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The University and Intellectuals in Chile

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The opinions expressed in these papers as well as the analyses and interpretations they contain are the exclusive responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) Program, Santiago, Chile, or of the International Development Research Centre.

INTRODUCTION

The two works published here, Universities and the Production of Educational Certificates and The Late Professionalization of Academia: Concepts for Case Studies form part of a larger and more comprehensive project on universities and intellectuals in Chile, which the authors have been developing under the FLACSO Program [Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences], Santiago, Chile, sponsored by the International Development Research Centre of Canada (IDRC).

Both works are theoretical and conceptual in nature. In other words, they seek to identify and develop conceptual frameworks that can be put to use in research on the problems posed by the relationship between higher education and society in developing countries such as Chile.

Chile has, of course, responded in its own way to the frequently dramatic problems that have arisen as a result of the evolution of the higher education system as it relates to the global social and political questions that affect our country.

However, we believe that in spite of the parochial nature of our concerns the problems in question have a much more general application. In other words, these are problems that go beyond the peculiar features of a given national society. They affect a large number of countries

even though their realities may be different from those of Latin America. Also, we believe that some of the dimensions brought into play by the evolution of the higher education system are also shared by countries usually regarded as developed.

Therefore it is our opinion that the theories we have to offer can be applied quite extensively. As a result, they may be of use to investigators in very different regions, and it is with this conviction that we submit them for consideration by those working on the problems that arise from the processes of higher education. Our readers will decide whether or not this assumption is valid.

However, the authors have the duty of informing the reader of why we selected the two specific topics dealt with in these studies. Why this emphasis on the processes of producing educational certificates and on the late professionalization of universities? In order to explain the reasons for our focus we must examine, although briefly, the general problems posed by higher education in countries such as Chile.

Broadly speaking, we can say that these problems can be classified into two large groups. On the one hand, there are all the questions having to do with the lack of equal opportunities of access to higher education. Although the general evidence available might make us believe that this problem has been more prevalent in developed countries, in recent decades it has become a real presence in developing countries. For example, Chilean university reforms, which began towards the mid 1960s and lasted until the beginning of the 70s, exhibit a clear ideological bent towards equality of access. Both the detection of blatant inequalities in access opportunities, and the declared goal of

democratizing access to higher education are expressions of social pressures brought to bear by groups that attach great importance to their own demands for this type of education, and who feel frustrated because these demands are not met. These demands may take the form of pressures channeled in different ways or they may remain latent awaiting circumstances more favourable to their expression, depending on whether general political and socioeconomic conditions are more open or more closed. In any case, this is a permanent phenomenon which is not easy to solve, and which the higher education system must continue to deal with through good or bad policies that are well or poorly designed.

On the other hand, there is a series of questions that have to do with the general role that the higher education system plays within the context of social activities. Specifically, this has to do with the privileged place occupied by the system in the inter-generational production, reproduction and accumulation of cultural capital - used in the broad sense of the term - and with the general social use to which this capital is put.

This general formulation of the problem is expressed through different and specific concepts, which are not necessarily harmonious among themselves, but which tend to share the idea that an articulation is needed between the products and activities of higher education, on the one hand, and different social demands or requirements on the other. In turn, it is usually assumed that this articulation is not easy to obtain nor does it come about automatically.

In spite of the different approaches to this subject, there appears to be a broad consensus that the higher education system constitutes a subsystem that is highly independent. In other words,

its workings do not adjust necessarily to the purposes or goals that prevail over or guide the economy and society, assuming that it is possible to identify these global purposes or goals. Thus, there may be major disadjustments between the types of human resources required by the economy and the types of professionals produced by universities. The nature of the technology and the scientific research produced in universities may not be very similar to the types of technology and the scientific information required by the different economic agents. The problem is then one of syntonization between the activities and products of higher education and economic and social requirements and demands.

The form this syntonization will take varies depending on the predominant type of social organization postulated for the global array of socioeconomic activities. For some, the problem lies in designing a higher education system which is flexible enough to meet the demands for human resources, scientific information and technologies that originate in the marketplace. For others, it is a case of forecasting and estimating these demands in terms of the way they will evolve over the medium and long terms so that the activities and products of higher education can be planned by university decision-makers themselves. Last, for those who believe that the whole range of socioeconomic activities should be organized by a central planning system, the problem is reduced to incorporating higher education into this system and making its specific goals compatible and coherent with those of the general plan.

The types of treatment that have been given to the problem of the social uses of cultural capital, briefly described above, make it

apparent that a generalized prejudice exists in the analysis of higher education, a prejudice that is also present in reflections, proposals and policies aimed at dealing with questions involving democratization of access to the cultural capital.

To put the matter briefly, we can say that the problems of higher education are defined and considered on the basis of an instrumental concept of education. This is especially clear in the case of the second group of problems. The university is judged in relation to some general function that is external to it. This may be the market, certain socioeconomic trends that are supposedly present in society as a whole, or the goals and objectives of a national development plan. However, this instrumental concept also permeates the different ways in which the first group of questions is treated. Here, the university appears as a mere agent, or as one more agent in the processes of reproducing social inequalities whose bases must be sought outside the university. In other words, the university has a role to play in a system of inequalities, whose dynamism lies outside the university insofar as it depends on other processes and other structures. From the most simplistic viewpoint, the university is merely one more means used by the dominant groups in a society.

This concept of the university as an instrument, which is almost always accepted implicitly and uncritically, leads to a result that has consequences of very different kinds. And this result is that the need to analyze higher education as a specific institutional medium is ignored, or else relegated to a secondary position, where it is sometimes looked on as being superfluous.

If the instrumental concept of higher education could explain all the problems to which it gives rise, an analysis of higher education as an internal medium with its own dynamics would, in reality, be superfluous. As independent study objects, universities and higher education would simply involve specialized sociology that would basically focus on academic matters and which, in the best of all cases, could make partial contributions to the planning of educational policies, and this only insofar as the specific phenomena of the internal organization of higher education are relevant to the achievement of global social and economic goals.

But in the case of realities such as those of Chile, the instrumental concept of higher education is clearly insufficient and introduces major distortions into our understanding of the processes to which it gives rise.

Therefore, the image of an institutional complex that is truly a dynamic agent or a leader agent capable of affecting the economy and society (with very blurred lines separating it from them) is much more acceptable than the image of an institutional complex that is an instrument for achieving certain goals.

Using this new viewpoint, it will be necessary to reformulate the way in which the problems of more democratic access to the cultural capital and the social uses of it are treated.

To begin, questions affecting the internal organization of this dynamic agent, which is the higher education system, come into the foreground. We are not maintaining that universities and other similar organizations enjoy complete independence and that therefore an explanation of the relevant processes must take the higher education

system as its point of departure doing away with all other considerations. An explanation of this kind would have to take into account the general context that higher education uses as a basis to generate specific dynamics and effects, by virtue of its own internal conditions. But at most, this general context is a necessary condition for these dynamics and effects. There is another set of conditions imposed by the special features of the higher education system itself which convert it into a privileged mediator in respect of the general effects that can be observed.

In other words, universities are not merely reflections of general processes that occur independently of their own actions, much less links in a causal chain which, after receiving impacts or stimulation from the outside, returns them transformed after having mechanically applied a rule that can easily be identified.

From our viewpoint, universities are actors in an ecological complex of political, social and economic moves. And within this ecology, the moves that resolve around access to the cultural capital and its production and accumulation cast universities in the role of protagonists or privileged actors. In other words, in these moves the specific weight of higher education is comparatively very high and its contributions are essential.

However, it would also be an error to attribute the same kind of rational behaviour to these actors as is usually attributed to individuals. This idealized anthropomorphologizing would once again distance us from a suitable metaphor for the types of reality under consideration. In truth, inside these specific institutions that represent higher education we also have many types of movements

revolving around power, influence and opportunities of different kinds, led by individuals or, what is more usual, by groups with different degrees of organization and cohesion.

This other ecology of movement, which is peculiar to the higher education system but which is in turn linked to that more inclusive ecology that characterizes the general socioeconomic situation, ends up by producing and reproducing a number of given logics which regulate both the unequal distribution of the cultural capital, as well as its production, reproduction and accumulation.

The two studies we are presenting for the reader's consideration constitute two specific cutouts from this ecology of movements that defines the internal environment of the higher education system. As we have noted, the way in which we treat the production of diplomas and the processes of academic professionalization respects the links between this internal environment and the larger social system of which it forms part. However, in turn, it attempts to retain the individuality and causal uniqueness of this internal environment as a dynamic agent in the different processes we have stressed.

The fact that we have chosen these phenomena, excluding other possible alternatives, reflects the fact that our vision of higher education is based on a different approach.

When a more classical approach is taken to the problems of higher education, a phenomenon such as that of certification is a relatively secondary product, that can be explained as an artifact or mechanism conceived to achieve articulation between the goals of the economy or society and the products of this kind of education, or else as a reflection or effect of a preexisting system of inequality that

causally or logically antecedes the operation of the higher education system.

In our opinion, the phenomenon of certification is a principal effect which cannot be narrowed down to fit the requirements of society or the economy - whether they operate as markets or adopt other alternative types of organization - nor is it a pure reflection of a system already based on inequalities.

On the contrary, higher education has made a dynamic and non-subordinated contribution to the development of the phenomenon of certification, a dynamic which in turn is driven by a logic produced from inside the processes of higher education themselves, but always remembering that the latter are determined by the general context and that there are no precise and clear dividing lines between a society's subsystems.

In these terms, the phenomenon of certification is precisely the special means that higher education adopts to affect the economy and society. In a scenario in which market or quasi-market mechanisms predominate in structuring social activities, the phenomenon of certification is, in reality, a way of intervening in the market and changing it. This affirmation is valid when things are viewed from the macro viewpoint. If we look at the finer structure of the processes involved, we are dealing with an emerging effect produced by a confluence of the strategies employed by certain groups that seek either to restrict opportunities or to open up new opportunities that until now have been relatively restricted. In either of the two cases, there is no such thing as a guarantee of automatic synchronization between market requirements and the products of educational processes. Indeed, we

can ask whether this question is really meaningful, because it is possible to hypothesize that allegations regarding a lack of synchronization are really one more fencing tactic in the context of dialectics concerning the restricting or opening up of opportunities. Clearly, this concept of certification either as the result of intervention or as an emerging effect is perfectly applicable even when mechanisms that are not market mechanisms are used to structure social activities.

Similar comments can be made in regard to the question of unequal access to the cultural capital. From our viewpoint, the phenomenon of certification is a component part of observable inequalities as well of the evolution that these inequalities may undergo.

Although this kind of proposal makes an analysis of the existing system of inequalities more complex, at the same time it makes us aware of the fact that the system may be much more dynamic than is apparent at first glance, and that the potential for change it may contain is much more varied than we generally imagine. This does not imply any prejudgements regarding the positive or negative implications that can be attributed to possible or predictable trajectories - a judgement which also assumes prior ethical convictions that are independent of the factual development of the system of inequalities. It is relatively clear that judgements on this subject must be based on a picture of the trends involved that is as complete as possible.

What we have said in regard to certification can be extended to the phenomenon of academic professionalization. In the transition from the traditional system of higher education to new methods which have

still not been fully characterized or crystallized, the processes of academic professionalization are central. And the forms that the production, reproduction and accumulation of the cultural capital assume depend on the new forms that professionalization assumes.

Once again, higher education takes the lead here. At bottom, through the forms it adopts, professionalization imposes on society and the economy the type of cultural capital that will be available, and therefore, determines the social uses of cultural capital to a great extent.

According to the conventional view of these problems, it would be possible to resolve them by allocating resources properly (which assumes a redefinition of priorities in the dominant cultural ethos) and by adopting modern forms of academic organization. Once these basic decisions are made, the result is predetermined and it is sufficient to wait until things mature.

A somewhat more complex version of this same view tends to stress the need to produce a high quality type of cultural capital that would be suited to the characteristics of the national economy in question. For example, the production of technologies and the development of basic research that would be in harmony with the natural resources of the nation.

However, in both cases the basic idea is that the processes of academic professionalization are subject to simple rules and that, at bottom, they are made of a plastic material that has very little independence, and therefore can be molded without great friction by suitable and inspired policies.

Like the phenomenon of certification, professionalization turns out to be quite opaque, with a marked tendency to follow its own paths, leading to unforeseen results and following unsuspected logics. Once again, the ecological complex of moves that professionalization deploys ends up by imposing guidelines on the production, reproduction and accumulation of cultural capital, independently and even at odds with the pretensions of other social agents or the inspired plans of individuals.

The phenomena of certification and academic professionalization are therefore central aspects in the concept of higher education as a dynamic or leader agent: they constitute the forms that higher education adopts to shape society. If we remove all connotation of cooperation from this expression, we could say that these are the university's specific contributions to the evolution of society, for bad or for good. This is sufficient reason to study the types of logic that regulate them: if we are to understand what happens in higher education we must first properly understand both phenomena.

Undoubtedly, if we abandon the concept of the higher education system as an instrument, this will have major consequences in terms of how educational policies in this area must be understood.

If this reality is structured around principles that are very different from those assumed in the traditional concept of what educational policies in this sphere must be, we can only conclude that policies based on the traditional concept are doomed to failure. Policies conceived on the assumption that certain agents of higher education are passive and obedient, react mechanically and in entirely foreseeable ways to the regulations and incentives put out a super-planning agent, will sooner or later discover that the results

have little resemblance to initial expectations, and this throws the very notion of efficient planning into a state of crisis.

This is why, alongside recognizing the need to investigate the phenomena of certification and professionalization, the studies we are presenting to the reader allow us to reach another equally important conclusion: efficient policies for higher education must be based on processes of harmony of action, which recognizing the character of the system and its components as a leader agent, will articulate it with the other relevant agents and promote cooperative and clear forms of intervention and professionalization.

If the problems of unequal access to the cultural capital, in addition to those arising from the production, reproduction, accumulation and social uses to which it is put, find (or simply do not find) solutions based on the play of an ecology of moves that revolve around the phenomena in question, then this ecology of moves becomes the main element that must be taken into account when any effort is made to intervene in a premeditated fashion.

Thus, the basic question is to set up conditions that will permit these moves and their interrelationships to develop around cooperative principles. If elements that are strictly competitive, or even non-cooperative dimensions, should predominate in them it becomes very difficult to clearly understand motives, preferences and objectives, and this is what makes all policies or planning efforts sterile in the long run.

If we are encouraged to think about and redefine the problems of higher education following this line of thought and its consequences, we can thus open up new roads for basic and applied research that will lead to fertile results.

UNIVERSITIES AND THE PRODUCTION OF EDUCATIONAL CERTIFICATES*

José Joaquín Brunner

PRESENTATION

We attempt to analyze educational certificates as relevant objects within the sociology of universities. For this purpose, we study how they emerge in modern times in relation to the processes of bureaucratizing power and professionalizing services offered on the market. Next we analyze the university bases for the process of certification; the use of certificates as a strategic resource to create closed social systems; social selection channelled through the process of certification; and the control systems that articulate around certification. Last, we discuss the advantages of the approach that makes it possible to examine certificates as a social reality and a means of reproducing high culture.

This document forms part of the research program on universities and intellectuals being conducted at FLACSO with support from the International Development Research Centre.**

Historically, the use of educational certificates has represented a complete revaluing of the role played by teaching in relation to the state and the market. This has given rise to two central figures in modern times: the civil servant and the professional. The social origin of the processes of certification, however, is usually studied as a purely educational phenomenon.

*Working document No. 166, FLASCO Program, Santiago, Chile, November 1982.

**The following related studies have already been published under this research program:

- The Intellectuals: Notes and Background for Defining the Field of Study (two volumes).
- Intellectuals and the Intellectual Sphere.
- The Market Situation and Problems of Academic Professionalization.
- Academic Culture and Conformity in Chilean Universities.

We know, however, that the production of educational certificates presupposes, as a minimum, the existence of universities, the introduction of specialized examinations and the belief that degrees are formally equal in value. Durkheim refers to the first point when he remarks that certificates depend in the first place on the existence of a body of professional teachers that regulates its own survival through the production of certificates.¹ Weber deals with the second point, by observing that the demand made by bureaucratic organizations for specialized personnel is met through the introduction of examinations in which candidates are assigned specific grades.² Last, Marx deals with the third aspect when he maintains that certificates formally consecrate unequally distributed lay knowledge, permitting an "objective" tie to be established between the individual and the public service, in other words, between the knowledge of civilian society and the knowledge of the State.³

We know, therefore, that the production of certificates is a process through which education will become entwined with processes of power and exchange. At the same time that this assumes the existence of outside demands, it also responds to "a logic that belongs to the education system".⁴ In short, certificates arise historically at the points where the education system articulates with the social system.

I. CERTIFICATES AND THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON

The bureaucratic baptism of knowledge, as Marx terms it, is inextricably tied up with the structure of the absolute monarchy. To understand its appearance it therefore becomes necessary to "look at the prince's ministers and officials in their capacity as defenders of power and actors in extending it".⁵

The modern state was only able to establish itself because of a new type of personnel - civil servants - who are agents of a new social and political machine: the bureaucracy.

Legists in the Roman tradition and legists who expound the Koranic texts form a single great army, which, both in the East and the West, works unceasingly to affirm the idea of the monarchy and to derive from it the consequences of the prince's prerogatives. Of course it would be rash and false to attempt to attribute everything involved in this evaluation of monarchical institutions to their zeal, devotion or their calculations. Naturally power had additional sources other than legal ones. Monarchies continued to be charismatic. And the economy played its part. But in any case, there is no doubt that this army of legists, from the most famous to the most humble, works incessantly for the development of great states.⁶

Thus begins what Weber will call the bureaucratization of all domains, and this represents a substantial change in relationships and in the exercise of power.

Parallely, the bureaucracy opens up a new employment area which marks out avenues of social mobility.

In all cases, the decisive feature is that from the beginning, preparation for public office involves obtaining an academic degree, which is even more useful when an individual has "influential friends or considerable financial resources of his own or in his family".⁷

The above means, precisely, that the move from pre-bureaucratic forms of domination to bureaucratic forms⁸ depended simultaneously on the

emergence of modern institutions of higher education and doing away with corrupt practices such as the sale of public offices.

It is also true that under special conditions, positions in traditional bureaucracy were ranked on the basis of the education required.

As Bordieu has noted, perhaps only the Confucian tradition has gone to the same lengths in determining social hierarchies on the basis of hierarchies of educational achievement⁹, to the point that "a stranger whose social position was unknown would be asked first of all how many examinations he had passed".¹⁰

The contents of this traditional education, and therefore its social function, are however entirely different from modern education linked to bureaucratic phenomena.

Confucian education is, above all, the acquisition of a "salon culture" or introduction into a lifestyle. Weber describes this "pedagogy of cultivation" as follows:

Canonically perfect and beautiful achievements were the highest aspiration of every scholar as well as the ultimate yardstick of the highest qualification certified by examination.¹¹

The ideal of the cultured man is not bureaucratic in itself; instead it supposes the cultivation of a kind of refinement whose nature is defined by the educational ideals of a social class.¹²

Just as examinations are not the exclusive property of the modern bureaucracy, the pedagogy of cultivation is not exclusively limited to these traditional modes of education. Even in the 20th century, up until the Second World War, Halsey observes that a type of education predominates in England that is in the service of an "aristocratic structure of domination".

... the typical transition of universities from their earlier functional emphasis was not a simple story of extension in provision for secular professional training as a response to the demands of developing industrialism. On the contrary there was an overlapping and, in England at least, a still observable phase in which the universities were dominated by their function as preserves of the aristocratic and gentry classes.¹³

In spite of everything, the bureaucratic structure of domination leads to a new type of education within which educational certificates will play a truly modern role for the first time.

The direction of the change - which the rise of the modern state brings to the surface - is mainly determined by the demand for "men of letters", i.e., certified specialists capable of rationalizing a centralized administration. According to Weber, bureaucratic domination encourages:

specialized and expert schooling (which) attempts to train the pupil for practical usefulness for administrative purposes - in the organization of public authorities, business offices, workshops, scientific or industrial laboratories, disciplined armies.¹⁴

As historians of the early forms of bureaucracy note, the link between education/certification and the civil service was not, in the beginning, an uncomplicated process. This was for at least two reasons: (1) on account of what Koenigsberger calls the low yield of universities; (2) because the introduction of a system of this kind implied opposition to adscriptive recruiting for bureaucratic positions.

Originally university degrees were established as way of regulating access to teaching and, therefore, they served to perpetuate a body of professors.

In fact:

We have here the origin of the licentiate degree, which did not mean that the holder was legally capable of exercising a profession, but instead meant a license to teach publicly after fulfilling the prerequisites demanded by law, i.e.: having studied well, petitioning the faculty, having a record attesting to good behaviour, having given public lessons to demonstrate ability, answering test questions, swearing an oath that he had not bribed the examiners and respecting the solemnity of the public investiture.¹⁵

The fact that it was necessary to swear that the examiners were unbribable shows the extent to which the university was weakened in the later Middle Ages. Adam Smith claimed that in his day teachers "had altogether given up even the pretense of teaching".¹⁶ In the case of Spanish universities, an examination of enrollment records from Salamanca and Alcala lead Jimenez to conclude that "registration drops continually from the middle of the 17th century, and there is no evidence of any enrollment at all in surgery or mathematics". The situation in less important universities was even more deplorable, because it had become the practice to sell degrees.¹⁷ Winstanley, who wrote a history of Cambridge University, when referring to his professors, deplored that in his time:

the story for the most part is one of broken oaths, violated statutes and cynical disregard of testamentary wishes; and unfortunately the sinners were sufficiently numerous to keep one another in countenance.¹⁸

In any case, as long as the university was only meant to impart culture to those belonging to certain social classes, in other words, as long as it was linked to a relatively closed and stable elite and was engaged in training clerics and men of letters plus a few intellectuals or professionals, it was able to continue functioning without any major demands for renovation or change. In fact:

Under such conditions, educational reform was at a discount. Teaching in the colleges was at a very low ebb and students seeking academic distinction were forced to have recourse to private tutors in the town. Further, the examination system,

which was still based on the medieval practice of disputation, had lost all relevance and often degenerated into a farce.¹⁹

On the other hand, once bureaucratic demand appears, grows and stabilizes, at the same time as a market is created for professions (as we will see later), universities find themselves in a position in which change becomes necessary. They must eliminate aristocratic and corporate traditions once these are defeated in society or are forced to cede ground in the face of new economic practices and forms of domination.²⁰ They must in the future:

plan to make conscious use of higher education to train the specialized personnel required to carry out certain state activities (administration, secondary school teaching, law, medicine and later, engineering) without dwelling on academic tradition.²¹

At the same time, the rise of "men of letters" to form the prince's bureaucracy leads to a second obstacle that must be overcome on the road towards rationalizing examinations and bureaucratizing teaching systems.

Braudel quotes two early examples of the way nobles reacted to the rise of the new body of public servants which they farsightedly recognized as the gears of a system that would overthrow the order of patrimonial domination. In his Guerra de Granada [The War of Granada], Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, diplomat and soldier, bemoans the fact that:

The Catholic monarchs had placed the administration of justice and public affairs in the hands of scholars whose profession was legal affairs and who were men of the middle class, falling between those of high and low condition, so as not to offend either.²²

For his part, at the beginning of the following century Rodrigo de Vivero, Marqués del Valle, calculates that 70,000 students had invaded Spanish universities all wishing to become state employees: "and these include children of shoe-repair men and farm labourers!"²³

Therefore, the slow move from the traditional forms of domination to bureaucratic domination systems is accompanied everywhere by a shift in the principles of distributing public offices and positions. New avenues of social mobility and new job opportunities, linked to the state and to extending its apparatus, open up and they must find new claims to legitimacy. In an intermediate stage in which bureaucratization of the state is still ambiguous, access to public positions could be purchased or won through social and family connections.²⁴ Increasingly, however, these ascriptive recruiting methods will be replaced by access based on educational diplomas that ensure formal equality in the sphere of public employment. In this way, modern legal philosophy maintains that there is no immediate natural tie between the public service and the individual: "in appointing an individual the objective factor in his appointment is his knowledge and proof of ability. Such proof guarantees that the state will get what it requires; and since it is the sole condition of appointment, it also guarantees to every citizen the chance of joining the class of civil servants."²⁵

Next, specialized, rational examinations, as Weber calls them, become part of the ideology (liberal bourgeois) of equality, purveying a belief in the equalizing power of educational certificates and later, acting as the basis for the meritocracy argument. Marx will be able to say, then, that examinations constitute the objective factor in the bureaucratic credo, which - we add - is inextricably linked to belief in the value of certifications. In turn, this could explain (and we will return to this later) the reason why in the modern world the tie between universities and societies revolves around

certifications - universities that produce certificates and societies that demand them. However, in order to make this perfectly clear, we must first trace the path followed by certifications until they are completely integrated into the marketplace which assigns them their value. In short, we must ask ourselves how the figure of the professional arises alongside the figure of the public servant.

II. CERTIFICATES AND THE MARKET PHENOMENON

If we continue to use Hegelian language for a moment, we could say that just as certificates are determined in the public sphere by the state, which is the objective factor in the relationship between education and bureaucracy, they are also determined in the private sphere by the market, which is the objective factor in the relationship between education and its exchange value.

In fact, Hegel conceives civilian society in the form of a market²⁶ - "multilateral ties of dependency among all" - and finds that participation in it (the general patrimony) is rooted in the private patrimony, conditioned by capital and skills. The latter, in turn, are conditioned by capital, "but also on accidental circumstances whose multiplicity introduces differences in the development of natural, bodily and mental characteristics, which were already in themselves dissimilar".²⁷

Thus, education enters the private sphere as a conformation of individual skills, whose origin is to be found in the family. But, in turn, this means that each individual, depending on his "special skills", is destined to belong to a corporation whose purpose "does not extend beyond industry, business and private interests".

According to this determination, under the control of public authorities, corporations have the right to watch over their own interests, to accept members depending on the objective quality of their skills and honesty, in numbers that are determined by the general situation, and to care for their members in special circumstances and respect their training.²⁸

Later, in the sphere of civilian society, and therefore in the market, certificates will establish the objective relationship that exists between a particular skill and its exchange value. As Hegel endeavours to demonstrate, the corporation is important because it rationally regulates "the so-called natural right to use one's abilities and to gain as much as possible from them", elevating them "at the same time to the level of a conscious activity for a common end".

The structure of all modern professions includes precisely these two central elements: a body of knowledge and what Goode calls "the ideal of service".²⁹ In Hegel's terms, these two elements are a theoretical culture and individual well-being perceived as a right, which rises to the level of a thinking and conscious ethic.

The ideal of service which is both the foundation for and partly the product of the ideology of professions (and corporations) "does not alter the obligation of the individual to earn his own living" according to Hegel.

In fact, traditional professions are forced to reorganize around the labour market, which in turn can only fully emerge by doing away with:

Non-contractual types of organization involving blood relationships, neighbours, professions and creeds... that demand an individual's loyalty thereby restricting his freedom.³⁰

The change that is introduced when professional services are organized on contractual bases and around a cash nexus is a profound one. In fact, professions had traditionally rested on community-type structures, and these structures are now replaced by a market community.³¹ Under these conditions it becomes necessary, above all, to find new grounds for legitimizing the practice of professions whose legitimacy was formerly ensured inside a specific world of beliefs and through a closed corporate and patronage system that favoured, in most cases, distribution of professional reputations among the aristocracy.

Thus, despite the existence of a minority of very successful middle class practitioners, the 'first-class' marks of professional distinction were practically monopolized for the aristocratic or quasi-aristocratic elite.³²

The expansion of market relationships and the breakdown of the old professional corporations make it necessary to find a universal means of legitimizing the practise of professions which will also ensure, at the same time, that access to professions will be through competition. From this moment, educational certificates can acquire a market value, thereby inextricably linking the exercise of a profession to the possession of specialized education. As Weber points out, "the driving force behind this evolution is, above all, the prestige of diplomas that accredit skills which have been acquired through special tests, especially when they have been transformed into economic advantages".³³

Studies on the historical formation of modern professions show that they could only fully emerge once the following conditions were achieved:³⁴

i) Specialized training of professionals, whose product as offered on the market is precisely the practice of a particular skill based on an abstract body of knowledge.

ii) Standardization of both the services offered and the criteria for evaluating them, which - due to their very nature - will tend to be set by the professionals themselves. Therefore, there is a tendency to protect the services offered from "unscrupulous" competition from uncertified and unrecognized individuals.

iii) A claim that professional services have a public character on account of their dual nature involving certified practice and regulated competition. From here, a specifically professional ideology is developed, built around the notion of a service ideal that must be financially rewarded in a suitable fashion by society.

Negotiations, as well as social strategies aimed at ensuring social acceptance of these conditions, will involve educational certificates and the conditions under which they are produced.

In fact, then, modern professions revolving around the market place are inseparable from the production of certificates, which is a means of legitimizing professional practice under new conditions as well as a strategic means for ensuring that professionals will enjoy an advantageous position on the market. In fact,

if we note that the introduction of specialized tests is demanded in all spheres, this is not due, of course, to a sudden "desire for culture", but rather to a desire to limit the number of posts available and to give the individual possessing diplomas a monopoly over them.³⁵

In this sense, educational certificates act as a new means of social closure which guarantees that those who possess them will enjoy monopolistic opportunities.

In other words, the establishment of professional markets is an effect of the strategic use of educational certificates to regulate entry to key positions in the social division of labour.³⁶ Therefore, it is a means of regulating the way this social division of labour is organized based on closed social relationships which, once they have been legitimized through the use of educational certificates, make it possible once again to control access to certain occupations by protecting or improving the market value of these certificates.

III. THE UNIVERSITY AND THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS

From the moment the university comes to play a central role in certifying bureaucratic and professional personnel, it is exposed to a set of typical situations and tensions which constitute, to put it one way, the force field in which universities must move.

In fact, it is possible to define contemporary universities, no matter how different their historical development has been, as certification agencies. Ladd and Lipset³⁷ have said that "the university has become the great legitimizing and certifying institution of contemporary secular societies", while a few years earlier Jencks and Kiesman noted that:

The decisive *raison d'être* of a North American college... is perhaps not education but rather certification. Almost all college courses end with an examination and a grade, and almost all study plans lead to some type of diploma or degree.³⁸

The struggle, and specifically the competition that arises for the control of certificates (their production, obtention and use), constitutes a decisive driving force for change in university

institutions, and more broadly, represents one of the forms that the struggle for power, wealth and status takes in society.

In the last instance, it is the university that produces these means which permit systems of social closure to be created, maintained and transformed, with decisive effects on power and market relations. Therefore, it is through universities that typical strategies are channelled aimed at regulating the production and obtention of these means.

These strategies bring "social forces" into play which can be identified through analysis. However, they operate mainly in the cultural field, as opposed to communicative processes which, in the special case that concerns us, are aimed at producing a precise symbolic good: the certificate. Therefore, we cannot rely on the categories normally used in studying conflicts, such as social classes for example. Instead, we must make a special effort to identify those categories that can be used for analyzing the subjects which play a part in structuring and transforming the cultural field. And from here, it may be possible to relate these structuring and transforming phenomena to more general processes of change in society, providing we are able to detect the complex relationships established between one and another of the levels in play.³⁹

The following analysis of the force field in which the communicative production of certificates takes place will involve four dimensions which, for the purposes of this study, we will consider separately:

- a) the relationships between professionalism and certificates;
- b) the value of the strategic use of certificates;
- c) social selection based on certificates;
- d) control systems for perpetuating the culture.

1. University bases for professionalism

As we have seen, professionalism, i.e. obtaining specific educational treatment for a relatively homogeneous set of occupations, has always included establishing specialized training schools that codify a body of knowledge and practices and define valid ways of transmitting them.⁴⁰

Historically, this process of institutionalizing knowledge for professionals has been carried out by universities for professions. In effect,

if these training schools do not begin within universities (...) they always eventually seek contact with universities, and there is a steady development of standard terms of study, academic degrees, and research programs to expand the base of knowledge.⁴¹

The formation of this base of knowledge which can be publicly transmitted and certified is a necessary condition for the success of all strategies aimed at full professionalism. From there, also, arises the strategic role of the university as a certifying agency as well as its interest in preserving for itself a monopoly over the legitimate production of certificates.

On the other hand, progressive identification of universities with the certificates they produce, as well as the need to legitimize them through the communicative process of their production involves universities in the very process of institutionalizing professions.

Typically, the university will be subject to the demands made by the "mobilization group" in a profession, which is often to be found outside the university, or which may exist as an academic pressure group that operates from within the institution itself. In either of

the two cases, factors having to do with the way in which universities are internally organized - for example, the extent to which they are decentralized - and the internal decision-making system may facilitate or hamper strategies to consolidate emerging professions. In general, groups belonging to different faculties or professionals who are already established in universities will tend to dispute the way in which a new "career" is defined, which will lead to negotiations regarding both its material and cognitive limits.

In countries where academic professionalism is introduced late, and which therefore experience a demonstration effect and/or find it necessary to hire specialists trained abroad, a specific conflict between localists and cosmopolitans may take precedence over the conflicts discussed above, as can often be observed in Latin American universities, and which involves humanities professors who claim to be the carriers of a humanistic tradition and professors of linguistics who define themselves as modern scientists closer to the other social sciences, biology and mathematics.

Within universities, the typical tensions we have mentioned are expressed in a perfectly tangible way which has to do with decisions regarding how to distribute scarce funds, recruiting academic personnel, the lines along which the university is to develop, and the inter-university balance of power. Efforts to professionalize a new field of knowledge encounter a brake here that can, on occasion, be a powerful one.

The question of public recognition of the certificates granted also gives rise to conflicts and to intra- and inter-university negotiations, which also involving the government. In Chile, for

example, recent legislation on universities⁴² rules that the production process for certificates to be granted by new universities must first receive recognition from one or another of the older university institutions. In addition, the legal recognition of educational certificates will generally be negotiated between the state and universities, and legal authority authorizing an individual to exercise a profession may lie with the university itself or with other public accrediting agencies.

Equally decisive in the struggle to control certificates is the way in which their production is organized, especially the division of labour that is set up within the higher education system. To a large extent, the segmentation and hierarchy of this system are results of the way in which the conflicts that revolve around the institutionalization of communicative processes leading to educational certificates have been resolved.

Chilean experience in recent years is illuminating in this regard. The combined demands of traditionalist academic groups and the neo-liberal technocracy led to the establishment of a group of careers that are the exclusive province of universities, represented by those professions that can only be exercised once a licentiate has been obtained, and this degree can only be granted by universities⁴³. In this way, the prestige of those professions that have an exclusively university status is strengthened, at the same time as the system of higher education is forced to diversify, now including professional institutes at the second level, and centres for technical training at the third.

It is clear that we are not dealing here with a merely technical-pedagogical question, or one that is academic in nature. The new ranking of certificates is not imposed by the "objectivity" of the system governing the division of labour or the way in which it manifests itself through market demand. Instead, there has been an attempt to redefine the role of universities in function of a select nucleus of professional careers, whose certificates command the highest income, provide the greatest prestige, and offer their holders the highest degree of security. In this way, what is obtained is a clear effect of social reclassification in favour of high status professional groups, which might have been threatened by the educational "mesocratization" that resulted from the mass access to universities that existed in Chile from 1967 to 1973.⁴⁴ In addition, the pre-university education of the different groups that gain access to post-secondary education is more rigidly classified, and in this way higher education regains its ability to operate more effectively as a screening device for intellectual and technical jobs.

In short, here we see how strengthening the powers of universities so that they alone regulate the processes of professionalism acts as an efficient method of controlling the distribution of professional status in society, a decisive phenomenon in periods of rapid expansion of the middle classes. The latter, precisely because they base their social position on the possession of a certified educational capital, will tend to define their possibilities and expectations of mobility on the basis of certificates. Therefore, an efficient way of acting on their destiny is through the institutions that plan the production of certificates. However, this places universities, at least under certain conditions,

at the centre of this "class formation" process, a process which under other circumstances was directly controlled by the growing and changing labour market, itself a product of the development of a capitalist economic base.

The phenomenon of the growth of educational certificates "against the market" as it has been sometimes called, has been frequently observed in Latin America. Each time this phenomenon occurs, it can be seen that universities play a central role in creating status groups, i.e. certificates not only acquire value on the labour market, but they are also simultaneously valued, as are other symbolic goods, on the market for these goods, thereby establishing variable rates of conversion between educational, social and economic capital.⁴⁵

It may be that the obsession for conducting sociological analyses of social classes has hampered the timely "discovery" of these social estates that have developed around higher education and the distribution and appropriation of educational certificates. It may also be that analyses of university processes have not given due weight to this aspect, on the mistaken assumption that the production of certificates does not express social or power relationships mediated through the university system.

2. The production of legitimate competition resources

The process of producing educational certificates constitutes the second pole around which a specific force field revolves that conditions and is conditioned by the development of the higher education system.

The short time needed to produce these certificates, conveniently marked off by annual examinations and degree exams, can barely conceal the fact that the process is socially determined by hiding behind so-called technical-pedagogical requirements. In fact, the phenomenon of prolonging the studies required to earn a certificate from the higher education system can be found everywhere, as well as a continuing process of up-grading these diplomas. Also, it is not difficult to prove that a widespread relationship exists between the length of an educational career and the socioeconomic status of the occupation to which it gives access. As Jenks and his colleagues note: "trying to invent a status index that does not take education into account is like trying to invent a standard of living index that does not include income".⁴⁶

In short, social demands for legitimizing the value of all kinds of certificates via the education system will play an important role in regard to the types of social closure that are imposed/negotiated for access to the occupations in question.

The above does not, however, mean that a perfect balance exists between education and occupation. Instead, what happens is that educational certificates play a strategic role in job competition, reserving certain sectors of the labour market for the bearers of certain certificates and excluding - a priori - individuals who do not possess certain certificates that act as entrance requirements.

From this viewpoint, the phenomenon known as education inflation must be studied more closely. In general, it is identified with a presumed depreciation of educational certificates on the labour market.⁴⁷ One of the following two reasons could explain this: loss

of the intrinsic value of certificates (academic downgrading) , or the loss of their market value, frequently attributed to an increase in the number of educational certificates available. In both cases, we are dealing with a reduction in the scarcity of certificates, on the one hand due to qualitative reasons that have to do with their production processes, and on the other due to quantitative reasons that have to do with the supply and demand for qualifications on the labour market.

Looking at things from the viewpoint that interests us here, on the other hand, educational inflation represents (inside universities or outside them on the market) one result of conflictive strategies which immediately becomes a new battleground for specific struggles. Thus, for example, it can be seen that in Latin America the process of mass access to universities was accompanied by depreciation of certificates due to a drop in the quality of training.⁴⁸ Or else, in extreme versions, there is talk of the downgrading of upper levels produced by a superabundance of certificates which are no longer capable of effectively closing off the labour market. Behind this last argument, in its more moderate version, there is always the idea of an overly rapid increase in the demand for higher education which is not accompanied by an equally rapid expansion of the socio-professional structure.⁴⁹

We said above that the effect - educational inflation - leads to new strategies. Thus, in the face of the mass proliferation of educational certificates of a given level, we can frequently observe the appearance of a movement that tends to classify (and therefore to redistribute) certificates by introducing a more complex way of

organizing their production processes. The phenomenon is sometimes called "the moving target". "Many students pursue their studies ever longer, ever higher, in an attempt to regain a competitive advantage in the race for the scarce, interesting and well-paid jobs."⁵⁰ The growing segmentation of educational systems at the advanced level, and the consequent ranking of the certificates they grant, restores the "intrinsic" value of these certificates under conditions that are inflationary or involve mass production.

The above also permits us to understand the fact that the increase in the demand for university education has not been continuously and systematically followed anywhere by a process of "proletarianizing" certificates, even when the term proletarianizing is defined in its broadest sense. A recent study of the situation in France, for example, shows that this process has never occurred either for men or for women who have continued their studies beyond the baccalauréat level. However, in the case of those who hold only the baccalauréat, these diplomas are devaluated but only in the case of women, a phenomenon which the authors attribute not to a devaluation of the traditional baccalauréat, but rather to the appearance of technical baccalauréats alongside the traditional ones, and which for census purposes are counted together.⁵¹ On the other hand, the study quoted, as well as many other similar studies, shows that advanced education certificates, including those which have proliferated, continue playing a decisive role in competition for the key positions in the social division of labour. However, if they are to play this role, their academic legitimacy must be maintained relatively intact. Under normal

conditions, this will depend on their production processes and the institutional framework under which they are produced. Therefore, to uphold the importance of the academic legitimacy of certification does not mean to prejudge the undoubtedly related question of the intrinsic educational value of these certificates, nor does it imply a prejudgement regarding the often discussed question of the correlation that may exist between educational achievement and the jobs obtained. Berg's well known study shows, for example, that there is a minimal relationship, if any exists at all, between certification and job performance.⁵² Or as Jenks and his colleagues conclude:

our inquiry suggests that neither tests nor diplomas are likely to correlate very well with job performance, although there will certainly be some exceptions.⁵³

Instead, it would appear that educational certificates act as an efficient means of selection that permits the processes of social mobility to be regulated, assuring that certificate holders have a legitimate resource for making the most of job and living opportunities, and forging around them more or less resistant limits of closure-aperture.

Therefore, certificates - conceived as a legitimate resource in the struggle for social positions - not only confer advantages on the inheritors of the cultural capital (demonstrating that it is not evenly distributed) but they also lead to degrees of social mobility that can be significant. It could be said then that they confer academically evaluated cultural capital, which can be used to advantage throughout the working career of the individual. The view, therefore, that education merely reproduces inequalities of origin and/or defines a priori the places that individuals will occupy within the social division of labour is theoretically incompatible with the postulate that

education and the formal qualifications it produces are legitimate grounds and resources in the struggle to occupy/close positions with their corresponding incomes, prestige and security. It is hardly necessary to mention that recent studies endorse this last postulate, empirically weakening the reproductional thesis of education, at least in its most rigid version.⁵⁴

The above should be supplemented along the following lines: when we view educational certificates as a legitimate resource in the competition for positions, we go beyond the ground on which their value is measured only in terms of the individual returns they guarantee on investments made in education. The question of whether certificates permit the holder to enjoy monopolistic incomes in the cases of certain professions⁵⁵ is not even central here. The exchange value of certificates on the market place, and the power they command to establish monopolistic or semi-monopolistic income benefits are the economic components, to give them a name, of this legitimate resource. But certificates operate in a wider field insofar as they give symbolic' and concentrated expression to a network of social relationships that have made it possible to produce/obtain the certificate, and which then facilitate its strategic use in different situations that may or may not have economic effects in the marketplace.⁵⁶ Therefore, the "trademark" of certificates (the institution that grants them) may significantly condition the strategic value of the use of this resource, as can be demonstrated, this time in the political field, by the case of post-graduate degrees in economics granted by the University of Chicago and how they influence the shape of authoritarian power in Chile.

3. Social selection based on certificates

The distribution of this valuable resource in society (who will obtain these certificates, when and how) is regulated in the last instance by universities. The problem in question is an old one. Braudel quotes Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, whom we have already mentioned, and who complains in his Guerra de Granada [War of Granada] about the rule of men of letters, "a form of rule that has extended to all Christianity and today is at the apex of its power and authority". The French historian remarks:

With lucid hate, Hurtado de Mendoza enumerates the members of the clan: judges in civil cases, judges in criminal cases, chief magistrates, members of tribunals... and at the apex, the supreme congregation of the Royal Council. As the men who compose it claim, their authority extends to all matters: it is a type of science of what is just and unjust. Envious of other posts, they are always ready to invade the territory that falls under the jurisdiction of military authorities, in other words, the large aristocratic families.⁵⁷

The influence of men of letters - the first modern holders of certificates issued by universities - arises as a power alternative in opposition to the power of the old dominant class.

From then until now, the importance of certificates in determining who will influence the way in which society is stratified has gained a lot of ground. It has been argued that we have reached a point at which all stratification in modern societies is the product of the process of "selection by certification", a postulate that is based on the ideology of meritocracy which can also be called the ideology of men of letters.

Meritocracy has been defined by Daniel Bell as the ideology of the post-industrial society:

The post-industrial society in its initial logic, is a meritocracy. Differential status and differential income are based on technical skills and higher education. Without those achievements one cannot fulfil the requirements of the new social division of labour which is a feature of that society. And there are few high places open without those skills ... Thus, the university, which once reflected the status system of the society, has now become the arbiter of class position. As the gatekeeper, it has gained a quasi-monopoly in determining the future stratification of the society.⁵⁸

It is true that most studies in the field of education have taken little interest in the effect of certification as a discreet event that could explain variations in job status and in the income received by individuals. As a recent study points out:

A strong emphasis on certification screening, creating a bias in the status system in favour of those with academic degrees, would introduce measurable departures from linearity in the relationship between years of school completed and measures of occupational status or income.⁵⁹

On the other hand, studies on the relationship between education/certification and income differentials are still on very uncertain ground.⁶⁰ Even the conventional view of economists - that education increases the productivity of individuals and therefore increases the market value of labour - has been disputed on various fronts.⁶¹

For our purposes, a discussion that falls strictly within the margins of the economics of education is less interesting than an expanded version of Arrow's thesis, which maintains that higher education serves as a screening device and acts as a filter that permits individuals with different skills to be selected, and gets this message across to those who hire the labour force in the marketplace.⁶² The study by Jencks and colleagues appears to confirm that:

the financial return to extra schooling derives almost exclusively from the fact that schooling provides men with access to highly paid occupations, not from the fact that it enables men in a given occupation to earn more. Giving everyone more credentials cannot provide everyone with access to the best-paid occupations.⁶³

Therefore, if the university acts as a filter towards the outside by establishing access to the labour market through certification, it is especially important to know how much internal selection goes on, i.e. permitting or restricting access to this resource which the university produces and controls.

This subject has been widely discussed. Everywhere, the probabilities of gaining access to higher education are the result of a selection made during the entire school career "which is extremely unequal and depends on the social origin of individuals" according to the well-known formula of Bourdieu and Passeron.⁶⁴

In the case of Chile, the unequal progress of individuals through school, depending on their social origin, is a fact that has been well documented:

As far as the parent's occupation is concerned, 100% of the offspring of parents belonging to the highest social class complete primary school, but only 18% of the offspring of the lowest class parents do so. Just over half of the children of the highest level parents enter university (51%), but only 3% of the offspring of parents who work in primary industries enter university. The differences between the extremes of distribution according to parents' education are even more pronounced. All the offspring of parents with university education complete secondary school, and 59% of these enter university. Only 10% of the offspring of illiterate parents complete the eight grades of primary school, 3% finish secondary school, and fewer than 1% enter university.⁶⁵

Therefore, the university selects from among those who have already been strongly selected at lower levels of the education system. Those who are able to survive to the end of secondary school will immediately have the opportunity to compete among themselves for admittance to universities and other institutions of higher education.

Thus, for example, in Great Britain universities recruit over half their students from the upper class, and almost 20% from among the children of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled manual labourers and farm workers. On the other hand, the ratios for part-time further education are 14 and 52% respectively, and for colleges of education the ratio is 26 and 36% respectively.⁶⁶

In any case, it is interesting to note that (given the selective character of the higher education system, which also includes selection for opportunities that are hierarchically ranked by the different advanced institutions) obtention of the certificates in question is nevertheless subject to changes depending on the greater or lesser access to these institutions that the different groups and classes achieve.

One of the dynamic factors that explains the massive expansion of higher education is the increased demand for this kind of education by social sectors that hope to obtain a larger share of the educational certificates that are distributed.

In Great Britain, for example, the chances of entering university for the different classes remained almost constant in spite of the great expansion of higher education, but the absolute gain by the upper class compared to the lower class in terms of access possibilities was massive. As it has been rightly noted, "there is no universal law linking expansion to equality".⁶⁷ In France, university enrollment increased 300% over a 15 year period, but the students' social origin changed relatively little. In other words, groups that were already favoured by social selection benefited from the expansion when enrollment increased. Thus, the rate of university attendance for

young people from 20 to 24 years of age grew in the case of children of "upper classes and liberal professionals" from 37% to 72%, that of the middle class from 20% to 32%, while that of the working class and service personnel grew from 0.5% to 4.3%, and that of farm workers from 0.7% to 2.1%.⁶⁸ This shows that like Great Britain, in France the absolute gain is greater for the upper classes although the growth rate is higher for the lower social classes. "Rates of increase and absolute gains depend on the starting-points and saturation levels".⁶⁹

The information available for Latin America is not sufficiently broken down to allow us to see the social effects of expanding enrollment since the mid 1960s. But everything seems to indicate that, in this case as well, it is mainly the middle class that benefits from the new opportunities, especially through increased female and regional enrollment, as well as through the opening up of new technical careers that take an average number of years to complete.⁷⁰

Due to significant changes in the job structure, with considerable growth in the number of senior and middle ranking positions beginning in the 1960s, it is likely that in Latin American countries the certificate has played an even more decisive role in inter- and intra-generational movement. This does not necessarily apply to all positions in the job market, but is probably true for the higher ranking jobs.⁷¹ In the case of Chile, Schiefelbein and Farrel have concluded that, out of all the young males who began their studies in the early 1960s, almost one half (51%) have stayed in the same occupational group as their parents, while 4% have experienced descending mobility and 45% have moved up.⁷² In all cases, educational

certificates are the principal means of access to the more important positions. At least in this case, the existence of a certification effect appears to be proven, and would apply equally to both men and women.⁷³

In short, the selectivity of advanced education has increasingly been turned into one of the main instruments used by the different groups that struggle to obtain certificates which they will use during their entire working careers. The processes of expanding university enrollment, and in general the diversified offer of different types of higher education, have complex repercussions on the nature and operation of the social selection that is made through higher education. Above all, in combination with the changes that occur in the labour market, higher education maintains a high level of influence on the production of the certificate resource, whose importance for the organization of individual careers and for social mobility appears to be on the increase, although it never comes close to the utopia implied by the meritocracy ideology.

4. Control systems for cultural perpetuation

Higher education has been sometimes defined as a social structure for the control of advanced knowledge.⁷⁴ One of the typical instruments used by higher education institutions to exercise this control is, as we have seen, the production of certificates. Professions and various conflicting forces are organized around this production.

Now these forces - which up to now we have analyzed as the deployment of a number of different collective and individual

strategies - place the university within a control system whose principal components are the state, the market and the institutional power of higher education bodies themselves.

This means that the way in which the university negotiates its functions and the margins allowed are decisively conditioned by the components in question and by the relationships among them. In particular, the production of certificates depends heavily on their public consecration by the authority of the state; and their exchange value, at least, is established on the market and/or is determined by the state.

At the same time, universities are complex organizations and therefore they become progressively bureaucratized.⁷⁵ Therefore the very strategies that universities can use will be strongly conditioned by the way in which they are organized and, in particular, by the roles played by academics and their associations and by a university's senior administrative staff.⁷⁶ From time to time, through their organizations, students may also affect the way in which universities are organized as well as the strategies they develop in relation to society.⁷⁷

Also, the type of strategy that institutions of higher education can employ will be decisively determined by whether the control system that operates on universities is articulated exclusively around the state or solely around the market, or whether its centre is located at an intermediate point on the continuum between these two main forms of coordination.

In the case of institutions that compete among themselves for community support, for academics or for students, certain types of organization and authority will tend to prevail, as Ben-David has

shown, for example, in the case of North American universities,⁷⁸ which are different from those that will tend to prevail in institutions that are controlled by administrative means. One of the reasons for this is because the financing of higher education will be organized in different ways depending on whether the market or the state dominates in regulating university activities. Also, either of these situations will bring structural pressure to bear in favour of having academics identify in a one way or another with universities. When market strategies predominate, it is likely that instrumental organizational characteristics will prevail as well as a tendency to reinforce corporativism among academics. On the other hand, when communications strategies aimed at negotiating the obtention of administrative decisions prevail, the political identities of academics will tend to predominate and an attempt will be made to strengthen the state's ability to intervene in the way the university is organized.⁷⁹

The production of certificates, which is historically linked to the emergence of the modern state and the expansion of the market, in turn constitutes the keystone of the organizational strategies employed by universities aimed at maintaining their power in the face of the state and the market.

Thus, certificates which were once a legitimate way of self-perpetuating the teaching corps, later become a way of legitimizing professional aspirations in society, and in modern times they become a universal method of legitimizing elites in all spheres of social activity. During this long trajectory, the university will be relatively successful in retaining control over the production of advanced scholarship, and therefore over the institutionalization of

research and the patterns for the modern division of cultural labour.

Therefore, the certificate-producing function is relatively immune to administrative changes decreed by the state and to changing market "signals". The case of Chile in recent years is illuminating in this regard.

The government decided to reclassify certificates thinking that in this way it could begin to rank them by determining the procedures through which they would be produced and what legal recognition they would be given. The above does not mean, however, that an immediate impact was produced on the university function of certification.

To a large extent, this is because the decision was made to favour twelve degrees offered by universities which, however, are the same twelve that have the highest social prestige and which, therefore, command the highest salaries on the market.

On the other hand, those degrees that are not legally the monopoly of universities can still be offered by universities, which in practice blurs the distinction between one kind of degree and the other, and weakens the hoped for effects of reclassification and ranking.

What we see here is the fact that certificates - just as any other symbolic possession - do not have a value in themselves, but rather acquire it only because they exist within a social circuit that supports their production, obtention and use as a strategic resource in the competition to make the most of living and job opportunities, which at the same time are opportunities for evaluating the goods possessed.

As we have seen in this study, these supportive social circuits incorporate not only universities and their independent production of

certificates, but also the force field in which the university is situated and on which it acts at the same time as it is conditioned by demands for education, by collective claims for status, by government administrative decisions, by internal operations that are not at all homogeneous, by interactions with the labour market, etc.

In short, the system of control that universities seek to define as their legitimate sphere of work and influence is linked to the control system that operates on universities. The production of certificates is probably the main element that mediates between the two control systems, and therefore expresses - with relative stability - the true metabolism that is established in the propagation of culture.

IV. CERTIFICATES AS A SOCIAL FACT AND A COLLECTIVE BELIEF

It has sometimes been said that certificates define a frontier that is only an illusion, and are supported by a collective belief in their value as a recognized indicator of the social capital that the holder has accumulated and demonstrated during his university career.

But, as we have seen, the process of producing certificates, insofar as it is a communications process, does not merely have a ritual effect. It is not simply a right of passage. It also involves an authentic process of learning or acquiring knowledge. Therefore, the sale of a certificate automatically negates its legitimacy because this does away with the production/acquisition process which is socially recognized as legitimate.

For the same reason, the collective belief that supports the value of certificates cannot simply be reduced to an imaginary frontier that separates certain individuals from others because they have passed examinations and the results have been measured on a conventional grading scale. Instead, this belief has its own material and social bases, a body which today is represented by the university.

Universities produce educational certificates that are decisive in society for obtaining management positions. In cases where the bureaucratization of organizations and professionalism of services have become central features in a society, universities will play strategic roles in setting up the bases of legitimacy for access to the major organizations and professions.

Universities can fulfill this function only to the extent that they maintain their central position in organizing culture, in other words, while they maintain their predominance in transmitting high culture.

From this viewpoint, certificates carry an excess of meaning which is conferred on them precisely because they are identified with this high culture. Without prejudice to the fact that modern certificates are the products of specialized communications, they are also invested with this increased value which comes from the fact that they crystallize the dominant cultural ideal of a society.

Therefore, if universities come close to the model defined by the ideology of meritocracy - i.e. act as the arbiters of class positions, to use Bell's expression - this is precisely due to the fact that they represent the dominant cultural values of a society. It is these values that give certificates their aura and lend them their

almost religious character.

Thus, the frontier established by certificates represents real systems of social closure. Within a culture as a whole, these systems determine the limits between high culture and mass culture: they operate in the labour market, conditioning the possibilities of establishing protected zones around opportunities that are scarce.

Pressure can lead to shifts in these systems of closure or limits, as we have seen, but they always remain fully valid as ways of excluding certain sectors of society and organizing the ranking system that applies to those who are included. In other words, these shifts and relocations, as well as changes in hierarchy, continually represent new power articulations, which form the foundations on which more complicated structures of domination are built.

The preceding viewpoint is what permits us to include both the production/obtention process and strategic use in our analysis of certificates. In regard to use, in turn, the viewpoint we have adopted permits us to distinguish between those use strategies that can be termed micro-social and those which, because they have a collective basis, produce macro-social effects.

The distinction between production/obtention shows that it is also possible to study differentiated strategies depending on the pole from which the process is viewed. The institutional production of certificates simultaneously involves various participants in the communications process through which this symbolic asset is generated. The obtention of a certificate, in turn, is a typical appropriation process that involves both cultural transmission and the act of

recognition based on the preexisting cultural capital and scholarship.

The existence of certificates is, then, in the strictest sense a social existence: they are evaluated through complex social circuits which they feed into and receive feedback from during the stages of the production, obtention and use of certificates. Therefore we can speak of them as an expression of a collective belief, only in the extent to which this belief can be "reduced" to the social circuits that generate, maintain and transform them.

NOTES

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11. Ibid, pp. 436-37.
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24. See J. Vives Vives, op. cit., pp. 99-141.
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27. Ibid, No. 200, p. 240. See also No. 237.
28. Ibid, No. 252, p. 279.
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30. K. Polanyi, op. cit., p. 117 and p. 229.
31. Cf. M. Weber, Economy and Society, op. cit., pp. 493-497.

32. Cf. M. Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism, University of California Press, 1977, p. 12.
33. M. Weber, Economy and Society, op. cit., p. 750.
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35. M. Weber, Economy and Society, op. cit., p. 751.
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39. The metaphore infrastructure and superstructure would not be very helpful for our analysis either.
40. "How a society selects, classifies, distributes, transmits and evaluates the educational knowledge it considers to be public', reflects both the distribution of power and the principles of social control". B. Bernstein, Class, Codes and Control, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1975, p. 85.
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42. See the Council of Presidents of Chilean Universities, General Secretariat, Nueva Legislacion Universitaria Chilena [New Legislation Governing Chilean Universities], 1981.
43. Professional titles for which it is necessary to have obtained the degree of licentiate are listed in Article 12 of Legal Decree No. 1 of December 30, 1980, and are:
 - lawyer
 - architect
 - biochemist
 - dental surgeon
 - agricultural engineer
 - civil engineer
 - commercial engineer
 - forestry engineer
 - surgeon
 - veterinarian
 - psychologist
 - pharmacist

Also see J.J. Brunner, Ideologias universitarias y cambios en la universidad chilena [University Ideologies and Changes in Chilean Universities], FLACSO, Santiago, Chile 1981.

44. Cf. J.J. Brunner, Concepciones de universidad y grupos intelectuales [Concepts of Universities and Intellectual Groups]. FLACSO, Santiago, Chile 1981.
45. Cf. P. Bordieu, "Les trois états du capital culturel" ["The Three Estates of Cultural Capital"], Actes de la Recherche, No. 30, November 1979.
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65. E. Schiefelbein and J. Farrell, Eight Years of Their Lives, IDRC, Canada, 1982, p. 111.
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67. Ibid, p. 217.
68. Cf. C. Baudelot, R. Benoliel, H. Cukrowicz, R. Estabiet, op. cit., pp. 20-32.
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70. See UNESCO, CEPAL, PNUD, Desarrollo y educación en América Latina: Síntesis general [Development and Education in Latin America: General Synthesis], Vol. 3, Part VIII.
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THE LATE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF ACADEMIA: CONCEPTS
FOR CASE STUDIES*

Angel Flisfisch

PRESENTATION

These notes offer a conceptual framework for case studies on how academic professionalization is introduced into peripheral societies. I begin with a description of the classical model of the academic profession. I deal next with the historical circumstances under which it is introduced, examining three aspects: ideology, enclaves of professionalism and questions of power and legitimacy. I conclude with an examination of the results of this introduction and their consequences for professionalization.

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**The following related studies have already been published under this research program:

- The intellectuals: Notes and Background for Defining the Field of Study (two volumes).
- Intellectuals and the Intellectual sphere.
- The Market Situation and Problems of Academic Professionalization.
- Academic Culture and Conformity in Chilean Universities.

INTRODUCTION

These notes offer a conceptual scheme which, I hope, can be put to use in detailed case studies of how academic professionalism is introduced into peripheral societies.

The notion of introduction simply refers to the fact that in the case of higher education, as in many other walks of life, efforts to make changes acquire meaning in peripheral societies through references to certain experiences in central societies that possess a classical or paradigmatic value. In peripheral societies attempts to make changes almost always come later than in central societies.

Therefore, this study begins with an abstract description of the ideal classical model of academic professionalism, because it forms the compulsory reference point for the processes I am attempting to explain.

However, efforts to introduce academic professionalism do not take place in a vacuum. They begin as openly contradictory to traditional systems of higher education and their subsequent trajectories and vicissitudes are explained in terms of a dialectic which brings the model that guides actions for change into confrontation with traditional elements.

Therefore, much of this study is aimed at describing the traditional system and the dynamics generated by efforts to change it.

The central idea governing this study is that the results finally achieved differ considerably from the original model that acted as an ideal reference framework.

In turn, these results have a major effect on academic life, because they either encourage or discourage opportunities for professionalization in the strictest sense of the term. The final sections of this study describe the results achieved and attempt to evaluate their potential.

It is hoped that the conceptual materials presented here will be useful for in-depth studies of national cases. I believe that studies of this kind are relevant and are worth pursuing, not out of mere curiosity or a desire to accumulate information, but because they provide a clear means of identifying the necessary conditions for establishing, once and for all, processes that will result in the production of knowledge and scholarship.

I. THE ACADEMIC PROFESSION: ITS FEATURES AND CONTENTS

There are several historical examples that can serve to illustrate the features of what is nowadays called a profession. One example is the case of the Prussian civil service, starting in the 18th century. The characteristics of professionalism in this case can be briefly described as follows:¹

- a) Growing independence from political and administrative authorities. In the case of the Prussian civil service, this represents independence from the king, who was in theory the absolute political authority.
- b) Control by the members of the profession over the personnel forming part of it and over the policies governing promotion or ascent.
- c) Self-determination of the standards governing the training and performance of the members. As for training, formal education processes and examination procedures are instituted and become routine

and they culminate, in the 19th century, in the demand for diplomas that formally certify that an individual possesses given abilities. Also, formal and informal standards are set up to evaluate performance, and therefore they affect the way in which prestige is distributed.

d) A professional ethos is defined that regulates recruiting processes to ensure that new members who are admitted show a marked affinity with existing members. A sort of "moral policing" or diffuse social control exists over recruiting processes and new members, which makes it possible to achieve a high degree of homogeneity in attitudes and values, and this homogeneity is usually the result of the notion of an ethos that is characteristic of a profession.

e) An elitist ideology emerges in which belief in a professional duty to act for the good of others, who are not members of the profession, plays a central role. This ideology of service to the public tends to assume that the very contents of a professional activity, insofar as they are exclusive to it, in themselves possess a general social value that is independent of the value assigned to them by others who are not members of the profession. This pretention is the foundation on which professions base their claim to autonomy and independence, and it is also the basis for the right they claim over the rest of society to make those decisions that the profession itself has defined as being matters in which only it is competent to judge.

The historical experiences that underlie the processes of professionalization, which begin to consolidate in the 19th century, are based on the existence of corporate bodies or social estates with aristocratic roots which are characteristic of pre-19th century

European societies. Societies divided into social estates are implicit in the processes of professionalization in spite of the strong connotations of meritocracy contained in the ideologies associated with it - perhaps precisely because of these connotations. In fact, most of these processes can be interpreted in terms of aspiring to become an aristocracy of merit. This is fully apparent in the central role assigned by the members of a profession to the distribution of prestige, and in the stress they place on the problem of its acquisition, conservation and loss. Professions and professionalization are a contemporary projection of pre-19th century societies that were divided into estates. At any rate, this affirmation is plausible in the case of the academic profession.

Still speaking in general terms, it should be noted that to analyze a profession we take into account a basic duality that is present in all domains of systems involving the social division of labour: the duality between humans and structures.² On the one hand, a profession is a set of posts or jobs that have been formally defined within the economy. The special feature of these posts in the case of professions is that they are highly stable, permanent and specific. In general, these are posts that have been defined in a more or less permanent manner by the organizations through which a professional activity is conducted. These posts are independent of the individuals occupying them at any given moment. On the other hand, a profession is also a group of men and women who at any given time are recognized as members of it, through the accreditation mechanisms in force. At any given time, most of them occupy posts that constitute the structural facade of the profession. But it is not necessary for all to hold jobs. At any given time there are members who have retired, are out of work, unable to work, etc.

The entire set of jobs can be conveniently termed the professional market, even though the logic governing the creation of new positions and the processes of filling and vacating existing positions may differ considerably from the logic governing the classical market. What leads us to use the term market in the case of professions is: a) the fact that there may not be enough jobs for all the professionals in a given field (in conventional economic language, the supply of labour is greater than the demand); b) the fact that the profession itself establishes a hierarchy among jobs, assigning them different degrees of prestige, which leads to differences in the desirability of these jobs; and c) the fact that vacant positions tend to be filled through competition. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile repeating that both competition for vacant posts and appointments to them may be regulated in ways that are very different from what usually occurs in markets, using the term in its strictest sense.³

The phrase professional community can be used to designate the group of men and women who are members of a profession. The characteristics of a profession, briefly described above, are also the characteristics of a professional community. Whether a professional community is formally recognized under the law or whether it exists as an informal association, the characteristic notes of independence, autonomy, self-regulation, the ideology of public service and a professional ethos are attributes of the professional community itself.

The characteristic feature of the academic profession, understood as what we can see today in mature industrial societies, is that it is structured in terms of a special interrelationship between the academic market and the academic community.

Setting aside the specific contents of academic activities for a moment, we can describe the academic profession as follows:

- a) It is a system involving competition among academics for prestige in which prestige is distributed among academics by the community itself.
- b) The academic market is made up of academic posts that are formally defined inside universities and ranked according to prestige differentials also assigned by the community itself.
- c) The processes of creating vacancies and filling vacant positions are regulated by competition among academics for positions and by competition among universities for academics.⁴

Academics have the final say in the decisions that must be made regarding these processes, and their decisions are mostly guided by criteria of academic prestige.

A system that operates along these lines must necessarily tend to build up strong correlation between the prestige enjoyed by the members of the profession and the rank held by these members insofar as job opportunities are concerned. This is a system in which the men and women who enjoy the greatest prestige occupy the most prestigious positions and those who control access to these positions attempt to attract the professionals with the highest prestige to fill them.

Therefore, there are three main elements in the academic profession: the existence of a number of independent employers; the predominance of academic prestige in the processes of creating job vacancies and filling these vacant positions; and the control exercised by the academic community over the universities that employ their members.

The reason behind the first element must be viewed as an historical contingency. According to studies by Ben-David and Zloczower⁵, the university systems that exist in countries such as Germany or the United States (which are characterized by a large number of universities that are independent and are not centrally administered at the national level) do not emerge as the result of deliberate planning policies for higher education, but instead must be explained as a new development effect deriving from the play of general political and social conditions. In any case, we are dealing with decisive historical contingencies. According to the first of these two authors, the decentralization and competitiveness of the university system was a necessary condition for creating new disciplines and new academic communities,⁶ and for the production levels achieved by the scientific disciplines beginning in the 19th century.⁷ Undoubtedly, both the spread of new disciplines and the exponential growth of scientific productivity are the main ingredients in the general legitimacy conferred on academic professionalism by society. If these elements had been lacking, it would have been difficult for the processes of academic professionalization to have achieved the solidity they exhibit today in industrial societies or the demonstration effect they have had on other societies.

The predominance of criteria of academic prestige in the processes of creating vacancies and filling positions is closely related to the special contents of academic activities and also to the characteristic criteria governing achievement in these activities.

Academic activities consist of producing scientific knowledge and scholarship.

In other words, academic activity today is basically a research activity. In terms of the binomial teaching/research, sufficient documentation exists to allow us to assert that research has relegated teaching to a secondary place insofar as academic prestige is concerned, whether it be teaching for the self propagation of academia or teaching to train non-academic professionals.

Using a synthetic formula, we can say then that academic prestige is based on scientific or scholarly excellence. This excellence is central in the processes of creating vacancies and filling posts, although it may compete with other values which are also present in regulating these processes.⁸

In measuring this prestige, a *sine qua non* exists that is used by everyone: the possession of a title or degree that formally attests to the fact that certain skills have been acquired. In industrial societies, the PhD degree is taken for granted.⁹ Starting from this *sine qua non*, the following categories are used to evaluate scientific excellence or scholarship: a) the quality of the institutions where an individual studied; b) the type of professional career and professional experience; c) the academic distinctions an individual has received; d) the judgement of his peer group, expressed through things such as letters of recommendation; e) proven and expected scientific productivity; f) the quality and nature of an individual's written production and where it has been published.¹⁰ The last two criteria are central and much more attention is generally paid to them than to the others.

Operative decisions regarding academic prestige are made by those segments of the academic community that are directly involved in the processes of creating vacancies and filling them. This is coherent with the image of the scientific community as a system for reciprocal recognition among peers, where recognition of the written production of each member - through quotations by others in their own writings - plays a central role. 11

Undoubtedly, this decisive intervention by the academic community in its own propagation, generation after generation, is a major element in the make up of the academic profession as a specific cultural product of a given civilization. If it were absent, we would have something very different from what we recognize today as being the academic profession in industrial societies, and perhaps, also different results. In other words, something different from the type of scientific development and scholarship that has been associated with the characteristic processes of professionalization in these societies.

However, we must recognize that this particular way of organizing science and scholarship does not exhaust the different possible types of organization, either logically or historically. In Table I, the type of organization that connotes academic professionalism appears in the upper box on the left-hand side. It is not difficult, however, to find modern or historical examples to illustrate the remaining boxes in the Table. In fact, organizational forms which differ significantly from the type of institutionalism that characterizes industrial societies predominate in most other countries.

Table I

The market is ultimately controlled by:	
<hr/>	
The academic community itself	Others
The market is governed by:	
Academic criteria	
Other criteria	

Indeed, there are industrial societies in which academic communities are considerably less independent than we have assumed in the model outlined in these pages. This is the case with the academic profession in France and the Soviet Union.¹²

However, it is a fact that the classical model of the academic profession, although it is by no means universal, enjoys much greater prestige than we might be led to expect from its limited extension. Specifically, the hypothesis can be put forward that in situations in which university institutions differ from the classical model, there are often forces in operation that tend to modify them by bringing them closer to the classical model. This is another way of saying that, in general, academic communities develop claims to independence that are exercised by devising strategies aimed at obtaining a considerable amount of control over job opportunities and over regulating the processes of creating vacancies and filling vacant positions according to academic criteria.

In turn, it should be added that this claim to autonomy is generally presented as a legitimate right of all academic communities. When they claim independence, academic communities do so in the belief that they are not asking for anything more than their just due. The claim to independence is regarded as fully legitimate within academic communities. It also tends to acquire a positive, although somewhat diffuse, echo in society in general. What is consecrated in this manner is the legitimacy of the classical model of the academic

profession. The legitimacy of this model is what permits deviant situations to be judged negatively, even though they are far from being unusual occurrences.

Both types of legitimacy, full legitimacy within the academic community and the general and diffuse legitimacy achieved in society at large can be explained by the great persuasiveness of the ideology behind the academic profession.

The central element of this ideology is the notion of academic freedom. This is a negative idea of freedom. It is equivalent to the idea that academics and the academic community should be independent from other social institutions and agents, especially from political or political/administrative authorities. This independence is expressed through certain key points: a) decisions regarding who belongs to the community and who is to be excluded from it are made exclusively by the academic community; b) judgement of academic products and, as a consequence, the bestowal of prestige, is the exclusive right of each academic's peer group; c) decisions regarding the contents of research or teaching also depend solely on academics and must be free from interferences from outside.

This academic freedom is much more specific than freedom of expression, defined in terms of the liberal political ideal. In fact, it does not assume that each academic enjoys unrestricted freedom of expression as conceived, for example, by J.S. Mill.¹³ This can be clearly seen in certain criticisms of academic professionalism based precisely on a notion of freedom similar to that of Mill: these judgements assume that academic activities differ considerably from situations governed by this strict liberal ideal.¹⁴ In fact, academic

activities are highly regimented through specific processes of socialization and systems of awards and sanctions. Each academic is required to conform to the ethos of the profession, and in fact, this conformity is normally obtained.¹⁵ Therefore, academic life is subject to major and well-defined restrictions.

In harmony with the above, the idea of academic freedom is also based on a specific ideology which rests on what are assumed to be the dominant institutionalized values in the profession. Parsons and Platt have identified these values quite accurately as values of cognitive rationalism. This gives rise to the notion that the academic profession is a very special type of association (fiduciary collegial association) whose primordial responsibility is towards cognitive standards and their implementation through processes of critical evaluation.¹⁶ In other words, trust is placed in the fact that the academic profession undertakes to uphold the values of cognitive rationality and put them into practice. Because it is fiduciarily responsible for these values, the profession has the right and the duty to preserve them from interferences that might weaken them.

The ideology of academic freedom also possesses other resonances which bring it close to certain postulates of economic liberalism. In fact, it is assumed that economic liberalism is a necessary condition, at least for the kinds of development in science, technology and scholarship that have been historically associated with the processes of academic professionalism. This development is conceived of as a process of accumulating new results whose production mechanisms can be seen in: a) the fact that research is guided by strict standards of cognitive rationality; b) the investigator makes

independent decisions regarding what his research interests are, in line with concerns that are purely for the sake of knowledge; c) researchers complete for prestige.

Therefore, a sort of "invisible hand" exists in the production of knowledge and scholarship, similar to that which regulates competitive markets. This explanation of the obvious achievements of science, technology and scholarship permits us to confer a utilitarian connotation on the idea of academic freedom. It is probably this dimension of the academic ideology that explains its more general and widespread social popularity which goes beyond the academic profession itself. In turn, this justifies and, insofar as it has been internalized by the profession, accounts for its resistance to efforts aimed at centralizing the planning and administration of academic activities, especially if the final decisions are to be in the hands of others to the exclusion of those segments of the profession involved in research.

It would be easy to turn to the notion of a closed society¹⁷ as an explanation for the ideology of academic freedom. After all, a profession is a corporative association whose main ambition is to monopolize a particular set of activities. This monopolistic pretention is usually accompanied by an ideology of public service intended to legitimize it. The academic profession does not differ from other professions, and the ideology of academic freedom is an effort to legitimize a monopoly or a claim to a monopoly over scientific production and scholarship and their transmission.

There is no doubt that when it is accepted by society, the classical model of the academic profession translates into the existence of an almost pure corporative association and enthrones in society a strongly independent corporative interest. Undoubtedly, the ideology of academic freedom confers legitimacy on this interest. However, it must be conceded that we are dealing with a particularly strong ideology when compared with the ideologies of public service used by other professions or with the universe of ideologies in general. However, the notion of a closed society, although it points to a real factor, does not at all exhaust our efforts to explain the relationship between academic professionalism and the special ideology that characterizes it.

It is likely that the ideology of academic freedom has its roots in Enlightenment thought, specifically German thought,¹⁸ and to a much lesser extent in 19th century liberal thought. This explains why academic freedom is understood as freedom to preserve the values of cognitive rationalism, and is viewed less as freedom of expression. The fact that German philosophy played a part in the creation of the modern German university system may be important, especially if we consider that the classical German model has been a major ingredient in the processes of academic professionalization in general. However, it is likely that another factor is more important: in different versions and in very dissimilar incarnations, Enlightenment thought has formed the "natural", semi-official ideology of scientific activities and scholarship in both modern and contemporary times.

Dressed in different costumes, Enlightenment thought has provided the categories and concepts used by academics to reflect on their activities and they have gained self-awareness through these activities. The insistence on preserving the values of cognitive rationalism as a specific moral obligation of the academic profession is simply one way of paraphrasing the idea of the supremacy of Reason and its laws. The idea of fiduciary responsibility for maintaining these values and implementing them is a translation, into Parsons' language, of the idea of an enlightened elite who are custodians entrusted with the care of reason and its exercise.

In this sense, there is a necessary historical connection between the ideology of academic freedom and scientific activities and scholarship. This ideology is considerably more than a mere expedient for obtaining legitimacy, in other words, a mere accessory to academic activities that can be put on or removed at will, or easily replaced with a different one. On the contrary, it constitutes a tradition¹⁹ which the academic profession uses to interpret itself.

Even efforts to provide academic activities with new horizons end up paying a major tribute to this tradition. A clear example of this is Feyerabend's radical criticism of the oppressive nature of the academic ethos. This author concludes that political interference in the academic atmosphere can be beneficial, but to justify this he explicitly accepts the emancipatory horizon of the Enlightenment.²⁰ Also, the anarchistic theory of knowledge he proposes recognizes that there may be times when it may be necessary to give first place to reason for a while, and that it may be wise to defend its rules above all else. If Feyerabend believes that his antirational program is acceptable, it is because he believes that this necessity does not arise in modern times.²¹

Therefore, the ideology of academic freedom is, together with the academic market and the academic community, a basic element in the academic profession. Also, because the processes of professionalization and the self-perpetuation of professions that have already been established are political processes in the broad sense of the term,²² this ideology is what articulates the academic community with its market and makes the special interrelationship that exists between the two possible.

II. THE HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE INTRODUCTION OF ACADEMIC PROFESSIONALISM: THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM

In industrial societies, the processes of academic professionalization respond primordially to the internal dynamics of individual countries. In some cases, we are dealing with an authentic accumulation of emerging effects that leads to consolidation of the academic profession, and this phenomenon is not the result of premeditated and planned interventions. In other cases, the processes of professionalization acknowledge a certain amount of centralized direction, especially the existence of government policies aimed at producing given effects. However, the common denominator of all these experiences is the relative novelty of the phenomenon. In these countries, the academic profession is, to put it one way, a home-grown product, that can basically be explained by national circumstances.

The situation is different in peripheral societies. For them, by the time academic professionalization is perceived as a real problem in the higher education system, historical experience with consolidated academic professions already exists. Even more, by then the processes

of professionalization in central societies have already reached very advanced stages of development. In general, we are dealing with trans-nationalized academic professions. The different academic communities that represent the different disciplines and the pertinent academic markets include both members and universities from different nations.

To a great extent, the fact that academic professions already exist and have a history is what makes academic professionalization a problem for peripheral societies. There is nothing new here. We have an interaction between a foreign experience that has become internationalized and national or domestic circumstances. What we are dealing with, then, is the late introduction of academic professionalization. This explains why, unlike the case in central societies, academic professionalization can be imposed as an explicit goal, that can be implemented in a premeditated fashion through policies and strategies guided by a fairly well thought out institutional plan, which owes much to the forms of institutionalization that prevail in cases where professionalization is introduced at an early date. Undoubtedly, a demonstration effect is apparent in late professionalization. In a certain sense, we are dealing with an import or an effort to acclimatize a foreign product which was born and developed in other cultural climates.

However, this introduction does not occur in an institutional, cultural or educational vacuum. At least in the case of Latin American countries, which are this study's main concern, an institutionalized system of higher education that had been operating for a long time already existed prior to the introduction of academic professionalization.

Both the basic principles on which this system is built and its active operation over time have generated certain typical interests that are strongly ensconced in society. Put another way, the higher education system has consolidated a system of positions and prestige distribution that rests on a fully formed power structure. In turn, the new model of academic professionalism to be introduced will involve a relatively radical renovation of the existing system of positions and prestige distribution. In consequence, its introduction will necessarily change the power structure that has already crystallized. Therefore, there will be a clash between ensconced interests and the interests of those who wish to introduce academic professionalism. This conflict will mean that the processes of introducing professionalization will take the shape of a reform of the higher education system.

The pre-existence of institutions and the presence of contradictory interests explain why efforts to introduce professionalism are interpreted in the light of a conflict between the modern and the traditional. The modern aspect is identified with the model of the academic profession, which has already become classical, and with the interests of those who are promoting it. In turn, the pre-existing institutions and the interests associated with them represent the traditional school.

From a simplistic viewpoint, we could conclude that the processes of professionalization can only have two results: either the triumph of the modern - in other words, the definite establishment of academic professionalism and the resulting restructuring of institutions to conform to its characteristics - or its defeat, in

which the traditional or old system is preserved. A more complex approach might find that a combination of the traditional and the new would be acceptable. In other words, a significant dualism might be consolidated in which a modern sector coexists with a traditional one. In any case, from the very outset we must exclude the idea that there is a kind of law of development or rectilinear progress that will lead inexorably to the final consolidation of a classical model of the academic profession. Recent historical experience in peripheral societies shows that things tend to be more complex.

The central idea behind this study is that efforts to establish academic professionalism do not lead either to the preservation of the traditional system, or to the final consolidation of a classical model of the academic profession, or to a situation characterized by a significant dualism. On the contrary, we hypothesize that they lead, with a high degree of probability, to results that although typical, are considerably different both from the traditional model that existed beforehand, and from the new classical model that certain interests are trying to introduce.

The reason for these results must be sought in the special dynamics that efforts to introduce the classical model unleash as they interact with specific national circumstances that are more or less generalized in peripheral societies. In other words, the analytical models that are suitable for investigating the phenomena of professionalization must be models of processes that can retrieve the strategic orientations and sequential responses of the different agents involved. In turn, they must be models that do not prejudice

the results of these processes. This study attempts to identify certain elements that we believe must be present in these models.

The point of departure is the model of the academic profession, whose main characteristics were described in the first section. This model fulfills a paradigmatic function for the series of agents involved in the processes of professionalization. It constitutes a compulsory reference, either because it is rejected - "it is a model for other realities and is not suitable for realities such as ours" - or because it defines a situation that some would wish to attain. However, the processes of professionalization cannot be understood only by referring to this model. The system of higher education that pre-exists in a country is just as important a phenomenon as academic professionalism in industrial societies. This system, which can be called traditional, is in opposition to the idea of academic professionalization. It is this opposition as a whole, and not any of its points taken singly, which gives meaning to the processes of academic professionalization. Therefore, we must describe the traditional system.²³

Based on the academic activities that characterize the system, its main features can be described as follows:

- a) Academic activities consist of teaching aimed at training professionals for non-academic professions.
- b) Teachers occupy formally defined posts in universities. A few of these posts require full-time teachers. The remainder require part-time teaching which is marginal in the total work day of the individual occupying the post. Salaries for these positions are comparatively low.

- c) Whether academics have a final say in decisions or not, the filling of vacant posts is regulated by non-academic criteria. There is frequently competition for vacant posts.
- d) Academic positions enjoy a generalized social prestige. This prestige does not vary to any great extent depending on the academic position or from one university to another, when more than one exists. Universities do not compete to attract individuals to fill vacant posts.
- e) The individual occupying a post may acquire prestige through teaching, prestige which is conferred on him or her by the students. However, academics do not compete among themselves for this prestige nor does prestige won in this way constitute a criterion for stratification that is accepted by the academic peer group.

The features of the traditional system can be explained by the fact that this system is really a sub-system of the general systems represented by each of the non-academic professions that university teaching is meant to serve.

In fact, those who occupy teaching posts to prepare students for a given profession represent, in most cases, only a segment of the professional community in question. Belonging to this community is decisive in terms of defining their social identity. Holding a university position is only a secondary element. Basically, one is a lawyer, physician, engineer, etc.

The main purpose of the non-academic professions is to sell services on a professional service market. University teaching could be viewed as a part of this service market although this is doubtful from a conceptual viewpoint. In any case, because individuals at universities teach for only a few hours and receive low salaries, and

teaching is a very secondary and marginal part of the market. Those engaged in teaching also compete with the rest of their colleagues in selling other services on the market, and this constitutes their main activity.

Consistent with this main purpose, the criterion for measuring professional achievement is success in the service market. Prestige is higher or lower depending on the degree of success achieved in this market, which mainly involves recognition by the buyers, expressed through the actual purchase of services and does not depend on recognition by one's peer group.

Other prestige factors such as "reputation" or "publicity factors" are secondary, and generally subordinate to success in the market. The generalized social prestige associated with holding a university post is normally one of these secondary factors.

In a system of this kind in which the production of knowledge and scholarship is set to one side, academic excellence can only consist of excellence in teaching. In other words, when a teacher excels by regularly and systematically presenting the newest literature, frequently updating course contents, seeking new teaching methods and ways of motivating his students. However, and this is a consequence which it is worthwhile stressing, the traditional system operates under negative conditions for achieving this excellence, and offers few, if any, incentives.

On the one hand, teachers have no time to keep themselves up to date. The time they use to prepare their classes is stolen from the time they spend exercising their profession. This situation makes them increasingly dependent on their notes from previous years, and they

rapidly become mere repeaters of texts and contents that grow more out of date each year. In turn, this has broader negative effects: the lack of demand for new bibliographical materials explains why library services are antiquated and insufficient, and in time, policies for updating libraries are relegated to second place which makes it even more difficult for teachers to keep up to date.

The only identifiable positive incentive lies in the possibility of winning prestige among the students. However, there is no competition for this prestige within a teacher's peer group, and it has no impact on the system of academic stratification. To this we must add that, in general, prestige won through teaching tends to be restricted to the university environment. This implies that it is very difficult to convert prestige into a resource that can be transferred to other domains: for example, into a reputation on the service market.

In a cultural climate of this kind, course contents tend to congeal, and teaching itself tends to become a traditional activity: the subsequent generation tends to repeat the same course contents and employ the same methods that were used by the preceding generation. This traditionalism ends up by reinforcing the vicious circle it has created because it views any kind of innovation with suspicion and finds it virtually unacceptable. It is not merely that there are no incentives or rewards for innovation. On the contrary, innovation is discouraged through informal sanctions.

The only opportunity for renewal might lie in the changeover from one generation to another, if this were regulated by academic criteria. However, filling vacant posts is frequently governed by other kinds of criteria: belonging to certain ideological or political groups; to university or professional cliques; nepotism or favours from friends; clienteeism. Therefore, this opportunity is lost because new individuals with non-neutralized abilities or concerns are only recruited at random. It might even be maintained, perhaps, that the use of non-academic criteria in recruiting is a positive factor. Given the stagnation of teaching activities, the use of academic criteria could simply bias recruiting in favour of conformist personalities. The use of other criteria may have attenuated this bias by choosing at random between innovators and conformists.

Thus, the traditional system of higher education is traditional not only because it co-exists in time with systems that operate on the basis of an academic professionalism that has already been consolidated, but also because it is traditionalistic. On the one hand, it is shaped into a system of interrelations that is hostile to innovation. On the other, it generates pressure towards eliminating all prestige differentials that arise from competitive academic activities. In practise, this means that competition is devalued and adaptation strategies that imply preservation of the existing equilibrium are rewarded.

This traditionalism will continue to be important in the future in spite of the changes that the traditional system has undergone. These changes are sufficiently recent - in general, they have occurred in the last 20 years - and traditionalism has operated for a long

enough time to persist today as a cultural pattern. It has left a legacy of values and attitudes that has been inherited by contemporary systems.

It is also important insofar as it explains the singular features of the dynamics that lead to transformation of the system. In a context such as the one shaped by traditional institutions, those who begin to visualize the introduction of academic professionalization, and, as a consequence, the need to transform the prevailing state of things, are in a minority. The innovator is a solitary figure in a conformist consensus. If the situation should be totally blocked, the only path left open - even though its cost would probably be too high - would be to seek allies outside the higher education system.

What unblocks the system, at least potentially, is the presence of students. In Latin American countries the student body has traditionally been a focus of discontent and agitation. This tradition has enjoyed full social legitimacy for long periods.

To a great extent, student discontent is explained by the deterioration of higher education. Traditionalism in teaching leads to progressively poorer quality of education and large numbers of students view this deterioration negatively. Because rebelliousness is socially acceptable, the response to deterioration in education rejects conformity and acquiescence and is expressed openly.

These circumstances permit a meeting of minds between students and innovators, which paves the way for future alliances. On the one hand, the innovator tends to stand out among the other teachers and to win prestige and confidence. On the other, he is capable of channeling student unrest, orienting it according to his own vision and transforming it into a power resource for his cause.

Every instance of curriculum reform that occurred during the days of the traditional system exhibits this same pattern of a fortunate encounter between innovators and concerned students. The same thing occurs in the efforts to introduce academic professionalization. The fate of innovations that were much more radical in scope than curriculum reform, could only be rejection. But from the moment that pockets or enclaves truly interested in the idea of academic professionalism became consolidated in universities themselves, this led to a fortunate encounter between innovators and mobilized students who were sympathetic to the cause of academic professionalization. We should not be surprised, then, that student discontent and mobilization are among the principle agents in the dynamics to transform the traditional system.

III. THE HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE INTRODUCTION OF ACADEMIC PROFESSIONALISM: IDEOLOGIES

We should now enquire into the ideologies that are part of the cultural climate in which academic professionalism emerges. Are we dealing with ideologies which favour the values that are essential to academic professionalism, or on the contrary, are these ideologies indifferent or perhaps hostile to them?

Without describing different ideological clusters in detail, which in any case may vary depending on national situations, we can plausibly affirm that most of them share one trait: marked utilitarianism that tends to subordinate all activities generated by the different social divisions of labour to the goals of national

economic development.²⁴ Analyses identifying economic development as the main national problem tended to prevail in Latin America around the time that academic professionalization was introduced. Based on these analyses, the conclusion was reached that all kinds of activities - especially those under public control or subsidized by the government, which is generally the case with university activities - should be viewed as means towards development goals.

This developmental utilitarianism is supplemented by two other equally important features: stress on planning at the national level and anti-dependency. Stress on planning translates into the idea of explicitly defining development goals and coherent policies for achieving them, coordinated as far as possible by a relatively centralized national administration. Put negatively, this implies that it is harmful for different agents or institutions to independently pursue the goals they have set for themselves by following independent strategies. In turn, anti-dependency which is expressed by affirming the need for national development patterns that are not dependent on the lifestyles imposed through the actions of central countries, also has a negative consequence: mistrust of foreign cultural products and refusal to unconditionally accept or adopt these products.

When dealing with the idea of introducing academic professionalization, these features of the predominant ideologies offer an ambiguous response.

The diagnosis that identifies national development as the central problem also points out the scientific and technological deficiencies from which the nation is suffering. In turn, in line

with anti-dependency postulates, the conclusion is reached that these deficiencies can only be overcome by developing independent national scientific and technological capabilities. Undoubtedly, the idea that independent scientific and technological development is what is needed has played a major role in the efforts to establish academic professionalism, and has provided grounds for severe criticism of the traditional higher education system.

However, these same features have major negative consequences for establishing academic professionalism.

Developmentalist utilitarianism begins by clashing with development of the humanities. From the viewpoint that goals for economic growth must be given priority, the traditional allocation of resources to the humanities comes under suspicion because it is difficult to show how they are related to these goals, except through highly sophisticated reasoning that contradicts common sense. If any suggestion to increase allocations to the humanities is made, it will always be evaluated negatively. But academic professionalism presupposes that more resources than have been traditionally provided be given to all disciplines, including the humanities.

A similar phenomenon occurs in the case of natural and social sciences. No one denies that these disciplines lie at the root of scientific and technological development. But development goals stress utilitarianism and tend to demand that a clear and immediate connection be demonstrated between academic activities and these goals. Only the production of knowledge that can be immediately applied appears to be legitimately admissible. Allocation of resources to so-called basic

research activities, whose connection with development goals is at least indirect, is viewed as luxury spending or mere waste, similar to the case of the humanities.

The idea that academic activities should be the object of national planning which integrates them with other means for achieving development also clashes with the ideology of academic freedom. One of the main elements of this ideology is the affirmation that academics must be free to determine their research topics. Another central element is that although research may have practical applications, these must emerge spontaneously, and are not and cannot be premeditated. Both the claim to independence and this liberal view of unplanned and unplannable scientific and technological development stand in contrast to the spirit of the times, which is one of planning.

Last, ideological anti-dependency is suspicious of the model of academic professionalism because it is undoubtedly an imported product that develops and is regulated by logics that are totally foreign to traditional national approaches including politically progressive approaches and is subject to extra-national interests. From the beginnings of professionalism, accusations of scientific and intellectual "sellouts" abound. This phenomenon is especially strong in the case of social sciences, but is not restricted to them.

Similar cases have occurred in the domain of natural sciences and have generated small or large scandals. There is always an objective basis to these incidents, which can be fully explained if we remember that efforts to introduce professionalism take place within academic communities that are already internationalized or transnationalized and whose center of gravity lies in academic groups in the central countries.

Nevertheless, the ideological climate surrounding the introduction of academic professionalism also contains more positive aspects.

One of these aspects originates in the fact that, to a large extent, the first enclaves of academic professionalism that emerge from the traditional system are associated with the humanities and related social sciences. These enclaves give rise to authentic traditions involving the production of scholarship, which have gained legitimacy within the traditional system and society at large. The cultivation of history in Chile or philosophy in Colombia are examples of these traditions.

Aside from conferring legitimacy on research itself, these traditions have two important effects. On the one hand, they accept the ideology of academic freedom and attempt to impose its validity as something that goes hand in hand with the growth and production of scholarship. On the other hand, they help to attenuate developmental utilitarianism by forging a broader idea of development that possesses cultural and ideal connotations. This idea of development is not hostile to scientific development or academic professionalism, which are relatively independent of the immediate pursuit of growth objectives. It should be stressed that the ideological positions generated in these enclaves tend to become generalized. This can be seen clearly in the case of spokesman for the idea of academic professionalism. These spokesmen tend to be important figures who have come out of these enclaves and who generalize their own academic experience, extending it to all types of scientific knowledge and scholarship.²⁵

Another feature of the ideological climate that is positive for establishing professionalism comes from the idea of the independent university. The tradition of independence, one of whose main supporters is the student movement, can only help to create conditions that favour acceptance of the ideology of academic freedom. In fact, there are periods and events in which the two are clearly synonymous.

However, this equivalence is only superficial. In practise, the traditional claim for university independence is almost synonymous with the political idea of freedom as cast in the liberal mold. It tends to translate into a demand for unrestricted pluralism which can be contradictory to the much more restricted and scarcely pluralistic ideas that characterize the professional ethos of all academic communities. As we have seen, academic freedom is not freedom to express any point of view or to acknowledge that "anything goes" according to the anarchistic proclamation of Feyerabend.²⁶ Instead, it consists of the freedom of the academic community to impose values, attitudes, paradigmatic orientations and norms on its members. Thus, the traditional claim for university independence is also ambiguous in regard to the ideology on which academic professionalism is based.

The set of ambiguities that surrounds efforts to establish academic professionalism will affect the future of these efforts. The immediate effect is to provoke a series of tensions among the persons advocating this process, who are mostly individuals identified as professional academics. These tensions are not easy to resolve, and are frequently expressed as misunderstandings and errors, which are pregnant with consequence. Thus, aspirations towards professionalism

are generally disguised as utilitarian aspirations so as to win legitimacy in the eyes of prevailing ideologies, in spite of the fact that these utilitarian considerations are not generally very substantial. The prevailing mood of anti-dependency will clash with those who identify with a clearly international or transnational academic community, and will lead to clandestine behaviour or bad faith which in turn will lead to basic insecurities that will not help in attaining academic achievement or in institutionalizing academic values. The need to take refuge in the traditional ideology of independent universities, which will rapidly clash with the ideology of academic freedom, will produce a similar effect.

IV. ENCLAVES OF PROFESSIONALISM ALREADY IN EXISTENCE WHEN THE FIRST ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH PROFESSIONALISM OCCUR

In general, explicit efforts to establish academic professionalism occur once enclaves or pockets of professionalism have developed within the traditional higher education system. As a general rule, enclaves tend to play a major part in these efforts. The first academic groups almost always assume an innovating role in the dynamics aimed at changing the traditional system.

The nature and specific character of these groups depend on equally specific historical processes. Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish a few typical cases which are apparently more general in nature: a) there are individuals with a vocation for scientific work who are in a position to devote all their time to it and to university teaching in the traditional sense because they do not need to work to

earn their livings. This is the case with financially independent academics who receive more or less substantial incomes and who do not need to devote a great deal of time to administering their estates.

In earlier stages of the traditional system it was probably these financially independent academics who were engaged in the extremely limited production of scientific knowledge and scholarship that took place at that time. To these we can add individuals who must work to earn their living but who sacrifice their expectations of higher incomes to devote time to research. To this type of unconventional academic we can add others for whom academic activities are hobbies pursued in their free time, and those who are able to devote all their time to research because they have patrons.²⁷

These cases represent a stage in the production of scientific knowledge and scholarship in which a seigneurial or aristocratic ethos prevails. Academic activities are conceived of as something altruistic and disinterested, and their pursuit has to do with superiority of the spirit, far removed from the prosaic demands of remunerated activities.

This aristocratic ideology represents a negative condition for efforts to establish professionalism, and is a factor that may weigh heavily on account of tradition. Efforts to establish professionalism necessarily involve spreading the idea that academic activities are a profession. In other words, a way of earning a living. Nevertheless, there are stages in which the aristocratic ideology can contribute to conferring prestige on the cultivation of science and scholarship.

b) Cases involving the classical image of the professor or teacher are more interesting than the ones just described. These are individuals totally devoted to teaching, and who depend on it for their livelihoods.

From early times, the traditional system has made room for academic positions with these characteristics. There are certain careers which, once they have been included in the university curriculum, entail training in basic disciplines and this requires the presence of specialists. This is the case with medicine, and other careers based on specialized studies in independent disciplines that have been gradually added to the list.

Initially, if there were not enough national specialists, individuals from other countries were hired. Ultimately, this led to training citizens of the country itself, which includes advanced studies abroad.

This kind of case has two major consequences. On the one hand, both foreign academics and the national academics who were trained later are integrated into already formed academic communities, although perhaps often in a marginal way. Although national academic communities do not yet exist, both the idea and the ethos of communities of this kind takes root and begins to grow through the education offered by these precursors. On the other hand, the appearance of university positions requiring full-time staff begins to give rise to the notion of an academic market.

c) There is a third kind of case which is especially relevant on account of its numerical importance and special features. It involves enclaves devoted to teaching sciences and humanities for the purpose of training teachers for secondary and advanced schools.

The professional teacher (professor) has the closest affinity to the professional academic in contexts where the teaching of professions predominates and where the curriculum and diploma have strictly utilitarian connotations.

These professional teachers gather in university posts whose purpose is to train teachers - in other words, in university institutes devoted to this activity - and they are interested in transforming their posts into full-time jobs, and in increasing the number of positions. They generate interest in creating a real academic marketplace. This interest can be explained by the special market situation they face: a) the relatively low social status of the teaching profession is an incentive to obtain university posts; b) university teaching is much more gratifying than secondary school teaching; c) as Hirschman views it²⁹ these professionals have few possibilities of "exiting" from university and non-university teaching posts into other occupations. Therefore, they tend to bring pressure to have the number of university posts increased, because these are comparatively more desirable.

This last feature has broader repercussions. Because they have no "exit" strategies, these professionals are forced to have recourse to protest strategies ("voice" in Hirschmann's terminology). This converts them into one of the most active agents for change within the traditional system.

This feature, together with the fact that major segments of this group (those devoted to humanities and related social sciences) are clearly oriented towards the production of scholarship and are

carriers of an ideology of academic freedom which belongs to the classical model of the academic profession* places it in the vanguard of the dynamics generated by efforts to establish academic professionalism.

d) In the last stages of the traditional system, enclaves of academic professionalism tend to become more numerous and acquire greater importance on account of their functions.

There are two types of reason that explain this proliferation and this importance.

First, society makes demands on the higher education system that require the presence of an increasing number of specialists in basic disciplines who are able to survive only in university occupations.

Second, the social groups involved in professional activities begin to accept the idea (highly stereotyped) of scientific activity as something intrinsically prestigious. These stereotypes spread, especially among the middle classes which have recently been upwardly mobile and which hold strong beliefs that society should be a meritocracy. Scientific activities hold a very high place (almost too high) on the prestige scale to which these groups subscribe, and they are viewed as being enormously attractive. This begins to generate a demand to educate scientists, and young professionals with academic vocations appear more and more frequently.

The four types described above coexist in situations prior to the introduction of academic professionalism, and the two last types probably predominate.

* See above, Part III.

At the same time as enclaves of academic professionalism become more numerous, their views and expectations of what is desirable move progressively closer to the classical model of the academic profession.

On the one hand, these enclaves view themselves as members of international academic communities. Two factors are the cause: a) the different academic communities in the central countries have become transnationalized; b) the younger generations, especially, have been exposed to a fully-formed academic life through their undergraduate, postgraduate or professional development studies abroad, and have become familiar with the ethos of the contemporary academic community.

This implies increasing internal acceptance of the prestige system on which the modern academic community is based, which not only implies that the ways in which academic activities are institutionalized are accepted as desirable and legitimate, but also implies acceptance of its main thrust towards achievement in the production of scientific knowledge or scholarship: in other words, the primacy of research.

Also, this primacy of research (insofar as it is a criterion of professional achievement) becomes more plausible because it is related to the objective development of research activities. However, this development does not necessarily imply that new national resources will be allocated to research, or that existing resources and priorities within the traditional system will be reassigned. Research is possible only because of funding provided by foreign governments, foreign foundations or international agencies.³⁰

This kind of funding has been the object of very different kinds of considerations. But its most important effect has been passed over or ignored. The effect is that it makes the idea of an academic professionalism that conforms strictly to the classical model in vogue in industrial societies (where success in research is the central element) fully plausible. This can only make the incipient expectations of professional enclaves more rigid, and because of this lack of flexibility, will sharpen the tensions and clashes that necessarily accompany efforts to establish academic professionalism.

V. PROCESSES OF ESTABLISHING ACADEMIC PROFESSIONALISM: THE PROBLEMS OF POWER AND LEGITIMACY

The growth of professional enclaves in conjunction with analyses that identify the need for national scientific development and technology lead to the processes of establishing academic professionalism.

Unlike the case in central societies where the academic marketplace, the academic community and the ideology that links them arise as the organic products of a spontaneous evolution that followed its course without being aware of society or requiring premeditated intervention by society, in the event that academic professionalism must be introduced, those involved in the process must seek to establish it deliberately through policies and measures designed for this purpose.

The central element in establishing professionalism is the creation of an academic market. This assumes that: a) academics and aspiring academics must control decisions to create and increase the number of academic posts, as well as defining the requirements for these positions, in other words, preparing a typical job description for a post; b) sufficient resources must be generated to maintain academic professionalism and make it viable; c) academics must have control over the processes of creating and filling vacant positions, based on academic criteria.

An academic market cannot be built in a vacuum. On the contrary, it operates on a pre-existing set of institutions represented by the traditional system, which it is attempting to change. This means: a) converting the traditional system of positions into a different one, so that the new positions permit individuals to earn their living from academic activities and effectively allow work to be guided by achievements in research; b) re-assigning existing resources and obtaining new resources; c) replacing the criteria currently in place for regulating the processes of vacancies and filling vacant positions with criteria that are in harmony with the prestige system of the academic community itself.

Therefore, there is no reason to suppose that efforts to establish academic professionalism will be peaceful. They are directed against a power structure and a set of vested interests in the traditional system. It becomes necessary to remove individuals from positions of authority and power, and to oust persons who occupy academic posts. It also means competing with the vested interests of

the traditional system for the few resources that are available. In short, as a general rule these processes will be conflictive, lining new academics up against the members of the traditional system.

In this conflict, new academics find themselves in a situation that has two basic drawbacks: a) insufficient grounds for legitimacy in a large number of areas affecting academic professionalism; b) insufficient power resources in comparison with their antagonists.

The problems of the legitimacy that affect academic groups - including those which are already enclaves of academic professionalism and those who hope to become academics - start with credentials that are measures of academic prestige. Credentials similar in level and quality to those traditionally required in industrial societies are only demanded of a few members of professional enclaves. From here on down, we find a series of intermediate situations requiring lower level credentials or incomplete studies, until we reach the most frequent case which is represented by the individual who possesses only a traditional professional degree granted by the traditional system itself.

Academic credentials pose problems on at least two levels.

First, the lack of clear credentials that cannot be questioned makes it difficult to construct an image of a solid group of academic communities, linked to the different internationally consecrated disciplines, that can be held up against traditional groups. In fact, it is objectively impossible to interpret the situation in this way. Most of the groups which are struggling to establish academic professionalism have, at most, only plans for constituting communities of this kind. The fact that their equal potential is not recognized by existing academic communities could be overcome if a broader range of

academic credentials were recognized. However, even this formal requisite for recognition is absent. On the other hand, traditional groups enjoy the legitimacy that derives from possessing the academic credentials required by the traditional system, and therefore they are at an advantage.

Second, the absence of credentials has a negative effect on the effort to control the processes of vacancies and filling vacant positions. Because communities have not been set up in each discipline, no real academic criteria exist (based on the system the academic profession employs to assign prestige) that can effectively regulate these processes. The result is a situation that lacks legitimacy. On the one hand, innovative groups subscribe to an official ideology which maintains that vacant positions should be and are filled on the basis of academic achievement. On the other hand, in most cases those who apply for these positions simply have a personal ambition to become academics and work towards academic achievement.

The problems of legitimacy continue in terms of the special nature of the activity that innovators propose to institutionalize. The processes of establishing academic professionalism assume that academic reference communities exist in central societies and that they operate according to the system of assigning prestige that we described in the first part of this study. Some of the members of the new groups associated with establishing professionalism have been recognized by these reference groups, and most other members aspire to this recognition, or will shortly be forced to do so. But this recognition and the prestige associated with it are not easily convertible into recognition and prestige in the national context.

This conversion runs into major obstacles arising from the traditions of the higher education system (teaching, for example, which is one of the few sources of differential prestige in the system, is simply not associated with achievement by the international academic community) and from the features of the general ideological climate that have already been discussed: developmentalist utilitarianism, stress on planning, anti-dependency, university independence understood as pluralism.

The fact that efforts to establish academic professionalism encounter major difficulties in institutionalizing the general principle of the legitimacy of academic professionalism is closely linked to the above considerations. In other words, difficulties exist in institutionalizing the values contained in the ideology of academic freedom.

These difficulties have to do with the prevailing ideological climate. But they also have to do with the lack of power resources available to groups seeking to establish academic professionalism. As a general rule, these groups are not in the majority, and they cannot successfully establish academic professionalism all alone. In other words, they must seek allies and form coalitions.

In the search for power resources, there are only two alternatives: a) become allied with students and student movements within the higher education system;³¹ b) politicize the conflict outside the system, converting it into a national struggle that can be won by appealing to power sources outside the universities.³² In fact, these are generally the alternatives that have guided efforts to establish academic professionalism - either through a coalition with

students that excludes outside resources, through a triple coalition that includes outside resources, or through a coalition that makes it possible to use outside resources but excludes students. However, as we pointed out above, it is difficult for groups who seek to establish academic professionalism to prescind with student movements, and therefore, the third type of coalition is the least frequent.

Lack of power resources and its implications - the need for alliances - would perhaps be a secondary phenomenon if innovative academic groups were in a position to assume effective leadership within the coalitions that are formed, and impose ideological contents on them that are coherent with the effective institutionalization of the academic profession. However, both the power situation and the precarious legitimacy or open illegitimacy of their positions makes them pay a double price in any kind of coalition.

On the one hand, they must renounce control over the dynamics that they themselves have helped to generate. On the other, they are forced to engage in ideological transvestism because they must accept other ideologies or disguise their own to make them acceptable to the other members of the alliance.

These circumstances are of major importance because they explain why efforts to establish academic professionalism and the processes they unleash do not culminate in institutionalizing a type of academic professionalism that fits the classical model which prevails in industrial societies. Instead they lead to the ensconement of models of higher education that deviate considerably from this pattern, which was originally the standard or ideal behind the introduction of academic professionalism.

VI. RESULTS OF THE ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH ACADEMIC PROFESSIONALISM

Although efforts to establish academic professionalism lead to results that deviate from the classical model, these results do not always deviate in the same way. Deviations vary according to national contexts because they depend on the specific features of each national process to establish academic professionalism. In spite of these variations, however, it is possible to distinguish certain typical results that demonstrate that the conditions affecting national processes are somewhat more general in nature.

Perhaps the best way of describing both the results of efforts to establish academic professionalism and the way in which they deviate from the classical model of the academic profession would be to take, as our unit of analysis, the one organizational unit that is central to the academic market. This unit is the university.

According to Parsons and Platt,³³ the university, as the dominant type of organization in the academic system, is a highly stratified system in which the lower strata are subordinate to the higher strata. This stratification begins with the non-academic staff (the lowest stratum) and reaches up to the highest levels which enjoy the greatest prestige and academic recognition. The *raison d'être* for this type of institution lies in its special function: fiduciary responsibility for the values of cognitive rationalism and their implementation through the processes of critical evaluation. In any case, this description seems to fit university realities in countries where academic professionalism is consolidated, and is accepted as the model for universities that form part of the classical model of academic professionalism.³⁴

These authors also identify three other models that can compete with their own, but reject them because they are incompatible with the institutionalized values of the profession. The models are:

a) The academic market model in which academics are the producers of academic services and students are the consumers of these services.

To differentiate this model of the academic market from the model described in the first part of this study, we must speak of a model involving the purchase and sale of academic services.

This expression makes the difference clear between the concept of academic activities as the production of services for consumption by a student public and the idea of an academic market as a job structure at the service of the system for distributing prestige based on academic excellence.

b) The bureaucratic organization model in which bureaucratic authorities are those who intervene decisively in academic processes, academics represent the middle level (implementation) and students are similar to labourers who obey orders.

c) The democratic association model in which all those involved are like citizens who participate on an equal footing, including not only academics and students, but also, at times, staff with no academic qualifications or aspirations.

In terms of the Parsons-Platt model, the three models described are definite anomalies. The reasons for rejecting them are not as important here as the fact that these models adequately describe the types of results that generally arise from attempts to establish academic professionalism.

That is to say, these processes frequently culminate in institutionalizing situations that are much closer to models for the purchase and sale of academic services, bureaucratic organization or democratic association (or close to some combination of the three) than to institutionalizing the type of university situation assumed in the classical model of academic professionalism.

It is not difficult to find empirical examples of each case. The market for the purchase and sale of academic services is well exemplified by the lower quality subsystem (in some cases governmental, and private in others) that has emerged in almost all Latin American university systems. It is also exemplified by plans to convert the entire university system to the market logic of the purchase and sale of educational services, such as the neoliberal plan for the university system in contemporary Chile.³⁵

The bureaucratic organizational model suitably describes the university situation in countries with authoritarian political systems. In turn, the democratic association model was adopted by reformed Chilean universities prior to 1973 and is similar to models that apply in public universities in Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela.

The general conditions that favoured the emergence of one type or another can be identified with a fair amount of certainty.

In cases that resemble the democratic association model, the pattern followed by academic professionalism as it evolves is probably determined by: a) the existence of an innovative or modernizing coalition in which a politicized student movement predominates - this politicizing frequently adopts a radical form; b) the existence of

external power resources which the coalition can use for support, or at least, a general political climate that tolerates the coalition.

In turn, cases resembling bureaucratic organizational models and educational services market models appear to presuppose: a) a fairly radical exclusion of students and student movements; b) modern academic groups that are weak or have been weakened through conflicts which they have lost; c) predominance of traditional university sectors with strong support from external power resources. The most extreme instance of this support is government intervention in the university system which leads to the establishment of a bureaucratic organizational model.

In any of these three types of situation, the gap between them and the classical model of academic professionalism is large enough to distort the initial objectives of efforts to establish academic professionalism, often making them unrecognizable.

VII. CONCLUSION: THE CONSEQUENCES FOR ACADEMIC PROFESSIONALISM

The situations that imply the greatest distortion in the classical model of academic professionalism are those closest to the model of the market for the purchase and sale of education services.

These situations really represent a regression to the traditional system of higher education.

The primacy of research or the production of scholarship has no place in them. On the contrary, academic activities are exclusively limited to teaching.

However, unlike the structure of part-time academic positions that was central in the traditional system, what is being offered here

is a number of academic working hours that are paid for per unit. The situation is much closer to that of the classical labour market in which universities demand teaching labour and the labour force constitutes a relatively undifferentiated pool, similar to a semi-skilled or almost unskilled labour force. In other words, teaching has become relatively proletarian.

In this sense, rather than a return to the traditional system, what is being created here is a debased traditional system.

The traditional system involved conferral of prestige that was supplementary to the main source prestige which depended on the various professions. When traditional academic positions disappear the generalized social prestige associated with them also disappears.

In the degraded system what we have is a market for the sale of teaching services which professionals use as a strategy for survival or to supplement their incomes. Successful sale of these teaching services does not generate any prestige beyond that produced by professional success in general.

Under these conditions, no academic market exists and no academic community of any kind can survive.*

In situations that resemble the bureaucratic organizational model, the main deviations from the classical model have to do with two decisive questions: a) control over creating vacancies and filling vacant positions, and the criteria regulating this control; and b) regulating academic freedom in coherence with the ideology of academic freedom.

* Defenders of the market for the purchase and sale of academic services try to assimilate it to the classical model of the type described by Parsons and Platt, stressing the competitive nature of both. This is either the result of error or bad faith. The classical model presupposes university centres that complete

In these situations, bureaucratic authorities typically have a decisive say in the processes of creating vacancies and filling vacant posts, and generally regulate these processes using ideological criteria that have nothing to do with academic achievement, and only secondarily using criteria that are truly academic.

In turn, bureaucratic authorities impose discipline and an ideological "policy" that narrowly restrict the scope of academic freedom.

for academics, in an attempt to attract those with the greatest prestige. The bait for academics is the prestige of the department that wishes to hire them. In turn, the prestige of the department depends on the prestige of its members, and their prestige depends on their academic excellence as judged and recognized by their peer group based on their production of scientific knowledge or scholarship. The main element here is competition for prestige.

In the model of the purchase and sale of academic services, the university is ruled by the logic of maximizing the profit that can be obtained by selling services to students - in other words by selling diplomas. Here, the salary received by teachers is simply charged to costs, and the idea is to keep them as low possible. The only incentive that may encourage independent universities to compete for prestigious academics is that this might influence student decisions as to where they will purchase academic services. In other words, better off students may prefer universities where prestigious academics teach. Aside from the fact that this is highly doubtful, if it were true then prestige would be judged not by the academic community but by an undifferentiated public. Under these conditions, the criterion of academic excellence will be replaced by other criteria which have nothing to do with it: appearances in the mass communications media, political relevance, popular works for the public at large, etc. This would constitute a pseudo-academic system of prestige that would not in any way stimulate the production of scientific knowledge or scholarship.

In the case of Chile, Brunner's analysis³⁶ shows that the most probable result of this kind of situation, insofar as academic behaviour is concerned, is the predominance of ritualistic behaviour as defined by R. Merton.³⁷

This conformism in academic behaviour produces two important results.

On the one hand, it diverts the academic's attention from the academic community to the loyalties and behaviour demanded by the university system. In this way both the system of assigning prestige differentials which is central to academic life, and the incentives for the production of scientific knowledge and scholarship that this system entails are especially weakened, leading to low productivity and poor quality production.*

* One of the main mechanisms that produces these conformist effects probably lies in the fact that those individuals who are least able to compete for prestige can always have recourse to strategies based on bureaucratic authority either to gain advantages for themselves or to neutralize the advantages that others have. Individuals may attempt to gain favour with the authorities by stressing the firmness of their own convictions and loyalties, or by pointing out the faults of others in regard to convictions and loyalties. These faults may be real or simply illusions. But the political climate that operates in these situations is willing to give credence to either kind. Of course, denunciation is the classical strategy for bringing faults to light, but other more subtle strategies are almost certainly employed as well.

Ritualism or academic conformism introduces a major block into the situation. Academics may take a profoundly negative general view of what is happening but they are not able to generate dynamics that can overcome the situation.

As a consequence, the only alternative is for change to be produced from outside the system. In turn, the perception of blocking may lead an individual to intensify his ritualistic behaviour thereby producing a vicious circle in which conformity leads to the perception of blocking and the perception of blocking intensifies conformity.

These circumstances do not make the evolution of situations that resemble the bureaucratic organizational model very promising. Although they tend to lay the foundations for an academic market, at the same time they considerably weaken the likelihood that solid academic communities will be formed, and they hamper internal and social acceptance of the ideology of academic freedom. If they last for any length of time, they also create various generations of academic bureaucrats, prearmed with bureaucratic and authoritarian ideas, who are no longer willing to run the risks inherent in an open competition for academic prestige. This group can place formidable obstacles in the path of any attempt at reform.

From the viewpoint of the classical model of academic professionalism, the most favourable case involves situations that resemble the democratic association model.

Undoubtedly, the presence of the student body as a permanent actor in academic life introduces certain dysfunctions which have been

stressed by many, often excessively. The following dysfunctions are worth noting:

a) When a student body becomes relevant, recognition of the academic community tends to be replaced by recognition of this body and prestige from the production of scientific knowledge or scholarship is replaced by prestige won through teaching.

In highly politicized and radical situations, the main source of prestige may simply be the ability to influence people ideologically.³⁸

b) Predominance of the student body makes the ideology of university independence prominent, when interpreted from within the university system as being a demand for ideological pluralism, which replaces the ideology of academic freedom.

This fact is ambiguous. On the one hand, it hampers the formation of academic communities. It has the effect of grouping followers of a given discipline into ideological cliques, which are viewed as legitimate forms of association, and this undoubtedly hinders construction of a purely academic system of prestige and recognition.

However, on the other hand, it establishes a generalized and broad democratic ethos, which is much more favourable to academic freedom than the ethos that prevails in situations resembling the bureaucratic organizational model or the market for the purchase and sale of services.

In spite of the dysfunctions inherent in situations that come close to the democratic association model, we must stress one phenomenon, usually judged negatively, which holds promise in regard to the evolution of democratic associations towards consolidation of

academic professionalism. It involves the fact that the university system is corporate in nature and is relatively isolated from society.³⁹

It is likely that this phenomenon originated in the political radicalization of the student movement. Although this radicalization tends to reproduce national political divisions within the movement, and leans toward the seductive possibility of introducing external power resources into university conflicts, at the same time it leads different groups to adopt defensive strategies aimed more at preserving situations and positions rather than at changing them to gain major advantages.⁴⁰

In the long run, the predominance of strategies of this kind extends to the entire system which begins to define itself in the face of society and government in terms of acquired rights or authentic corporate legitimacy.

This move towards corporatism can be viewed negatively in that the system becomes relatively resistant to social or government demands. However, from the viewpoint of consolidating academic professionalism this resistance must be viewed positively.

On the one hand, it acts as a defence against possible processes of downgrading towards bureaucratic organizational models or the market for the purchase of services. A series of academic bodies acting in a corporate fashion cannot help but develop a high sensitivity to threats to the status quo, and acquire great skill in planning and using defensive strategies to preserve it.

On the other hand, and contrary to what is normally maintained, immunity to outside influences can play a major role as a mechanism for

selecting criteria on which to build a system of prestige differentials based on the achievement of academic excellence.

In fact, relative resistance to social and government demands tends, with time, to blur the lines of conflict, making them less relevant. In turn, once the different groups feel relatively secure in their positions and a relative general balance has been established, collective strategies and group confrontations begin to give way to individual strategies and inter-individual competition.

The situation is reinforced with the entry of new generations into the system, whose mobility can only be determined by academic criteria. Even more, it is possible that these new generations will see advantages in assigning priority to academic criteria.

In short, we have a combination of factors that begin to make it seem rational to use academic excellence as a criterion, and which push towards the constitution and consolidation of academic professionalism.

In comparison with the other kinds of results achieved, situations that resemble the democratic association model are those that exhibit the greatest potential for establishing academic professionalism.

NOTES

1. R.R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution, I, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1959, p. 33.
2. H. White, Chains of Opportunity: System Models of Mobility in Organizations, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970.
3. In the case of the American academic market, Caplow and McGee (T. Caplow and R.J. McGee, The Academic Marketplace, Science Editions, New York, 1961, pages 166-169) show how this market differs from the classical market model. Later, Smelser and Content (N.J. Smelser and R. Content, The Changing Academic Marketplace, University of California Press, Berkley, 1980, pages 1-30) after affirming that the market for academic services is a nightmare for economists, identify a number of variables that differentiate the American academic market from conventional market models.
4. The classical description of this situation is provided by Caplow and McGee in T. Caplow and R.J. McGee, op. cit., passim.
5. J. Ben-David and A. Zloczower, "Universities and Academic Systems in Modern Societies", in La Universidad en transformación. [The University in Transition], Seix Barral Publishers, Barcelona, 1966.
6. J. Ben-David and R. Collins, "Social Factors in the Origins of a New Science: The Case of Psychology", American Sociological Review, Vol. 31, No. 4, August 1966.
7. J. Ben-David, "Scientific Productivity and Academic Organization in Nineteenth Century Medicine", American Sociological Review, Vol. 25, No. 6, December 1960.
8. N.J. Smelser and R. Content, op. cit., page 158.
9. T. Caplow and R.J. McGee, op. cit., page 162.
10. See Appendix B in N.J. Smelser and R. Content, op. cit., pages 186-188.
11. W.O. Hagstrom, The Scientific Community, Basic Books, New York, 1965.
12. J. Ben-David and A. Zloczower, op. cit., pages 61 ff.
13. J.S. Mill, On Liberty, edited by G. Himmelfarb, Penguin Books, Great Britain, 1980.
14. P. Feyerabend, Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, New Left Review Editions, London, 1979.

15. On socialization and discipline in the scientific ethos see L. Lomnitz and J. Fortes, Ideología y Socialización: el Científico Ideal [Ideology and Socialization: the Ideal Scientist], manuscript, Mexico, 2/f.
16. T. Parsons and G.M. Platt, The American University, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1973. Quoted in N.J. Smelser and R. Content, op. cit., pages 156 ff.
17. See the pertinent literature in J.J. Brunner, Los intelectuales: esbozos y antecedentes para la constitución del campo de estudios [The intellectuals: Notes and Background for Defining the Field of Studies], Vol. I, Working Document, FLACSO-Santiago de Chile Program, 1982.
18. On the relationship between German philosophy, universities and academic professionalism, see J. Ben-David and A. Sloczower, op. cit., page 20 ff.
19. In the sense of H.G. Gadamer. See H.G. Gadamer, Verdad y Método [Truth and Method], Sígueme Publishers, Barcelona, 1970.
20. P. Feyerabend, op. cit., pages 47-53.
21. P. Feyerabend, op. cit., page 22.
22. M. Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism, University of California Press, 1977.
23. For what follows, see J.J. Brunner, Universidad Católica y Cultura Nacional en los años 60. Los intelectuales tradicionales y el movimiento estudiantil [Catholic Universities and National Culture in the 1960s. Traditional Intellectuals and the Student Movement], Working Document no. 127, FLACSO-Santiago de Chile Program, October 1981; A. Flisfisch, Situación de mercado y problemas de la profesionalización académica [Market Situation and Problems of Academic Professionalism], Working Document no. 136, FLACSO-Santiago de Chile Program, March 1982. Although these two studies use the Chilean university system as the reference framework, it is likely that the materials they contain apply more generally.
24. E.F. Fuenzalida gives useful information on this point in The Institutionalization of Research in Chile's Universities, a study presented at the annual meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, March 1982.
25. E.F. Fuenzalida, op. cit., pages 17-18.
26. P. Feyerabend, op. cit., page 26.
27. Regarding these cases, see A. Flisfisch, Situación de mercado y problemas de la profesionalización académica [Market Situation and Problems of Academic Professionalism], Working Document No. 136, FLASCO-Santiago de Chile Program, March 1982.

28. A. Flisfisch, Elementos para una interpretación de los procesos de reforma en la Universidad de Chile (1950-1973) [Elements for Interpreting the Processes of Reform in the University of Chile (1950-1973)], Discussion Materials No. 19, FLACSO-Santiago de Chile Program, September 1981, page 63 ff.
29. A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970.
30. E.F. Fuenzalida, op. cit., passim., illustrates this situation well in the case of Chile.
31. On this point, see the general proposals made in A. Flisfisch, Elementos para una interpretación ..., op. cit.
32. An illuminating analysis of this point is contained in J.J. Brunner, Concepciones de Universidad y grupos intelectuales durante el proceso de reforma de la Universidad Católica de Chile: 1967-1973 [Concepts of Universities and Intellectual Groups during the Process of Reforming the Catholic University of Chile: 1967-1973] Working Document no. 133, FLACSO-Santiago de Chile Program, December 1981.
33. T. Parsons and G.M. Platt, op. cit., pages 125 ff.
34. For an empirical analysis of North American universities as modern organizations see P.M. Blau, The Organization of Academic Work, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1973. His conclusions do not contradict the model postulated by Parsons and Platt.
35. J.J. Brunner, Tendencias de cambio en el sistema de educación superior. Chile: 1973-1982 [Trends Towards Change in the Higher Education System. Chile: 1973-1982], Working Document no. 152, FLACSO-Santiago de Chile Program, June 1982.
36. J.J. Brunner, Cultura academica y conformismo en la universidad chilena [Academic Culture and Conformity in Chilean Universities], Working Document no. 150, FLACSO-Santiago de Chile Program, July 1982.
37. R.K. Merton, Teoria y Estructura Sociales [Social Theory and Structure], Fondo de Cultura Publishers, Mexico, 1964, Chapters IV and V. Quoted by J.J. Brunner, op. cit.,
38. J.J. Brunner, Concepciones de universidades y grupos intelectuales ..., op. cit., page 110 ff.
39. The phenomenon is described for Venezuela in O. Albornoz, "Intellectuals and the State: The Case of University Professors in Venezuela", Estudios Sociales, No. 20, Second Quarter, 1979, Santiago, Chile.
40. A. Flisfisch, Situación de mercado ..., op. cit., pages 65-68.

