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
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Research ICT Africa! Network of researchers conducting ICT policy and regulatory research in 20 African countries across the continent in the absence of data and analysis required for evidence based policy


Towards evidence based policy


- Response to absence of current indicators and analysis in Africa.
- Policy research based on series of supply and demand side research undertaken by the network which is triangulated with a telecommunications regulatory environment perception survey.
- Series of policy papers that provide decision-makers with an assessment of policy performance, provide




















The Herfindahl Hirschman Index is the most common measure of market concentration. The market concentration in a particular country is made by adding up the squared values of all the players in the market's market share, e.g.:

Market concentration = (market share of player 1)2 + (market share of player 2)2 + (market share of player 3)2 + (market share

The Index can range from 0 to 1 or 0 to 10 000, depending on whether the market shares are in percentage (E.G. 25,35,40) or decimal values e.g.(e.g. 0.25;0.35;0.4)

The HHI values are translated to a degree of competitiveness.

Nearly Zero - The theoretical model of perfect competition


Below 100 (or 0.01) - Highly competitive


Less than 1 000 (or 0.1) - unconcentrated market


1 000 - 1 800 (or 01. - 0.18(- moderately concentrated


above 1 800 (or 1.8) highly concentrated market


10 000 (1) - Only one player, total monopoly



























Market structure/Conduct Despite horizontal licensing regime, operators remain vertically integrated Anticompetitive incentives Requires constant adjustment of behaviour by regulator


Policy/Law

- No integrated policy
- Market structure constraints
- Constraints on low-cost innovation
- Extension/continued state state ownership and conflicts of interest
- Institutional arrangements unclear Not always clear delineation of policy making, regulatory and operational powers



Regulation Resources intensive access regulation Human capabilities and institutional capacity Independence/accountability Onerous timespans/ interested outcomes Delays in critical licensing and regulation









Market performance/policy outcomes - Access to limited range of services at high cost - Asymmetries of information - Government chooses winners and losers - Constraints on innovation


Special role of Parliament


• ensuring independence and accountability of sector regulator - though appointment process, oversight of implementation against financial budgeting, safeguard from 'regulatory capture'.



























Mobile willingness to pay

	Average WTP for a mobile handset in US\$		Average WTP for a mobile handset in US\$		
Variable Description		Average expected cost of a mobile handset in US\$	Major Urban	Other Urban	Rural
Benin	7.45			9.44	6.92
Botswana	19.14	27.38	22.85	16.17	19.46
Burkina Faso	8.92	12.84	11.09	14.28	8.44
Cameroon	15.11	22.16	20.06	13.09	14.91
Côte d'Ivoire	29.70	30.06	21.34	26.15	31.38
Ethiopia	6.06	64.19	12.65	14.26	4.74
Ghana	14.02	23.15	11.12	11.99	14.86
Kenya	16.98	26.68	21.99	15.79	16.75
Mozambique	4.00	23.2	9.29	6.74	2.93
Namibia	24.64	25.12	33.78	34.32	22.17
Nigeria*	5.65	12.57	5.19	5.32	5.72
Senegal	19.55	2543.0%	21.73	17.27	19.39
South Africa	17.44	32.41	22.75	22.75	13.27
Tanzania	10.89	17.3	21.24	11.09	9.74
Zambia*	17.42	22.43	25.25	34.89	13.98







Findings... fixed... recommendations

- FINDINGS
 - Fixed lines access and usage charges major obstacle to usage
- RECOMMENDATIONS
 - Create competition while ensuring adequate return to invest in network extension
 - Reduce access charge (monthly line rental) even if higher usage charges to enable entry of consumers into fixed market
 - Open competition in access network
 - Unbundling local loop
 - Critical for broadband development



Findings... mobile..recommendations

- Mobile phone access and usage constrained by high costs
- Increase competition and remove any existing customs and excise and VAT on handsets below \$50 and on any additional taxes on communication services



Findings...pay phones ... Recommendations


- FINDINGS
 - Payphones still widely used in multiple access and usage strategy of individuals.
- RECOMMENDATIONS
 - Regulate pay phone extension and prices for mobile and fixed networks to ensure access for those marginalised from fixed and mobile services, and extend these services at public access points to Internet.
 - Support innovations around a universal number allowing for messaging and charging



Internet

- FINDINGS
 - Internet awareness reasonably high but access limited by absence of skills to use Internet and absence of access points
- RECOMMENDATIONS
 - **Lesson** Extend services at public access points to include Internet.
 - Roll out Internet training in schools, community centres and set national targets.
 - Reduce the cost of Internet enabled mobile services





Institutional arrangements

- FINDINGS
 - Unintended policy outcomes, particularly affordable access to full range of communication services
 - Conflicts of interest between policy makers, regulators and operators
- RECOMMENDATIONS
 - Develop institutional arrangements and transparent administrative procedures that allow for clear division of policy, regulatory and operational functions and participatory policy processes that draw on all available expertise



PRICES

- FINDINGS
 - High prices constrain the entry of new consumers into markets and inhibit the usage of those in the market
- RECOMMENDATIONS
 - Remove barriers to entry and establish conditions for fair competition Including include cost-based interconnection and access to facilities of incumbents, prevention of the abuse of market dominance and access to spectrum and numbers; regulate bottleneck facilities



CONSUMER WELFARE

- FINDINGS
 - Consumers unaware/confused by artificial licensing categories
 - Constrained access outside of major metropolitan areas and informal settlements
 - Leave Victims of price extraction from operators and governments
- RECOMMENDATIONS
 - Negative impact of policy lags can be overcome with service-neutral licensing that allows operators and service providers to develop seamlessly to offer new services
 - Develop open-access regimes to encourage the optimal use of available spectrum and facilities and encourage entrepreneurship and innovation.
 - Move to cost based pricing and remove secondary taxes



