HYBRIDIZATION IN THE ORGANIZATION AND
PROVISION OF SAFETY AND SECURITY IN POOR
URBAN NIGERIA

By

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Abstract

This paper aims to clarify the notion of formal and non-formal security provisioning in Nigeria by locating hybridity in the seeming divisions amongst security providers. It interrogates the interwoven processes that occur at the core of formal and informal security actors, juxtaposed against extensive interfaces of wide range of diverse state and non-state security actors. Using extant literature and multi-layer approach to gather and analyse data, it explores Embeddedness, Role/Character, Impact, Legitimacy vs Legality at all level of security governance in Nigeria. It argues that the distinction between formal and non-formal security institutions is often hasty and misleading specifically in the context of Nigeria. Observing that, the existence of the informal security (pluralistic security order) has been part of everyday life in security landscape of communities across Nigeria due to the emasculation of Westphalian postulations by normative African setting. More so, questions the single monolithic Westphalian security provisioning construct viz-a-viz a more traditionally attuned pluralistic security provisioning settings often entrenched in a post conflict or emerging society.

In the contest of security, the formal actors are identified with primacy but due to the numerical inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the formal security actors; the informalisation of the state machinery begins to proliferate. Similarly, the paper observes the trajectory and proliferation of informal security actors in security provisioning structured based on jurisdiction and typologies. The paper highlights that women face governance challenges in security sector ranging from the need to rebalance security and liberty. The paper argues that despite all the frameworks, agenda setting, national action plans advocacy and training, only made substantive progress on women's participation in security structures and processes such that women are under-representation and negatively portrayed in the security (sector) institutions thus stagnating their social progress and among other things makes recommendation for policymakers and practitioners. The paper also provides perspective and argues the participation of women in informal security, reinforcing their hybridization in security provisioning.
INTRODUCTION

Globally, the maintenance of State security and protection of citizens are key responsibilities of governments. This is essential because security is vital for citizens to realize their full potential to contribute to national prosperity and development. It is for these reasons that countries establish security agencies to protect their territories and populations against external or internal threats.¹ In Nigeria, these responsibilities are expected to be performed by state’s security actors, which have the core responsibility of designing and implementing the country’s security policies for the protection of the State and its citizens. With the complexity and upsurge of violent conflicts and criminality in the country, one may wonder if State security actors can effectively respond to most of the challenges at hand.

These violent conflicts and criminalities have created security and safety gaps that individuals and communities struggle to fill in manners they considered as most appropriate. One of the consequences of poor security provisioning, is that most members of the society now resort to self-help by inclining towards cultural cleavages and or by using private, non-state sector approaches/actors to address their security needs. The study argues that, such complementary roles would rather enhance security provisioning in Nigeria against the hitherto exclusionary state posture.

Studies² conducted in Nigeria in the past established the pivotal roles that non-state (informal) policing systems play in addressing the safety and security needs of majority of the deprived population. In particular, informal policing systems are patronized by

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the poor for a variety of reasons including knowledge of the inner recess of the society, its grassroots outlook, the protection of their neighbourhoods from criminal attacks, provision of speedy safety and security services, which the formal state security outfits are alienated from. However, their existence and operations have not only added to the plurality of actors but also compounded the ambiguity of roles and relationships.

In recent times there has been a paradigm shift, in the trends and patterns of security from households up to the State level. In most households, families hire guards for the protection of their homes. At community levels, neighbourhood watches and vigilantes have been created for broader community protection schemes, leading to the emergence of loosely organized non-state security actors. At the State level, these non-state actors now exist and operate alongside the police, army and all other public policing or regulatory agencies. These non-State actors are often well-organized and undertake crime prevention through patrols, investigation and at times, through violent means. Consequently, with the current mix, there are inevitable areas of inter-relatedness between the State and the non-State security actors, which creates a hybrid concept of security provisioning.

The Federal Government’s monopoly of the institutions of security worked fairly well during the military era, where other tiers of government were subordinates to the central tier. Conversely, on the return to civil rule in 1999, the structural autonomy of the federating states conflicted with the centralization of security infrastructures, fuelling the demand for State or Regional police in some quarters. In the absence of State police, the operation of other non-State actors such as vigilantes has complemented, but often

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times interfered with the mandate of State security forces. Consequently, the urban space in Nigeria presents an environment that tends to reinforce the call for the implementation of the concept of the hybridization of the security system. This would be a combination and use of multifaceted (State and non-State) actors, towards safety and security at community levels.4

From the foregoing, this paper aims to firstly, identity and analyse the diverse complexities of the formal and informal security sectors, secondly, examine the similarities and differences between formal and informal security provisioning, thirdly, review the management and accountability processes, fourthly, deliberate on the perceived impact of the hybridization of the formal and informal system on vulnerable citizens and communities, and lastly, assess the gender roles in formal and informal security structures while promoting a hybrid security system in Nigeria utilizing questions on the patterns of embedding between the State and hybrid security organizations, the likely impacts of the processes of hybridization on the current security order and their impacts on vulnerable groups such as the gender considerations in the processes of hybridization.

Hybrid Security Actors under Examination

There is the general perception that the ineffective policing and rising crime had given impetus to the emergence of a plethora of non-state policing groups in Nigeria5 but arguably to note, these groups have existed prior to the advent of colonialism.

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5 Baker B., “Multi choice policing in Uganda”, Policing and Society, 15(1) 2005
Consequently, the Nigerian state has shared its security responsibility with a variety of non-political organisations including vigilante groups, religious vigilante, ethnic militias and private security guards. The activities of these multiply actors of plural policing manifests in different forms, guises and are characterised by cooperation, co-option, and in some cases conflict. In the context of this paper, non-state in security actor emerged as vigilantes to fill gaps, as opposition to state or parallel forces, then get incorporated or codified in laws, or proscribed. Importantly, they are adaptive in nature and some like the Civilian JTF are likely to evolve as the situation which they evolved to respond to changes.

a) The Bakassi Boys

In the South-East of Nigeria, the Bakassi Boys is a group established in Aba Abia state with an objective to patrol the markets, prevent crime as well as investigate acts of crime within the precinct of the commercial hub of the city. The success of the group arises from its vicious activities, propelled by rumours and fears leading to drastic reduction in crime. This successes further spread their activities from markets spaces to communities and beyond to neighbouring Anambra and Imo States. The Bakassi Boys were armed with lethal weapons without police authorization and often make routine spectacles of captured suspects, paraded naked and often treated cruelly, inhumanely and at most times killed.

Though the group succeeded in controlling crime in the region, they did not succeed in creating an atmosphere of safety as residents live more in fear of the Bakassi Boys than in fear of regular crime and to poses alleged supernatural powers. Complaints about the

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high-handedness of the Bakassi Boys again pitched them against the Nigeria Police. The Federal Government proscribed the operation of the Bakassi Boys and totally disbanded the non-state (informal) security provider but overtime, the aforementioned states created laws backing the operations of the group. The field study of the Bakassi Boys was collected in Abia State, where the group was founded.

b) The Civilian JTF (Borno state)

The Civilian Joint Task Force locally known as “yan gora” (‘men with sticks’)

is a community based non-state offshoot of the Joint Task Force set up by the Nigerian Military in concert with community members. It has over time earned relevant state government supports to confront the Boko Haram insurgency. Before its co-option by various tiers of government, it had emerged as a vigilante group depicting the civilian population’s response to the menace of insecurity in the Northern Eastern states of Nigeria. The group operates semi-autonomously from state control since June 2013, within Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States and unlike the Military’s JTF, the Civilian JTF’s troops speak local languages (Kanuri, Shuwa, Hausa and Arabic); understand local cultures, share religion or geography and comprised of youths between the ages of 15 to 35 mainly from the affected areas with grassroots structures in local government areas.

The Civilian JTF was set up as vigilante groups and loosely organized into area coverage called ‘sectors’ (neighbourhoods) in the communities under the supervision of the Joint Task Force state commands. They are equipped with axes, knives, bows and arrows, locally made guns and any other traditional means of weaponry.

7 Daniel Agbibo, Resistance to Boko Haram: Civilian Joint Task Forces in North-Eastern Nigeria, Conflict Studies Quarterly Special Issues, 2015
Accordingly, their weaponry is inferior to the sophisticated ones used by the insurgents or the military. In spite of the obvious disadvantage in firepower, the Civilian JTF is reputable with remarkable success fighting off major assaults and making arrests. Following its recorded successes, the Military Joint Task Force initiated working relationship with the community based CJTF.

**c) Hisbah (Kano)**

The introduction of Islamic Penal Law (Sharia) in the early 2000s, shortly after the return to democratic civilian led government; in the northern part of Nigeria, steered the formation of a faith based policing group known as Hisbah to enforce Sharia laws. These laws among other things include ban on alcohol consumption, indecent dressing, arrest of petty thieves and executing punishments for all offences ordered by a sharia court. The Hisbah, a faith based security policing group is considered non-state because it emerged from the need to enforce religious laws and separated from the mainstream policing system that is constitutionally defined in the country yet formal as it was created by a confederating state government with an enabling law and performs the function of ensuring compliance to the Sharia law which is a state-owned (formal) law.

On 9th of February 2006 The operations of the Hisbah group attracted the concern of the federal state police who sought legal interpretation against Hisbah and the Kano State government on the basis that the new policing outfit was not only unconstitutionally but as well usurping its exclusive policing powers as enshrined in section 214 to 216 of the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria.\(^8\) The contestation of the legality of the state-owned Hisbah led to a long litigation wherein

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\(^8\) See Rasheed Olaniyi, Sharia, vigilantes and the State in metropolitan Kano, Nigeria: the battle for social control
the police sought to proscribe the functioning of the Hisbah without accepting to enforce the Sharia law. In between the litigation, a mild drama over the use and control of the Nigeria Police played out, and further reinforced the import of the Nigeria Police to the Federal Government and its detachment at the state command from the public and their interests at the grassroots.⁹

Though Hisbah group was established to complement the police in their statutory duties and not rivals it, the Hisbah criminal code system contrasts sharply with the conventional legal system posing a paradox. For the Proponents of the Sharia law, the inauguration of Hisbah denotes democracy at work that would drive social transformation, economic ethics, and reduce crime. In its earlier phase, Hisbah was linked to partisan party politics; accusations stated it was primarily used by the governor as a political machine rather than for the enforcement of Sharia law. Hisbah is queried on intricacies of security and redefines crime and criminality in Kano. For instance, Hisbah engendered skirmishes and breaches of social order, especially Sections 1 (3) and 4 (5) of the Nigerian constitution which protect the fundamental rights of citizens.¹⁰

Severally, the NPF and Hisbah clash over the enforcement of the Shari’a law in Kano state. The tension was accentuated by the gradual shift in the policing power base which threatened the police authority and status quo in dealing with public order. The Kano police force cautioned the Hisbah Committee not to over-step its mandate in the implementation of the Shari’a legal code. The most recent of such cases was the 2015 emergence of a new Emir for the ancient Kano kingdom considered politically a stronghold of the then opposition party and from the believe that the new Emir has

⁹ See Rasheed Olaniyi, Sharia, vigilantes and the State in metropolitan Kano, Nigeria: the battle for social control
¹⁰ Rasheed Olaniyi, Sharia, vigilantes and the State in metropolitan Kano, Nigeria: the battle for social control
sympathy for the then opposition party the federal government ordered the removal of its police protection from the palace of the Emir, the offices and residence of the then Kano State Governor. In response to the withdrawal of the federal police, the state Governor drafted in the newly and contestable state’s Hisbah group to the services of protecting the new Emir and himself. The study of Hisbah as a non-state security outfit was conducted in Kano state, North West Nigeria.

d) The O’odua People’s Congress – OPC

In the South-West, the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) emerged largely as response to the fiercest military dictatorship of Nigeria’s post-colonial history. OPC grew out of the controversy which trailed the annulment of the presidential election of 1993 perceived to have been won by M.K.O. Abiola. The OPC’s official fundamental objectives are set out in its constitution. The OPC claims to have several million members, men and women in smaller proportion, Christian, Muslims and Traditionalist with a bulk concentrated in the heart of Yorubaland.

The OPC was labelled a mass movement; its movement was not as high as at its inception in 1994 created specific circumstance characterised by frustrated promises of democratic transition and fierce repression of political opposition.\textsuperscript{11} The founders of OPC adopted ethnic reading of the political situation and resort to use of force to reach its goals. Yvan observe these two elements laid the ground for the conversion of the OPC into ethnic rebellion.\textsuperscript{12} Ibeanu and Momoh also agreed that it was due to the

\textsuperscript{12} Yvan Guichaoua, The Making of an Ethnic Militia
“increasing youth restiveness, economic hardship, social tension and insecurity that the OPC formed a vigilante wing to handle the matter of neighbourhood security”.13

By 1996, the OPC had become violent organisation more feared than the criminals it was designed to confront. They challenged the Police, Army and Federal Government over the annulment of the 1993 election; they were thought to be untouchable even by the federal government. Members of the OPC frequently went about with charms and amulets. It’s reliance on magical techniques and beliefs gave advantage to their activity and rumoured to possess supernatural powers not only to withstand bullets but also to magically know suspects and solve tough crimes. This magical equipment is often complemented by more classical weaponry, such as carry guns, locally produced, stolen or smuggled from police stores.14 The Odua’a People’s Congress is one of the largest ethnic militia’s in Nigeria today Primary data on the successor of OPC was collected in Lagos State.

**Literature Review**

Two main trends generally dominate discourses in Nigeria about security mechanisms and security providers. The culturalist trend that highlights the extraordinary role of militias as security providers and the normative trend that emphasizes the persistent and stereotyped portrayal of the Nigerian state as inherently weak. The concept of hybridization or pluralism in security provisioning has engaged the minds of government officials, media practitioners, scholars, and security officials in dissertations on security arrangements. Scholars have focused on both the actors that operate within the rule of law and those often considered as being illiberal by Western

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13 Okechukwu Ibeanu and Abubakar Momoh 2008
14 Yvan Guichaoua, The Making of an Ethnic Militia
paradigms, such as warlords, cartels, paramilitaries, millenarian cults, anti-
globalisation movements and mafias. In spite of these literature, this paper identifies
compelling reasons why the distinctions between formal and non-formal security
institutions are misleading in general, but more specifically in the context of Nigeria.

The paper argues that non-state security institutions are not necessarily un-official in
character as they are often quite official in organization and activities. Similarly, some
public security arrangements are not official, particularly counter-insurgency forces,
some of which operate underground using unofficial and unorthodox methods. Hence,
to define non-state security arrangements as unofficial suggests that they are ad-hoc and
casual in character, making it cumbersome to distinguish between legal or illegal, as
many non-State security arrangements are recognized by law and regulated by statute.

Scholars have written extensively on the existence and emergence of informal policing,
in which all members of a community were responsible for maintaining order. In other
words, private individuals, groups, associations and organizations carried out policing
from the beginning of human history. To Bangoura, organization of security along
occupational, community or religious lines or even witchcraft practices, working or
exchange groups, networks. It is estimated that non-state providers in Africa deliver
play critical roles in providing security and justice services.

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15 Reno, W. Warlord Politics and African States Boulder Colorado: Lynne Reihner
Publishers 1999
16 Okechukwu Ibeanu and Abubakar Momoh 2008 State Responsiveness to Public
(London: Conflict and Development Group, Kings College).
17 Bangoura affirms studies on security in Africa to have pointed out the organization
of security along occupational, community or religious lines or even witchcraft practices, working or exchange groups, networks
18 OECD DAC, Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and
Justice, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2007; Bruce Baker,
Security in Post
Ekeh, also noted that from time immemorial, ordinary men and women have made several sacrifices to ensure the safety of both their lives and those of their families.\(^{19}\) Lar asserts that, plurality is not merely a function of current practice but traceable to a specific historical moment, from the last decade of British colonialism.\(^{20}\) Dambazau also admitted that the primary purpose of policing during this period was to promote the economic and political interest of the colonial masters and also engage in the brutal subjugation of communities and the suppression of resistance to colonial rule.\(^{21}\)

Igbo identifies Age grades, masquerades, extended family, secret cults and other local organizations including vigilante groups were used in policing various communities in Nigeria” before the advent of formal policing, after the stages of transformation in the 1930’s.\(^{22}\) Ibeanu and Momoh also claims, neighbourhood watches and vigilantes have spread as a result of persistent low police capacity adequately to keep the populace safe since colonial times. Gore and Pratten opines vigilante groups or self-help organizations evolved after the civil war of the 1970’s, due drastic increase in crimes of violence and robberies and the proliferation of small arms increased\(^ {23}\) while Shearing had observed the low institutional capacity to deliver public and physical security for the citizens efficiently and effectively created a security vacuum, increasingly filled by private actors in response to genuine demands for citizens’ protection\(^ {24}\), Omeje identified the

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20 Jimam Timchang Lar, Vigilantism, State, and Society in Plateau State, Nigeria
proliferation of incidents of State failure as the re-invention and comeback of traditionalism in all sectors of the society, and consequently a mystical re-traditionalisation of security.\textsuperscript{25}

Conversely, as societies became more complex, however, these informal methods become effective due to increased heterogeneous populations and lack of social solidarity. The representations of vigilantes in Nigeria connect in many ways to historical discourses about vigilantism, drawing numerous dichotomies.\textsuperscript{26} Omeje suggests that security was systematically detached from society, and its interrelated social structures vested in the modern bureaucratic State, and consequently the phenomenon became overly professionalized, secularized and militarized.\textsuperscript{27} This trajectory of security dynamics is categorized by Yoroms as contexts of insecurity driven by colonialism, the politics of divide and rule, economic flight and the existence of colonial states, which were highly linked to their home governments. Thus, the transfer of power to the local petit-bourgeoisie in the sub-region only served to exacerbate their quest to monopolize power.\textsuperscript{28}

Accordingly, Klocker and Oghi, vigilantism or self-help organization is identified as one category of informal policing\textsuperscript{29}, which continued to exist in secret despite attempts to counter them both in the colonial State and independent Nigeria. Ibeanu and Momoh

\textsuperscript{25} Kenneth Omeje, Oil Conflict in Nigeria: Contending Issues and Perspectives of the Local Niger Delta People, 2005 New Political Economy 10/3
\textsuperscript{26} See Marianne Vardodalos , Engaging Terror: A critical and Interdisciplinary Approach University publishers.com amazon.com
\textsuperscript{27} Kenneth Omeje, Oil Conflict in Nigeria: Contending Issues and Perspectives of the Local Niger Delta People, 2005 New Political Economy 10/3
\textsuperscript{29} Klockers G.B The idea of Police Beverly Hills Calf: 1985; Oghi 2013.
advanced the development of private security arrangements in Nigeria, classifying them into the moment of resort to traditional self-help strategies to compensate inadequacies; the moment of mapping of non-state security structures in the growth of private security companies; and the moment of the trajectory of private security arrangements, which saw the emergence of armed militias, arising out of gaps in public security decision-making structures in the face of increasing crime.\(^{30}\) Similarly, Alemika and Chukwuma recognize four typologies of vigilantism as religious vigilantism, ethnic vigilantism, state-sponsored vigilantism and neighbourhood or community ‘vigilantism’.\(^{31}\)

Further, Ibeanu and Momoh, Oghi, Aleimika and Chukwuma; Fourchard, 2005\(^{32}\) agreed that the intensified economic and political crisis of the 1980’s and the unprecedented degree of identity politics, ethnic, religious or regional identity to struggle for access to state and resource control or demand for basic rights and socio-economic provisioning as well as protest against exclusion and oppression have led to the present security challenge in the country.\(^{33}\) Smith further buttressed that, “vigilantism’ popularity is response to a widely shared sense of political and economic reforms that has led to greater inequality and injustice and a failure of accountability” arguing that in spite of the reported atrocities of the group, the eager public was

\(^{30}\) See Ibeanu and Momoh 2008.
\(^{31}\) See Alemika and Chukwuma.
\(^{32}\) Ibeanu and Momoh 2008; Oghi 2013; Aleimika and Chukwuma 2007, Fourchard, 2005.
unwavering in its support for the insurgents as they continued to turn out en-masse to witness executions of alleged criminals by the group.34

Additionally, Caparini notes political inefficiency of the corrupt State police warranted the existence of informal ordering. The common development in the transitional countries is commonly known as “shadows” an informal non-state based organization of varying legitimacy. Shadows take many forms, but mostly and commonly as a community based informal justice or vigilante type, processes or private security organization.35 Equally, Caparini and Kwaja argued that “the Informal security structures have become a part of the everyday security landscape of most communities across Nigeria, due to the cluelessness of the formal security actors to the security challenges in the country”, but this is not to say, formal security, policing and justice institutions are cases subverted, corrupted or incapable of performing their security functions. It is also important to note that emergent non-State groups benefit from their proximity with local communities, understanding of local norms and practices, as well as, mutual trust between them and local community leaders in providing tailored made security measures in local capacity.36

Kwaja proposes that the emergence and activity of informal security can complement or even dislodge the State in the provision of security for their communities, due to the failure to gain or even seek the legitimacy, confidence, and respect of the people they

34 Daniel Jordan Smith, Violent Vigilantism and the State in Nigeria, The Case of the Bakassi Boys
35 Caparini Marina and Ortwin Marenin, Transforming the Police in Central and Eastern Europe (2002)
are supposed to protect. Andrea identifies vigilante groups to possess both disintegrative and reintegrated dimension. Vigilante activities he notes are not necessarily a sigh of loss of State control over violence as conventional failed States; instead, vigilantes are interwoven with the State through complex relationships of cooperation and competition. Hence, they simultaneously strengthen and weaken different dimensions of Statehood. Accordingly, this study argues that hybridity in security can be a conduct for building cooperation and political trust. North emphasized the interaction between the rules (institutions) and players (organizations), detailing the importance of informal rules and how they are complementary to formal rules.

Gender inequalities are pervasive on all levels of society and are reinforced by the state and non-state apparatus. Within this context, the actions of formal and informal security actors inevitably affect gender dynamics. Often times, gender in a wider hybrid security sector is treated as a niche issue, and in some cases peripheral, rather than seen as an integral part of the broader security sector agenda. To buttress the place of gender in a responsive government context, and in specific terms, Salahub pointed out that gender policy is more than a human rights issue. Security institutions, she noted tend to be designed and operated by men.

To meet the needs of women, their inclusion in security sector services, as well as, the development of policies sensitive to the different experiences of women, is necessary and must be responsive to the whole society, not just segments of it. The failure to provide security for citizens according to Alaga has resulted in the proliferation of non-State security providers, whose activities are most often unregulated and unchecked by the State, thus doubly jeopardizing the security of citizens (men and women alike).\(^1\)

In most cases, the recourse to traditional security providers promotes discrimination and violence against particularly women and girls due to prevailing stereotyped cultural norms about the roles and relations between and among men and women.\(^2\)

Babatunde and Donli, also express the subordination of women in terms of power, status, employment and access to other resources in Nigeria, emphasizing the sexual composition and the social institutionalisation of male dominance and female subordination as the bedrock of traditional and cultural norms, values and practices that make women subordinate to men and therefore obstruct their progress within private and public spheres.\(^3\) The lack of societal consensus on fundamental issues, the unrepresentative and repressive governance approaches utilized by the State, coupled with the destabilizing impact of economic and social disparities have resulted in the systematic exclusion and marginalization of minority and vulnerable groups.

A great deal of literature on informal security provisioning diagnosed the trends of security mechanisms, rule of law, existence, emergence, trajectory, typologies, economic factors, persistency of low institutional capacity due to it overly

\(^1\) Ecoma Alaga Gender and Security Policy in West Africa, working Paper Published online in May 2011 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Regional Office Abuja.
\(^3\) See Babatunde Tosin 2015 and Patricia Donli 2008
professionalized, secularized and militarized nature only a few reasoned alongside the complementary, disintegrative and reintegrated dimension of informal security actors. The literature showed much progress made in closing the gender gap in areas of education, healthcare, employment and government, gender inequality is still pervasive in the face of highly complex lineage. The data on gender representation in formal and non-formal security sector institutions are mostly inaccurate and largely inaccessible for which this paper intends to address.

UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF HYBRIDIZATION, FORMALITY AND INFORMALITY

There are diverse definitions and actors influencing the provision of security and justice. Hybridization in African context is also referred to as Twilight Institutions/Policing, Governance without government, Institutional multiplicity, and mediated state, Plural Policing or Institutional Pluralism (Plurality). In recognition of the diverse nature of security challenges in Nigeria and the need for a holistic approach to deal with these re-occurring challenges, this paper adopts the concept of hybridization as the process by which multiplicity of situations of diverse animating logics and forms of political authority coexist, collaborate, or compete to construct security arrangements.44

In recent times, hybridization has gained significant currency among government officials, media practitioners, scholars, and security officials. It was introduced to capture the contested nature of governance and security arrangements in fragile and

44 See Legitimacy in fragile post-conflict situations – why it matters for peacebuilding and conflict transformation, Framing paper for the Berghof project Addressing legitimacy issues in fragile post-conflict situations to advance conflict transformation and peacebuilding.
post conflict States. Experts rightly note that hybrid contexts are negotiated, bargained and enforced through both formal and informal processes that coexist, overlap, and intertwine. As such, the hybrid natures of security rejects a purely state-centric approach to security and as a substitute, seeks to uncover complex arrays of international, state, and non-state actors, who all cooperate and compete for power and resources, as well as determine patterns of security and insecurity alike.

The arrival of the liberal pluralist scholars conclude that states are not isolated actors in the political system and not necessarily homogenous because they composed of competing bureaucracies. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye re-examined the state centric paradigm because it has failed to identify the importance of non-state actors while Waltz emphasized the role of these actors arguing that the nature of power had changed and divided among different types of actors, its use had not. Security hybridity cannot be defined as neither a fragmentation of security apparatus actors mechanisms, nor as a division of labour between state and non-state actors rather it emphasizes on the processes in which diverse actors co-exist, negotiate, intertwine, compete and quite often complement each other and collaborate. Security actors have been discussed through rethinking the informal versus the formal. However, the security provision systems bring together state security forces, private and public provision or formal and informal actors.

In many contexts, hybridization in security recognizes public services including security and justice as provided by actors and institutions beyond the State. Contrary

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46 Crisis Control and (In) Formal Hybrid Security in Lebanon policy brief and Poster inside Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research
to the notion that formal systems are codified and process-driven while informal systems are lacking in systems and processes: hybrid practice connotes the core of formal institutions, their rules, processes and standards guide the non-formal. Such hybridity therefore allows a measure of overlap, interchange and indeed conflict between the formal and the non-formal.48 The distinction between the State and non-State security actors is often arbitrary. By labelling one group (the State); by implication legitimate and the other (the non-State) by implication illegitimate, scholars, government policy makers and practitioners become embroiled in struggles of definition, acceptance and participation. This paper believes the present discourse should be centred on assisting and enabling actors, structures respect human rights, provide effective legitimate security and justice services to communities, regardless of their form or relationship because both are not only interwoven in goals and objectives but also have distinct areas of influence.

The paper presents four case studies, which have common classification as non-state actors, sharing the security space with state-owned security agencies in Nigeria. The four case studies presented have common classification as non-state actors, sharing the security space with state-owned security agencies. These non-state structures operate as vigilante or neighbourhood watch groups and from a cursory observation of the case studies, a typology of the vigilante evolution will be suggested, in which three distinct stages of progression will manifest, namely; the populist, consolidation and abuse phase and the demise.49


49 See Ibeanu and Momoh.
In an environment of uncertainty, insecurity and perceived inadequacy of existing security mechanisms unavoidably precede these stages of progression. This tripartite typology is well illustrated by the rise and fall of the Bakassi Boys in South East Nigeria. In the populist phase, there is widespread social acceptance of a self-help and non-State approach to the crises, the second phase, despite being perceived as the bigger evil in comparison to criminality by a section of the society, the Bakassi Boys spread beyond Aba to other towns of Abia and Anambra states where they received government endorsement, protection, drafted into the State machinery and renamed Abia State Vigilante Services. The state government then took responsibility for recruiting, training and remunerating the Bakassi Boys. The Abia State Vigilante Services became a government agency (parastatal) with officials recruited by government. Indeed informal institutions are seldom impartial, having their own political and economic agendas, some pursued through violence.\textsuperscript{50}

Hisbah and the Civilian Joint Task Force also received government endorsement and attendant support, making it safe to argue that this typology of hybrid security order has dual identity of community vigilante and State attempt to codify and sponsored community based vigilante. Conversely, OPC, Bakasi Boys and Hisbah have all survived – albeit – transformed into new structures, the CJTF however, irrespective of it status of codification remain to be seen whether they would become institutionalised or transit into some either smaller or bigger roles owing to the vagaries of change in political dispensation.

Similarly, some states have incorporated non-State systems into the official policing order by extending legality and legitimacy to it. For example, Lagos State passed the

Neighbourhood Safety Agency Bill 2016, which institutionalizes and codifies community security measures. The Lagos state House of Assembly passed a Bill to establish the State Neighbourhood Agency and for the control of Vigilante Corps activities in the State after it passed its Third Reading at the plenary sitting. The Bill was initiated to strengthen the State security structure and activities in the State to assist in reducing criminal activities, incessant cases of kidnapping, ritual killings, gang war and domestic violence, among others.51

Similarly, Laws on vigilantes have been passed in Kano and Abia States amongst others. Distinctively, in Plateau State, the government created a hybrid institution called the ‘Operation Rainbow’, which constitutes of vigilante members, but has representation from all formal security services. This is an example of a hybrid organization that is a non-state but state sponsored operating with official security actors. At the National level, the National Assembly passed the Private Guards Companies Act directed at private security firms, provided there is a useful framework for conceptualizing cooperation between the formal and informal security organizations.52

Patterns of “Embedding” Between Hybrid Security Organizations

51 The Paradigm, Lawmakers Pass Bill to Establish Regulate Agency to Regulate Activities of Vigilantes Groups in Lagos, Neighbourhood Watch Bill into Law.
See A Bill For An Act to Provide for Professional Private Security Practitioners to Carry Arms While on Duty Sponsored by Senator I. S. Martyns-Yellowe (Rivers West) Senator Dalhatu S. Tafida (Kaduna North) Be it Enacted by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria http://www.nassnig.org/document/download/788
52 A Bill For An Act to Provide for Professional Private Security Practitioners to Carry Arms While on Duty Sponsored by Senator I. S. Martyns-Yellowe (Rivers West) Senator Dalhatu S. Tafida (Kaduna North) Be it Enacted by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria http://www.nassnig.org/document/download/788
The broad understanding of hybridization or hybridity lays valid claims as anti-thesis to the Westphalian stereotypes about state sovereignty and other forms of state monopoly of instruments of violence and state autonomy. It proposes that the provision of security should be empirically and operationally as a collection of loosely coordinated and constantly changing processes. However, its intellectual roots in subaltern history and anthropology, does not denote the mere grafting together of separate actors and institutions to make new entities. Such relationships can evidently be found amongst our case studies in their relationship and levels of intrinsic embeddedness amongst state security actors in Nigeria. Policing in the context of Nigeria as asserted by Lar changed vigilante practice because the interaction has created a certain kind of symbiotic interpenetration.

Hybridization occurs in different ways or through different levels and in different directions. Locally manifested aspects can be transferred to the national, regional or global level and may be adopted and institutionalized in a modern or mixed way. Importantly, the institution of policing in Nigeria has gone through different periods and experienced different processes of composition, structures and ultimately practice have not remained static. Security decision-making in Nigeria has evolved principally around pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial states, as well as the political regimes. Lar affirms the link between the plural policing landscape of colonial Nigeria and the evolution of a new plurality of policing to emerge first decade after independence and has continued to evolve in response to changing political and social contexts.

54 Jimam Timchang Lar, Vigilantism, State, and Society in Plateau State, Nigeria
55 Jimam Timchang Lar, Vigilantism, State, and Society in Plateau State, Nigeria
56 Jimam Timchang Lar, Vigilantism, State, and Society in Plateau State, Nigeria
As observed by Ibeanu and Momoh between 1900 and 1994, security decision-making was top priority, although the issue of the provision of security in general was not an exclusive State affair.\(^{57}\) Participants noted during a FGD that:

“…informal actors have existed in our community from time immemorial; they have existed to checkmate security and livelihood of our community and we have several groups supervising security, these include market association whose members oversee sectors of the market such as cattle dealers and drivers ‘among others’. Such that they can identify or become vigilant of suspected criminals”. \(^{58}\)

Prior to the advent of the Nigeria Police Force in 1889 by the British Colonial administration, there were various groups performing the role of policing the communities. In the Southern part of Nigeria, communities had their own ways of detecting and preventing crimes. In some Igbo pre-colonial societies, the role of policing or protecting lives and properties of the people was the responsibility of the entire community even though it was facilitated by the age grade and masquerade societies. Among the Okrika, Kalabari, Nembe and Akassa Ijo, there was the Sekiapu club also known as Sekeni or Ekine enforced the payment of debts, investigated and generally acted as Police in each village, just like the Ekpe society did among the Efiks.\(^{59}\) While in the Northern part of the country, in areas like Bata and Nbula in Yola Province, the Mbamto, virgin priestess was also instrumental for the detection of crimes. Similarly, in Tiv land, the council of elders, the Mbaivesen, performed useful

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\(^{57}\) See Ibeanu and Momoh 2008
\(^{58}\) Focus Group Participant Wudil Kano State, March 2015.
quasi-police functions.\textsuperscript{60} It was this model of community policing that colonial authorities supplanted with colonial police in 1889, to provide quasi-military assistance to the British colonial administration.\textsuperscript{61}

In several of these communities, women also played the primary role of socialisation, instilling discipline, morals and virtues in their children as part of the broader system of crime prevention and control in society. The display of deviant behaviour by children was often attributed to a lack of maternal care and supervision, a manifestation of the belief that women were ‘naturally’ capable of preventing and controlling crimes to enhance security in the society. For instance, the Ete group in Nsukka Division of Present day Enugu State in Nigeria “acted as police to collect women’s “Awha” (elders) to meetings and bring women who had committed offences before their council.\textsuperscript{62}

Politically, women also played prominent roles and held important positions among the majority of ethnic groups, particularly among the Hausas, the Yorubas and the Igbos. In the Hausa society, the dominant people culturally belonged to a civilization characterized by matrilineal succession in the ruling class, where women held high political offices. A particular case in point was queen Amina of Zaria who succeeded her father’s throne, led her first military charge a few months after assuming power fortified each of her military camps with an earthen wall.\textsuperscript{63}

Basically, pre-colonial Nigerian communities had persons who were entrusted with police duties. These ranged from men of valour, repute and those of military acclaim,

\textsuperscript{61} See Oghi, Reflections on Africa’s Security Situation 2013
\textsuperscript{63} History and Women, Friday, August 13, 2010 http://www.historyandwomen.com/2010/08/amina-of-zaria.html
but certainly not strangers, rather, those who had local knowledge of the area. Messengers and bodyguards were also used, with emphasis on physical fitness and character.\textsuperscript{64} Usually, these groups composed of individuals from the local community and often derived their credibility and unofficial authority from the community in which they serve. During this period, traditional institution particularly the traditional leadership remained a strong force to reckon with in securing communities. Traditional leaders in Nigeria have a complex and changing role in governance. The position of traditional rulers was divine and based on ritual leadership and political power seen with sacred trust between the people and their rulers.\textsuperscript{65} The people submitted themselves and were absolutely responsive to the authority of the rulers and in turn expected them to rule for the general good and welfare of the community. Functioning as both religious and administrative leaders, traditional rulers were also responsible for judiciary matters in their domains and led their people to war. In places like Yorubaland, Nupe kingdom, the king appointed Baloguns, in Edoland there was the Okakuo. These officers reported to their appointers, affairs concerning security in their areas of authority. By and large, structures existed that guaranteed security.\textsuperscript{66}

For the colonial administrators, the maintenance of law and order was to ensure that basic tasks were accomplished. The security of the colonial order and its agents was paramount. Apart from the heavily policed settler colonies, Africans were left to their own devices and local customs, under their traditional chiefs. In some cases, it was considered the responsibility of Africans to police their communities. Crime control

\textsuperscript{64} Tamuno, T.N. “Crime and Security in Pre-colonial Nigeria 1993
\textsuperscript{65} Cohen Abner Customs and Politics in Urban Africa, Berkeley University of California 1970; Ashiru, D Chieftaincy Institution and Grassroots Developments in Nigeria Lagos Centre for Black and Africa Arts Civilization (CBAAC) 2010
\textsuperscript{66} See Oghi, Reflections on Africa’s Security Situation 2013
was dealt with by the Native Authority System, which enabled native rulers to exercise considerable political powers. These excessive powers allowed traditional rulers to use forced labour, impose arbitrary fines and practice oppressive rule. This liberal policy was extended to matters of security\textsuperscript{67}. Thus, law and order, and the exercise of social control, were executed through communal initiatives.\textsuperscript{68}

The later termed indirect rule strengthened the power and influence of traditional rulers and created arbitrary powers as experimented with the establishment of ‘Warrant Chiefs’ to act like the Hausa Emirs or Yoruba Obas.\textsuperscript{69} As self-government drew near, traditional rulers were given a say in governmental matters. Undoubtedly, the introduction of the indirect rule system, first in Northern Nigeria and later in the South, gave traditional rulers the opportunity of active participation within the colonial government, through the Native Authority System. \textsuperscript{70} The colonial conquest of some states in Northern Nigeria also led to the establishment of police courts and prisons as a means of coercion\textsuperscript{71}. To curtail crime, the Yandoka, which was the pre-British system of policing, was made to join the British Police, such that: “the decrease in crime in the Province in 1933 was partly attributed to it.”\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{67} Cohen Abner Customs and Politics in Urban Africa, Berkeleys University of California 1970; Ashiru, D Chieftaincy Institution and grassroots Developments in Nigeria. Lagos Centre for Black and Africa Arts Civilization(CBAAC) 2010.
\textsuperscript{70} Native Authority Police Force Rules, Native Authority Law, (No. 4 of 1954) Printed by the Government Printers, Kaduna 1954.
\textsuperscript{72} David Killingray, The maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa in African Affairs, Vol. 85 NO 340
This suggests the Nigerian state never relied on the colonial administrative structure and agencies for security but rather, created parallel security agencies for intelligence, surveillance and monitoring of the colonial State\textsuperscript{73} and as societies develops, incidence of crime and insecurity take different shapes, requiring society to adjust, by accommodating new actors in the provision of security. These informal security sector also known as an informal policing structure or voluntary are referred to as vigilantes, neighbourhood watch, ethnic vigilante, religious vigilante, community guards or traditional police in Nigeria.\textsuperscript{74} Hitherto, available literature shows that since colonial times, neighbourhood watches and vigilantism have spread as a result of persistent capacity and inadequacy to keep the populace safe.\textsuperscript{75}

This history corroborates Alemika’s arguments that since colonial times, neighbourhood watches and vigilantes have become widespread as a result of persistent low police capacity in providing security to the populace. These types of vigilante are not rigid or exclusive; a group may combine the features of two or more types.\textsuperscript{76} Vigilante groups of whatever forms offer a modicum of refuge to Nigerians who seek security in an increasingly unstable society. The popular logic for vigilantism was characterized by historical complexities of violence, injustice and depressing economic conditions.

\textsuperscript{73} See Ibeanu and Momoh 2008 CSDG Paper  
\textsuperscript{75} Native Authority Police Force Rules, Native Authority Law, (No. 4 of 1954) Printed by the Government Printers, Kaduna 1954.  
Conversely, the development of private security arrangements in Nigeria has been classified into three main moments; the moment of resort to traditional self-help strategies to compensate inadequacies; mapping of non-State security structure in the growth of private security companies and the trajectory of private security arrangements that has led to the emergence of armed militias each arising out of gaps in public security decision-making structures in the face of increasing crime.\textsuperscript{77} The second trend in the emergence of non-State security structures in postcolonial Nigeria was the growth of private security companies.

The rise particularly in the 1980s, was a reflection of the need to provide more professional security services to private and public establishments, as well, as individual homes.\textsuperscript{78} Alemika also asserts that the crime rate rising from the 1980s, particularly armed robbery; more vigilante groups arose in towns and cities to compensate for police inadequacies.\textsuperscript{79} However, the perception of police as alien, corrupt and occupying force by the citizens has not changed since the colonial period. Marenin claimed that, “the public avoids contact with the police to the point of not reporting crimes or accidents as it is widely believed that to be a police witness is almost as bad as being the criminal offender”.\textsuperscript{80}

From 1995 onwards, the economic, social, communal and political challenges that Nigeria faced threw up a complex security dynamic which made non-State security

\textsuperscript{77} Ibeanu and Momoh 2008
actors visible and relevant, thus eroding the State’s monopoly of security decision-making and necessitating the need for non-State actors security. In the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, the security landscape further changed dramatically with the emergence of several insurgent and tribal militia, ethnic, communal and community groups like the Oodua People’s Congress, Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys, Arewa Youth, Yan bangsa, Yankalare, Hunters and the Civilian Joint Task Force, amongst others across the country in response to some governance and security gaps in their communities. The operational structures of these voluntary policing groups vary; some groups have well documented structures, operational guidelines and administrative or financial procedures. State sponsored actors have structures at state, zonal, local government and community levels.

The standard procedure for recruitment is by referral by existing members or vetting by community leaders and accordingly, their roles and functions of include providing security, early warning alerts, traffic control, gathering intelligence, settling dispute, conducting and combining community developments activities with security roles or enforcing religious rights.

“A participant observed that virtually everyone in this community is kwato da gora (vigilante) but the recognized ones are the civilian JTF and members of the BOYES who are majorly volunteers”.

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81 See Ibeanu and Momoh 2008
82 See Ibeanu and Momoh 2008 CSDG Paper
84 Interview with participant identifying existing vigilante (Jere, Borno state) January 2015
The increasing involvement of non-State actors in security decision-making of Nigeria is sometimes in cooperation and sometimes in conflict with State structures.\textsuperscript{85} Other forms of hybridity witnessed between the formal and informal sectors, emerged between 1999 and 2001 after Nigeria’s return to civil rule. Vigilantism became one of OPC’s main activities at the time of rising criminality. The OPC as a cultural and self-determination group remained a very vocal political actor in South West Nigeria because the police force was highly a distrusted institution, alternately for its passiveness, degree of corruption and its propensity to overact when it intervenes. Thus OPC became the police force that poor people can rely on and an alternative traditional dispute settler. Its successes lie in its ability to bridge gaps and delivery of public services in areas completely abandoned by formal institutions.\textsuperscript{86} Doubtfully, the security services of the OPC has become less pronounced as other non-formal actors such as vigilantes and the confederating state government created Neighbourhood Watch Group to fill the non-state (informal) security vacuum created by the roll back of the OPC.

The reintroduction of Sharia Law into by twelve states in Northern Nigeria also emerged to develop and strengthened judicial, administrative and policing apparatuses through the establishment of several bodies, primarily to serve or support the application of Sharia Law in those States.\textsuperscript{87} The bodies established include the various Sharia Commissions, Zakkah Commissions, Anti-Corruption Commissions, Sharia Implementation Advisory Commissions, Shura Councils, A Daidaita Sahu, Zauren Sulhu and Hisbah Commissions. The most embedded of these commissions is the

\textsuperscript{85} Ibeanu and Momoh 2008 CSDG Paper
\textsuperscript{86} Yvan Guichaona, The Making of an Ethnic Militia
\textsuperscript{87} Zamfara, Kano, Niger, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Kaduna, Jigawa, Yobe, Borno, Bauchi and Gombe
Hisbah Commission. The blueprints/whitepapers and other government policies that brought in Sharia Law incorporates the provision for the establishment of Islamic based regulatory agencies, be it by the name of Hisbah, market judge or Islamic market regulations.88

Hisbah structures are in four levels, state, senatorial district, L.G.A and community. The state level comprises three divisions, the board, administration and command. The board advises the government on Islamic matters, the administration handles administrative activities of the hisbah commission and the command controls the enforcement of sharia law.89 Though NPF retains its constitutional role even if it fails to provide adequate security, it is complemented or supplemented by the state sponsored Islamic guards known as Hisbah and by self-help community protection groups such as trade association.90 Other group identified to have complemented the police even before Hisbah in Kano include Community Security Association, Bajira, Uwar Wudil, KAROTA amongst others.91

Hisbah is an informal security group that has faith and state sponsored roots that was established to enforce a distinctive ‘Islamic government and tackles the problems of community security in a different way. Indeed, it is dedicated to the abolition of the business and consumption of beer and sex work and to the policing of a moral order based on Sharia’. Hisbah vigilantism differs markedly from those carried out by neighbourhoods. The identity of Hisbah vigilante was distinguished by Islamic religion

88 See S.8 (f) of the Katsina State Sharia Commission Law 2000.
91 Interview in Kano
and combines security duties with religious services including patrolling schools and communities, gather information, monitor social activities and traffic control. The Hisbah organization from the study proves to have similarities formal security organization, but affirm to be subordinate to formal security actors, subjecting Hisbah to trainings, oversights, collaborations and operations between actors.

Unlike crime control vigilantism, this form of vigilante was rooted less in government ineffectiveness but pursues an Islamic agenda bargaining maybe necessary but compromise is not seen but as strength and the various actors tolerates or accommodates each other’s rationalities. According to Rosenbaum and Sederberg, ‘social group performing control vigilantism may also be employed when religious values are threatened by the spread of secularism, heresy, or competition with other faith’. This body is responsible for the commanding of good and prohibiting evil is best done by the Hisbah which has powers to arrest, seize, regulate, control, supervise and sometimes prosecute offenders in every Islamic environment that enjoys the leverage of applying Sharia Law. The Hisbah group is expected to perform some regulatory and security functions:

"According to respondents in a FGD in Gwarzo, Hisbah group in general helps us curb the menace of drug abuse because the religion forbids it. Hisbah also deals with issues of reconciliation. For instance, criminals caught by the vigilante group are handed over to Hisbah, but if the offence is massive, hisbah refer the case to the formal police for necessary actions."

92 Ernest Ogbozor, Understanding the Informal Security Sector in Nigeria
93 Rosenbaum J.H and Seidenberg, Vigilantism: An analysis of Establishment Violence
94 Rosenbaum and Sederberg, Vigilantism 1974:553
95 Extracted from FGD Safety and Security in Urban Poor Nigeria (Gwarzo Kano) March 2015
In the new democratic dispensation, the police at the beginning of the Sharia processes were not ready to enforce Sharia rules and laws.\textsuperscript{96} The Attorney General of the Federation also sent a memorandum to the Governors of the States informing them that Sharia Law is illegitimate\textsuperscript{97} This implies that the apparatus of the Federal Government is not expected to ‘lend its hand’ towards the implementation of Sharia Law. Thus, the state-sanctioned Hisbah became imperative, as the Nigerian police lacked the prerequisite training.\textsuperscript{98}

Hisbah has the largest profile of Kano’s policing groups, and is currently an important actor by virtue of its religious significance, access to state decision makers and the popularity as a provider of quick an affordable justice\textsuperscript{99} and was initially widely accepted by the people and reluctantly by the police. But this trend changed with the passing of a Law by the State House of Assembly, prohibiting the ferry of women on Achaba (motorcycles) in Kano State. The enforcement of the Traffic Amendment Law of 2004 by Hisbah drew resentment from many youths, whose livelihood, were threatened by the legislation.\textsuperscript{100}

The Federal Government was suspicious of the rapidly growing strength of Hisbah, especially since secessionist bids; ethno-religious bigotry and global terrorism were

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{96} Liman, A.A. The Roles of Ministries of Justice and the Nigeria Police Force regarding the Implementation of Sharia. Unpublished paper presented at the 10th Annual Judges’ Conference, organized by the Centre for Islamic Legal Studies, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, held at the Kongo Conference Hotel, Zaria (30th-31st Oct. 2008) p.10.


\textsuperscript{100} Rasheed Olaniyi Hisba and the Sharia Law Enforcement in Metropolitan Kano
\end{footnotesize}
reaching alarming proportions. Thus, the government began to view Hisbah as a parallel institution, performing the statutory functions of the police, including: arrest, interrogation and detention of suspects. The Hisbah structure was furthermore organised on the same model as the conventional police including intelligence, investigation and operation units.\textsuperscript{101}

In 2006, the former Inspector General of Police declared Hisbah an illegal organization and ordered the arrest of two of its top officials. Hisbah challenges the NPF’s secular understanding of policing and community security.\textsuperscript{102} The Kano State government challenged this move at the Supreme Court by instituting a case against the Federal government and invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under section 232 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. The Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because there was no dispute involving the Federal Government and Kano State government. The court however observed that the responsibilities of the Hisbah Corps under the Hisbah Board Law of 2003 were identical to the responsibilities of the police under the Police Act of 1943.\textsuperscript{103}

Conversely, it is insightful to see the Hisbah not as the police or a security agency but an agency that assisted the police and other security agencies. This is because the Hisbah was involved in activities that transcended policing or security matters; it was involved in encouraging whatever was good and propagated it and also discouraged and eradicated whatever was contrary.\textsuperscript{104} Hisbah by virtue of its religious significance,

\textsuperscript{101} Rasheed Olaniyi, Hisba and the Sharia Law Enforcement in Metropolitan Kano
\textsuperscript{103} R.O Olaniyi, Community Vigilantes in Metropolitan Kano
\textsuperscript{104} Barkindo Ibrahim, The Role of the Institution of Hisba In The Sharia Implementing States In Northern Nigeria. A Thesis Submitted To The Faculty Of Law, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria unpublished 2011.
access to state decision makers and populate as a provider of quick and affordable justice winning the hearts and minds of people and was involved in preaching, counselling, encouraging, assisting and cooperating. These issues were outside the purview of the Nigeria Police or any other governmental agency.

Just like the introduction of Sharia Law gave rise to the emergence of Hisbah groups, the outbreak of criminality, insurgency have equally underpinned the proliferation of many vigilantes/civilian volunteers across the country, with some of them operating in the form of militia groups. The on-going insurgency has further heightened the proliferation of vigilantes that participate in counter insurgency operations alongside State security actors. Kano has a mixed system that is defined in relation to NPF. It is not a fluid interpretation of additional and residual security in which forms state municipal, private and voluntary policing coalesces in a mixed economy.

The Civilian Joint Task Force informal groups originated from the willingness of some youths in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States to give useful information regarding the activities of Boko Haram Terrorists (henceforth referred to as BHTs). These youths emboldened many others who came out en-masse to voluntarily give information and identify the BHTs in their communities. Members of the public described these civilian volunteers as “Civilian Joint Task Forces” Civilian JTF. The Civilian JTF and about a dozen other vigilante groups around the Northeast played a pivotal role in turning the tide against the BHTs, beginning mid-2014. They defended the communities from raids and detained hundreds of suspected terrorists before handing them over to the military.

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106 Adam Crawford, Policing and Security as “Club goods”: The new enclosures in Wood and Dupont (eds) Democracy
while some have also operated alongside the military in attacking Boko Haram camps and rescuing adopted women and girls.

The youths resorted to mounting roadblocks and checkpoints for better identification and arrest of BHTs. Unfortunately, some of their activities degenerated to other forms of misconduct including extortion from commuters and human rights abuses. The informed need for better organization, administration and control to ensure effective control led to the emergence of the BOYES. The BOYES was thus formed out of the local civilian volunteers, trained and financed by the Borno State Government for the purpose of information gathering and other minor tasks including traffic control.\textsuperscript{107}

The current strength of the BOYES is about 1,800, while the local hunters and youth vigilantes who have not been trained are estimated to be about 5,000. Findings from our field survey indicated the age bracket of the BOYES is from 18-40 years, while their academic qualifications range from no education at all, to Primary/Senior Secondary School Certificate (SSCE), to National Diploma (ND). They are paid a monthly salary of N15, 000:00 by the Borno State Government. Additionally, they are provided with uniforms and mobilized with patrol vehicles, while the rest survive on occasional ‘welfare’ from the State, and the Operation Commands in the field.\textsuperscript{108}

Abba Aji Kalli, asserts that there are 26,000 registered loose members of the Civilian JTF, organized from each ward and some major towns, as well as trained in the art of warfare.\textsuperscript{109} The “CJTF” is divided into 10 sectors under the Divisional Garrison, in line with the sectors of the military troops. Each group works in conjunction with, and under

\textsuperscript{107} Hamza Idris, Yahaya Ibrahim & Ibrahim Sawab, Who are Borno’s ‘Civilian JTF’ Publish Date: Mar 29 2014
\textsuperscript{108} VOA, Vigilantes Ponder Future After Fighting Boko Haram, July 7, 2016.
\textsuperscript{109} Abba Aji Kalli, Head CJTF (Interviewed 25th January 2017) in Kaduna
the supervision of a Sector Command. Some plain cloth members also gather intelligence about insurgency to share with the military.\textsuperscript{110} However, there are some cases of human rights violations perpetrated by the members of “CJTF”. Investigations revealed that these misconducts were observed in the early stages of their operation when the youths were still nursing serious grudges against the dastardly acts meted out on their parents and family by BHTs and had not come under the control of the military.\textsuperscript{111}

Information reveals that the acts rights violations were rampant in the course of identifying the disguised BHTs among law-abiding citizens. It is however believed that if the volunteers are properly organized, trained and financially remunerated, their youthful exuberance in the area of violation of the human rights would be better managed.\textsuperscript{112} Notwithstanding, the administration and control of the “CJTF” is yet to be properly streamlined. This is because the volunteers are partially administered by their respective State governments, but controlled by the military. Though, efforts were made by the Military and Department of State Security to capture their biometric data, the exercises were, however, inconclusive largely due to logistic constraints.\textsuperscript{113}

From the foregoing, it is evident that security provisioning in recent times is not only by State institutions like the armed forces or State police (formal actors), but complemented by a broader range of non-State actors, which may include voluntary groups, community-based associations, citizens’ forums, commercial or corporate entities, militias, and neighbourhood watches. In response to the growing security

\textsuperscript{110} VOA, Vigilantes Ponder Future After Fighting Boko Haram, July 7, 2016.
\textsuperscript{111} Report of the Committee on Regulating The Activities Of Vigilantes/Civilian Volunteers Operating In Nigeria 2015.
\textsuperscript{112} Interview with traditional leader Kwayar Kursa Borno State January 2015.
\textsuperscript{113} Report of the Committee on Regulating The Activities Of Vigilantes/Civilian Volunteers Operating In Nigeria 2015.
lacuna, due to inadequate manpower, security and the law enforcement agencies sought the creation of effective partnerships with the community and other public and private sector outfits. The role of alternative security providers such as private security companies, militia groups and community vigilante groups has grown in response to the changing environmental threats in Nigeria.\textsuperscript{114}

For instance, both State and non-State actors have in most cases cooperated and complemented security provisioning in communities across the Northeast. Checkpoints are manned not only by soldiers but civilians, mostly armed with little more than machetes and swords. The informal actors are mainly driven by a determination to establish some semblance of security within their communities. They organize themselves into groups to patrol streets in search of Boko Haram members.

"They are similar in their operation, which is in the area of providing the requisite, protection of life and property. The difference is in the uniform state actors wear and the weapon they are assigned to carry that the vigilantes don’t have. They patrol like the soldiers and police, they make arrest, they do recognizance that is intelligence gathering for the community and they give feedback to the formal security actors. In fact there is a symbiotic relationship between both actors."\textsuperscript{115}

On the conduct of the informal security actors, a respondent in a focus group discussion states that during operations the military use heavy military equipment including fighter jets, while the civilian vigilantes or city neighbourhood watches are armed with just machetes, axes, bows and arrows, clubs, swords and daggers. In a hybrid environment


\textsuperscript{115} Key Informant Interview at Shagari Locust January 2015.
such as this, accountability encompasses the notions of transparency, democratic and civilian oversight and control of the informal security actors. Accountability explains and justifies their use of power publicly, as such, transparency is an essential foundation for accountability. Although communities heavily rely on the informal actors for their immediate security needs, formal actors are credited for their professionalism and capacity to handle complex issues.

In an interview, a respondent stated that the structure of informal actors is not open for public oversight, but allows for advice and criticism that assist them in regulating their conduct. The resultant hybrid environment of multiple security providers will have some impact on society. Some vigilante groups differ in remarkable ways in terms of how they relate to State agencies and other politico logical authorities, with their reactions oscillating between different form of resistance, disengagement, accommodation, containment and collaboration.

According to a recent report, the Nigerian Police trained vigilantes on intelligence gathering in the 36 states of the country. Equally, the Governor of Abia State announced a far-reaching measure towards curtailing ethnic clashes that occurred between the Igbo traders and Hausa community. He ordered the revival of the moribund State owned vigilante group; the Abia State Vigilante Services, to enhance community policing; and directed traditional rulers to put forward names of 10 able-bodied youths from their...
communities in a bid to further not only revamp the outfit but as well consolidate its reach and spread in the South-eastern state.

The Impacts of Hybridization on Security in Nigeria

Hybridity for the purpose of our work describes a situation in which there is a merging or synthesis of forms to create a new form. The informal/private security sector has been credited with varying degrees of success, which may be attributed to either their pro-poor orientation or efficiency in responding to security threats. For the majority of people excluded from mainstream security provisioning, informal mechanisms have become parallel strategies for protection. Hence, security is increasingly becoming a public good managed by both the Nigerian State and private entities, albeit in a cooperative fashion.\textsuperscript{119}

According to Jenerali, the cooperation between the State and non-State actors is proved useful in the provision of essential services, and that both actors attest that room exists for close and productive cooperation. The cooperation that exists between the informal and formal actors does not preclude some elements of mistrust that could arise from partisanship.\textsuperscript{120} In a BBC documentary titled “Welcome to Lagos”, disputes among urban slum dwellers are first subjected to internal resolution mechanisms within the ambit of a non-State framework, with little or no resort to the instrumentality of State, owing to the absence of State presence. In some communities, the use of traditional voodoo in fishing out criminals has become a potent instrument in addressing the challenges posed by insecurity. In others, vigilante groups go on the hunt against idle

\textsuperscript{119} Chris M. A. Kwaja Informal security provisioning in Nigeria: Implication for security Sector Governance.

\textsuperscript{120} Jenerali Ulimwengu , The Role of Non-State Actors, the seventh African Forum” Building Capable State in Africa UNDP

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people in the late hours of the night, arresting and even detaining them in cells for possible trial in the morning.\textsuperscript{121}

Indeed in Nigeria, vigilantism has been linked to the breakdown of law and order and partisan politics in many parts of the country. Hisbah once linked to partisan politics in its early days. It was primarily used by the governor as a political machine rather than the enforcement of the Sharia Law. In recent times however, Hisbah have embraced democracy by providing security during elections, preventing ballot boxes from hijacking, intimidation of voters, rigging and violence.\textsuperscript{122} For example, the Hisbah resolved cases involving matrimonial, land, pastoralist, business transactions and neighbourhood disputes. The settlements of disputes were carried out by Zaurukan Zulhu, a Community Reconciliation Council established in the 44 Local Government Areas. Also, Hisbah assisted persons with medical support and provided Islamic Adult Education, provided security services at government offices and ministries as well as provided control to reduce congestion in the metropolis while missing persons and children were reunited with families.

It is arguable to suggest that informal system of communication and understanding exists between the NPF and Kano’s religious authorities where sensitive or potentially controversial issues are dealt with unofficial. The NPF enforces secular aspects of the law by virtue of its statutory backing, while the Hisbah handles religious matters on the basis of its religious authority. When stalemate exists concerning the categorization of issues, an ad hoc committee meets to resolve the issue before it becomes public

\textsuperscript{121} See BBC Documentary Titled ‘Welcome To Lagos, 2013.
\textsuperscript{122} Barkindo Ibrahim, The Role of the Institution of Hisba In The Sharia Implementing States In Northern Nigeria. A Thesis Submitted to The Faculty of Law, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria unpublished 2011.
knowledge. High and low level coexistence are seen in the light of the NPF’s dealings with the Emirate council and the Kano command of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria, while contestation characterizes its relations with Hisbah. This suggests that the discretion and political skill rather than strategy are more critical for effective police management in Kano’s competitive environment, and that co-existence association and contestation are more typical than cooperation. High and low level coexistence are seen in the light of the NPF’s dealings with the Emirate council and the Kano command of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria, while contestation characterizes its relations with Hisbah. This suggests that the discretion and political skill rather than strategy are more critical for effective police management in Kano’s competitive environment, and that co-existence association and contestation are more typical than cooperation.

Similarly, the cooperation between the Civilian JTF and the military has assisted law enforcement agencies to provide security to troubled locations. This corroborates Albrecht’s findings that rather than seeing local actors as simply challenging the State’s claim on the monopoly of security provision, a strong degree of integration is imperative. This form of collaboration helped the JTF to significantly overturn deep-seated mistrust, suspicion and fear, characterizing the relationship between the security operatives and the civilian populations. Typically, such collaboration involves information sharing, training, and operational responsibilities, the result of which has somewhat improved intelligence gathering, leading to the effective identification of sect

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125 Chris M. A. Kwaja Informal security provisioning in Nigeria.
126 Peter Albrecht, The need for a systemic approach to urban security: Danish Institute for International Studies 2015
members and violent activities. Their contribution to providing a safe environment is well captured by an interviewed participant when he noted:

...The BOYES are more relevant because they are within the environment in every community you will find their presence. The communities have trust for them they are immediate to respond in case of any problem compared to the police or the military in the Military Joint Task Force with limited presence in some streets. The non-State actors are the people who know the people and can identify the good, the bad and the ugly in their community; they are an integral part of the people. The soldiers may be smart with the security but they lack the knowledge of the environment the way the BOYES have. I will pitch my tent with them’’

Kwaja rightly states that in several states across Nigeria, groups and communities are increasingly relying on informal security providers in response to their own rising insecurity and declining confidence in formal State institutions, particularly the police. Subsequently confronted by the harsh realities of insecurity, groups and communities are moving beyond ethnic, religious, and regional nationalism towards a shared sense of under-class alienation from land, livelihood and largesse. There is also a strong preference for disputes within the communities and between the states, to be resolved informally, rather than through the formal law enforcement channels of the federal state that fails to provide the justice, mediation and reconciliation services that Islam advocates.

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127 Interview with a respondent at Bulunkutu area of Maiduguri January 2015
128 See Chris M. A. Kwaja Informal security provisioning in Nigeria.
129 Blench et al, The role of traditional rulers; David Ehrhardt, Traditions for Peace : informal organisations and horizontal inequalities in Kano, Nigeria (unpublished paper
The Public support for informal security structures is fundamentally because they are considered part and parcel of the community, shares similar sentiments and aspirations with the rest members of the community. Their commitment is also defined by their membership of the community and identification with its collective interests. Though, members of the civilian JTF are volunteers, they now receive State stipend, this gives financial assistance especially to families of those killed in action while the JTF pays for treatment of injuries sustained in encounters with Boko Haram members but in spite of their commendable activities, the Federal Government needs to develop a coherent policy for dealing with vigilante groups.130

Gender Mainstreaming in Hybridity of Security Provisioning

Gender, refers to the role and relationships, personality, traits, attitudes, behaviours and values that society ascribe to men and women. Women, men, girls and boys have different security experiences and priorities. Gender and gender security is perceived differently by different people131 and also women or locals are not homogenous whole. In response to different security needs within the society, the integration into the discourse is a key to the effectiveness and accountability of security reform. Individual

security needs vary depending on factors such as sex, ethnicity, age, physical ability and sexual orientation.  

Over the years, men have continued to be vastly over-represented in security (sector) institutions in Nigeria. The practice of gender discrimination has largely been attributed to culture and tradition that place different values on males and female rights from birth. These traditional norms, values and practices subordinate women and obstruct their progress in both private and public spheres. This perpetuates unequal power relations, with men having all power to legally influence decisions, as well as, dominate in security institutions a conundrum that is to a large extent rooted in Nigeria’s colonial experience.

Years after the establishment of the Nigeria Police Force in 1930, no women police existed in Nigeria. The policing philosophy and tradition of the colonial State also assigned policing as predominantly a task for adult males up until 1955, when Nigerian Women’s Party (NWP) proposed changes in policing tradition and organisation to establish the ‘Women’s Police Branch’ (WPB). Between the early years 1940s and 1955, women police in Nigeria went through the phases of integration, acceptance and development. The Nigerian experience at that time was quite different to the rest of

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the world, in that the reform of policing tradition and organisation resulted in the design of an unusual style of social-work-oriented policing, geared specifically towards policing women and children. This new style of policing was radically different from traditional policing operations.\textsuperscript{137}

However, women’s involvement in social control has not remained static. In order to meet the needs of women and children (in trouble), women have supported formal agents of social control, by enlisting in the police and other security sector institutions (SSIs). Conspicuously, women were not deemed fit for the rigours of police work until the increase in criminal activities involving women suggested a profound need for women police in crime prevention and control. As a result, the campaign for the enlistment of women in the police started, dwelling on the need for women police to assist in the prevention of prostitution and the protection of its victims.\textsuperscript{138}

The pressure on the colonial administration, as well as the police authorities, regarding the need to enlist women in the police made the colonial government announce its decision to establish the ‘Women’s Police Branch’.\textsuperscript{139} The screening process relied heavily on physical ability rather than verbal communication skills or a background in problem solving since policing involves more communication skills and negotiating abilities. Pioneer women police were trained in Western dressing and footwear, gymnastics, swimming, lifesaving, first aid, fire and ambulance drills, police duties, court procedure, law of evidence, criminal law, penal code and field training, with the


exception of arms drills. Firearms were considered unnecessary for the roles undertaken by women police, who were considered too weak to handle heavy weaponry.¹⁴⁰

The first task of the pioneer policewomen was to take care of female prisoners and juveniles and to obtain their statements. These policewomen were employed for investigative duties with the railway police and at the police headquarters in matters involving women and children. The distinction between social-work-oriented roles for policewomen as opposed to the traditional masculine roles of police officers, created gendered segregation in police work, but nevertheless initiated specialised responsibilities and compounded the social duties of women in the police force.¹⁴¹

Currently, is an increase in the number of women in the NPF. The proportion of female police officers has increased substantially in the last two decades. In 1993; there were 137,734 officers, 6,900 of whom were women (5.01%) (66). By 2007 the total number had risen to an estimated 320,000, with less than 2% of the station, command, division and area command headed by women. In 2009, the police service had staff strength of 345,023 members, while estimates for 2010, put the size of the force at some 360,000 police officers.¹⁴² However, the increment in the number has not been reflected within higher ranks, whereby only 5.00% of senior offices are women compared to 8.03% in 1993. Data provided in July 2010 by UNIFEM estimated 35,192 female junior officers (12.90%) and that 936 of the 18,745 senior officers were women (5.00%). The same

¹⁴¹ See Tosin Akinjobi-Babatunde, Women police in the Nigerian security sector.
data indicated 97.41% of the female staff occupied lower ranks compared to 93.02% of their male colleagues.143

Despite the promise of gender mainstreaming, gender sensitivity in SSR has often been reduced to recruiting and retaining women in the security sector144 although modest achievement have recorded in terms of gradual increase in female recruitment into the NPF, the problem of gender discrimination still confronts the very few women within the force and in spite frameworks, agenda setting, national action plans advocacy and training, only a substantive progress is made on women’s participation in security structures, and processes. The study by Alemika and Agugua stated 57.6% of women were reported to have been discriminated against in the force, while 41.9% women were less discriminated against in matters of ethnicity. The most important area of discrimination against women in the force is with regards to posting because the terms of posting fail to recognize gender specific needs.145

Nonetheless, the police force is one SSI in Nigeria that has established both specialized structures for service recipients and procedures for dealing with gender based violence and drafting of gender policy. It has also introduced a recruitment target for women and is reviewing its internal regulations in order to counter discriminatory provisions.146 Gender relations and the status of police-women in Nigeria have either been grounded in laws and policies and/or patriarchal attitudes. Golafale argued that this reflects the

145 Etannibi E.O Alemika and Austin O. Agugua, Gender Relations and Discrimination in The Nigeria Police Force, Centre for Law Enforcement Education Foundation.
perception that female police officers are “weaklings,” who cannot succeed in more traditional or conventional policing roles, and by extension, linked to broader societal restrictions on women and girls’ access to education and continuing high rates of female illiteracy in the country. These observations highlighted the insufficiency of simple quotas in bringing about gender equality in policing, and the shortcomings of quantitative measures in evaluating gender-sensitive police reform.\textsuperscript{147}

Equally, the Nigerian armed forces have adopted procedures to respond to Gender Based Violence perpetrated by their staff and have provided separate infrastructure for male and female staff. However, the military has no gender policy, gender sensitive code of conduct or specialized gender structures or gender training. Women only account for 3\% of military personnel and are banned from combats units. The high-ranking female officers are mostly within the medical and catering units. So also, female participation in peacekeeping operation is limited.\textsuperscript{148}

Like their other counterparts in formal security, the information about women informal sector institutions inaccurate and largely inaccessible but considerably, the result observed from the field indicated 48\% formation of non-state security outfits as against 38\%.\textsuperscript{149} for most respondents there are there are no female memberships amongst non-state security actors. From this extraction, it can be deduced that, though there are considerations for women to become members of non-state actors, there representation is quite low in the formation of non-state security actors due to physiological factors

\textsuperscript{147} Jartu Golafale and Martha Boyoi Margins for SSR- Centre for international Governance Innovation.


\textsuperscript{149} Findings of CLEEN Foundation on Safety and Security in Poor Urban Nigeria 2015
that might have played out in the cases of BAKASSI boys and the OPC in Abia and Lagos States respectively.

According to a participant ‘Bakkassi boys’ as the name inclined, does not have much provision for women in the group and majorly male responsibilities when it comes to vigilantism and security provisioning in their communities even though the government incorporated the group, the representation of women is regarded as an insignificant number.\textsuperscript{150} Likewise, the percentage of women representation in OPC is less frequent than because their roles are deeply rooted within a traditionally gendered experience even though female presence is instituted at all levels of the OPC’s administration through the creation of female leadership positions that complement those of men. Respondents corroborated that there are women within OPC’s outfits. Outside the scope of this study, the paper observes that, God motherism and financing of the group is played out by women market leaders in the case Bakassi Boys. Nolte affirms the existence of women’s wings is mostly associated with the limited representation of women’s interests.\textsuperscript{151}

Meagher affirms gender as rarely foregrounded in vigilantes’ understanding of community security, they frequently draw both on wider political debates and economic concerns.\textsuperscript{152} Though the report obtained from Lagos suggests low representation of women, participant acknowledges their support. The most visible structure of support for women within the OPC is its Women’s League which autonomously functioning within the overall structure of the organization and coordinates the activities of female

\textsuperscript{150} FGD Aba
\textsuperscript{151} Insa Nolte ‘Without Women, Nothing Can Succeed’: Yoruba Women in the Oodua People’s Congress (Opc), Nigeria. Africa 78 (1), 2008
members. There are conflicting figures to women constituting the OPC structure, in Noltes reports between 10 and 20 per cent of the OPC’s overall membership of roughly 3 million to which she regarded unrealistic than the assertion by Sesay et al. (2003) that the proportion of women in the OPC could be as high as 40 per cent.  

In spite of the disparity in membership, female OPC members control an organizational wing within the OPC’s constitution, playing a full role in the life of the OPC and in its struggle for the emancipation of the oppressed. The presence is instituted at all levels of the OPC’s administration through the creation of female leadership positions to complement their men. At the highest executive level, the National Coordinating Council includes the secretary-general, the OPC state coordinators.  

A participant acknowledged that, though OPC has enabled and accepted women’s active participation in physical confrontations and vigilante activities in some communities, it has excluded women from such roles in others from most vigilante activities and conflicts in several of the communities. The main reason for this appears to be that in those communities vigilante activities were originally linked to the male-only Orò association, with which the OPC has some affinity.

Differing from Bakkassi and OPC, women representation in non-state security actors exist Borno and Kano states. The emergence of the CJTF and subsequent collaboration with the State security agencies to tackle insurgency in the affected states led to the adoption of new tactics by the insurgents. There are incidents where men were disguised as women in order to evade arrests and to carry out attacks. O’Rourke affirms that, feigning pregnancy may also decrease the likelihood of being subjected to a

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154 Nolte Without Women, Nothing Can Succeed
155 Nolte, Without Women, Nothing Can Succeed
thorough physical search. Evidently, Boko Haram women have graduated from being helpers who cook and clean to becoming suicide bombers. This new trend by Boko haram is becoming an effective strategy that draws attention from the general public and relevant support from their sympathizers.

The use of female suicide bombers as fighters in the insurgency campaign as opined by some analysts is to cash in on the women bomber strategy, while others believe it is a sign of desperation, or perhaps the group running low on male fighters. Edukugho posits that terrorists’ organizations use women as weapons because the method provides tactical advantage: stealthier attack, element of surprise, hesitancy to search women, female stereotype (e.g. non-violent), increased number of combatants, increased publicity, psychological effect and human precision bomb. The Nigerian military has reportedly raised an alarm over new tactics being employed by the Boko Haram sect. The insurgents have relied on the knowledge that Nigerian troops have a responsibility to observe strict rules of engagement, hence recruiting children to fight and also women as human shields in a quest to weaken military operations. This recent phenomenon of using female as suicide attackers in the country represents a devastating situation on the counter insurgency operations. Ewi quotes that: ‘When you have female suicide bombers, the security challenge becomes bigger; it means you need female officers at every check-point to search women’. Available literature might not have reported the presence of female membership in the roles and ranks of CJTF due to general

156 Lindsey A. O’Rourke (2009), What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism? Security Studies, 18:681–718, Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0963-6412 print.
patriarchal perception and representation of women as weaklings or being compared to female representation of most existing vigilantes. However, according to some interviewees, there is the perception of gender sensitivity in the structure of the BOYES (CJTF). Women have been deployed at check points, markets, motor parks and public places to search women and are majorly used as informants but membership does not cover women in tactical operations; they are strictly used for administrative purposes.°

A female member of the CJTF during an interview affirms that women have also taken centre stage in the fight against terror in Borno State; she claimed to have joined the CJTF after the insurgents attacked and killed her family members. She started working as a community informant passing out intelligence about suspected members of the group to the military. Under the precepts of Islam, men are not allowed to enter the home of married women they are not related; in such situations she makes the arrest. The interviewee admits the work is hard and vulnerable for women. In a follow up interview, respondents in Maiduguri indicated that 250 members of the Civilian JTF just concluded military training and were fully inducted into the other ranks of the Nigerian Army. The recruitment process engaged qualified young individuals from the 27 local governments of the State who were formerly members of the Civilian JTF. Unfortunately, only a female soldier was part of the newly recruited soldiers.

There is a prevailing narrative of women not able to explore their potential and possibilities roles in society, because they tend to be confined to the private sphere in this part of the country. As with the Civilian JTF, women have equally played a part in security efforts of the Hisbah. Since the establishment of Hisbah in Kano, there is an

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159 KII at Bulunkutu January 2015
160 Interview with a Female member of the CJTF Bulunkutu area Maiduguri
161 Telephone Interview with Commander CJTF Bama, July 15 2015
open consideration of women in its formation of the group. For most respondents, the involvement of women in Hisbah is an integral aspect of dealing with the cases of women in every community in Kano state majorly playing the role of information gatherings and food joints.\footnote{162 Interview at Wudil} In respect to Hisbah’s command and decision making structures, female commanders are in every local government to represent women, at least two in every community this. Usually, female members are used as informants in women gatherings and sometimes they organize and invite women for lectures. More so, issues regarding women are treated by women commanders. Equally, women are not engaged in operations, patrols and raiding but to some extend engaged in some administrative works.

It is also observed that, the method of enlistment for most women into Hisbah is first being a Muslim with Knowledge of Islam with age limitation. The applicant needs an approval and consent of their fathers or spouses. Report from Kano stipulates that between 1999 and 2003, there were 250 Hisbah Corps. In 2003, the Board was given the power to recruit 1000 corps out of which 700 corps (600 males and 100 females) was recruited at the State level.\footnote{163 Olaniyi, O. Community Vigilantes in Metropolitan Kano, 1985-2005, Ibadan: Ifra} In 2005, the Hisbah operation was further strengthened with the massive recruitment of 9000 trained guards, 900 of whom were women and as part of the capacity building for Hisbah corps, a one-week induction course titled, ‘Towards Enhancing a More Enlightened Hisbah Command (women).’\footnote{164 Rasheed Olaniyi Hisba and the Sharia Law Enforcement in Metropolitan Kano}

47% of respondents have also indicated that there are no specialized treatments for suspected female offenders and 36% indicated there were specialized treatments for suspected female offenders. This corroborates the U.S Department state report which
posits that authorities sometimes hold female and male prisoners together especially in rural areas. More so, prisons had no facilities for pregnant women or nursing mothers. Infants born by inmates in detention centres were usually remanded with mothers until they are weaned.\textsuperscript{165} In police detention, women were vulnerable to sexual abuse and other forms of violence, which may be used to force confessions to offences they did not commit. Apart from women held in police detention, another vulnerable group of imprisoned women were female combatants held as prisoners of war. According to Human Rights Report, security forces committed rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls. Domestic and international human rights groups also reported the existence of unofficial military prisons in Maiduguri.\textsuperscript{166}

Reports from the field indicate that a large number of respondents do not agree that the decision making of the informal actors was without regard for the rule of law. For instance varying Sharia (Islamic Laws) penal codes delivered sentences in some Sharia States, for offences like prostitution. Some Sharia court judges allowed evidentiary requirements to prove adultery or fornication for female offenders. Some courts convicted men only if they confessed or there were eyewitness’ testimonies regarding the crime.

CONCLUSION

This paper addressed the concept of hybridization, formality and informality by offering diverse definitions and actors influencing security provisioning and the adoption of hybridization as multiplicity of situation of diverse animating logics, forms

\textsuperscript{165} United State Department of State The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2015, Country Reports on Human Rights

of political authority co-existing, collaborating, or competing to construct security arrangement. Hybridity here does not denote the mere grafting together of separate actors and institutions to make new entities. A comparative of these kinds’ hybrid organization co-existing, overlapping and interwoven by formal and informal processes is discussed from security structures with common classification, sharing security spaces in Nigeria suggesting Bakassi Boys, Civilian JTF, Hisbah and Oodua People’s Congress.

In this paper, security actors were discussed through rethinking informal vs formal. It demises the notion of codification and processes driven in the formal system or informal institutions lacking systems and processes but hybridity is centred on assisting, enabling actors and structures in effective, legitimate security and justice services to communities. The evolution of these actors is suggested in stages of progression, populist, consolidation, abuse and demise. Nigeria has gone through different periods and experienced different processes of composition, structures and ultimately practice. The paper acknowledges the attachment to informal security structures are part and parcel of the community sharing similar sentiments and aspirations with the rest members of the community and their commitment is defined by membership of the community and identification with its collective interests.

Hybridization occurred levels and directions adopted and institutionalized in a modern or mixed way. The paper supports views on response to some governance and security gaps, incapacity of state security for the emergence and proliferation of informal actors; it also suggests the growing incidence of crime and insecurity take different shapes, had required society to adjust, by accommodating new actors in the provision of security to form a hybrid nature. The operational structures of these voluntary policing groups vary; some groups have well documented structures, operational guidelines and
administrative or financial procedures while the state sponsored actors have structures at state, zonal, local government and community levels.

More recently, the paper observes that the services of actors like OPC and Bakassi Boys have become less pronounced as other non-formal actors such as vigilantes and the confederating state government created Neighbourhood Watch Group to fill the non-state (informal) security vacuum created by the roll back for these groups. Hisbah an informal security group with has faith and state sponsored roots, established to enforce a distinctive ‘Islamic government and tackles the problems of community security in a different way combining security duties with religious services including patrolling schools and communities, gather information, monitor social activities and traffic control. Having had confrontations with formal over legality and legitimacy, the group and formal group tolerates and accommodates each other’s rationalities and equally playing the complementary roles. Other recognised group identified to play a complementary role is the child of necessity, the CJTF. It emerged as a voluntary organization in communities of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states playing the pivotal role of turning the tide against the Boko Haram terrorists. To ensure effective control and excesses of the group, the state coarse, trained and financed the group as state sponsored organization the Borno Youth Empowerment Scheme (BOYES) for the purpose of information gathering and other minor tasks including traffic control and similarly operating alongside formal actors in sector structures.

The merging synthesis of hybridization credited with varying degrees of success, attributed to pro-poor orientation or efficiency in responding to security threats to become parallel strategies for the protection majorly people excluded from mainstream security provisioning. The collaboration between actors helped to significantly overturn deep-seated mistrust, suspicion and fear, characterizing the relationship between the
security operatives and the civilian populations. Collaboration involves information sharing, training, and operational responsibilities, the result of which has somewhat improved intelligence gathering, leading to the effective identification of sect members and violent activities.

In Nigeria, gender in a wider hybrid security sector is treated as a niche issue, and in some cases peripheral, rather than seen as an integral part of the broader security sector agenda. The paper portrays high consideration of women involvement but only a few enrol as informal security, for those engaged for services in are limited to administrative role reducing, women’s participation in the political sphere on the basis of gender equality. Women in hybrid or informal security provisioning play complementary roles to men.
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