YOUTH VIOLENCE AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN JAMAICA:

CAUSES AND COUNTER-MEASURES

An Examination of the Linkages and Disconnections

Final Technical Report

AUTHORED BY
HORACE LEVY

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SYNTHESIS

THIS PROJECT EMANATED FROM the need to establish research-based grounds of solid value for an alternative to the *mano dura* approach, elements of which the authorities planned to continue using, or even extending, to address Jamaica's high homicide rates. The objective, therefore, was to investigate the relationship between youth violence and organized crime, with special attention given to the role of women and best practices and with the aim of influencing policy.

Enabled by the Participatory Learning and Action (PLA) qualitative methodology, the Institute of Criminal Justice and Security (ICJS) research team was able, through focus groups and interviews with key informants, to engage directly with gangs and crews in communities in Kingston, and to a lesser extent, those in Spanish Town. The team encountered "defence crews" that were aligned to communities. These crews did not exhibit behaviour similar to that of illegal, wealth-seeking criminal gangs and, indicated no movement in that direction. Instead, they were strongly supported by women and responded positively to the mediatory and developmental "best practices" of state and non-state agencies. A significant number of criminal gang members also showed interest in pursuing an alternative and legal lifestyle.

Women, for their part, were not associated with personal weapon usage. They tried to discourage conflicts and played an important part in community bonding. However, by having sexual relationships with "the enemy", they were often the ones blamed for provoking conflicts.

The team encountered "defence crews" that were aligned to the communities. These crews did not exhibit behaviour similar to that of illegal, wealth seeking criminal gangs and indicated no movement in that direction.

For inner-city people, the community is of prime importance and defence crews and sometimes gangs are embedded in it. The various crews provide a constant source of enjoyment for inner-city people who live in depressed conditions.

The research team recommends a national security policy that, rather than focusing simply on attacking the gangs, proposes the combination of community policing with community development and firmly asserting the central authority of the state. In the series of public forums held with security officials, the researchers received support for this approach from high-ranking officers of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). A number of specific recommendations include the provision of additional resources to "best practices", and women's empowerment, as well as ceasing to grant contracts to criminal gangs.

BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH PROBLEM

THE REASON FOR THIS RESEARCH was the world-leading levels of homicide and community violence in Jamaica. This, along with other factors, even raised the concern that organized crime could exert an extremely dangerous level of influence on and pose a threat to the state.

For many years, sociologists have seen a correlation between violence and homicide and income inequality.[1] It is not accidental, then, that the Caribbean and Latin America have the highest levels of both income inequality and crime.[2] In Jamaica's case, with unemployment a high 14 per cent in late 2012, two to three times higher for young people, and with nearly 20 per cent of the population below the poverty line, inequality is affecting the already vulnerable. In a small island this is highly visible. Economic inequality is based on the country's two-tier education system.

Inequality leads to disrespect and shaming, a thesis powerfully argued and demonstrated by Gilligan.[3] It is particularly felt by the Jamaican poor because of their history. A very large majority is black and the descendants of slaves, something they have not forgotten. It is not by accident that the class line separating the middle and upper classes from the poorer class coincides with race, those above the line being brown or white. "Respect" is a common parting word in the inner-city.

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1. See, for example, John Braithwaite's 1979 *Inequality, Crime and Public Policy* (Boston, Mass., & London). As Harvard Medical School psychiatrist James Gilligan says in *Preventing Violence* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2001), "Some three dozen studies at least have found statistically significant correlations between the degree of absolute as well as relative poverty and the incidence of homicide". Gilligan refers also to a meta-analysis in 1993 of thirty-four such studies that found strong statistical support for these findings.

2. See UNDP's *Regional Human Development Report for Latin America and the Caribbean 2010 and Caribbean Human Development Report 2012*. Only some African nations had higher inequality.

3. *Op. cit*.

A third source of crime in Jamaica has been the weak exercise of authority by the state and civil society in a situation of economic scarcity. Mid-east socio-political theory has found that feuding occurs as a result of weakness in the authority of the state. The feuding there is very similar to Jamaica's inner-city community conflicts.[4]

This assertion of authority would explain, in large part, the impact of the May 24th, 2010 "incursion" of the security forces into Tivoli Gardens[5] – regarded by many as a virtual state within the state. The heightened police activity that followed, especially in inner-city areas, resulted in a significant reduction in homicides and in criminal organisation over subsequent months. The threat of danger to the state was removed.

These policing strategies were also accompanied by stiff pieces of legislation and the threat of introducing even more of such legislation along the lines of the *mano dura* path taken in Central America. The failure of *mano dura*, which was abandoned in several countries after several years of being tried as a technique, appears to have escaped the attention of Jamaican security chiefs and legislators. They continue to pursue tough anti-gang laws, even though one of the earlier pieces of legislation, when it came up for renewal in 2011, was challenged in the courts, judged to be unconstitutional and had to be abandoned.[6]

In this context, and taking into account the complexity of a situation in which some state and non-state agencies were successfully utilising other methods to address community violence, it seemed appropriate to conduct research into the relationship between community youth violence and criminal gangs. This research would form a basis for a policy approach that would be an alternative to the "iron fist". The policy approach would be more effective and more in keeping with human rights and social justice. This was the rationale for the research project.

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4. See: Herbert Gayle, unpublished doctoral dissertation, *Urban Poverty and Violence: A Study of Selected inner-city Communities in Jamaica and Britain* (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2007); and Gayle and Nelma Mortis, *Male Social Participation and Violence in Urban Belize: An Examination of Their Experience with Goals, Guns, Gangs, Gender, God, and Governance* (October, 2010).

5. Tivoli Gardens is a community in the southwest of Jamaica's capital city, Kingston, which was controlled by Christopher "Dudus" Coke and his Shower Posse gang. Confronted by the barricades erected by Tivoli, the "incursion" of a large force of police and soldiers was to take Dudus into custody, his extradition having been requested by the USA but resisted for nine months by the Jamaican Government of Prime Minister Bruce Golding in whose constituency Tivoli falls.

6. The denial of entitlement to bail (constitutionally guaranteed) during a 60-day pre-charge detention.

OBJECTIVES

THE CORE GOAL, OVERALL, WAS TO examine the relationship between youth violence and organized crime: How were youth crews and criminal gang different? What connecting links were there among them? Was there a movement of violent youth into criminal gangs? If so, what were the factors influencing such movement and what were the obstacles? What the role of women in community violence and gangsterism might be was another central goal to be examined with a view to reducing violence against women and enhancing their role in reducing youth violence. "Best practices" in community-based youth violence prevention were also to be documented, with the roles of state and non-state actors delineated in order to strengthen collaboration between community and state. Finally, the policy implications of the findings were to be outlined so as to influence relevant policy frameworks aimed at reducing youth violence in communities.

Thus, *specifically* stated, the objectives were to:

1. Investigate and document the nature of youth violence, in particular its relationship with organized crime;
2. Characterise different types of gangs and their influence on youth violence in Jamaica in order to contribute to the design and implementation of more effective youth violence prevention strategies, targeted to the specific contexts and audiences;
3. Elucidate the role that women play in violence and their attitudes toward youth violence, in order to identify strategies that would reduce violence against women related to youth gang activities, and enhance the role women can play in reducing youth violence, particularly at the community level;
4. Document "best practices" of community-based activities that target prevention of youth violence; delineate the roles and capacities of state and non-state actors to employ cultural approaches in youth violence prevention and strengthen the integration and collaboration between community and state actors;

5. Outline the policy implications of the findings on youth violence and present them to stakeholders, so as to influence the relevant policy frameworks in place and strive for a holistic and long-term commitment to significantly reduce youth violence in Jamaican communities.

METHODOLOGY AND ACTIVITIES

(PROJECT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION)

1. Project activities essentially comprised **qualitative research** using the method known as **Participatory Learning and Action (PLA)**. This involved three (3) lanes of investigation:

1. Full research team PLA deployment across a community, or a section of a community, under the supervision of the consultant;
2. PLA-type focus group discussions conducted by two senior members of the research team along with the consultant; and
3. Interviews of key gang members individually by one or two members of the research team or a research team member and the consultant.

Lane #1, interviews "of convenience" across an entire community or community section, was considered and proved to have value for providing good information on a gang or corner crew from another point of view than their own. This was important because crews and gangs often gloss over objectionable or criminal behaviour on their part or might claim acceptance by the community when the opposite is the case, etc. Community interviews provided, therefore, to some extent, a relatively independent source of validation or correction. Very importantly it could also contribute, through older residents, to filling gaps in the history of an area and of a gang; and history was valuable for tracking significant changes in behaviour or direction of gang or crew.

Lanes #2 and #3 are standard methods and require no explanation. They constituted the main avenues of information. Additionally, it should be noted that two (2) of the regular senior interviewers were community persons with backgrounds of extensive knowledge and contacts with community "shottas" [= shooters]. Their involvement in the community interviews amounted to virtual "peer" interviews, a method shown elsewhere to be effective in eliciting in-depth information.

It must be emphasised that, unlike quantitative methods, PLA conducts interviews not with pre-set questions, but only a check-list of broad areas of interest, allowing interviewees, by their responses from the outset, to guide the course and pace of the interaction. This clearly indicates a great deal of respect for those being interviewed, which is a distinguishing and basic feature of PLA. It requires regular stops to review the process and re-shape it in order to focus more on surprising elements or to confirm matters requiring confirmation from multiple sources. It demands interviewer creativity and considerable flexibility in charting interview direction to reach a fruitful outcome. These points are raised to explain some of the patterns of activity sketched in Figure 1.1.

2. Research activities ranged over different sections of Jamaica's capital city, Kingston, and in the later months, Spanish Town in the adjoining parish of St Catherine. The



Figure 1.1: Map shows community clusters where research was done

team began in Whitfield Town,[7] neighbouring Rose Town, sections of Rema, and Denham Town (the next-door neighbour and one-time satellite of Tivoli). All these communities are in the traditionally volatile western end of the city (see map – Figure 1.1). Brown's Town, Rockfort and Mountain View on the city's east end were next, followed by Sunshine, Top Penwood, Dust and Moscow, districts in Waterhouse in the northwest of the city. Spanish Town, the last area reached, is a large township 13 miles from the capital and the scene of repeated conflict between two (2) prominent gangs. It offered a fruitful complementary field for analysis.

A large proportion of the community PLAs, (five of the six) and of the focus group sessions in Year One, were conducted in the communities in the west because of the number of reputed criminal gangs there and the changes in orientation of some crew and possibly some gang members. Outbreaks of violence impeded PLAs in the east and northwest areas.

Table 1: Contact Outcomes

	Year One			Year Two			
		PLA Persons, Groups & Group Members		Total Groups & Individuals Interviewed	Group Members & Individuals		
Contact Type	Total No	M	F		M	F	
Community PLAs	6	96	38				
Focus Groups	(20) 164	(18) 151	(2) 13	(15)	131	1	
Individual Interviews	12	3	9	11	10	1	
Total Persons		250	60		141	2	453

Group ( )

In Year Two there were no PLAs (due to funding limits) and emphasis was placed on focus groups and interviews. Researchers tried a different tack of gathering 64 leaders from five (5) communities to examine, by community and then all together, the changes in community leadership of the don, politician and women. To explain why there are so few females, unlike the focus groups and individual interviews in Year One, which comprised community citizens or members of defence crew, those in

7. In the view of the researchers, the naming of this and other communities carries no risk to them.

Year Two were largely with members of criminal gangs, almost all male. Their ages ranged from 17 to 45, but a few older non-gang persons – aged 52, 54 and 55 – were interviewed in Rockfort. **The large majority of all groups were school dropouts after grades 7 or 9** who had hardly or never known their fathers (a case review done in one of the research communities showed this to be the situation with 48 out of 56 [86%] of defence crew members[8]).

An interesting aspect of the movement across the city was how it altered the earlier selection of communities to be studied. The flexibility allowed by PLA guided this modification, including the decision to add Spanish Town. Discrete communities gave way to clusters in order to follow up the connections that were discovered between gangs in adjacent communities. An important criterion for pursuing a cluster was the ostensible or likely *presence of some combination of crew, gang and criminal gang*, since relationships among them were the central target of the research.

This explains why the research covered a wide area (see map, Fig. 1.1, page 13) yet almost entirely bypasses Arnett Gardens–Trench Town, which many would expect to be included. Indeed, it was considered, but other parts of the city were necessary to ensure a comprehensive and balanced output. The linkages that the research disclosed as it moved along, together with crew-gang relations and the beckoning importance of Denham Town to which many Tivoli youth had moved after the Tivoli incursion, informed the final selection.

Overall then, the research concentrated on city sections rather than communities. This was not to minimise the importance of each community within a section, as the findings will show. Instead, it situated communities within their broader settings in which linkages involved in:

(i) the expansion of a criminal gang;

(ii) the evolution of a corner group in a criminal direction; and

(iii) the circumstances leading to conflict between neighbouring communities;

According to the PMI the large majority 48 out of 56 (86%) of gang members dropped out of school by grade 9. The case reviews also indicated they hardly knew their fathers.

8. Unpublished PMI study.

could emerge in the views expressed and the comparisons made by interviewees. They could then be given attention. The importance of such linkages is borne out by the impact of the incursion into Tivoli, which disclosed, to the unsuspecting and unaware at least, the citywide connections centred on Christopher "Dudus" Coke and Tivoli.

Community selection and timing of entry were affected by two (2) other factors. One was a single instance of political partisanship whereby community leaders refused to allow delegates to leave for an outside meeting or even, in the end, to allow entry to the research team. The second factor was the recurrent bouts of instability, a regular feature of inner-city community life, stemming from inter-group conflicts with attendant homicides or disputes over leadership.

3. Though not specifically planned, in effect, this research was conducted in **partnership with the Peace Management Initiative (PMI)** from whose field staff and Board a majority of the research team was drawn. The Peace Management Initiative is an agency that was established in 2002 by the Minister of National Security to head off or defuse community violence. Its Board comprises professionals from the church, The University of the West Indies and the Director of the Dispute Resolution Foundation as well as representatives of the two main political parties.

After over ten (10) years of citywide efforts and having kept its distance from the police, the PMI has built up a large reservoir of trust. This background and experience enabled the PMI to make the contacts through which the research team could freely enter almost every community and meet not only with the general citizenry to gather their views, but also with key members or representative groups of crews and gangs for extensive interviews.

An important part of the network of contacts is the formal liaison persons identified by the PMI in some 20 communities. (These persons are given a small monthly stipend of US$50.) These contacts proved invaluable, not least because they provided information and protection for the researchers.

It should be noted that the majority of the communities in the areas under examination had been relatively peaceful and stable prior to the May 2010 incursion into Tivoli, the State of Emergency and the heightened police activity that followed. It is important to take this fact into account so as to put into perspective and not exaggerate the impact of the Tivoli event and subsequent policing action. Nevertheless, the influence of these on the behaviour and responses of those interviewed and studied in the research was considerable.

These communities are located in four (4) of the six (6) police divisions in which the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA) is divided. In four (4) of these divisions, homicides had declined by 42 per cent over the five-year period 2005 to 2009, largely as a result of the work of the PMI (see charts in Appendix 2). The full significance of this decline is realised in the fact that the highest ever number of homicides to take place in Jamaica occurred in those five (5) years; and the greater majority was perpetrated outside of those divisions.

Only social service organisations like Grace (Kennedy) and Staff, led by an outstanding social worker in the city's downtown centre, and S-Corner in Whitfield Town, operated like the PMI in dealing face-to-face with combatants. Holding communities together in other ways in the West were Hope for Children located on Spanish Town Road on the edge of Greenwich Farm, Agency for inner-city Renewal in Arnett Gardens and, in the city's northeast, the August Town Sport and Community Development Association. Contributing to infrastructure and training and some development, once the PMI had secured a degree of peace, were the Jamaica Social Investment Fund, the Social Development Commission and the Citizen Security and Justice Programme.

4. The PLA, far from precluding the formulation of **definitions** as a useful starting point for this research, did set out a number of them as agreed in the work plan. They are definitions of **crime, criminal, gang, corner crew, garrison** and **don**.

Crime was defined as a serious offence against an individual or the state and punishable by law. Generally and traditionally, it had been regarded as *law breaking*. More recently, restorative justice proponents have put law breaking in second place and regard crime as primarily *conflict harmful to persons, community and offender*.[9] Rather than dwelling on the individual in relation to the state and its legal and judicial system, primacy is given to the harm done to the community, while the victim of the crime and its agent, the state, are moved to second place. This is a major change in focus and perspective and the one preferred in this research.

Following from this approach to crime, a **criminal** in the 'law breaking' definition is someone pursuing *wealth or power by illegal means* with the emphasis on the illegality. In the second definition, the criminal is pursuing *self-interest to the harm of other individuals, of community and of him- or herself*, where attention is given both to the collective

9. See H. Zehr's, *Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice* (Scottsdale, PA: Herald Press, 1990) and Daniel Van Ness', "Restorative Justice and International Human Rights", in Galaway, Burt and Joe Hudson, eds., *Restorative Justice and International Perspectives* (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1996), p. 22–23.

hurt and to the selfishness from which it stems. Though it is not necessary to go into the implications here, it is clear that they are considerable for the roles and inputs of lawyers, courts, police, relatives and friends of the crime victim, the agent of the crime and its witnesses.

Not every serious illegal act is called "criminal" by lower income Jamaicans. This cannot be attributed simply to the desire to protect community members targeted by the police. Without ever having heard of "restorative justice", many "ordinary" people spontaneously incline to that perspective. This may be because laws are changed from time to time and the need for change is widely recognised: what is illegal today can or could be legal tomorrow; and what is illegal in one country is known to be legal in another. The recreational use of marijuana is the example that immediately comes to the minds of community people, given its widespread use and cultural acceptance.

This reality has repercussions for the support given by some members of the public in police pursuit of criminals defined as such by the law but not so regarded by a community. Many police officers recognise this and consequently may themselves half-heartedly pursue or "turn a blind eye" to the offender, as in the example cited. On the other hand, a gun held without legal permit is used as an excuse for some police to administer equally illegal and, indeed, criminal execution.

While the term **"gang"** can be used broadly for any group of people and has been used for a group of labourers, it also stands for a group of criminals. It is in this last sense that this research employs the term: three (3) or more persons united by a common wrongful purpose,[10] which the Ministry of National Security also substantially follows.[11] For the sake of clarity, this report often uses the term "gang" with the qualifier "criminal". ***This report takes "organized crime", in the first objective of the study, as equivalent to "criminal gang".***

10. The *UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime*, Article 2, defines "organized criminal group" as follows: a group having at least three members, taking some action in concert (i.e. together or in some coordinated manner) for the purpose of committing a 'serious crime' and for the purpose of obtaining a financial or other benefit. The group must have some internal organisation or structure, and exist for some period of time before or after the actual commission of the offence(s) involved.

11. It speaks of a gang as a formal or informal group, association or organisation consisting of three or more persons who: (a) have a primary objective or activity to individually or collectively commit criminal or delinquent acts, which may create fear and/or intimidation or secure financial gain by criminal means; (b) may have in common an identifying name, leader, de facto claim of territory/division or colour; (c) may or may not be identified or linked by visible markings or mannerisms; and (d) may share or enjoy the proceeds of crime as well as conceal such proceeds.

Table 2: Gang and Crew Classification

Category	Objective	Activities	Types	
			JCF typology	*PMI typology*
Criminal Gangs	Illegal wealth &/or power; selfish harm to community/ individual	Gun & drug trade, robbery, assassination, extortion, rape	International	International
			Local	Local
Crews	Mutual support, enjoyment & defence of community or section of it	Dominoes, beach party, football, netball, church, chat . . ., & defence involving illegal guns, petty theft, marijuana smoking & sale of "spliffs"	Community or "First Generation"	[Prior to the research] "Corner Crews"

(Table 2 attempts to set out the different views, and their overlap, in respect of "corner crew"/"first generation".)

This was not to take a position on the distinction between organized crime and gangs, but was simply a practical option because our research did not enable detection of organized crime using local gangs as agents. The nearest we got to that was a local criminal group in Denham Town, which might be an agent of, or linked with the same transnational entity in which Dudus had been a principal. With Coke removed from the scene, it was, however, uncertain what connection the Denham Town group (fighting to establish itself) had with the remainder of that entity. At the same time, it was general knowledge that the entity was still, on the local scene, receiving construction contracts from the state. *PLA, our agreed method, was geared more for studying communities and community groups, but could not give automatic access to that level of criminality.*

In the classification adopted by the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), gangs take shape in three (3) stages or "generations". The third stage is the transnational network; the second stage, the local gang (though it may have a "big daddy" overseas); and the first stage, a group of delinquent youth engaged in armed conflict with similar groups (which means the illegal possession and use of firearms) as well as in petty or more serious theft and the use of marijuana. For the JCF, there is a natural progression from

the first stage or generation to the third stage, by way of a ladder or slippery slope (depending on one's perspective).

The Peace Management Initiative (PMI) – taken as the most experienced agency in the field – acknowledges the criminal actions of the first stage group as well as, at times the minority presence of criminal individuals in it. It has emphasised, however, peer solidarity, turf orientation and openness to alternative social influences as the determining features of the group as a whole. The common thread in these features is one of a positive relationship with others, in contrast to the criminal's willingness to do harm to others out of self-interest. ***To emphasise the difference between delinquent youth group and criminal gang rather than relations between them, the PMI has preferred the term "crew" for the former***, the most common community usage and ***the one used in this report***. Further reason for this approach will become clear in the Findings.

The box on page 19 attempts to show the differing views with the JCF identifying as "first generation" criminal gangs (engaging in the same activities as the other two levels or "generations") while the PMI labels them as "corner crews". According to the PMI, the crews do commit crimes but they are not gangs of hardened criminals.

Garrison in the Jamaican context, as succinctly described in the *Report of the National Committee on Political Tribalism*, 1997, citing the principal authorities, Figueroa and Chevannes, is the term adopted for a community that is a political stronghold completely controlled by one political party. The first garrison was established in the mid-1960s through large-scale, state-sponsored housing. Others followed in the 1970s and early 1980s through housing, group seizure of a housing estate from a rival party, and squatting. Political control was exercised through manipulation of the voting process in elections along with gun violence and intimidation. Garrisons usually have a considerable impact on the constituency of which they are a part. Garrison residents, in exchange for their votes and the surrender of some freedoms, enjoyed free water and electricity along with housing.

The primary task was for the research to determine, in a specific set of inner city communities, the nature of the relationships between the principle groups and gangs engaged in violence.

Today, many of the early features of the garrison, such as the stuffing of ballot boxes and free electricity and water, have virtually disappeared. Voting for the dominant party continues, but on the basis of traditional allegiance rather than ideological commitment and with more tolerance of minority views. Also, at election-time, violence between the parties is almost nil. Garrison residents themselves, when asked, express rejection of the term. To some it stands only for a place of poverty and depressed conditions.

A **don** is the male leader of a gang who, by his possession of guns and other resources, exercises control over a garrison community or a wider area. Initially, he was the local agent for the Member of Parliament (MP) in whose constituency the community or area fell. Through him the MP gave out contracts for road works and other infrastructure improvements and exercised political control. Over time, however, dons and gangs acquired, through the drug trade, their own resources and became less dependent on the politicians.

The primary task for the research was to determine, in a specific set of inner-city communities, the nature of the relationships among the principal groups and gangs engaged in violence. In *definitional terms*, the question was whether or to what extent the hypothetical distinction between corner crews of the first generation and gangs of the second and third generations was supported by the data unearthed by the research. If this were not so would the hypothesis have to be significantly altered?

PROJECT OUTPUTS AND DISSEMINATION

GIVEN PROJECT OBJECTIVES OF policy influence and good violence prevention practice, the research team held a series of four (4) forums[12] to present research findings. Participants were drawn from among high-ranking police and military officers, the Ministry of National Security, the Planning Institute of Jamaica and interested sections of academia and the non-government communities. Presenters included not only members of the research team but also on occasion representatives of the IDRC and experts in the field. From Mexico there was Professor Arturo Alvarado of El Colegio de Mexico and from Guatemala, Isabel Aguilar of Interpeace Guatemala.

There was also participation in other kinds of forum. One focused on best practices for peace building, with a presentation, for example, by an NGO leader. Another involved researcher input into a workshop on Media and Policy makers.

Another kind of output from the research was the two and a half day training for a team of nine (9) that was carried out in January 2011. The purpose of the training was twofold: to ensure that the entire research team grasped the central research method, namely PLA; and to equip a group of inner-city members with that skill, which they could later use to assist the PMI in its work. Overseas travel and presentations were undertaken by the research team.[13]

12. The forums were held on the 1st June 2011, 13th October 2011, 19th June 2012 and 26th September 2012 on the following themes respectively: (i) "Preliminary Findings" introduction to the research, its direction, objectives and methodology; special guest Presentation Markus Gottsbacher, IDRC; (ii) "Development of Public Policy" interim report, namely on the first year of research; special guest Ms. Isabel Aguilar, Interpeace Guatemala; (iii) " Approaches and Best Practice", gang case study, refinement of findings, special presenter Arturo Alvarado, El Colegio de México; and (iv) "Youth Violence and Organized Crime Measures and Counter-Measures" presentation of full final report.

13. Overseas travel saw researchers visiting the Chicago Ceasefire Programme (June 27–July 1), attending a Gangs and Governance Conference in Trinidad (November 3-4, 2011), and visiting with International Agencies in New York (March 28, 2012).

The training comprised one day in the classroom, one supervised day in the field and a half-day back in the classroom. Another PLA expert from the University of the West Indies was brought in to assist the trainer consultant with field supervision. The trainees comprised six (6) young adults (2 females, 4 males) from inner-city communities (selected by the PMI's Programme Manager), an older community person with some previous PLA training and experience, and two (2) senior persons from the Violence Prevention Alliance and the PMI.

The issue is how the efforts to reduce homicides and other crimes originating from defence crews and criminal gangs are best directed. Are efforts to focus primarily on apprehending gang members or on changing the factors that move youth into crews and gangs? Are they to be mainly repressing the results or also addressing the causes? The community development referred to ensures good early childhood training, alternative education strategies aimed at school retention, youth life skills and trade skills training, opportunities for work, and cultural and sport activities. In sum, community development will end the social exclusion that has produced the criminalising climate of many communities.

PROJECT OUTCOMES

A. RESEARCH FINDINGS

The identification of defence crews as being distinct both from criminal gangs and other community corner crews constitutes the first finding of the research. This also offers a basis for challenging the broad definition of gang that appears in the current draft of anti-gang legislation and is a part of the *mano dura* approach.

The second finding is the positive response of defence crews to developmental initiatives of both state and non-state agencies, and the willingness of a significant number of gang members, regarded by the police as criminal, to pursue a legal lifestyle. This amenability to positive change is critically important.

Third, these two (2) findings add up to the equally important central role the community plays for both defence crews and criminal gangs. The reality of community in the lives of inner-city people – offers the basis for advocating a community development approach that abolishes social exclusion. The development approach, when combined with community-based policing that is assertive of state authority, provides the alternative to the narrow gang approach proposed for reducing homicides and building a safe and secure environment. Through these findings, the research makes a critical contribution to policy formulation, based on well-grounded insight.

1. Crews and Gangs Distinguished

As was to be expected, there was no standardised and widely accepted usage of the terms "corner crew", "gang" and "criminal gang" inside the inner-city communities. Occasionally, all three (3) were clearly set apart and differentiated. At other times, the first and second or the second and third were fused into the same entity, and were not without real commonalities. A number of additional factors, which the people themselves recognise, also led to unclearness and confusion regarding the different types

of groupings. These factors include: the common presence of a criminal in a crew; the mingling of youth from all three (3) types on the corner, in games and in dances; the schoolmate, family and friend relationships that they all share and that bring them together at different times; and the same harsh treatment they receive from the police, regardless of real innocence or guilt.

The coming together of youth from the different types of groups is particularly evident during times of stability and freedom from conflict. As a woman from Spade Corner in Whitfield Town put it: *"Once there is no war…, it seems as if there is no gangster in the community"*. In other words, the "defence crew" (see page 26) appears to settle back into being just another crew, ceasing to exercise or losing its armed-action function.

In spite of the multiple and seemingly contradictory uses of the terms, the data coming from all areas of the Kingston Metropolitan Region studied in this research agree on and make very clear the existence and the nature of *distinctions between corner crew, defence crew and criminal gangs*. The **corner crew** is a group of youth or "big people" engaged in quite ordinary, positive, non-violent activities. Some may be members of a defence crew.

While not all these groupings are in every community, clearly a significant number of people are members of one sub-group or another. Inner-city people lead a vibrant group life with an emphasis on enjoyment and on making the best of bad situations.

Corner Crew



Inner-city NGO Director, Angela Stultz, describes the corner crew as:

> *"A supportive gathering . . . a comfort spot. At about 10.30–11.00 each morning a group of youth congregate across the road – I can see them from my office here. They enjoy one another's company, run jokes on passers-by. Later towards evening, it is the turn of older folk to gather there and chat."*

The Corner Crew is a group of youth or "big people" engaged in quite ordinary, positive, non-violent activities. Some may be members of a Defence Crew.

Distinguishable also from these crews are the "defenders" of the community. These are youth who take upon themselves the task of protecting and defending the community against attack from a rival community or group. This group is set apart by the task of "defending" the community and by having and using guns to carry out the assigned task. It is usually in times of "war" that this group is therefore noticed as distinct from other crews. Outside of "war" it becomes dormant. This urge to defend turf stems from the sense of identity that comes with belonging to a specific community. It is their very being that is under attack and therefore requires and is given defence. This group has no distinctive name, but "community security" was used in Moscow, while Top Penwood suggested "good garrison" and "community watch". A Rockfort man called them "community defenders". In this Report, it is referred to, therefore, as the **defence crew**. The classification given above with its inclusion of defence crews may help police to accord them appropriate treatment.

The lack of a distinctive name may stem from a certain ambiguity in the way this group is seen by a community. On the one hand, it is highly regarded and welcomed for its protective role, because for years:

> *"De police nah take more action when certain harms ah take place; because of that lack of action dem yute take it pon themselves to defend the community. For years the police would wait till 4–5 people get killed and then show up."* On the other hand, the fact that this group has and uses guns in lethal ways raises doubts and leads some to call it a 'gang'. *"Once you ah defend and you ah go fyah shot [even 'in defence', for the community], it go become criminal."* However, others added, *"dem term it criminal but we call it defensive."*

Defence crews originated out of the rivalry of the two leading political parties, the Jamaica Labour Party and the People's National Party. Urban communities especially used violence in pursuit of the parties' quest for control of the state.[14] Youth born into these communities have found themselves in this conflict box and only in the past decade, disillusioned with the failure of the parties, have they shed the partisanship. However, they have retained the conflict over turf except in those instances where PMI mediation has turned them away from that.

A Dunkirk voice on "defence crews":

> *"There are a number of semi gangs who commit crimes but not for money. For instance, there are a number of named corners in the Dunkirk area, such as 110, 42, Coolers, Red Square, Washington, Welly Skelly, Bryden Street, Bray Street, Black Street, Maiden Street. These corners are always in gang war between corners, fighting for turf, fighting for respect, defending justice as they see it, and filling the gap that the government and the security forces have left vacant. When there is no war these youth are not involved in criminal activities. Yes they have gun but is to protect their life and property."*

Differentiated sharply in community terminology from the defence crew, even when the crew is considered and called "gang", is the **criminal** gang. This type of gang is characterised by the kinds of crimes that it commits – rape, robbery, extortion, assassination, gun and drug trade – and the fact that these acts are initiated in pursuit of wealth and opportunity rather than being actions taken as defence or retaliation or out of need. It is usually identified, not by a definition, but by the immediate naming of specific instances of such gangs, notably the Christopher "Dudus" Coke gang and the earlier Rat Bat gang.

Two other features of the criminal gang are also regularly given. One is its character of being a network – it is not restricted to one community or area; it is *organised*. This important feature of organisation gives the gang a level of stability and permanence that differentiates it from the defence crew, which becomes dormant in periods of peace with a rival community or a community section. However, no explicit distinction is

14. See Amanda Sives, *Elections, Violence and the Democratic Process in Jamaica 1944-2007* (Kingston & Miami: Ian Randle Publishers, 2010) for the history; and Obika Gray, *Demeaned but Empowered: The Social Power of the Urban Poor in Jamaica* (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2004) for the quality of the conflict generated, though he much exaggerates what he calls "badness-honour".

made by community members between a strictly local gang and one with international connections, unless the singling out of the Tivoli Dudus gang is so interpreted.



Criminal Gang versus Defence Crew

A second feature of the criminal gang, which is also a feature of defence crews, is its exercise of "jungle justice", the swift punishment of those who are found guilty of rape or robbery inside the community. This has been known to endear both gang and crew to the community, given the notable slowness of police action and the court process. On the other hand, excesses are known to have occurred in the exercise of jungle justice by criminal gangs (see the example of the Tony Brown gang in Rockfort, page 57). In the case of the criminal gang, the dons also have the reputation of demanding and getting sexual favours from young girls from within their communities that they want to have.

These distinctions amount, therefore, to an important refinement of the hypothetical definitions with which the research started and which, along with the PMI, incorrectly lumped corner crew and defence crew into a single category. What these two have in common, namely a community orientation, does set them apart from the money and/or power seeking of the criminal gangs with their more serious crimes.[15] Turf

defence, not economic gain, is what motivates the defence crew. This was the principal point of the PMI approach and it should definitely be retained.

The importance of making the foregoing distinction between defence crew and criminal gang should not be underestimated. This is evidenced, for example, from police lists that include and characterise as criminal, gangs in West Kingston, ascribing to them major crimes. There is a large number of groups that, based on the criteria advanced here, should instead be regarded as defence type groups and not criminal gangs. The total number given by the police is 268, whereas Anthony Harriott placed the number of organized crime groups under 20.[16] The police lists, which have come to our attention, make it very plain how the anti-gang legislation presently in draft form would be applied. There is a clear indication that defence crews would also be targeted in *mano dura* fashion.

2. Case of a Defence Crew becoming a Criminal Gang

On the other hand, the same distinction made between the defence crew and other crews also explains how the *expansion of the Rat Bat gang* under Machine Man came about, as detailed in the attached case study. The gang was formed ***by drawing in some defence crews*** as its affiliates, although in many cases crews simply assumed the name to enhance their status. This instance would support the police viewpoint of seeing the defence crews as first rung on the criminal ladder. As a single set of instances, however, it does not substantiate the generalisation made by the police. The defence crews, with members having possession of guns which they are inclined by a macho culture to use, and whose members are unemployed and deprived, can move toward affiliation with criminal gangs, where certain incentives and circumstances encourage the association. However, movement of that kind is, by no means, automatic.

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15. The defence crew may be thought to coincide with the "street gangs" defined by American and European consensus (Klein, Malcolm W. and Cheryl Lee Maxson, *Street Gang Patterns and Policies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, and *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012: Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security*, UNDP, ch 3, p 67, col. 2) as "any durable street-oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal activity is part of their group identity" and this illegal activity is said to be "criminal activity, not merely disorderly conduct". However, defence crew identity is *community turf* defence (see below), not illegal activities (unlicensed guns, shooting, etc.) which can decline or disappear outside of times of "war".

16. Personal communication.

The Rat Bat Network in Whitfield Town extended from Galloway (top and bottom), Top Berwick, Pretoria and Mission, through Top Fitzgerald (Paradise) to Whitfield Avenue and Swettenham, then across Waltham Park Road to Steven Lane, 17 Lane, Bones Road and Delamere (bottom), and the list is not complete. All these streets or corners, "affiliated" to the Rat Bat Network with real but varying degrees of closeness, were drawn to the Network by its disbursal of money, guns and the occasional motor bike. Incentives clearly matched needs. The Rat Bat case also illustrates the power of a single individual with the funding of an ambitious overseas criminal who sought to build an empire comparable to that of Dudus.

At the same time it is to be noted that a large number of other streets and corners – Spade Corner and Ramsay Road, along with 33 Lane, 35 Lane, Latour and Bottom Berwick – resisted the influence of Machine Man.[17] Resistance led, of course, to open gun conflict. As voiced by a Top Penwood spokesman and others, the resistance was the result of their basic community integration.[18] Defence crews protected the community and the community women in particular (see # 7, page 34), valued this protection. This relationship of mutual support was vibrant and meaningful, an obstacle to lawless behaviour and not something readily abandoned.

There were also social interventions from outside that they shared with other corner crews around them and which made them hostile to absorption in a criminal network. This was reinforced by the growing realisation, that the political parties had failed them and therefore that political partisanship, which had for decades been linked with criminality, had to be abandoned. (The full extent of this abandonment was revealed in the fraternising in the streets in the December 2011 general election but it had been growing for six or seven years.) It must be emphasised that this was the general pattern of youth resilience in the face of criminality seen in all the areas considered in this study.

3. Violence of Individuals

Other violence that is also reported as occurring, but is not directly linked to crew, defence crew or criminal gang, can provoke conflict involving one or more of the latter groups when it erupts, and can result in a slaying. This type of violence is between

17. Some even saw Machine Man's credentials, contemptuously according to one very knowledgeable informant, as those of a good 'baller' [= footballer], not of an "original bad man".

18. On the value of social cohesion in relation to gang presence and violence reduction, see *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012: Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security* (UNDP), p. 79–82.

individuals and between families. In the former case, it is often related to domestic or man-woman quarrels or disagreements of some kind.

Nationally, in the last few years violence *inside* families has become an issue of great concern. There are instances of children being beaten with all kinds of weapons. There is also the witnessing by children of violence between parents, especially the more common case where it is directed at the female partner. It is only in its spill over into the community and occasioning conflict at that level that domestic violence has received attention from studies of community conflict.

Violence *between* families, family feuds, which are long lasting, persisting over years or even decades, are more difficult to control, much less bring to an end. Family feuds are extremely dangerous to communities. They tend to be intractable because, based on reprisal demands strengthened by blood ties and religious beliefs – eye for eye - they will erupt into violence even after calm has been restored at community level for years. This is often because the feuds are fed by distant family members supplying money and weapons, or supporting claims to family land.

4. Influence of the Shower Posse (Organized Crime)

In terms of assessing the ***relationship between the Shower Posse (Presidential Click) of Christopher Coke and community defence crews or local criminal gangs***, which would attract great interest, data on material or personnel assistance are limited to lower Rose Town. Only a short distance from Tivoli Gardens, Rose Town had the same political party affiliation as Tivoli, and its don enjoyed good personal relations with Coke. The don collaborated closely with Coke in the acquisition of guns and other illegal activity. The relationship here is between two criminal gangs (see case study in Appendix 1).

More generally, what has emerged from the testimonials of many about the effect of the incursion into Tivoli and the overnight ending of its impunity is that the influence exercised by Tivoli and its gang was, above all, a matter of example. It was felt that if

Violence between families, family feuds, which are long lasting, persisting over years and even decades, are more difficult to control, much less bring to an end. Family feuds are extremely dangerous to communities.

Tivoli's impunity could be terminated so abruptly, then nowhere else was safe from the police. And this meant not only criminal gangs but defence crews also. The impunity that Tivoli enjoyed exposed weaknesses in the state – a failure to assert authority, where it was required, through the security forces. Besides providing a hiding place for persons wanted by the police, Tivoli, with its impunity, also encouraged emulation by others in other ways.

5. *The Tivoli Gardens Incursion and Central Authority*

The constructive impact of the Tivoli incursion and of follow-up police measures (4,495 more motorised patrols and 960 more curfews from January to June, 2011, compared to the same period in 2010, according to a JCF press release), notwithstanding the excesses connected with both, makes very clear the value of a ***central authority*** insisting on the rule of law and of a constabulary firmly enforcing it. These had been missing for too long, allowing a bad situation to fester. This was the universal verdict across the inner-city – Tivoli's "above-the-law" status had to be ended. The security forces "had to bring a level of order"; "the government made the situation fester for a long time before they addressed it".

The effect of the forceful application of old laws and new measures was much wider than making youth fearful of congregating on a corner. It carried the powerful psychological message that the country's laws were there to be observed, that they applied everywhere and that the police were the ones now in control. Shootings and murders declined, in some instances quite dramatically. According to one elderly man, on his street in Upper Whitfield Town, the shooting [by what appeared to be defence crews] stopped the very day of the incursion into Tivoli. A long flourishing sense of impunity, that allowed the youth with weapons to fire them as they pleased and engage in war with neighbouring groups, evaporated overnight. According to a Top Penwood man, *"Tivoli shake up all garrison. Garrison dying after Tivoli"*.

The recognition of this authority in inner-city communities is shown in:

(a) the increased acceptance of the role of the police as the agent of the central authority of the state, even if this role was exercised too frequently in an oppressive and unjust way; and

(b) the new freedom of ordinary citizens to pass information to the police, indeed a "surge in popularity" in doing so (encouraged in part also by the Force cracking down on its lower level members, or at least on their brazenness in visiting gangs).

On the other hand, many informants described the police as being "criminals", members of gangs, and committing acts of extortion from those who want to hold a night "session" [= music and some dancing].

At the same time, it must be made very clear that this recognition of the need for central authority does not imply approval of the way it was asserted. The deaths inflicted in the "incursion" are described by members of the community as a "massacre" or "genocide". The judgment is universal - that the way it was done was brutal in the extreme and could not be justified. Other descriptions include: "gone overboard", "too drastic", and "a violation of rights to declare war on a residential community". According to some youth, treatment by police right after the incursion is worse than it was before. Police are said to describe themselves as "the bad man" on the corner now, and youth as "having no say" – "We feel like fugitive in our own community" say some members.

One of the basket of measures introduced by the police on a frequent and wide-scale basis after the Tivoli incursion was the public naming, via national media, and summoning to the nearest police station of "persons of interest", these being inner-city persons "suspected" by the police of a crime as well as those actually on their "wanted" list. Along with the other measures already listed, this had the desired effect: fear. As a Rockfort youth put it: *"Everybody in the community is afraid of the security forces… Nobody want to be a don anymore, only some idiot…"* Top Penwood men spoke of looking for a community leader, not a don (their previous don was abducted and assumed to have been killed).

The economic repression, such as the prevention of night dances where vendors did good business selling peanut porridge, fried fish and beer, the seizure and scrapping of vendors' pushcarts, which destroyed items of legitimate business, bore particularly hard on people who had now to be paying for the water and electricity they had received free for years. Young girls were reported to be begging more and in one area were selling sex for as little as JA$100 (CA$1.06). The men for their part were more resentful: *"Wi think wi did hate police but a now wi hate dem."*

> A long flourishing sense of impunity, that allowed the youth weapons to fire on them as they pleased and engage in war with neighbouring groups, evaporated overnight…."Tivoli shake up all garrison. Garrison dying after Tivoli."

6. Leadership

Consonant with the other findings were the views on the changes in the kind of l***eadership*** emerging in the inner-city communities. Broadly, it includes very low regard for politicians, while dons, one-time surrogates for the politicians, can no longer exercise former unquestioned, one-man decision-making. Everyone with a voice and a view now wants them heard. In keeping with the low opinion of politicians was the demise of strong partisan feeling, in train over the past decade, which became very evident in the fraternising in the streets during the last General Elections of December 2011. The changing, indeed diminished position, of the don is more than just a tactic to avoid being called to a police station as "a person of interest". With the abrupt removal of Dudus, dons have lost "face", have had their status lowered. A more collective, democratic wind is blowing. Youths, in particular, are challenging "older heads" and are responding to economic imperatives that they say the "elders" cannot meet.

7. Gang Members and Legal Alternatives

A serendipitous revelation was the possibility of ***criminal gang members transitioning into an alternative and legal style of life.*** Data emerging from interviews with members of four (4) or five (5) such gangs make the point quite clearly – willingness to accept legitimate employment. They also want to change their image. **Rat Bat has already renamed itself Progressive Youth**. Cynically, the police rubbish the seriousness of such interest on the part of gang members, arguing that this was no more than efforts to escape, for a while, the pressures placed on them by the police in the wake of the incursion into Tivoli. This argument cannot be simply ignored.

On the contrary, however, establishing whether there is a genuine interest in a legal lifestyle, would require testing the real response of resources on the ground, which this research can only recommend. In fact, in the Rat Bat instance, some evidence of genuineness already exists in the legitimate income-earning own-account projects undertaken – raising pigs, tying steel, building and operating a shop and bar. (For more on Rat Bat, see Appendix 1.)

8. Women

Women for the most part, play a positive supportive role for defence crew men, helping them in community defence by warning them of the movements of police and rival groups, hiding them, and seeing to their food and clothing needs when they end up

behind bars. Women speak of constantly urging the men, even if unsuccessfully, to put down the gun and stop the "warring". One community describes them as peacemakers, protesting against the wars.

The reference to women as peacemakers should not be misunderstood or exaggerated. Nothing formal or from "out front" was intended. Women do not generally exercise that kind of leadership in the inner-city. What is meant is what women often do on the domestic scene with male partners who are aggressive or tough talking and going out there to be assertive. In a "war" situation it would be simply to urge them against taking part in it, counsel that the men mostly ignore. Nor would such behaviour on the part of women be universal, as some women, older ones perhaps, are as militant as the men and even more so at times, urging a son to take revenge for a fallen brother.

On the other hand, adolescent girls in the inner-city lack the militancy of older women. In its strong machismo culture, they are extremely vulnerable to sexual abuse of one kind or another. Many become the "baby mothers" for male youth, themselves still in school, and have to drop out of school. The effect of the violence and warring in communities is to incline them to an attitude of dependency on a male, to seeking protection and security rather than to standing up and challenging them.

The active use of a gun by a woman in gang war is extremely rare. Rarely is it spontaneously reported, although on one street, because of their active support for gang members, they are called and considered gangsters. Women generally exercise little or no overt community leadership. On the whole, while the violence stimulates aggressiveness in the men, it appears to lead the women to greater dependence on the men, instead of wishing to become the breadwinners.

There have been, however, exceptions to this pattern. One of these is Lady B (not real name), the former partner of a don, now deceased, and the mother of several sons who were also dons. She has been known to "cow" strong men and has wielded considerable influence over gangsters and crews in her section of the city. Today she leads a quieter life, content apparently to see her small business prosper. Another active woman in her day was Aston's wife, Sandra. While he was behind bars in the 1990s and, to some extent even later, she gave leadership to Rat Bat, having control of its guns, fighting regularly with her partner over his freedom with other women and having to take flight after setting their house on fire.

Although there has been the positive influence of the women, there have also been negative complications resulting from man-woman relationships. In the macho culture

that prevails, it is the women who always get the blame, not the men. It is the women who also have to suffer the pain of the losses through the death of partners or relatives and have to bear the economic hardships imposed by such losses (as well as by the current repressive police measures). Defence of a woman for the disrespect allegedly shown to her by a rival gang member is said to provoke "war".

9. *Five (5) Best Practices*

The ***"best practices"***[19] of several organisations were identified: firstly, by the high regard of community people and others for these practices; and secondly, by the successful outcomes they effected. In keeping with the fourth objective of this research, it is their role in preventing youth violence that qualified them for inclusion here, not necessarily their impact in all instances on defence crews or criminal gangs, although some spinoff in that direction might follow. On these criteria, a few from a longer list have been selected for summary description here, with focus placed on their specific methods. Selection was determined by the principle of representativeness, that is, the different practical ways in which a shared core approach to community violence prevention was expressed: a community-based NGO; a specifically charged state-civil society agency; a child-focused NGO (also community-based); a women's "edutainment" group; and an educational setting aimed at school retention.

9.1. S-Corner Clinic is a non-governmental organisation that is unusual in that it is also community-based, located as it is in Bennett Land, a section of Whitfield Town. At one time it was also mainly community-staffed. The leadership of S-Corner, with their grassroots background, spotted from early the developmental needs of the environs and gradually broadened the output from purely medical clinics (family planning, diabetes, immunisation, etc.) and follow-up home visits, to yard sanitation (toilets and running water), teenager education, community organisation and, above all, tackling the violence tearing the community apart – some 17 or 18 murders a year in a population of only 4,500 is a huge rate. Its fresh, un-patronising approach to people's real problems won much trust and respect for S-Corner.

Indeed, S-Corner's peace-making efforts brought immediate cooperation. Initially, these were mediatory, with assistance sought and obtained from an outreach arm of

19. In quotation marks because not in the technical sense of having passed a specific evaluation, though all have had evaluations. Good or promising practices would perhaps be the better term.

The University of the West Indies (UWI). The University's involvement was employed both for advice and knowing that combatants would perceive this as a sign of respect and thus be drawn to the process, as indeed they were. Later, for the same reason, S-Corner involved popular stage artistes in the process. However, the initial efforts failed completely, in part because one tactic, a march, was quite useless, while another failed to recognise individuals who were criminal and insincere. Subsequent efforts brought intermittent periods of calm, the violence resuming after the pauses.

S-Corner was persistent, however, for the better part of two decades and eventually achieved positive outcomes, mainly because their devoted example inspired some youth to end the violence themselves. It takes time and perseverance to replace a culture developed over decades and to rebuild social capital. It also takes what only a dedicated organisation can offer – the range of measures commensurate with the wide ranging needs that development involves. Along the way and in the end, there occurred some incredible peacemaking encounters involving scores of youth and astonishing leadership.

So, in addition to mediation, S-Corner initiated a programme of self-help income-earning projects for a number of youth groups across the community, including one connected with the Rat Bats, who were based in Bennett Land. Employment undoubtedly contributed to removing a crucial incentive to "war-making" and moving a then notorious gang in the positive direction it now seems to be taking.

Established in 1991 at a bend in St Joseph Road, Kingston 13, S-Corner understood its people, identified with them and was fully accepted. It operated with its "clientele" on a footing of equality. There was sympathy for problems and genuine respect for people, together with an insider's knowledge of people's "tricks", firmness in dealing with them and a demand for reciprocal respect and discipline. It needs to be added that the platform was strengthened by the religious motivation of the Clinic staff.

The Clinic also came to understand, through trial and error, the difference between a criminal gang and a corner crew. The Clinic's partner in the peace process was the latter. What became evident among them was a certain level of consciousness, a yearning for justice and unity among the youth and an end to wrong behaviour, their own included. Most strikingly, it was the youth themselves, not the politicians or the church, who were taking the initiative. This is precisely what the Clinic had been trying to stimulate. It was the yearning of the youth for work, decent incomes and living conditions that eventually brought a stable peace.

For the residents of Bennett Land, with their depressed living conditions and high unemployment rates, S-Corner and its staff were a *respect-building presence* and a strong

beacon of hope. Community people saw the steady stream of foreign and local visitors coming to see what the Clinic was doing and praising its work. They saw and appreciated the Rasta and Christian motivation of the Clinic's leaders and personnel, and their willingness to try new approaches.

Thus, when attendance at community council meetings fell off, better results came from having lane leaders and lane sessions, as well as linking these with HIV/AIDs clinics on the street corners, or home visits to check on the weight and general health of infants. A kite festival was an enormously stimulating event. A fund-raising music festival was another big effort, though partly ruined by rain. Not all the income-earning projects prospered, but one pig rearing enterprise certainly did; and another business producing bagged juice became an on-going success. Most recently, the Clinic established three (3) sites equipped with computers. Keeping local police informed of their doings has also been regular procedure, not only for having good relations with them but also as a way of inducing them to exercise proper community policing.

9.2. The Peace Management Initiative (PMI) is a unique combination of state funding and civil society implementation charged to head off and reduce community violence. The idea was the novel one of involving civil society and utilising non-blood-letting methods in helping to resolve the security problem of community violence usually handled by the police. The PMI's approach was simply to meet with the combatants, those who came forward, drawn by their interest in "high status" people from outside. The first meetings were with each group separately. The groups would then be persuaded to talk to each other in a neutral place, this dialogue leading to an agreement to "hold down" the acts of shooting.

The obvious elements of this approach were its respectful treatment of the "shottas" (i.e., not reporting them or any information about them to the police), reasoned persuasion (i.e., bringing each party to acknowledge its own part), the incentives of peace benefits (e.g., a sports programme, cultural activity, skills training, work, if possible, etc.) and actual follow-up that demonstrated, even though in relatively small ways, genuine concern and interest in their well-being.

The crucial implications were the fact that those who came forward were not criminals but youth wanting something better. They were corner crew or defence crew as it turned out; and they could be turned around without a jail sentence if some development programmes, even the "soft" kind, were put in place, along with counselling for those traumatised by the violent death of a relative or friend.

It was in this way that the PMI managed to and was "credited with stopping the wars in August Town, Greater Brown's Town and Mountain View"[20] and elsewhere. By targeting community defence crews and working with them to develop sustainable ways of dealing with community conflicts, the PMI went a long way in mobilising a culture of peace. This became a strong current running against the subculture of violence that had rooted itself in Jamaica's marginalised communities over the previous 40 years.

The PMI approach has been summarised as follows:

- *Engaging the Wider Community.* Identifying community problems and the key persons involved in the conflict;
- Inviting persons in conflict to *Closed Door Mediation* and developing a platform for community safety;
- Providing *Healing and Reconciliation* programmes allowing youth to cross community borders established during conflicts; *Counselling and Therapy for victims* to deal with the grief and the rage that arise from loss of family members and friends, which is very effective in heading off reprisal;
- Establishing *Peace Councils* to sustain a communication network between corners, an important component for long-term community stability; and
- *Facilitating a space for other Partners and Stakeholders to enter and re-enter the communities*, shifting the focus to the overall development of the community.

Unhampered by a large bureaucracy, the PMI, while retaining its basic approach, has significantly altered its application to meet changes in the situation on the ground. Thus, the PMI moved from inter-community mediations as partisan hostility lessened, first to intra-community group meetings to deal with turf-based conflicts, then to pinpointing the key individuals who instigated the threat of violence. With its hand-holding soft development measures and the trust it has won, the PMI is essentially responsible for a "holding" action that would allow time and space for state, private sector and NGO interventions to meet more fully the need for large-scale development.

It should be noted that addressing community violence also contributes to countering criminal violence. This is essentially because of what the abovementioned

20. McLean et al, 2009

measures to reduce community violence do achieve. They *interrupt* the criminalisation process of social exclusion that is pushing youth from idleness into turf defence and sometimes serious crime. These steps and reduced violence *begin the rebuilding of communities* and of their social capital. Communities then begin to take responsibility for themselves and their children and to respect the rule of law. The emerging culture of peace and collaboration with the police does not make for a climate in which crime will flourish.

> It was in this way that the PMI managed to and was credited with stopping the wars in August Town, Greater Browns Town and Mountain View and elsewhere. By targeting community defence crews and working with them to develop sustainable ways of dealing with community conflicts, the PMI went a long way in mobilizing a culture of peace.

It is important for the impact that reduced community violence has on criminal violence to be appreciated. There is, we have emphasised, an important difference between the two. But this does not lend support to the view that quieting communities only *sends* their criminal elements to rural areas where they can operate more freely. Individual criminals do move around to escape increased police pressure. Others are either killed by police, end up in prison or, give up on criminality and are absorbed by a community. No evidence has, however, been produced to support the notion that "pacification" leads to wholesale relocation.

Fuelling the said view is an under-estimation of the criminalisation process that is occurring, and a failure to face up to the fact that criminalising conditions can be found in many major rural towns. They include – political partisanship, unemployment and prolonged economic hardship, police brutality, a justice system allowing four (4) of every five (5) murders to go unpunished and creating a provocative sense of impunity, and many other kinds of social exclusion. These conditions must be addressed in order to stop the island-wide culture of homicidal violence.

An example of this is seen in the case of Greater Brown's Town, a community that had experienced over 65 homicides in the year previous to PMI's entry. After a

community walk-through conducted by PMI, "shottas" agreed to a ceasefire and consented to attend meetings to be held outside the community. Closed door mediation with the key persons was held at a hotel. It was during these meetings that a peace agreement was reached by all parties.

Key persons were then taken on residential retreats outside of the community. Grief counselling teams visited the community and, where necessary, the homes of those who had lost family members. Sporting competitions were held where youth from opposing groups played on the same teams. Dance parties were held, with all sections of the communities in attendance, and income-generating activities, such as chicken rearing and furniture making, were secured for key community persons.

The peace laid the foundation for other agencies – Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP), Community Security Initiative (CSI), Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF), Ministry of Health (MOH), etc. – to re-enter the community. Health and birth registration fairs were held. Skills training and job creating activities were carried out. Parenting, after-school and life skills training programmes were held. There were summer camps and ongoing sporting activities. Community policing and governance structures in the form of benevolent societies were established in the community and formed the basis for ongoing development activities. Volunteer community liaison officers continue to work with the PMI to monitor the peace process. The need for early intervention in emerging conflicts is relayed by the community liaison personnel to trained PMI staff. The level of homicide in Greater Brown's Town fell to eight per year and has remained at this level for the past five years.

9.3 Children First – Since its inception in 1989, Children First has offered a range of programmes directed mainly at youth at-risk (from low literacy, lack of employable skills, substance abuse, sexual delinquency, etc.) in the 10 to 24 age group. Its location at 9 Monk Street is in territory controlled by the One Order Gang, one of the two big gangs dominating Spanish Town. This has made for some very tense times, given the violent war that for many years was waged between the gangs.

On the other hand, the agency's non-adversarial relationship with the gang brought warnings to lie low when things were about to get "overheated". The gang's leader even complained, but amiably, that Children First, by opening up other avenues, was stealing many of his potential "soldiers". Here was testimony from an unexpected source to the effectiveness of the community work of the agency. It was greatly appreciated.

Children First has provided remedial education for school drop-outs, skills training in areas ranging from the very popular barbering and cosmetology to videography and information technology, life skills, and environmental awareness. Its colourful mobile "Bashy Bus", equipped with examination room, multi-media projector, audio equipment and technical teams, has effectively engaged audiences for medical services (to combat HIV/AIDS), counselling and cultural involvement. Its Male Awareness Now (MAN) project was developed as an urgent response to re-socialising at-risk male youth.

It is the on-the-ground, hands-on approach and a willingness to take on all aspects of the problem facing inner-city young people that are striking features of Children First. The participation of its youthful clientele in decision-making, up to the Board level, is also one of its core beliefs and practices. This best expresses the agency's profound respect for those it serves, a respect which in turn it receives from them.

An outstanding feature of Children First is its holistic approach. Thus, in targeting the 10–24 age group, the agency has spread its efforts to include school placement and remedial literacy to the youngest, career guidance and job placement to older ones, an active parenting group, Parents in Action, which trains other civic groups, and the establishment of senior citizens groups in collaboration with HELPAGE International. Along with health and educational efforts, Children First also established an award-winning performing arts group and sponsored research from which emerged the publication, *The Adolescents of Urban St Catherine: A Study of their Reproductive Health and Survivability* (Spanish Town: Children First Agency, 2004) by a large team led by Herbert Gayle.

A unique community organisation providing life changing programmes for children and adolescents, Children First has been recognised by several organisations, both local and international, for its creative participatory approach.

> For inner-city people the importance of community is significant. It occupies a central place for gangs and especially for defence crews. This communal setting is what underlies the general acceptance and approval of Community defence crew, whose members are the sons and daughters, nephews, nieces, cousins and the "grans" of older heads.

9.4. Sistren Theatre Collective uses the performing arts – music, dance and drama – to analyse and interrogate social issues and directs its "edutainment" to all segments of society, but especially the poorer classes. Thus, it carries out a multi-faceted popular education programme and a participatory approach to learning with students in schools, youth groups and communities, as well as with parents and community-based organizations (CBOs). This includes psychosocial services for students in nine (9) public schools within the Kingston Metropolitan Region and street theatre productions to raise public awareness.

Sistren conducts street corner "reasoning" sessions, "Pon di Corna" street theatre, seeking to move males to address domestic violence, the gender-based violence for which they are among the chief culprits. Unattached male youth form a large contingent in their audiences. Women are an even larger contingent, and Sistren's message and example are critical for moving that community out of their excessive dependence on men and into exercising greater leadership. More broadly, Sistren advocates increased participation in community life and indeed for a community transformation offering opportunities for full human living. Current major interventions of this kind are conducted for the Citizen Security and Justice Programme in four (4) communities in a "Tek It To Dem" gender-based violence prevention project.

Sistren was formed in 1977 by Honor Ford-Smith to draw together female workers in the State's Crash Programme[21] and give them a vehicle through which to tell about the struggles of under-privileged women through a popular medium. Since then the organisation has developed further. Now located at 16 Queens Avenue in Richmond Park, it is directed and controlled by the women themselves and has broadened its scope to take on a wide array of issues addressed to the entire society, men and women, without forgetting its roots and its principal audience. Ford-Smith's *Lionheart Gal: Life Stories of Jamaican Women* (Kingston: UWI Press, 2005) is a vivid portrayal of what the Sistren Collective stands for.

The Sistren message, clothed in music and drama and using male drummers, includes reaching out to both young at-risk inner-city males and women in need of guidance. It seeks to break down the barriers separating communities and to prevent the violence that has become endemic. Its effectiveness is indicated by the high repute that Sistren has gained, internationally and locally, where its performances are widely sought after.

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21. This programme was an emergency effort by the socialist-leaning government of the day to provide employment to the unskilled in menial work such as street cleaning or clearing empty lots.

9.5. Kingston YMCA is a programme designed to provide at-risk, low-income males ages 14 to 16 from inner-city communities with remedial education, social skills training and personal development over a three to four-year period. A study of the programme was conducted by a University of the West Indies team led by Professor Julie Meeks-Gardener. This study included 125 students in the programme and 56 graduates (of the previous five years) along with control groups of 55 on a wait-list and 60 from the community. After controlling for aggressive propensity (i.e., intent to use aggression in the future) it found significant reductions in aggressive behaviour in those enrolled. In the graduate sample, there were significant reductions in both aggressive propensity and aggressive behaviour. About 75 per cent of participants themselves felt that the programme helped them, "quite a bit" or "a great deal" to "help others and deal with myself when I am angry", "come up with creative ways to work out a problem", "manage my own life, and take responsibility for things and people".

What the findings bring out is the potential of programmes developed by youth service agencies for extremely disadvantaged youth to produce both short-term and long-term benefits for community youth most at-risk. There is also the importance of considering the control of the propensity for aggression as a viable programme outcome, as well as support for the notion that it is "never too late" to help youth succeed.

This Youth Development Programme grew organically out of the YMCA's work with street boys. The Y is guided by and strives to build values of caring, honesty, respect and responsibility. It provides to the students counselling, guidance and discipline along those lines. The programme runs from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. daily and is directed at boys not attending school because of academic or social problems, such as aggressiveness and deviant behaviour. It seeks to bring them to the grade nine level and has reported that 28 who sat the 2009 Grade Nine Achievement Test set by the Ministry of Education were successful and had been placed in high schools.

The programme received some support from the World Bank and some from the Government, but this has, however, been cut. The study cited earlier has been published as: Guerra, N.G., Williams, K.R., Meeks-Gardner, J., Walker, I. (2010), Case study: The Kingston YMCA Youth Development Programme: An effective anti-violence intervention for inner-city youth; in Knox, L. and Hoffman, J. (Eds.) *Youth Violence Prevention Around the World* (Praeger International Press), p. 81–87.

Table 3: Group Types, Features, Triggers, Interventions

YOUTH VIOLENCE AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN JAMAICA: CAUSES AND COUNTER-MEASURES

Progression

Progression

Progression

Progression

Types of Group	Characteristics/ Features	Similarities	Triggers	Intervention Needed
Corner Crew	Existent in all communities Has varying elements that serves as solidarities: foot ball, dance, "looking women", etc. May or may not have one or two members who engage occasionally in criminality. (smoke weed) Harmless group but can be very fluid.	Members of the three groups are very fluid and can be part of any at any point in time. A defence crew can morph (though it does not happen often) into a criminal gang and a criminal gang can be reduced to just a defence crew All three have turf oriented characteristics.	Poor housing, small yard areas. Social histories/legacy of communities. Inadequate avenues for talent expression. Poor presence of after-school structured activities. Poor access and presence of structured programmes for school drop outs.	Better housing conditions. More sensitization and publicity of programmes for school drop outs. Greater follow through activities by organisations who did engage youth in a particular activity.
Defence Crew	Members see themselves as protectors of the community. Turf oriented. Existent in urban/inner city communities in Kingston. May comprise members of corner crews. Can comprise members who are women. Loosely organized. Dissolves after threat on community is gone. Access to weapons. (9mm, M16 etc.)		Poor police presence in communities. Feelings/perceived incompetence of police to handle gang problem. Socialization and community culture.	Greater citizen participation in community policing. Establishing of early warning system in communities. Establishing of restorative justice, dispute resolution centres in communities. Expanded therapeutic activities – grief counselling, etc.
Criminal Gang	Criminality is a way of life of members. Violence extends beyond turf wars. Members may serve as pawns and or foot soldiers of wider criminal networks. Serve as contract killers, enforcers etc. More organized Access to weapons (9mm, M16, etc.) Early signs and conduct of undermining state authority. Comprises women, who engage in petty crimes.		Lack of opportunities for personal development. Loss of sense of belonging. Economic push Access to corrupt avenues for illegality No employability skills. Opportunity for upward mobility. (social & professional)	Expanded access to life skills training. Greater police presence and citizen participation in controlling crime and reporting extortion. Scaling up of resources of witness protection programmes. Legislation for acceptance of alternative methods of giving evidence in court. Greater outreach for incarcerated gang members who lived in communities where their gangs are plagues.
Organized Crime	Criminality extends beyond country of location. Members engage in professional criminality. Horizontal Hierarchical leadership structure. Exhibits capacity to diversify in to new and different areas. Acts as financier on activities conducted by lesser gangs. Operates inside and outside of formal and informal market		Access to corrupt avenues for local and transnational illegality. Deep underground labour intensive markets.	Proper use and enforcement of anti corruption and racketeering laws and agencies. Greater checks and balances through institutionalized systems on use of state funds and issuing of contracts. Special prosecutor established. Greater participation from private market in prevention of white-collar crime.

Regression

Regression

Regression

10. The Importance of Community

For inner-city people, the importance of *community* is significant. It occupies a central place for gangs and especially for the defence crews. This communal setting is what underlies the general acceptance and approval of the community's defence crew, whose members are the sons and daughters, nephews, nieces, cousins, and 'grans' of older heads. It is where these relationships are known to everyone. It is what holds together, on the streets, street-sides and playgrounds, the interaction and mingling of young people of a range of orientations in a variety of recreational, sport and other social activities. It is this interaction which in turn, as indicated in interviewees' comments, makes it difficult for people in general to easily articulate the difference between a crew and a gang. It is also this intermingling which leads to it being quickly and widely known who committed a particular crime.

Bonding among people in an inner-city community, in spite of the depressed conditions, is a constant and considerable source of enjoyment to its members. There is a strong sense of communal feeling and sharing, something unknown to middle income "outer city" communities. There, households are more closed off from one another, residential location is less important than outside special interests, and northern urban lifestyles have displaced African roots. The communal sharing in inner-city areas is the reason why banishment from a community for a period can be and has been given as a penalty for the serious crime of sexual assault. In spite of inner-city machismo, the role of women is central to community bonding, as in all social capital.

It is not possible here to go into the history of the bonding, referred to earlier, of, communities, gangs and crews with the leading political parties. Not out of place, however, would be a reminder of these decades-old bonding relationships which date back to the 1940s, were intensified in the 1960s and '70s, and still continue to have traditional weight – more so in the Spanish Town area. There, these relationships form the bases of the continuing rivalry between whole communities and sections of the town.

11. Policy Implications

Overall Approach

The foregoing suggests an approach that, rather than simply or chiefly focusing on attacking gangs, seeks to strike a balance between the **two central components** that the past decade has indicated **must be combined**. The first is community policing that firmly asserts the central authority of the state, and the second is socio-economic

development that puts an end to existing social exclusion. As emphasised above, this approach recognises the central importance of the community. Community is the location of much of the problem of violence. With its bonding relationships and social and human capital, it is also the location of many of the solutions. This approach declares appreciation at one and the same time for the effective policing of the past two (2) years *and* for the social holding action of the Peace Management Initiative and other state and non-state inputs of a decade and a half. Using the profound jolt, which the May 2010 incursion and subsequent policing inflicted on garrisons, this approach should continue the cultural change that started with the peace initiative in the Kingston Metropolitan Area even before May 2010.

The community (based) policing urged here omits the negative or repressive elements of the policing of the past two years. Its basic approach is to seek to address community problems jointly with communities through a partnership with them. By tackling problems, it sets out to prevent crimes rather than mainly apprehending those responsible after the crimes have been committed. By partnering and joint action, it gives up the role of a controlling, independent agent, without responsibility to any other.

This kind of approach changes the entire climate of police work. Police and community residents getting to know each other require foot rather than motorised patrols. It demands respect and courtesy being shown at all times, something totally different from the domineering and often brutal way that some police squads behave, kicking down of people's doors and extra-judicial killing. Handguns would replace M16s.

Regular police/citizen meetings adequately advertised and jointly chaired with citizens, would normally be the vehicle for having community problems aired and solutions and follow-up worked out. It would be the means of contacting those agencies, state and non-state, that can help deal with the problems identified. Police support for youth clubs and neighbourhood watch organisations, but without taking over leadership positions or dominating youth and citizen leaders, would be a regular outcome of this kind of policing. This approach conforms to the other arm of the recommended combination – community development.

Building and developing communities corresponds with the close relationship between defence crews and the communities in which they are imbedded. It offers to both of them, and to those members of criminal gangs interested in moving into a legal lifestyle, the opportunities they are seeking. It is in keeping with the "best practices", and would lend support to the role that women already exercise and further strengthen that role.

The alternative is more of the current repressive policing measures. The descriptions are unequivocal:

- "They [police] have less respect for people."
- "Youth can't hang out on a corner without being molested, called criminal."
- "Police beatings has increased, your human right is abused more frequently, business places are being lock down, weed [= marijuana] and knife [used for cutting up weed] charge has increase."

Gone is the previous tolerance for smoking cannabis or "spliff". Severe restrictions were also put in place on a number of other community activities, most entirely legal – night time music and dance sessions (which normally require a police permit), corner games of "bingo, card, and dominoes", sidewalk gambling, and street and sidewalk vending. The situation in Denham Town and Tivoli is described not as "transition but vacuum" – nothing has been put in place. In addition to the curtailment of community entertainment and commerce, there are also the extra-judicial killings.

These measures, the good and the repressive together, have lowered the level of murder to three per day (from four and five). Holding it there or lowering it further is unlikely, however, without either the change of strategy recommended above, or the "more" sought by the police. Specifically, this "more" is to enable the police to target defence crews with a harshness not yet seen, even though criminal charges have been formulated but not substantiated against their members. This is what is intended by the proposed anti-gang legislation, where gang is defined so broadly as to include defence crews but which runs headlong into the data showing the impossibility of separating them from their communities. More police posts in more "hot spots", which is the present trend, would move the country closer to a police state.

A narrow focus on gangs, which is the *mano dura* or "iron fist" approach, will be counter-productive, therefore, if it extends to defence crews – the lowest level type of gang in the JCF's typology and the type that the PMI deals with in addressing community violence – the same treatment given to mature criminal gangs, levels two and three. This would assign a permanent back-seat to the policy of community-based policing started as early as 1996 by the JCF. This policing strategy already takes continuous blows from **the increase in extra-judicial killings** by other elements in the Force, who in an hour destroy the trust built by their colleagues so carefully, over months, with communities. ***Of critical importance, therefore, is the definition of "gang" adopted in any legislation.***

A discriminatory definition would mean a return to the draconian measures mounted against guns and gangsters in the 1970s when crime was hitting new highs. Then it was the Suppression of Crimes Act (1974) and the Gun Court Act (1976), neither of which produced any real or lasting results. The Suppression of Crimes Act succeeded only in giving excessive powers of search and detention to the police and, with its abuses clearly shown, had to be repealed 19 years later. Excessive powers of discretion, open to abuse, are also central to current anti-gang drafts.

Mano dura or "iron fist" would be (i) lumping defence crews with criminal gangs and giving them the same treatment, (ii) giving such discretion to police as in effect to return to the excesses of the Suppression of Crime Act of 1974, which had to be repealed, (iii) endorsement of extra-judicial killings that are already at high levels, and (iv) a serious, if not fatal, blow to the JCF's declared policy of community-based policing.

The issue is how the efforts to reduce homicides and other crimes originating from defence crews and criminal gangs are best directed. Are efforts to focus primarily on apprehending gang members or on changing the factors that move youth into crews and gangs? Are they to be mainly repressing the results or also addressing the causes? The community development referred to ensures good early childhood training, alternative education strategies aimed at school retention, youth life skills and trade skills training, opportunities for work, and cultural and sport activities. In sum, community development will end the social exclusion that has produced the criminalising climate of many communities.

This, to a large extent, is what the Community Renewal Programme drawn up by the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), after wide consultation with the Ministry of National Security, other government agencies and NGOs, is about. This is now being launched, though regrettably with a much reduced scope. On the basis of its violence reduction work with at-risk combatants, the PMI has been identified by the PIOJ to lead that aspect of the Programme. The focus on community is the path already taken by some of the Best Practices sketched above. The visit of the PMI staff to Chicago Ceasefire disclosed this, to both visitors and host, as a major difference between the two programmes.

In Boston, USA, the government was successfully able to transition youth away from gang activity by creating a pathway for them out of gang activity while using tough anti-gang policing measures for those who refused to take advantage of the opportunities. The process of bringing them to the surface, however, is only effective if a vision for change and opportunity is clearly articulated. It must also include opportunities

for the youth that should be accompanied by a process of nurturing and hand holding.

Within this framework, special attention will have to be paid to areas such as Tivoli, Denham Town and Rose Town through community specific interventions. These areas were dominated until recently by criminal gangs, and the struggle to oust criminal elements and build communities free from their rule is presently under way. Interventions of this kind would have to be sensitive to gang and community history and be able to deal, in exchanges based on trust, with pivotal gang members as well as with entire groups on a one-on-one basis.

The conclusion reached in a recent study by Small Arms Survey on anti-gang efforts in Central America may well apply, even if not in exactly the same way, to Jamaica:

> *"Many Central American governments appear to be using their highly publicized crackdowns on gangs to avoid taking action on key issues such as exclusion, inequality, and the lack of job creation. In other words, gangs have become convenient scapegoats on which to blame the region's problems and through which those in power attempt to maintain a particular status quo."*[22]

Specific Recommendations for Immediate Implementation

1. Central to the recommended community development are additional ***resources*** that would improve front-line **"Best Practices"**, notably those listed here, most of which pay particular attention to the role of women, youth at risk and defence crews. Opening up opportunities for income-earning work to those persons and their groups helps create community safety. "Best Practices" not listed above should be assessed.

2. Also central to the recommended community development are ***resources*** to the **Community Renewal Programme** (CRP), the six pillars of which take in:
   (a) community infrastructural improvements, including housing and sanitation;
   (b) promotion of the Parish Development Committees, which organise and channel community inputs into Parish Councils; and

22. Rodgers, Dennis, Robert Muggah and Chris Stevenson, *Gangs of Central America: Causes, Costs and Interventions* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2009), p. 23–24.

(c) attention should be paid to the priority of bringing into the mainstream[23] at-risk youth, some in defence crews and some even in criminal gangs, by putting them on alternative livelihood paths.

Implementation of the CRP and scaling up of "Best Practices" would go far toward ***reducing the risk factors*** pushing youth into violent activity.

3. ***Resources*** towards the establishment of **a registry of high risk youth**, such as that which the PMI has already begun to implement. This should take the form of an integrated management system that shares data from prisons, courts, police, school and the community.
4. Establishment of **an early warning system** in the communities under study, such as that which again the Peace Management Initiative has started but needs ***resources*** and recognition to strengthen the capacity of the system.
5. Expansion of **peace and restorative justice centres** (some established by the *Dispute Resolution Foundation*) with structured programmes and rapid response mediation practices that are essential for defusing prolonged conflict that trigger reprisal activities in communities.
6. **Educational enrichment programmes** employing targeted behaviour-change strategies for inner-city teenagers who fail in school, to prevent drop out of males and ensure literacy and skills development that enhance employability, as well as to give special attention to the vulnerability of girls, to sexual pressures and early pregnancy.
7. **Women empowerment programmes** that support their efforts toward economic independence, while engaging them in community building, peace-building and leadership, so that they can play a critical part in stopping reprisals.
8. Strengthening of **police accountability**, including directly to communities, through a fostering of cooperation between citizens and police in order to put an end to repressive police measures, especially extra-judicial killings, and build that trust which will bring about the protection of rights and the safety of both citizens and police.
9. Special "transition" measures, worked out in consultation with "Best Practice" agencies, for the communities of western Kingston, from which a military opera-

23. Vision 20/30 Jamaica. PIOJ.

tion forcefully removed Christopher Coke and which holds symbolic and real meaning for the city. Along with recommended community development and creating a climate counter to the criminalising environment that has prevailed, these measures would both enhance the positive qualities of defence crews and address the interest of some criminal gang members in pursuing a legal alternative.

10. Cut funding to criminal gangs and organized crime via government contracts and subcontracts. Strengthen the legal and judicial system to ensure state capture of the proceeds of crime and, through use of technology, to reduce delays and increase conviction rates. Fast-track the **Restorative Justice** programme to increase community involvement and reduce reprisal killings and the execution of witnesses.
11. Conduct **Research on violence within families**, given the role of large kinship ties in small low-income communities and the occurrence of family feuds that then spill over into wider community violence.
12. Increase sensitivity on the part of any anti-gang legislation **to the reality of** corner crews and defence crews, perhaps **by recognition of defence crews in a formal classification of gangs** (such as in Table 3 page 45), thus stopping the "scraping up" of youth who could be treated for their anti-social behaviour outside of the judicial system.

"Defence Crews, are loosely organized groups of individuals who perceive or share a common threat from another community. The individuals see themselves as protectors of the community as the need arises. The activities may involve violence that may be gun related. Between threats the group dissolves and is no longer active."

B. Fulfilment of Objectives

All five (5) of the objectives listed earlier in this Report, we believe, have been achieved without modification, as the findings stated above show in large part and as the following exposition summarily sets out:

OBJECTIVES	OUTPUTS
1 & 2. Relationship of youth/ crew violence to gangs and organized crime, along with gang types and influence on youth violence	(1–4) Defence crews are identified and distinguished from other crews and criminal gangs, and generally are not drawn in a criminal direction, though a contrary instance is identified. Shower Posse connection with criminal gangs and influence on defence crews are shown. Violence by individuals occurs on a relatively small scale, sometimes spilling into crew violence. The positive contrary character of the Tivoli Gardens "incursion" in its assertion of central authority is noted (5).
3. Role of women in youth violence and attitudes toward youth violence	(7) While there is no personal weapon usage in conflicts, which they mostly try to discourage, they do support defence crews in multiple ways; but are also blamed in sex relationships with "enemy" for provoking conflicts.
4. Community-based 'best practices' targeting youth violence prevention	(8) The respectful face-to-face mediation/dialogue and countering of social exclusion by good practice – in education, sport, culture, jobs, training, life skills, etc. – demonstrate the difference between defence crews and criminal gangs and their openness to inclusive community-building opportunities.
5. Policy implications of findings presented to stakeholders toward improving existing framework for a long-term holistic violence reduction commitment	(9–11) Based on the other findings, especially the non-criminal pattern in defence crews (1); a drift away from authoritarian leaders (6); positive role of women (7); best practices (8); the role of school retention through use of educational enrichment strategies for failing children and the community's central role in lives of all concerned and (10); a policy recommendation is made for a community-development-centred approach (11) that incorporates assertion of central authority (5) and interest shown by some members of criminal gangs in legal alternatives (9).

C. Other Outcomes

The willing attendance of security personnel at the forums hosted by the ICJS to air research findings, coupled with the expressed agreement by community policing advocates within the Constabulary with the positions emerging from the research, reassured the research team that its efforts were helpful. However, whether the final decision makers in charge of security (several of whom are known to favour the *mano dura* approach) have been or will be influenced remains to be seen. One sign or criterion of such influence will be the terms of the anti-gang legislation, which is yet to emerge for debate in Parliament. Policy-making tends to take a long time in Jamaica. And there can be no certainty that the harsh anti-gang terms of the earlier drafts will not be embodied in final legislation, contrary to what this research project may recommend.

The presence, however, of the Minister of Justice at the final forum on September 26 does raise hopes. This forum was attended by representatives also from the Ministry of National Security (MNS), the Police, the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), the Cabinet Office, The University of the West Indies (UWI) – both Mona and St. Augustine – international organisations, Citizen, Security and Justice Programme (CSJP), the Church, the Private Sector and numerous NGOs. The session was broadcast live on UWI TV compliments of the UWI MITS and over 130 persons viewed the live broadcast which is now archived on UWI TV. The presentations by the research team were followed by a panel response and a lively discussion.

Minister of Justice, The Hon. Mark Golding (2nd left) with members of the Research Team at the Final Forum – L-R: Milton Tomlinson, Horace Levy, Tarik Weekes, Dr. Elizabeth Ward, Dr. Deanna Ashley and Prof. Anthony Harriott

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

THE *ACHIEVEMENT* OF THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES – namely the identification of defence crews as distinct from both other kinds of crews and from gangs of a criminal kind, the absence of a pattern of transition from defence crews into criminal gangs, the supportive role of women that the crews enjoy, existing best practices of the inclusive community-building sort, the importance of the assertion of central authority, and the central place of community development in any solution – would have to be the basic considerations for assessing the project. Based on careful and thorough research, these are worthwhile findings.

They were reached through the interaction of the research team, employing PLA, with community people and through the trust PMI had accumulated, having been able to reach and interview those labelled by the JCF as "persons of interest" and top members of organized crime in Jamaica. The team considers this a major success. The findings might have been more impactful on those reading this Report, however, had there been greater faithfulness in using the visual tools that PLA itself offers; and more attention could have been paid to collecting quantitative data that would have usefully complemented the qualitative.

Another success was the training of four (4) young men and two (2) young women from inner-city communities in PLA and in researching youth violence. Along with the PMI's liaison persons, they form part of an early warning team for heading off community violence and carrying out gang intervention.

The principal *actionable idea* to emerge from this project would be the one set out in the last finding above. It is that homicide levels in Jamaica should be approached through community development, with a positive attitude toward at-risk youth and defence crews rather than through mainly repressive anti-gang activity. This must entail ensuring some publicity of the research and its finding, with ICJS and perhaps the Canadian High Commission, on the basis of some input from IDRC, offering their support, and certainly commenting critically on the anti-gang legislation in its present form.

THE FUTURE

THE CURRENT SCENE IS DYNAMIC, varied and complex. The variables, that is, the factors affecting either change or tradition, are not entirely the same in every community. To make sense of what is happening, this has to be recognised and remedial action adjusted if it is to be appropriate and effective.

In the Kingston area, there is a suggestion of movement in a positive direction by way of legal economic enterprises. But this is one end of the spectrum. At the other end in Spanish Town, long-standing practices of extortion and traditional ties to the principal political parties are the dominant features. This is a major difference, though the Spanish Town scene could be changing.

In between the relatively clear directions of those two extremes on the spectrum lie Rose Town and Denham Town/Tivoli Gardens which are gripped and torn by tensions and conflicts that would require interventions of some special kind to be resolved. In both instances the turmoil has been triggered by the removal of the don – removal in the first case by informers and police (subsequent to the Tivoli incursion), and in the second, by the incursion and extradition.

In both instances, factions of the original gangs are at one another's throats and, while some of the gangs' previous criminal pursuits have been interrupted, an illegal "system" continues and seeks to continue underneath the semblance of order established and maintained by constant police patrols and surveillance. The Rose Town scene, with only two factions and with active church and community efforts, is more straightforward and offers some hope, with the Peace Management Initiative (PMI) in closer contact with some of the principals. The Tivoli and Denham Town combination, which has more criminal factions and behind the curtains entrenched politics, is a much more difficult scene.

An interesting contrasting case is Rockfort where, prior to the Tivoli incursion, the don was removed by a rebellion on the ground, old age and finally death. The criminal Hotstepper gang, with roots going back to the 1970s and bases in the Wareika Hills, no longer therefore functions. This is a major transition; a generational shift has been

completed. Conflicts continue, but between rival defence crews. The youth in these conflicts carry not the slightest awareness of the quasi-socialist revolutionary longings of the earlier era, being led rather by their own sense of identity connected with their specific location or 'turf' (rather than by any political connection or ideological principle), as well as their own macho impulses, lack of work and possession of high-powered weapons.

The Youth View of Tony Brown's Gang:

"Tony Brown use to order a lot of beatings where men hand and foot were broken, some man teeth get lick out because they were accused of not taking the don order…. Tony Brown usually send a squad a man fi yu, him jungle justice system was not working… Bullyism was the order of the day when Tony Brown ruled. The youth group up from various corners and seek revenge, hence Tony Brown's rule came to a halt."

The main study findings were the identification of defence crews as distinct from both any other crews and from gangs of the criminal kind, the positive role of women, the supportive role of women that crews enjoy, the impact of best practises of the inclusive community building sort and the role of school retention, the drift way from authoritarian leaders, the absence of a pattern of transition of defence crews into criminal gangs, the communities central role in the lives of all concerned and the central place of community development that incorporates central authority in long term violence reduction.

Appendix 1: CASE STUDIES

1. THE RAT BAT STORY[24]: DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL GANG AND TRANSITION TO DEFENCE CREW

The Beginning

The Rat Bat Gang originated in the Two-Mile area spreading from Spanish Town Road to Waltham Park Road with their main activities confined to the Crescent Road area. The Gang started out originally as the Doberman Gang in the early 1980s as a set of loosely fitted set of robbers who specialised in extortion, break-ins and hijacking of public transportation vehicles. The Doberman Gang was led by Aston who directed the activities of these young men in their late teens to early twenties.

The Two-Mile area at this time was very underdeveloped and, very much like today, was characterised by a maze of zinc fences and largely wooden living accommodations. Two–Mile at this time was not a part of the strong PNP political grassroots movements in East Kingston, Waterhouse or even neighbouring Whitfield Town, which were well armed, politically conscious groups with very strong leadership. Aston and his crew based their exploits on the "livity" they experienced at the time. They claimed they had to "rob to put money in their pockets and food on their tables". At that time the group had no access to guns and relied on "knives, bottle bombs, machetes, and acid".

The situation for the Doberman Gang changed when a conflict broke out between the top and bottom sections of the community. It is believed that the conflict started based on a young man, Danny, who stabbed someone from the top of the road and made his escape to the bottom of Crescent Road where he was given safe haven. The Leader of the top section of the community, Gangsta, who was a mechanic, had a marked advantage in that he had access to a gun. The Doberman crew staved off

24. Some of this story, the current situation, was published in the *Sunday Gleaner* newspaper of 11th March, 2012, p A2-3. Real names have not been given in some instances.

attacks with Gangsta's gun by burning down houses and stabbing and chopping their enemies. This situation persisted until a young member of the Doberman gang, Tony, who was Aston's nephew, encouraged Aston to hold on to a gun which they borrowed from another community. This marked a change in the direction of the gang who were, by the late 1980s, being called the Rat Bats because one of their members had huge ears. They embraced the name and started to draw pictures of the creature all over their community.

Aston's Reign

The conflict between the top and bottom sections of the community characterised the rise and fall of Aston. Having accumulated weapons by the early 1990s, Aston transformed his Rat Bat Gang into a hardened set of robbers who waged a series of significant robberies all over the Corporate Area. Tony, Aston's nephew, had slowly emerged as a significant influence on the gang, having managed to migrate overseas to England where he started making a lot of money from hustling. Before he migrated, however, he left Crescent Lane and got married to a young lady from Gem Road on the other side of Maxfield Avenue. She had four sons who Tony adopted as his own. He, however, had a special bond with the youngest son who took to Tony and followed in his stepfather's footsteps. This youngest son was a very talented football player who, because of his intensity in football while going to Norman Manley High School, received the nick name "Machine Man".

While overseas, Tony shared his success by helping dozens of persons from the Rat Bat Gang and his adopted home of Gem Road to go overseas. When they came up, he "put thousands of pounds in their hands and said 'make life'". By this time, Aston had developed a serious drug problem and became increasingly "corrupt" in the eyes of the wider community. When the men went out "and robbed he took away their tings". He would "go into people's houses see their tings and send for it". His leadership position as head of the gang was also under scrutiny as he increasingly started to spend a lot of time in the community of Rema where he had a "woman". By the time Tony visited Jamaica in 2000, Machine Man had joined up with Aston in Crescent Road and became a very strong personality in the gang. With his roots in Gem Road, he also managed to expand the gang from beyond the boundaries of the Two-Mile-Waltham Park Road areas.

Aston eventually befriended a member of the community and concocted a story to kill Machine Man, who got wind of the story and called Tony who tried to mediate.

By now, all the "soldiers" wanted Machine Man to assume control of the gang; they asked Tony, Aston's nephew and Machine Man's stepfather, to give them their support. A confused Tony, felt he was overseas and too far from the scene, told them to "do what they thought was in the best interest of the community". Aston was killed.

Machine Man

Machine Man had assumed power over the gang by 2005. A plumber by training and filled with immense ambition, he influenced all around him to rise above "the dutty foot slippers bwoy" image of the men from Two-Mile and "become more". Machine Man had an infectious personality and he used his charm and influence to "build linkages" outside of the community. With these intentions, he was able to change the "livity" of the gang and showed the men that they "could get birth certificates, they could get passports, they could go get jobs". The "youth felt empowered under Machine Man". He was the man "with one talk" who managed to get contracts with external parties outside of the communities, and the gang felt like a "family" and the "community loved him".

Still, one of the most influential Dons in the history of Whitfield Town could not develop such a reputation from the police and the wider community without fighting a number of "wars". Indeed, the "war" that made him and eventually led to him being targeted and killed by the police in 2008 immediately after making a report at the Denham Town Police Station, was the one he inherited from Aston. Now it became the Machine Man/Aston war or the Rat Bat/Congress War. This conflict enveloped the entire Whitfield Town. The area from Spanish Town Road to Arnett Gardens was now split with some corners supporting Gangsta and the others supporting Machine Man. Scores of persons died as these gangs traded bullets with each other year after year.

The Turning Point

Things changed, however, with the introduction of Jo-Max. Max originated from Whitfield Town and had a special hatred for Gangsta. This, coupled with his driving ambition to wield control from the shores of the United States over hundreds of youth, made him a valuable ally of Machine Man. Max had the money and the guns which he sent to fuel Machine Man's war with Gangsta. Hundreds of youth benefited from money sent through Western Union weekly. Oftentimes, the message to kill someone who crossed Max or who didn't follow his instructions was attached to this money.

With this injection of Max's lust for power, Machine Man started to overwhelm the other sections of Whitfield Town loyal to Gangsta.

Machine Man now emerged as a power house in the entire area, and with this reputation and status came a willing set of communities, hungry for guns and wanting to be attached to the Max money train. The Rat Bat Empire was swelling and the ambitions of both men stretched the gang's influence to Portmore, Central Village, McDonald Lane, Kencot, Montego Bay, Waterhouse and many more areas. Sections of these communities started to call themselves Rat Bat to get the support of the main gang. A similar situation was witnessed with the One Order and Clansman Gangs that had communities all over the country, especially in Clarendon, taking on these labels to enhance their local situations.

The Retreat

By 2008, Tony had been deported and was now based largely in Gem Road where his wife was from. He again offered his wisdom to Machine Man and opened his eyes to the fact that Max was only "using the youths". Members of the Rat Bat Gang now realised that Max never supported the income generating initiatives Machine Man always tried to support. The youths had started pig farming and poultry farming under Machine Man but Max ignored these projects. He would "send $400,000 to buy a rifle but would not buy the youths a deep freeze for the chickens." This discontent with Max's directions led to a break in the link with the Bats and Max. After Machine Man's death, Tony was identified as the only person with the respect to lead the group and he reluctantly stepped into the fray in which he watched his uncle and stepson lose their lives.

Tony's first challenge was to manage a gang which was ranked highly by the police, and which had dozens of guns once well managed by Machine Man and now spread all over the place. He now took the blame for any Rat Bat infraction, many of which he was clueless about, and managed groups of youth who had become reliant on a leader who provided for his soldiers. Tony was never for "war" and after Machine Man's death he now had to also face off new challenges from the Congress Crew who now thought the Bats were weakened.

His first act as leader was to cut off the links with all the subsidiary groups, which attached themselves to the Rat Bat Gang. His second big act was to work with the PMI in developing a successful peace agreement with the Congress Gang, which has now lasted for three years. His third big act was to establish that "everyman now had his

own free speech", that every man must now earn his way and go get jobs and leave the community and "guh seek work a road". His fourth big act, and probably his most challenging, is to change the image of the gang from an organized criminal outfit to a corner crew of youths willing to defend their turf – the 'Progressive Youths'.

Conclusion

It is clear, in examining the evolution of the Rat Bat Gang that several key issues emerge, especially in relation to youth and their involvement in organized crime in the Jamaican context:

- Of note is the fact that while in many of these communities there are youth involved in turf violence and other criminal activities, the possibility exists for them to be influenced by any number of factors, from the strong independent intentions of a leader to the injection of guns or money into a community.
- In fact this leads to a deeper conversation as to the notion of gangs being very fluid in their development and that they can become more criminal or less criminal with the right influence.
- That there is a real space for social transformation groups like the PMI to work with these groups in trying to demobilise them.
- That while we classify these groups as gangs, their life and death is couched in the validation of the wider community.
- That in this light the idea of how we dismantle gangs has to be re-examined.
- That the nature of how complicated community violence has become in the Jamaican context is clearly not fully understood by our policy makers.
- That thousands of these youth living in these communities will continue to organise to survive.

Of note is the fact that while in many of these communities there are youth involved in turf violence and other criminal activities, the possibility exists for them to be influenced by any number of factors, from the strong independent intentions of a leader to the injection of guns or money into a community.

2. THE ROSE TOWN STORY[25]: A COMMUNITY IN TRANSITION FROM CRIMINAL GANG

This community, or at least the lower half of it, between Trench Town on one side and Whitfield Town on the other, is caught in a perilous but challenging place between two remnants of the criminal Discipline Gang, one loyal to its leader, the other eager to see him spend a long time behind prison bars and anxious for the development of the community. In fact, this person, Leroy Tapper known as Downie, age 40 plus, son of a police inspector, twice in and out of jail over the past 18 months on murder and robbery charges, is now out on bail. The community, as a result, is in a state of transition, its future, the future of Rose Town, hinging in large part on Downie's future.

This account is based on interviews conducted separately with four leaders of the gang, two on one side and two on the other, as well as on a series of meetings. Most of these meetings were organised by a local pastor and held at his church in the community, others at different locations by the PMI or community leaders. It was not possible to verify the accuracy of the accounts, some details of which may have been exaggerated for our benefit, except that Respondent A, age 38, recounts his own criminal history from age 18 (not detailed here), in which he very frankly traces his own career from petty chain and bicycle thief to Downie's right hand man responsible for "many killings" and in control at one point of nine rifles.

The background to the Rose Town story is the Rema/Tivoli "War" of 1994 to around 1998, which resulted in scores of persons being killed. Rose Town eventually got involved in this "war" when men from Rose Town killed someone from Rema. While things cooled down around 1998, Willy Haggart's death in 2001, which was blamed on Labourites (supporters of the JLP), caused an escalation of events in the area. This situation lasted until about 2004. From 2004 to 2010, the place was relatively stable and this is credited to Downie's dominance and control.

According to Respondent A., Downie took over in 1996 after conspiring to have Urma, the previous leader from 1991 who had as many as 100 men, 80 per cent of them full time, removed by Kirky, whom eventually he then used the police to kill. People thought that Downie, who was a drug dealer, would be a good leader and do a lot for them. In fact, he did "escalate" the gang's criminal activities, organising large scale robberies and many contract killings. According to both Respondents A and B, this killing of close associates, using either police or other gang members, appears to have been a trademark of Downie.

25. Real names are not given.

"Downie was very close to Jim Brown and when Brown and his son Jah T were killed and Dudus took over, Downie came in and guided Dudus. He told him about people who owed his father money and about his father's links. He helped Dudus establish himself especially in the drugs business. Dudus made a lot of money because of Downie and Downie prospered under Dudus' s protection."

"I saw so many incredible things", says Informant A, "barrels upon barrels of guns came through Downie for Dudus. Downie did a lot of Dudus' business overseas as he travelled a lot. The gang was well equipped. We had police vests, bullet-proof vests, blue seam and red seam clothes [= police uniforms] and ammunition to spare. I saw tables full of millions of dollars, Downie built several apartment schemes and he had millions in his bank accounts."

"In 2010 prior to the Tivoli incursion Downie told Dudus that he had his backing but was against it and would complain to the men in Rose Town about not really wanting to get involved. Still, shortly before the incursion Downie started to hand out guns on a large scale and called in all the men to be a part of the resistance. The men went down to Tivoli and fought only part way. Most of the resistance to the police actually took place on the Rose Town/Spanish Town Road."

Eventually, after the "incursion", Downie was named by the police as a "person of interest". He turned himself in and was arrested and held until his first bail, which he obtained in an *in camera* hearing that surprised even senior police officers. But Downie is credited by both Respondents A and B with having scores of police on his payroll. On the other hand, he is described as mean, sending truckloads of men out to work on a site and then not paying them.

The community now, according to Respondent A, is torn in two as a lot of people are not with Downie, but they fear that he will use the police to kill them if they rebel against him. Right now he has armed mostly 13, 14 and 15-year-olds as most of the older gangsters are not with him. Fear of Downie, according to Respondent B, is what is holding back many residents from openly opposing him and his faithful few. Respondent B corroborates most of A's report. On the other hand, other things are happening in Rose Town, in particular development in housing as a result of the Prince's Foundation building on the earlier work of Michael Black. This, along with some police presence – though not the foot patrols requested by citizens – and active mediation efforts by the clergy and the PMI stir hopes of the community shaking off the baneful presence and influence of Downie's Discipline Gang.

Appendix 2: MORE ON "BEST PRACTICES"

THE PEACE MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE (PMI)

The following charts show the decline in homicides in 4 of the 6 Police divisions in Kingston–St Andrew for which MI claims some, though not exclusive, credit.

A 5-year 75% Decline in Homicides in 4 Communities, & in 4 of 6 KMA Police Divisions a 42% Decline





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





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





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



Appendix 3: EXAMPLES OF OTHER VISUALS EMERGING FROM PLA INTERVIEWS

Causal Tree



Appendix 3 *cont'd*

Problems/Solutions



Corner Crew versus Criminal Gang



Appendix 4: PROJECT MANAGEMENT

The managing of the research project was undertaken by the team at the Institute of Criminal Justice and Security (ICJS). The Legal Office of UWI provided support and guidance in the preparation of contracts. Because funds from IDRC were dispatched on an annual basis after their review of the first year's report, the University would only allow contracts for the period that the funds covered. Contracts therefore were redone for year 2, after the 2nd tranche of funds was received from IDRC.

The nature of the research meant that there were often changes in implementation plans at short notice because of outbreaks in community violence or difficulties in reaching the target group. However the team worked at all times to assist in facilitating these changes and the payments of transport costs, etc., which often arose at very short notice.

The project was implemented within the IDRC contract period and within budget. The IDRC team provided timely advice and guidance to the ICJS team so as to ensure that the project was implemented consistently with the IDRC guidelines. Overall, the management of the project has provided the ICJS with valuable experience in the handling of an IDRC funded project.

Internally, project organisation/management processes were developed and revised and included the development of project proposals, systems of accountability, etc.

In respect of equipment, there was the addition of two laptops and one copier/printer/scanner.

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International Development Research Centre
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