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Public Policy and Migratory Behavior in
Selected Developing Countries

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
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The problems associated with rural-urban migration and rapid urban growth in less developed nations are well known. As many as two-thirds of the adults in some of the large, expanding cities of the developing world are in-migrants and, their high fertility (due in part to their young age structure) means that the cities are growing very rapidly through the combined effects of continued in-movement and natural growth. Metropolitan populations which double every 12 years and which require a doubling of social services in the same period just to maintain current standards are not uncommon. Related issues include the cost of extending services to growing suburbs, transportation overloading, water shortages, circles of slum housing around the outer periphery of the cities, and general administrative confusion among the overlapping political authorities within the urban area. The fact that the population living in the large, urban slum areas may be predominantly composed of migrants with little education and of poor rural background has led many policy makers to focus on rural-urban migration as "the problem" which must be solved. More frequently, however, rural-urban migration and metropolitan growth have been considered elements in a broader nationwide problem: What pattern of human settlements will permit the best utilization of existing national resources for increasing production, expanding employment, improving living standards?

No clear answer is yet available to this question. Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank, in discussing the "steady drift from the countryside to the cities" has argued that "... our knowledge of how best to deal with the whole issue of urbanization is primitive."

"We simply do not yet understand the dynamics of urbanization in sufficient depth to be fully certain of the most efficient solutions. Should the developing nations use their limited resources in an effort to motivate villages -- through intensive rural development -- to remain in the countryside? Or should the funds be invested in massive urban infrastructure? If the latter, should heavy investments be made to expand older cities, or is it wise to build entirely new ones? We do not know."

(McNamara, 1970)

Answers to such difficult questions will develop at best only gradually through an assessment of the experiences of nations who have tried one or more of these approaches. Our objective in the present paper is to review a limited number of strategies which have been applied in developing nations to influence migration and human settlement patterns. We hope to come to some preliminary conclusions about which of these are most likely to work, and under what conditions they will do so. The data for this review come from a number of published and unpublished sources. The unpublished sources are study group reports produced by research teams working in the following eight nations: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Turkey and Venezuela.¹

FOUR MIGRATION POLICY APPROACHES

It is convenient at the outset to broadly distinguish "intentional" migration policies from "other" policies which unintentionally influence migration. Intentional migration policies have as their explicit objective a change in human settlement patterns. Examples of such objectives include decisions of governments to "freeze" the size of a metropolitan area or to open a relatively underpopulated "frontier" area.

Our focus in this paper is primarily on intentional migration policies. However, this is only a matter of emphasis since in fact most programs and policies which are used or which could be used to influence migration are established to reach some broad^{er} objective. Thus, for example, one reason for land reform programs

may be to slow the rural exodus, but the overriding policy concerns will be social justice and the welfare of rural peoples. Policies which favor the colonization of frontier lands, the growth of intermediate cities in less favored regions, and the eradication of slum housing in the metropolitan areas also tend to have other objectives. The impact which such programs may have on migration and urbanization is often a side benefit only.

The policies and programs which we shall examine below vary considerably with regard to their explicit focus on migration and human settlement patterns. At one extreme are broad land reform and community development programs which have many goals in addition to reducing metropolitan growth. At the other extreme are programs which attempt to directly minimize problems associated with rapid metropolitan growth through controls on migration to the cities and through assistance to migrants once they have arrived.

Most policies and programs which have been or could be justified at least in part in terms of their effect on migration into metropolitan cities can be subsumed under one of the four following strategies.

1. Stop the flow of migrants at the source by encouraging the people to "stay on the farm." Land reform and rural community development programs often have this as one of their implicit, if not explicit, goals.
2. Redirect the flow of migrants to other areas. These areas may be:
 - a) Rural "frontier" areas or
 - b) Small or intermediate urban "growth poles" or "new cities"
3. Return the rural-urban migrants to their hometowns or otherwise discourage them from staying in the metropolis. This may be done through an "entry permit" approach, busing programs, or the control of ration cards and/or other privileges.
4. Accommodate to existing patterns of rural-urban migration in an attempt to provide services and programs which will improve the lot of migrants, especially low income migrants living in marginal metropolitan housing.

In any given nation one is likely to find some combination of these approaches being used. The following examples have been selected in order to indicate some of the advantages and disadvantages of each approach.

Stop the Flow at the Source

Many governments have policies and programs designed to improve the living conditions of people in rural areas. Such programs may have, as sub-goals, the desire to increase agricultural production and to "keep rural families on the farm." Specific programs include increased crop production (through the introduction of new crop varieties, improved agricultural technology, use of fertilizers and agricultural extension); social justice programs such as land reform and community development; and public services such as rural credit, rural health and sanitation, water supply, education and others. Where the problem involves movement of people from small towns and intermediate cities to metropolitan areas, governments have also instituted policies and programs designed to "keep them in the towns" through such approaches as improved services (housing, water, protective service, health, education, and welfare) and creation of better economic and social opportunities in these alternative urban places. In some countries, there are attempts to enhance the productivity of towns and small cities through such schemes as industrial estates, free port zones, housing estates, and encouragement of manufacturing.

Among this wide variety of programs and policies, two approaches which have been at least partially justified in terms of their effect on rural-urban migration seem to be particularly noteworthy in the nations reviewed: land-reform programs and community and development programs.

Land reform. The strongest argument for land reform is, of course, social justice. In countries where agricultural land is owned by a small landed gentry and most peasants are tenant farmers, conditions have been found

to be exploitative, with poor farmers living at the subsistence level. Ownership of land, therefore, becomes a strong motivation for poor people. It has been argued that if farmers get control of the land, they will be less prone to move out of rural areas, as the land serves to anchor them to a place.

The relationship between land reform and rural-urban migration is not clear, however. A United Nations document (U.N., 1970, p. 271) has noted that: "assuming that a temporary slowdown in rural migration in developing countries would be desirable, the premise that agrarian reforms would contribute to this slowdown is largely hypothetical and needs to be tested in the light of actual experience." The limited amount of direct evidence on the topic indicates that in many cases land reform tends to support a continued, even an accelerated, pattern of out-migration. This may be particularly the case when other goals of the land reform, such as increased production, are realized.

The nationalization of the large coastal sugar plantations in Peru under the military government after 1969 provides one example of what can happen. Some of the plantations, such as Casa Grande, were relatively modern and efficient prior to the take-over, while others were relatively backward and inefficient. The government turned the plantations into cooperatives in which the workers became members (socios) and as such were able to collectively share in administration and profits. Attempts were made to improve agricultural techniques, upgrade capital inputs and improve social services in the communities. Levels of living in some cooperatives at least appear to have increased rapidly, as evidenced by the proliferation of consumer durables, such as television sets and modern appliances. While one might question the social justice of spreading the wealth among the new owner/members only, and not sharing some with less privileged workers and farmers elsewhere, the land reform effort must be evaluated as having achieved many of its goals.

The revolutionary shift in control over the land and in living conditions did not, however, appear to discourage out-migration. Quite to the contrary, there is evidence that the young men and women are leaving in large numbers. This may reflect several basic factors, such as a slowing in the demand for labor due to higher productivity on the farms, or an increase in the demand for education now that the heads of families are more affluent. The key mechanism directly associated with the exodus is, however, clear: Only the older workers become socios and their children have no special privileges on the cooperative farms (Bazan, 1975). Thus, land ownership may have slowed out-migration among the older generation, but the reform did not give land to the young and they continue to move to the cities. It is difficult to imagine any successful land reform program which would not, after a few years at least, have the same outcome.

Unfortunately, there are few case studies of the direct impact of land reform on migration and it is difficult to know under what conditions, if any, and for how long, reforms would tend to keep people on the land. The indirect evidence available also tends to suggest that land reform may not be particularly useful for this purpose. For example, it has been shown that out-migration is generally heavier from rural areas in Latin America where minifundia (small subsistence plots) predominate (see Shaw, 1974), and where presumably land reform per se (rather than colonization schemes or transmigration schemes which move farmers from one area to less intensively cultivated lands elsewhere) would be difficult. Evidence from Taiwan suggests that there are insignificant differences in the rates of out-migration of tenant farmers and owner/cultivators (U.N., 1970). Obviously there are many variables that enter into the decision to migrate and land ownership is only one of these. We may tentatively conclude, therefore, that land reform may benefit some rural people and keep them on the land, but that other social forces, such as rising productivity and continuing

population growth (due to natural increase) and the expansion of education and work opportunities in the cities, in combination, will continue to draw off rural people into metropolitan areas. If this is true, then land reform programs should be supported entirely for their possible impact on social justice and productivity, and other policies should be pursued for the purpose of dealing with problems related to rural-urban migration and rapid metropolitan growth.

Community development. Aside from attempts to improve the lot of rural people by increased production and agrarian reform, many developing countries are also seeking to encourage the development of rural communities through various programs falling under the general field of community development. Economic motivations and social justice are strong influences on whether a person moves or stays where he is. Community development, by encouraging identification with a community, popular participation, involvement in local affairs and developing community leadership, may serve to encourage people to stay where they are. The hope is that when people have a stake in their own communities they will be less prone to leave them.

In the countries reviewed for this paper, very few studies were found which sought to evaluate the impact of community development programs on migration patterns. An exception was a study conducted in the Philippines where it was found that community development efforts served to penetrate local communities and introduced innovative reforms (Study Group Report, Philippines.) The program was able to provide administrative and political linkages between the barrios (rural villages) and urban centers such as towns, capital cities, and the central government in Manila. By thus improving the integration between rural and urban places, the program contributed to nation-building efforts.

The same program, however, also contributed to rural-urban migration. Exercise of political leadership in community development programs made it possible for village leaders to become town or even national politicians. People reached by the community development programs saw the effort as primarily coming at the initiative of a national bureaucracy. While local leaders helped to facilitate things, feeder roads, fertilizers, artesian wells, and other parts of the grants-in-aid program came from the national government. The community development workers, though often hired from the locality, were paid from a far-off central payroll office in Manila. Thus, all good things seemed to come from the outside, and eager and ambitious village people eventually sought these in the outside world themselves.

Counter-examples of programs of rural community development which have served to keep people on the land are more difficult to encounter. Even Cuba, which is often considered to provide a relatively successful example of a "return to the land" movement, is really a mixed case. The emphasis on agricultural development in Cuba after 1964 served to slow the growth of established cities, but at the same time scattered rural peoples were being settled in towns with a broader range of improved services, and selected urban centers throughout the nation were being reinforced to serve as ports or manufacturing locations (see Acosta and Hardoy, 1972). The large scale government housing program in Venezuela may provide another example. Beginning in the late 1950's Venezuela attempted to build inexpensive well-constructed dwellings to replace the traditional wattle-and-daub thatch-roof huts (MacDonald and MacDonald, 1968). By 1965, nearly 50,000 of these dwellings had been constructed. The program has by now had a rather substantial impact on rural housing, although exact figures are not available. A survey of rural non-migrants and rural urban migrants, however, have shown that neither improved housing in the rural areas nor a shortage of housing in urban

areas have been major reasons for staying in the rural area. Availability of work opportunities and the presence of kin in the cities to help during the adjustment period seem to be much more important in the decision to move or stay. For example, 9 percent of those who had directly benefitted from the rural housing plan in the rural areas gave housing shortages in the city as a reason for not migrating, as opposed to more than 45 percent in the same group who gave family or work reasons for not migrating (MacDonald and MacDonald, 1968, p. 425).

Redirect Migrants to Other Rural Areas

Many of the countries we have reviewed have schemes labelled resettlement, transmigration, colonization, homesteading or land development which are designed, in almost all cases, to correct a perceived imbalance in the distribution of the countries' population. In Indonesia, for example, it has been estimated that Java, which has only 7 percent of the country's land area, holds 65 percent of the population. In contrast, Kalimantan, with 28 percent of the land area, has only 4 percent of the people (Goantiang, 1968).

A similar situation prevails in Malaysia:

"Though West Malaysia, as a whole, may be said not to have population pressure, there are various sections of the country which are congested while others are sparsely populated. A federal government with complete authority in land matters could plan for or induce the migration of population from congested to less crowded land, from one state to another, if necessary."

(Salim, 1968, p. 127).

Despite the fact that the most serious imbalance in developing countries occurs between metropolitan areas and rural areas, there are very few schemes to correct this by attempting to influence people to return to the land. To a great extent, this seems to be a recognition of the fact that the process of urbanization is irreversible -- once farmers have seen the "bright lights" of

the city, they will not return to the farms again. In the Philippines, a small program of the Social Welfare Department which pays for the transportation back to villages of origin, has not had many takers. Of the few who have taken advantage of this incentive, it is not known if they have remained in the village after the free trip.

It can be seen, therefore, that programs seeking to influence people to move to certain areas largely involve rural-rural migration. As such, they are an indirect way of counteracting rural-urban migration. By channeling migration to other rural areas, the movement of the people to the cities may be delayed. If they elect to remain in the new areas, it may be prevented completely. The primary concern of these programs seems to be to correct the imbalances in population concentrations involving rural peoples. Any impact these policies have on rural-urban movements is an unexpected bonus.

When people are moved in large numbers, however, it becomes almost inevitable that, sooner or later, the urban patterns in a country become directly affected. This is especially true in massive efforts such as those required by insurgency or war. An example of this is the so-called emergency which gripped Malaysia between 1948 and 1960.

The emergency is noteworthy for the lasting impact it has had on Malaysia's urban picture. To prevent rural villagers (especially Chinese "squatters") from aiding insurgents in the jungle, nearly one million people were relocated in about 600 new settlements (often called New Villages) during the emergency. After the insurgency period, many of these settlements continued to thrive. Because of the creation of these new settlements, about 216 urban centers (settlements with a population of 1,000 or more) were added to Malaysia, helping to raise the urban proportion of the national population from 26.5 percent in 1947 to 42.5 percent in 1957. The new settlements also changed the ethnic composition of Malaysia's urban population, raising the proportion of Chinese from 43.3 percent to 73.0 percent (Sandhu, 1964).

Under normal times, most resettlement schemes are designed to colonize frontier or unsettled areas. This is certainly true of the transmigrasi (transmigration) program in Indonesia. Indonesian citizens who want to take advantage of the government's transmigration program register with the pertinent department, expressing their intentions. Settlement sites are prepared and the migrants are moved there, provided with various services they need for gainful employment, usually in agriculture. Sites are usually in the sparsely populated regions of Indonesia such as Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Sunda Islands, and Maluku. Migrants are mostly Javanese or Balinese, from the densely populated region of Java.

The transmigration program in Indonesia now seeks to move about 100,000 families per year. Between 1961 and 1968, the target was set at 390,000 families or 1.5 million persons. However, it has not been easy to move so many people, as various problems have been encountered in site preparation, transportation, support to the migrants in their destination areas, and selection of appropriate migrants. In 1961, only one-fourth of the planned number of persons were moved, while one-third of the planned number were moved in 1962 (Goantiang, 1968).

Land development was started in Malaysia in 1956, with the creation of the Federal Land Development Authority (FLDA) (Lai, 1973). Since that time, FLDA has developed no less than 429,193 acres of land planted to rubber, palm oil and sugar cane, resettled 25,762 families, and generated \$180 million (Malaysian) in agricultural production. All this was accomplished for \$548 million (Malaysian) in direct grants and loans.

The typical FLDA scheme covers between 4,500 and 5,500 acres where about 400 families (about 2,500 persons) are settled. Approximately 6.1 percent of the area is reserved for the central village, 81.7 percent used for crop areas (about 10 acres per settler), and 12.2 percent is kept unplanted (swamps, steep areas, etc.). Actual conditions in the scheme would vary, but this model is used for various calculations and projections.

The long-run goal is for the farmer to own his 10 acre lot when he has paid off advances made by the FLDA. Questions are already being raised in Malaysia on what will happen when the loans are paid. Will the same high quality of management that was available when all land was owned by the FLDA be assured to the farmers? Will cooperatives work as effectively and efficiently as the FLDA bureaucracy? Contingency plans are being prepared for the time when the farmers cease to become employees of the FLDA and be the owners and managers. Such plans are needed because the future is full of uncertainties.

Urban development, with its concomitant need for urban services, often demands action which affects the lives of people in rural areas directly. One service with especially serious impact on other sectors is electricity. The building of large dams, which flood settled areas, often requires resettlement of migrants. When the displaced migrants are accommodated in other rural sites, the rural-urban balance will not be disturbed. However, in many countries, especially in Asia, suitable agricultural sites are difficult to find, and most displaced farmers are reluctant to farm upland sites or marginal lands. Some farmers, eventually, drift to towns and later on to metropolitan areas.

Of course, as with the case of Malaysia, there are still a number of developing nations with sparsely populated areas which they would like to colonize. Bolivia provides another example of such a case. The highlands and western mountain areas of Bolivia constitute only 41 percent of the total national territory but contain 93 percent of the population (Edelmann, 1967). A major program of colonization has been pursued in Bolivia since 1962 in order to increase agricultural production and to prevent the encroachment of foreign interests in the eastern lowlands (since independence Bolivia has lost half her original territory to neighboring states). In some zones at least the colonists are provided with temporary homes, with livestock, tools, a limited amount of credit, schools and health clinic services. However, unforeseen problems did emerge

particularly with regard to inadequate marketing mechanisms for the bumper crops that the colonists soon began to produce. Roads to the cities are often inadequate and wash out at critical times of the year. These circumstances greatly reduced the contribution of the new colonies to food production for urban areas, and had a negative impact on the communities themselves. Despite such problems, however, only about 6 percent of the colonists appear to have returned home in the first four or five years (Edelmann, 1967, p. 46).

Generally, though the physical task of moving people from one place to another is technically feasible, there are several unanticipated problems which may be encountered. One of these is "ethnic imbalance" created by efforts to achieve population balances. In the Philippines, resettlement was organized in the southern island of Mindanao because it was sparsely populated. Original inhabitants in Mindanao, however, were mostly Muslims, while most of the settlers coming out of the densely populated islands of Luzon and the Visayas were Christians. Because of the official government policy to encourage migration to Mindanao as "the land of promise," the balance between Muslim and Christian inhabitants has been altered. In 1903, 31 percent of Mindanao's population was Muslim. The proportion went down to 20 percent in 1960 (Wernstedt and Simpkins, 1965, p. 101). The competition for land, later translated into political partisanship and even open warfare, has brought calamity and distress to Mindanao. At the present time, the Philippine Government is engaged in a near war effort to cope with Muslim "rebels," a fact which threatens development in the whole country seriously.

From the foregoing discussions, it is clear that, though there have been some measures of success in resettling people to less congested areas, the financial costs, administrative requirements, and unanticipated problems have exacted a high price on these efforts. On top of all these, there is the

additional prospect that eventually developing countries will run out of frontier land where people can be resettled. This stage has been reached in many Asian nations, and will be reached soon in many African nations. Only perhaps in Latin America are there still really significant "frontier" lands. Once unsettled lands are settled, there will be no alternative but to move to urban centers. Thus, in the context of continuing population growth in rural areas and (hopefully) increasing productivity in agriculture, settlement programs may at best postpone urbanization.

Redirect Migrants to Urban Growth Poles

In the countries studied, difficulties have been encountered in directly controlling rural-urban migration. Political traditions and ideologies usually come in the way of such policies. Thus, the less direct approaches have been favored by governments. These approaches seek to change the prevailing conditions in the country in such a way that human migration is affected by these changes.

Many studies have shown the importance of economic considerations in migration. The possibility that a person will find jobs or better economic opportunities for him and/or his children in a certain place often triggers the move. Such prospects are the magnets that attract people to large metropolitan areas. Policymakers, therefore, have concluded that if alternative job opportunities can be made available in other areas people would go there rather than to the large cities.

Examples of such attempts are usually found in a country's urbanization strategy or in more sectoral strategies such as those dealing with manufacturing, industrialization, agriculture, or public investments in infrastructures. Concrete examples range all the way from the location of manufacturing and industrial plants in specific places (Korea), the creation of industrial estates (Philippines), the setting up of new towns (Malaysia), the construction of whole cities in virgin

areas (Venezuela), and the integrated planning and development of specific sub-national regions (Indonesia). The conceptual basis for most of these efforts has been "growth pole" or "growth center" theory. However, frequently, such an approach is chosen without a full understanding of its implications.

Left to their own devices, entrepreneurs in a market economy normally locate factories and industrial plants close to cities to have ready access to markets, skilled labor, utilities, and services. In an attempt to influence such decisions, some governments have set up industrial estates where incentives were extended to entrepreneurs in the form of free land, services, special tax considerations, exemptions from certain regulations, etc. However, the massive costs of planning and implementing industrial estates programs (both direct outlays and subsidies) have had a sobering effect on most governments. In some instances, despite these heavy supports, the goals of such programs have not been achieved.

The Mexican Government has tried several programs of industrial estates. One of the more serious efforts was at Ciudad Sahagún where the state set up some industry and provided services and incentives for private manufacturers. However, despite the fact that this industrial estate is only some 60 miles from Mexico City, few private firms came. Lavell (1972) concludes that, for both market and political reasons, more companies have set up in Mexico City than have been dispersed as a result of such government programs. Peru, in contrast, seems to have been more successful in attracting private companies to make radios, dehydrated foodstuffs, aluminum products, etc. on industrial estates established in that country. The most successful estates in Peru appear to be located near to the city of Arequipa.

Even "successful" programs of industrial estate development have little success in influencing patterns of population movement. To begin with, such estates are usually capital-intensive and do not employ large quantities of labor. Furthermore, they attract highly skilled individuals instead of the mass of unemployed and unemployables who comprise the more serious problem in migration. Finally, under-capitalized entrepreneurs are rarely able to provide the services and amenities needed by skilled workers and these workers are either content to remain in the city or they leave the industrial estates in disgust afterwards.

An important experiment to create an urban alternative in Latin America is the setting up of Ciudad Guayana in Venezuela. From a small mining town at the confluence of the Orinoco and Caroni Rivers, planners and engineers created a city for 300,000 population to be reached by 1980 (see Rodwin, 1970). The development authority for the region established a steel mill and expanded nearby ports. Vast amounts were invested in social overhead and infrastructure. As Gilbert (1974a, p. 265) has noted:

"Venezuela had enormous funds from petroleum revenues with which to support the Guayana project; between 1965 and 1975, its income was budgeted at U.S. \$3.8 billion, of which U.S. \$2.0 billion would come from the national government. The size of this budget can be seen if it is compared to the total government budget of neighboring Colombia, a country with more than twice as many inhabitants. While the Venezuelan Government spent U.S. \$200 million annually on the Guayana project, the Colombian total budget was a mere five times higher."

This scale of investment in Ciudad Guayana is rarely within the reach of countries that do not have the oil and mineral wealth of Venezuela. Even with full financial support, however, Ciudad Guayana was not without its problems. From the outset, the orderly projections of planners were upset by migrants who flocked to the area and build their shanties in every section. In time, the city extended services and amenities to their marginal populations which, in the

eyes of visitors knowledgeable about Latin American urbanization, at least lent a sense of familiarity to the Ciudad Guayana setting.

A unique approach to a counter-magnet is the "free port" zone set up by the Philippines in Mariveles, Bataan (see Study Group Report: Philippines). By legislation, a land reservation close to the tip of the Bataan Peninsula was declared a free port zone and private developers, with the assistance of the government, were encouraged to set up factories and industrial plants under tax-free conditions. Roads, power, and other infrastructures were provided by the government. Foreign firms were invited to locate in the zone. The large area covered by the free port zone discouraged land speculation, though there were attempts artificially to inflate land prices at the zone's periphery. It is too early to say whether the project will succeed or not. As a counter-magnet, however, the free port zone is not far enough from the Manila metropolitan area to serve that purpose. With improved roads or better water transportation (such as by hydrofoil), the free port zone is only hours away from the metropolitan area so that, in the future, it would most likely be within the commuting zone and will only serve to expand the influence of the metropolis.

From the review of country experiences, it is clear that to achieve the goal of serving as an alternative area of development, a location should be rich enough in resources and far enough from the central city. It should have the combination of rural and urban characteristics to form an integrated whole. It has to be planned as a region, more or less self-contained, though planning should be linked to national development.

Stop Migration at the Destination

Faced with rapid rural-urban migration to metropolitan areas, some countries have taken direct measures to stop or discourage such movement. One of the best known attempts to limit entry of migrants to the city is seen in Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia.

Jakarta grew from about 533,000 persons in 1930, to 1.5 million in 1950, 2.9 million in 1961, and 4.7 million in 1971. An important part of this growth came from rural-urban migration, mostly from surrounding regions in Java. In 1970, the Governor of Jakarta, Ali Sadikin, passed a decree limiting the entry of more migrants (Williams, 1973). It has been claimed that, due to this decree, migration to Jakarta has been cut by 50 percent, that only about 1,400 persons per month now enter the city. However, doubts have been expressed about the accuracy of the statistics, for the presence of many marginal people with rural backgrounds in Jakarta has been only too visible (Study Group Report: Indonesia).

According to the decree, a migrant to Jakarta must first apply for a "short visit" card from the local city district (lurah). The district official sends the migrant to the Jakarta Government, where the migrant registers. He deposits an amount of money with the city government equivalent to twice the fare of his trip to Jakarta. Six months after registration, the migrant returns to the city government office and proves he has a job and a home. If he can prove this, he is refunded his deposit, minus 10 percent for administration. If he remains in Jakarta, the migrant has to buy an identification card for "Jakarta citizenship" which costs 25 rupiah (about nine cents U.S.). If he cannot prove that he has a job and a home, the migrant is given a one-way ticket to his place of origin.

Simple as these regulations are, they have proven to be extremely difficult to administer. There are just too many violators for effective control. In one night, for example, city officials and police have rounded up as many as 13,000 persons who were vagrants or without identification cards. These persons were trucked to their villages of origin. However, there are reports that they eventually returned to Jakarta almost immediately. Periodically, the Jakarta Government still rounds up people and deposits them outside the city limits, but it is acknowledged to be a futile effort.

An undesirable side effect of the regulation on migrants has been petty corruption. Identification cards and other official papers are clandestinely bought and sold in Jakarta. Petty corruption has also affected the enforcement agencies, for people are most willing to give bribes to escape the trouble and inconveniences arising from enforcing a rule which is almost impossible to enforce. Perhaps, the known difficulties have served to discourage rural people who are law-abiding and proud of their rural traditions. If this is true, then a more subtle side to "self-selection" among migrants may actually breed negative results. The adventurous, the brave, or those who are not too concerned with law and order may be the ones motivated to move to Jakarta, and this may be a source of problems later on.

Despite the claims that the migration of people to Jakarta has been drastically cut down, it is still too early to tell whether the closing of the city to migrants has been really effective. In one of the latest accounts of the experiment, an observer noted that "...despite registers, control cards, cash deposits and transmigration, the Indonesian capital still leaks internal migrants like a sieve." (Williams, 1973, 16-20).

A less direct but no more successful attempt to discourage the entry of migrants to the city has been tried in Manila. In 1963, upon the election of Antonio Villegas into office, he implemented an election promise to provide free education to city residents. However, free education was for bona fide Manila residents only -- migrants and commuters have to pay a steep fee to get into the school system. Administering this system proved most difficult. It was almost impossible to check all applications even though claims of residence were supposed to be proven by certificates of tax payments, sworn statements (affidavits) and a residence certificate. Most migrants are too poor to pay taxes. On the other hand, they are often willing to pay a lawyer the fee for drawing up an affidavit. And anybody with 50 centavos is able to get a residence

certificate in the Philippines, even with a fictitious address. The result was predictable: petty corruption on the one hand and the rapid increase in the city's school enrolment on the other. By 1968, the City of Manila was spending more than a third of its budget for education alone!

The Jakarta and Manila cases discussed above, show the conflict inherent in democratic systems that guarantee freedom of movement on the one hand and try to correct imbalances in population distribution through direct and indirect means on the other. Short of a strictly enforced passport or identification system, efficient policing, and enforcement of a rationing system for city services, it is extremely difficult to control the movement of people to large cities. The funds and efforts poured into a "closed city system" could become enormous. If they were to be applied to a more positive use, they may perhaps contribute more effectively to social and economic development.

Programs which use administrative fiat to stop migrants from moving to the city are generally destined to fail because they run counter to the distribution of employment opportunity and other factors which attract migrants. Evidence for this may be taken from a wide variety of studies indicating that wage and unemployment differentials are closely related to population movements. Even poor, unemployed migrants in metropolitan areas are likely to evaluate their prospects as better now than where they lived before. Some indicative findings in this regard were gathered by the study teams in the eight developing countries on which we have focussed in this review. In each country a "typical" low income housing area was identified, and, all the heads of households (nearly all of whom were migrants) were interviewed on a variety of topics related to their migration experience. While the typical slums were in some cases located in the city center and in other cases at the periphery of the city, such that they are not precisely comparable, the general consistency of responses with regard to current satisfactions and desire to "return home" is impressive. As Table 1 shows, with

few exceptions, the great majority of migrants feel that life is better in the city, and only a minority would be willing to return home. This is true even in Bandung, Indonesia, where as we shall see (Table 2, ahead) approximately half the population in the settlement studied had no electricity or toilet facilities, two-thirds got their water from open wells or streams, and four-fifths simply threw their garbage into the bay. Thus, as bad as things may seem to be in the marginal settlements in these cities there is reason to believe that circumstances may have been even worse where the migrants came from. This being the case, it is difficult to see how direct administrative decrees alone can control migration. Only when such decrees are reinforced by programs which operate to improve living conditions in alternative migrant destinations will there be some chance of success.

Insert Table 1 about here

Accommodating Migrants in Metropolitan Areas

Even as governments in developing countries try solutions to influence or stop rural-urban migration, they are also painfully aware that the past migration waves have created serious problems that have to be dealt with. Foremost among these are urban services required by cities whose capacity to provide them is badly strained by the influx of migrants.

Some planners have even argued that investments in metropolitan infrastructure are not just necessary, but are in fact the key to national development. Currie (1966) has argued, for example, that a deliberate metropolitanization policy may generate sufficient demand for housing and materials for construction of roads, buildings, etc., that unemployment in the country as a whole will be reduced. This will in turn draw in more workers to urban areas for construction and manufacturing employment, and will reinforce a continuing growth cycle. The concentration of markets and labor forces will then permit increased integration and economies of scale in the production and distribution of goods and services.

Counter-arguments against continued growth of the large metropolitan areas in developing countries include the fear that per capita investment in services may actually increase once the city passes a certain optimum size. There is also concern about the high cost and scarcity of urban land and the negative influence of this on productive investments in manufacturing. Finally, there is the fear that further polarization of wealth and productivity will occur, such that the poor classes in the cities and the rural population in general will fall increasingly behind the income levels of an urban minority. In addition, there are arguments on how large cities increase pollution, frustration, and social alienation.

At the present time there is no way of adequately assessing whether the hypothesized negative consequences of metropolitanization outweigh the possible positive consequences. Regardless of what the answer on this issue will turn out to be, throughout the world planners and policymakers at the national and local levels are devoting resources to improve conditions in the marginal urban settlements where so many migrants live. As Table 2 indicates the need for government involvement in providing services is great in many of the lower income settlements in the eight cities surveyed. Of the settlements surveyed, only in Caracas, Venezuela, can one say that levels of service are high.

Insert Table 2 about here

Two contrasting waysⁱⁿ which governments are attempting to deal with the lack of services to low income residential areas in the metropolitan cities are as follows:

1) Large scale building of "inexpensive" housing. Such programs are not common since the total cost to governments is often too high. Jones (1964) reports that in Caracas over a four-year period some time ago (1954-58) the

government bull-dozed several barrios of shanties off the hills on the eastern part of the city and built in their place 85 "super blocks" of between 150 and 450 apartments each, housing a total of 160,000 people or nearly 13 percent of the metropolitan population at the time. It was not anticipated that the flood to the city would continue, perhaps encouraged by the available housing in the building boom, nor that soon slum housing would begin to grow up around the new blocks, populated by families which could not afford the high (although subsidized) rents in available housing.

2) More common in countries without Venezuela's economic resources have been "sites and services" schemes where poor people are allowed to build their own shanties from whatever scraps of material they can get, supplemented by some standard building materials provided through government credit. In such schemes anything which will alleviate urban housing needs is considered to be helpful. Thus, public officials in some countries no longer ask for housing that would give so many square meters of living space per person, nor do they plan for piped water in every house. Communal taps, pit latrines or even pail collection systems for sewerage are better than nothing. It is significant that the World Bank now has "sites and services" projects in Indonesia, Peru, and Turkey, and is considering similar projects in the Philippines and Nigeria. As a related measure, lower standards of services and housing are now acceptable in many countries because of the seriousness of urban problems in relation to the resources available to solve them. A study group composed of the World Bank, the International Development Association and the International Finance Corporation found that the least expensive form of public dwellings provided by governments in many cities could not be afforded by the following proportions of households: Mexico City, 55 percent; Hong Kong, 35 percent; Nairobi, 68 percent; Bogota, 47 percent; Ahmedabad, 64 percent; and Madras, 63 percent (Globe and Mail, 1975). In the spirit of the general "sites and services" argument, Calcutta has declared all

standing dwellings, whatever their condition, to be part of the housing stock of the city, and hence eligible for services and development assistance programs.

THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED PLANNING

Virtually all government policies can influence migration in human settlement patterns. Policies concerning the magnitude and location of foreign investments, the pattern of agricultural and industrial development, the provision of health, education and other services, and the birth and death rates (natural population growth) in various regions, will all influence the spatial distribution of human populations. In aggregate, such policies may be the primary determinants of migration and urbanization patterns. In this sense most of the planning of settlement patterns in the developing world is unintentional, since it is guided by policies and programs whose impact on urbanization was not explicitly considered. Often the net impact of general social and economic planning may be contrary to more limited policies designed intentionally to influence migration and settlement patterns. The challenge to planners and implementors lies in whether they can and will harmonize these activities of government, consciously assessing the impact which they are likely to have on decisions to migrate.

We have noted several instances of policies which from the government's point of view had never been considered to have an impact on population patterns, but which in fact tended to strongly favor outcomes at direct odds with population distribution policies. For example, in the Philippines a move was made to "unpeg" the Philippine peso from the American dollar. This move was initially considered to be unrelated to the spatial distribution of benefits. However, it was realized immediately after the implementation of this policy that certain export-oriented industries located in the metropolitan Manila area were receiving a windfall from the policy while others in rural areas were being penalized. Naturally, prospering industries attract more people and what was believed to be a "space blind policy" proved to be related to

an urbanization pattern which the government was trying to discourage. A more common problem has been noted by Gilbert (1974b) in the case of Colombia. The Colombian Government has been actively pursuing a policy of internal regionalization, and offering incentives for industry to locate in selected intermediate centers throughout the country with the hope that this would promote development and reduce concentration of wealth and people in the principal cities. At the same time a very high proportion of all government spending on armed forces, services and economic infrastructure was invested in the large cities, and they continued to grow quickly.

To be really effective, alternative urban places have to be planned within the framework of a national development plan. In too many cases, countries develop five-year plans without much regard for the spatial impact of projects and programs. Being sectorally prepared, the plans concentrate on increasing production no matter where it occurs, and on providing services wherever the people currently live. This usually serves to concentrate development in large metropolitan areas, even when the government is concerned about the continuing growth of these areas. In none of the countries which we reviewed in detail -- Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Turkey and Venezuela -- is there anything approximating what can be called a "national urban strategy" that would place a spatial ingredient in the socio-economic planning process. There were specific programs for developing certain regions, but they were dictated more by particular political pressures (ethnic, religious, and "pork barrel" political campaigning) than by careful analysis of the spatial aspects of development.

In one country, the Philippines, an attempt was made to categorize a wide variety of policies and programs according to their possible impact on migration and the distribution of people and settlements. These categories are seen in Table 3. The individual programs were then analyzed, to find out the extent to which they were in conflict or complementary to each other. The resulting analysis suggested, as we have

indicated above, that there was overlapping and contradiction among the programs so that influences favoring the urban growth and development outside Manila were being undermined by the impact of other programs. Further analysis of this kind in other countries may clarify the linkage between migratory behavior and public policy. The resulting information could be fed back into the policy process to improve the reformulation and implementation of such policies. In this way, hopefully, development which is concerned both with growth and with more equitable distribution of such benefits can be achieved.

Insert Table 3 about here

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Rural-urban migration and rapid urbanization in the world are determined by the interaction of rather fundamental socio-economic, ecological and biological forces, including: rapid population growth and excess labor in rural areas, shortages of land in settled rural communities, soil erosion, ethnic conflict and, perhaps most importantly, the economies of scale in production and distribution of goods and services associated with the urban way of life. Public policies have often a weak control over many of these factors (take rural population growth as an example) and where they do have some impact (say, in areas of trade, industrial investment and the location of social services) programs are often implanted without any particular regard for their impact on the size and spatial distribution of human settlements, nor for the subsequent impact of these variables on the development process itself. It is not surprising, therefore, that when specific policies are implemented which do seek to influence the pattern of human settlements, they are often not effective.

The "inertia" of other government policies and of the broad dynamics of socio-economic change are far more powerful than the specific policies.

In our review of specific policies which have been pursued at least in part for their potential impact on migration and settlement patterns, we found that some simply did not work and that others tended to have the opposite impact of that expected. Our tentative conclusions may be summarized briefly as follows:

1. Attempts to return rural-urban migrants to their rural areas, or to prevent them from entering the city seem to be largely unworkable in the cases examined. Not only are these programs ineffective but they encourage a number of undesirable side effects, such as corruption. The presence of such programs would seem to indicate an inadequate appreciation on the part of the government of the causes of rural-urban migration.
2. Land reforms and other programs which are designed to bring about social justice and increase farm production will at best have only a short-term and limited impact on the exodus from settled rural areas. This is particularly the case in successful programs which eventually lead to a reduced demand (or a slowing in the rate of new demand) for labor as productivity increases. A long-term regional plan which includes land reform would therefore also include other policies designed to absorb surplus labor which will be generated in the land reform itself.
3. Attempts to redirect migrants to alternative locations, either virgin rural lands or intermediate "growth pole" urban areas seem to have been successful in many cases. This is partly because these approaches require a more integrated approach to planning, in which the confluence of employment opportunity, services to attract and hold migrants, market circumstances and economic infrastructure must be considered together. These approaches do of course have their problems. The provision of adequate economic infrastructure to a region in order to permit or encourage growth is often much more expensive than at first it would appear, and hence the more successful programs of this kind are often found in countries

where the governments have considerable financial resources at their disposal, or where there exists a combination of market circumstances which will attract private capital and initiative once some initial government investments are made.

4. Conscious programs to reinforce metropolitanization and encourage rural people to move to the large cities by providing special housing and employment opportunities have scarcely been tried in developing countries, due in great part to the existence of fears about the negative impact of such settlement patterns on the quality of human life and the cost of social services. Yet, in many countries the net impact of government investments and programs is (unintentionally) designed to encourage metropolitanization. Since the negative impact of the continued growth of large cities is largely hypothetical and not yet tested empirically, we shall have the opportunity to see whether in fact it is correct as future evidence on this matter is collected. Programs which seek to reduce the cost of providing housing and essential services in metropolitan areas tend to increase the likelihood that metropolitanization will become identified as a viable strategy for development, at least under some circumstances.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Reports on patterns of internal migration, on conditions in sending and receiving areas, and on policies and programs designed to influence migration and human settlement patterns were prepared for each of these nations by study groups at the following institutions: Institute of Administration, West Java Regional Office (Bandung, Indonesia); Institute of Urban Studies and Development, Yonsei University (Seoul, Korea); Ministry of National Unity (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia); Institute of Administration, University of Ife (Ibadan, Nigeria); Department of City Planning, City Government of Lima (Lima, Peru); Local Government Center, College of Public Administration (Manila, Philippines); Faculty of Architecture and Department of City Planning, Istanbul Technical University (Istanbul, Turkey); Sectoral Plans and Zoning Department, Oficina Municipal de Planeamiento Urbano (Caracas, Venezuela). These research supports were developed through a collaborative research program sponsored by the International Association for Metropolitan Research and Development (INTERMET) in cooperation with the International Development Research Centre. A preliminary report of the organization of the research and its policy objectives may be found in A. A. Laquian, Rural-urban migrants and metropolitan development (Toronto: INTERMET, 1971). The authors are indebted to the eight research teams for many of the examples discussed in this paper.

Table 1. Satisfaction with present life and willingness to return "home" in six low income communities.

Question	Low income community sampled in:					
	Bandung	Caracas	Istanbul	Kuala Lumpur	Manila	Seoul
Do you think your life here in the city is better than your life in your place of origin (home)?						
Percent who believe life is better in city.	87	69	79	95	69	34
If you were given a choice, would you return to your place of origin (home)?						
Percent who would not return.	71	78	82	81	72	**
Number of respondents (migrants only)	586	497	496	366	291	1779

Source: Research Team Reports (see Footnote 1, text).

** not available.

Table 2. The service situation in six low income communities

Service	Low income community sampled in:					
	Bandung	Caracas	Istanbul	Kuala Lumpur	Manila	Seoul
PERCENT WITH:						
1. No electricity	48.4	.4	18.3	65.7	4.8	27.7
2. No toilets	55.8	2.0	----	14.6	40.3	0.2
3. Source of Water						
a. Piped in house	23.1	95.6	9.0	37.5	64.6	72.1
b. Piped water, neighbour	4.4	2.0	.6	4.6	32.6	----
c. Public faucet	3.2	2.4	62.7	42.2	1.3	----
d. Artesian well	2.5	----	1.0	9.3	.5	8.3
e. Open well, streams	66.4	----	----	----	----	----
f. Vendors	----	----	26.1	----	----	----
g. Others	.4	----	.6	6.4	1.0	19.6
4. Garbage disposal						
a. Gov't collects	8.1	86.8	59.5	34.6	23.2	36.6
b. Vacant lots	0.4	6.2	1.9	0.6	4.6	7.6
c. Bodies of water	83.7	0.4	24.5	6.7	53.5	17.3
d. Burn	2.1	5.6	0.2	49.4	9.7	----
e. Pit and holes	2.7	----	5.2	7.5	2.0	1.8
f. Throw anywhere	----	0.8	8.1	----	5.4	5.2
g. Others	3.0	0.2	0.6	1.2	1.6	31.5*
5. Health care when sick						
a. Public hospital	26.8	30.3	56.3	8.1	20.4	N
b. Private hospital	7.4	0.4	1.0	3.3	2.0	0
c. Private doctor	40.9	0.6	40.2	66.2	23.2	
d. Health centre	10.1	68.7	1.6	----	53.0	D
e. Herb doctor	4.1	----	----	0.2	0.8	A
f. None	2.6	----	0.4	2.4	0.3	T
g. Others	8.1	----	0.5	19.8	0.3	A
N =	683	500	499	507	392	2335

* Private Disposal

Source: Research Team Reports (see Footnote 1, text)

Table 3.

Programs and activities that influence migration.

<u>Programs and activities</u>	<u>Impact of migration patterns**</u>			
	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>
1. Frontier colonization and homesteads	x			
2. Resettlement of former Huks	x			
3. Resettlement of urban squatters to rural areas	x	x		x
4. Industrial estates	x			
5. New towns	x	x		x
6. Highways and infrastructure development, irrigation	x			
7. Relocation from disaster areas, military operation zones, stricken areas		x		
8. Natural resource conservation, reforestation		x		
9. Administrative regionalization		x	x	
10. Manpower training and development	x	x	x	x
11. Intra-urban relocation and land tenure	x	x	x	x
12. Public housing	x	x	x	x
13. Welfare, health, and urban poor services				x
14. Utilities and other urban services				x
15. Land reform		x	x	
16. Sites-and-service schemes for squatters	x		x	x
17. Cottage industries			x	x
18. Rural credit, price supports, cooperatives	x		x	
19. Agricultural extension			x	
20. Housing finance	x		x	x
21. Rural electrification	x		x	

* Legend:

- I. Those that encourage people to move to certain areas;
- II. Those that discourage people from moving to, or staying in, certain areas;
- III. Those that encourage people to stay where they are;
- IV. Those that cope with problems arising from internal migration.

Source: Research Team Report: Philippines (see Footnote 1, text).

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