Canadians abroad are a major asset for Canada’s international affairs.

How can we deepen our connections with citizens overseas for the benefit of all Canadians?
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada initiated the Canadians Abroad Project as part of a policy research consortium and is deeply grateful to its project supporters—the Royal Bank of Canada Foundation, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the Government of British Columbia, the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, and Western Economic Diversification—for their generous investment of time and money. More than just a research report, the findings of this project provide a platform for policy development and public awareness about Canadians abroad, and an opportunity to tap into Canada’s global asset.

Don DeVoretz, Research Director
Kenny Zhang, Senior Project Manager
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In the same way that globalization has connected distant corners of the earth through trade, finance, and information flows, increased international mobility—especially of the highly skilled—is connecting Canadian citizens to the world in new and challenging ways. An increasingly globalized world is changing the way we think about immigration, residency, citizenship, human capital, and the panoply of government policies that affect these issues.

The flow of people between Canada and Asia has been an integral part of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada’s research for many years. In the 1980s and most of the 1990s, the focus was on immigration from Asia. Indeed, this period saw the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Asian immigrants and the transformation of cities such as Toronto and Vancouver. By the turn of the century, however, we observed that a substantial number of these immigrants had disappeared. Some had gone to third countries, especially the U.S., but most of them had returned to their places of origin. Hong Kong stood out because of the special circumstances (and uncertainty) around the return of the then British territory to Chinese rule in 1997.

The more we looked into this phenomenon, the more we became convinced that the issue of Canadians abroad was more than a one-off story about Hong Kong. In 2009, we released our first estimate of citizens living overseas and came up with the astonishing figure of 2.8 million. This figure has since been validated by further APF Canada research and is today widely accepted as the best estimate of the number of Canadians living overseas. In 2007, we formally launched the Canadians Abroad project, which consisted of in-house and commissioned research, workshops and conferences, policy consultations, and information dissemination. This report is the culmination of that work.

While the phenomenon of Canadian citizens living overseas is not new, the concept that Canada is actually an emigrant nation is foreign to many people. That’s partly because Canada receives more immigrants as a share of its population than most other countries, and has done so for many years.

Indeed the notion that Canadians (including recent immigrants) would choose to live abroad does not fit with the country’s self-image. At times this is reflected in attitudes that are dismissive or resentful of Canadians who choose to live overseas as “disloyal”. At the government level, it is reflected in often narrow, piecemeal and reactive policies. Derogative perceptions of Canadians abroad include: Big-name stars pursuing their careers in film, sports, or other high profile careers; citizens who from time to time get into trouble overseas and require consular assistance; and immigrants who couldn’t make it in Canada, have returned to their native countries and are therefore “citizens of convenience.”

This report is an attempt to paint a more complete and nuanced picture of Canadians abroad and to better understand the policy implications of a Canadian diaspora that is nearly a tenth the size of the total population. Our research has led us to conclude that Canadians abroad should be seen more as an asset than as a liability, and that a more conscious and coordinated approach to policy is needed to unlock the potential—and mitigate the risks—of this overseas citizenry. An important starting point is to foster their attachments to Canada—through political, legal, economic, institutional, and socio-cultural channels—so that the interests of Canadians abroad are more likely to be aligned with national interests.

The Canadians Abroad project was led by Don DeVoretz and Kenny Zhang, who not only produced much of the original research, but who were also tireless in their outreach activities to the policy, academic, and practitioner communities. Heather Kincaide played a major role in report production and was part of the research team, along with Victor Chen and Ajay Parasram.

We would also like to thank our advisory group for their contributions and support including Satwinder Bains, François Bertrand, Miro Cernetig, Tung Chan, André Cyr, Patrick Johnston, Martha Justus, and Eugene Kwan. Many others contributed to the project through data collection and analysis, case studies, commissioned papers, and advice. The full project can be found at the project website www.canadiansabroad.ca

Yuen Pau Woo
President and CEO
Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada
Our team defined a “Canadian abroad” as a Canadian citizen, naturalized or born in Canada, who has been living outside of Canada for one year or more since acquiring Canadian citizenship.

Canadians have always had mixed feelings about their fellow citizens who choose to live outside of the country. For more than three decades, concerns about “brain drain” and the liabilities associated with Canadians abroad have shaped public debate about Canadian emigration. Canadians have often expressed concern about their country’s ability to remain competitive when highly-skilled medical professionals, intellectuals and business leaders leave Canada. Furthermore, recent evacuations of Canadian citizens from Lebanon, Egypt and Libya have sparked debate about the rights and responsibilities of Canadians abroad, especially naturalized Canadians with multiple citizenships.

Increasingly, however, the Government of Canada, provincial governments and the media are recognizing that Canadian citizens abroad are potentially a large asset. Nevertheless, there is very little evidence-based research that government agencies can use to inform their policies regarding Canadians abroad. In order to fill this gap, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (APF Canada) conducted three years of research to produce Canadians Abroad: Canada’s Global Asset. The research report aimed to:

- Determine the number and demographics of Canadians living abroad for periods of more than one year
- Better understand the attachments these Canadians have to Canada
- Ascertain how Canadians feel about citizenship rights, taxation and consular services for Canadians abroad
- Identify pressing policy issues and recommend possible solutions

**KEY FINDINGS**

Since Canada does not keep exit data on émigrés, one of the basic challenges of researching Canadians abroad is determining how many there are and where they live.

Chapter One presents our findings on demographics. Using Canadian census data from 1996, 2001, and 2006, we determined that there were approximately 2.8 million Canadians living abroad as of 2006, or approximately 9 per cent of Canada’s population. This 9 per cent figure is much higher than the
percentage of Americans living abroad (1.7 per cent), about equal to the percentage of Britons (9 per cent) and lower than the percentage of New Zealanders (21.9 per cent).¹

Canadians can be found in almost every country. Currently just over one million Canadians are living in the U.S., and the vast majority of them were born in Canada. Hong Kong SAR is the jurisdiction with the second-largest number of resident Canadian citizens (about 300,000), the majority of whom were born in Hong Kong.

Individuals born in Canada make up the majority of Canadians abroad (58 per cent), but it is naturalized Canadians that make up the fastest growing segment of Canadians abroad, with an exit rate of 4.5 per cent between 1996 and 2006. By contrast, individuals born in Canada who chose to live overseas had an exit rate of 1.33 per cent.

The tendency to move abroad also decreases substantially with age. Between 1996 and 2006, young people between the ages of 21 and 25 were the most likely to move abroad, and men were more likely to move abroad than women.

**For citizens born in Canada:**
- Emigration from Canada is driven largely by economic forces in the U.S.
- The most dramatic variations in exit rates occurred according to ethnicity
- Individuals who claimed French background have a high net return rate to Canada of 29 per cent
- Exit rates were high for individuals who claimed an Eastern European, South Asian or Middle Eastern background, and indicate a mobile second generation

**For naturalized Canadians:**
- The largest variation in exit rates occurred by country of origin
- Countries of origin with high exit rates from Canada tend to be developed countries/jurisdictions (Hong Kong SAR, U.S., Taiwan, France)
- Immigrants from mainland China and India had very low rates of exit between 1996 and 2006. Considering that substantial immigration from mainland China only began in the late 1990s, the relatively small number of returnees is not surprising. More recent anecdotal evidence suggests that exit rates amongst Chinese immigrants are increasing.

Chapters Two and Three explore emigrant attachment to Canada and citizenship issues. Our research indicates that Canadians abroad generally retain strong, multi-dimensional attachments to Canada. Our findings from a 2010 survey of Canadians living in Hong Kong SAR reveal that:

- Two-thirds of respondents have immediate and or extended family members residing and/or studying in Canada
- 43% of respondents reported that they or their children go to school in Canada or to a school with a Canadian curriculum
- Approximately one in four respondents retains a professional practice license in Canada
- Three in five respondents intend to return to Canada

¹ Association of Americans Resident Overseas website; Sriskandarajah and Drew, 2006; Hugo, et al, 2003
Although many of Canadians living abroad actively retain connections to Canada, the ad hoc policies of the Government of Canada actually discourage attachment and narrow the definition of citizenship. Two of the most problematic policies relate to voting rights and citizenship. Canadians who have been abroad for more than five years are not permitted to vote in Canadian elections. Furthermore, the 2009 amendment to the Citizenship Act restricts citizenship by descent to one generation born abroad. The latter policy means that Canadians cannot pass on Canadian citizenship to their grandchildren born abroad.

These policies reflect an attitude that Canadians abroad should not have the same rights as those Canadians who live permanently in Canada. Opinion polls by the APF Canada, however, indicate that the majority of Canadians do not hold this view. In a 2010 poll of Canadian residents, sixty-six per
cent agreed that a child of Canadian parents should be a Canadian citizen regardless of where the child was born.

Consular services and taxation issues are particularly central to many public debates about Canadians abroad. Chapter Four outlines Canada’s approach to consular services and dispels the myth that Canadians at home regularly subsidize consular services for Canadians abroad. Chapter Five discusses the taxation issue further by exploring how the impact of emigrants on the federal and provincial treasuries depends on age, length of time abroad, foreign birth status and human capital, such as post-secondary education.

Chapter Five also explores how returnees fare in the Canadian job market. Our research suggests that some Canadians face significant economic disincentives to return to Canada. While Canada-born returnees, with the exception of females aged 25-35, generally earn higher salaries than their counterparts who never left Canada, naturalized Canadians earn less. As naturalized Canadians make up an increasingly large percentage of Canadians abroad, this finding could have serious implications for government programs aimed at enticing Canadians abroad back to Canada. After all, will naturalized Canadians abroad be interested in returning to Canada if they face relatively poor economic prospects?

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the federal and provincial governments of Canada take a more proactive and coordinated approach to engaging with Canadian citizens abroad. Government at all levels must recognize that Canadians living abroad are a significant global asset and are an important part of the Canadian landscape.

This is not to suggest that individual federal and provincial government departments have not already demonstrated great interest in Canadians abroad. However, we believe that there is a case for better policy coordination and some centralization of functions. This could amount to the creation of a standalone agency or department, or it could be a special secretariat within an existing ministry that is tasked with policy coordination and development, as well as support for cross-departmental and civil society initiatives. A first step in the creation of a new agency or secretariat would be for all relevant federal departments to produce an audit of their activities that pertain to Canadians abroad, and to map the extent to which these activities connect with each other.

The creation of a dedicated agency overseeing Canadians abroad would pave the way for a more fundamental reassessment of underlying issues that drive outmigration, return migration, attachment, and the beneficial linkages that citizens living overseas can bring to Canada. We believe a special Parliamentary Committee on Canadians Abroad should be created.
The need for more study and deliberation on issues concerning Canadians abroad should not be an excuse to delay more immediate and practical actions that can lead to benefits for Canadians abroad and at home, and which do not require fundamental policy changes. The underlying goal of these actions is to foster attachments to Canada in practical ways—through political, legal, economic, institutional, and socio-cultural channels—so that the interests of Canadians abroad are more likely to be aligned with national interests. Examples include:

- Support for overseas networks of Canadians to connect with their counterparts in Canada for commercial, research, and social improvement goals. An example of such a network is the C100 group in Silicon Valley.
- Staffing and funds for Canadian posts abroad to be more active in their outreach to Canadian citizens, by way of promotional and networking events, information dissemination, and public diplomacy.
- Partnerships with universities and colleges to establish a stronger link between Canadian alumni groups and networks of Canadians abroad. The “family” of overseas Canadians should include non-Canadians who have strong attachments to the country, for example through study in Canadian post-secondary institutions. It should also include the growing number of Canadian Overseas Schools that deliver high school curricula to foreign nationals (many of whom later attend Canadian universities).
- The creation of a global, cross-sector non-governmental organization (in addition to a coordinating government agency or policy secretariat) to link various national and regional Canadian networks overseas.
- Funding for more research on the incentives and obstacles for outmigration and return migration, and on ways to foster attachment to Canada that is in the national interest.
- The modernization of bilateral double taxation and/or social security agreements, especially with countries that have large populations of overseas Canadians. These mechanisms make it easier for Canadians to live and work abroad, as well as for foreigners to live and work in Canada. They can also address, to some extent, the problem of negative fiscal transfers in the case of Canadians who are abroad during their most productive (tax generating) years.

There is undoubtedly a balance sheet when it comes to Canadians abroad, with liabilities (and contingent liabilities) as well as assets. Public attention has recently focused excessively on liabilities. Unlike items on a typical financial balance sheet, however, Canadians abroad can’t be defined by accountants. They are real people, often highly skilled and very mobile, who make personal and professional choices based on changing circumstances, incentives, and motivations—much as all Canadians do. Whether or not Canadians abroad end up as an asset or a liability for Canada, therefore, is not a foregone conclusion, but is predicated on the Canadian policy response.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Emigration from Canada is not a new phenomenon. Immigrants in the nineteenth and early twentieth century often entered Canada for brief periods before leaving for the U.S., while Canada-born Quebecois left for northeastern parts of the U.S. in large numbers. By the mid-twentieth century, Canada’s so-called “brain drain” to the south raised anxieties and produced ad hoc policy responses that attempted to reverse the exodus. However, for a number of reasons, these outflows of Canadians did not create a population of citizens living abroad that was comparable to the one that exists today.

The concept of Canadian citizenship was not formalized until 1947, after which time the possibility of being a Canadian citizen living abroad became a reality. Thirty years later, the decision to permit dual citizenship in Canada set the stage for a larger population of Canadians abroad. Under the Canadian Citizenship Act of 1977, Canadians would no longer have to give up their citizenship if they opted to become the citizen of another country that also recognized dual citizenship. The Canadian Citizenship Act 1977 also removed ethnic criteria for immigration and citizenship and created the possibility of a more diverse population of Canadians at home and abroad.

In addition, changes to immigration policy in the 1970s opened the door to highly educated and mobile would-be Canadian citizens. Applicants for immigration in the economic admissions class were assessed under a point system that heavily favoured educational attainment, language facility, and youth. By the early 1990s the goal of successive governments was an immigration target of one per cent of Canada’s population, or 300,000 immigrants a year, equally divided between economic and non-economic immigrants. As a result, more than three million immigrants were admitted...

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2 In the late 1960s, the federal government created tax holidays to attract academics back to Canada.

3 In fact, the points-assessed entry gate is so stringent that if the test were applied to the Canada-born population circa 2006, less than half of Canadians could immigrate to their own country.

4 Neither of these goals have been met, since total admission numbers rarely exceeded 250,000. In addition, only 25 per cent of these, or 50,000 immigrants per year, were evaluated and admitted under the points system.
to Canada between 1990 and 2010, with about one million in the highly mobile economic immigrant category.

What is interesting, however, is that rapidly developing economies such as China and India, two large immigrant source countries for Canada, are now attracting back some of their citizens who made Canada home (naturalized Canadian immigrants and students who studied in Canada). China now takes back over 30 per cent of its overseas-educated elite. And India now allows a form of dual citizenship that permits holders to work in India without a visa, while restricting some aspects of political participation. In short, the change in Canadian immigrant selection by both source country (China, Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan, and India) and Canada’s preference for economic immigrants has created a substantial naturalized emigration pool.

Canada’s pool of potential citizen émigrés is also impacted by the differing rates of citizenship acquisition by country of origin. The two countries that send the largest number of people to Canada, China and India, recently experienced a quick (75 per cent) ascension to Canadian citizenship after their waiting period (approximately five years) had expired. Our research indicates that traditional immigrant source countries (Italy, Germany, U.S., and Netherlands) exhibit modest rates of citizenship ascension. Thus, one implication for future Canadian emigration is clear. The potential pool of naturalized émigrés will grow fastest from the newer immigrant source countries that have exhibited substantial rates of inflows into Canada since 1990.

METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS

Counting the number of Canadian emigrants is a fundamentally different process than counting the number of Canadian immigrants. When a person enters Canada as a permanent immigrant, a well-documented process begins, starting with the landings record. This record includes all of the immigrant’s pertinent demographic, educational and economic background. This information is also updated for permanent residents in Canada in order

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5 Two interesting variants of foreign student sojourners have arisen in Canada. First is the typical solo foreign student who when finishing her degree leaves Canada. In fact, Canada has the lowest foreign student retention rate of all OECD countries. In addition, some 1.5- and second-generation Canadian immigrants are acquiring their post-secondary education in Canada and then leaving Canada.

6 Zweig, 2008

7 India circa 2011 has introduced a merged long term visa status for both components (Person of Indian Origin (PIO) and Indian Overseas Person (IOP) of its overseas population in Canada. In effect, dual citizens of Canada can now retain their Canadian citizenship while living in India on a long-term basis with many benefits of Indian citizenship conferred on them except the right to vote and stand for political office.

8 During this period, neither China nor India offered its foreign nationals the option of dual citizenship.
to create a longitudinal record. In contrast, no such detailed records are kept for Canadian émigrés, as is the practice in Europe, Australia and many other countries. This absence of “gateway” emigration data is a political decision in North America, since free emigration implies an absence of control including recording exit information. This means that the most direct method to count Canadians abroad is unavailable.

The Canadians Abroad Project used a 20 per cent sample of the 1996, 2001 and 2006 census data, and grouped individual respondents in each sample year by five demographic characteristics:

- Gender
- Year of birth
- Year of immigration (if applicable)
- Residence in a census metropolitan area (CMA)
- Country of birth

This method deduced the changes in the relevant population size over the 1996-2001 and 2001-2005 periods and inferred a decrease or increase in the relevant population. When mortality is taken into account, a decrease in population would imply net outmigration from Canada over this period. This allows us to estimate the number of people who left Canada between 1996 and 2006, and who remained abroad as of 2006. An increase in the population would imply a net return migration to Canada over the same time period.

This approach does have some inherent limitations. Firstly, we can only estimate a net exit emigration rate over a specific period, not how many people lived abroad for more than one year between these time periods. Furthermore, we can estimate who leaves Canada, but not where they go or details about their later work history. For that kind of information, census and official records in destination countries and representative sample surveys must be used.

Is it possible to estimate the population of Canadians living overseas if we apply these leaving rates to Canadians living abroad before 1996? The answer is yes, if we are willing to make a major assumption: the recent past (1996-2006) mirrors the more distant past (1976-1996) in terms of age-specific mortality rates and exit rates. If the assumption holds, then it is possible to estimate the number of Canadians who left to live abroad during the period 1976-2006, or the last thirty years.

As Table 1-1 indicates, under this assumption, we can estimate that the number of Canadian citizens living abroad adds up to 2.78 million.

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9 The original landings record is referred to as a “tombstone” record, which is electroncially clipped to the immigrant’s yearly tax file to create an administrative longitudinal file (IMDB). The IMDB is of paramount importance in estimating the number of emigrants who are naturalized Canadian citizens.

10 Care must be taken when stating that no records are kept on Canadian emigrants. The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) requires that taxes on capital gains and other forms of income are paid when a citizen leaves the country permanently. So some tax records are kept on Canadian émigrés. In addition, the Canada Revenue Agency can grant Canadian citizens “deemed foreign resident” status, which implies that CRA does have some information on the number of Canadians living permanently abroad.

11 Please see Appendix I for additional information on methodology.

12 1978 is a crucial benchmark year, since after thirty-one years, a portion of this population could still be living abroad.
TABLE 1-1 CALCULATIONS OF THE NUMBER OF CANADIANS ABROAD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population of Canada</th>
<th>Median Age</th>
<th>Years to 2006</th>
<th>Survival Rate</th>
<th>Estimated number of Canadians Abroad (2006)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>29,610,757</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>98.7%</td>
<td>1,062,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>26,100,587</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>96.8%</td>
<td>918,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>23,449,793</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>93.9%</td>
<td>800,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,781,190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DeVoretz (2009)

KEY TRENDS

Our study found that there were approximately 2.8 million Canadian citizens living abroad as of 2006, or approximately 9 per cent of Canada’s population. This 9 per cent figure is much higher than the percentage of Americans living abroad (1.7 per cent), about equal to the percentage of Britons (9 per cent) and lower than the percentage of New Zealanders (21.9 per cent). It is also interesting to note that, of Canada’s thirteen provinces and territories, only four have populations greater than 2.8 million.

![Figure 1-1: Percentage of Population Living Abroad: An International Comparison](image)

Note: This chart is compiled using information from various secondary sources, including, the Association of Americans Resident Overseas, website; Bergsten and Choi, 2003; DeVoretz, 2009; High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, 2001; Hugo, et al. 2003; Srisvandarajah and Drew, 2006; The World Confederation of Institutes and Libraries for Chinese Overseas Studies website; Vertovec, 2005; Zhang, 2006. The definition of population abroad for each country may vary considerably. Some define their population abroad by citizenship, some by ethnicity or both. Also some sources calculated their population abroad during a specific time period, while others may include generations of population living abroad.
As mentioned previously, determining destination countries for Canadian emigrants is difficult because Canada does not keep exit data. The Canadians Abroad team utilized a variety of sources to estimate the numbers of Canadians in selected destination countries (Table 1-2). The United States alone is the current place of residence for just over one million Canadians abroad, the vast majority of whom are Canada-born. Hong Kong SAR is the foreign jurisdiction with the second largest number of resident Canadian citizens (approximately 300,000), the majority of whom are Hong Kong-born.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1,062,640</td>
<td>Coulombe and DeVoretz, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong SAR</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>Zhang and DeGolyer, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>UK Office of National Statistics Labour Force Survey, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>DFAIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>27,289</td>
<td>Dumont and Lemaitre, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>19,990</td>
<td>Chinese Census 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>14,210</td>
<td>OECD, International Migration Database, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>13,390</td>
<td>OECD, International Migration Database, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>11,931</td>
<td>OECD, International Migration Database, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>11,016</td>
<td>OECD, International Migration Database, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>DFAIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>7,770</td>
<td>Dumont and Lemaitre, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>DFAIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>DFAIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>5,768</td>
<td>Dumont and Lemaitre, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>5,243</td>
<td>OECD, International Migration Database, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>5,140</td>
<td>Foreign Ministry of Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>DFAIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Parasram, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4,145</td>
<td>Dumont and Lemaitre, 2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our analysis of census data shows that individuals born in Canada make up the majority of Canadians abroad (58 per cent), but overall, had a low net exit rate of 1.33 per cent during the 1996-2006 period. Naturalized Canadians make up the fastest growing segment of Canadians abroad with an exit rate of 4.5 per cent.
Reporting exit rates for Canada-born and naturalized Canadians, however, hides the complex variations in the tendency within these groups to live abroad. The tendency to move abroad, for example, drops substantially with age. Young people aged 21 to 25 had the highest tendency to move abroad, with exit rates double the average for Canada-born individuals and triple the average for naturalized Canadians. Other key trends for both groups will be discussed in greater detail below.

CITIZENS BORN IN CANADA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1-3: OUT-MIGRATION RATES FOR CANADIAN BORN POPULATION, 1996-2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996 (weighted count, rounded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age in 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For those born in Canada, the most dramatic variations in exit rates occurred according to ethnicity. Our analysis found that those individuals born in Canada who self-identify as French, for example, have a high net return rate to Canada of 29 per cent. Exit rates for second-generation Canadians who claimed an Eastern European, South Asian or Middle Eastern background, were high, and are indicative of a mobile second generation.

Emigration from Canada is driven largely by economic forces in the U.S. The economic downturn after 2001, for instance, caused a collapse in the net outmigration rate from 1.88 per cent during 1996-2001 to 0.75 per cent during 2001-2006.16

15 Persons aged 0 to 71 in 1996.
16 DeVoretz, 2009
NATURALIZED CANADIANS

a) Exit Rate by Country of Origin

As Tables 1-4 and 1-5 illustrate, naturalized Canadian citizens demonstrate a wide range of exit rates based on country of origin.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Num.</th>
<th>Out-Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong SAR</td>
<td>44710</td>
<td>23.98 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>15130</td>
<td>10.64 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>14060</td>
<td>30.37 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>7620</td>
<td>15.14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5090</td>
<td>11.47 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>4460</td>
<td>10.10 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1630</td>
<td>12.50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1130</td>
<td>10.44 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>12.02 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DeVoretz (2009)

Naturalized Canadians originally coming from the countries listed in Table 1-4 show robust cumulative outmigration levels and outmigration rates for the 1996-2006 period. These countries send a diverse set of immigrants to Canada, ranging from predominately refugees (Iran) to business and professionally trained immigrants (U.S., Japan, Australia).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Num.</th>
<th>Out-Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainland China</td>
<td>5230</td>
<td>2.74 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>4620</td>
<td>4.83 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>3800</td>
<td>6.29 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>3710</td>
<td>4.39 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3680</td>
<td>1.34 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>2840</td>
<td>5.91 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2290</td>
<td>4.27 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>2270</td>
<td>4.74 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2180</td>
<td>2.06 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>8.12 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>0.95 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>7.00 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>0.63 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DeVoretz (2009)
Table 1-5 shows that many immigrant groups do not participate in substantial emigration from Canada. China, for example, is a major immigrant-source country for Canada, but Chinese immigrants have yet to exhibit any substantial exit from Canada. Whether these exit rates will increase as China develops economically remains to be seen. Furthermore, many immigrants from Sri Lanka, Haiti and Guyana entered Canada as refugees, a group which has low exit rates.

It is clear from the above tables that the circular flow of emigrants during 1996-2006 between Canada and the rest of the world predominantly took place between developed countries. There was little return migration between Canada and less-developed immigrant source countries.

b) Exit Rate by Length of Stay in Canada

Emigration rates of naturalized Canadians vary over the length of stay in Canada. Exit rates for Hong Kong sourced immigrants peak after four to five years of residence in Canada, or just after the minimum waiting period required to gain Canadian citizenship.17 Conversely, exit rates for Indian immigrants to Canada decrease after four years of residency. The low exit rate of around one per cent or less amongst immigrants from India is no doubt owing to two forces, namely the immigrant entrance class (family) and until recently, slow economic development in India.

17 Three years is the legally defined waiting period for citizenship acquisition. In practice the process takes slightly longer.
When 2.8 million Canadian citizens live outside the country on a long-term basis, to what extent, if any, do they stay connected to Canada? This question has been a long-standing cornerstone of the public debate about Canada’s expatriate population, especially since the evacuation of over 14,000 Canadians from Lebanon in July 2006 (see Box 2-1) and from Egypt in 2011. Many Canadians questioned whether these evacuated citizens paid Canadian taxes and, if not, why Canadian tax dollars were being spent to bring them back to Canada. In other words, paying tax was seen as an indicator of attachment.

There appears to be widespread disagreement about the degree to which Canadians living abroad are attached to Canada and what criteria should be used to determine a real or strong connection. Some argue that “if you’re going to be a Canadian, you have to have some substantive ties. If you keep giving citizenship indefinitely to your progeny and their progeny, the ties are pretty questionable.”

Currently Canadian policies tend to discourage attachment to Canada by citizens living abroad. Canadian citizens are prohibited from voting in general elections after residing abroad for five years. Furthermore, Canadians cannot pass on Canadian citizenship to their grandchildren born abroad. Other measures, such as taxation policy and professional licensing regulations, tend to discourage citizens from maintaining their ties with Canada while living abroad.

This chapter will discuss the types of attachments and some problematic policy areas.

MEANINGS OF ATTACHMENT
In general, the attachment to Canada of a citizen living overseas refers to interactive ties or linkages between the individual citizen and Canada. The

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18 Chant, 2006; McGregor, 2009a; 2009b.
19 McGregor, 2009b.
20 Zhang, 2009b.
development of transportation and communication technologies has dramatically changed the way in which these ties or linkages can be maintained. Michael Fullilove, a former adviser to Australia’s Prime Minister Paul Keating, recently observed a trend common among diaspora communities worldwide:

“Connectedness has grown exponentially, as the telegraphy, the press, radio, television and transcontinental telephony have given way to computers, satellite television, the Internet, email, chat rooms, blogs, Internet telephony such as Skype, video-sharing sites such as YouTube, and social networking communities such as Facebook and MySpace. This trend, which has enabled information flows and interactions between people who are physically distant, has naturally benefited Diaspora communities.”

These kinds of connectedness shape relationships between Canadian citizens abroad and the state of Canada. Three things are important to keep in mind when considering the attachment of Canadians abroad to Canada. First, attachment to Canada is a two-way relationship between citizens abroad and the state of Canada. The ties or links have to be observed from an interactive perspective between individuals and the state. Second, the ties and links can take place on many different levels and are typically multi-dimensional (see Table 2-2). Third, Canadians abroad, like many other diaspora groups, are attached to both sides of the world—Canada as their homeland and the country in which they are living. These two types of attachment shape ties between Canada and the rest of the world, and can be a unique asset for Canada.

**TYPES OF ATTACHMENT: THE STATE PERSPECTIVE**

Many countries have mechanisms for keeping the state connected with its diaspora. One mechanism focuses on diaspora building, which cultivates and recognizes diaspora communities, while another emphasizes diaspora

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**BOX 2-1: THE EVACUATION OF CANADIANS FROM LEBANON IN 2006**

On July 12, 2006, fighting broke out between Hezbollah militants in Lebanon and Israeli soldiers. At the time of the conflict, it was estimated that 40,000 to 50,000 Canadians were visiting or residing in Lebanon. The Government of Canada announced that it would evacuate—at its own cost—any of its nationals who wanted to leave Lebanon, leading to the largest mass evacuation program the country has ever mounted.

According to the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada voluntarily evacuated 14,370 people by the end of the crisis. The cost of the evacuation was $85 million, according to CTV News. The evacuation ignited a debate about the rights and obligations of Canadian citizens who live permanently overseas, especially those with dual citizenship.

There was debate about those who were termed “Canadians of convenience.” These are people with multiple citizenships who immigrated to Canada, met the residency requirements to obtain citizenship, moved back to their home country, and continue to hold Canadian citizenship.

Many argued that if a Canadian passport was the only connection these expatriates had with Canada, their attachment was questionable. Others suggested that citizenship should expire after a certain period if the person in question did not live in Canada. Others said a longer residency in Canada should be required before an immigrant can obtain Canadian citizenship.

Others wanted to see dual citizens who lived outside the country pay Canadian taxes. They argued that if these people do not pay taxes, they should be forced to relinquish their citizenship. Many questioned why “tens of millions of dollars” were spent on individuals who are citizens but who do not reside in Canada.

As a rule, Canada asks citizens to reimburse the government for their evacuation from foreign lands. But in this case, the federal government decided that taxpayers would foot the bill. Ottawa similarly agreed to waive evacuation charges after the devastating 2004 tsunami.

For more information, please refer to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (2006).
integration, which draws members into reciprocal ties with their homeland. A summary of diaspora building and diaspora integration in selected countries is found in Table 2-1.

**TABLE 2-1: DIASPORA MECHANISMS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types and Examples of Diaspora Mechanisms</th>
<th>Country Examples*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultivating a Diaspora:</strong> Celebrating national holidays; honouring expatriates with awards; convening diaspora congresses; proclaiming affinity with and responsibility for diaspora; issuing special IDs/visas; national language and history education; extended media coverage</td>
<td>Haiti; India; Ireland; Israel; Japan; Mexico; Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recognizing the Diaspora:</strong> Expanded consular units; commissioning studies or reports; improving statistics; maintaining a diaspora program, bureaucratic unit, or dedicated ministry</td>
<td>Algeria; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Benin; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso, Chile, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, Romania, Senegal, South Korea, Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extending rights:</strong> Permitting dual nationality, dual citizenship or external voting rights; special legislative representation; consulting expatriate councils or advisory bodies</td>
<td>Colombia, Croatia, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extending rights:</strong> Providing pre-departure services; extensive bilateral agreements; intervening in labour relations; supplementing health; welfare and education services support; upholding property rights</td>
<td>Ireland, Mexico, Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extracting obligations:</strong> Taxing expatriates; customs/import incentives; special economic zones; investment services; tax incentives; matching fund programs; diaspora bonds and financial products; facilitating remittances, fellowships, skilled expatriate network</td>
<td>Brazil, China, Eritrea, India, Mexico, Philippines, Syria, U.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Examples indicate countries that have “many nation-building activities, a bureaucratic unit, legislative representation, social justice focus, [and] initiatives to leverage the diaspora.”

TYPES OF ATTACHMENT: THE INDIVIDUAL’S PERSPECTIVE

From the individual’s perspective, the relationship between a citizen abroad and his/her home country can take place on different levels.

A recent survey of Canadian citizens in Hong Kong SAR provides some information about the multi-dimensional connections Canadians living in Hong Kong maintain with Canada. Survey results suggest that family ties with Canada are extensive for most respondents, with around two-thirds having immediate and/or extended family members residing and/or studying in Canada. Education ties are also extensive as 29 per cent of respondents indicated that their children attend or will attend schools in Canada. Another 14 per cent send or intend to send their children to Hong Kong schools that offer Canadian curriculum. About one in four respondents also retains a professional license to practice in Canada. Nearly one in five respondents said they still paid taxes in Canada while living in Hong Kong. However, only one in ten respondents are either doing business with clients in Canada or work in Hong Kong for Canadian companies or organizations.

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Zhang and DeGolyer, 2011.
The same survey also found that more than three in five respondents (62 per cent) plan to return to live in Canada, 21 per cent of whom said they consider doing so all the time. About half of the respondents plan to return to Canada within ten years.

The survey results also suggest that not all individuals have the same degree of attachment to Canada. About one in six respondents reported that they will never return to Canada to live. One third have never considered Canada home. Three in ten never visit Government of Canada websites. Two in five have never made a phone call to the local Canadian Consulate General, and another 37 per cent have never visited the local office of the Canadian Consulate General. Furthermore, one in five does not want to receive information from the Canadian Consulate General.

BOX 2-2: “CAPTAIN CANADA” IN VIETNAM

Toronto-born Graham has earned the nickname “Captain Canada” for his enthusiastic involvement in Canada-oriented activities in Vietnam, where he has lived for the past fifteen years. He is involved with the Canadian consulate and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Ho Chi Minh City. He is also an enthusiastic participant in his city’s annual Canadian Thanksgiving dinner and Terry Fox Run. Graham keeps up to date on current affairs in Canada by reading CBC news online and through his involvement with Canadian organizations in Vietnam.

Source: Zhang and DeGolyer, 2011

The survey results also suggest that not all individuals have the same degree of attachment to Canada. About one in six respondents reported that they will never return to Canada to live. One third have never considered Canada home. Three in ten never visit Government of Canada websites. Two in five have never made a phone call to the local Canadian Consulate General, and another 37 per cent have never visited the local office of the Canadian Consulate General. Furthermore, one in five does not want to receive information from the Canadian Consulate General.24
GLOBAL ATTACHMENT
Canadians abroad, like many other diaspora groups, are attached to both sides of the world—Canada as a homeland and the country in which they live. Nearly 57 per cent of Canadians abroad live in the U.S., Greater China (Mainland China, Hong Kong SAR, Macau and Taiwan), the United Kingdom and Australia,25 countries that represented a total of 83.5 per cent of Canada’s export market and 65.5 per cent of its import market in 2010.26 In addition, Canadians abroad are connected in a global network, through a variety of available civil society and government run mechanisms. C100 (see Sidebar 2-3), for example, is a U.S.-based non-profit organization dedicated to supporting Canadian technology entrepreneurship and investment through partnerships among Canadians in Silicon Valley. This kind of attachment shapes exceptional ties between Canada and the rest of the world and is a unique asset for Canada.

PROBLEMATIC POLICY AREAS
The attachment of Canadians abroad to Canada can be multi-dimensional and often takes place on different levels. This reality is much more complicated than a simple assessment based on whether a citizen lives in Canada or pays Canadian taxes. The complexity of attachment also suggests that some policies in Canada related to citizens abroad are problematic and need to be revisited.

TAX RULES DISCOURAGE TIES TO CANADA
When people questioned whether citizens overseas paid Canadian taxes,27 they may not have realized that Canadian tax rules specifically define tax obligations based on resident status under the following options provided by the Canada Revenue Agency:

- A factual resident is someone who left Canada but is considered to be a resident of Canada for income tax purposes;
- A deemed resident is someone who lives outside Canada and who severs his/her residential ties with Canada, but is deemed a resident of Canada for income tax purposes;
- A non-resident is someone who is considered to be an emigrant for income tax purposes, and for all following years, if this situation does not change, will be considered a non-resident;
- A deemed non-resident (effective after February 24, 1998) is a factual resident of Canada and a resident of another country with which Canada has a tax treaty.

BOX 2-3: C100—SUPPORTING CANADIAN ENTREPRENEURS

C100 is a non-profit organization dedicated to supporting Canadian technology entrepreneurship and investment.

C100 is made up of a select group of Canadians based primarily in Silicon Valley, including executives of leading technology companies, experienced startup entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. C100 members are passionate about leveraging their collective experience, expertise and relationships to help mentor and grow a new generation of successful Canadian-led technology companies.

C100 Charter Members include startups, CEOs, top executives of companies such as Apple, Cisco, Electronic Arts (EA), eBay, Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Oracle, and venture investors with more than $8 billion in capital.

Source: http://www.thec100.org/

26 Statistics Canada, 2011.
27 More detailed discussion on taxes can be found in Chapter 5.
According to the website of the Canada Revenue Agency, as a factual resident or deemed resident, a person is subject to federal tax like any other resident of Canada. As a non-resident or deemed non-resident, a person has to report certain types of income from Canada. In other words, and contrary to popular belief, Canadians abroad are liable for tax payments to the Canadian treasury if they file a Canadian tax return.

Currently, Canada’s rules regarding income tax payments allow citizens to make a rational choice. The problem is that some people cut their residential ties to Canada in order to be eligible for non-resident or deemed non-resident status.

Residential ties include:
- a home in Canada;
- a spouse or common-law partner or dependants in Canada;
- personal property in Canada, such as a car or furniture;
- social ties in Canada.

Other ties that may be relevant include:
- a Canadian driver’s licence;
- Canadian bank accounts or credit cards;
- health insurance with a Canadian province or territory.

Once these ties are cut, it is difficult for Canadians abroad to resume their attachment to Canada.

**FIVE YEAR LIMIT ON VOTING RIGHTS**

Under Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which came into effect on April 17, 1982, every Canadian citizen has the right to vote and to be a candidate in an election. In 1993, Bill C-114 introduced voting rights for Canadian non-resident voters who had been abroad fewer than five-years. Can this five year limit stand up to legal challenges under the Charter?

Voting rights for non-resident citizens are now common in many countries, but the significance of the overseas vote varies widely according to the proportion of citizens living overseas and the turnout of those who are eligible to vote.

There are four systems for overseas voters to participate in elections:

1. **Vote in home district.** Expatriates have to travel back to their country of origin in order to vote.
2. **Vote abroad in home district.** Expatriates can vote in polling stations abroad but the votes are counted as if they were resident in an electoral district within their country of origin.

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28 Canada Revenue Agency (website), 2011.
29 Bauböck, 2005.
3. **Vote abroad for direct representation.** Expatriates elect their own representation in legislative elections.

4. **Expatriates are not allowed to vote,** although elections are held in the country.

In a sample of 144 counties, Michael Collyear and Zana Vathi found that 115, or 80 per cent, allowed citizens who reside permanently outside the country to participate in elections in their home country.\(^{31}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2-3: SURVEY OF OVERSEAS VOTING SCENARIOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Vote in home district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Vote abroad for home district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Vote abroad for own representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Not allowed to vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. No elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Collyer and Vathi, 2007:16; 29-36.

In Collyer and Vathi’s survey, Canada falls under scenario 2. Expatriates can vote in polling stations abroad but their votes are counted as if they were resident in an electoral district within their home country. Under Canadian law, voting has to be exercised under certain conditions that relate to residency requirements.

The right of Canadians living abroad to vote in federal elections\(^{32}\) by special ballot is provided for in section 222 of the Canada Elections Act.\(^{33}\) In order to qualify, a Canadian living abroad must have resided in Canada at any time before making the application, must have been living outside the country for less than five consecutive years immediately before applying, and must intend to return to Canada to resume residence in the future.\(^{34}\)

\(^{31}\) Ibid.

\(^{32}\) Six months after moving outside Canada, citizens are no longer eligible to vote in either municipal or provincial elections. See Elections Canada (2009) details. For reasons of simplicity, we discuss federal elections only.

\(^{33}\) The Canada Elections Act (S.C. 2000, c.9).

\(^{34}\) The five consecutive year requirement does not apply to employees of the federal or provincial public service, international organizations of which Canada is a member and to which Canada contributes, persons who live with an elector as described above, or persons who reside with a member of the Canadian Armed Forces.
Why does the legislation specify a five-year period for voting eligibility as opposed to four or six? And what evidence can be used to determine whether a citizen resident abroad intends to return to Canada?

Canadians living abroad (with the exception of military personnel and diplomats) were not allowed to vote at all until 1993, when Bill C-114, an Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act, was introduced in the House of Commons. Under Bill C-114, all Canadians living or travelling outside the country—not just military personnel and diplomats—can vote, provided they have not been absent from Canada for more than five years and intend to return home at some time in the future. They must also apply for a special ballot.³⁵

Parliamentary debates about Bill C-114 shed some light on the reasoning behind the five-year limit. Some Members of Parliament argued that Canada did not have official statistics on the number of Canadians living abroad and that the right to vote might be granted to citizens who were not paying Canadian income taxes. Other lawmakers were in favour of granting the right to vote to any Canadian citizen with no time limit as long as they were able to prove their intention to return to Canada. Ultimately, Parliament compromised and decided to set a time-limit of five years while maintaining as a requirement the intention to return to Canada.

That decision is likely to result in thousands of Canadians abroad losing their voting rights in Canada. This number could include everyone from retired hockey stars now living in the U.S. to celebrities and employees of Canadian companies who are on long-term postings abroad.³⁶

CITIZENSHIP BY DESCENT LIMITED TO ONE GENERATION

Bill C-37, an Act to amend the Canadian Citizenship Act, came into effect on April 17, 2009, one year after the Royal Assent. The legislation restricted citizenship by descent to one generation born abroad (with some exceptions). Some organizations and individuals involving Canadians abroad have voiced their concerns about this change.

On October 23, 2009, the Executive Committee of The Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong³⁷ issued a position paper after extensive consultation with the Chamber’s membership.³⁸ The Chamber recommended that Canadians born abroad should retain the ability to have children outside of Canada after completing the same residency requirements as Permanent Residents seeking citizenship.

³⁶ Yuen Pau Woo, 2008.
³⁷ The Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong is a proactive, non-governmental body representing more than 1,200 members with business interests in Canada, Hong Kong and mainland China. Founded in 1977, it is the biggest Canadian business association outside Canada and one of the largest and most influential business groups in the Asia Pacific region.
³⁸ The Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, 2009.
Just before Bill C-37 came into effect on April 17, 2009, the Canadian Expat Association\(^39\) launched an online petition to prevent the bill’s enactment.\(^40\) Addressed to Jason Kenney, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the petition complained that the amendments to prevent citizenship from being passed from generation to generation failed “to take into consideration that Canadians in fact are strongly connected to this great nation but due to no fault of their own were born outside of Canada...” As of the beginning of 2010, 2,441 people had signed the petition.

Created by Canadians in Singapore, a website, www.amendc37.ca, discusses citizenship issues and the consequences of Bill C-37. The website states that:

“This legislative change has significant implications to Canadian expatriates, the families of adopted children born abroad and the global organizations hiring Canadians in any position outside Canada, including the U.S. Real people and real lives are seriously impacted and we’ve created this site to:

- Learn how Bill C-37 impacts you, your loved ones or future generations
- Communicate with others affected
- Help you act to amend Bill C-37
- Attract support & resources to help fight Bill C-37’s ‘2nd generation’ clause.”

Despite the anger and anxiety of many Canadian expats about this legislation, some are not even aware of the policy change. In Hong Kong, for instance, a recent survey indicated that 76 per cent of Canadians are not aware of this new law.\(^41\)

**CONCLUSIONS**

The attachments between Canadian citizens abroad and the state of Canada may take place on different levels and may be multi-dimensional. It would be problematic to assess attachment based on a single observation, such as whether a citizen lives in Canada, or pays Canadian taxes. Similarly, one cannot assume that all individuals would like to stay connected to Canada to the same degree.

Canada’s case-by-case approach to its diaspora has limited its ability to tap into the global Canadian network. Current tax rules, voting and citizenship rights are the key problem areas that have severe impacts on the attachment of overseas Canadians to Canada.

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\(^39\) The Canadian Expat Association is a non-profit, non-governmental organization linking Canadians living abroad under one bilingual platform. The association, which opened its doors in the summer of 2007, enables members to search in both French and English for global events, and to read articles and obtain information that enhance their lives overseas. As an advocate for Canadian expatriates, the association plays a key role representing Canadians who previously had no collective voice.

\(^40\) [http://www.petitiononline.com/cexpat01/petition.html](http://www.petitiononline.com/cexpat01/petition.html)

\(^41\) APF Canada, 2011.
CHAPTER 3
Citizenship Issues for Canadians Abroad

What does it mean to be a Canadian citizen? Does residing abroad make a Canadian citizen less Canadian?

Many become Canadians at birth while others become Canadian citizens through immigration and naturalization. Living in or outside Canada is very much a personal choice – and the right of mobility is guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom.

Globalization, international migration and the emergence of multi-ethnic nations (citizen states instead of traditional single-nation states) have reshaped the international system. This has made it difficult to distinguish between ethnic-based-, citizenship-based-, or residency-based-loyalty, identity, rights and responsibilities in discussions about nation building and emigration.

Gradually, Canadian citizenship policy is becoming more restrictive, and we have seen recent amendments to the Citizenship Act, as well as the newly revised Canadian citizenship guide. The fundamental question is whether Canada’s citizenship policy should be different for Canadians at home and Canadians abroad?

WHO IS CANADIAN?
A Canadian citizen is a person who possesses Canadian citizenship by birth or through the naturalization process under the Canadian Citizenship Act. Prior to 1947 and the introduction of the first Citizenship Act, there was legally no such thing as Canadian citizenship. Both native born and naturalized citizens were considered to be British subjects. The first person to become a Canadian citizen was William Lyon Mackenzie King, the tenth Prime Minister.

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42 Boll, 2007; Fullilove, 2008.
45 Minister of Justice, 2011.
of Canada. He became a Canadian citizen on January 3, 1947, forty-eight years after Canada became an independent nation in 1867.

The Canadian Citizenship Act has changed over time. The most significant changes occurred in amendments to the Act in 1977 (see Box 3-1) and in 2009 (Box 2-4, p. 24). The Act suggests that being Canadian is not an ethnic concept, but rather is founded on citizenship.

ACQUISITION OF CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP

According to the Canadian Citizenship Act, people generally acquire Canadian citizenship in two ways: at birth or by naturalization. Citizenship can be conferred by birth or descent from a Canadian citizen (jus sanguinis, or ‘law of blood’) or based on the soil principle, when citizenship is transmitted by birth in the country that is conferring citizenship (jus soli, or ‘law of soil’). Canadian citizenship can also be granted if a person has gone through the immigration and naturalization process according to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Canada amended its Citizenship Act in 2009 and limited the transmission of Canadian citizenship by descent to the first generation (see Box 2-4). This new blood principle has no impact on Canadians in Canada because the automatic and unconditional soil principle guarantees Canadian citizenship. The amendment only affects Canadian citizens who leave the country.

CITIZENSHIP AND MULTIPLE CITIZENSHIPS

Since 1977, any Canadian citizen, whether born in Canada or a naturalized Canadian, may hold more than one citizenship. Canada is one of nearly ninety-three countries in the world that officially allow some form of dual- or multiple-citizenship. This can result in a number of different scenarios including the following:

- A baby born in Canada to Swedish parents is considered a dual citizen of Canada (soil principle) and Sweden (blood principle).
- A baby born in Canada to a French mother and a Bangladeshi father is a citizen of Canada (soil principle), France (blood principle) and Bangladesh (blood principle).
- A person born in Canada who immigrates to Paraguay and naturalizes as a Paraguayan citizen is a dual citizen of Canada (soil principle) and Paraguay (naturalized). If this person was born to a Taiwanese parent, she/he will also have Taiwan citizenship (blood principle).

BOX 3-1: CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP ACT CHANGES IN 1977

In 1977, the Citizenship Act made extensive changes to the law. The effect was to make citizenship more widely available (for example, by reducing the period of residency required from five to three years), and to remove the special treatment for British nationals and the remaining discrimination between men and women.

The act also provided that Canadians could hold dual citizenship, reversing the previous situation in which citizenship was lost upon the acquisition of the citizenship of another country.

An important conceptual change also came about in 1977, when citizenship became a right for qualified applicants rather than a privilege as it had been in the past.

(Government of Canada, 1998)
A person born in the U.S. who immigrates to Canada and becomes a naturalized Canadian citizen is a dual citizen of the U.S. (soil principle) and Canada (naturalized).

A baby born in the U.S. to Canadian parents working under a NAFTA visa will be a dual citizen of the U.S. (soil principle) and Canada (blood principle for the first generation only).

A baby born in Australia to a Canadian tourist will be a citizen of Canada (blood principle for the first generation only), but not of Australia at birth. She/he may have a chance of becoming an Australian citizen when she/he turns ten years old.49

These scenarios suggest that a person who has never moved outside Canada may hold one or more citizenships. At the other extreme, a person who is born outside Canada to Canadian parents may be stateless if the baby happens to be in a country where nationality is not determined by the soil principle, only by the blood principle.

Among Canadian citizens living in Hong Kong, for example, 16 per cent were born in Canada and 12 per cent hold Canadian citizenship only (see Charts 4-1 and 4-2). This mixture mirrors the complexity of identity.50

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49 Australia grants citizenship to children born in Australia regardless of the parents’ status if the child resides in Australia from birth to the age of ten (cited in Macklin & Crépeau, 2010).

50 Macklin & Crépeau, 2010
CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY

In the field of social sciences, identity is a general term used to describe a person’s expression of individuality or group affiliations (such as national identity and cultural identity). Psychological identity relates to self-image (a person’s perception of him or herself), self-esteem, and individuality. Components of identity include a sense of personal continuity and of uniqueness from other people. In addition, people acquire social identities based on their membership in various groups—familial, ethnic, and occupational, among others. These group identities, in addition to satisfying the need for affiliation, help people define themselves.

Canadians abroad, especially those who became citizens through the naturalization process, are sometimes called “citizens of convenience” or “foreigners holding Canadian passports.” Such pejorative terms reflect the negative views of some people in Canada towards Canadians abroad.

A recent poll by APF Canada, however, found that a majority of Canadians believe their overseas compatriots are still ‘real’ Canadians, and believe that their counterparts living outside Canada should have the same rights as those living in Canada.

For individual Canadians who live abroad, one of the most important questions is whether or not their Canadian identity remains strong. According to an online survey by APF Canada, nearly two-thirds of Canadians who live abroad still view Canada as their home and 69 per cent have plans to return to Canada in the future. Many do business globally and see themselves as global citizens or transnational citizens.

RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CITIZENSHIP

What are the legal rights and responsibilities of Canadian citizens? According to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, three rights are reserved to Canadian citizens: the democratic right to vote and to stand for election (section 3), the right to an education in a minority language (English or French, section 23) and the right to enter, remain in, and leave Canada (section 6).

BOX 3-2: FOUR YEARS IN PROVENCE

“Although I live in France, I definitely consider myself to be Canadian,” says Amélie, a Quebec-native who has lived abroad for four years. All of her family members still live in Quebec and she remains in contact with them mostly through telephone calls and email. She reads La Presse online (Cyberpresse) every day and is registered with the Canadian Embassy in France. Although they are enjoying their lives in France, Amélie and her husband plan to return to Quebec in the near future to pursue career opportunities and to be closer to their families.

52 APF Canada, 2007.
53 APF Canada, 2010.
54 Zhang, 2007.
The 2010 edition of Discover Canada: The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship – Study Guide spells out the rights and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship and emphasizes that in Canada, rights come with responsibilities (See Box 3-3).

A Canadian citizen’s right to enter, remain in, and leave Canada (or their so-called mobility rights) is guaranteed by the Charter, while there is no evidence in Canadian law to support arguments that Canadians living abroad cannot or will not fulfill their responsibilities as citizens of Canada.

**PROBLEMATIC POLICY AREAS**

**Value Based Citizenship?**

The amended Citizenship Act suggests that Canada is attempting to add the value principle to citizenship through birthright. When Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism Minister Jason Kenney announced that the new citizenship law was in effect and limited citizenship by descent, his department stated explicitly that the new law protects “the value” of Canadian citizenship. 56

This value principle, as a cornerstone concept in Canadian citizenship, is not new. It has been a topic of continuing public debate in Canada’s French and English communities for many decades. In general, the Quebecois view the value of citizenship in terms of a citizen’s mission, faith, patriotism and responsibility. In their opinion, Canadians moving to other countries de-value their Canadian citizenship. 57

Admittedly this view is not universal in Quebec. For example, writer Jean Syndical expressed a different view as early as 1923. Syndical wrote: “Stop beating on the people who leave; stop telling them that you have forgotten the providential mission of French Canadians, that you have no faith, that you are not patriotic; stop throwing the responsibility on their shoulders.” For Syndical, the real responsibility [in terms of citizenship] lies with those who run the government and the economy. 58

His arguments may still be relevant today.

The English Canadians’ view of the value of citizenship, has tended to focus more on the cost-benefit of citizens living abroad. 59 According to this view, if Canadian citizens do not reside in Canada, they do not pay taxes, and

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58 Syndical, 1923.
therefore should not qualify for certain government services made available through tax revenue, or at least not without paying for them.\textsuperscript{60} The impression is that Canadian citizens who choose to live in a different country are “free riders.” Former Canadian politician Tom Kent sums up the sentiment in the following way: “The duty to pay taxes should be inherent in citizenship.”\textsuperscript{61}

Some consider the above argument to be too narrow because it is based on what they consider to be a faulty premise that links citizenship to paying taxes. They argue that despite the appealing rhetoric of “No taxation without representation,” the fact is that noncitizens (temporary and permanent residents) do pay taxes yet cannot vote, while citizens living in Canada who pay no taxes can still vote. Income tax is payable to the government by all those who earn income within the country, regardless of citizenship status. Sales tax is payable by all consumers, be they citizens, tourists, temporary workers, refugees, permanent residents or even irregular migrants. The same is true for property taxes, capital gains taxes and so on. Citizens who do not earn income or persons in receipt of income support may pay no income tax, but their formal access to the legal entitlements of citizenship is not precluded on that basis.\textsuperscript{62}

\textbf{Statelessness}

A few months after the most recent amendments to the \textit{Citizenship Act}, a child was born stateless as a result of amendments to the law:

Rachel Chandler was born to a naturalized Canadian, who was working in Beijing in September 2009. Her father was born in Libya, where Rachel’s grandparents met while teaching at an English school. Rachel’s paternal great-grandparents fought in World War II and descended from generations of Irish, Canadians and Americans. Though her father had lived in the Toronto area since he was two years old (until moving to Beijing to work in 2007), Rachel was not deemed Canadian because she is a second-generation Canadian born abroad. She is also not considered a Chinese citizen because her parents are not legally married. As a result, she is not eligible for Chinese citizenship, health services, travel documents, or protection from any state.\textsuperscript{63} When Canadian officials were confronted with this dilemma, they suggested that Rachel’s father, Patrick, ask Ireland whether it would be willing

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{60} Chant, 2006.  \\
\textsuperscript{61} Kent, 2008.  \\
\textsuperscript{62} Macklin & Crépeau, 2010: 23-24.  \\
\textsuperscript{63} Bramham, 2009.
\end{flushright}
to bestow citizenship on Rachel, even though only Patrick’s father (Rachel’s grandfather) was an Irish citizen.\textsuperscript{64}

Rachel is not alone. Chloe, who was born a month later in Brussels to Canadian and Algerian parents, is still stateless.

The two girls and their parents are confronting the increasingly common problem of securing nationality for the children of the 214 million people who choose to live, work and study outside their home countries.\textsuperscript{65}

\textbf{Gender Discrimination}

If Canadian citizens living abroad have to return to Canada to give birth in order to ensure that their children are deemed to be Canadian citizens, this places a large burden on women.

In many cases, Canadian mothers are forced to take extended leave from their jobs to return to Canada because pregnant women cannot fly after the fetus reaches a certain age. This can have very damaging effects for women pursuing careers abroad, and imposes extra costs and inconvenience.

\textbf{International Experience}

The current Citizenship Act unduly burdens Canadian citizens who live and work internationally. Their international ventures include, but are not limited to:

- Canadian businesses with employees based overseas;
- Canadian charities and non-governmental organizations based abroad;
- International government-structures (United Nations/Commonwealth, etc.) and associated groups;
- Canadians working for non-Canadian businesses, NGOs and governments overseas;
- Canadian students and scholars studying or teaching abroad.

Canada emphasizes the importance of maintaining its presence on the international stage. It encourages private initiatives to compete globally,
and promotes international education at home and abroad. It would be ironic if Canadian citizenship policy punishes Canadians who are engaged in international work.

**Equity**

The current *Citizenship Act* also creates two tiers of Canadians. The law creates separate rules for children and/or grandchildren of Canadians born in Canada and abroad. This undermines the spirit of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, as well as the principle of the 1977 *Citizenship Act*.

The Charter guarantees rights and freedoms. Every individual is equal under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, nationality or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability (section 15). The 1977 *Citizenship Act* was also based on the principle of equity. It is unclear whether this citizenship policy will stand when confronted with potential legal challenges based on equity.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Canadian citizenship is defined by the *Canadian Citizenship Act*, which clearly demonstrates that being a Canadian citizen is not an ethnic or nation-based concept, but a citizenship-based definition. People can acquire Canadian citizenship at birth by *jus sanguinis* or *jus soli*, or by naturalization. The complexity of resulting dual- or multiple-citizenship can create difficulties in terms of loyalties, identities, and the rights and responsibilities of Canadians at home and abroad.

Canadian citizenship policy creates a number of problem areas including stateless children, gender discrimination, the lack of appreciation of international experience, and inequalities under the law.
On February 26, 2011, the government of Canada announced that it had sent a military transport aircraft to Libya to evacuate Canadians due to the growing political unrest in the region. At press time, the Canadian operation had evacuated 238 Canadians. In January 2011, another Canadian evacuation operation took place in Egypt where the political situation was becoming precarious. The largest-ever evacuation of Canadians occurred in Lebanon in July 2006 (See Box 2-1 on page 17). Many Canadians feel bitter because they believed that taxpayers were footing the bill to evacuate Canadians who have not lived in Canada for many years and do not pay taxes.

CONSULAR SERVICES

What kinds of consular services are provided to Canadians abroad? Who pays for these services?

“Consular” is the word used to describe the services that a country provides for its citizens abroad. Canada’s consular services operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week, through a network of more than 260 offices in over 150 countries. The network includes embassies, high commissions, consulates, consulates headed by honorary consuls, and offices. These offices provide different levels of services to Canadians travelling, working, studying, or living abroad.

Canadians seek consular assistance abroad for many reasons. Some need advice about local conditions or Canadian regulations, but the majority use consular help to replace lost, stolen or expired passports. With the number of Canadians living overseas increasing each year, many require consular assistance in filing citizenship applications and in registering themselves as

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67 DFAIT, 2011a.
68 DFAIT website, 2011.
69 Please also consult more details about extensive consular services by the Government of Canada at DFAIT, 2004.
Canadians abroad. Other reasons for requesting for consular assistance include financial destitution, medical emergencies, family distress, arrest and detention, child abductions, deaths, evacuations following natural disasters or violent conflicts, and kidnapping. 

**PERFORMANCE BY NUMBERS**

**Increase in Number of Cases Handled**

Between 1993 and 2003, the number of cases handled by consular services increased by an average of 7.5 per cent per year. In 2003, Canadian consular officers handled a total of 184,054 cases. Of these, passport-related requests made up 63 per cent, citizenship applications 17 per cent, and ROCA (Registration of Canadians Abroad) made up 11 per cent. The remaining 9 per cent were divided among loss and theft, general assistance, arrest and detention, and legal/notary.

In 2009, the number of cases handled by Canadian consular officers had reached nearly half a million. Routine passport, citizenship and ROCA services declined to 70 per cent of the annual total in 2009 compared with 2003, while assistance services grew to 30 per cent. Of these assistance services, 25 per cent were handled only by DFAIT’s (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) Emergency Operation Call Centre. A minority of these calls were severe enough to warrant further attention from DFAIT. In fact, real consular cases opened and emergency crisis situations managed (last two rows in Table 4-1) only accounted for 5 per cent of consular services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Consular Services</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Passport service delivered</td>
<td>155,558</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>User accounts opened in the Registration of Canadians Abroad service</td>
<td>134,029</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls handled at DFAIT’s Emergency Operation Centre</td>
<td>114,000</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship applications processed</td>
<td>29,839</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consular cases opened*</td>
<td>24,018</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency crisis situations managed</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>457,460</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** *Excludes passport services, citizenship applications and Registration of Canadians Abroad service.

**Source:** DFAIT, website 2010.
Distress Situations

In cases of distress, the majority of incidents involve arrest or detention, in most cases in the U.S., China or Mexico (see Chart 4-1).

### TABLE 4-2: DISTRESS CASES ABROAD FROM 2005 TO 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrest/Detention</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1744</td>
<td>1843</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Assistance</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well-being/Whereabouts</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childrens’ Issues</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>1079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4720</td>
<td>4569</td>
<td>4600</td>
<td>4791</td>
<td>5031</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DFAIT, website 2010.

### CHART 4-1: NUMBER OF ARREST/DETENTION CASES: 2009

- United States: 1,035
- China: 102
- Mexico: 84
- United Arab Emirates: 68
- United Kingdom: 58
- Thailand: 32
- Japan: 31
- Cuba: 29
- South Korea: 25
- Dominica Republic: 24
- The rest of the world: 489

Source: DFAIT, website 2010.
Recent Evacuations

Recent evacuations by the Canadian government shed light on the risks facing Canadians living overseas, including war, natural disasters, and civil unrest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Case Description</th>
<th>Canadian Citizens Evacuated</th>
<th>Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Storms in Cayman Islands and Haiti</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Natural disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Tsunami in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Natural disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Crisis in West Africa</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Social unrest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>War in Lebanon</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Political unrest in Bangkok</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>Violent conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Political unrest in Egypt</td>
<td>300+</td>
<td>Violent conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Political unrest in Libya</td>
<td>238 (ongoing)</td>
<td>Violent conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


CONSULAR FEES

There was discussion following the Lebanon evacuation in 2006 that non-resident Canadians should pay higher passport fees to maintain their Canadian citizenship. It has also been debated whether taxpayers should be footing the bill to rescue every Canadian caught in a foreign trouble spot. The question whether non-resident citizens should be protected by the Canadian government is discussed by Macklin and Crépeau (2010).

Cost Recovery Basis

According to DFAIT, the federal department that has a mandate to provide consular services to Canadian citizens, part of Canada’s consular services is provided for a fee on a cost recovery basis, while other services are free of charge. A few examples of these services are listed below and a dollar symbol (‘$’) indicates which services are provided for a fee.

Services related to emergencies

- Assisting in arranging an evacuation in the event of war, civil unrest, or a natural disaster, as a last resort ($).
- Arranging help in a medical emergency by providing a list of local doctors and hospitals.
- Arranging for a medical evacuation if the necessary treatment is not available locally ($).
- Comforting and assisting victims of robbery, sexual assault, and other violence.

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71 Chant, 2006.
72 National Post, 2011.
73 Macklin and Crépeau, 2010.
74 DFAIT, 2011b.
75 The same DFAIT document also spells out the services that are NOT offered by Canadian consular officials.
Services related to legal issues
- Providing a list of local lawyers.
- Providing information about local laws and regulations.
- Seeking to ensure fair treatment once arrested or detained.
- Notarizing Canadian documents ($).

Other services
- Replacing a lost, stolen, damaged, or expired passport ($).
- Transferring funds if urgent financial assistance is required ($).
- Contacting relatives or friends to request assistance in sending money or airline tickets.
- Contacting next of kin in case of accident or detention by police.
- Accepting citizenship applications for approval by Citizenship and Immigration Canada.
- Providing advice about burying a Canadian abroad or assistance in repatriating remains to Canada.
- Advising police in Canada to contact next of kin in case of death.

As a general rule, the costs of operations, such as the evacuation of Canadians, are fully reimbursed by individuals to the Canadian government. In selected cases, however, evacuation costs are waived for humanitarian and/or political considerations. This was the case in the evacuation of 500 Canadians from Tsunami-affected areas of Southeast Asia in 2004 and the evacuation of 14,000 Canadians from Lebanon in 2006.

Fee Collection
Canadian consular services receive fees from the travelling public including non-resident Canadians. All the fees collected are used to maintain and improve Canadian consular services around the world. These fees are collected when one applies for a passport or, in some instances, when a special service is provided.76

There are two main fees:

- Consular Service Fee: A consular fee of $25 is included in the cost of all adult passports. In 1995, this fee was instituted as a way to provide the program with a sound funding base. Revenues were supposed to, and largely did, match expenditures.77
- Consular Specialized Services Fees: These fees are collected when a specialized service is provided (see examples mentioned above).

In addition to these two types of fees, non-resident adult Canadians, depending on where they live, have already paid between 11 per cent and

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76 DFAIT, website 2008.
15 per cent more in passport fees than their counterparts in Canada (Table 5-4). Moreover, according to DFAIT’s financial statements from 2009-2010, revenue from consular affairs in 2010 reached $102 million while expenses for consular affairs totalled $62 million, resulting in a $40 million surplus.78

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4-4: CANADIAN PASSPORT FEES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in the U.S. or Bermuda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Please note that the fee for a 24-page passport is C$87 and that the fee for a 48-page passport is C$92 if the application is submitted in person at a service location in Canada or mailed from within Canada.

Source: Passport Canada, website 2011.

**CHALLENGING POLICY AREAS**

In 2007, Dr. Claude Denis, a political science professor at the University of Ottawa, analyzed cases involving Canadian tourists in Mexico who died violently and found that many of their families used the media to pressure the Canadian government to obtain justice from Mexico. Family members and a sympathetic public regularly call for assistance for fellow Canadians stranded abroad following natural disasters and war. A lot of public attention was also paid to the case of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen “rendered” by the U.S. to Syria, where he was tortured. These cases have contributed to the image of Canadians abroad predominantly as “citizens in trouble.”79

In 2004, the Office of the Inspector General made nine recommendations to improve Canada’s consular affairs. The first recommendation was to ask DFAIT to develop a comprehensive, forward-looking strategic policy that

78 DFAIT, website 2011-01-31.
79 Denis, 2007.
would govern the delivery of consular services. In 2007, the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade produced a report reviewing the 2006 evacuation of Canadians from Lebanon. The document put forth five policy recommendations, the gist of which were to improve Canada’s response to large-scale crises overseas.

In addition to other recommendations by the Office of the Inspector General and the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, a strategic policy on protecting Canadian citizens overseas should also focus on the following challenges:

**Changing Mindsets**
The concept of “citizens in trouble abroad” has created a negative mindset in Canada and influenced policy makers to focus on crisis responses. However, crisis situations actually only account for 5 per cent of the cases of Canadian consular services each year; emergency assistance, including evacuations, are generally operated on a cost-recovery basis; and revenues collected from consular fees largely match expenditures.

**Working with All Partners**
The safety of Canadians abroad is a complicated issue that involves individuals who choose to go abroad; employers/organizations that hire them for overseas work; Canadian governmental departments that operate consular services; and host countries that have rules and regulations Canadians must adhere to.

As a country with a long tradition of international peacekeeping work, Canada must continue to build a capacity to work with local partners to manage country-specific risks and deliver consular services to Canadians. The government of Canada must also build stronger relations with Canadian organizations that work globally to ensure the safety of all Canadians living outside the country.

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**BOX 4-1: RISKS ABROAD**

Canadians may be exposed to various risks when they are abroad. According to the government of Canada’s websites, the most common risks include:

- Overseas Fraud
- Terrorist Attacks
- Dual Citizenship Friction
- Natural Disasters
- Pandemics
- Upcoming Elections

(DFAIT, website 2011; Government of Canada, 2010)

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81 The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2007.
82 For example, Canada needs to extend the Consular Services Sharing Agreement with more countries. Currently, Canada has such an agreement with Australia. In countries or regions where Canada does not have an office, Canadians can obtain consular assistance from the Australian consulate, such as in Hawaii, Bali, and Samoa. Canada in turn provides similar services to Australians in countries where they do not have an office, such as Guatemala, Ivory Coast, etc. (DFAIT, 2004)
CONCLUSIONS

This chapter illustrates that demand for consular services has grown quickly in recent years. While many people feel frustrated that, as tax-payers, they are helping foot the bill for evacuations of Canadians living overseas, in fact, such crises make up only about 5 per cent of all the cases Consular Services deal with each year. In addition, emergency assistance, including evacuations, is generally operated on a cost-recovery basis and revenues collected from consular fees largely match expenditures on consular services.

This chapter has also shown that protecting the safety of Canadian citizens abroad is a very complicated task that involves Canadian individuals, organizations, governments, and international communities. The biggest policy challenges include turning our mindset to be more objective and balanced, and working with all stakeholders.

A comprehensive, forward-looking strategic policy has to have mechanisms to protect the safety of all Canadians. It should also have ways to fully utilize the potential contribution of citizens no matter at home or abroad.
This chapter examines the economic impact of emigration from Canada in two areas: taxation and economic outcomes for returned Canadian emigrants. The taxation question is particularly important because tax revenues pay for social services for all Canadians, including would-be and returned emigrants. This section evaluates the impact of emigration on these federal and provincial tax revenues. If emigrants receive more in public services than they contribute through taxation, this could have severe ramifications for Canada’s public finances.

In the second half of this chapter, we review whether there are financial disincentives for Canadians abroad to return to Canada. If so, government programs designed to encourage Canadians to return may face substantial obstacles.

**TOPIC 1: TAXATION**

Canadians living permanently abroad can apply to the Canada Revenue Agency for deemed non-resident or non-resident status. If awarded either status, these Canadians are not taxed on income earned outside of Canada. The logic of this provision is two-fold. First, by meeting the stringent requirements needed to become a deemed non-resident it is difficult for these Canadians to enjoy any public goods financed by the Canadian taxpayer. Second, a Canadian émigré is still subject to any income tax in his/her country of residence. As a result, many Canadian émigrés pay income taxes, but not to Canada.

Under a pay-as-you-go tax regime, Canada’s treatment of its deemed non-resident émigrés would have little impact on the Canadian treasury if the federal and provincial governments enjoyed a balanced budget or there was a flat income tax rate. Under those conditions, an absent Canadian would have no net impact on federal or provincial treasuries.

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83 This is in sharp contrast to the U.S. case in which American citizens must report their worldwide income and are liable to pay U.S. taxes if their income is above a certain threshold.

84 Among the criteria of being deemed a non-resident: no bank accounts in Canada, no residential property, and no immediate family members living in Canada.
In the real world, however, Canada has a progressive tax system, which implies that if Canada's émigrés were previously high-income earners while resident in Canada, then leaving will have an impact on the Canadian treasury. In addition to paying higher taxes, high-income earners also do not consume many tax-payer financed benefits (such as welfare and unemployment benefits). Furthermore, Canadian taxpayers while resident in Canada have a variable impact on the Canadian treasury over the course of their lifetimes.

Canada-born residents consume most of their public services before entering the labour force in the form of education and healthcare and upon retirement by consuming healthcare and retirement benefits. Conversely, during a Canadian-born resident’s economically active years (ages 30-65), taxes collected would likely exceed taxpayer-financed benefits, leading to a net transfer to the Canadian treasury (see Figure 5-1). In the case of naturalized Canadians, most come to Canada after the age of 25. As a result, their early education and healthcare expenditures are not paid by Canadian taxpayers.

In sum, an emigrant’s impact on the Canadian treasury depends upon the emigrant’s age, length of time abroad, birth status, and human capital. For example, if all of Canada's émigrés were over the age of 65 or under the age of 25, then the Canadian treasury would gain by their absence. On the other hand, if a professionally trained Canada-born émigré left at the age of 30 and returned at age 65 or older, the impact on the Canadian treasury would be negative.

What impact do emigrants of various ages have on federal and provincial treasuries? Figure 5-2 depicts yearly average tax transfers for Canada-born males across three age groups (25-35, 36-61, and 62 and above) living in
If any of these age cohorts left Canada there would be a net loss to Canada’s treasury. The most substantial annual loss ($14,370) to the federal treasury occurs when peak earners aged 36-61 emigrate. This annual tax loss via emigration falls to half ($7,443) for the youngest emigrant cohort (ages 25-35).

Figure 5-3 reports the transfer patterns for naturalized male Canadians in 2006. As is the case with males born in Canada, annual taxes paid are a positive function of age with only the oldest cohort receiving any sizable government expenditure. However, unlike males born in Canada, the oldest naturalized Canadian cohort make the largest annual transfers ($15,032), followed by the middle aged ($12,059) and youngest groups ($6,704). As with Canadian-born males, if any of these age groups were to leave Canada, there would be a net loss to the Canadian treasury.

Canada-born males aged 62-80 make a positive contribution to the treasury in this example because we restricted the sample to employed seniors. If all seniors are included, the transfer would be negative.

As noted above, this positive tax transfer is due to the use of only employed older people in the census sample. If the entire 65 and over population were included, there would be a negative transfer.
It is possible to restrict our analysis to Canada-born and naturalized males working in professional occupations in order to illustrate the lost transfers derived from this critical emigration group. Again, the treasury transfers are a positive function of age, with the largest annual transfers for both Canada-born ($32,709) and naturalized Canadians ($33,450) occurring in the group that is 62 years of age and older. The middle-aged (36-61) Canada-born and naturalized male professionals, if living in Canada, would respectively transfer $25,607 and $21,344 to the Canadian treasury annually. The 25-35 age cohort, if present in Canada, would transfer approximately $10,000 regardless of birthplace. In short, if any of these male cohorts of employed Canadian citizens left Canada, there would be an annual net loss to the federal treasury.

Figure 5-1 delineated the age structure of the total treasury transfer with respect to the loss of a Canada-born émigré. What it does not depict is the federal and provincial share of this potential transfer. A large fraction of the reported taxes embedded theoretically in Figure 5-1 actually accrue to the provinces, which are responsible for costly education and healthcare services. The treasury transfer patterns resulting from the emigration and potential return of a Canadian citizen will differ at the provincial level for the selected age groups.

The level of education received in Canada impacts treasury transfers at the provincial level. Census data reveals that a post-secondary trained, male Canada-born taxpayer aged 36 to 61 living in British Columbia in 2006 paid less in annual combined income and consumption taxes to the provincial government than their non-educated counterparts.

Source: Author’s calculations from 2006 Canadian Census.

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See above for the exception to this conclusion.
government than the annual contribution necessary to repay the government for the healthcare and education costs spent on him since birth. For example, for the male Canadian-born 36-61 cohort, past educational and contemporary health expenditures equal $10,700, while only $7,857 was paid in personal income and sales taxes. Beyond age 61, healthcare costs rise to $8,000, which is well beyond this cohort’s provincial tax payments ($5,556). This situation would lead to a drain on the provincial treasury in the absence of indirect taxes (provincial sales tax). Emigration of naturalized male citizens aged 61 years or older would result in a net gain to the provincial treasury. In all other cases, emigrants younger than 61 years of age would imply a saving on health care costs but a loss in recompense for past educational expenditures to the provincial treasury.

The experience of naturalized male full-time employees in British Columbia reveals a similar pattern. The health costs of those over the age of 62 exceed their annual income-tax payments and only their annual sales-tax payments offset their annual healthcare costs. In addition, education and healthcare costs greatly exceed tax payments for the younger groups even when we factor in sales-tax revenues. In the case where the foreign-born Canadian obtained education abroad, these results will change dramatically for the 25-61 year-old age group since their Canadian subsidized education costs collapse to zero and healthcare costs are less than $2,000.

In sum, several important emigrant tax transfer patterns emerge at the provincial level. First, the return of a life-long emigrant upon retirement will impose a tax burden at the provincial level for two reasons. First, an educated Canada-born citizen who was absent between the ages of 25-61 did not contribute to education costs in Canada via tax payments. The shortfall or tax gap must be made up by resident Canadian tax payers. Secondly, returnees over the age of 61 will not cover their healthcare costs with income taxes alone, unlike Canadians over the age of 61 who never left Canada. Thus, the return of long-term émigrés concerns provincial treasury officials since resident Canadian taxpayers must make up for this shortfall.

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88 The $2,843 annual shortfall is made up for through other provincial tax sources and federal transfers.
89 This deficit in the 62-80-year-old age bracket becomes even more pronounced if we make the employment outcomes of this age cohort more realistic. If we include all males who report income rather than full-time employed males, the provincial tax payments for naturalized (Canada-born) males aged 62-80 would fall to $1,324 ($1,280), which represents a fraction of their healthcare costs.
90 Please see Appendix III for discussion on challenges related to analyzing the impact of emigration on the treasury.
One potential policy response would be to more strongly link the provision of services to residency, rather than citizenship, and to develop a provident fund for Canadians who intend to one day return from abroad. In this way, Canadians abroad could contribute to the shared cost of their pension and healthcare and not experience disruptions in the provisions of these services.

**TOPIC 2: ECONOMIC OUTCOMES FOR RETURNED ÉMIGRÉS**

The Canadian government and many Canadian corporations and universities have expressed interest in attracting highly skilled Canadians abroad back to Canada. However, the big question is whether there are sufficient financial incentives for them to return to Canada. Are the skills and broader cultural outlook obtained while abroad readily transferable in the Canadian labour market?

The literature abounds with optimistic networking stories of Chinese or South Asian immigrants to North America returning to their countries of origin armed with investment funds, additional skills and social networks. But does this paradigm of knowledge and skill transfer hold for Canadian émigrés returning to Canada? This is a key question as Canada’s émigré population is still largely born in Canada, although naturalized Canadians now make up a significant and growing minority (42 per cent). Unlike the typical cases cited in the literature, most Canada-born émigrés reside in developed countries while naturalized Canadians are widely dispersed across developed and less-developed regions.

Canadians returning from developed countries will arrive with a different set of skills and social networks than those who return from less-developed regions. This does not mean that there may not be economic and cultural advantages whenever a Canadian émigré returns. However, it is possible that a naturalized Canadian émigré will experience discrimination upon return from a developing country. The education and labour market experience gained in an emerging economy may not be recognized in the Canadian

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91 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2011.
92 Fifty-two per cent of all Canadian émigrés, regardless of place of birth, reside in Australia, France, the U.S. and the U.K. (DeVoretz, 2009).
labour market. On the other hand, foreign job experience, social networks and education acquired by Canadians while residing in the U.S. or Europe may yield a positive reward upon return to Canada.

**CENSUS FACTS**

The available literature suggests that individuals who return to Canada will be more productive given the new skills they acquired abroad and their ability to exploit previously established social networks in their home country.\(^{93}\) In this section we attempt to determine if this is true and whether returning Canadians with overseas experience outperform corresponding cohorts that stayed in the country. In other words, was it a good investment to leave Canada?

The 2006 Canadian census asks three questions that will allow us to trace the economic outcomes of Canadian citizens who return to Canada. The questions were: country of birth, country of citizenship and place of residence five years prior to the census date (2001). The answers allow us to compare the earnings of long-term naturalized Canadians who returned to Canada prior to 2006 and naturalized Canadians who never left Canada.

Our research indicates that for naturalized Canadians, there is no short-term income gain from their foreign experience. Instead, there is an earnings penalty that actually increases as the naturalized Canadian ages or returns to Canada later in life. For example, naturalized males in the 25-35 year-old age group who return to Canada after five years abroad earn $1,122 less a year than naturalized resident Canadians who never left. For males aged 36-61, earnings are $8,279 less than naturalized resident Canadians who

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**BOX 5-1: THE MASTER’S STUDENT RETURNS**

John is a thirty-year-old Canadian who recently completed his Masters degree in Leiden, Holland following a year teaching in South Korea and several years of travel. Like many young Canadians, he was motivated to pursue employment outside of Canada by a desire to broaden his perspectives and attain a variety of cultural experiences. Upon returning to Canada, John was surprised to discover that, due to his lack of Canadian contacts, he continued to have problems finding work. Nevertheless, he feels that the time he spent abroad should increase his career options in the long run because he gained a better understanding of Canada’s place in the world and international politics.

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\(^{93}\) See Tian and Ma, 2006 for a review of the literature.
never left. This pattern continues for female naturalized returnees but in a more pronounced way. The penalties may be short term, however, and only longitudinal data can determine if the earnings penalties will persist.

We now turn to the Canada-born émigré group, who largely live in the U.S. and other developed economies. Our research reveals a substantial income gain for the Canada-born émigré population that returns to Canada. For example, Canada-born males who were living abroad for five or more years and returned home in 2006 earned ten to twenty per cent more than the similarly aged cohort that did not move away. For Canada-born females the same trend held for all age groups except females aged 25-35, who did not outperform Canadian women who never left Canada.

An important question from the perspective of resident Canadians is: did these returnees make a net contribution to Canada’s treasury after their return? Our analysis of 2006 census data shows that Canada-born male émigrés who return to Canada transfer more to the Canadian treasury annually than Canadians who never left the country. For female émigrés who return to Canada, however, there is no difference. In the case of naturalized Canadians, the treasury transfers were smaller for returnees when compared to naturalized Canadians who never left Canada.

Overall, our census-based analysis indicates that naturalized Canadians who return to Canada have a difficult adjustment period, while Canada-born returned émigrés have exceptional outcomes. These findings raise key questions about programs aimed at encouraging naturalized Canadians abroad to return to Canada. Will naturalized Canadians be interested in returning if they face relatively poor economic prospects?

**BOX 5-2: THE GLOBAL ACADEMIC**

Melinda is a mid-career, naturalized Canadian professor who was born in Europe but was seeking a full-time tenure-track position at a university in Vancouver. After a series of temporary teaching positions, she decided to return home to Europe to gather additional job skills which would enable her to compete in the Vancouver university teaching market. She worked for a total of seven years in Europe as an economist in a research capacity with two renowned international organizations. In 2007, a university job opportunity arose in Vancouver that required the particular skill set she had obtained in Europe and, upon obtaining the job, she returned to Canada on a full-time basis.
Canadians living abroad lack a political avenue to air their concerns. After five years outside of Canada, they lose their right to vote and, unlike emigrants from some of the other diaspora-producing countries, Canadian émigrés lack a political presence in Canada. They do not have an overseas Member of Parliament, for example, or a government agency that can articulate or help ameliorate their concerns.

Indeed, in the media coverage of the evacuation of 14,000 Canadians from Lebanon in 2006, some questioned whether the evacuees were in fact “real” Canadians. Are Canadian residents aware and sympathetic to issues surrounding the population of Canadians living abroad? In 2010, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada posed four questions to a sample of Canadian residents.

Figure 6-1 presents the outcome of the survey. Sixty-six per cent of respondents agreed that children of Canadians born in another country should have the same citizenship rights as children of Canadians born in Canada. There was little variation in this opinion across Canada by age, education or income.

The opinions of Canadian residents on the core issues of citizenship and voting rights were slightly more ambiguous. Sixty-three per cent of the respondents favoured the continuation of Canada’s dual citizenship policy, which enables Canadians to hold two or more passports. However, this group varied by age, place of residence, income and educational level.

Finally, when asked if they supported voting rights for dual citizens abroad, only a slight majority were in favour of granting voting rights to Canadian citizens who have been living abroad for more than five years. In effect, those polled appear to make a distinction between voting rights and citizenship rights for Canadians abroad.
The poll demonstrated a strong positive response (73 per cent) for the establishment of a central body to co-ordinate issues affecting Canadians living abroad.

Canadian residents who were sampled were aware of key political issues arising from Canada's growing population abroad and strongly supported this group with the exception of voting rights. But how do Canadians living abroad view these and other issues? We look to the results of two surveys: The Global Canadians survey, which polled Canadian citizens living across Asia and the U.S. in 2007, and a 2010 survey that focused specifically on Canadian citizens living in Hong Kong SAR.

OPINIONS OF CANADIANS LIVING IN ASIA AND THE U.S.

Rights of Canadians Abroad

In the 2010 survey of Canadians living in Hong Kong SAR, the majority of respondents said that Canadian citizens abroad should have equal rights to Canadians abroad in all respects. Specifically:

- 79 per cent of respondents agreed that Canadian citizens should be entitled to dual citizenship
- 80 per cent held that children of Canadians born in another country should have the same citizenship rights as children of Canadians born in Canada
- 66 per cent of respondents agreed that Canadian citizens abroad should have the same voting rights as Canadian citizens living in Canada
- Just over half (53 per cent) of respondents agreed that Canadian citizens abroad would benefit from a central agency to coordinate issues
- 20 per cent agreed that Canadian citizens abroad should pay more for passport services than Canadian citizens living in Canada
While a majority agreed that the founding of an agency for Canadians abroad would be beneficial, most respondents were unsure about the role the agency should play or how it could be helpful. When asked what issues the agency should address, 68 per cent of respondents said they either did not know or did not have any suggestions. Areas where respondents felt that an agency could be useful were consulate assistance in case of emergencies (7 per cent), taxation consultation (5 per cent), and passport/citizenship inquiries (5 per cent).

**FIGURE 6-2: OPINIONS OF CANADIANS IN HONG KONG SAR**

![Graph showing opinions of Canadians in Hong Kong SAR on various statements.]

Source: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2011

**Please indicate agreement or disagreement with the following statements**

1. Children of Canadians born in another country should have the same citizenship rights as children of Canadians born in Canada (Q1)
2. Canadian citizens should be entitled to dual citizenship (Q2)
3. Canadian citizens abroad should have the same voting rights as Canadian citizens living in Canada (Q3)
4. Canadian citizens abroad would benefit from having a Canadian central agency to coordinate issues affecting citizens living abroad (Q4)
5. Canadian citizens abroad should pay more for passports than Canadian citizens living in Canada (Q5)
In the 2007 Global Canadians survey, the majority of respondents agreed that Canadians living abroad should be entitled to the same level of consular support as Canadian tourists. They also agreed that the Canadian government should do more to keep in touch with Canadians living overseas. Nevertheless, the vast majority of our respondents did not feel that Canadians abroad should be subject to Canadian income tax or to a surcharge on passport renewal. These findings suggest a fiscal challenge that often confronts Canadian policymakers: constituents are generally in favour of the provision and improvement of services, but expect them to be paid for through existing revenue sources.

COMPARING THE RESPONSES OF CANADIANS AT HOME AND ABROAD

The results of our polls provide an opportunity to compare how Canadians at home and a select group of Canadians abroad feel about a range of issues. The findings included:

- Overall, both groups feel that Canadians and their offspring should have the same rights regardless of whether they live in Canada or abroad
- A larger percentage of domestic Canadians support an agency for Canadians abroad than do Canadians living permanently in Hong Kong
- Both domestic Canadians and Canadians abroad are less adamant about the need for equal voting rights than they are about other issues

BOX 6-1: THE RIGHTS/RESPONSIBILITIES BALANCE

Khalid is a Canadian in his twenties who has been living in Pakistan for three years. He feels it is reasonable that Canadians who have been abroad for more than five years should not be allowed to vote in Canadian elections. “This might sound cliché, but voting, as with citizenship, comes with responsibilities as well as rights. If someone is not living in Canada, not serving on juries, things like that, then I think it’s reasonable that they lose their privileges for a certain period.”
CHAPTER SEVEN
Policy Responses: An Agenda for Action and Further Research

The Canadians Abroad Project set out to measure the size and scope of the country’s overseas citizen population and to shed some light on what policy issues should be addressed to more fully capture the potential—and mitigate the risks—of a Canadian diaspora.

That the issue of Canadians abroad should be of interest to policy makers is no longer in doubt. While a policy of benign neglect might have been justified in the past because of limited knowledge or a presumption that only small numbers of Canadians lived overseas, this approach is no longer viable. The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada’s work in this area—as well as that of other organizations and researchers—has turned the spotlight on a number of issues that cannot be addressed in a piecemeal or reactive fashion. While the Lebanon evacuation of 2006 was an important event in drawing public attention to Canadians abroad, it also led to an overly narrow and generally unhelpful debate on the issue. There will be other situations like the one in Lebanon, and while the Canadian government should prepare for such cases, it should not allow evacuation planning to define its policy on Canadians abroad. It is an encouraging sign that the recent evacuation of Canadians from Egypt—on a cost-recovery basis—did not cause any controversy in Canada.

There are many policy implications to be drawn from this report. Some are highly practical and immediate and do not involve substantial investments of money or political capital. Other policy ideas will require more research, consultation, and political will because they could affect the machinery of government and basic notions of citizenship, attachment, and the rights and responsibilities of Canadians at home and abroad.

A fundamental starting point for all of our policy suggestions is the need to re-frame the idea of Canadians abroad as a) a significant part of the Canadian polity worthy of serious, long-term policy attention, and b) a global asset that can be harnessed in the Canadian interest given the right set of incentives
and actions. The idea of Canada as a source country for emigrants runs counter to the prevailing notion that Canada is an immigrant nation and challenges the belief that Canada is the country of choice for immigrants from around the world. Canada is far from becoming a net emigration country, but a greater appreciation of outmigration is useful for the nation’s self-image, if for no other reason than to take the issue of Canadians abroad more seriously.

There is already a growing awareness of this in government. The support for this project from Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Government of British Columbia is a sign that officials understand the importance of the issue even if they don’t yet have the tools to deal with it. Similarly the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has recently launched an initiative on Global Canadians that encompasses—but is not exclusively focused on—Canadians abroad. Other federal government departments also have an interest in this subject: Health Canada on the international transmission of contagious diseases; Industry Canada on research and innovation linkages of transnational Canadians; the Department of Finance on fiscal impacts; Human Resources and Social Development Canada on labour mobility and human capital development and so on. There is, however, very little communication between these departments on Canadians abroad, and virtually no policy coordination or vision as to the kind of approach that needs to be taken on the Canadian diaspora.

We believe there is a case for better policy coordination and some centralization of functions on issues related to Canadians abroad. This could amount to a standalone agency or department, or it could be a special secretariat within an existing ministry that is tasked with policy coordination and development on overseas Canadians, as well as support for cross-departmental and civil society initiatives. As Chapter Two has shown, many other countries have mechanisms dedicated to connecting with their overseas citizens, from full-fledged ministries to quasi-government agencies. A first step in the creation of a new agency or secretariat would be for all relevant federal departments to audit their activities that pertain to Canadians abroad, and to map the extent to which these activities connect with each other. A number of core Canadians abroad activities currently dispersed across various departments may well be best placed within the new central agency, for example consular services.

The creation of a dedicated agency to address issues of Canadians abroad would pave the way for a fundamental reassessment of the underlying issues that drive outmigration, return migration, attachment, and the beneficial linkages that citizens living overseas can bring to Canada. These include citizenship and the role of residency in defining a citizen, voting rights, incentives to encourage attachment to Canada without a tax penalty, and options for long-term overseas residents to ensure access to social and
healthcare services on return to Canada. This report has launched a
discussion on these issues, but there is much more work to be done, including
public consultations, before a consensus can be reached on fundamental
questions of identity, rights and obligations. To this end, we believe a special
Parliamentary Committee on Canadians Abroad should be formed so that
these issues are discussed not only in bureaucratic circles, but also in the
political arena.

The need for more study and deliberation on issues concerning Canadians
abroad should not be an excuse to delay more immediate and practical
actions that can lead to benefits for Canadians abroad and at home, and
which do not require fundamental policy changes. The underlying goal of
these actions is to foster attachments to Canada in practical ways—through
political, legal, economic, institutional, and socio-cultural channels—so that
the interests of Canadians abroad are more likely to be aligned with national
interests. Examples include:

- Support for overseas networks of Canadians to connect with their counter-
  parts in Canada for commercial, research, and social improvement goals.
  An example of such a network is the C100 group in Silicon Valley.
- Staffing and funds for Canadian posts abroad to be more active in their
  outreach to Canadian citizens, by way of promotional and networking
events, information dissemination, and public diplomacy.
- Partnerships with universities and colleges to establish a stronger link
  between Canadian alumni groups and networks of Canadians abroad. The
  “family” of overseas Canadians should include non-Canadians who have
  strong attachments to the country, for example through study in Canadian
  post-secondary institutions. It should also include the growing number
  of Canadian Overseas Schools that deliver high school curricula to foreign
  nationals (many of whom later attend Canadian universities).
- The creation of a global, cross-sector non-governmental organization (in
  addition to a coordinating government agency or policy secretariat) to
  link various national and regional Canadian networks overseas.
- Funding for more research on the incentives and obstacles for outmigration
  and return migration, and on ways to foster attachment to Canada that
  is in the national interest.
- The modernization of bilateral double taxation and/or social security
  agreements, especially with countries that have large populations of overseas
  Canadians. These mechanisms make it easier for Canadians to live and
  work abroad, as well as for foreigners to live and work in Canada. They
can also address, to some extent, the problem of negative fiscal transfers
in the case of Canadians who are abroad during their most productive
(tax generating) years.
Short of a radical change in Canadian citizenship policy (for example, the elimination of dual citizenship or taxation of Canadians regardless of residency), the phenomenon of Canadians abroad is not likely to go away. On the contrary, there is good reason to believe that the number of Canadians abroad will grow in the foreseeable future, and that foreign-born Canadians will increasingly dominate the outflow. There is undoubtedly a “balance sheet” to Canadians abroad, with liabilities (and contingent liabilities) as well as assets to consider. Recently, public attention in Canada has focused excessively on the liabilities and not sufficiently on the assets. Unlike the items on a balance sheet, however, Canadians abroad are real people, often highly skilled, and highly mobile, who make personal and professional choices based on changing circumstances, incentives, and motivations—much as all Canadians do. Whether or not Canadians abroad end up as an asset or a liability for Canada, therefore, is not a foregone conclusion, but is predicated on Canadian policy.

**BOX 7-1: LEARNING FROM INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE**

A paper commissioned by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada surveyed models of diaspora engagement around the globe. The authors, Mark Boyle and Rob Kitchin, identified eight policy interventions that Canada could consider when developing its citizens abroad strategy. These include:

1. **Developing an inclusive definition of Canadians Abroad**
   Scotland’s diaspora strategy aims to include not only individuals who were born in Scotland, but also Ancestral Diaspora (individuals abroad with Scottish heritage) as well as Affinity Diaspora (individuals with connections to Scotland, but no Scottish heritage).

2. **Establishing an Emigrant Support Program to extend consular service beyond reactive humanitarian support during natural disasters**
   Since 2004, the Government of Ireland has administered a program that provides culturally sensitive, frontline welfare services to vulnerable Irish emigrants.

3. **Encouraging philanthropic giving to Canada amongst Canadians Abroad**
   Over the past 30 years, the Ireland Fund has raised more than €300 million through diaspora networks for domestic projects.

4. **Targeting tourism campaigns at diaspora markets**
   Scotland’s Homecoming 2009 was a flagship tourist campaign which sought to secure tourist visits from diasporans and to use these visits to build longer term relationship between Scotland and its diaspora.

5. **Mapping the full range of Canadian diaspora business networks to determine if additional networks are required**
   If a new business network is required, Canada could examine models such as Advance Australia, Global Scot, Kea New Zealand, Indus Entrepreneurs Network, and the networks run by Enterprise Ireland.

6. **Establishing a high-level forum through which prominent Canadians Abroad can contribute their expertise to Canadian matters of interest and concern**
   An excellent model is the World Class NZ Network, which brings together very senior and influential New Zealanders and ‘New Zealand-friendly’ experts committed to accelerating the country’s development, international competitiveness and economic growth.

7. **Honouring prominent Canadians Abroad to foster “Canadian-mindedness”**
   On Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Overseas Indians Day) each year, the Government of India awards overseas Indians who have contributed to enhancing the country’s development and global status.

8. **Considering the introduction of a new category of citizenship to balance the benefits and liabilities of the Canadians Abroad population**
   India has recently introduced a new category of citizenship, the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI). This citizenship extends a number of formally designated citizenship rights to overseas Indians, but not the full set of political rights extended to citizens of India.

The full paper *A Diaspora Strategy for Canada? Enriching Debate through Heightening Awareness of International Practice* is available at [http://www.asiapacific.ca/canadiansabroad](http://www.asiapacific.ca/canadiansabroad)
APPENDIX I

Canadians in Hong Kong Survey: Methodology

The telephone survey was conducted from November 3 to November 27, 2010 in English, Cantonese and Mandarin. (A total of 125,558 telephone numbers were called.)

The survey contacted 35,825 households out of a total of 2,341,500 domestic households as of mid-2010 in Hong Kong SAR,\(^{97}\) representing 1.5 per cent\(^ {98}\) of all households in the city. Of the 35,825 households contacted, 1,800 included one or more Canadian citizen over the age of 18. Ultimately, 507 respondents completed the survey.

A random sample of the target population (Canadian citizens in Hong Kong SAR who have stayed or have a definite plan to stay in Hong Kong for more than one year) of this size (507) has a range of error of +/- 5 percentage points at the 95 per cent confidence interval. The +/- 5 points indicates the range of error that the information and views reported are actually reflective of Canadians in Hong Kong.

This survey was produced with the support of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Western Economic Diversification Canada, the Government of British Colombia, and the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation.

APPENDIX II

Global Canadians: A Survey of the Views of Canadians Abroad

The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada designed the 18-question survey, which was posted on a website operated by InSite Survey System Ltd.

Reaching appropriate respondents was challenging. We followed the following strategy:

- Invited responses through Canadian diplomatic offices’ contacts in each country;
- Invited responses through members of Canadian chambers of commerce or Canadian business associations in each country;
- Invited responses through members of Canadian social and cultural organizations in each country;
- Invited responses through subscribers to the websites run by overseas Canadian organizations or individuals; and
- Invited responses through word of mouth or an onward-referral process.

The survey was posted online on April 9, 2007 and ran from April 9 to June 14, 2007.

The survey was open to error including sampling error (because respondents needed to have Internet access to complete the survey). Respondents also needed to have some facility with the English language to understand and complete the survey, to have been informed of the existence of the survey by Canadian organizations in their host countries or through other sources, and to be adults at the time of the survey in order to be members of such organizations or subscribers to such e-contacts. Canadian organizations in host countries needed to be willing and legally


\(^{98}\) Demographers routinely work with 1 and 2 per cent census samples of households and consider the results as acceptably accurate representations of the whole population.
able to forward survey information on to their members or subscribers. The survey was open
to measurement error due to the wording of questions and/or question classification and order,
deliberate or unintentional inaccurate responses, non-response or refusals, etc. With the
exception of sampling error, the magnitude of the errors cannot be estimated. There is,
therefore, no way to calculate a finite “margin of error” for this survey.

APPENDIX III

The ideal circumstance for analyzing the macro treasury impact of emigration would be to know
the number of deemed non-residents and Canadian non-resident citizens living abroad who do
not file tax returns. However, an inquiry to Canada Revenue Agency on the number of deemed
non-residents produced this reply:

“As explained in the (email) below, we do not know how many deemed non-residents there are,
because many of them do not have to file a return. If they do not have to file a return, and are
not issued any type of slip (such as a T4, T4-ANR, or NR4) we do not have them on file.”

Aggregate yearly data reported by the Department of Finance allows a calculation of the
relative importance of non-resident income tax to total tax revenues in any year. For example,
in the fiscal year 2008-2009, non-resident income tax amounted to $6.2 billion or 3.2 per cent
of Canada’s total tax revenues. While it is a considerable sum, this is an overstatement of
Canadian emigrant returns since non-Canadian citizen payments are included in the
$6.2 billion estimate of non-resident income tax payments.

The tax transfer values reported in Chapter Five, however, must be put in context. First, in the
absence of an accurate count of deemed non-residents it is difficult to deduce how much of this
treasury loss is due to awarding non-resident status alone, since a myriad of other factors affect
the size of tax transfers. Secondly, for every 10,000 deemed non-residents aged 36-61, the
annual tax loss to Canada ($3.2 billion) is small when compared to the annual income tax
payments ($167.3 billion) in Canada circa 2006.

Finally, deemed non-residents often still pay income taxes, but just not to Canada, and existing
tax treaties protect them from double taxation. Thus, recovered tax payments from instituting
a world-wide Canadian tax system would, in many cases, but not all, be small.

However, there are still possible side effects if the deemed non-resident status accelerates
Canada’s brain drain by providing an incentive to emigrate. There is substantial literature on
the brain drain that indicates that mid-career (aged 36-45) Canadian professionals did not leave
Canada for the U.S. unless there was at least a $250,000 lifetime income gain circa 1998. If any
of the age groups lived in a moderate (U.S.) to high (European Union) tax environment, the tax
incentive derived from deemed non-resident status for a potential Canadian émigré would not
be enough alone to encourage Canadian citizens to emigrate. However, if a Canadian citizen
moved to a low tax environment (e.g. Middle East, Hong Kong SAR) after obtaining a substantial
subsidized Canadian education, then being a non-resident Canadian would produce a
substantial tax incentive to move during his/her working lives.

99 These include all the factors that would lead an individual abroad not to be in the labour force.
100 The taxable population was calculated using the following assumptions: A permanent deemed non-resident population of
10,000 with an assumed labour force participation rate of 70 per cent and with tax payments were used in this calculation.
For example, the federal transfer loss for 25-35 year olds equals $186 million. This is calculated as
$74,000*(10,000)*(.36)*(.7). The $74,000 is the federal transfer loss reported in column 1, row 1 of Table 1. The weight
*(10,000)*(.36)*(.7) is a product of the assumed 10,000 deemed non-residents abroad times (.36) which is the estimated
percentage of 25-61 year olds in the Canadian overseas population circa (2006) times their assumed labour force
participation rate of 70 per cent.
101 The total income tax payments in Canada in 2006 were $167,276 million (see Statistics Canada). Consolidated Federal,
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Mapping Canadians Abroad

2.8 Million Around the World

Milestones in Canadians Abroad

1947
The Canadian Citizenship Act is passed. Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King becomes the first citizen of Canada.

1977
The Canadian Citizenship Act is amended to permit dual citizenship.

1993
The first year that Canadians living abroad could vote. Currently, they can vote if they have lived abroad for less than 5 years.

1997
Handover of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China. Many immigrants to Canada who had arrived in the previous decade returned to Hong Kong in the years following.

2006
The evacuation of 14,000 Canadian citizens from war-torn Lebanon sparks a debate over whether they were truly Canadians or “citizens of convenience”.

2009
The Canadian Citizenship Act is amended again. This time, the second-generation of children born abroad do not have citizenship rights.

Canada Compared to Other Countries

% of Population Living Abroad

- USA: 21.9%
- China: 9%
- France: 9%
- Australia: 9%
- Canada: 9%
- United Kingdom: 3.3%
- New Zealand: 4.3%
- Chile: 2.6%
- Mexico: 1.7%

Who Are Canadians Abroad?

- 58% Canadian-born
- 42% Naturalized Citizens

Naturalized citizens are the fastest growing segment of Canadians abroad with an exit rate of 4.9%. This contrasts with Canadian-born citizens whose exit rate is only 1.3%.

The numbers on the map represent selected estimates of Canadians living abroad.
