

**Volume II: an evaluation of Centre supported institutions**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The five centres supported by the IDRC under the special institutional grant program undertake social science research in a difficult, sometimes hostile, environment. Under the military regimes of Chile and Argentina, orders have the force of law, public information is restricted and social knowledge discouraged.
2. Military officers administer universities, approve curriculum and faculty. University education is seen as a technical necessity and the social sciences restricted to undergraduate or a minimum of approved graduate courses.
3. There have been four responses to this situation; by researchers, with the creation of independent research centres; by concerned institutions particularly the church in Chile and the regional organization for the social sciences in Latin America, CLACSO (see Appendix A); by international agencies, who have supported the centres financially and morally; by individuals showing that they are willing to remain in the country and pursue research.
4. The five centres passed from universities or institutions to functioning research organizations and the success of that transition depended on its cause, prior institutional commitment and leadership. Their success has resulted in research policies based on individual, donor or collective preferences.
5. With research as their major objective, distinct research policies have influenced institution building. Institution building depends on a combination of administrative and professional decisions, which together make up institutional policy. The key administrative decisions for the centres have concerned salaries, administrative costs and management; the key professional decisions are membership, internal review and teaching.
6. Centre costs in both countries have risen substantially in the past two years because of inflation and exchange rate policy (see Appendix B). Fixed costs range between 25-35 per cent of a centre's budget; wages between fifty and seventy percent. Institutional funds account for approximately half of the centres' income. Project supported ranged 19 and 47 per cent of centre funds in 1979 and between 7 and 68 per cent in 1980/81. Indirect costs rarely have been charged to projects which have been absorbed by the centres.
7. The centres receive between 90 and 100 per cent of their income from non-domestic sources. The majority of the non-domestic sources are provided by five or six donor agencies. Domestic sources of income are either not available or continue to exclude the centres as recipients.

8. Institutional support grants have allowed centres to maintain a core staff and develop a research policy.
9. The average staff of a centre is around 18 with approximately 15 professionals. The majority of the professionals have masters or doctorate degrees. Staff fluctuate between full and part time depending on the number of projects available. Centres that employ staff by projects alone cannot build a core staff and therefore a strong institution. There are few opportunities for training younger researchers.
10. The Centre contributes to centre building through its Special Institutional Grants program, which is soon to end. These have allowed the centres greater flexibility in their allocation of resources. The funds have been used for project development, training junior researchers and support costs.
11. The Centres have tried to find alternative financial sources through consulting and providing courses. They have found few opportunities.
12. The centres perform an important public function by maintaining a spirit of inquiry and developing social knowledge. Three important activities are meetings, publications and contributions to public debates.
13. The research centres can only continue to develop their institutions if they have adequate funding, so permitting them to define policies and clarify research priorities. Their funds have been seriously eroded by inflation (T.7.2) and the domestic purchasing power of the dollar to establish a continuous research policy and are properly concerned over the deterioration of researchers' job security, younger researchers and their public function.
14. The centres face the problems of long term planning in a short term world. Institutional grants have provided stability to allow the centres to grow and have protected research quality and provided for adequate project development and performance.

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## Introduction

This report presents the results of an evaluation of the Centre's special institutional support program with a number of social science research centres in Argentina and Chile. The evaluation was undertaken between July 13 and July 28, 1980 with the objective of establishing the real value of IDRC's special institutional grants. These grants are to be found as T.6.1. (p.55)

Although modest in scope, this evaluation is broader than first envisaged. The Centre's contribution to the five research centres, although useful and much appreciated, is relatively small when compared to that of other international donor agencies. An understanding of the Centre's contribution has to be seen in the light of the value of all external funding and the purposes to which it is being put. Furthermore, to understand the role of external funding, it is necessary to evaluate both the resources at the disposal of the various centres - financial and human - and most importantly, their organizational mission.

The mission of an organization encompasses more than its formal objectives. The formal objectives of the centres are to undertake research in a particular field such as education or economics. Although an assessment can be made as to their success or failure in completing projects or undertaking worthwhile research, such information would only tell us a limited amount about the organization and how it functions. A research centre has to be viewed in a wide enough perspective to include its recruitment practices, project selection, administrative capacity, and its public function. An organizational mission reflects the character of the organization - its ability to develop and grow as an institution.

An organization is not separate from its environment, which influences the institutional purpose in a variety of direct and indirect ways. This is particularly the case with research organizations which have developmental as well as academic objectives. A hostile or friendly environment influences the way in which an institution approaches its work and therefore the way it grows. It is also reflected in the choice of research topic - permissible or unpermissible - its capacity to recruit and train researchers as well as its choice and approach to research issues.

These three elements - resources, organizational mission and environment - become intrinsic elements in any evaluation of Centre supported research institutions.



## I The research environment in Argentina and Chile

The centres are the product of their environment and to understand both why the centres were created and follow their particular development, it is important to understand that environment.

### 1.1 Research and Social Knowledge

The objective of undertaking research is to reach greater understanding of physical and biological phenomena; since the seventeenth century, scientific understanding has been expressed in the form of laws, absolute truths about the structure of matter, the universe and life on earth. Although the absolute truth of scientific discoveries are modified by further discoveries and questioned by discoveries that do not lend themselves easily to prediction (pace the debates over the discovery of evolution, relativity, the uncertainty principle), most scientists would subscribe to the view that the attainment of knowledge is a cumulative process where partial knowledge will finally lead to fuller and possibly, annus mirabilis, complete knowledge.

These views must seem a luxury to scientists working on problems of development. Too often partial knowledge of crop conditions, bacteria or new strains of corn seem limited to particular countries, regions or areas. Knowledge becomes bounded by its environment in a way that positivism - science as the accumulation of ordered facts - would not lead us to expect. The environment seems to play tricks on what we know and how we know it. There are many illustrations of this in the history of science, but two will suffice. The principals of mechanical computation were worked out by the British mathematician Charles Babbage in the early nineteenth century; however there was little or no ancillary knowledge which would allow either the machine to be built and then to function effectively. His work became a historical curiosity until its potential was understood in this century. Again, the celebrated case of Sir Cyril Burt who apparently cooked up his influential results on the environmental influence of upbringing for separated twins illustrating that nature - the hereditary environment would triumph over nurture - the immediate environment, so influencing fifty years of experimental psychology. Even less pleasing signs of the influence of the environment, as reported the New York Times, are to be found in recent revelations about the validity of a number of recently published medical research experiments, where the data appears to have been falsely reported. The article reached the conclusion that the demands of 'publish or perish' found in modern universities accounted for a great deal of this behaviour.

If the environment - institutional or psychological - influences the progress and results of natural science, then it is more likely to do so with the social sciences. The social sciences have always stood rather nervously at the gate of natural sciences, looking anxiously in but without the wherewithall to enter. Social sciences have developed a number of disciplines - economics, demography, anthropology, sociology - to understand the role of man in society. The very nature of the subject matter has led to confusion about the scientific nature of the disciplines and despair about

finding universal laws of human behaviour. In the late nineteenth century, German philosophers talked about two sciences; the study of nature, Naturwissenschaft, and the study of man and culture, Geisteswissenschaft, implicitly recognizing that these sciences would be founded on different principles. Few have accepted this division, although the majority of social scientists recognize that their truths are partial and bounded by time. Some have even gone as far as declaring social sciences as policy sciences, the accumulation of knowledge for better social engineering or government policies.

Whatever the definition chosen, social sciences are distinct in that they are within the universe being studied. There is little or no distance, in the form of laws or universal truths, from the object of study. Social sciences cannot be abstracted from society and stand apart; their material is around them and their investigative techniques are themselves a social process, which can influence and alter the subject matter itself. Social science without curiosity about the short and long term problems faced by members of that society become arid, speculative and unscientific.

To accept this view of the social sciences is to acknowledge a difference but not to declare the enterprise invalid. The results of social science research influence governments, firms and individuals. Our knowledge of poverty, voting intentions, the long term impact of interest rates have a daily impact on our lives and the way that we view society has been effected by the finding of social research. This is particularly the case in the development process where social problems define the use of knowledge, and rational procedures for a Canadian are not accepted by a Chinese or Indian.

Knowledge from the social sciences emphasises social diversity and human variety; most social scientists hope that these partial truths will provide useful information to enable members of the society to take more rational decisions. Rational decisions depend on an agreed framework to make those decisions and a collective agreement about the goals of the society. Useful social knowledge about the rules of the game and shared objectives depend ironically enough on the existence of these two features; common rules and common objectives.

## 1.2. The military regimes

The regimes of Argentina and Chile neither operate with common rules or common objectives for their societies. The governments of both societies came to power through military coups, believing that they could impose such common rules and behaviour fairly rapidly. The manner in which they have done so seriously increased conflicts within their societies as well as diminishing their chances of success. Both, it should be recalled, took over their respective governments to restore democracy; neither has yet announced a definite date for its restoration. Both regimes claim to have popular support without allowing the means to test that claim

(a) Chile

The Chilean coup of September 11, 1973 was intended to resolve the severe social and economic difficulties being faced by the elected government. These problems were ascribed to the socialism of the leaders of the Unidad Popular whom, it was argued, were hoping to build a communist state in the Southern Cone. The military government of President Pinochet claimed, with important international backing, that only a return to the free market and a respect for property could resolve the country's economic problems. The nation was placed under a state of seige and all political parties were outlawed. The government declared Marxists and friends of Marxists as enemies of the state and proceeded to hunt them down and arrest them. An estimated 10,000 Chileans fled into exile and approximately the same number were captured and imprisoned, often subject to beatings and torture. Although the state of seige ended on March 10, 1978, the state of emergency remains in force allowing the government ample powers over their population. The government claims that human rights are now being respected and as if to show a willingness to change, replaced the notorious Direccion De Inteligencia Nacional (DINA) on August 12, 1977 with the Centro Nacional de Informaciones (CNI) as the chief internal intelligence agency. The CNI however inhabits the same building, uses the same personnel and records as DINA. The government has reduced the number of political prisoners by reclassifying them as either common criminals or under process. According to Amnesty International, there are at least 1,000 people under process - some have been kept for five years without trial and to this has to be added 1,500 disaparecidos, people who were, arrested, captured or kidnapped by para military forces, are not recorded as having entered any official place of detention. No record exists about them; they are considered lost or dead.

The Chilean government, to counter what it regards as communist inspired propaganda, has announced an amnesty of exiles and the development of a new constitution. The conditions for amnesty, where known, are harsh and arbitrary, offering few guarantees. Few have been accepted. A council of state was established in 1978 to review the terms of a new constitution. The terms, as reported in the Latin America Weekly, offer "no hasty return to democracy." The constitution will be the subject of a plebiscite. When approved, it will allow a five year transition to a Presidential election. Augusto Pinochet, will appoint the 120 members of the assembly who will serve with him for this period. A president will serve for six years following his election. The draft indicates that "totalitarian groups" (undefined) will not be allowed to participate.

A number of events this year suggest that the repressive apparatus is being kept in shape. Reports suggest that hundreds were arrested, roughed up and then released on International Women's Day (8 March 1980) and again on May 1, Labour Day, including priests and women. The government has also changed the law to allow them to apply internal exile (relegacion) for three months to those who are defined as "repeated offenders." The government has used this method, sending offenders to remote parts of Chile

for three months, with people found in the Women's Day march and students. Following the murder of Rodrigo Vergura, chief of the Chilean military intelligence school on July 15, the government extended the detention period for those accused of possible terrorist acts from 5 to 20 days. There is no appeal in any of these cases.

Groups within Chile, particularly the Church are seriously worried by the increased repression over the last few months, which is more the result of internal political conflicts within the government, between the blandos and the duros (hardliners), than the result of a real threat to the power of the regime. Those who do not agree with the government, yet advocate peaceful change, are particularly susceptible to such pressure, because they cannot support this government wholeheartedly. Criticism of government actions in whatever sphere has the potential of being used one day, against the writer or teacher.

(b) Argentina

The Argentinian military took over a country on March 24, 1976 which had already been under a state of seige for two years. Faced with increasing social disintegration, the weak and corrupt government of Isabela Peron and increasing terrorism from inside the ruling party (the Montoneros), the armed forces declared themselves the saviours of the country. Their goals are set out in the Act for National Reorganizational Process which established a military junta of the chiefs of the armed forces as the ruling authority with the power to appoint a president; appoint governors, the Supreme Court, Attorneys and other members of higher courts; dissolve and annul national and provincial legislatures and other elected bodies and declare that their own acts have the force of law.

Civilian rights are restricted including the right of arrest without trial, particularly where acts of terrorism and the honour of the military as guardians of the nation are involved. The severe internal disruptions caused by terrorists were seen by the military to be the work of "marxists and intellectuals," so that the wars against subversion had to be undertaken at two levels; physically and ideologically. Where the military junta has tried to put forward its philosophy either as a political plan or a doctrine, it has claimed that it is a society based on Christian values, property and a free market economy. But it has always insisted that any discussion about the future of the country has to come after social order has been re-established.

The re-establishment of social order has taken violent forms. The three armed services decided to use all their military might to exterminate the enemy. They used a variety of intelligence, line and para military forces to arrest anyone who might have been connected with the terrorists. The commander of the army, Roberto Viola, explained his view of these actions in a speech on May 29, 1979.

This war does have, like all wars, a dimension that is different from the value of life. For that reason, it is a war. Dams and barriers are broken. Life and death are gambled for the purpose of victory. The worse thing is not loss of life; the worse thing is to lose the war. For that reason, the army which today has restored the value of life can say to the country we have carried out our mission. That is the only and, we believe, the sufficient explanation. The price of this is known to the country and to the army too. This war like all wars had an aftermath; tremendous wounds that time and only time can heal. These wounds are the number of casualties; the dead, the wounded, the detainees and those who will be missing forever. The army knows it and feels it because it is not inhumane or insensitive. The terrorists fought with unbridled arrogance that its assassinations could break the will to win of the mean of arms of the immense majority of the population. Unfortunately, the terrorist group consisted of men and women who had been born on generous soil. They fouled themselves and cast a dark shadow over the soil beneath their cradles. They deceived their supporters, whom they had made anxious and today nobody can legitimately comfort them. These circumstances will undoubtedly widen the gap in the wake of the war because blameless families have been effected by the pain are also Argentine. The Army knows this and feels this. Its only explanation is the liberty which our homeland entrusted to it for safeguarding.

Few speeches capture the tone of public discourse today in Argentina as this one. However, there are a number of other reasons for citing it so extensively. First, the military junta believes that the war on terrorism justifies everything; more recently it has used this doctrine to legitimize its foreign policy (see Appendix F). Second, it alone sees itself as the guardian of the nation; those who oppose it are its enemies. Third, Roberto Viola is to become the president of Argentina in May 1981, when Gen. Videla steps down.

The military government, through its paramilitary and military agents, summarily arrested in a four year period a large number of supposed enemies. The results are frightening; over 6,000 disappeared persons and 9,000 arrested by executive order. The recent reports of Amnesty International, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights and the U.S. State Department implicate the government and confirm their refusal to follow any known legal procedures. Human rights groups which had planned to testify to the InterAmerican Commission had their offices trashed in late 1979 and when members complained, they were abducted for days and in some cases weeks.

#### (c) Information and the Press

Few examples illustrate better the might of these governments and their attitude to information than their treatment of the press. In Chile, all opposition newspapers were closed and not allowed to re-open; censorship

is practiced informally with nods and winks at the appropriate time by the government. In Argentina, newspapers were attacked through the arrest and detention of over a hundred newspapermen; the most famous case was that of Jacobo Timmerman, who was arrested in 1977, has his newspaper La Opinion taken over by the military, was finally stripped of his rights as an Argentine citizen and sent to Israel. Robert Cox, the editor of the only newspaper not run by the military, the Buenos Aires Herald, left Argentina in late 1979 after the life of his children had been threatened for his repeated attacks of disrespect for civilian rights. His successor, James Neilson, has recently been threatened with the same fate (July 1980). An indication from the point of view of Argentine government of their policy success is that there are no longer any foreign correspondents from European or N. American newspapers stationed in Buenos Aires as the government cannot guarantee their safety.

Newspapers generate knowledge about society; their treatment is a touchstone of the way that regimes consider this knowledge. In Argentina and Chile, censorship is necessary for the survival of the regimes and sufficient to emasculate the press.

### 1.3 Higher Education

Social sciences are not necessarily a product of the universities but historically in both these countries they have been intimately linked to them. The political environment, described in the above section, had an immediate and direct impact on the educational system and particularly the structure and functioning of higher education. Both regimes, in Argentina and Chile, have declared their intention of changing the educational system. First, by a thorough going revision of the curriculum at all levels up the University, with an emphasis on technical subjects and patriotism; second, by making education, particularly university education, self financing. Both governments have the power to undertake such reforms because educational resources are paid for by the state; both governments have the will to do so because they see undisciplined education as the cause of social grievances, civics classes are little more than a litany for the patriotic army; in Chile, the textbooks have been revised and teachers re-educated.

The view that education is a technical necessity has been applied to the universities. Since 1973 in Chile and 1976 in Argentina, the universities have been controlled by military appointees. They are serving or retired officers who take their orders from both the junta and the Ministry of Education. Universities are regarded not as places of learning but as places of training. They are to provide the technical knowledge that will grease the wheels of the modern state; knowledge is information and is the result of application not questioning. Needless to say, the humanities and the social sciences take a back seat, if any seat at all.

(a) Chile

There are two major university systems in Chile; the Universidad de Chile with a number of campuses, financed by the state; and the Universidad Catolica de Chile, run by the Church. Both were taken over in 1973 and their rectors and senior officials replaced by military appointees. There were five major results of this action, which remain to the present. First, a large number (an estimated 18,000) of teachers and students left the university; second, the student organizations were banned and then re-organized; third, the university commenced a review of its curriculum, emphasising technical rather than liberal education; fourth, the system was declared to be self-financing and fees were increased. Between 1973 and 1978, they increased five times; and this together with a reduced number of places, because of the cancellation of certain courses and in some cases faculties, resulted in 128,000 applying for 23,500 places in 1979. Fifth, a number of major research centres were ejected from the University.

These actions have led to a university system which provides technical information but little or no opportunity to study the social and other problems of Chilean society. Teachers can be dismissed at will, with or without student support. The Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, (AHC), the higher educational co-ordinating organization of the Church in Chile, estimates that between January and June 1980, 530 full and part time professors have been dismissed from the universities. These include 300 from the Universidad de Chile, 141 from the Universidad del Norte, 41 from the Universidad Tecnica, 31 from the Universidad de Concepcion and 17 from the Universidad Catolica, (Santiago). Although a small number may be because of old age or incompetence, the numbers lead the AHC to consider that this is part of a wider campaign to purify the teaching staff and diminish the size of the universities. Two illustrations show that professors have to face both ways. In November of last year, Andres Sanfuentes, the Head of the Instituto de Economia at the University of Chile, was dismissed because he had agreed too readily with income distribution figures produced outside the university. The government made it known to him and seventy other colleagues who were also dismissed that they expected such figures to be firmly refuted because the data suggested increasing income inequality. Where students have supported their professors - and there have been occasions recently - not only have the professors been expelled but students as well. Indeed the procedure of internal exile, relegacion, was introduced for this apparent reason.

Conversations with university students and teachers convinced us that this was seriously hampering the open expression of ideas in the social sciences.

(b) Argentina

A similar pattern and philosophy is to be found in Argentina. Here there is a wider variety of institutes of higher education, so that the smaller private universities have not had military appointments, although their syllabus has to be presented to the newly titled Ministry of Education and Worship. The negative results for the social sciences have been both quantitative and qualitative. Psychology departments in most universities have been drastically reduced and told to concentrate on experimental or behavioural psychology; the sociology faculty of the University of Buenos Aires has been drastically reduced in numbers, its post graduate course cancelled, and its status changed to a department of the Law Faculty. Text-books have been thoroughly revised and one of the recommended texts deals with the philosophy of man from an anti-Darwinian viewpoint. Students are expected to learn by rote and, wishing to pass their examinations, do so.

It would be a mistake to believe that only social science faculties have been effected. Medical, mathematics and other scientific faculties have had personnel revisions. The most famous case was the arrest and detention of the nuclear physicist, Antonio Masetich, together with a number of other colleagues working in the Argentinian Atomic Energy Commission.

The government is hoping to introduce a new Law governing the universities. This was due to be published by the end of the year, but only part of the text is known. Two features are worth mentioning. The Rector and his administrative staff will control the universities without consultation from the teaching or the student body; article 20 allows for immediate dismissal of a student without recourse, if he is suspected of "adhering to or disseminating totalitarian conceptions."

1.4 Responses

The present environment for research and research organization is made up of policy as orders rather than discussion; a conservative and military ideology; a revision of the educational system; the exclusion of most social sciences from the universities, and governments who believe that society has to be remade through their version of the market philosophy.

This environment is not propitious for open discussion. Social criticism is curtailed and proposals for research as well as research results are self censored in the interests of personal and institutional preservation. However, both countries have a long tradition in the natural sciences and humanities. Those who remain have tried to find ways of preserving that tradition and it is important to them and to the social sciences that they continue their research work. Such work has been continued through a number of mechanisms, notably independent research centres.



(a) the creation of the centres

Research centres in the social sciences are independent institutions dealing with particular social issues such as demography or economics. Although commencing as collections of individuals, the majority have tried to create an institutional base and collective way of working which will preserve their research endeavours. A full discussion of the centres is to be found in volume I. These remarks will concentrate on those centres currently receiving special institutional support.

The creation of the centres in Argentina is the result of the environment and reasons internal to the social science community. Both these factors have led to the particular pattern found in and between the centres. To understand why this is the case, it is important to understand the dominance of the Instituto Torcuato di Tella (ITT) for social science research during the sixties.

The Instituto Torcuato di Tella is named after the founder of the SIAM company, one of Argentina's major firms. As an institution still dominated by the family it has gone through a number of phases; first as an arts centre supporting sculpture, music and the plastic arts; then in the 1960's when Enrique Orteiza became its director a major push into the social sciences and planning. During this period, economics and history were joined by research centres within the Instituto studying urban and regional planning, public administration, political science and demography. When Orteiza left, to be replaced by Roberto Cortes Condé, a well-known economic historian, his departure coincided with financial and academic issues. Money once no object, had become one; Cortes Condé and the family believed that ITT should be modelled on a research institute such as St. Antony's, Oxford. These two facts led to a realignment of resources toward a more academic and private research centre, which ITT remains today.

The changes led to disagreements about the purpose of the Instituto. Although some universities had post graduate courses, ITT had fulfilled that role for most Universities in the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires, the majority in the country. Many of those who disagreed with the decisions of the ITT considered that it has a wider social role and greater responsibility than that of a private institute taking decisions with a purely institutional perspective.

A substantial number of senior researchers left between 1975-77 to found centres which could undertake the kind of research they wished in a way that they wished. These included the Centro de Estudios de Poblacion (CENEP), the Centro de Estudios Urbanos y Rurales (CEUR) and the Centro de Investigacion sobre la Administracion Publica (CIAP) which was later to divide into the Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (CEDES) and the Centro de Investigacion sobre el Estado y Administracion (CISEA). Although a number of the more famous researchers received offers from the ITT, there were a number of differences

apart from the way that the institution was run, which would have made their remaining difficult. Such issues included the role of social science research as a policy rather than academic knowledge and the importance of teaching, neither of which were to have a high priority in the institution.

CEDES was established on 15 July 1975 by a number of researchers led by Guillermo O'Donnell. They believed that their multidisciplinary research could be concentrated on the role of the state and that they should explore its many manifestations. They expected to undertake a full range of research (see T.I.1.) on sociological and economic themes.

CEUR decided to set up on its own, to both preserve its collective work and to promote its research. This group traces its origins back to 1961 and the majority have worked together since then in a number of regional and metropolitan institutions before leaving ITT after ten years in 1977. This group places particular emphasis on collective participation which owes much to the intellectual leadership of Jorge Hardoy.

In Chile, with the exception of FLACSO, research centres have evolved from the University. CIEPLAN and PIIIE were both constituent research centres within the Catholic University undertaking interdisciplinary work with a semi-autonomous status. There is a contrast between them, however, in that the group that formed CIEPLAN left voluntarily; PIIIE was forced out of the University.

The CIEPLAN researchers have an international reputation and as will be seen, received international support. In their own words,

The organization of CIEPLAN was motivated by the willingness of a group of social scientists to maintain a tradition of independent academic research on fundamental economic and social problems related to Chilean and Latin American societies under a context in which for a number of reasons, this activity has been seriously curtailed in the Universities.

They received their legal status from the Ministry of Justice as a private corporation in 1976.

PIIE remained within the University where it was hoped that it could survive as a centre for research on educational policies within the Catholic University framework. This proved to be impossible as this account by Jeffrey Puryear of the Ford Foundation shows.

Unfortunately, however, PIIIE became increasingly affected by the partizan policies which have dominated Chilean universities since the 1973 military takeover of the government and in mid - 1977 was summarily dissolved by University officials. This action was preceded by a series of informal threats and harrassments in the form of piecemeal decreases in University support, subtle and effective moves to force the resignation of PIIIE's most experienced leaders, Dr. Ernesto Schiefelbein and Dr. Beatrice Avalos, and

suggestions that PIIIE was not doing sufficient research of direct interest to the University. Simultaneously, relationships with the University's military rector, Admiral Jorge Swett, and its academic vice rector, Fernando Martinez cooled perceptibly primarily because of the group's politically pluralist composition. Although possessing no record of political activity, PIIIE eventually found itself confronted with the partisan attitudes and distrust for social science research which has characterized the University in recent years and, in due course, was expelled.

The expulsion of PIIIE illustrates a number of lessons about the University. First, PIIIE was accused of being a centre of US imperialism because it accepted funds from the Ford Foundation, and so their leaving was a blow for national pride. Secondly, the dismissal notices contained the phrase that "research was no longer a priority of the University". If the consequences were not so serious, one might have thought that these were passages from Through the Looking Glass. The decision of the group to maintain itself was supported by the Catholic authorities, now no longer in charge of their own university, but with a new institution, the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano.

The same institution supported the Facultad de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) when it faced serious problems in 1979. FLACSO is an independent body, created in 1956 with UNESCO support, to promote research in and the teaching of the social sciences on a regional basis. At that time, there were only four graduate courses in the social sciences in Latin America. FLACSO, by drawing on Latin American scholars, was to organize post graduate courses, undertake research and diffusion of the results. Agreements were entered into with a number of governments, and faculties were established in Argentina and Chile. At present, there are also faculties in Ecuador, Mexico and Costa Rica. FLACSO, unlike the other centres, is an international organization. Agreements are made with the host governments and the officials and teachers receive international privileges.

FLACSO (Chile) built up an excellent reputation particularly for its post graduate master's course on the Social Aspects of Population, as well as for its research faculty and its incomparable library. From 1976 to 1979, the government harrassed the institution particularly over the interpretation of the international agreement. In 1979, FLACSO was informed that the government no longer accepted the agreement. The Chile branch is no longer an international organization but a member group of the AHC with which it signed a two year agreement on 4 October 1979.

None of these institutions are part of the official state run higher educational system. They would like to be, but the opportunity for independent research in the social sciences does not exist in either Argentina or Chile. By deciding to become independent institutions, all the centres took a considerable risk. In this, they were helped by national and regional institutions.

(b) national and regional organizations

The departure of the centres from universities and stable research institutions has wide implications indicating a new role for the universities and a rejection of social sciences as a critical research discipline. Social knowledge and humanistic studies depend on research and discussion; on the critical examination of all ideas and therefore on a forum where such discussions might take place.

In Chile, the church established such a forum as the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano on November 12, 1975, directly sponsored by the Cardinal, Raul Silva Henriquez. Its aims are to "promote research, development and communication of the humanities and the social sciences" which it does through projects, programs and study circles. Like all such institutions, it is run on a shoe string with overcrowded premises and tolerant goodwill. The officials of the AHC are clear about their objectives which are to provide a place for discussion where none exists; to promote critical reflection on society and encourage research and diffusion in a wide variety of topics, not dealt with at the University, for all interested citizens. They are also quite clear that this is not a University. Enrique d'Etigny, once Head of the Engineering Faculty and now a director of the AHC, said recently that,

The Academy is not the University of the Cardinal. The Church has its universities and these, sooner or later, ought to be restored to it.

The AHC provides a legal umbrella for many of the centres. It is both difficult and costly to become an independent centre; CIEPLAN spent several years becoming one. Centres like PIIE or FLACSO can sign agreements with the AHC so obtaining legal status under Chilean law as programs of the Academia. The Academia charges a small (five per cent) overhead.

The Academia has developed a number of projects on history, the law and political philosophy; programs on work and labour, agricultural research and education. Probably its most impressive activity is support for the "Circulos de Refleccion", courses and seminars on a wide variety of topics which are attended by researchers, students, and interested people. There are twelve such circles and in July 1980 alone there were meetings scheduled on the role of women, health, education, economy, law, planning and medicine. Many of the meetings are held at the weekend so that people can attend their jobs. Much of the pressure for the courses comes from students at the Universities. The Academia, backed by the power of the church, plays a crucial role in maintaining the centres and research in the social sciences.

There is no equivalent organization in Argentina. The major Universities are lay institutions, dependent on state financing, so that the Church cannot have the same interest in University education. Support has come from the regional organization of the social sciences in Latin

America, the Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales, (CLACSO) which has its headquarters in Buenos Aires. Founded in 1967, its basic purpose has been to "contribute to the development of associate centres and a better communication between them." CLACSO, together with its other activities, has been able to offer moral and financial support to the centres in the Cono Sur, through its information, contracts and individual assistance program. The Centre has supported part of this program which is described and evaluated in Appendix A of this report.

The lack of any organization in Argentina, similar to the AHC, places an added burden on the centres. There is no forum where researchers can meet to discuss social science issues or provide a moral focus for their work. They must rely on their own commitment.

### (c) international

International agencies have provided financial and moral support to the centres. Their involvement in Argentina and Chile has passed through three phases; preserving lives and protecting academics; supporting institutions and concerned interest.

Following the coup, many international agencies tried to protect lives through international pressure, facilitate leaving the country and ease the exiles entrance into their new homes. The second phase, supporting institutions, followed with passing of the immediate crisis. Then it had become clear that under certain circumstances, social science scholars and centres could function in their own country, providing they found independent support. The Ford Foundation, which then had a number of regional offices in Latin America including Santiago, was particularly instrumental in encouraging scholars to remain, through financial and moral support. In some cases, they had supported them within the University system; now they were to do so collectively and individually. Ford was joined by a number of other agencies including the Centre, SAREC, the Freidrich Ebert Foundation and a number of other independent foundations. Bilateral agencies found that they could not obtain recipient government approval to support researchers.

Most agencies, such as our own, placed a high value on the ability of researchers to stay in their own country and continue their work. National and development policy requires eclectic thought and ideas to capture all the vicissitudes of their application, and social science research is one of the ways in which social actions can be monitored. Moreover, science or not, the study of society offers a perspective on social development which is not dependent on convenient official formulae or wishful thinking. It was expected that research support would provide a bridge for scholars and centres until they could be reintegrated into the working life of the country.

The third phase, concerned interest, is a result of previous expectations and current trends. Most observers, basing themselves on history and the stated intentions of the regimes, considered that democracy would be reintroduced relatively quickly, that the military regimes were a short interval between two civic acts in the political theatre. This has proved

to be untrue. Both governments have made it clear that there will be no return to parliamentary or presidential democracy as previously practiced; that in any constitution the military will have a determining role; that political parties must accept the new rules or face extinction and that public opinions can only be expressed by those who support these plans. Public support is required only for approval not participation. Rather than a few years, a return to civilian life might take a decade and therefore centres and scholars who can only thrive breathing pluralist air might have to be supported for a greater amount of time than first envisaged.

Quite naturally, many agencies find difficulty in coming to terms with these conditions. Not only are they abnormal, but the agencies have many other calls on their funds. Their perspective may be limited to the budget cycle or be changing. Some agencies, such as the Ford Foundation, are limiting their support to particular project areas. Most agencies, perhaps following the example of the Centre, would prefer to support projects rather than institutions. Some would like to believe that the conditions for institutional development exist in Argentina and Chile and the countries are returning to normality. The evidence for a judgement on these issues is to be found in the following chapters, but it is the case that many agencies would prefer short rather than long, project rather than institutional, commitments to the centres.

(d) personal

For individual scholars and academics working in the centres, there is no issue. They have chosen to stay in their countries, often in difficult circumstances, because they believe in the value of social science research and in its contribution to social knowledge. They receive little money, find their status changed and worry about the future of their centres.

The personal cost of this process has been high. All centres are subject to annual police revision which in the early years could result in the loss of papers or books. Because of their public positions, as citizens unwilling to accept the regime's definition of their society, they often have to face small harrassments. Telephones are apparently tapped, passports issued slowly and tax forms revised in miniscule detail.

More personally, there is the cost and uncertainty of not being able to act with complete confidence in private and public. A number of people whom I knew five years ago seem more tense and much older than their contemporaries in Canada or other countries.

Above all, the researchers are committed to the continuation of their centres and research. A number have received attractive offers from international agencies and have turned them down because of their responsibilities to present and future research.

### 1.5. Research and the environment

Is it possible to undertake worthwhile research in such environments? Are not the constraints too serious and the issues too difficult for effective social science investigations?

The very existence of the centres is proof that their members do believe that social science research is necessary and possible in Argentina and Chile. There are a number of constraints, in practice, that one must take account of. First, the type of research undertaken is constrained by the resources available. Second, certain social science methods, such as large national surveys are difficult to undertake even if the centres could afford it. Surveys require the co-operation of state institutions (such as the Census bureau) and sometimes the permission of the government. Third, the treatment of the subject matter must often be tempered. Description and analysis should not lead to explicit policy recommendations - they should remain implicit. Fourth, care has to be taken with diffusion and dissemination. Writing in confidence about dissemination one centre noted that,

In this area the sensitivity toward the political context has to be extreme. Up to now we have been very cautious regarding the organization of academic seminars and meetings. We have also been cautious in our distribution of our documents and publications. For the future our strategy will have to be a flexible one so as to be able to react to whatever signals or clues are available regarding the feasibility of our program.

Providing there is self censorship most of the centres can continue to undertake research. The secret is low visibility.

The research output has been of a high quality, particularly in Chile, where the institutional base is firmer. Research in economics and education has been particularly fruitful, with several papers which have led to international as much as regional debate. The work of economic stabilization policy in Chile and Argentina has led to conferences in North America and Europe; on education and poverty in Chile to an analysis of the methodology at a regional level. It is probably invidious to emphasize these areas because each of the centres can point to well thought out research work and interesting results.

For all the constraints on their research work, Chilean and Argentinian scholars continue to provide intellectual leadership in a very competitive environment. Working in a hostile research environment has acted like heat on steel, tempering the material and providing it with flexibility, strength and focus.

TABLE I.I. Centre Supported Research Centres in Argentina and Chile

<u>The Centres</u>	<u>Research Areas</u>
<p>1. <u>Centre de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad, (CEDES)</u></p> <p>Hypolito Yrigoyen 1156 Buenos Aires 1086</p> <p>Director: Elizabeth Jellin</p>	<p>1. Economic policies</p> <p>2. Urban poverty</p> <p>3. Micro social effects of government policy</p> <p>4. Bureacracy and public policy</p> <p>5. Labour and labour unions in the 1970's</p> <p>6. Public enterprises and international trade</p> <p>7. Political parties in the Cono Sur</p>
<p>2. <u>Centro de Estudios Urbanas y Regionales, (CEUR)</u></p> <p>Bartolome Mitre 2212, Buenos Aires</p> <p>Director: Oscar Yujnovsky</p>	<p>1. Urban problems and policies in Argentina</p> <p>2. Regional problems and policies in Argentina</p> <p>3. Urban and regional development in Latin America</p>
<p>3. <u>Corporacion de Investigaciones Economicas para Latinoamerica, (CIEPLAN)</u></p> <p>Av. C. Colón, 3494 Santiago 9, Chile</p> <p>Director: Oscar Muñoz</p>	<p>1. Employment, underemployment and poverty</p> <p>2. International economics and co-operation</p> <p>3. Public policies and the role of the state</p>
<p>4. <u>Programa Interdisciplinaria de Investigacion en Educacion, (PIIE)</u></p> <p>Luis Videla Herrera 2360 Santiago 9, Chile</p> <p>Director: Rafael Echeverría</p>	<p>1. Education and Poverty</p> <p>2. Action research in marginal communities</p> <p>3. Teaching alternatives</p> <p>4. Impact of the educational system</p> <p>5. Education and Development</p>
<p>5. <u>Facultad Latinamericano de Ciencias Sociales, (FLACSO)</u></p> <p>Leopoldo Urrutia 1950 Santiago, Chile</p> <p>Director: José Joaquin Bruner</p>	<p>1. Social structure and the political process</p> <p>2. Social movements</p> <p>3. Culture, ideology, education</p> <p>4. International relations</p>



## II      The centres: development and policy

The early years of the centres have been dominated by the struggle for survival. Their development has been conditioned by a search for scientific and institutional legitimacy in an environment hostile to those aims. For many of the researchers the change was dramatic, altering career, job security, as well as testing their beliefs in the utility of social research. They moved from the relatively secure world of monthly pay cheques, offices, educational and professional status to irregular incomes, crowded premises and uncertain futures; they moved in one unwelcome step, from university career to entrepreneur.

The centres have coped with the change in various forms, resolving their institutional objectives and mission as well as their comprehension of their relevance to their society.

### II.1      The transition

The success of the transition - from research group to research institution - can be seen in hindsight to have depended on three factors. These are the way that the transition came about, the prior institutional coherence of the group and leadership. The most successful centre(s) were fortunate enough to possess all three factors.

The transition from university unit to independent centre came about in three different ways (see p. 15f above). These can be classified as collective choice (CIEPLAN), mutual agreement (CEUR, CEDES) and expulsion (PIIE, FLACSO). CIEPLAN was formed by three internationally known economists who believed correctly that the direction and range of their research would be limited by remaining at the Catholic University. In that decision, they were joined by almost all the members of the research unit, then known as CEPLAN, who considered that their research careers were more important than their university careers. The decision of CEUR and CEDES to leave ITT was also a collective decision in that no one was forced to go, but because it was less aggressive and less directed, taking a number of years in some cases, it was different in kind from that of CIEPLAN. Rather there was a realization that the world they had built in the Instituto di Tella was slowly being taken from them. Finally PIIE and FLACSO were subjected to bureaucrat irritations and a lack of institutional comprehension so that they were given no choice. PIIE realized that it was being harrassed and various individuals left believing that it was their presence that was causing the problems. FLACSO knew what the government thought about it - they had received enough evidence - but could not foresee the time when the agreement would be abrogated.

The second factor, prior institutional coherence, is implicit in the comments of the previous paragraph. CIEPLAN and CEUR have the greatest institutional coherence because as a working group they have been together longer. The CIEPLAN economists had not been popular with the left wing of the Allende government and were considered trimmers; their work was considered too rigorous and without a redeeming ideology. Many of the researchers in this group had held government positions under Frei and were able to build up an institutional coherence precisely because they held occasional official positions. CEUR had worked together as a group from 1961 in an area normally dominated by architects with little or no social science training. Their intellectual objectives - understanding urban and regional planning and structure - maintained their coherence as a group, because in a world of broad aims they were specialists in one particular field.

If CIEPLAN and CEUR had the greatest institutional coherence, PIIE and FLACSO, because they were expelled as units, also maintained their's under great strain. In both institutions, there was a process of attrition. The two intellectual leaders of PIIE either left the country or took other positions, while a number of the researchers left the Program to return to line University functions. The non Chilean faculty of FLACSO gradually left the country, destroying the regional base of the Santiago organization, one of its great advantages to students and teachers alike. One organization only, CEDES, had to build a structure where none had existed. Although associated within ITT, many of the CEDES members first left to found CIAP which later divided into two organizations, CEDES and CISEA. The division was mutually agreed and had a lot to do with how the institutions are run and organized. (see Appendix E)

The foundation of a new organization such as CEDES or CISEA depends a great deal on the third factor, leadership. In the case of CEDES, the administrative entrepreneur and intellectual leader was Guillermo O'Donnell. People joined CEDES as much because of his capacity as for an idea; in contrast CISEA was formed with a much clearer idea of the collective task of forming an institution. Leadership has played an important, though less vital role, in the development of the other organizations. Alejandro Foxley, the President of CIEPLAN, saw that the topics and style of economic research would be limited by the changes taking place in the University. Jorge Hardoy long ago earned the respect of CEUR so that when he was told not to return to Argentina, at the time of the Vancouver Habitat conference, there were people capable of running the organization in his spirit.

Only CIEPLAN combined the three characteristics of a collective decision to leave the University, prior institutional coherence and leadership so that they swiftly moved through the transitional period to an institutional base. CEUR has relied on its long collective association which has seen it through difficult times. FLACSO and PIIE had a prior institutional coherence but their expulsion put severe strains on their

leadership. PIIE after three years has begun to resolve its leadership and organizational problems through patient collective decisions; FLACSO, which is still in the throws of transition, has yet to resolve them. CEDES has tended to remain an organization dependent on individual initiatives.

The overriding objective of undertaking independent research is as important as the transitional features which influence their development. The centres were created by people determined to work together, both to pursue research and to confirm the value of social knowledge. In most cases they received valuable social and financial support from the Ford Foundation; only FLACSO, until 1979 an ongoing international organization, did not require commencement funding, but did receive from the Foundation, an emergency transition grant. These grants were often given without any clear idea as to the duration of the transition or the resources needed to build a complete institution. Then, as now, the important element is to keep the institutions functioning.

The problems of creating an institution are complex under normal circumstances, but hazardous in the environment of Argentina and Chile. Although these five centres do not include all the surviving institutions the universe of surviving institutions is far less than attempted institutions, itself far less than intentions. It is not difficult to see why. Building an institution depends on more than a scholarly commitment to continue research, but a willingness to submit academic and research decisions to collective agreement. The two most important set of decisions concern research and the nature of the institution.

## II.2. Research policy

All the centres considered in this sample are research centres with research knowledge as their primary objective. Although some centres have tried to take on other functions (see Chapter V), the majority of those interviewed wished their institutions to be judged by the quality and value of their research.

The major research areas are set out in T.1.1. (p.23). Each of the centres commenced their program with a key research topic; the role of government and the state (CEDES), urban and regional planning (CEUR), economic policy (CIEPLAN), and educational policy (PIIE). FLACSO, as a teaching institution, covered most of the social sciences with an emphasis on sociology. As the centres overcame their transitional problems and realized that they would be permanently excluded from the University by the present regimes, so they were faced with developing a research policy.

There are three types of research policy. First, individual preference where in the academic tradition the research subjects are defined by the researchers alone. Second, donor preference where the research topics are the result of funding opportunities and third, institutional preference where research endeavours result from collective choices. The more developed the organization as a coherent institution, the more it will want to set its own research policy.

Those centres without a strong prior institutional commitment began in the academic tradition, with individual preference. CEDES began and continues in this tradition, principally because the researchers who make up its staff have regional or international reputations and believe that CEDES reputation depends as much on them as it does on the name of the institution. FLACSO with seventeen staff, many with important contributions to the social sciences in Latin America, sees its research as a matter of individual preference.

Donor preference can have a crucial influence on research policy particularly with new institutions. This was well understood by the founders of the Centre who insisted that research priorities should be set by researchers and not office bureaucrats or in house experts. The flexibility of donor agencies is particularly important with centres trying to find their financial feet, as it can make the difference between research policy set by institutions and those set by the perceptions of the agencies themselves. PIIIE is a striking example of how donor funds have influenced research priorities for their major project support is now in the field of action research, with less money in applied research and no research support at all for basic research. There is a danger that the staff may have to learn new skill inadequately and that the research, which depends on their research understanding, runs down valuable human capital. These issues are discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

Research policy set by institutions is the exception rather than the rule. Only CIEPLAN has been able to keep to its research goals, issuing a stream of valuable reports on economic structure, policy and theory which have relevance for Chile and Latin America. They have achieved this position because success in policy making at the research level is cumulative. Reputations are earned by past work and it is easier to obtain support if the reputation exists. It is more difficult where the research institution is run by relatively unknown people and where there is no international community - as there is in economics - which can pass informal judgements.

The type of research policy should be seen within the context of the building of an institution. The research centres do not believe they have a completely free choice about research topics, but they know that without judging the relevance to their institution and the utility for the society, they cannot build a research policy. Of course,

individual preferences are respected and donor agencies receive valuable information because personal satisfaction and finance are key elements for research endeavor. However, without research choices made with centre interests in mind, it is difficult to build an institution and thus develop an organization character which will allow such complex endeavors to grow.

### 11.3. Institutional Policy

A decision to found a research centre does not make an institution, which can only be built with a combination of commitment and collective decision making. If leadership, finance and luck are important ingredients, their continuation cannot always be assured, so that centre members have to think seriously about the way they take decisions to increase the strength of the centre as an institution. There seem to be, from our conversations, a number of key administrative and professional areas which influence institutional policy.

The administrative decisions concern salaries, administrative costs and the running of the centre; the professional decisions are membership, internal review and teaching.

#### (a) administrative decisions

Administrative decisions over salaries, costs and day-to-day administration can make the difference between a coherent and confused centre.

Too great a salary differential between senior and junior researchers particularly where the opportunities of expansion and therefore promotion are limited, can lead to resentment. Because the centres are small, few have a well defined hierarchy; members have to get on with one another. Nevertheless a difference of \$ 500 dollars can be the difference between comfort and poverty given the rate of inflation and the level of salaries.

Salaries have been set in three ways: by collective agreement, custom and by project. Two institutions, CISEA and CIEPLAN, set their salaries by collective agreement. In CISEA it has been agreed that all members of staff will be involved in salary decisions and that none will earn more than the agreed rate. If a member receives an international consultancy, he or she is expected to pay that to the institution and to receive his normal salary. In 1979 researchers with working spouses did not receive income for more than six months because funds were short and it was decided that those with no other source of income were to be paid first. CIEPLAN's salary policy is set by a three person committee which excludes the senior researchers.

CEUR and FLACSO can be described as setting their salary policy by custom rather than collective agreement because prior salary differentials were accepted by the new organizations. In both cases, the members had worked together for a long period of time and there was an implicit understanding by members of the centres that present differentials would continue.

Both PIIE and CEDES have moved to project defined salaries. This policy concerns less the level of salary than if the researcher is to receive a salary at all. CEDES proposes that its members search for projects in its name and where successful pays a proportion to the institution and receives an income from the remainder. The institutional portion is intended to cover centre running costs, an unemployment fund and a fund for research. PIIE has also moved to this system, with reluctance, in order to diminish overhead costs.

Although perhaps necessary, project defined salaries alter the concept of a centre staff and could lead to competition between researchers for project money and centre affiliation. Such a policy diminishes the possibility of building an institution just as collective agreement strengthens it.

Where centres administer projects, they have to deal with an associated issue, overheads. PIIE and CEDES have made this the central administrative issue by expecting each project to provide something for the development of their centre. PIIE charges a ten per cent overhead for running costs but is finding that this will not suffice. CEDES hopes to implement a similar policy but has provided no details. The objective of the policy is to find institutional funds through projects, but the danger is that the centres will end up as intellectual holding companies, charging a tax on research that could be undertaken more efficiently in another way.

Centres which receive institutional funds will often subsume these costs and support projects which do not claim these charges. It is unclear whether charging project overheads will work because costs for an institution do not vary as much with fixed (rent, telephones, electricity, etc. have to be paid) as with variable costs, particularly salaries. In this sense, institutional grants support projects and allows centres to see their overheads as stable and not temporary or completely related to workload.

Finally, a centre depends on the willingness of its members to run the centre. Collective decision making will not work unless there are capable executive officers willing to give up their research for the good of the centre. Often this depends on the size of the organization for the larger it becomes the more have to become involved. This has proved to be a problem with a number of the centres with only CIEPLAN which divides the tasks between all researchers, having a successful

management structure. As CIEPLAN does have a large staff, the major management posts are revolved more rapidly, a process which results in more people understanding administration. Management seems as much the results of habit as decisions at CEUR where the senior researchers began to work with each other in 196 . PIIE has resolved its administrative problems by assigning three members of the research staff half time and ensuring that all decisions about research now go through them. CEDES, which does not take much collective decision making, has found it difficult to find members to take on the task full time. Their research policy, based on individual preference, has taken precedence over any institutional decisions. FLACSO, which has only recently become an organization independent of the international network is searching for a new administrative style.

(b) professional decisions

Professional decisions which shape the mission of the institution include membership, internal reviews and teaching.

Membership does not depend entirely on resources but on the concept of the centre. Most of the centres have not expanded their membership because of the fear of too many responsibilities at a time of financial uncertainty. Until last year, both CIEPLAN and FLACSO were increasing their staff and assuming that they could be financed from general funds. Both have not put a moratorium on staff increases. The other centres have a number of practices by which researchers can join, either as members or researchers. CISEA and PIIE have honorary members, researchers who participate but cannot or are not paid from centre funds. A number, particularly in Argentina, have the category of visiting researcher, where the person might work, normally part time on a centre project. In the case of CEUR, there are three such visiting researchers who have their own project money and where the centre provides facilities for their research. One has the impression in most centres that membership is not discussed because it would imply a greater, if only moral, responsibility which they do not want to assume.

A second policy that the centres must define is how to judge the quality of the work they produce. This is undertaken informally and formally, through personal comments and conversations and by seminars where all the staff are present. These discussions are informed and sharp resulting in improved work. Weekly or fortnightly seminars/meetings were held in all the centres visited.

The majority of the researchers commenced their careers as university teachers and realise that without students their work could become arid and self absorbed. Only FLACSO has a teaching faculty, presently providing two courses on population and current trends in Chile. These may not be able to continue without funding. Many of the centres have tried to find ways in which they could continue a teaching program. Their solutions have been personal rather than institutional, although some institutions such as CIEPLAN expect their researchers to participate in the 'Circuitos de Reflección' of the AHC as well as provide

time for teaching at university, when invited. In Argentina, most of centre members teach at the Instituto de Desarrollo de Economía y Sociedad (IDES) or FLACSO, the only two graduate courses open to them, while in Chile the three centres participate in the activities of AHC. The inability to undertake more teaching is frustrating for many centre members particularly because they receive so many requests to do from university students.



## T.2.1.

The Centres; a profile

<u>NAME</u>	<u>FOUNDATION</u>	<u>ORIGIN</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>INITIAL FUNDING</u>	<u>ACCESS</u>	<u>ADMINISTRATION</u>	<u>CORE MEMBERSHIP</u>
CEDES	1975	Di Tella/ CIAP	Soc. science research	Ford-\$50,000	Agreement	No	10
CEUR	1977	Di Tella	Urban/regional research	Ford-\$30,000	Invitation	No	8
CIEPLAN	1974	Catholic University	Economic res and policy	Ford	To Staff	Yes	14
PIIE	1977	Catholic University	Educational re- search/policy	Ford-\$119,000	Projects	Admin Cttee	8
FLACSO	1979	Interna- tional	Soc. science research	Transition funding - Ford IDRC	To Staff	Yes	17

Source: interviews, centre documents.

### III Financial and Human Resources

For the majority of the centres, research policy has taken second place to financial security. This chapter describes the financial position of the centres by looking at total costs, income sources, expenditures and the effect of current finances on the centres. A last section examines human resources.

#### III.1. Total costs

The current budgets of the centres, where available, are set out in T.3.1. All are in current US dollars and demonstrate a significant increase from 1978 on. Both Argentina and Chile have experienced hyperinflation, which coupled with the exchange rate policy, have serious implications for the resource requirements of the centres (see Appendix B).

To understand the budgets, it is necessary to look at how costs are assigned, how projects are costed and the major cost, salary levels.

##### (a) Fixed and variable costs

The distinction between fixed and variable costs is set by convention and is somewhat arbitrary. In this section, unless otherwise indicated, fixed costs are defined as minimum running costs and include rent, electricity, telephone, postage, paper, supplies and administrative personnel. In some cases where indicated, it also includes professional personnel undertaking management functions. Many of these calculations are estimates based on conversations with centre representatives.

Fixed costs seem to fall within a range of 25 to 35 per cent of the total budget. CEUR calculates that its fixed costs are about 30 per cent per year; CEDES at about 33 per cent. Neither own their building and both are faced with substantial rent increases in the coming year.

CIEPLAN (reference year 1979) indicate that their costs can be broken down in the following form: fixed costs at 30 per cent, research costs 53 per cent and the remainder for publishing, travel etc. (17 per cent). The fixed costs of PIIE which include library and travel amount to about \$70,000 per year or 40 per cent of their budget (ref year 1979/80). This figure also includes half the time of the Director, his deputy and the administrative secretary. FLACSO's budget indicates that the minimum running costs of their institution amount to approximately 30-35 per cent. This includes non personnel costs, supplies and equipment, but excludes transfer payments (ref year 1980).

Fixed costs have risen with inflation. The majority of the centres have three or five year leases on their offices (none own property) and fear that in both Santiago and Buenos Aires where rents have increased substantially that they will be faced with sharp increases.

T.3.1. Centres Budget Statements, 1976-1980  
(Current U.S. dollars)

<u>Centre</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
<u>Argentina</u>					
CEDES	90,692	114,385	168,190	273,876	389,375
CEUR		54,600	81,500	133,472	200,700
CISEA*			64,400	159,110	202,600
<u>Chile</u>					
CIEPLAN		310,000	310,000	358,240	390,000
PIIE**				172,280	252,227
FLACSO				400,000***	307,554

Sources: interviews, centre documents.

\*Year ending July

\*\*Year ending March

\*\*\*Guestimate

### (b) Project costs

Project costing depends as much on experience as on accountancy. To obtain this experience, many centres have put research above monetary values in accepting projects. This section examines the value of projects to total expenditures, direct and indirect project costs. Direct costs are associated with the project; indirect costs those which the centres expend in support of such projects. Because it was hoped that the centres would have established an institutional base after a three or four year period, we were interested to see the amount of income from projects, rather than institutional support and how their projects are costed.

The available information is set out in T.3.2. A number of features are apparent from this table. First, in only one centre (PIIE) do projects account for more than fifty per cent of estimated income; second, in most cases the average amounts received are very small and as the third column showing the range illustrates, in a number of cases the arithmetic average is increased substantially by the size of the top value. Third, many of the income sources are regional from either CLACSO or PISPAL, the product of the social science network in Latin America

Few of the centres distinguish between direct and indirect project costs. For most of them the value of projects lies in moral recognition, an acceptance by regional and international agencies of their existence as a centre and as a research group. There is also a feeling that charging for indirect costs is either too difficult or may well discourage donors.

Practices do differ by centres. CIEPLAN, because of its strong research policy, can fit most projects within programs or research areas. For some of the larger projects, certain office charges have been made, although rarely with small (less than \$5,000) projects providing they fit into priority areas. PIIE, because of the substantial amount of income based on projects, have begun to charge an overhead to develop its own internal fund (Fondo PIIE) to support the institution. In this they have followed the example of AHC, which charges 5 per cent for its costs. For a long time PIIE did not have a policy on costing projects and even today are uncertain if donor agencies will accept this policy. As the percentage of their income covering institutional costs declines, they will have to develop a clearer policy on project costing, or their already difficult institutional base will deteriorate. Only 21 per cent of their administrative costs are covered by overhead charges to projects.

### (c) Salaries

Salaries are the major cost for the centres (see T.3.3.) ranging from 50 to 72 per cent of all expenditures. The average salaries, not discounted for inflation, range between \$600 to \$2,500 per month. Salary figures are gross without allowing for taxation. None of the centres offer medical, retirement or other social security benefits.

## T.3.2

Value of Projects to the Centres, 1979/80  
(Current U.S. Dollars)

<u>Centre</u>	<u>Project Value</u>	<u>Percent Income</u>	<u>Range (thousands US \$)</u>	<u>Sources</u>	<u>Av. Project Value</u>
CEUR 1979	25,927	19.4	1.8 - 8.7	5	5,184
1980	59,000	29.3	2.9 - 13.6	7	8,428
CEDES 1979					
1980	82,950	21.3			
CISEA 1979	45,600	44.8	2.4 - 27.9	3	14,533
1980	78,120	48.9	.9 - 30.0	6	13,020
CIEPLAN 1979	71,740	20.0	3.2 - 25.6	6	11,957
1980	19,500	5.4	6.0 - 19.0	3	6,500
PIIE 1979/1980	81,963	47.5	.8 - 50.0	6	13,660
1980/1981	172,078	68.2	1.2 - 80.7	11	15,643
FLACSO 1980	53,836	17.1	1.4 - 36.050	4	13,459

Source: interviews, centre documents.

CEUR pays senior researchers approximately \$ 2,500 per month, while CEDES approximately \$ 2,000. CIEPLAN pays the senior researchers \$ 2,000 per month, associates about \$ 1,500 and research assistants around \$ 1,000. PIIE pays on a salary scale of \$ 600 to \$ 1,000 similar to FLACSO. Differentials are based on academic qualifications. In only one centre, not included in the sample, the Centro de Investigacion y Desarrollo Educativo (CIDE) was there an allowance for family responsibilities.

Few can look at these rates and not feel them more than adequate. However, in peso rather than dollar terms, the salaries are significantly less than that received in equivalent professions. It was not possible, in the short time available, to gather detailed equivalent information. University teachers in both countries received between 15 and 40 per cent more, while architects, economists (in banks) could receive substantially more. (see Appendix D) Most of those questioned, with current inflation at 30 percent (Chile) and 100 percent (Argentina), were clearly not making fortunes and most were concerned about the insecurity of their employment.

### III.2. Income sources

The majority of research centres in the world as well as in other parts of Latin America can rely on the government or its agencies for support as well as other domestic sources. These centres, because of the research between international and domestic sources.

#### (a) International

The centres receive between 90 and 100 per cent of their income from international sources. Domestic sources play no role or a minimum role.

The sources are concentrated in a number of research supporting donor agencies. An attempt to calculate this, with the data available, is set out in T.3.4. No distinction is drawn here between project, program and institutional grants. The first four columns cover the current contribution of the Ford Foundation, SAREC, UNDP and the IDRC to the centres and then the largest of the grants received, not provided by the four agencies. The subtotal is the sum and the percentage of these grants only, not including other international contributions. In all cases, these contributions amount to over 65 per cent of income within average of over 75 per cent. The figures for CIEPLAN are the current assured funding for the present year; they have budgeted for a total of US \$ 390,000.

The remaining twenty-five per cent or so come from a variety of regional and international sources, covering small projects and programs. The figures demonstrate the value of institutional grants for the continuation of these centres. In 1979, for example, over 80 per cent of CEUR's

T.3.3. The Centres Expenditure Patterns, 1979/1980  
(Current U.S. Dollars)

<u>Centre</u>	<u>Wages</u>	<u>Per cent</u>	<u>Inst. support</u> (per cent)	<u>Projects</u> <u>Total</u>	<u>Per cent</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Argentina</u>						
CEDES (79/80)	248,457	63	65	82,950	21	389,375
CEUR (1980)	126,000	63	70	59,000	30	200,700
CISEA (79/80)	100,700	63	44	78,120	49	159,520
<u>Chile</u>						
CIEPLAN (1979)	254,350	71.0	47	71,000	20	358,240
PIIE (79/80)	125,000	72.6	48	81,963	47	173,280
FLACSO (1980)	155,151	50.5	48	53,836	17	307,554

Sources: interviews, centre documents

Notes: The wage bill for the various centres was calculated for professional staff only PIIE and CEUR and for professional and administrative staff for CIEPLAN, FLACSO, CISEA and CEDES.

income came from three agencies (Centre, Ford, SAREC). To obtain the remaining sum, income came from five other sources. Again CIEPLAN income for 1979 shows that 58.3 per cent was covered by 2 grants, five donors provided grants of over \$20,000 accounting for 31.1 per cent and the remainder were made up of another five donors or contractors, providing an average project cost of \$ 6,000. To have begun the other end, with projects, would have been very difficult. The same picture holds true for CEDES and PIIE.

International funding, particularly institutional grants, have been crucial for the survival of these social science research centres.

(b) Domestic

Domestic contracts are the exception rather than the rule. They are the exception because of the research environment and the attitudes of the government. Most social science research is subsidized through public finances, either in the form of government contracts, university research support, specialized institutions or research councils. Few of these sources are available to centres in Argentina or Chile. The majority of the centres have been excluded from the educational system and the system itself has reduced or cancelled social science research if not teaching. Moreover, many of the individuals who make up the Centres are formally or informally excluded from government and educational contacts. The price of independence has been financial isolation.

There have been frequent attempts by the majority of the centres to find domestic funding. Most of the attempts have been fruitless, although there have been some minor successes. CEUR, for example, has undertaken a project around the Rio Negro for a local newspaper which is thinking of setting up a foundation; it also participated in a review of the problems of the province of Misibnes for the local government, as has, CISEA. These two projects in 1980 amounted to \$ 23,500. CIEPLAN has approached a number of companies without success, and are excluded by the government as they do not subscribe to the monetarist and sectarian views of the dominant Chicago school of the public and private sector. PIIE, after enormous effort, will receive \$13,500 from a local institution to review kindergarten teaching. Many of the parents involved in this association are sympathetic to the aims of PIIE. FLACSO has received a grant from the AHC to continue their courses on the Social Aspects of Population and to undertake some short courses with University students but these are domestic funds which would have been channelled to social science centres anyway.

Domestic sources are extremely limited for university research so that it is unlikely that there will be any surplus for the unfashionable centres.



T.3.4.

The Centres: sources of funds, 1979/80  
(Current U.S. Dollars)

<u>Centres</u>	<u>Ford Foundation</u>	<u>SAREC</u>	<u>UNDP</u>	<u>IDRC</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Argentina</u>							
CEDES							
CEUR (1980)	52,000	67,000	-	22,500	13,628(PISPAL)	155,128 (77.2)	<u>200,700</u>
CISEA (1979/80)	25,000	45,200	-	47,000	21,900(MISIONES)	139,100 (87.4)	<u>159,100</u>
<u>Chile</u>							
CIEPLAN (1980)	80,000	53,000	85,000*	17,500	47,000(Ebert)	282,500 (93.4)	<u>358,240***</u>
PIIE (1979/80)**	59,000	-	-	21,891	56,228(Novib)	137,119 (79.3)	<u>172,280</u>
FLACSO (1980)	16,000	72,256	36,050	34,158	48,091(UNFRA)	206,555 (67.2)	<u>307,554</u>

Sources: interviews, centre documents.

\*Part of the I.L.O. Employment project.

\*\*Fiscal year runs March to February.

\*\*\*As currently known.

### III.3. Expenditures and institutional policy

If building an institution requires a policy, how much of the funds can build that policy and how many are tied to particular activities? These activities are, of course, chosen but their expenditure is limited to the projects or programs contracted. An institution requires a margin, not only for rising costs, project overruns and mistakes, but for project and professional preparation as well as responding to day-to-day requests for information. Part of this issue has been considered in section III.1., but here it is important to see how constraints influence the development of an institutional policy.

Centres which receive institutional support grants have had the opportunity of defining policies. However, few have been able to make them as consistent as CIEPLAN. If T.3.3. is examined again, it is possible to see why. Unlike the other centres, CIEPLAN receives program grants for a given body of research, a combination of projects which allows for continuity and for economies of scale in the research process. CIEPLAN has, for example, undertaken such programs for UNDP-ILO and a number of other agencies. Such programs amounted to 37.8 per cent of total income in 1979 and do allow certain charges, for overhead costs, which projects often do not do. The other institutions, with the exception of FLACSO, either obtain funds for institutional support or projects.

The institutional grants have allowed centres such as CEUR and CEDES to establish priority areas. CEUR has undertaken a number of valuable studies dealing with housing policy and land use in Buenos Aires as well as regional policy in Argentina. CEDES emphasised personal research initiatives and only the economic stabilization policy program has had anything like collective work. They, unlike CEUR, have spent money on diffusion and on the dissemination of their Estudios CEDES series. PIIE, which carries a large number of researchers to income, has emphasised keeping a critical mass of researchers together rather than dissemination. FLACSO, recently faced with transition, maintains a number of programs from international agencies which it will lose because it is no longer part of an international teaching network.

In summary, only CIEPLAN has been able to develop projects and proposals on the basis of its own policy. CEUR has continued its previous research work and partly because of the lack of project opportunities has undertaken research which explores new areas of regional and urban planning. PIIE has a policy but not the funds to apply it, while CEDES' research policy is that of individual preference. FLACSO would like to continue its current project areas but the Director realises that the new circumstances and ambiguous role of the institution will require changes.

#### III.4. Human resources

Human resources as qualified manpower are as important to a research institution as financial resources. This section will look at qualified manpower, the relationship between project and institutional staff as well as the opportunities for professional development.

##### (a) qualified manpower

The figures, where known, on qualified manpower are to be found in T.4.5. set out by institutional status. The majority of the professional staff have either doctorates or master's degrees from the United States or abroad. Although the total employment figures are only available for three centres, all show a small proportion of administrative to professional manpower. First, because administrative employment reduces research funds and second, because administrative staff often come under minimum wage legislation which in high inflation countries can increase rapidly. Most secretaries undertake a wide variety of tasks and cater to several professionals. Few institutions have more than two secretaries. The distinctions of senior and associate researcher, where drawn, are on the basis of experience but have salary implications. One centre director stated that he could not promote an associate to senior because they did not have the money.

Some of the centres allow for visiting fellows or distinguish contract staff. Two of the centres have part time librarians and one has a person in charge of publications. CEUR is the centre of the Urban and Regional Commission of FLACSO which permits some administrative and professional assistance.

The staffing position in most of the centres has been static for a number of years. There is little promotion or change of status although most of the centres circulate the directorship. CEDES, for example, to alleviate the financial burden and because of the international reputation of the staff, has a number of key members teaching in other countries. In early 1981, five members will be abroad.

##### (b) staffing policy

There are two issues in staffing policy, both a function of the level of salaries. These are the proportion of full to part time staff and the status of project related professionals.

Where there is both a strong commitment to the centre and an adequate income, staff tends to be full time. The majority of the staff in CIEPLAN and CEUR are full time, although inflation is causing a number of personal problems for members. FLACSO is assumed to be a full time job, although conversations indicated that many took other positions when available. PIIE has accepted that it has both limited funding and that staff need to take other jobs, so that it is the only centre which appears to categorize staff as full or part time. Many of the full time staff of CEDES is more apparent than real, a combination of long absences

## T.3.5.

Qualified Manpower 1980

<u>Centres</u>	<u>Total Employment</u>	<u>Professional</u>	<u>Senior</u>	<u>Associate</u>	<u>Assistants</u>	<u>Other</u>
CEUR	17	15	5	3	2	Visiting (3) CLACSO Commission (2)
CEDES		16	10		3	Contract (2) Visiting (1)
CISEA	13	10	4		2	2 in Peru: 1 visiting, 1 honorary
CIEPLAN	24	18	10	4	2	Documentation (1) Publications (1)
PIIE		17				See T.4.6.
FLACSO		18	17			Library (1)

Sources: interviews, centre documents.

and other responsibilities.

Most of the centres distinguish between project and full staff, although only recently as project opportunities have outweighed institutional support, have the centres come to see a major difference between their employment. CEUR has not expanded its staff base for some time and now only employ new researchers if they have project money. FLACSO and CIEPLAN prefer to build up an institutional core putting people on staff and hoping to be able to carry them. However, both institutions are now thinking about changing this policy, although neither has done so as yet. PIIE and CEDES, on the other hand, are trying to limit core staff and make the relationship of the researcher to the centre project related.

The danger of this policy, taken for sound institutional reasons, is that it could divide the staff and result in a decline in the number of committed members, willing to build the institution into a research centre. The figures provided by PIIE show the difficulties faced (see T.3.6.). First, although PIIE has a compliment of 17 researchers only seven are in full time research. Second, with a new policy initiated recently, only three (part time) professionals are not ascribed to projects. Third, project related employment has a specific termination date so that in 1980, unless other funds are found, two full time researchers could leave in 1980 and another four in 1981. The table also illustrates the job insecurity for researchers in this field.

CEDES has also moved to project related employment, and in line with the research policy of individual preference, the researchers themselves in their own name will be expected to find the projects and then pay a fee to CEDES.

The move from full to part time staff and project related employment conditions are being reviewed by all the centres. It is unlikely to lead to a strengthening of their institutional base and has not been welcomed by many of them. They see it as a response to rising costs and a greater future reliance on projects.

### (c) Training

Although some of the staff with international reputations obtain temporary teaching positions and visiting fellowships, the major problem lies with younger researchers who cannot obtain graduate teaching from Universities in most subjects and who have neither the money nor the reputation to go abroad.

All the centres are conscious of the lack of opportunities for younger researchers and have come to terms with it in different ways. The dominant training mode is apprenticeship, working with a senior scholar in the institution. CEDES at one time tried to build a training program for

T.3.6. PIIE - Full and Part Time Manpower by Project

<u>Function</u>	<u>Manpower</u>	<u>By project employment</u> <u>Project ends</u>		
		<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
Administration	1.5			1.5
<u>Researchers</u>				
Full time	7.0	2.0	4.0	1.0
Part time	5.0	.5	4.0	.5
Honorary	2.5	2.5		
Student	1.0	1.0		
Total	17.0	5.5	8.0	3.0

Source: PIIE, interviews

Note: It has been assumed that every part time researcher is a half time researcher.

younger researchers based on the tutorial system but it was not a success. Tutors were often absent or otherwise occupied. CEUR used the Centre grant to allow two younger researchers to undertake two projects while PIIIE does have one student. In summary, although there is good will to establish training programs, the centres do not have the resources to do so.

The centres can help in another way by lending their name to applications for grants or scholarships. Few have succeeded with domestic resources and in the case of Chile there is evidence that students associated with the centres, even by family ties, have been crossed off the list of potential award holders. The centres have been most successful in supporting applications for foreign universities and offering to support CLACSO or PIESPAL award holders.

The lack of resources for training is one of the most serious weaknesses of the centres, for it can lead to a static research group and the loss of many bright researchers.

#### IV. Financial Alternatives

Most of the centres realise that they must find other sources of income than the donor agencies. The agencies, faced with increasing world demands and the discouraging value of the dollar in domestic markets (see Appendix B) could find the game not worth the candle. More, the centres strongly feel that they have skills and capacity and that they have something to contribute, through research, to their countries. They have therefore looked - and continue to look - for alternative domestic funding.

The results are not hopeful. Their attempts can be divided into consulting and courses.

##### (a) consulting

As research institutions, the centres have a great deal of specialized knowledge which might be sold domestically. CEUR, with its wide experience in regional and urban problems, has approached regional and municipal governments. They have received some small commissions from the Provincia de Misiones and in the private sector a newspaper which is hoping to set up a foundation for the development of the Rio Negro. Both contracts have been small amounts. They have also been negotiating with the city government in Buenos Aires but after nine months nothing has been agreed. There is some possibility of future work on the Rio Negro project.

CISEA has also been involved in the Misiones project. This was established with OAS money provided through the national government for which they had to receive security clearance. This proved to be onerous and they were told that they were unlikely to receive it again.

PIIE has organized, with an association of private kindergartens, a project on their educational effectiveness.

The centres have been more successful in finding international consultancies, because of personal or institutional reputation. In the majority of cases, it is the person required by the technical assistance agency. In most cases, the individual receives the fee, although in the case of CISEA, that money goes to the institution and the consultant receives his normal honorarium.

##### (b) courses

Many of the centres hoped to give courses or seminars. However, they have been discouraged because of cost or because they cannot provide a certificate accepted by the educational authorities. Where courses have been given they have often been promoted by AHC or CLACSO, and therefore rival centre courses might cut into a limited market. PIIE is hoping to provide courses for teachers, CIEPLAN for newspaper reporters and other



specialized groups, while FLACSO offers a course on current social conditions in Chile. CEUR would like to mount courses on planning but has only been able to do so in Venezuela and Brazil. Many of the centre's personnel teach in specialized courses of institutions where possible. In Argentina, where FLACSO and IDES support occasional courses, some of the centres' personnel participate but again in their own name.

The search for funds is constant but the domestic research environment is not encouraging. Moreover, the range of options is limited, excluding commercial consulting for example, if the centres wish to continue as research institutions.

V. The centres' public function

The last two chapters have been concerned with finance. As important as this aspect is to their continuation, the objectives of the centres are broader, including not only research but the continuation of a social science tradition in public and academic life. The majority of the Centres were created as both a refuge and a place to undertake research. The members hoped that their absence from the university was temporary and that they would soon return. Gradually, they came to see that this was not so and that they would have to find a different mode of operating. A number of issues have shown them that they must contribute, with their specialized knowledge, to civic debates.

The centres are closer to these civic needs than the universities. The principal cause is the precarious independence they have chosen, falling uncomfortably between official disapproval and social acceptance. There are four reasons for not becoming isolated. First, because social science research must understand society as it functions, not as we would like it to be, a wide range of actual social issues must be explored. Second, some agencies have pushed research groups, principally through action research, to involve themselves in society and social problems. Third, there is a substantial hidden demand from university students and others for more knowledge about what is happening in their society. Finally, an independent institution, unlike a University department, must build up a range of contacts in the society to be able to function.

There are three public functions which the centres rather than the members perform. These are holding external meetings, publishing and contributing to public debates. Centres in Argentina find it more difficult than Chile to undertake this social function because they have neither the Church nor the Academia as active co-operating institutions.

None of the centres in Argentina hold courses or meetings. CEUR has attempted to do so but found it both difficult and costly. As noted, most of the members participate in the IDES courses, but they do not undertake national or international meetings. In Chile, the situation is different. Members from PIIIE participate in the 'Circuitos de Reflexión' organized by the AHC, have hosted the Interamerican seminar on Education for Justice and Human Rights and are planning another on 'Poverty and the first years of Childhood'. There have been very few international seminars in Argentina recently because of inflation. FLACSO organizes two seminars; continuation of its MA on Social Aspects of Population and a course on changes in Chilean society in the last ten years. This course receives funds from the AHC and some scholarships are offered particularly for needy students. FLACSO is the organizing institution for a number of research seminars, again under the auspices of the AHC on agrarian structure, democracy, education reforms and from 1981 on US foreign policy. None are open to the public. All are by invitation and include either other research groups working in the field (agrarian structure, educational reforms) or particular groups such as teachers and trade union leaders (US foreign policy).

Apart from the internal weekly seminar, CIEPLAN supports a range of meetings. First, they are sponsoring a number of public seminars on the new constitution and the Brandt Commission report with international speakers. They have also signed an accord with MIT and are planning a lecture series with MIT professors visiting Chile. During the latter half of 1980, CIEPLAN will hold a course on economic policy in Chile for newspaper reporters. If this is successful, they would like to extend it to other groups. CIEPLAN has also been responsible for promoting three international seminars, including an important one on international trade in 1978. All the staff have contributed to the Circulo de Reflección on economics which has proved to be immensely successful with both students and citizens. CIEPLAN is the only consistent voice in Chile which does not subscribe to Chicago economics.

The majority of the centres publish books and working papers. None of the centres has their own printing press or company (unlike CEBRAP in Brazil) and rarely publish books in their own country. The four most recent books from authors who are members of CIEPLAN were published in Mexico, Peru and Argentina. Because there are few or no opportunities for publishing, the working papers take on a special meaning. In Argentina, CEUR and CISEA publish mimeographed working papers with a coloured cover. CEDES moved to printing booklets about two years ago which contained essays of thirty to fifty pages. Although attractive, they are expensive and CEDES is currently reviewing its publishing program.

PIIE has suspended its publication series, Estudios PIIE, and is trying to find a way in which they can recommence. They would also like to begin a statistical and commentary series and are exploring ways to found a magazine. FLACSO has produced working papers since 1973 and has built up a useful record of dissemination with its international network.

CIEPLAN has the most impressive publishing record. Their papers fall into three categories: studies, technical papers and apuntes, commentaries on current economic issues. They cover a wide range of subjects and command serious respect in the economics profession. They have recently begun to publish their studies in printed form, placing three of four in the same c.200 page volume, entitled Estudios CIEPLAN.

All of the centres would like to believe that they can influence public opinion. To do so effectively, one has to have a forum, a condition not available in Argentina. Unlike Chile, none of the researchers write for magazines or have the opportunity to influence policy.

In Chile, there are three or four magazines (Hoy, Mensaje, ASPI, Analisis) which use members of the research institutions as columnists. Hoy which has a relatively large circulation, has published monthly columns by Oscar Muñoz, Ricardo Ffrench-Davies and Alejandro Foxley from CIEPLAN.

Mensaje, the monthly magazine of the Vicaria, has published articles by members of PIIIE and FLACSO. ASPI, a little magazine, uses some members as does Analisis, the monthly magazine of the Academia, which is sold only by subscription. Compared to official publications and opinion makers, these are not numerous, but they are something.

CIEPLAN has twice this year, through their research work, caused the government to enter into a policy debate. On the first occasion, Ricardo Ffrench Davies showed how the figures for non-traditional exports were not carefully presented and therefore had to be revised. Teodoro Fuchs, Head of the external branch of the Central Bank, tried to defend their position but only succeeded in showing that the External Price Index was more dubious than at first thought. Certain types of copper, for example, had been included in the non-traditional exports category, so boosting their growth.

In early 1980, a CIEPLAN study showed that the employment figures used by the government were incorrect. The government claimed that employment in the Greater Santiago area had increased by 32.7 per cent between 1974-78. By careful use of the annual survey and other data, the CIEPLAN researchers demonstrated that the real growth was 2.73 per cent and that in some areas there had been a decline in the labour force. Because of the care of the study, the planning ministry (ODEPLAN) has now revised their figures, revising employment downward from 3.2 mn to 2.8 mn.

Both these cases are examples of how careful social science research can contribute to public information and therefore knowledge about the society.

Research groups in both countries believe that their research can contribute to a greater understanding of their countries. This is the principal aim of their research and why, in difficult circumstances, they continue to believe in its value.

T.5.1.

Social Contribution of the Centres: Summary

	<u>Projects/Programs (current)</u>	<u>Dimension Domestic</u>	<u>International</u>	<u>Publications (Books) etc.</u>	<u>Papers</u>	<u>Seminars</u>	<u>Teaching</u>
CEUR	11	8	3	4	5	6	Mainly out of country
CEDES	6	3	3	6	?	20	IDES and out of country
CISEA	4	2	2	1	7	15	IDES and out of country
<u>Chile</u>							
CIEPLAN	11	2	9	4	29	3 int.Int. courses (AHC) weekly	
PIIE	13	11	2	0	?	20	Mainly out of country/AHC
FLACSO	15	10	5	?	10	Weekly 2 courses	Own courses/AHC Other FLACSO's

source: interviews, centre documents. The ascription of domestic or international dimensions is based on the available project description and open to error.

## VI The contribution of the Centre

The first Centre grants for special institutional support were approved as a Project Notification Memorandum (PNM) by the executive committee in June 1977 and as a Project Summary (PS) in March 1978. The first grant (3-P-77-0033) was for a total of \$150,000 divided between two institutions, CEDES and CIEPLAN. These were followed by grants to CEUR, (3-P-77-0158) and to PIIE (3-P-77-0157) which were approved in 1978. A special institutional support grant was awarded to FLACSO (3-P-79-0153) in March 1980 to assist it in overcoming the withdrawal of Chilean inter-governmental recognition and the consequent loss of an approximately \$90,000 per annum institutional subsidy.

The overall objective of these grants was to provide funds to allow the organizations to maintain themselves as ongoing institutions. The grants were therefore not tied to particular projects but to the research mission of the centres. Although the grants were intended to be flexible, Divisional representatives took care in identifying the general expenditure areas, in consultation with centre representatives. The grants were to assist in the building of the centres as institutions and to provide funds for this purpose which often could not be included in project support.

These grants, being a departure from Centre policy, led to a useful debate within the Division and the Centre. There was a wide range of opinions concerning their value. Firstly, some opposed institutional support for whatever reason, believing that the Centre should not depart from its policy of project support. Secondly, many saw them as unique exceptions to a general rule, not to be repeated. Thirdly, several believed that provided the grants were associated to the research mission of the centres, then it would allow a wider degree of choice concerning resource use by the institution and research programs by the centres. Finally there was a general agreement that the institutions would not be supported by project funds if they received core support grants. At that time, the sums seemed reasonable to allow for both research costs and a modicum of administrative support.

The grants have been used in a number of ways, with a pronounced emphasis on supporting junior researchers and research assistants. The Centre has requested and received annual reports from all the centres; the figures and activities were discussed intensively with a wide variety of personnel of the recipient institutions. The average figures for the two years for which reports are available indicate the following patterns:

- (a) CEDES; to supplement current research by established researchers.
- (b) CEUR; assistance on three research projects, with 85 per cent going to research salaries and project costs and only 15 per cent to administrative support;
- (c) CIEPLAN; about 77 per cent to junior researchers in the first year, increasing to 90 per cent in the second year;

- (d) PIIE; approximately 68 per cent to salaries, including junior researchers, mainly for project development. The remainder went to library and administrative costs.
- (e) FLACSO will spend an estimated 42.5 per cent on support salaries, about 10 per cent on rent and the remainder on travel, publication and office costs.

Apart from FLACSO, which is facing a particular transitional problem, the bulk of Centre funds has been spent on supporting researchers and particularly junior researchers. Little has gone to support the institution as an administrative organization, for the centres have chosen to use the money to develop research talent and promise. This often means that administrative services within the organizations are weak, typing is slow and correspondence is delayed. In most cases, the researchers themselves undertake administrative tasks connected with their research.

The final three columns of T.6.1. show the importance of the grants to the centres. By using the original project document for the estimated value at the time of grant approval and the annual reports received in subsequent years, it is possible to compare the Centre's contribution as a percentage of estimated and actual income. In all cases it has declined, indicating as much as anything else the changing financial requirements of the centres as a result of inflation. There has been little or no expansion of personnel in the centres or large capital expenditures. The lower percentage reflecting a higher total shows how guaranteed income can be eroded by costs subject to substantial inflation.

The value of the grants is greater than the dollar amounts. Time and time again, centre representatives expressed their thanks for the grants, but reiterated that an association with a prestigious international research centre such as the IDRC gave them both a psychological boost and kept them in touch with the wider international research community. As experienced researchers, many of the centres' officials understand that the issues faced in their own research are capable of being substantially helped if not completely resolved by comparisons with other countries and that to see matters only from the point of view of their own society is to misunderstand science and its application to development problems. The value of the Centre and meetings with Divisional program officers to these small institutions, it was declared by one researcher, is to help avoid provincialism in research objectives and methodology.

In all cases there was a strong appreciation for the current special institutional grants as well as a concern that they should continue.

T.6.1.

Centre contribution to the Social Science centres.

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Project Number</u>	<u>Years</u>	<u>Total amount</u>	<u>Purpose</u>	<u>Income (percent)</u> <u>Estimated</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Ref. Year</u>
<u>Argentina</u>							
CEDES	3-P-77-0033-01	3	\$75,000	Research support Junior staff	32.8		1978
CEUR	3-P-77-0158	3	\$75,000	Junior staff on projects Administration	25.0	20.9	1979
CISEA							
<u>Chile</u>							
CIEPLAN	3-P-77-0033-02	3	\$75,000	Researchers, Research assistants salaries	9.4	6.8	1978
PIIE	3-P-77-0157	3	\$75,000	Salaries, data coll -ection, library	33.0	22.7	1978
FLACSO	3-P-79-0153	1	\$44,000	Administrative salaries, Rent	12.6	na	1980

Source: annual reports to IDRC, project documents.



## VII The future of the Centres

If it is assumed that the research environment in Argentina and Chile will remain the same, then the future of the centres depends on them continuing to build their institutional strength. In 1980/81, the research environment will be influenced in both countries by two similar political events. First, the change of presidency. Jorge Rafael Videla, the present Argentinian president, is likely to be replaced by Roberto Viola (see above page 12) in March of the coming year. Augusto Pinochet is likely to be confirmed under the new constitution (see Appendix G). Second, both countries are proposing to publish, and in the case of Chile apply, a new constitution in 1980. These actions are likely to test the strength of the authoritarian political system created by the military regimes.

The regimes' search for a new legitimacy is to be based on visible public accord. In Chile, newspaper columnists and opposition magazines have been warned that they must accept the new constitution and not call for revisions. University officials have been told to encourage students to support the government. In Argentina, where a series of consultations are taking place between the Minister of the Interior and a number of political parties, newspapers are expected to report progress toward democracy even though the new president will be chosen for his four year term by the members of the military junta.

The line between public information and public manipulation is a narrow one and it is possible that independent groups, including the research centres could face increasing government disapproval because their views are more scientific than ideological. During the coming years it will be vital to maintain pluralist voices in the two countries, of which the centres are an important, non-political, constituent.

To maintain themselves the centres must continue to build an appropriate organizational base which will depend on funds, research and institutional policy.

### VII.1. Future funding

The directors of the centres are conscious of the difficulty of finding new funds and returning to donor agencies with more requests. It is for this reason that most of them have tried to expand the sources of financial support to include programs and small projects. For this reason, too, they have searched for domestic sources. However, as indicated, the centres have little option but to search for international funds.

The future funding requirements of the centres, where available, are set out in T.7.1. In most cases, the 1981 figures are estimates of their requirements based on present knowledge. For many of the centres the budget is in shortfall. CISEA had a known deficit of \$48,130 when it closed its book at the end of July 1980 for the previous year. CEDES is \$30,000 short

T.7.1.

Centres Future Financial Requirements, 1980-82  
(Current U.S. dollars)

<u>Centre</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>		<u>1982</u>	
	<u>Budget</u>	<u>Surplus/Deficit</u>	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Assured</u>	<u>Required</u>
<u>Argentina</u>					
CEUR	200,700		300,000	135,000 (45%)	165,000
CEDES	389,375	23,546	468,000	237,000 (50.6)	248,000
CISEA*	157,100	(48,130)	(202,600)	62,000 (38.4)	91,600
<u>Chile</u>					
CIEPLAN*	390,000	17,835	468,000	219,301 (46.8)	248,699
PIIE*	252,227		302,653**	150,000 (49.6)	152,672
FLACSO	307,554		369,065**	200,000 (54.2)	169,065

Sources: interviews, centre documents

\*CISEA - fiscal year ending July to June: PIIE - Feb. to March

\*\*Guestimates based on interviews.

for its estimated second semester income of \$197,000. If CIEPLAN reaches its figure, then it will have a surplus of \$17,835 to pass to 1981.

The third column shows estimates for the 1981 budget provided by the centres. Those for FLACSO and PIIE are our guestimates. Only two institutions, CEDES and FLACSO, have covered one half of these costs with the remainder ranging between 38 and 49 per cent. These figures put considerable pressure on the directors of the centres to find funds. None of them have enough assured funds to continue research, although fixed costs - rent, materials, administration - would appear to be covered. Only one institution provided figures for 1982 without any clarification of how it would be funded.

The funding difficulties of the centres are brought into clearer focus by T.7.2. where the budget changes, on a year by year basis, are indicated.

In Argentina, none of the centres have been or seem likely to catch up with inflation. CEUR faces the problem of declining rates of increase, themselves far less than the relative drop in the inflation rate. CISEA has only grown because senior researchers agreed not to receive salary payments for a large part of 1979/80. The figures found in the table are calculated with real expenditures, excluding the \$48,000 owed to them.

Only one centre in Chile has overcome the inflation rate and this under very special circumstances. The rates of increase for CIEPLAN have been less than half the growth of the CPI. The figure for 1981 is calculated assuming that costs will grow at a constant rate with inflation. FLACSO had an apparent decline in funding when its international agreement was annulled, while only PIIE increased its project and resource obligations for 1980/81.

The future funding of many of these institutions is dubious, without donor assistance. Moreover, two features should be born in mind. First, income is a reflection of activities. The growth in the PIIE budget illustrates both a growth of personnel and projects, rather than an increase in disposable income. Second, in dollar terms, their rate of growth is less because of the fall in the purchasing power of the dollar (see Appendix B). Research activity in these centres will continue only if international funding continues; without it or at a reduced level, the centres will be seriously reduced in scale or close.

## VII.2. Future research policy

A research policy consists (in part) in defining how research is to be undertaken. The more successful centres have used the research process as a collective decision making process, supporting not only team research but institutional development. Providing that this commitment continues, and we have seen no evidence that it will not, future research policy depends on three other factors; an assurance of continuity, a realistic view of project costs and an ability to explore new project areas.

T.7.2. Centres; per cent annual budget change

	<u>Year end</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
<u>Argentina</u>					
Inflation rate		<u>157.5</u>	<u>120.0*</u>	<u>80.0*</u>	
CEUR		63.8	50.3	49.4	
CEDES		62.8	42.2	20.0	
CISEA		57.8	9.2	38.3 (27.3)	
<u>Chile</u>					
Inflation rate		<u>37.9</u>	<u>30.0*</u>	<u>20.0*</u>	<u>20.0*</u>
CIEPLAN		6.4	18.2	20.0	9.0
PIIE			46.4	19.9	
FLACSO		-23.3	20.0*		

Sources: Inflation rate (CPI) T.B.2., CIEPLAN estimates and guestimates. Budgets, T.3.1 and T.7.1.

Note: That the deficit has been excluded when calculating changes involving 1979 for CISEA. The figures for 1979 thus becomes \$111,000.

\*estimates and guestimates.

An assurance of continuity is associated with commitment, but commitment can change to frustration if there is no guarantee of resources. The most effective way of planning research is to know that a major portion of a centre's costs are covered. During 1979 and 1980, this assurance was guaranteed by institutional grants. Most, like those of the Centre's, are coming to an end this year. Agencies providing institutional grants would appear to be fewer and the grants' domestic value, largely due to inflation is declining. Assured funds for institutional costs, as indicated in T.7.1. range between 35 and 54 per cent for 1981. There are few commitments for 1982. Without such grants there is little or no assurance of continuity unless a centre can obtain alternative types of financing. In the past, assured resources have rarely come through project grants. There have been three overall features of such grants which have not been conducive to institutional development. First, the project grants have been relatively small in value as the evidence from T.3.2 has shown; few projects have been worth more than \$50,000. Second, finding or bidding for projects takes time and involves in an already risky world, continued uncertainty. Finally and most important, projects do not allow for the establishment of a core staff when there is no other funding apart from project research. Staff are then employed because there is a project rather than because of the existence of permanent staff.

Finally, without assured resources and staff continuity there is little or no possibility of undertaking exploratory or basic research. The ability to explore new themes or to undertake reviews and evaluations of past research are crucial to research quality. Most projects allow for little preliminary work or methodological experimentation. Yet consulting, teaching, course development and other ancillary activities, let alone professional satisfaction must be based on sound fundamentals and research exploration which may not be fully covered by project related research.

Institutional grants have had the great merit for these centres of providing some assurance of continuity, supporting and protecting project development as well as allowing centres to explore new research interests.

### VII.3. Institutional Development

The directors of the centres have three major concerns about the future development of their institutions. These are the appropriate size for their organizations, the importance of training young researchers and their future public role. They believe that they must come to grips with these concerns in the near future if their institutions are to grow.

To a surprising degree, directors have a sense of what the optimum size of their organization is likely to be. CEUR, CIEPLAN and PIIE believe that they have reached that optimum size. CISEA, which has four senior researchers, would like to be able to add another three and two more assistants. CEDES and FLACSO did not have strong opinions.

Where all the centres do have strong opinions is over the deterioration of the job security of researchers. Researchers who joined the centres - which they did out of conviction - knew they were joining organizations that were likely to have their share of problems. Now some centres have had to revise their commitment to the staff on the basis of potential funding. The policy of PIIIE and CEDES to accept staff only when they have project money could be followed by other institutions. It may be a necessary policy but it destroys an essential element of the institutions, a core group of researchers. If researchers can only be backed when they are riding a project horse, part of the collective spirit that has supported these centres through very difficult times is lost.

A second concern is the inability to train younger researchers. Centre members are acutely aware of the importance of further training to young researchers. In Chile, in particular, most centre members meet and discuss projects with young students. In some centres, there has been an attempt to commence tutorial or training programs but either there has not been enough time or the students have become research assistants, itself a useful education, and been integrated into projects. The centres are not teaching institutions and cannot replace the university. However, all the centres recognize that without younger researchers, their work suffers and appropriate opportunities are not being offered to them.

A third concern, apart from maintaining staff and helping young researchers, is that of the public function of the centres. Although this is a complex theme with many dimensions, all the centre directors interviewed emphasised the importance of publications and diffusion. Publications are seen as essential because they provide a public identity where one might not exist; they psychologically justify the research task to the ignored researcher; it provides a medium of communication within and without the country as well as showing that the social sciences flourish, in their way, in the Southern Cone countries. Very few of the centres would give up publications, if they did not have to.

#### VII.4. Future Survival of the Centres

The account given in the first six chapters and the evidence of this chapter show that none of the centres are firmly established. All lead precarious lives and there is a strong possibility that, in the future, events could lead to their demise.

There are four principal dangers in this and the coming year. They are inflation, search time, staffing and international support. First, because the inflation rate, undertaking research is becoming more costly in each of the societies. All fixed costs continue to rise. Inflation has, for example, taken a savage toll on all sectors but particularly small businesses. The centres are not small businesses - they have only knowledge to offer - and are therefore weaker than organizations that might expect some kind of continuous income flow. Inflation could destroy the will to continue.

Second, without an institutional base - which can only come if fixed and minimum running costs are covered - the centres will be forced to look for projects. Projects involve lengthy negotiations with donor agencies with the possibility that the project proposal may not be accepted. The centres discussed here have small staffs so that there is a high opportunity cost for staff time. Project search therefore becomes costly and the search time for projects expensive, particularly for the institutional development of the centres.

Third, there is a real danger that centres which dispense with a core staff either moving to part time or project related staff employment, will destroy the very feature that makes working in a centre worthwhile - collegiate research and collective decision making. Staff on projects will not, unless a very real effort is made, consider themselves to be part of the centres' team but drift into seeing themselves as contract employees. As a corollary, they might then push to replace a research policy based on collective preference by one based on their talents, a policy of individual preference, which would not benefit the long term aims of the institution.

Finally, donor agencies could lose interest either assuming that things will work out or that one of the other agencies will pick up the pieces. Such a view, given the centres' sources of funding could be fatal to the continuous growth of research centres in the Southern Cone.

### VIII. An Evaluation

Previous chapters have identified the organizational decisions faced by centres as they attempt to become institutions. This chapter reviews those decisions and evaluates the current performance and future needs of the six centres.

The key organizational decisions are,

- (a) the decision to become an independent centre, within a difficult and unsympathetic research environment, rather than continue a research career or accept the terms imposed on research by University or other authorities.
- (b) the decision as to how research issues are identified and organized, named above as research policy. The research policy includes first, the explicit objectives of the centre and second, the manner by which the research topics are chosen. These choices are likely to have an implicit bias stemming from the way preferences are organized. There are three types of preferences, (individual, donor and collective) which influence research policy.
- (c) the decisions concerning how professional and administrative activities are to be undertaken within the centre, described above as institutional policy. Institutional development - the change from a group of individuals to a functioning organization - is identified as depending on two sub classifications of institutional policy. First administrative decisions which concern salaries, internal accounting (especially for projects), and management. Second, professional decisions concerning membership, research quality and teaching.
- (d) the decision concerning the public responsibilities or public function of the centres. Finally a decision which is only partially in the centres' control.
- (e) the decision to apply for and receive funds and how these funds are allocated.

Not all the decisions, as can be seen, are straightforward or under the control of the centres. Some decisions, like those making up institutional policy, are cumulative; others depend on the research environment and international support. However these are implicit choices which alter the pace and direction of an organization and which help or hinder its growth and development.

A helpful distinction can be drawn between resource and research performance. Resource performance is the way that an organization distributes its human and financial resources, at given levels of availability. Research performance is the capacity to undertake research and the process by which it is achieved. Finally a third dimension, funding availability, has to be considered in the light of the other two. Resource and research



performance, together with funding availability are the three measures used here to evaluate the centres.

#### VIII.1 Resource performance

The effective use of the resources available - resource performance - is the result of a mix of dimensions, already discussed in the report. These dimensions are institutional policy, research preferences and the level of funding.

One important factor which illustrates resource performance is the attention paid to administration, itself an illustration that running a centre is not the same as running a research project. During our exploration of this factor, (see Chapter III) the indicators chosen showed how centres dealt with the issues of administrative and therefore institutional policy. The first issue, salaries, was concerned with how they were set, a second, project accounting with how costs were distributed and finally, the management of the centres. Salaries have often been set by convention, but in a number of centres, (CIEPLAN, CISEA) they are set and revised by collective agreement. These are centres making a determined effort to maintain a core staff. The other centres were either not able to see salaries as a key factor, (CEUR) or had passed to project related salaries or employment by project. Centres who chose this method of salary payment might appear to be more resource efficient. However there comes a time when the long run effects outweigh the short term advantages, when researchers see themselves as contract employees rather than a staff, and so without a loyalty to an institution.

A second factor which illustrates the use of resources is the costing of research. Given the small value of most project grants, centres are faced with the difficult choice of absorbing overheads or either requesting an increase in the grant or reducing the money available for direct research expenditures. Where this has been attempted - as in the case of PIIE - a ten per cent overhead has not covered fixed and running costs. Most centres have therefore not charged an overhead believing for a variety of reasons that it would be difficult for them and perhaps unacceptable to the donor agencies. The centres receiving institutional grants have been able to pass on these fixed project costs to their central fund and so have taken the opportunity of using project funds without fear of the financial consequences.

A third administrative factor which has influenced resource allocation and performance is the seriousness with which the management function is undertaken. Running centres in hostile research environments with continuous inflation and therefore financial problems, is a headache. Few would wish, unless very committed, to undertake such a task. However centres which have spent some time thinking about management - including the appointment of full time directors - seem to have a greater control over their resources than those that believe institutional leadership can be exercised a few hours a week. The agreement that members should undertake administrative tasks would

appear to depend on both research policy and level of funding. Given that none of the members are professional managers, administration can take second place to research particularly where individual research preference dominates research policy. Each of the members wants to get on with his research and finds little time for institutional matters. In contrast where there is a collective research policy, then there seems to be a greater sense of responsibility by the director to the group and the group to the director. Research is no longer a question of personal glory but institutional reputation. The administrator's role is made easier if the level of funding allows for a number of ancillary staff. Where a director can rely on a clerk and an adequate number of secretaries, then his task is made easier.

Resource performance is, therefore, the result of a mix of factors, strongly influences as could be expected in small institutions, by other organizational processes. There is very little fat on any of the animals weighed in this report, but it should be emphasised that resource performance does not depend entirely on the amount of funding but also on the attitude to resources expressed by the centre's management. The more professional the management, the more efficient the resource performance.

With the figures and time available, it was not possible to establish performance indices. The surrogate dimensions of administration, discussed above, must do. Although none of the centres wasted resources, two centres, CIEPLAN and CISEA showed, in their different ways an effective use of resources. Two others PIIE and CEUR were learning to work within their current funding structure. CEDES and FLACSO, because they continue to work with an academic view of research, individual preference, have continued to encounter difficulties in their resource allocation management.

#### VIII.2 Research performance

The research performance of the institutes depends on a number of qualitative and quantitative factors. First, a superb researcher with ideas, common sense and a good style is an asset to any institution. Rather than compare individual work, research performance examines the output of the institutions themselves, a comparison often difficult to make. Three factors, discussed previously, influence an institution's output; the research policy, the staff and the public function. Enough has been said about research policy in previous sections; this will concentrate on the importance of the core staff and the public function to research performance.

Professional work is based on a good education but sharpened by apprenticeship and critical collegiate atmosphere. The majority of the researchers are relatively senior, between 30 and 45 years old, being fortunate enough to serve their research apprenticeship at a time when Universities encouraged social science research. The majority commenced their research careers in University departments or centres and have grown to understand the value of critical discussion to improve their work. Many of the centres were founded by groups who had previously worked together and they chose to continue because they valued this atmosphere. The hidden assumption of such collegiality is that each has research work to undertake and can call on members at any time. However when a centre finds that it cannot maintain a

full time staff these assumptions no longer hold. Researchers find that they are only required or fully participate when they have a project to undertake. Other members of staff are either looking for projects or completing them, so that often the critical spirit inherent in a research staff is lost and the researchers find that the sum far from being greater than its parts is equal or less. Most of the centres as well as the researchers are only too conscious of the danger of losing staff members. They do so with great reluctance and make efforts to build an informal network of researchers loosely attached to the appropriate centre. But as time passes, there is an inevitable division between core staff and project researchers, and evidence can be found, a loss in research output.

A core staff is crucial to build an institution. Commitment cannot be expected to survive on the side of the researcher alone. Moreover the factors identified above as the professional dimension of institutional policy - membership, internal review and teaching - are mutually reinforcing. Important, too, in very much the same way are the public functions of publishing, holding meetings and participating in professional activities. They reinforce the researcher and so the institution in its objective of producing useful research. Research cannot be evaluated unless it is published and circulated; unpublished research is psychologically damaging to the researcher and thus the institution.

The most impressive research record is that of CIEPLAN, which has had an important influence not only in Latin America, but, against the government's will, in Chile itself. Their collection of over a hundred research reports, notes and technical papers stand comparison with any research institution in Latin America. Moreover the CIEPLAN team has been very careful to understand the process of research. The other centres have produced valuable research - indeed in none of them are there not some examples of effective research performance - but none compare to CIEPLAN.

For the remainder, judgements vary. PIIIE has undertaken some very innovative research in the field of education, but lacks publishing funds. CISEA and CEDES have explored some important aspects of current Argentinian economic and social policy; CEUR continues to explore difficult and unfortunately unfashionable field of urban and regional planning, while FLACSO's research output remains uncertain in its new circumstances.

### VIII.3 Funding availability

Funding availability is directly related to way the donor agencies provide funds. It will be recalled, from Chapter III, that domestic sources have accounted and will account for very little until there is a change in the research environment. Donor agencies have provided funds in three ways; with institutional grants, projects and program grants.

Institutional grants have proved to be the key to successful institutions. CIEPLAN, the most impressive, was blessed from 1976 with a number of institutional grants which allowed it to develop collective

research policy and to grow into an institution. CEUR received less but because of the prior institutional commitment of the members, maintained itself as a collective institution. CEDES, also received strong institutional support, but continued to develop it less successfully. Many of the problems faced by PIIE and CISEA are directly due to not obtaining an institutional grant. They came onto the market when donor agencies were moving away from long term grants to project specific awards.

It would be a mistake to think that projects are not welcome by the centres. Rather projects are extremely advantageous as a way of sharpening up research skills in an international, non provincial, context. However projects without institutional grants allow no margin for building the institution.

Total funding inflow is directly related to donor agencies choices. If the donor agencies decided today to withdraw from Chile and Argentina, this would be the end of the independent research centres. They could not survive. When one agency changes its plans or fails to define its international objectives, then this causes a great deal of concern and can have a dramatic influence on the future perspectives of the centres. Again if all agencies decided that they would fund projects only either the centres would begin to charge a large overhead or they would cease to grow as institutions.

There has to be a mix of institutional support and project money, if a centre is to grow. Moreover, institutional grants by guaranteeing continuity and the maintenance of a core staff, protect project performance.

#### VIII.4 Centre evaluation

When the Centre provided funds for the independent research centres in Chile and Argentina, it made, as the Board discussions showed, two assumptions. These were first, that the institutions would become viable and second that the research environment would improve. Neither, sadly, has turned out to be the case.

How do institutions become viable? This study shows that there are three elements. First a core staff, committed to the development of the institution; second, an adequate physical and human infrastructure; third, the growth of collective decision making. These elements are vital for institution building, and the Centre, being a responsive institution, should consider carefully the way that it reacts to these elements. Projects without institutional viability could lead to research without dissemination or policy follow through.

What is required for a change in the research environment to help the centres? First, in both countries, an increasing willingness by the governments to tolerate a plurality of opinions about their policies; second, some comprehension of the role of the social sciences and finally that both these changes lead to domestic financial support. The research environment, on current evidence, seems to be more not less imposing a new

institutional order and do not care to discuss these crucial changes (for Chile see Appendix G). Social scientists, particularly in Argentina, continue to face ridicule and possible danger, while domestic funding seems less rather than more likely.

The Centre has made a valuable contribution to the independent research centres in the past. At a time when its special institutional grants are coming to an end, it might ponder the value of viable institutions in difficult research environments and continue to match the commitment of social scientists in the Southern Cone.

## Appendix A

### The Individual Academic Assistance Program; an evaluation 3-P-78-0009; CLACSO

1. This project, to support individual Latin American scholars, was approved on March 2, 1979. The original document identified the following objectives:

- a) to resolve "critical situations" faced by social scientists in Latin America. A "critical situation" is defined as one where "political reasons prevent a social scientist from practising his profession in his country of origin or residence, whether in government institutions, in private bodies or on his own. The measures which constitute such a situation may take the form of dismissal, the barring of access to a workplace, arrest, exile, and other forms of discrimination which prevent the social scientist from practising his profession".
- b) to prevent the emigration of Latin American social scientists, and particularly emigration to centres in Europe, the U.S. and Canada.
- c) to encourage the repatriation of Latin American students who have continued and completed their studies outside of Latin America, and of Latin American researchers who are presently working abroad.
- d) to build up the CLACSO member centres by increasing their overall capacity to carry out research projects, train new social scientists, and disseminate information.

In addition, the Centre's grant funds will be used specifically to place young and middle level researchers in research positions and projects.

2. The program is a response to the difficult individual circumstances of scholars, particularly those that wish to remain in their own country, in the social sciences. The Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) proposed the program to a number of donor agencies in 1977 and 1978 in order to alleviate the increasingly serious problem of supporting research in Latin American countries. Francisco Delich, the executive secretary, was able to draw on CLACSO's experience in Chile and other Cono Sur countries. It will be recalled that CLACSO, by opening an office in Santiago in 1973, was able with the assistance of WUS, the Ford Foundation and later SAREC, to rescue a large number of social scientists after the 1973 coup and find jobs for them in other countries, particularly Argentina. This experience, the continuing deterioration of conditions for

research and the leadership of Delich led CLACSO to view the problem as one involving the whole of Latin America and to call on regional as well as international resources.

3. The individual assistance program, which the Centre supports, has been merged with the other programs to pursue two discrete aims;

- a) individual assistance to scholars who face oppression or who cannot practice their profession;
- b) assistance to both younger researchers, including those who have recently left university, and to allow them to develop research skills.

The second phase of the Cono Sur program began in 1975 with assistance from SAREC and Ford. Two years later it was expanded to include Central America and then in 1979/80, the Andean area was included as a separate group. At the same time CLACSO, with the urging of a number of research centres, set up a competition entirely for younger researchers - known as the programa de formacion - for those countries which lacked facilities to train junior researchers. This year CLACSO hopes to set up another regional competition for the Caribbean. Not all of these programs are supported by Centre funds. They are included in these notes because for CLACSO officials they are part of the same problem and moreover they are administered in the same way.

4. The programs are administered by the central office of CLACSO in Buenos Aires and by a number of regional committees. If CLACSO looks after the funding and enters into agreements with the chosen candidates, then the regional committees select the candidates and monitor the progress of the research. There are presently four committees for the Cono Sur, the Andean region and Central America. The members are chosen for their individual probity and their knowledge of the social sciences in the region; they are not chosen for their institutional affiliation. The committees have a number of tasks apart from selection. Discussion with a number of individual members suggests that the committees are working well and members take their tasks seriously. Members, who may come from a number of different countries, receive their airfare and a small allowance as per diems. The committee members are usually put up in local houses.

5. At first it was expected that a selection committee would be formed for each nation. This proved to be too cumbersome and it was found that regional groupings were more convenient. There are a number of organizational and intellectual reasons for this change. First, it proved impossible to organize a committee that would not attract the unwelcome attentions of local authorities in smaller countries such as Paraguay and Uruguay. Secondly, a regional committee, apart from offering less visibility, offers the advantage of being able to compare projects more fully and probably more fairly. The regional committees have proved

their worth and have led to useful contacts between researchers from different countries at a number of levels.

6. The outcome of the various programs are to be found in the following tables.

T.A.1. CLACSO; Requests and Awards for Individual Support, 1975-1979

<u>Program</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Requests</u>	<u>Awards</u>
(a) Cono Sur	1975	103	33
	1976	127	36
	1977	120	37
	1978	107	38
	1979	45	27
(b) Central America	1978/79	21	17
(c) Andean Area	1979	27	11
		<hr/> 550	<hr/> 199

Source: CLACSO

It should be pointed out that the apparent decline in overall demand is as much the result of inquiries through the informal network of centres, that constitute CLACSO, as it is a decline in need. The other important program, to which the Centre does not at present contribute, is that for younger researchers.

T.A.2. CLACSO: research support for younger researchers

<u>Year</u>	<u>Requests</u>	<u>Awards</u>
1977/78	50	15
1978/79	27	10
1979/80	44	13
	<hr/> 121	<hr/> 38

Source: CLACSO

7. The Centre's support has been used for the scholarship program (covered in T.A.1.) during the period July 1979 to June 1980. Funding of the total expenditure of \$109,750 has come from Ford and SAREC as well as the Centre. This money was used in the following way.



T.A.3. CLACSO: first year of Individual Academic Assistance Program  
(US dollars)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Total awards</u>	<u>Expenditure Total</u>	<u>Centre Contribution</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Argentina	9	39,000	2,771.87	7.0
Chile	5	40,000	15,000.00	37.5
Central America	10	30,000	25,000.00	83.3
Total	24	109,500	42,771.87	39.1

Source: CLACSO report to IDRC (1980)

These awards have gone for a wide variety of research topics almost all for scholars already in the region. None went for repatriating scholars.

8. Because of the importance of these programs to the development of social sciences in Latin America, CLACSO has commissioned a number of evaluations from well known social scientists in the region. As these reflect our more casual findings, then they are worth noting.

- (a) An evaluation of the Cono Sur program was undertaken by professors from the Universidad del Pacífico, (Lima), Yale and FLACSO. They confirmed that the program was well run and that the research had maintained a high standard; that in most cases it had meant the difference between a person staying as a researcher rather than finding another job; that it led to younger scholars forming intellectual links with older more experienced researchers; that research support for individuals also helped the centres if they were working there.

However, they also indicated that the research grant was extremely small - rarely more than \$4,000 and that it would probably be more useful if they were formally connected with centres or universities, (where possible) so that there would be a mutual benefit; they believed that for the present one year was enough although they saw the difficulties of seeing research as only an annual exercise; however, they made the suggestion that perhaps part of research could be funded and that the academic program could be used as seed money. They believed that the award should be individual - its purpose - and that senior and junior competitions should be established. They also considered that it might be worthwhile defining research areas.

- (b) Some of these suggestions were taken up in later programs like that for Central America which was evaluated following the first cycle in October 1979. By this time, the awards were open to research in four definable areas - rural issues, urban growth, economic history, and the state - and primacy was given to researchers that did have an institutional affiliation.

The evaluation pointed out that 16 of the 17 scholarships awarded went to proposals from Costa Rica, itself a reflection of the development of social

studies in that country compared to the other five. They approved awards going to non graduates and also to non-nationals of the six Central American countries. They were three Latin American residents who received awards for research dealing with Central American issues. They found the program a great success and believed that it should be continued by being organized through CSUCA. They, like the other evaluators, considered that publication of the works was important.

These two evaluations illustrate the care and attention that CLACSO dedicates to the task of running the Individual Assistance program.

9. The CLACSO program shows how an enterprising organization can help others to help themselves. The salaries are extremely low - between \$3,000 to \$4,000 for ten months - and for a married man implies part time research. Nevertheless a choice is offered and as can be seen from the number of requests a choice which many would like to make. Although no long term solution, there is little doubt that the program has contributed to the development of younger researchers, the maintenance of experienced researchers and the continuation of a social science tradition where it could have been forgotten or allowed to wither.

## Appendix B. The Domestic Value of the Dollar

The domestic value of the US dollar in Chile and Argentina depends on the domestic rate of inflation and changes in nominal exchange rates. The real value of the dollar is in equilibrium when the annual rates of change are equal.

An outstanding feature of both economies is the past and current rate of inflation. Changes in the Consumer Price Index are to be found in T.B.1. Canada is included for comparison. All the centres practised inflation accounting as best they could - calculating not merely the overall rates but their differential effect on fixed and variable costs, often because of indexed social security and minimum wage legislation provisions which apply to administrative staff. However, inflation accounting works best when there is relatively consistent inflation increases and funds are generated and spent within the domestic economy. Then all the figures, particularly in current terms, have the same meaning.

This is not the case with the centres, for as noted, most income comes from outside the country. Therefore, the nominal exchange rate - the official relationship between the domestic and an external currency - comes to have a determining influence on the centres. The nominal exchange rates for the Argentinian peso and the Chilean escudo per US dollar are set out in T.B.2. The Canadian rate is again included as a comparison.

### T.B.1. Argentina and Chile: annual changes in the Consumer Price Index

	<u>Argentina</u>	<u>Chile</u>	<u>Canada</u>
1974	39.9	375.9	10.9
1975	334.8	340.7	10.8
1976	347.1	179.3	7.5
1977	160.4	63.5	8.0
1978	169.8	30.3	8.9
1979	157.5	37.9	9.1
1980	120.0*	30.0*	

\* estimates based on present trends

Source: CEPAL, Notas sobre la economía y el desarrollo de america latina.  
No. 309/310 p. 4, based on figures from IMF and national sources.  
Economic Review, (Department of Finance).

Table B.2. Argentina and Chile: nominal exchange rates  
(US dollar = 1.00)

	<u>Argentina</u>	<u>Chile</u>	<u>Canada</u>
1973	11.29	.30	1.000
1974	16.25	.83	.978
1975	72.16	4.903	1.017
1976	257.79	13.04	.986
1977	423.13	21.54	1.063
1978	818.29	31.67	1.141
1979	1333.92	37.2	1.171
1980	2100.00	39.0	

Sources: Organization Techint, Boletin Informativo (Argentina)  
World Bank Country Report, Chile  
Economic Review, Department of Finance (Canada)

Note: The figures for Argentina refer to the free market valuations;  
1980 figures are estimates based on current trends (July)

Both governments wish to make their economies more competitive and use world prices to realign internal prices and therefore, like Canada, expected to devalue the currency according to trends in domestic and international prices. The government has promoted high interest rates for certain deposits to attract both domestic saving and international finance. Providing that domestic interest rates are high, then any differential between changes in the nominal exchange rate and domestic prices can attract savings income. With a high commercial interest rate, Argentina (1977) and Chile (1978) began to use the exchange rate as a policy instrument, devaluing by lesser amounts than the implicit price index. The effects of these policies, which appear to have been taken for and with the interest of the domestic financial sector, have resulted in a deterioration of the purchasing power of external funds, which can only be made up through interest. If the funds are small or have to be spent, then the loss is equivalent to the rate of change between domestic prices and the nominal exchange rate.

To obtain the domestic value of the dollar, it is necessary to combine the domestic value of the currency and the inflation rate. A crude exercise is to be found in T.B.3. which shows the purchasing power of 1976 and 1978 dollars on both currencies. 1976 was chosen because most of the centres were created at that time and 1978 because the Centre negotiated its grants in that year. Although inflation rates may have declined slightly, the table shows a dramatic decline in the domestic value of the dollar because of fixed exchange rate adjustments.

T.B.3. Argentina and Chile: domestic value of the dollar

	<u>Argentina</u>		<u>Chile</u>	
1976	100.0		100.0	
1977	59.4		86.1	
1978	41.7	100.0	90.4	100.0
1979	26.2	62.8	76.9	85.3
1980	15.9	38.0	59.8	66.3

Source: T.B.1. and Indice de costo de vida (1974-100) for Argentina Consumer Price Index (1969-100) for Chile. The index estimates for 1980 are based on T.B.1.

### Appendix C. Cost of Living Indices

Another perspective on the role of inflation in the two countries can be obtained by examining comparative cost of living indices. International agencies and diplomatic missions regularly adjust their salary scales to compensate for cost of living changes, so that those prepared for the United Nations and the Department of External Affairs, (Canada), give an indication of the magnitude of these increases from an international perspective.

(a) United Nations index.

The United Nations index for the cost of living in Canada, Chile and Argentina is set out in table T.C.1 below.

T.C.1 UN Post Adjustments, 1978-80  
(New York = 100)

<u>Argentina</u>			<u>Chile</u>		<u>Canada</u>	
<u>Post</u>	<u>Adjustment</u>		<u>Post</u>	<u>Adjustment</u>	<u>Post</u>	<u>Adjustment</u>
1978	12	171.03	6	127.63	2	105
1979	14	188.56	8	140.71	3	110.25
1980	18	229.19	11	162.89	5	121.55

Source: United Nations.

Posts are adjusted by a change in post classification. All the post classification numbers refer to the same position, except that to maintain the buying power associated with a given post income is maintained by changing classifications rather than by increasing salary for the post. In the UN system New York is classified as 100 for each of the years indicated. Therefore Argentina was 71.03 per cent above the UN posting, Chile, 27.63 per cent and Canada only 5 per cent in 1978. An indication of the inflation rate can be illustrated by comparing the figures for the different years. The post adjustment index increased by 10.25 per cent between 1978 and 1979 in Argentina and Chile, while it increased by 21.55 per cent in Argentina and 15.76 per cent in Chile compared to Canada's increase of 10.25 per cent, 1979-80. This does not take account of the increase in the base figure between years which, because of inflation in the United States has also increased.

(b) Canadian External index

The index used by the Department of External Affairs is that for Canadian Civil servants posted overseas. This index, which can be found in T.C.2, sets Ottawa at 100 and includes monthly changes in the index for the two countries.

T.C.2 Salary Adjustment Index for Canadian Civil Servants Abroad.  
(Canada = 100)

	<u>Argentina</u>	<u>Chile</u>
1978	March 105 November 110	May 105
1979	May 115 Sept 120	December 115
1980	February 125 May 130	115

Source: Department of External Affairs

The adjustment is made by multiplying gross salary by the post index. For example, if a post carried a gross salary of \$20,000, using the May-Argentina salary adjustment, then by

$$\text{Adjustment} = \text{gross salary} \left( \frac{\text{post index} - 100}{100} \right)$$

In calculating the salary adjustment each year is set at 100, not indicating changes in the Ottawa base pay, the adjustment would amount to \$6000.

The index is used to equalize the purchasing power of the gross salary of officers working abroad. Besides this adjustment the officer receives diplomatic tax concessions, subsidized housing and hardship allowances.

#### Appendix D. Salaries in Argentina; a comparison

The National Research Council for Science and Technology, (Consejo Nacional de Investigacion para Ciencia y Tecnologia - CONICIT) was founded in the mid 60's to support both individuals and research institutions. Currently it supports approximately 30 research institutions of which only one, dealing with employment and labour conditions, undertakes work in the field of the social sciences. It reports to the Ministry of Labour. The Council also supports individual scholars principally in the field of the natural sciences. Prior to 1976 it had a scheme for social science scholars which is now severely curtailed. Although applications continue to be accepted from social science scholars, few have been granted and none to members of the independent social science research centres.

Researchers within the research institutions and working at the university were awarded support in five distinct categories which refer to seniority and research capability. The categories are, with the English translation following in parentheses, Superior, (senior), Principal, (researcher), Independiente, (independent), Adjunto, (associate) and Asistente (research assistant). The categories were reviewed either every year or every two years and it was expected that researchers would, if approved, move from asistente to principal or superior. The system remains but present review procedures are unknown to our respondents. The salary gradations, in US dollars at the nominal exchange rate, were the following in July 1975; superior, (\$ 366); principal, (\$ 309); independiente, (\$ 269); adjunto, (\$ 232) and asistente, (\$ 201). May 1980 the salaries, for the same categories, were - superior (\$ 2922), principal (\$ 2612), independiente, (\$ 2306), adjunto, (\$ 1818) and asistente, (\$ 1527), showing a similar spread but a continuous increase for all categories in dollar amounts.

The accompanying table, T.D.1. shows salary levels for researchers and superiors from CEDES and CONICIT respectively. We were told that given the research experience and grant conditions normally offered the holders, the senior researchers at CEDES would expect to hold superior awards. The final column on the right shows the CEDES salary as a percentage of the CONICIT award. Between 1975 and May 1980 there have been curious variations in the value CEDES salary. On two occasions it has been higher than the superior category and in January 1976 more than twice as high as the official award. This can be explained by exchange rate policy when it was an advantage to receive, as CEDES' researchers' did, their salary in dollars. By 1978, as Appendix B was shown and this table confirms, the domestic value of the dollar was depreciating. From September 1978, the salaries offered by CEDES have declined in comparison to those of CONICIT.

A second table, using salary levels for January of each year, shows how these changes compare to the inflation rate. CONICIT salaries were adjusted in 1977 to compensate for the 1975/76 inflation rate of 347.1 per cent. The stronger domestic value of the dollar allowed for smaller readjustments between 1977/78, although in the following two years until January 1980, salaries have been readjusted although at less than the rate of inflation. Without the financial security of the council, CEDES has readjusted its salaries on a bi annual basis. They have been able to do



T.D.1. Argentina; researchers' salaries, 1975 - 1980  
(US dollars per month)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Cedes</u>	<u>Conicit</u>	<u>Per cent Cedes of Conicit salary</u>
1975 July	325	366	88
1976 January	425	167	254
September	484	444	109
1977 January	484	717	67
November	608	648	94
1978 January	816	811	101
September	935	1 243	75
1979 January	977	1 416	69
September	1 403	1 959	72
1980 January	1 542	2 327	66
May	1 844	2 922	63

Source: CEDES

The Conicit category used for comparison is that of superior ; for explanation see text.

so because a number of their senior researchers have positions in other countries.

Figures from the other centres are not so detailed. Current CEUR salaries for equivalent categories range around \$ 2000 per month. CISEA provided a salary of \$ 600 per month for senior researchers during 1977/78 which has now increased to \$ 1,500. It will be recalled that for a long time a number of senior researchers could not draw salary because of the financial problems of the centre. (see Appendix E).

Figures for the centres are gross and do not include any payments for social security or insurances. Receipt of an award from CONICIT does allow the holder the opportunity of entering the social security system, plus other benefits, part of which will be paid for by the Council.

T.D.2 Argentina; annual change in salary  
(per cent)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>CEDES</u>	<u>CONICIT</u>	<u>CPI*</u>
1976/77	13.9	329.3	160.4
1977/78	68.6	13.1	169.8
1978/79	19.7	74.5	157.5
1979/80	57.8	64.3	120.0
1976/80	262.8	1 293.4	

Source: as table D.1. and T.D.2.  
consumer price index as defined in T.D.1.

Appendix E. CISEA; a profile.

The Centro de Investigaciones Sociales sobre el Estado y la Administracion, CISEA, is frequently mentioned in the text, but does not currently receive special institutional support from the Centre. Included to round out the sample of centres from Argentina to the same number as Chile it is of considerable interest in its own right. This profile gives a fuller description and points to some features that are making it a successful institution.

This centre, like CEDES, emerged from the Centro de Investigaciones en Administracion Publica, CIAP, of the Instituto Torquato de Tella (ITT). By 1975 when CIAP had effectively become independent of the ITT, it was agreed that the members would form two institutions, CEDES and CISEA. The principal factor for the division was that of a difference in research orientation and so research policy. Later as the two centres faced more difficult and testing times, these differences became embedded in the organization and the functioning of the institutions.

(a) research policy and objectives

CISEA's objectives are to undertake research, teaching and technical assistance. Like the other centres, it has had mixed success within the current research environment in achieving these objectives.

The major research areas involve the interrelationship of the state and society. Their understanding of the term state includes public administration, the public sector, government policy, and resource utilization and distribution. Within Latin America, it is the state that has been the promoter and arbiter of social change, a process which calls for an understanding of the economic and social conditions by which it operates.

From the first, CISEA has practiced collective decision making for research and institutional policy. Accepting the common sense assumption that some researchers have a greater capacity in some fields than others, none of the researchers had reached the degree of eminence by which they could impose their individual preferences as the dominant element in research policy. Research issues have been discussed collectively and this has been reinforced by events since 1976. The research group believes that given current conditions in Argentina, there are a number of key issues which are both vital and necessary to understand and where research can make contribute to this understanding. These priority areas are,

(i) the deterioration of Argentina's productive base at a time of apparent financial wealth.

(ii) an examination of the performance of various sectors within the economy, particularly the relationship between agriculture and industry.

(iii) the terms of trade between sectors and compared to other economies and societies.

(iv) the concentration of wealth and power at a time when the functions of the state are being reduced or in decline.

(v) the relationship between the utilization and distribution of resources by the state and the frequent political crises engendered by social policy, distribution of wealth, political interests, etc. and which have resulted in a military - civilian - military political cycle since the first overthrow of Peron government in 1975.

These questions, which the members believe are vital to understand if their research is to contribute to a more rational society, led to the following projects.

1. The state in the development of Argentina's economy; an examination of the financial system, the fiscal system and the power of the state as a creator of markets. The study is still in progress; partially funded.
2. The Function of law in the democratic organization of the state: considers the relationship between the law and the administrative structure of the state. Shows the state has assumed increasing powers of legal discretion and that it has grown not only in size but in legal attributions. Relates this to development of legislation, jurisprudence public interest and planning: in progress.
3. Formation and characteristics of ruling class in Argentina, 1880-1914. Explores how prosperous and socially advanced country, reduced to economic stagnation and intolerance: how economic growth based on a number of agricultural commodities led to social and political instability. Major conflicts were over distribution of investment and power in the formation of society which could then compare itself to Australia and Canada: in progress.
4. Argentina 1966-1978  
Review of major issues in economic, social and state policy particularly how the main political groups tried to formulate policy in a society without consensus: not yet funded.
5. Industrial concentration and strategy; reviews the decline of the manufacturing sector and the growth of industrial and financial groups, particularly conglomerates. Examines government policy through policy instruments such as industrial promotion legislation.
6. Origin and consolidation of large business groups. Analysis of six corporate groups and their behaviour, particularly in relation to their investments and financial holdings.
7. Social, economic and political conditions for technical change in the Agricultural sector. Shows how output stagnation in the Argentinian pampa was a result of alternative profitable choices available to farmers even though technologies available to increase output. From 1960 on, increase in output due to technological change, but adoption rate far less than expected with results below that of other countries. Low technological demand due to opportunity cost and risk factors.

8. Regional corporations in Latin America. Reviews role of regional agencies to promote development in a particular region. Identification of 45 in Latin America; examination of impact and effects.
9. State purchasing power in Argentina. Effect of state decisions on creation and use of technology in the electronics sector: in progress.

These studies reflect the research policy and capacity of the members. There are preliminary papers on all the subjects, which have discussed and reviewed. However, only studies 3, 5, 7 and 9 have been funded as projects; the remainder have partial funding or none at all.

The teaching objectives of the centre has been reduced to offering seminars or conferences in private institutions. Previously, all the members of CISEA taught in Argentinian universities.

Technical assistance has been used principally to "increase the operating capacity of the state." They have undertaken diagnostic studies concerned with the structure and functioning of the administration; the design and implementation of administrative reform projects and training courses.

(b) institutional policy.

CISEA's style of work, based on collective research decisions, also implies shared administrative decisions. Their choices and their sacrifices have been collectively distributed.

This is best illustrated with their salary policy. First, members of CISEA are expected to be full time. When undertaking work for other organizations, such as technical assistance, it is expected that their fee will be paid to the institution and they will continue to receive their CISEA salary. As salaries from international agencies are considerably higher than those provided by CISEA, then the surplus strengthens the institution. Second, when faced with a shortage of funds, the members agreed that those with a family income, usually a working wife, would not receive salaries and members with children would have priority after the other costs (rent, electricity, administrative staff, etc.) had been met.

Salary levels have evolved slowly. In the period 1977-78 senior researchers could expect to receive US \$ 600 and assistants approximately US \$ 350. These were increased in 1978-79 to US \$ 1,000 and US \$ 600 respectively and currently, 1979-80 stand at US \$ 1 500 and US \$ 800 respectively. These are modest levels compared with other salaries set out in Appendix D.

(c) Resources.

The CISEA expenditures have grown from US \$ 64,000 (1977-78) to \$ 101,650 (1978-79) and in the last available fiscal year to \$ 159,100. Income for the same three periods was US \$ 46,900, \$ 71,900 and 159,100. The difference has been absorbed by the researchers themselves. By the last fiscal year approximately \$ 48,130 was owed to senior researchers. This sum is not included in the income or expenditure total for 1979-80 but carried on the books as a debt.

During the first period, 1977-78, technical assistance contracts amounted

to \$ 21,350 or 45.5 per cent of income. Although the level of technical assistance has remained at about the same sum, the percentage contribution to income declined to 38.9 per cent and 19.1 per cent during the last two fiscal years. The remainder of the income came from projects and from an institutional grant provided by SAREC.

Current professional staff consists of four senior researchers and four associated researchers. Two of this core staff of eight have taken leave of absence to work with UNCTAD in Peru; one is a visiting researcher and covers his own costs and another works without a fee while the Centre continues to have financial problems. The four principal researchers come from a variety of backgrounds. Two are engineers, one is a lawyer and the director is a social scientist. Three have held important positions in previous governments and all have had senior responsibilities with various Argentinian universities. One has a doctorate from the Sorbonne, another from the University of Buenos Aires. The others have masters or equivalent degrees.

(d) Future funding.

The funding requirements for 1980-81 are set out below with their assumptions.

T.E.1	<u>CISEA; funding options, 1980-81</u>			
	(current US dollars)			
Budget 1980-81	A	B	C	D
Professional salaries	91,200	120,000	169,000	217,000
Other costs	33,600	33,600	33,600	37,500
<u>Total</u>	<u>122,800</u>	<u>153,600</u>	<u>202,600</u>	<u>254,500</u>
Current deficit	60,800	91,600	140,600	192,500

Source; CISEA.

Assumption A is the income required for the minimum survival of the Centre; a current staff of four seniors at their present salary and two assistants. The second assumption, B, would result if the senior researchers were paid \$ 2000 per month each. Assumption C would involve paying part of the past salaries of the researchers and the addition of another assistant, while D, which includes the other options, would allow the centre to increase the number of assistants to four. This last assumption is seen as the current optimum size of the centre.

CISEA is made up of highly committed researchers who believe in their work and are willing to make sacrifices for it. They have thought carefully about the conditions for building a research institution and base their work on collective decision making and collegiality.

# ARGENTINA ABROAD

## Agents are exported to kidnap and murder

By JUAN de ONIS

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**BUENOS AIRES** — Argentina's military regime is exporting its "national security" doctrine, supporting right-wing political conspiracies in Bolivia and other neighboring countries and sending intelligence agents abroad to kidnap and murder Argentine dissidents.

Much like South Africa, with its strategy against black guerrilla movements on its borders, Argentina is trying to put as much geographical distance as possible between Buenos Aires and threats of left-wing revolutionary harassment from abroad.

President Jorge Rafael Videla is pursuing this policy despite diplomatic conflicts with the United States and democratic governments in Latin America over the military coup in Bolivia on July 17.

There was also the embarrassing cancellation of a scheduled visit by General Videla to Peru after three Argentines were kidnapped there by Argentine intelligence agents and spirited out of the country through Bolivia, with the co-operation of both countries' military officers. Such operations are denied officially in Buenos Aires, but military sources here and in neighboring capitals confirm the Argentine involvement.

Last week, General Videla attempted to justify the Bolivian

military takeover as vital to Argentina's security. Referring to the coup in La Paz, when far-right military officers annulled results of free elections that favored Hernan Siles Zuazo, a moderate left-wing presidential candidate, he said: "We do not want a situation in the heartland of South America that would amount to what Cuba represents for Central America."

General Videla added that such an elected government in Bolivia would represent a threat for all the military regimes in power in the

### Ideas present threat to military

so-called Southern Cone of South America — Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile.

"There was a high degree of risk because of the possibility that such a government would promote ideas contrary to our way of life and the permanence of military governments," he said.

Since the epidemic of left-wing guerrilla violence in the region that began in the 1960s with the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the Montoneros and People's Revolutionary Army in Argentina and similar groups in Bolivia, Peru and Chile, the military intelligence services have organized the counter-subversion known as the white terror.

After the Argentine military

ousted president Isabel Peron in 1976 and began a campaign of extermination of left-wing activists, Uruguayan military intelligence agents were given a free hand to round up exiled opponents of the Uruguayan military in Argentina.

Hundreds of people were seized and two leading opposition politicians, Zelmar Michelini and Alberto Ruiz Gutierrez, were assassinated after being dragged from their hotel room in the presence of Argentine police.

Chilean exiles also were handed across the border to Chilean secret police and have not been heard of since. General Juan Jose Torres, a former president of Bolivia, was kidnapped in Buenos Aires and found dead in an automobile trunk. General Carlos Prats, commander in chief of the Chilean army under the late president Salvador Allende, was killed by a bomb in Argentina.

A similar network of intelligence operations has also worked between Brazil and Uruguay. People abducted in the southern Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul, with co-operation from local political police, wound up in Uruguayan jails.

In Peru, however, after the military rulers there had held elections restoring democratic Government, the Argentine intelligence operation produced a political problem for the new President, Fernando Belaunde Terry. General Videla

had announced he would go to Lima for Mr. Belaunde's inauguration, but the visit was cancelled after the abductions became a Peruvian scandal.

Peru's military leaders acknowledged that authorization for seizure of the Argentines was given when Argentine intelligence agents identified them as suspected Montoneros, members of the left-wing Peronista movement which has continued hit-and-run operations in Argentina.

(In 1977, an Argentine military commando group went to Mexico

### Dirty tricks considered normal

with orders to kill Montonero leaders living in exile, but the operation failed and the agents had to take refuge from Mexican authorities in the Argentine Embassy.)

Such dirty-tricks operations are considered normal by Argentine intelligence groups waging clandestine war against leftist guerrillas. Since 1976, human rights groups have documented the disappearance of at least 6,000 prisoners who are presumed dead. Many bodies have been found in outlying places.

With the almost complete extermination of armed dissidents inside the country, the remaining active groups are abroad.



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# Protest grows over plan to delay Chilean vote

SANTIAGO, Chile (AP) — Chileans are becoming increasingly vocal in their opposition to a new constitution proposed in July by President Augusto Pinochet's military Government.

Gen. Pinochet has cranked up his propaganda machine to promote the document, which would grant the 64-year-old dictator power until 1989 and the right to name himself as successor for eight more years. But last week, the former civilian president, Eduardo Frei, a Christian Democrat, denounced the proposal.

Chileans over the age of 18 will be required to vote yes or no on

Sept. 11, seventh anniversary of the coup in which Gen. Pinochet toppled an elected president, the late Salvador Allende. Chileans who don't vote face up to three months in jail. About 7 million of the population of 11 million are expected to participate.

The major objections to the document are the tenure it would give Gen. Pinochet, restrictions on the opposition's access to mass media, the lack of electoral rolls and, most important, the lack of an alternative proposal.

The Chilean Conference of Catholic Bishops has asked the government to spell out what happens if

the constitution is rejected.

"Not to do so would leave the results ambiguous," the bishops said in a statement that criticized the Government for not permitting separate votes on Gen. Pinochet's stay, when elections should be held and the constitution itself.

The Christian Democrats, once Chile's largest political party but now operating semi-clandestinely because of a Government ban on all but official politics, has labelled the plebiscite "a farce."

"We reject the constitution . . . and we demand a transitional government immediately," said Mr. Frei, 70, the party's leader.

Mr. Frei told a rally last week he wants a transition government that would bring back full democracy in three years and challenged Gen. Pinochet to debate the new constitution.

After the rally, tens of thousands of Chileans ignored Government warnings and marched through the streets chanting anti-Pinochet slogans in the first major protest demonstration since the coup.

Club-wielding police broke up the march after about 10 blocks.

Opposition has been echoed by other organizations, including the Group of 24 — a committee of prominent lawyers and intellectu-

als working independently on a counter constitution, and the Group of 10, an organization of opposition union leaders.

They are making their views known through leaflets because they have been denied access to newspaper advertising, and to national radio and television networks.

The Pinochet proposal would provide for a strong executive and a two-house congress; create a National Security Council that would give the armed forces a strong voice in national policy; and guarantee free presidential elections in 1987.

Glossary/Abbreviations

AHC	Academia de Humanismo Cristiano (Chile)
CEBRAP	Centro Brasileiro de Analise e Planejamento (Brasil)
CEDES	Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (Argentina)
CELADE	Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía (Chile)
Centre	International Development Research Centre
centre (s)	independent research centres
CEUR	Centro de Estudios Urbanos y Regionales (Argentina)
CEPAL	Comisión Económica para América Latina
CIAP	Centro de Investigaciones de Administración Pública (Argentina)
CIDE	Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo Educativo
CIEPLAN	Corporación de Investigaciones Económicas para Latinoamérica (Chile)
CISEA	Centro de Investigaciones Sociales sobre el Estado y la Administración (Argentina)
CLACSO	Comisión Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales
CONICIT	Consejo Nacional de Investigación para Ciencia y Tecnología (Argentina)
Cono Sur	Southern Cone of Latin America referring to Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay
CPI	Consumer Price Index
CSUCA	Consejo Superior Universitario Centroamericano (Costa Rica)
FLACSO	Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales
IDES	Instituto de Desarrollo Económico y Sociedad (Argentina)
ILO	International Labour Office
ILPES	Instituto Latinoamericano de Planificación Económica y Social (Chile)
ITT	Instituto Torquato di Tella (Argentina)
OAS	Organization of American States
PIIE	Programa Interdisciplinario de Investigación en Educación (Chile)
PISPAL	Programa de Investigaciones Sociales sobre Problemas de Población Relevantes para Políticas de Población en América Latina (Chile)
SAREC	Swedish Agency for Research Co-operation with Developing Countries
INDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFRA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
WUS	World University Service (Geneva)