınız. Hangisini seçersiniz ?
KART 2'Yİ GÖSTERİN

K.39	
1	Normal ücret
2	Düşük ücret + kardan pay

S.5. Şimdi size bazı cümleler okuyacağım. Kartta yazanlardan hangisi bu cümleler hakkındaki düşüncelerinizi en iyi şekilde ifade eder ? **KART 1'İ GÖSTERİN.**

		COK DOGRU	DOGRU	KARAR SIZIM	DOGRU DEGİL	HIC DOGRU DEGİL
Fabrikanın üretiminden yöre halkının etkilendiğini düşünün. Yöre halkının talepleri sizin çıkarlarınıza ters düşse bile yöre halkı kendini ilgilendiren konularda fabrika da söz sahibi olmalıdır	K.40	1	2	3	4	5
Benim gibi çalışanların yönetime katılması fabrikanın karını arttıracaktır	K.41	1	2	3	4	5
Benim gibi çalışanların yönetime katılması sosyal adaleti gerçekleştirecektir	K.42	1	2	3	4	5
Benim gibi çalışanların yönetime katılması çalışma barışını sağlayacaktır	K.43	1	2	3	4	5

S.6. Çalışanların yönetime katılmaları en çok neye fayda sağlayacaktır ?
KART 3'Ü GÖSTERİN. SIRAYA SOKMASINI İSTEYİN. EN FAYDALI : 1°

	1° K.44	2° K.45	3° K.46
Karı arttıracaktır	1	1	1
Sosyal adaleti gerçekleştirecektir	2	2	2
Çalışma barışını getirecektir	3	3	3

S.7. Bu kartı birlikte okuyalım. Size göre en doğru olan cümleyi seçin.
KART 4'Ü GÖSTERİN

K.47	
1	Türkiye'de işçilerin yönetimine katılması için, geç kalınmıştır
2	Türkiye'de işçilerin yönetimine katılması için, tam zamanıdır
3	Türkiye'de işçilerin yönetimine katılması için, henüz erkendir

S.8 Herkes zaman zaman sinirlenip bir şeylere kızabilir. Geçtiğimiz yıl boyunca sizi de böyle sinirlendiren olayları düşünün. Şimdi soracağımız sorulara bunları düşünerek cevap vermenizi istiyoruz. KART 5'İ GÖSTERİN EĞER FAZLA SINIRLENMEDİĞİNİ SOYLUYORSA AZ SINIRLENDİĞİ ANLARI HATIRLAMASINI İSTEYİN.

Geçtiğimiz yıl içinde sinirlendiğiniz zamanlarda,		COK SIK	OLDUK ÇA SIK	BAZEN	HEMEN HEMEN HIÇ	HİÇ BİR ZAMAN
hangi sıklıkta kızgınlığınızı gizleyip göstermemeye çalıştınız	K.48	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta bağırıp çağırdınız	K.49	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta duygu ve düşüncelerinizi karşınızdakine sakın bir şekilde açıklamaya çalıştınız	K.50	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta konuşup tartışmaktan kaçınıp başka bir şeyle uğraşmaya başladınız	K.51	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta sinirinizi etrafınızdaki eşyalar- dan çıkarmaya çalıştınız ör; sandalyeyi tekmele- diniz, kapıyı çarptınız, duvarları yumrukladınız	K.52	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta birine vurdunuz	K.53	1	2	3	4	5

S.9a.12 yaşından beri hiç kimseyle
dövüştünüz mü?

K.54	
1	Evet
2	Hayır

DEVAM EDİN
S.10'A GEÇİN

S.9b.Son beş yılda hiç kimseyle
dövüştünüz mü?

K.55	
1	Evet
2	Hayır

S.10.Öğrencilik yıllarınızda hangi sıklıkta okuldan kaçtınız ? KART 5'İ GÖSTERİN

K.56	
1	Cok sık
2	Öldükçe sık
3	Hemen hemen hiç
4	Hiç bir zaman

S.11.Şimdi okuyacağım olaylar geçtiğimiz yıl içerisinde hangi sıklıkla başınıza geldi? **KART 5'İ GÖSTERİN**

Geçtiğimiz yıl içinde,		COK SIK	OLDUK ÇA SIK	BAZEN	HEMEN HEMEN HIÇ	HİÇ BİR ZAMAN
hangi sıklıkta bedensel bir rahatsızlığa yakalanmaktan korktunuz	K.57	1	2	3	4	5
kızgınlık hissettiğinizde hangi sıklıkta rahatsızlık duydunuz ör; baş ağrısı, karın ağrısı	K.58	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta korkulu rüya gördünüz	K.59	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta saldırıya, soyguna uğramaktan veya yaralanmaktan korktunuz	K.60	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta aklınızın karıştığını ve düşünme zorluğu çektiğinizi hissettiniz	K.61	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta dikkatinizi bir konuda toplamakta zorluk çektiniz	K.62	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta vücudunuzun herhangi bir yerinin hissizleştiğini farkettiniz	K.63	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta üşütmediğiniz ve boğazınız ağrımadığı halde sesinizi kaybettiniz	K.64	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta vücudunuzun değişik yerlerindeki rahatsızlıklardan dolayı huzursuz oldunuz	K.65	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta üzüntü ve çöküntüden dolayı huzursuz oldunuz	K.66	1	2	3	4	5
kendinize hangi sıklıkta güven duydunuz	K.67	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta kendinizi işe yaramaz hissettiniz	K.68	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta aklınızı yitirmekten korktunuz	K.69	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta "artık hiçbirşeyin değeri kalmadı" diye düşünmekten kendinizi alamadınız	K.70	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta iştahsızlık çektiniz	K.71	1	2	3	4	5

S.12.Aşağıdaki cümlelerden hangisi kendi hakkınızdaki düşüncelerinizi en iyi şekilde ifade ediyor? **KART 1'İ GÖSTERİN**

		COK SIK	OLDUK ÇA SIK	BAZEN	HEMEN HEMEN HIÇ	HİÇ BİR ZAMAN
Övünülecek çok şeye sahip olduğunuzu düşünürsünüz	K.72	1	2	3	4	5
Size endişeli biri diyebiliriz, hani evhamlı biri	K.73	1	2	3	4	5
Genelde hayatta başarısız olduğunuzu hissedersiniz	K.74	1	2	3	4	5
Kendinizi ya çok iyi yada çok kötü hissedersiniz	K.75	1	2	3	4	5

S.13.Şimdi okuyacağım olaylar geçtiğimiz yıl içerisinde hangi sıklıkla başınıza geldi ? **KART 5'İ GÖSTERİN**

Geçtiğimiz yıl içinde,		COK SIK	OLDUK CA SIK	BAZEN	HEMEN HEMEN HIÇ	HIC BIR ZAMAN
hangi sıklıkta vücudunuzun bir parçasının size ait olmadığını hissettiniz	K.76	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta uyanık olduğunuz halde kendinizi rüyada gibi hissettiniz	K.77	1	2	3	4	5
alışkın olduğunuz çevreler size hangi sıklıkta gerçek dışı gözüktü, sanki sinema ya da TV izliyormuşsunuz gibi	K.78	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta kendinizi bedensel olarak insanlardan kopmuş hissettiniz	K.79	1	2	3	4	5

S.14.Aşağıdaki cümlelerden hangisi kendi hakkınızdaki düşüncelerinizi en iyi şekilde ifade eder ? **KART 1'İ GÖSTERİN**

		COK DOGRU	DOGRU	KARAR SIZIM	DOGRU DEĞİL	HIC DOGRU DEĞİL
İnsanların büyük bir çoğunluğunun dürüst olduğuna inanıyorsunuz	K.80	1	2	3	4	5
Çoğu insana güvenebileceğinizi hissediyorsunuz	K.81	1	2	3	4	5
İnsanların başkalarına yardım etmekten çok kendilerini kolladıklarına inanıyorsunuz	K.82	1	2	3	4	5

S.15.Şimdi okuyacağım olaylar geçtiğimiz yıl içerisinde hangi sıklıkla başınıza geldi ? **KART 5'İ GÖSTERİN**

Geçtiğimiz yıl içinde,		COK SIK	OLDUK CA SIK	BAZEN	HEMEN HEMEN HIÇ	HIC BIR ZAMAN
hangi sıklıkta ani korku ya da panikten ötürü çarpıntı geçirdiniz	K.83	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta kalabalıktan korktunuz	K.84	1	2	3	4	5

S.16.İçki kullanır mısınız ?

K.85		
1	Evet	— DEVAN EDİN — S.21'E GEÇİN
2	Hayır	

S.17.Öyle bir kişisiniz ki içki içtiğiniz için ailenizle ve dostlarınızla tartışıyorsunuz ? **KART 1'İ GÖSTERİN**

K.86	
1	Çok doğru
2	Doğru
3	Kararsızım
4	Doğru değil
5	Hiç doğru değil

S.18. Geçtiğimiz yılda hangi sıklıkta alkolün kötü etkilerini hissettiniz, örneğin titremeler, vb. **KART 5'İ GÖSTERİN**

K.87	
1	Çok sık
2	Oldukça sık
3	Bazen
4	Hemen hemen hiç
5	Hiç bir zaman

İnsanlar farklı sebeplerden dolayı bira, rakı, şarap, kanyak içerler. İnsanların neden içtiklerine dair burada bazı nedenler sıralanmıştır. Geçtiğimiz yılda içme nedenlerinden her birinin sizin için ne ölçüde doğru olduğunu belirtin.

S.19. Herseyi unutmaya isteği geçen yıl içki içmeniz için ne derece önem bir sebebi ? **KART 6'YI GÖSTERİN**

K.88	
1	Çok önemliydi
2	Oldukça önemliydi
3	Hiç önemli değildi

S.20. Sınırlı ve gergin olduğunuz zamanlarda içki içme ihtiyacı duardınız, bu sebep içki içmeniz için ne derece önemliydi ? **KART 6'YI GÖSTERİN**

K.89	
1	Çok önemliydi
2	Oldukça önemliydi
3	Hiç önemli değildi

S.21. Şimdi okuyacağım olaylar geçtiğimiz yıl içerisinde hangi sıklıkta başınıza geldi ? **KART 5'İ GÖSTERİN**

Geçtiğimiz yıl içinde,		COK SIK	OLDUK CA SIK	BAZEN	HEMEN HEMEN HIÇ	HİÇ BİR ZAMAN
uyandığınız zaman güne başlamak için hangi sıklıkta zorluk çektiniz	K.90	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta çok çabuk bitkin düşmekten dolayı sıkıntı çektiniz	K.91	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta bazı işleri halletmekte yetersiz kaldığınızı düşündünüz	K.92	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta başkalarının duymadıklarını söyledikleri, bir takım sesler duydunuz	K.93	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta kimseye söylemediğiniz düşüncelerinizin başkaları tarafından öğrenildiğini hissettiniz	K.94	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta bir ruh tarafından ele geçirildiğinizi hissettiniz	K.95	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta birtakım hayaller gördünüz	K.96	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta size zarar vermek isteyen insanlar olduğunu hissettiniz	K.97	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta birtakım özel güçlere sahip olduğunuzu hissettiniz	K.98	1	2	3	4	5

Geçtiğimiz yıl içinde,		COK SIK	OLDUK CA SIK	BAZEN	HEMEN HEMEN HIÇ	HIC BIR ZAMAN
hangi sıklıkta ters giden herşey için kendinizi suçladınız	K. 99	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta cezalandırılmayı hak ettiğinizi hissettiniz	K.100	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta işlerin sizin istediğiniz gibi gitmediğini hissettiniz	K.101	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta her konuda tamamen ümitsiz kaldığınızı hissettiniz	K.102	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta tamamen çaresiz kaldığınızı hissettiniz	K.103	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta uykuya dalma güçlüğü çektiniz	K.104					
hangi sıklıkta çok erken uyanıp tekrar uyumakta güçlük çektiniz	K.105	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta uyumaksızın veya dinlenmeksizin günler boyunca dayandığınız süreler oldu	K.106	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta daha çabuk kızıp kolaylıkla köpürdüğünüz uzun günler ve haftalar yaşayıp kendinizi her zamanki halinizden tamamen farklı hissettiniz	K.107	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta heyecan verici fikirler ve olayların birbiri peşisıra aklınıza geldiği zamanlar yaşadınız	K.108	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta isteğiniz dışında ciddi bir şekilde hata yapacağınızdan korktunuz	K.109	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta doğru yapıp yapmadığınızdan emin olamadığınız için bazı işleri tekrar tekrar yaptınız	K.110	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta gerekmediği halde eşyaları tekrar tekrar temizleyip düzenlediniz	K.111	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta insanların sizinle tartışmaya veya münakaşa başlatmaya meyilli olduğunu hissettiniz	K.112	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta insanların arkanızdan konuştuklarını hissettiniz	K.113	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta insanların sizi kandırmaya çalıştıklarını hissettiniz	K.114	1	2	3	4	5

S.22.Geçtiğimiz yıl boyunca vücut sağlığınızın genelde nasıl olduğunu söyley misiniz ? KART 7'YI GOSTERİN

K.115	
1	Mükemmel
2	İyi
3	Orta
4	Kötü
5	Çok kötü

S.23.Öyle bir kişisiniz ki gurur duyulacak çok şeye sahip olduğunuzu hissediyorsunuz. **KART 7'YI GÖSTERİN**

K.116	
1	Cok doğru
2	Doğru
3	Kararsızım
4	Doğru değil
5	Hiç doğru değil

S.24.Hayatta genellikle başarısız bir insan olduğunuzu düşünüyorsunuz. **KART 7'YI GÖSTERİN**

K.117	
1	Cok doğru
2	Doğru
3	Kararsızım
4	Doğru değil
5	Hiç doğru değil

S.25.Geçtiğimiz yıl içinde vücudunuzdan ne kadar hoşnuttunuz ? **KART 8'i GÖSTERİN**

K.118	
1	Cok hoşnut
2	Biraz hoşnut
3	Hoşnut değil
4	Hiç hoşnut değil

S.26.Şimdi okuyacağım olaylar geçtiğimiz yıl içerisinde hangi sıklıkta başınıza geldi ? **KART 5'i GÖSTERİN**

Geçtiğimiz yıl içinde,		COK SIK	OLDUK CA SIK	BAZEN	HEMEN HEMEN HIÇ	HIC BIR ZAMAN
hangi sıklıkta baş ağrıları yüzünden sıkıntı çektiniz	K.119	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta elleriniz sizi sıkacak kadar titredi	K.120	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta mide ekşimesi yüzünden sıkıntı çektiniz	K.121	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta moraliniz bozuktu veya çok bozuktu	K.122	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta ağlayacak gibi oldunuz	K.123	1	2	3	4	5

S.27.Aşağıdaki cümlelerden hangisi kendi hakkınızdaki düşüncelerinizi en iyi şekilde ifade eder ? **KART 1'i GÖSTERİN**

		COK DOGRU	DOGRU	KARAR SIZIM	DOGRU DEGIL	HIC DOGRU DEGIL
Kişisel problemlerinizi başkasına açmaktansa kendinize saklarsınız	K.124	1	2	3	4	5
Çok sık gündüz vakti dalıp gidersiniz	K.125	1	2	3	4	5
İnsanları çok seyrek olarak ziyaret eder veya telefonla ararsınız	K.126	1	2	3	4	5
Kendi başınıza bir şeyler yapmayı başkaları ile birlikte yapmaya tercih edersiniz	K.127	1	2	3	4	5
Kolaylıkla arkadaş edinebilirsiniz	K.128	1	2	3	4	5

S.28.Şimdi okuyacağım olaylar geçtiğimiz yıl içerisinde hangi sıklıkta başınıza geldi ? KART 5'i GÖSTERİN

Geçtiğimiz yıl içinde,		COK SIK	OLDUK CA SIK	BAZEN	HEMEN HEMEN HIÇ	HIC BIR ZAMAN
hangi sıklıkta göğüs ağrısı çektiniz	K.129	1	2	3	4	5
kendinizi yormadığınız halde hangi sıklıkta kalbinizin hızlı atmasından dolayı sıkıntı çektiniz	K.130	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta tansiyonunuz çok yükseldi	K.131	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta başınız döndü	K.132	1	2	3	4	5
hangi sıklıkta baygınlık nöbetleri geçirdiniz	K.133	1	2	3	4	5
kendinizi yormadığınız halde hangi sıklıkta nefes darlığı çektiniz	K.134	1	2	3	4	5

DEMOGRAFI

D.1.Cinsiyet

K.135	
1	Kadın
2	Erkek

D.2.Memleket

İli yazın :

K.136	
1	Marmara
2	Karadeniz
3	İç Anadolu
4	Ege
3	Akdeniz
3	Güneydoğu Anadolu
4	Doğu Anadolu

D.3.Doğum yılı

K.137

Yazın :

D.4.Medeni durumu

K.138	
1	Evli
2	Bekar
3	Boşanmış
4	Dul

D.5.Görüşülen kişinin annesinin ve babasının mesleği

Anne K.139	Baba K.140	
1	1	İşçi
2	2	Çiftçi
3	3	Memur
4	4	Öğretmen
5	5	Asker
6	6	Ev kadını
7	7	Kendi hesabına

D.6.Görüşülen kişinin, annesinin ve babasının eğitim durumu

Görüşülen kişi K.141	Anne K.142	Baba K.143	
1	1	1	Hiç
2	2	2	İlkokul terk
3	3	3	İlkokul mezunu
4	4	4	Ortaokul terk
5	5	5	Ortaokul mezunu
6	6	6	Lise terk
7	7	7	Lise mezunu
8	8	8	Üniversite terk
9	9	9	Üniversite mezunu

D.7.Fabrika görevi

K.144	
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Yazın :

D.8.Kaç yıldır bu fabrikada çalışıyorsunuz ?

K.145	
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Yazın :

D.8.Toplam kaç yıldır çalışıyorsunuz ?


K.146	
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Yazın :


D.9.Sendikal Durum

K.138	
1 2	Sendikal Sendikası


ANKETÖRÜN ADI VE SOYADI / TARİH: /




Çalışanların eğitimi




Disiplin ve işten çıkarma




Fabrikanın yeni yatırımları örn.yeni bir bölüm açılması,makina sayısının artırılması




İşe giriş ve çıkış saatleri, fazla mesai,yardıya süreleri,haftalık toplam iş saati ve tatil zamanları



İş yerindeki görev dağılımı ve çalışanların bir bölümden bir başkasına transfer edilmesi




İşe alınacak yeni işçilerin seçimi




Ustabaşı ve amirlerin atanması




Maaşların tespiti




**Çalışanların kullandığı
alet edevat ve iş
makinalarıyla ilgili
sorunlar**




Üretilcek ürünler




**Ürünlerin hangi fiyatla
kime satılacağı**



**Kreş, anaokulu, revir,
servis ve yemekhane
hizmetleri**



**İş ortamı ve iş koşulları
örn. ışık düzeni,
güültünün denetlenmesi,
havalandırma**



**Ürünün üretilmesinde
kullanılacak teknoloji**

APPENDIX C

LIST OF INFORMAL INTERVIEWS

APPENDIX C

LIST OF INFORMAL INTERVIEWS

Akalın, Önel	GSD Foreign Trade	Head of Board
Akın, Nuri	Akın	Head of Board
Alptekin, Atilla	Bozkurt AŞ	General Coordinator
Arat, Hasan	Arat Holding	ex-Head of Board
Atalay, Sıdıka	Foks AŞ	Head of Board
Atasayar, K.	CTEU ¹ /TİSK*	General Secretary
Balin, Veysi	Balinler AŞ	Owner
Beşkök, Orhan	IDBT ² /TSKB	Director
Benzeş, Osman	APS AŞ	Owner
Bilal, Selman	Bilsar AŞ	Owner
Çağlar, Metin	IDBT/TSKB	Director & Expert in Textile Sector
Çelik, Seyfettin	Sümerbank	General Director
Duman, Şenay	SPO ³ /DPT	Expert in Textile Sector
Dumlu, Gürkan	Alboy	President
Duruiz, Lale	Marmara University	Academic
Ege, Yavuz	SPO/DPT	Ass.to Undersecretary
Erten, Ayşe	CRWU ⁴ /DİSK	Researcher in R & D Department
Devrimöz, Şükrü	Altınyıldız	Workers' Representatives
Güvenç, Levent	TFTU ⁵ /HDTM	Expert in Textile Sector
Heper, Gülşen	Altınyıldız	Vice President

¹ Confederation of Turkish Employers Unions

* The latter abbreviations are the Turkish version of the former.

² Industrial Development Bank of Turkey

³ State Planning Organisation.

⁴ Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions.

⁵ Treasury and Foreign Trade Undersecretary.

Kabasakal, Mehmet	Kavala	ex-Head of Board
Koç, Yıldırım	CTWU ⁶ /TÜRK-İŞ	Researcher
Kumbaracı, Mehmet	Lee Cooper	Member of Board
Mavituncalılar, Sezer	Tuncalılar AŞ	Owner
Mızrak, Hihal Y.	CTEU/TİSK	ex- Head of Research Dept.
Narin, Halit	Narin Holding	Head of Board
Özal, İhsan	AİBT ⁷ /TÜSİAD	ex-General Secretary
Özer, Azmi	IDBT/TSKB	Expert
Özütün, Erdoğan	ICI ⁸ /ISO	Researcher
Sel, Cüneyt	TFTU /HDTM	Researcher
Sönmez, Mustafa	CRWU/DİSK	ex-Head of R & D Department
Sunay, Serdar	Benetton	General Coordinator
Temel, Adil	SPO/DPT	Expert
Turgay Candan	Altınyıldız	Workers' Representatives
Türkkolu, İrfan	CRWU/DİSK	Expert in Textile Sector
Tüzün, Çiğdem	SPO/DPT	ex-Expert
Yelken, Çetin	Sümerbank	Workers' Representatives
Yentürk, Nurhan	Istanbul University	Academic

⁶ Confederation of Turkish Workers' Unions

⁷ Association of Industrialists and Businessperson of Turkey

⁸ Istanbul Chamber of Commerce.