Urbanization, Gender and Violence in Rawalpindi and Islamabad: A Scoping Study

Ms Amiera Sawas, Dr Daanish Mustafa, Dr Nausheen H. Anwar, Dr Humeira Iqtidar, Ms Sarwat Viqar

Department of Geography, King’s College London
Urbanization, Gender and Violence in Rawalpindi and Islamabad: A Scoping Study

Lead Author: Ms. Amiera Sawas

Co-Authors: Dr. Daanish Mustafa, Dr. Nausheen H. Anwar, Dr. Humeira Iqtidar, Ms. Sarwat Vqar

February 2014
Contents

1. Executive Summary ................................................................. 3
   1.1 Study Context and Research Agenda .................................. 3
   1.2 Key Findings of this Scoping Study .................................... 4
   Literature review ........................................................................ 4
   Media Analysis ........................................................................... 6
   1.3 Primary Research Agenda .................................................. 7
2. Introduction .................................................................................. 8
   2.1 What is the SAIC project? .................................................... 9
   2.2 Purpose and objectives of the scoping study ....................... 11
   2.3 Methodology ........................................................................ 12
3. Urbanisation and Vulnerability in Pakistan ................................. 12
   3.1 Definitions of vulnerability ................................................... 12
   3.2 Measuring vulnerability – tools and populations ................ 13
   3.3 Trends in urbanization in Pakistan ....................................... 14
   3.4 Urbanisation in Rawalpindi/Islamabad ................................. 26
   3.5 Impacts of urbanization in Rawalpindi/Islamabad ................ 36
4. Basic services and Infrastructure .................................................. 45
   4.1 Summary of basic services ................................................... 45
   4.2 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) and health ............... 46
   4.3 The NGO landscape in the region and types of assistance .... 52
5. Violence in Pakistan’s urban centres ............................................ 60
   5.1 Types of violence included in this study and examples in the Rawalpindi-Islamabad contexts ........................................... 61
   5.2 Gender and Violence in Rawalpindi/Islamabad .................... 68
   5.3 Media representation of violence .......................................... 71
6. Social capital ................................................................................ 97
   6.1 Definitions of social capital ................................................... 97
7. Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................... 105
   7.1 Geographical Areas Proposed For This Research ............... 105
   7.2. Gaps and Ways Forward .................................................... 108
References ...................................................................................... 109
1. Executive Summary

1.1 Study Context and Research Agenda

This scoping study is part of a research project entitled ‘Gender and Violence in Urban Pakistan’. This is one of 15 projects being conducted across the world which form the larger Safe and Inclusive Cities Project (SAIC). Co-funded by the International Development Research Center in Canada (IDRC) and the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), SAIC is directed towards understanding the drivers of violence in the urban areas of the global South so as to inform evidence-based policy making for safe and inclusive cities. This project, on urban Pakistan, focuses on the material and discursive drivers of gender roles and their relevance to configuring violent geographies specifically among urban working class neighbourhoods of Karachi and the twin cities of Rawalpindi/Islamabad. The research is primarily concerned with investigating how frustrated gendered expectations may be complicit in driving different types of violence in urban areas. The project is also concerned with addressing first, the material aspects of gender roles through improved access to public services and opportunities, and second, discursive aspects of gender roles in terms of public discourse, education and media.

The purpose of this scoping study is to bring together existing knowledge on the process of urbanization, and the interplay of gender roles, vulnerabilities, and violence in Pakistan. With an awareness of existing knowledge and knowledge gaps, the research team has been able to form a research protocol with a view to exploring known links and gaps in knowledge on the aforementioned themes. Methodologically, the study undertakes a review of the academic and policy related literatures, combined with a 3 month media analysis of selected print and online newspapers, television and radio which are relevant to national and local discourses about violence in Rawalpindi-Islamabad.

By undertaking an analysis of such links between urbanization and violence, this study concludes that various types of urban geographies and the associated infrastructure therein enable or produce distinct forms of violence in Pakistan. In
definitional terms, violence here is understood as the use of or threat of physical force in attaining particular aims. This understanding of violence allows an analytical distinction between ‘violence as a product’ and ‘violence as a process’. An accompanying expansion of focus led to the inclusion not only of spectacular forms of violence (like terrorism), which is quite common in Pakistan, but also the much more common, persistent and understudied forms of everyday violence.

1.2 Key Findings of this Scoping Study

i) Literature review

Types of violence

The review of available literature carried out in this study reveals that everyday violence is often seen taking three distinct manifestations:

- **Spectacular violence** - that instills fear and destroys or transforms geographical places and spaces;
- **Infrastructural violence** - violence generated through the organization of space and infrastructure in particular ways;
- **Violence of disempowerment** - flowing from Arendt (1973), is violence as loss of power.

There is a fourth type of violence often seen in the literature, i.e. structural violence, but for a variety of reasons this type will not be covered in this project.

Vulnerability-Violence Nexus

A more informed analysis of risks and specifically the geographical dimensions of violence could be understood by utilizing the concept of vulnerability. The term here is taken to mean the susceptibility to suffer damage from environmental hazards and extremes, and the ability of households and communities to recover from them. Hence ethnicity, class, gender, age, and associated political economy factors are central to this particular understanding. Based on recent developments within the field, the Vulnerabilities and Capacities Index (VCI) (Mustafa et al, 2010) has been selected as an appropriate metric to assess the vulnerability.
profiles of households and the neighbourhoods chosen for this research project.

**Social Capital Quality and Violence**

The final area of focus is a review of the literature on social capital, and the various ways that the concept has been studied in the context of urbanization, gender, and violence. This discussion opens up several interesting questions such as:

- Can social capital be used to enhance service delivery, specifically in water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH)?
- Can poor quality social capital, also labelled as anti-social capital, instigate different forms of violence?

The literature review also informs the direction taken by this research in problematizing traditional ways of measuring social capital, and drawing distinctions based on the quality of social capital, rather than the mere accumulation of it.

The challenge outlined is that aspects of social capital need to be examined and measured through various ways, which are best suited to capture its efficacy and quality. The aim here is to get a grounded and contextualized understanding of the different elements of social capital, of both the positive and the perverse kinds, that emerge in the shape of associations, trust, interpersonal connections, and informal social control within geographically bounded, but undoubtedly globally interconnected neighborhoods and communities.

**Urbanization, gender and violence in Rawalpindi-Islamabad**

Finally, the empirical literature on the themes and areas central to the larger project reveal several important facets. Pakistan currently has the highest rates of urbanization in South Asia, with a projected population of 335 million by 2050, and an annual urbanization rate of 3.06%. As a consequence of this demographic and economic transformation, the Rawalpindi-Islamabad conurbation has
witnessed significant changes in social formations, as well as land structure and use patterns, such as the rise of unplanned settlements, resulting in:

- Environmental degradation and amplified vulnerabilities;
- An increase in poverty and inequality, especially within the new migrant communities populating unplanned settlements;
- Poor service provision, especially within the domain of water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), and;
- The increased tension between the state and residents of unplanned settlements, and the insecurity associated with the imminent threat of eviction.

Adding to the complexity is the strong presence of the state across the twin cities – with Islamabad being the federal capital, and Rawalpindi the headquarters of the Pakistan army.

ii) Media Analysis

A complementary examination of primary news sources - undertaken to explore the discursive dimensions of violence and the construction of gender roles, finds that the print and electronic medias’ reporting of violence/crime and their types is selective and unrepresentative. The review, which covered a period of three months, highlights the varieties of violence/crime most often reported in print and electronic sources. Breaking down by type:

- **The most commonly reported category is social violence**, especially thefts and robberies;
- **Gendered violence is the next most common**, particularly abductions and gender-based murders.
- **The third prevalent category is vulnerability-related violence**, such as flood damage and fires, which flow directly from the nature of urban growth and unplanned patterns of settlement now increasingly characterising the landscape in Rawalpindi-Islamabad.
Unsurprisingly, stories with more public consumption appeal are prioritised. Between the two major media forms, electronic media displays less coverage of gendered, vulnerability and WASH related violence, when compared to print media. In both forms however, reported crimes tended to be those related to the public sphere, hence ignoring accounts of violence which are known to occur in the private sphere, like domestic violence and the vulnerability of women. This subjective construction of “newsworthiness” is shaped by the values of the dominant news agenda and news editors. There appears a largely opaque criterion for determining which events are allowed within the horizon of media visibility, and to what extent, and which are not.

Another worrying trend observed is the morality bound rebukes against victims, especially females, found in both media formats. Reporting practices often ignore vulnerability and power structures in society, which are recognized by wider literature and civil society as important factors in leading individuals to participate in behavior deemed criminal or illegal. This is most often visible in the coverage of sensitive issues like gender-based violence and prostitution. Through such coverage, it can be said that the media plays a role in society’s understanding of particular kinds of gender roles, and the moral over- and undertones attached to particular kinds of behavior.

1.3 Primary Research Agenda
For the purpose of a detailed examination of urban social transformations and extant trends in gender and violence, a total of six field study sites have been identified in the twin cities of Rawalpindi-Islamabad. The field study sites are France Colony and Afghan Colony/Maskeenabad, in Islamabad and Katarian, Dhoke Naju, Arya Mohalla and Dhoke Sayedan in Rawalpindi. The project will employ a mixed-methods approach, using questionnaires to capture first the vulnerability profiles of households and neighbourhoods. Then, using more in depth interviews and ethnographic methods, we will explore the multiple linkages between vulnerability, gender roles, social capital and the types of violence that take place within these neighborhoods.
This scoping study serves as the first step towards the larger project. It can act as a resource base for those who are concerned with issues such as gender, social capital, infrastructure and violence across urban Pakistan and more specifically in Rawalpindi-Islamabad. More broadly, we hope that this review of the literature and the profile of the twin cities will be useful for others researching similar dynamics in cities in the global South.

2. Introduction

This scoping study summarizes the state of knowledge on the issues of gender, urbanization, institutional landscape and violence in the twin cities of Rawalpindi/Islamabad. This scoping report is one of the first outputs of the Safe and Inclusive Cities Programme (SAIC) and it is supposed to provide a baseline document for the future research outputs of the ongoing research project on gender and violence in urban Pakistan. The document is furthermore meant to be a resource for any other development practitioners and decision makers concerned with issues of vulnerability, gender, social capital, institutional landscape and developmental challenges in the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad.

In this scoping study we define the key concepts such as:

- gender,
- violence, and
- social capital, to provide a shared basis for on-going research.

We also summarize the knowledge available about Rawalpindi/Islamabad from the literature, and lastly we also outline some of our key findings, resulting from a 3 month analysis of print and electronic media coverage of violence, environmental hazards and municipal water supply and sanitation issues.

After a brief discussion of the SAIC project, the rationale for the scoping study and the methodology for the project in this introductory section, the study will outline the main urbanization trends for Pakistan in general and the
Rawalpindi/Islamabad conurbation in particular. The report will then outline the state of infrastructure and access to critical water and other basic services in the twin cities. In the fifth section we define the types of violence in general and urban violence typologies that we deem to be within the ambit of the project, followed by the results of our media analysis and NGO survey exercises. The penultimate section of the report on vulnerability and social capital undertakes a brief literature review on the key concepts. It then defines the state of the knowledge and gaps on vulnerable populations in the twin cities as well as gaps in our knowledge of the quality of social capital that poorer communities may have access to. The concluding section of the report summarizes the gaps and state of the knowledge and defines the way forward for the ongoing project in particular, and possible other researchers and practitioners interested in Rawalpindi/Islamabad or comparable cities in the Global South, in general.

2.1 What is the SAIC project?

The SAIC is a multi-country project directed towards understanding the drivers of violence in the urban areas of the Global South, so as to inform evidence based policy making for safe and inclusive cities. The project is co-funded by Canadian International Development Research Institute (IDRC) and UK’s Department for International Development (DFID). A consortium led by Institute of Business Administration (IBA) with the Department of Geography, King’s College, London (KCL) successfully bid for a contract to research gender and violence in urban Pakistan, focusing on the mega-urban centre of Karachi and the mid-level urban conurbation of Rawalpindi and Islamabad.

The ongoing research on gender and violence will investigate the material and discursive drivers of gender roles and their relevance to configuring violent geographies specifically among urban youth in 4-6 working class neighborhoods of Karachi and Rawalpindi/Islamabad. The concern is primarily to investigate how frustrated gendered expectations may be complicit in driving different types of violence and how they may be tackled by addressing first, the material aspects of gender roles through improved access to public services and opportunities, and
second, discursive aspects of gender roles in terms of public education and media. To address these broad concerns the research poses the following research questions:

1. How are discursive and material constructions of gender linked to urban violence in Karachi and Rawalpindi/Islamabad?

To address the above research question the following sub-questions are posed:

i) What kinds of violence have been experienced by the inhabitants of specified localities? How often? And by whom?

ii) How is violence defined and experienced by these inhabitants?

iii) How is private and public violence linked within these localities?

In terms of material drivers of violence the attention is on access to services for fulfilling some key gendered responsibilities such as care giving and livelihoods. But it is also understood that access to such services is often mediated through the quality of social capital in a community. Accordingly the research asks:

2. How could the quality of social capital and access to higher quality social capital be improved for the poorer residents of Rawalpindi/Islamabad and Karachi?

To address the above question in a conceptual, and then in a policy response mode the research poses the following sub-questions:

i) What are the possible metrics for defining social capital quality?

ii) What are the gendered pathways to accessing high quality social capital?

The research is also alive to the issue of social vulnerability to environmental and social hazards. Accordingly there is a concern with how social vulnerability intersects with access to services and exposure to environmental hazards. Therefore the research asks:
3. How does the social vulnerability profile link with the incidence of violence in the poorer neighborhoods?

i) What is the gendered social vulnerability profile at the household and community level?

ii) What are the key drivers of vulnerability and what policy interventions could address them?

This scoping study is a first step towards addressing the research questions outlined above. The rationale for this scoping study is outlined in the sub-section below.

2.2 Purpose and objectives of the scoping study

The purpose of this scoping study is to bring together:

- Existing knowledge on urbanization, violence, gender and vulnerabilities in urban Pakistan, specifically Rawalpindi-Islamabad twin cities.
- Having a good grip of existing trends and research gaps, one can inform or reorient the research protocol that was set out at the beginning of the Safe and Inclusive Cities Project.
- But beyond the question of what we know is the more important question of what we don’t know, which is of utmost important to setting the orientation of the ongoing research effort.

The scoping study outlines the shared understanding of key concepts, such as violence, gender, social capital, and social vulnerability, for the benefit of the Pakistan research teams in the first instance. But those shared understandings could also contribute to broader body of knowledge of possible benefit to other beneficiaries of the Safe and Inclusive Cities Programme. Furthermore, the knowledge gaps identified in this scoping study will point towards where the teams need to focus their research efforts in order to plug those gaps. The following section outlines the methodology we have used to inform this study.
2.3 Methodology

This scoping study has been developed through:

i) Secondary research provided by government, academia, research institutes and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO)

ii) Primary research including: a 3 month media analysis of selected print and online newspapers, television and radio which are relevant to national and local discourses about violence in Pakistan (and Karachi and Islamabad/Rawalpindi)

iii) Two workshops incorporating the whole research team, one in June 2013 and one in December 2013, where the scoping study was planned, discussed and consolidated.

In the following section we summarize the state of knowledge on urbanization trends in Pakistan in general and the implications and manifestation of those trends as far as documented in the literature and prior research, in the case of Rawalpindi/Islamabad conurbation.

3. Urbanisation and Vulnerability in Pakistan

In this section on urbanization we will define the key concept of vulnerability and possible tools for measuring it. Following that we shall discuss the key urbanization trends in Pakistan in general and then with reference to Rawalpindi-Islamabad in particular. The urbanization discussion will then inform the sub-section on the impacts of urbanization in Rawalpindi-Islamabad with particular reference to issues of violence and the vulnerability profile of the population of the twin cities.

3.1 Definitions of vulnerability

The conceptualization and definition of vulnerability has generated considerable debate in the academic community. While physical scientists and engineers have typically equated it with physical exposure to extreme events and adverse outcomes, social scientists have emphasised the role of social structures and
differential access to resources in making certain groups more disadvantaged in the face of disasters (Adger, 2006). Some have attempted to bridge the gap between the physical and social scientific perspectives by proposing the concept of a ‘vulnerability of place’, where biophysical exposure intersects with political, economic and social factors to generate specific configurations of vulnerability (Cutter, 1996; Cutter et al., 2000). A detailed discussion of the various nuances of the definition of vulnerability is a little beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say here, that we understand vulnerability to be more of a chronic state of being rather than an outcome of environmental extremes. We therefore define vulnerability as susceptibility to suffer damage from an environmental extreme and relative inability to recover from that damage (as per McCarthy et al., 2001; Mustafa, 1998). Both the susceptibility, and then the ability to recover are understood to be a function of a person and group’s social positionality by virtue of ethnicity, gender, age and class and the wider political economy.

3.2 Measuring vulnerability – tools and populations

The concept of vulnerability has been one of the most important additions to hazards research in the last three decades. Vulnerability analyses from multiple theoretical perspectives have enriched our understanding of the patterns and causes of damage resulting from environmental extremes. The contribution of vulnerability analyses to the policy realm, however, has been peripheral at best. Policy makers and researchers often operate in different frameworks and have different goals. Three areas of contention help to explain the lack of integration of academic vulnerability analyses into policy:
1) policy makers are generally concerned with aggregate populations at the meso and macro-national scales, while vulnerability analysts are usually interested in household and community differentiation at the micro and meso scales (Mustafa, 2002, 2004; Pelling, 2003);
2) many vulnerability analysts are concerned with systematic change and fundamental inequities in the prevailing political and economic structures that policy makers represent and reproduce (Hewitt, 1983; Wisner et al., 2004); and
3) most policy makers need simple, generalised, actionable, preferably
quantitative information for input into policy process. However the work of most vulnerability analysts results in spatially and temporally nuanced, complex, generally qualitative information directed towards understanding causation rather than prescribing action (for example, Watts and Bohle, 1993; Swift, 1989).

Most attempts at measuring vulnerability have equated vulnerability with physical exposure or have drawn upon large national level indicators of social development. But those quantitative measures have typically not been very successful at capturing the local level variations in vulnerability. Mustafa et al. (2011) have suggested a quantitative Vulnerability and Capacities Index (VCI) for quantitatively capturing the key material, institutional and attitudinal drivers of vulnerability. Much of the on-going vulnerability assessments in Rawalpindi Islamabad and Karachi are based upon the urban version of that quantitative index. For details of the reasoning for the choice of indicators of vulnerability and the weights assigned to them please see Mustafa et al. (2011). Suffice it to say here that social networks and the social capital inhering in those networks is deemed to be one of the drivers of vulnerability. We have already discussed the vulnerability profile of the twin cities in the urbanization section above, therefore we shall proceed directly to a discussion of social capital.

3.3 Trends in urbanization in Pakistan

Pakistan has the highest rates of urbanization in South Asia, with a projected population of 335 million by 2050, and an annual urbanization rate of 3.06% (Table 1).

1) In Sindh and Punjab almost half the populations are already urbanized, while in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan provinces the level is lower (16.87% and 23.89%, respectively), but catching up. More than half of the total urban population of the country lived in 2005 in eight urban agglomerations: Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Multan, Hyderabad, Gujranwala, and Peshawar (Figure 1).
Table 1: Total, Rural & Urban Population Growth Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total %</th>
<th>Rural %</th>
<th>Urban %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Various GOP Census Reports; Hasan & Mohib (2003)

Figure 1: Percentage of Pakistan’s Urban Population residing in Eight Urban Agglomerations with 750,000 or more inhabitants, 1950-2015

Sources: (Mustafa and Sawas, 2013; Hasan and Raza, 2010)

Pakistan is also undergoing a demographic transition to a youthful country and is experiencing the growth of rapidly expanding primary (megacities like Karachi) and secondary (smaller towns) urban centers as a result of rural–urban migrations (Mustafa and Sawas, 2013). A recent trend, the growth of smaller towns of between half to one million inhabitants (Hasan and Raza 2010), has led to projections that they will more than double in size between 2000 and 2025 (Burki 2011). Pakistan’s total urban population is currently 35%, with projections at 50% for 2030 (UNDP, 2012). Around 70 million people are living below the poverty
line and concerns are regularly raised about the country’s ability to cope with population growth. New challenges are emerging for government in terms of service delivery, particularly in urban areas (Kugelman and Hathaway 2011).

We unravel Pakistan’s urbanization trends through the lens of:
(1) natural change;
(2) migration; and
(3) governance.
All key dynamics that taken together have significant implications for cities such as Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad. We explore each separately and then move on to a specific discussion of how these affect Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad. First, it is pertinent to note that Pakistan has not completed a census since 1998. The 2011 census was barely underway when it was suddenly postponed for various reasons ranging from resource constraints to political interference in Sindh and Baluchistan. There have been a range of different research publications from government, INGO, NGO and academic actors since, which cover population demographics and urban growth; thus we rely on a combination of sources for reliable estimations, but we maintain a cautious attitude towards their scalability and reliability in comparison to an official census. We are also sensitive to some criticisms of the above publications (including the census), which touch upon what is counted as ‘urban’. For example, the United Nations Population Division (UNPD, 2012) estimates that by 2025 approximately half of the country’s population will reside in cities. The Planning Commission of Pakistan contends that peri-urbanization trends have already pushed the country towards the 50% mark. Take Karachi, for example, some urban planners posit that approximately half of the population resides more than 10 km from the city centre (Qureshi, 2010) – this may not have been counted as urban in official censuses or research, but the lives of these residents are almost certainly urban in character. In the 1981 Census the definition of ‘urban’ changed, to include only areas designated as part of municipal corporations and cantonment boards. This change in definition led to approximately 1462 communities with populations exceeding 5000 being classified as rural, when perhaps they should have been counted as urban. In cities like Lahore, new
administrative boundaries did not account for contiguous small towns that enjoy strong economic and physical linkages with the city. If these populations had been added, Lahore's overall population estimate would have jumped from 5 to 7 million people. Therefore there is arguably an under-representation of the urban, which has socio-economic and political consequences.

The ‘urban question’ in Pakistan is, then, a contentious one. We remain aware that an accurate picture of urbanization in the country is unlikely, whilst small towns and urbanizing rural areas are systematically mis-represented as rural. The methodology for classifying the ‘urban’ has important implications for the national political landscape, in terms of job quotas, electoral constituency delineations, and formal municipal governance structures. Unfortunately, these political implications (shifting power balances and resources from rural to urban) may have something to do with this mis-representation; this will be discussed under the governance section.

**Natural Change**

Pakistan’s population growth or demographic transition began in the early 20th century and accelerated after Independence from British colonial rule in 1947. In the immediate aftermath of independence, expansion happened through unprecedented population movements across the India-Pakistan borders. From the late fifties until the seventies, urbanization quickened due to the introduction of green revolution technologies that displaced small producers and landless workers; also industrialization catalyzed rural-to-urban and inter-provincial migrations towards new industrial urban nodes like Karachi. Today, Pakistan is ranked as the world’s sixth most populous country. Compared to other South Asian countries, Pakistan’s annual population growth rate is deemed ‘alarmingly high’ (Khan 2010). The decades between 1950-2012 have witnessed a five-fold increase in Pakistan’s population to approximately 187 million (Table 2).
Table 2: Demographic Trends 1951 – 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population (millions)</th>
<th>Female Population</th>
<th>Male Population</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Annual Population growth rate</th>
<th>Total Fertility Rate</th>
<th>Life Expectancy at Birth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>187.34</td>
<td>91.10</td>
<td>96.23</td>
<td>67.32</td>
<td>119.68</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>64.5 64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>156.26</td>
<td>75.14</td>
<td>81.09</td>
<td>53.85</td>
<td>102.41</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>63.9 63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>133.32</td>
<td>64.16</td>
<td>60.17</td>
<td>43.32</td>
<td>90.00</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>62.7 60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>84.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>65.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>42.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>33.74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: SDPI (2008); GOP, Federal Bureau of Statistics; CIA World Factbook; UNPD (2008); various GOP Census Reports.

A combination of declining mortality, improvements in public health and lower incidence of epidemics and famines have contributed to population growth. Even though there is uncertainty about Pakistan’s future population trends, a fertility decline is projected, bringing the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) to 2.3 in 2027\(^1\) (Sathar et al 2013). Between 1950 and 2000, Pakistan's population was estimated as very young with 60% below the age of 25. This age structure has remained stable, sustaining Pakistan’s ‘population momentum’ (Sathar et al 2013) and presents challenges viz-a-vis employment opportunities and access to services. Pakistan’s ‘youth bulge’ denotes a demographic transition with an urban bias and the median age is 20 in the urban areas (Kugelman and Hathaway, 2011).

Accompanying these demographic adjustments is an increasing literacy rate especially in urban areas (Table 3). Between 1981 and 1998, the urban literacy rate increased from 47.12% to 63.08%, with female literacy jumping from 37% to 55% percent.\(^2\) These changes denote substantial investments made by the private sector in education. During the same period there was a marked change in the married population, which declined from 64% to 58% in urban areas (Table 4).

---

\(^1\) Total Fertility Rate refers to the average number of children born to a Pakistani woman during her lifetime. This is based on current birthrates.

The most substantial decline was noted in the 15-24 ages cohort with an overall decrease from 27% to 21%, and specifically for women this rate fell from 42% to 30%. Experts suggest these changes signal strong correlations between declining fertility, increasing literacy and the rising trend of working women in urban areas.

Table 3: Literacy Rate 1981 to 1998 with Karachi, Rawalpindi and Islamabad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National%</td>
<td>Rural %</td>
<td>Urban %</td>
<td>National%</td>
<td>Rural %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23.17</td>
<td>17.33</td>
<td>47.12</td>
<td>43.92</td>
<td>33.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>35.05</td>
<td>26.24</td>
<td>55.32</td>
<td>54.81</td>
<td>46.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>15.99</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>37.27</td>
<td>32.02</td>
<td>20.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 – 24 Years: Total</td>
<td>35.76</td>
<td>24.52</td>
<td>58.28</td>
<td>53.71</td>
<td>43.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>45.50</td>
<td>35.79</td>
<td>64.42</td>
<td>65.36</td>
<td>58.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>24.70</td>
<td>11.99</td>
<td>51.05</td>
<td>41.69</td>
<td>28.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* N.B. Rawalpindi aged 15-24 years breakdown is taken from PSLM 2010/11 and not the District and City Census reports, which do not include that age breakdown. This may account for higher literacy ratio as compared to 1998 census figures, which populate the rest of the table.
Table 4: Married Population 1981 – 1998 with Karachi, Rawalpindi and Islamabad Breakdowns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 – 24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>34.99</td>
<td>35.71</td>
<td>27.07</td>
<td>29.03</td>
<td>20.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50.74</td>
<td>52.17</td>
<td>41.54</td>
<td>40.61</td>
<td>28.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>68.75</td>
<td>70.58</td>
<td>64.46</td>
<td>63.04</td>
<td>58.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>65.24</td>
<td>66.97</td>
<td>61.36</td>
<td>59.83</td>
<td>56.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Migrations

Broadly speaking, both internal and international migration encompassing displacement and resettlement is the legacy of two partitions that have shaped Pakistan: 1947, the year of independence and the partitioning from India; and 1971 when the secession of East Pakistan led to the creation of the modern nation-state of Bangladesh. In 1947, nearly 4.7 million Sikhs and Hindus left Pakistan for India, and in contrast 6.5 million mohajirs (migrants) left India for Pakistan. This event pushed Sindh's population up by 6% with the two main cities of Hyderabad and Karachi most affected. Between 1941 and 1951, the urban populations of these cities increased by a staggering 150%. Cultural-linguistic commonalities with the new migrants, and matters of political economy and infrastructure made cities in the provinces of Sindh and Punjab natural choices (Ansari 2005). More recently, millions of Afghan refugees, have fled conflict towards Pakistan’s urban centres, firstly around 1992 (around 4 million) and then in 2001 (around 2 million); this makes Pakistan host to the largest
refugee population in the world (UNHCR, 2013). Their mass movement into the cities has no doubt had social and political impacts. For example 600,000 eventually settled in the city of Karachi; the majority of these refugees are ethnically Pashtun, and their migration to Karachi has quickly increased the ethnic Pashtun population to around 25% (Ur Rehman, 2013), challenging the socio-political balance of power (Kronenfeld, 2008).

The 1998 census revealed nearly 40% of total urban growth in Pakistan was due to internal migration (Haider, 2006). And while it declined in the period between the 1981 and 1998 censuses, this may have since increased due to new displacements and movements associated with the protracted conflicts in Afghanistan as well as in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The link between migration and poverty is important. In the new millennium, despite sketchy statistical data on the changing dynamics of rural-urban, inter-, intra-provincial and international migrations, case studies suggest within Pakistan both international and internal mobility remains unrestricted (e.g. see Raza & Hasan 2009; Memon 2006).

The 1998 Census and recent reports suggest intensifying migratory movements that took place predominantly from those areas which, are impoverished or where there is intense pressure on land and resources. For example in Sindh where there are deep structural changes underway, where caste systems are breaking down and village societies are in a state of flux. According to the Government of Pakistan (GoP) poverty rose from 17% in the late 1980s to 34.5% in 2001-02 and then declined in both rural and urban areas to around 22% overall in 2005-06 (Jamal 2005). Recent research, however, suggests a general increase of those living below the poverty line to 37.33% in 2010-2011 with increases in rural areas from 30.74% to 39.42% and in large cities from 14.7% to 24.03% between 2005 and 2011, respectively (Jamal 2013). Increased incidence of poverty has been observed in urban areas with greater vulnerability noted in secondary cities and small towns. Approximately 45% of residents of small towns have been categorized as poor across all provinces. Urban poverty is estimated to have risen

\[ Rupees \ 2,248 \text{ and } 1,854 \text{ per capita per month are used as poverty cut-off points for urban and rural areas, respectively.} \]
from 27.70% to 34.09% in between 2005-2011 (Jamal 2013a), but is still half that of rural poverty, which is around 39.37% (and which also rose by 8.52% in the same time period). This means that even though poverty is rising in urban areas, they remain more attractive as settlement options for migrants than the rural areas.

For the landless, who account for more than half of the rural population, migration to the city seems like the only option in the face of fluctuations in wages, demands for wage labor and food prices (Gazdar, 2003, Memon, 2006, Hasan and Raza, 2010). As a result, migrants find ways to settle in their new urban sphere, mostly in ‘unplanned settlements’ where service provision is weak and there is greater vulnerability to health impacts and environmental hazards (Ghani, 2012). At least one in three city residents in Pakistan lives in conditions that are slum-like, with limited access to decent shelter and basic amenities (UN-HABITAT). Residents in unplanned settlements often find work in the informal economy and rely on systems of brokerage for building homes and getting access to infrastructure. In Pakistan, the proportion of urban population living in unplanned settlements or katchi abadis varies between 35-60 percent; and these settlements are growing fast. In Karachi abadis increased from 212 in 1958 to more than 500 presently and in Lahore, there are more than 300 unplanned settlements (Arif and Hamid, 2008). Urbanization is also occurring in rural areas along major road corridors, where high density population settlement patterns are emerging. Ali (2013) points to Narowal, as one of the least urbanized districts (12.3% urban) of Punjab, where 60% of the population live within 4-km belts along the highways. This enables easier access to services and employment in urban areas and further leads to transformation of the rural areas into urban areas.

In many cities, the informal economy accounts for as much as 60% of citizens’ employment and may well serve the needs of an equally high proportion through the provision of goods and services. The rapid urbanization poses major challenges in three key areas, which are interconnected: urban governance, urban poverty and urban services delivery. Even in incidences of economic growth in
Pakistan’s cities, income distribution is highly unequal, due to an unequal distribution of economic opportunity, ownership of land and property. The financial assets along with an uneven access to social services like education, health, water and sanitation and economic opportunities and a failure to generate revenue for social and physical infrastructure further fuel this disparity (Anwar, 2005). Inevitably in Pakistan there is a tradeoff between growth and inequality, where in urban areas we find increasing trends in inequality in consumption, income and ownership of assets in the past decade (Asad and Ahmad, 2011).

What is becoming clear, is that urbanization does play a key role in the relationship between the citizen and state in Pakistan (Ali, 2013; Hasan and Raza, 2009; Mustafa and Sawas, 2013; Arif and Hamid, 2009). Urbanization does compound resource-gap, service delivery and quality of life issues including crime and violence, as well as struggles for political and social power. But it also opens up opportunities for new social and political structures to be forged, which may include (or exclude) those migrants from rural areas who previously were at the margins of the spaces where the social contract between the state and society is negotiated. Politics, whether informal or formal thus becomes an essential tenet of issues of urbanization in Pakistan (Anwar, 2013; Mustafa and Sawas, 2013).

**Governance**

Pakistan’s four provinces are divided into 111 districts, 397 towns and 6044 union councils, which are the lowest tier of government. Since independence, Pakistan has relied on centralized federal government. Its bureaucracy and military elites have copied the institutional and organizational style of the colonial state (Jalal 1995). With little room for democratic development, authoritarian tradition and military rule have shaped Pakistan’s governance structures. This has led to an unabashed reliance on centralized, elite-backed visions and the undermining of democratic efforts. However, 2013 marked a profound change in the status quo when a civilian elected government completed its term and a new civilian elected government took power. The passing in 2010 of the 18th Amendment which pushes for a center-provincial power-sharing arrangement signals a commitment to decentralizing power from the federal level, though whether that power
decentralization will go down to the local level in any substantial manner remains to be seen and mostly doubtful.⁴

Despite a democratic turn and new power-sharing arrangements, governance structures remain mired in controversy. Longstanding demands over the division of resources and for the reorganization of provinces along ethno-linguistic lines, and delayed local government elections are still pervasive. Coming back to the earlier point, regarding controversy over how the ‘urban’ is classified and its great implications for governance: an accurate representation of the urban through censuses is expected to lead to a shift in the nation’s electoral balance, away from rural toward urban electorates. This is significant given that Pakistan has traditionally been governed by rural elites whose political power has depended on a captive workforce-cum-electorate. The political consequences of urbanization present new electoral opportunities for both urban-based political parties, such as the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), new contenders such as Tehreek-e-Insaf as well as for coalitions of religio-political parties such as the Difa-e-Pakistan Council. Urbanization in Pakistan also poses major economic challenges in terms of employment opportunities and provision of basic infrastructure services. Pakistani cities have long-suffered a housing crisis, which has intensified along with the inadequate provision of infrastructure.

Governance tensions are visible in terms of the regional politics that undergird Sindh’s and by default Karachi’s governance, and allude to new political aspirations tied with the devolution of power and decentralization policies implemented under General Pervaiz Musharraf’s military regime (1999-2007). The lingering effects of Musharraf’s devolution plan which, was suspended during former president Asif Ali Zardari’s civilian regime (2008-2013), are significant. In provinces like Sindh the effects are manifest in the heightened demands of different political and ethnic groups seeking realignments in center-provincial and intra-provincial powers.

⁴ See for instance Adeney (2012)
When the Devolution Plan was implemented across Pakistan in 2001, all three levels of local government were given considerable autonomy to raise funds and plan and implement physical and social developments. In this process, the roles of the *zila nazim* and the District Coordinating Officer (DCO) became significant. The DCO oversaw the functioning of all government departments in the district. Devolution presented new opportunities to improve service delivery. For instance, in Sindh and Punjab, water supply was devolved to the local Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA). But devolution also brought new challenges concerning the management of water and sanitation. We discuss this issue in greater detail in section 6 on basic services and WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene). Prior to the 2001 devolution plan, planning and implementation were controlled by the provincial government. The new system was in a process of experimentation when it was suspended under Zardari’s government. Critics claimed the bureaucracy had been made subservient to the *nazims* who had allegedly acquired too much power. Studies carried out in certain UCs of Punjab suggest that clan and caste grouping had increased as a result of the devolution plan and development had become more unequal as *nazims* had invested in areas where votes were guaranteed. Similarly, media reports indicate community, labor and peasant boards provided for in the plan had not materialized.

In terms of women’s participation, a significant change that was introduced under the 2001 Local Government Ordinance was the reservation of 33% seats for women at all tiers of local government. This included direct election to the lowest tier of local government, i.e. the union councils. Aurat Foundation estimates that in Pakistan overall 90% of these seats were occupied, and around 32,222 women were elected as union councilors (Aurat Foundation 2007, 2008). Most NGOS and international donor agencies lauded this participation as a sign of empowerment and a positive signpost leading towards greater gender mainstreaming in the political process. However, the deeply entrenched gender bias in state and political leadership was revealed in the subsequent 2005 local bodies election. That was when women’s reserved seat at the local bodies level were reduced as a result of a general reduction in directly elected union councilor seats – from 21 to 13 (Mezara et al, 2010). Critics have also pointed to the fact
that, especially in rural areas, those women who did get elected remained bound to patriarchal family and clan interests. The kind of dynamics women’s participation as a large cadre of union councilors created in urban areas, especially in cities like Karachi, remains unexamined.

### 3.4 Urbanisation in Rawalpindi/Islamabad

The Rawalpindi-Islamabad metropolitan area consists of two cities, Rawalpindi, a historic city and Islamabad, a planned modern city established in 1962. Commonly referred to as the ‘twin cities’, they are socially and economically connected, despite very different development and administrative histories (Figure 2).

![Figure 2: Map of Islamabad and Rawalpindi in 2014](image)
Rawalpindi is situated in a district of the same name, in Punjab Province in the north-west of Pakistan. It spans 5,286 square kilometers. It is surrounded by Islamabad Capital Territory and the Khyber-Pawtunkwa Province (KPK) to the north, by Attock district to the west, by Chakwal and Jhelum districts to the south and Azad-Jammu Kashmir (AJK) State to the east. The district is divided into 7 Tehsils, Rawalpindi city comprising one.

Both cities are positioned on the southern slopes of the north-western extremities of the Himalayas. The rivers Indus and the Jhelum run to the south and north, of the twin cities respectively, and their tributaries run through the cities' settlements. Historically, Rawalpindi was a small trading town, which transformed to a major city in 1851 when the British army made it a military cantonment. Rawalpindi’s population grew rapidly, more than tripling from 52,000 in 1880 to 185,000 in 1940 (Specht, 1983 in Hull 2012). Three residential and business areas emerged: the indigenous city, ‘civil lines’ – areas for civil servants, and ‘cantonment’ - for military. The latter two surrounded the indigenous spaces from the west, east and south.

Rawalpindi’s architectural and social structures are centred around Mohallas, which are basically neighbourhoods. They are separated by bazaars, which serve as gathering places of diverse people for trading and manufacturing (Hull, 2012). Short, narrow, unnamed roads, or ‘lanes’ run through the residential areas of Mohallas; providing residents a sense of privacy and security. ‘Chowks’, the intersections of the lanes, provide social gathering spaces. In terms of administrative and physical governance, this set up proved difficult for the British and post-colonial governments. Not only was it hard to map, in terms of geography and demographics, it was hard to police and to provide basic services to. Urban planning was not part of Rawalpindi’s growth, despite discourses suggesting it would be in the 1970s and 80s (Maria and Imran, 2006).
After the founding of Pakistan in 1947, debate began about moving the administrative capital of Pakistan, to a new space in Karachi, or elsewhere. A special commission for the location of the Federal Capital, under the military dictatorship of Ayub Khan, decided in 1960 that Rawalpindi District would be a more appropriate location for the new capital, because Karachi’s rapid commercial development made it hard to separate administrative and business
interests. This recommendation was contentious and political (Daeshcel, 2013). Anyhow, a new city, called ‘Islamabad’ was established in 1962, 14 kilometres away from Rawalpindi city – close enough to be linked to the city, but with enough green belt between to prevent attempts at ‘corruption’ in new governance institutions from Pakistani society (Yakas, 2001; Mahsud, 2007). The planning job was given to Greek modernist architect, Constantinos Doxiadis. He aimed for Islamabad and Rawalpindi to expand indefinitely on parallel rays out from their centres, forever divided by a green belt, a transport system, and a linear industrial zone (Hull, 2012).

Doxiadis felt that the problems posed by rapid urbanization could be resolved with a new ambitious methodology of planning, called ‘Ekistics’ or ‘science of human settlements’ (Daeschel, 2013). This meant understanding the socio-cultural and geographic organizations of the population and then ensuring they were accounted for through planning. Doxiadis drew up a 5-year programme of housing and settlement activities involving far reaching administrative changes, integrated regional and city planning, housing initiatives, regeneration schemes, innovative building methods and new industrial settlements. He aimed at providing a socially inclusive living space, which would be sustainable in the face of rapid urbanisation. Additionally, the administrative functions of government would be set in the backdrop of, and interact with, the indigenous nature and culture of Pakistan (Mahsud, 2007; Hull, 2009).

Islamabad is set out in a grid format, with 11 sectors, each 4 square miles, extending southwest from the Margalla Hills. The eastern most part is the catchment area of Rawal Lake. Rather than Rawalpindi’s example, where community facilities exist at the juncture of lanes, in this plan, schools, medical centres, mosques, shops became each sector’s central point. Numbered streets exist within each sector, and large avenues extended across and between them. The linear nucleus, the ‘Blue Area’ was designed on an expanding axis, to provide a shopping and meeting place for all residents. Homes existed within sectors, which were grouped at a single distance alongside this axis, meaning that while the centre itself grew into a certain direction, new sectors could be added.
without increasing the distance between them and the centre. This grid system, or ‘dynapolis’, could then extend outwards as per the need for urban growth (Figure 3). A major aim was to reduce traffic, and having the blue area expand out that way would prevent gridlock at a central point; a problem experienced in Rawalpindi (Hull, 2012) (Figures 5 and 6). Further, having major roads, like the Islamabad highway traversing the side of the city in straight lines, would increase efficiency and speed of transport (Mahsud, 2013).

Figure 3: Transport structures of Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Extracted from National Transport Research Centre Paper, GOP, 1995

Figure 5: Photo of a typical day of traffic in Rawalpindi City. Image courtesy of Seem Nazir/EXPRESS
Figure 6: Aerial Photo of Islamabad Blue Area. Courtesy of www.ViewPakistan.com

Figure 7: Faisal Mosque in Islamabad. Image courtesy of Shubert Cicencia (Flickr)
However, Islamabad never grew at the pace that it was expected to – and a lot of population growth occurred either in Rawalpindi, peri-urban areas, or in unplanned settlements in and around the grid-structure (Daeschel, 2013). Thus while the aspired for urban growth would happen in a clean, sustainable grid-like structure, most growth occurred out of Rawalpindi city in a spider-web like way from the nucleus, leading to the governance and traffic issues Doxiadis was trying to avoid (Figure 5) (Maria and Imran, 2006). Secondly, and because of that, Pakistan’s political stakeholders, and the elite, were not interested in building a socially inclusive living space – more in providing housing for civil servants and the rich, with distance from other social classes – mainly refugees. This meant that the city developed, but the Doxiadis’ vision was ‘mislaced’; leading to an urban space characterized by social segregation. This has become more stark in the recent context of rapid migrations to the city; but that will be dealt with after we consider the role of natural changes in the urbanization of the twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi.

According to government figures, Rawalpindi and Islamabad cities, together, house over 4 million people. It has been argued, though, that the ground reality suggests a population closer to 5 million as many settlements classified as ‘rural’ in census data had actually developed mainly urban characteristics (RDPI, 2013).

Rawalpindi district’s population increased by 36% between the 1981 (2,121,450) and 1998 (3,363,911) censuses. In 1998, 53% was counted as urban; 49% male and 51% female. And although we cannot rely on figures calculated outside of the census, some reports put the population at 4,430,000 people in 2012 (2,466,000 urban; 1,939,000 rural). Population density supposedly increased from 636 to 1146 people per Km Sq in Rawalpindi (Punjab Development Statistics 2012 and 2005 paper on Pindi). Islamabad city was reported to have a population of 529,180 in 1998; an increase of 159% on the 1981 figure of 204,364. A 2011 housing survey conducted by the Census Department and Directorate of Education conjectured that the city’s population has more than doubled since 1998; estimating it at 2 million people.
Rawalpindi has a young population, with 44% under 15 years in 1998. Although the census points to a decline in fertility across Pakistan between 1981-1998, there is insufficient data about Rawalpindi and Islamabad’s urban areas to claim a trend. However comparison of age data with the 1981 census indicates that fertility has started declining, indicated by a reduction in children under 5 and a decline in child-woman ratio. Rates of marriage also declined between 1981-1998. We know that in Rawalpindi’s urban areas, the total fertility rate was 2.78 in 1998, compared with 2.94 in the district. Some figures suggest the district jumped up in fertility rates to 4.0 and even 5.0 in 2001 and 2003-4 (Khan, 2011; MICS, 2003-4). Rawalpindi does have the lowest general fertility rate of Punjab’s districts, at 90.28 (compared with Vehari, the highest at 171.89). There have also been higher mean ages of male and female marriages in Rawalpindi’s urban areas between 1981-98. Khan (2011) attributes this to faster socio-economic change and rapid urbanization. Still, Rawalpindi’s population continues to face cultural norms, which prevent population control. For example, according to PAIMAN (2005), contraceptive use remains low (37%) although knowledge about contraceptives is high (84%).

Health indicators in Rawalpindi-Islamabad are higher than that of the rest of the Punjab. The infant mortality rate in Rawalpindi district is estimated to be 55 per thousand live births, compared to 77/1000 in the province. This can be attributed somewhat to better access to education and healthcare than other districts. Both Rawalpindi and Islamabad’s urban areas exhibit high literacy rates: at 87% for males and 68% for females over 10 years in Rawalpindi (WHO, 2010). Islamabad city has the highest literacy rates in the country at 86%, and the highest school enrollment rates (PSLM, 2008-9).

Population growth in the Islamabad-Rawalpindi conurbation has not just been driven by natural factors, but also migrations due to: the search for economic opportunity, natural disasters and socio-political conflict in other regions.

---

5 Average number of children a woman would bear during her lifetime, assuming her childbearing conforms to her age-specific fertility rate every year of her childbearing years (typically, age 15 to 44)

6 number of live births per 1000 women between the ages of 15 and 44 years
The twin cities offer migrants the promise of economic opportunity, more social equality and access to basic services. There has been large-scale migration from rural areas, to Rawalpindi-Islamabad cities, experiencing a total in-migration of around 1,063,576 people by the 1998 census and an urban population growth rate of around 3.46. Migrants include those whose rural livelihoods have been destroyed by the impacts of climate change and pollution (Kugelman, 2013). Many find shelter in the flood plain and tributaries of the Lai river (Mustafa, 2005). Young people, including girls, head to the twin cities in the hope of education opportunities (Arif and Hamid, 2009). Others leave rural areas, or other provinces to escape conflicts, either between ethnic groups, or between the government and insurgents. Migration has also happened due to natural disasters, like the 2005 earthquake in northern Pakistan. Rawalpindi-Islamabad were the nearest cities offering quality health care and other facilities, which naturally attracted internally displaced peoples as well as NGOs.

Finally, international migrants, mostly from Afghanistan have flowed into the twin cities as a result of the 1990 Soviet, and 2001 US-led invasions of their country (Kugelman, 2013). A complex dimension in unplanned settlements in Rawalpindi-Islamabad is the living combination of Afghan Refugees and local populations. Despite significant integration into the local society and economy, local administrations find it challenging to provide their municipal needs (RDPI, 2013).

Although they are historically and geographically tied; Islamabad and Rawalpindi cities have completely different governance institutions. Rawalpindi is separated administratively into Rawal and Pothohar towns - The Rawalpindi City Government manages Rawal Town whereas a quasi-military administration, the Cantonment Board, manages the other. Rawal town is divided into 46 union councils, each with an elected nazim (coordinating public sector work). Pothohar town mostly comprises military barracks and rural areas, only one of its union councils contains unplanned settlements (Haider et al, 2013). The Rawalpindi Development Authority (RDA) is largely responsible for managing development and urbanization processes. Devolution of powers from federal to provincial and
local governments occurred in 2001 under the military dictatorship of General Musharraf. This put the RDA under the authority of Rawalpindi City District Government. Rawalpindi city also comes under the remit of the Punjab and Housing Physical Planning Department. Islamabad city is home to the federal governance institutions, and its development is managed by the Capital Development Authority (CDA). The CDA is primarily staffed and led by federally appointed bureaucrats that are supposed to not have the political and skill limitations of provincially run, or elected municipalities. The CDA has of late, however, come under scrutiny for fraudulent behavior regarding dummy housing schemes and the resettlement of ‘affectees' from villages which used to exist where the sector-system now sits (Hull, 2012).

The purpose of the devolution plan was to provide a more locally grounded, responsive and accountable government, interfacing with citizens through ‘Citizen Community Boards’ (CCBs) and ‘Community Based Organisations’ (CBOs) (Cheema et al, 2005). Citizens were positioned to actively participate in decision-making processes and development work. Although elected local governments had existed previously, they had limited powers and key decisions were carried out by the provincial or federal departments. Under the new system, District and City Governments are run by the Nazim and the District Coordinating Officer (DCO), the latter reporting directly to the head of Federal Government (Zaidi, 2005). Cheema et al (2005) note that the terms of devolution were not explicitly set out, which created confusion about roles and responsibilities and either gaps in power, or overlaps between local, provincial and federal governments. There was also the emergence of new inter-governmental political linkages and systems of patronage, which affected policy, implementation and ‘re-centralised’ the power structure (Cheema and Mohmand, 2007). Little commitment to upholding the needs of local constituencies was shown, and local government officials were either involved in patronage networks or limited by them. In the first case local government officials would channel funds through CCBs for private interests, rather than allocating them to public services; in the second case, often when officials tried to provide services to local communities they were swiftly and regularly forced to transfer to other districts.
When Musharraf was removed from power in 2008, this system remained in flux, and the passing of the 18th amendment of the constitution in 2010, aimed to revisit and restate the governments’ roles and responsibilities, giving “political, financial and administrative authority to elected representatives of local government”. However, to begin this process there needs to be free and fair local government elections, which are yet to materialize and constantly delayed, particularly in Punjab and Sindh provinces (Tribune, 14 Jan 2014). Thus the problems of patronage and overlapping functions of various departments continue, including in the federal capital and its sister city, Rawalpindi.

Maria and Imran (2006) find that there is no coordination between the governance institutions responsible for planning and urbanization in Rawalpindi and Islamabad, despite the former’s key supporting role to the latter. In the urban area of Rawalpindi, the federal government has no formal control over planning or development. Rawalpindi has significantly less financial and human resources than Islamabad, despite a larger population and more rapid urban sprawl. While Rawalpindi is the main supplier of shelter to Federal government and corporate sector workers in Islamabad, it is the main recipient of solid and liquid waste pollution from upstream Islamabad as well as the flood hazard in the Lai. In fact, Mustafa (2005) considers the governance institutions of the twin cities from a river-basin and exposure to hazards perspective. The upper basin is governed by the Directorates of the Capital Development Authority (CDA). The middle basin falls under the Rawalpindi Tehsil Municipal Authority and the RDA. The lower basin returns to federal control, under the Rawalpindi and Chaklala Cantonment Boards (RCB and CCB). In light of such social, economic and environmental linkages the lack of coordination between the civic leadership of the two cities is a particularly disturbing feature of the institutional landscape of the twin cities.

3.5 Impacts of urbanization in Rawalpindi/Islamabad

Urbanisation has impacted the twin cities in:

i) changes to the land structures and use patterns;

ii) growth of unplanned settlements which lead to environmental degradation and vulnerability;
iii) increased rates of poverty and inequality;
iv) impacts on service provision which impact health and quality of life;
v) perceived increase in crime/violence.

Butt et al (2012) used multi sensor and satellite data to assess urban sprawl and the changing uses of land in Islamabad. They found that urban infrastructural growth has not increased at the same rate as the city’s population. Large amounts of natural vegetation have been replaced by impervious surfaces. Urban expansion has increased from 165 km$^2$ in 1972 to 252.31 km$^2$ in 2009 while the area of agricultural land/vegetation has decreased from 640.71 km$^2$ in 1972 to 561.35 km$^2$ in the same period. The CDA tried to counter this trend with massive plantation of vegetation across the city. Nevertheless deforestation continues in neighboring Rawalpindi: the Loi Bher Forest Reserve on the Islamabad Highway is a case in point. There has been an overall increase of 2.36 km$^2$ per year in urban development in Islamabad territory over a period of 37 years (1972–2009).

There has also been a growth of unplanned settlements. In Islamabad, a property boom in the early 2000s shot up housing unit prices, making them, on the whole, unaffordable for lower income migrants. NGOs and media claim that there currently stands a shortage of 60,000 housing units; consequently informal settlements have increased. Although the CDA has planned to develop affordable housing in sector I, this has yet to commence. According to the CDA (2008), there are approximately 85,500 people living in 34 Kaatchi Abaadis in Islamabad city of varying sizes; 10 of which the CDA recognizes as legitimate for provision of water supply, electricity, gas and sewerage, as part of a ‘slum upgrading project’. The remaining are deemed illegal and discouraged by the government, which takes measures to prevent their development.

Rawalpindi has exhibited an urban growth rate of around 4% per year (ADB, 2005). While there has been faster population growth than in Islamabad city, as per the comparatively lesser governance and human resourcing of the ancient city, there has been less work on documenting unplanned settlements there. In 2009, the Directorate General of Katchi Abadis and Urban Improvement, Local
Government and Rural Development Department claimed that there were 8 Katchi Abaadis in Rawalpindi (Anwar et al 2010); all of which are actively discouraged by the RDA.

Mustafa (2005) finds that it is the lowest-earners and the ethnic and religious minorities who live within informal settlements in the twin cities (see also Beal, 2006). Many of them are located along the banks of the Lai river and due to this location and the informal nature of their housing, are very vulnerable to environmental hazards. The flood hazard is quite pressing, particularly in the Lai flood plain. There have been 19 major floods in the Lai flood plain between 1944-2002; with extreme floods in 1981, 1988, 1997 and 2001 (Kamal, 2002). In 2001, 74 people died and about 400,000 people were affected; 1,087 houses were completely and 2,448 partially damaged, generating an acute refugee problem in the poorer communities of the twin cities.

There is no formal water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) system in many flood plane unplanned settlements, and this leads to the polluting of groundwater sources and rivers (e.g. people literally throw their solid waste into the river) (Figures 8 & 9). Mustafa (2005) finds that solid waste is one of the biggest quality of life issues in the Lai basin (as well as water pollution, flooding and encroachments). Residents of such settlements are subject to significantly higher risk of disease outbreak (WHO, 2010; Action Against Hunger, 2007). Rawalpindi is in some senses more vulnerable that Islamabad, because the latter lies upstream, thus pollution comes down stream into the city and its water network.
Figure 8: A predominantly Christian sanitary workers’ slum along a tributary of the Lai in Islamabad.
Figure 9: Man throws daily solid waste into the Lai tributary near his house

Rawalpindi-Islamabad are located within a moderate risk earthquake zone and have experienced a long history of earthquakes. In the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, a modern apartment building in Islamabad collapsed, killing 78 people. Should another earthquake of the same intensity (7.6 Richter) occur, residents of unplanned settlements could be particularly exposed to dangerous building collapses, not to mention landslides, particularly for those living on riverbanks. When faced with hazardous conditions, the narrow streets make it difficult for rescue vehicles to gain access, and bottlenecks occur. Sewage floods the streets, exposing residents to even higher disease risk. The compounding nature of
economic, social and physical vulnerabilities in these settlements make the impacts of floods and other hazards potentially disastrous.

It is not only residents of informal settlements who are affected by urbanization; the housing shortage affects the remaining. While these residents tend to live in physically secure housing (93% having permanent ‘pacca’ roofs and 98% built out of burnt bricks), only 38% and 55% of residents of Islamabad and Rawalpindi, respectively, own their homes. Tenants face the financial insecurity associated with paying rent (Pakistan Social and Living Measurement Survey 2010-11).

This financial insecurity is compounded by livelihood insecurities: while unemployment is not a significant issue in the twin cities, there is a youth demographic bulge, an increasingly educated population without employment. According to NGO ACF (2007), this creates frustrations amongst the youth. Gender discrimination against female employment is also apparent. Consequently, a related impact of urbanization across Rawalpindi-Islamabad, has been increased rates of poverty and inequality in the educated classes. According to Saboor (2013) the twin cities exhibited an increase in the ‘multi-dimensional poverty index’ (MDPI); which looks at a range of deprivations extending beyond just income and assets, i.e. hunger, malnutrition, poor WASH access, illiteracy, inadequate health services, marginalisation and exploitation (CRPC, 2004). Migrant and minority communities, in particular, struggle to attain livelihood security, and daily wage labour is their most common option. Excluded from the socio-economic mainstream, refugee and religious minorities, especially, rely on garbage collection and manual labour as income sources (Figures 10 and 11) (Beall, 2006). According to ACF (2007), daily wage labour is used by 38% of residents of the twin cities. Fortunately, daily wage labourers are said to have quite consistent work, compared to other urban areas, yet the psychological burden of insecure livelihoods looms.
The development of infrastructure has not kept pace with urbanization and the cities have accumulated huge deficits across public services including health, WASH, utilities and transport, which adversely affect quality of life (GOP, 2010-2011; ADB, 2005; Haider and Badami, 2010). For example, in 1995, GoP statistics showed that the number of people killed in traffic in the twin cities was ten times higher than of cities in developed countries. Car ownership is constantly increasing, particularly in Islamabad. All this is despite insufficient budget for traffic management (GOP, 1995), and according to a police study (2013), in Islamabad city, traffic accidents are on the increase. In Rawalpindi, traffic
paralyses the streets on a daily basis, creating tensions for citizens and incidences of road rage (Shaikh et al., 2011) (Figure 5).

In sum, according to various government, NGO and academic sources, the major impacts of urbanization on services in Rawalpindi-Islamabad include:

• Under-resourced local government in Rawalpindi city in particular
• Depreciation of municipal infrastructure quality and scale
• Housing shortages
• Increase in car use due to lack of a public transport network
• Poor traffic management and high levels of congestion and accidents
• Poor/insufficient urban planning leading to haphazard urban sprawl which pollutes or drains environmental resources
• Little, if any, solid waste management leading to dumping into rivers and streets
• Poor and insufficient sewerage; many lines depositing directly into streams
• Lack of investment in climate change mitigation or environment protection

The changing context of the twin cities is being linked to perceived growth in experienced crime/violence. The narrative follows that: with increasing population density, reduced access to basic services, greater vulnerability and financial/livelihood insecurities, if one considers crime as a rational choice then there is a greater impetus for committing crimes. Another way of looking at this is that infrastructural violence could be on the rise because physical and psychological harms are increasingly being experienced, due to the infrastructure of everyday life (Rogers and O’Neill, 2013; Ferguson, 2013; Anand, 2013). According to a 2013 police study, in line with growing urbanization and an increasing number of unplanned settlements, there is a growing crime rate. Increased rates of theft, particularly car-theft with threat of violence (car-jacking) and traffic accidents are the dominant trend. According to the same data set, ‘hurt’ and ‘kidnapping for rape’ are also on the rise, although it is a common aside that rape and domestic violence in particular are severely underreported across Pakistan (Aurat, 2007, 2008). An increasing phenomena of gang crime is claimed in Islamabad-Rawalpindi cities, although there is a dearth of research to
corroborate this. At this stage we do not know if crime is on the increase due to infrastructural violence, or rational reasons. However we hope that our research can help us to understand if there are links between urbanization processes, vulnerabilities and violence in the twin cities.

With the above picture of urbanization and consequences of urbanization in mind, we turn to the state of basic services and infrastructure in the twin cities. Although the services in the twin cities are below par by international standards, they nevertheless offer interesting contrasts between the twin cities and even within the individual cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad respectively, with important consequences for violent geographies that our research project is investigating.

4. Basic services and Infrastructure

4.1 Summary of basic services

This project is concerned with access to Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) in urban Pakistan because poor access to WASH is one of the biggest negative outcomes of unplanned urbanization, and drives additional vulnerabilities to hazards and violence. Households', particularly women's time, labour and finances, are negatively impacted because of household members' vulnerability. Also generally appalling sanitary and water quality conditions, and exposure to environmental hazards like floods in the poorer neighborhoods of urban Pakistan are of concern (UNHABITAT, 2003, 2006; Ahmed and Sohail, 2003).

Similarly, in terms of livelihoods and employment, deemed to be men's domain, unemployment has been shown to be highly associated with crime (Becker, 1968, Ehrlich, 1973; Gillani et al, 2009; Jalil and Iqbal, 2010). Crime and violence are also highly associated with the related issues of landlessness and food insecurity (Malik, 2011). Access to livelihoods both for men and women in urban Pakistan are therefore of interest to this research. The WHO (2008) found in a sample of 2000 households in Rawalpindi, that over 83% have only one working member,
usually the husband, who must bear the responsibility of financial security in the home. Of those surveyed 37% were self-employed and 23.2% worked as manual day-wage labourers.

4.2 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) and health

Rapid urbanization affects basic services and quality of life for individuals, particularly women (ActionAid, 2013; WWF, 2011; Kraas, 2007). Growth without planning, or planning without taking into account the lives of women and men has led to huge service gaps, particularly in WASH (Siddiqi, 2011). Despite recent investments in improving WASH, per capita availability has declined, due to urbanization, population growth and climate change (WaterAid, 2010; World Bank Water and Sanitation Programme (WB-WSP), 2006). The WSP (2012) claims there are huge economic costs of poor WASH services amounting to 3.94% Pakistan's GDP, 299.55 billion PKR in health costs alone.

Across Pakistan, citizens face inequality in access to WASH. While the Joint Monitoring Programme of the Millennium Development Goals (2012) finds 92% of Pakistani women have access to improved water sources and 48% improved sanitation, questions remain over the quality of WASH, and equity in access to services. Arif and Farooq (2011) and Akhtar (2008) emphasise stark provincial inequalities – Baluchistan and Sindh demonstrating the poorest access, compared to Punjab and KPK. Moreover, there are inequalities in rural compared to urban access. For example, while the JMP finds Punjab displays the highest piped water supply rate at 98%, research conducted in rural Punjab found 17% of villages had zero access to piped water supply, and 83% had only intermittent access (ADB, 2009). According to the PSLM 2010-11, around one quarter of households in the twin-cities lack access to piped water supply in the home, the majority of the unserved residing in unplanned settlements (WHO, 2010).

7 According to Arif and Farooq (2011), in terms of physical infrastructure to supply piped water, this supplies 7% of Sindh, 7% of Baluchistan, 9% of Punjab and 20% of KPK's households. In drainage the figures are 23% Sindh, 58% Punjab, 7% Baluchistan and 19% KPK. Solid waste management: Sindh 30%, Punjab 66%, Baluchistan 8% and KPK 29%.
In terms of governance, Rawalpindi city’s WASH is supposedly delivered by the government’s Water and Sanitation Agency (RWASA), created in 1992 to meet the needs of the rapidly growing population. By 2010 RWASA was serving approximately 1.1 million people through 0.1 million household piped water connections (WSP, 2010). Despite accountability to both local and provincial governments, The World Bank (WSP, 2010) notes finds few checks and balances on RWASA’s performance. In 2005, the WSP concluded that 8 cities of Punjab (including Rawalpindi) suffer from insufficient WASH services, which is a major impediment to their economic development. In Islamabad, the Capital Development Authority (CDA) is the responsible agency for WASH. Rawalpindi and Islamabad’s urban populations rely on surface water from the Rawal and Khanpur Dams and groundwater accessed through tubewells from the Rawal Lake and Lai Rivers.

There are several problems with the current approach to WASH provision, which include:

- inequitable access,
- over-extraction and
- contamination.

RWASA argues that first insufficient revenue and second, overextraction are the biggest barriers to equitable WASH provision. Groundwater aquifers are becoming depleted. In 2007/8, the RWASA found 44% of the ground water extracted was unaccounted for. Only 14% household connections were metered and only 38% of those were functional. RWASA has since pursued an aggressive revenue generation strategy which, includes naming and shaming late-payers in local newspapers, upgrading water lines, and rehabilitating treatment plants (RWASA, 2010; WB-WSP, 2010). It has tried to extend household piped water services from 70% to 90% of the target population, and has managed to transform illegal groundwater connections into legal ones (from 78,000 to 124,000) and expand coverage to unconnected areas.
Contamination of the drinking water supply is a huge issue. While water supply coverage has improved in recent years, sewerage has not in Rawalpindi. Only 35% of Rawalpindi city’s population is provided sewerage (compared to 100% in Islamabad, according to CDA in 2011, although this figure is questionable), posing the risk of poor sanitation contaminating the water supply. The job of providing WASH services becomes more difficult in areas with expanding unplanned settlements, like the flood plain of the Lai. Sewage sits in open drains through streets, which eventually contaminate the Lai River, which passes through Rawalpindi city, and its unplanned settlements which are often built on the river banks. The same goes for the Korang river in Islamabad. In terms of solid waste management, the Rawalpindi city district government and the CDA in Islamabad collect solid waste on a daily basis in areas deemed ‘legal’. However, approximately 50 tonnes of it are left on the streets daily (Haider, 2013). In a sample of 6 neighborhoods of Rawalpindi, less than 50% of solid waste was collected in the higher income areas and no collection occurred in lower income areas and the uncollected waste was thrown into the streets and rivers (Haider, 2013). Ground water contamination is thus unsurprising. An interesting finding of Haider’s (2013) case study was that in the areas serviced by Cantonment Board, water supply was extended either to high-income or low-income neighbourhoods. The mid-income neighbourhoods have been left to fend for themselves which, is an example of continued inequitable access to WASH in the twin cities. However RWASA claims that due to their recent improvement strategy, the costs of WASH have been reduced by up to 15 times, and 3-5 hours per day have been saved for residents who previously had illegal/informal access.

The impact of insufficient government waste management services is obvious: a RWASA survey of water quality in 2007 found 64% of samples from piped household connections in Rawalpindi city were unfit for human consumption, due to contaminated water lines and seepage from wastewater (WSP, 2008). Government data on Islamabad found that 20 of 27 tubewells monitored in 2005-6, distributed water which was unfit for human consumption (PCRWR, 2005-6). Another study found that 50% of the 240 ground water tubewells in Islamabad/Rawalpindi produced bacteriologically contaminated water (Islam-Ul-
While RWASA has since brought this figure down to 26% by upgrading the quality of the water lines (preventing seepage), the problem of liquid and solid waste remains in both cities. Frequent complaints are made about gaps in supply, as well as leaking pipes and dirty water (RWASA, 2009, 2010). In 2011 RWASA found that water quality had deteriorated due to anthropogenic changes and new illegal connections and hospital records of gastrointestinal diseases and complaints confirmed this. Islamabad is a better planned and managed city in the sense of its water supply and sanitation system, particularly solid waste management, yet contamination of the water supply remains a big issue. Several independent reviews of WASH in Rawalpindi-Islamabad raise alarms about terrible sanitary conditions and their contamination of drinking water (PIEDAR, 2009; Farooq et al, 2008; Hashmi et al, 2008 National Institute for Health, 2004; Jehangir, 2002).

The experiential impacts of poor and inequitable WASH supply are something unconsidered when INGO’s flaunt statistics highlighting increased access to WASH. First and foremost is the impact on health. 100-150 children die daily in Pakistan from diarrheal diseases, which are caused directly by poor WASH (UNICEF, 2012). In Rawalpindi-Islamabad, waterborne diseases like Hepatitis E are common (Abdur Rab et al, 1997) and 90 working days per year are lost due to illness in poor households; the most common being WASH related diseases like diarrhea, malaria and polio (National Human Development Report, 2003). In sectors of Islamabad, like I-11, which houses internally displaced and vulnerable peoples with little access to WASH and healthcare services, outbreaks of Polio remain a risk (The Nation, 10 October 2013). It has been claimed that 30% of the deaths in Rawalpindi city are due to poor WASH (Saafpindi, 2013). Access to WASH in Pakistan is directly mediated by socio-economic status, because those with money can purchase improved WASH systems for their households. This is highlighted by the fact that morbidity rates reduce dramatically in households who can afford to install private latrines (Bosch et al, 2002; Khan and Javed, 2007; WHO, 2009).
Women and children also suffer disproportionately from poor WASH. In Pakistan, the majority of women spend most of their time in the home. Water management is critical to their identity, and poor/unsafe WASH supply tends to affect their lives more adversely than men’s (Halvorson, 2003, 2004). Diarrheal diseases tend to affect their children most and taking care of an ill child or seeking medical attention can lower their capacity to respond to other household needs, creating stress and anxiety. When access points become contaminated or dysfunctional, women and at times children often have to travel miles to collect water, again invading on their time, security and perhaps dignity (Halvorson, 2011; Ilahi and Grimard, 2000; World Bank, 1995, 2002) (Figure 12). The World Health Organisation (2010), interested in understanding health inequalities, surveyed 2000 households in the unplanned areas of Rawalpindi city and found that 67.2% of them had a household piped water supply and 94.5% did have a toilet. However, health and living conditions were poor, particularly for women and children who spent the majority of their time in the home. The survey reported that 40% of the 2-5 year old children were malnourished. Over half of the women had a child who had suffered diarrhea in the month prior to the survey, and 30% had acute respiratory infections. These infection rates, however, came down significantly in households with mothers with higher levels of education.

---

8 According to PIEDAR (2009), children in Islamabad-Rawalpindi suffer an average of 4 episodes of acute diarrhea a year.
Whilst the public health and human security implications of improved WASH are well known (WHO-UN 2012), the linkage between such interventions and incidences of domestic and social violence are yet to be investigated. There has also been insufficient research conducted to determine the socioeconomic impacts of poor WASH in Rawalpindi-Islamabad. But if we take wider research from Pakistan into account, there are some potential avenues for research: a) health – disease, mortality, productive time lost in being ill or caring for a sick family member, b) economic – increased expenditure on medical treatment, lost days of work, increased time spent accessing secure facilities and c) education and work – absence from school or work, particularly for girls, due to lacking sanitation or water facilities. This research project has the opportunity to explore those links, specifically considering the kinds of violence that may be related to, occur as a result of, or in conjunction with WASH issues (e.g. violence that transforms spaces, infrastructural violence, and violence of disempowerment). At this stage, there are more questions than answers, and thus some ethnographic research will help to understand if there are any links, or avenues for further research.
4.3 The NGO landscape in the region and types of assistance

As part of the scoping study, this research inquired about the range of organisations who are working on issues related to violence, urbanization, gender and WASH in the twin cities. A comprehensive online search was insufficient to build a realistic picture of the NGO network, because there are many smaller NGOs working on these issues, without online visibility (or out of date information).

The purpose of conducting this exercise was to understand the range of NGO actors on the ground working on issues related to our research questions, their discourses about these issues and their programmatic work. Furthermore, we could familiarize ourselves with them and use their networks and learnings, when and if appropriate to support our research endeavours. Finally, this could give us some perspective on kinds of social capital generated by, or including NGOs in our research neighbourhoods.

Our research team visited the offices of 25 NGOs in Rawalpindi and Islamabad, to share with them our research interests and to learn about any work they are doing in overlapping areas. We also asked for any research they could share with us to augment our scoping study.
Figure 13: Visual representation of the programmatic focus of NGO work related to our research in Rawalpindi-Islamabad.

N.B. The size of each bubble denotes the comparative scale of the type of programmatic focus (1cm of diameter represents 1 programme i.e. there are 11 capacity building programmes and 2 conflict resolution programmes).

Figure 13 represents the range of programmatic foci, related to our research project, by NGOs working in the twin cities. The diagram shows that capacity building of ‘communities’ (which usually means community-based organizations) has been the major focus of NGO work. The programmes are increasingly pursuing a rights-based language of development, promoting the rights of socially marginalized populations through awareness-raising and capacity-building in the respective communities. The most common socially marginalized population of focus is women and girls.

The next major focus is WASH Programmes which, aim to fulfill the basic needs of vulnerable populations, particularly in unplanned settlements in the twin cities. Again, women and girls are a major focus of this work, because they are understood by NGOs to be, firstly a socially, politically and economically marginalized group; and secondly, exposed to higher risk of suffering or violence by poor or non-existent WASH systems. Large international NGOs, like Plan International and UN-Habitat are conducting neighborhood-scale WASH projects in the twin cities. These most often involve gender mainstreaming, and awareness building about the rights of women.
Awareness raising on the issue of violence against women (sometimes labeled Gender-Based Violence but always focusing on women as the victims), is the next major workstream of NGOs. This includes public campaigns, workshops and community meetings which, discuss the issue and try to challenge any attitudinal, social or cultural drivers of violence against women.

Lobbying and campaigns is the next dominant workstream; with a particular focus on equal rights of women in Pakistani society, politics (representation) and legislation. Lobbying to support development of improved legislation to protect victims of sexual violence (mainly focusing on women), is also a key focus. Better criminal justice systems should improve reporting and prosecution rates, which are extremely low in cases of sexual and domestic violence. The training of Police is a newer and interesting workstream, and aims to develop their awareness, not only about the equal status of women in society, but also how to create conditions which, encourage victims of sexual or domestic violence to report a crime, and to protect them from physical or psychological abuse when in the police station.

As the diagram shows, the majority of NGO work on physical and infrastructural violence in the twin cities focuses on women and girls. A small number or NGOs (often smaller, national or regional ones) focus on interfaith harmony and conflict resolution, and also protecting victims of violence (including torture victims, male victims of violence including sexual violence). Although this work is very important, it is very much ‘under the radar’ and small in scale.

Finally, there has been some very interesting research work conducted by one national NGO (Aurat Foundation) and one smaller national NGO (Rozan) on the role of attitudes in violence towards women. The latter, in particular was interesting because it explored the roles of masculinities in violence in Rawalpindi specifically. For a more detailed exploration of the programmes and focuses of some of the key organisations working on our areas of interest in the twin cities, please see table 5.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Size and Scope</th>
<th>Core Focus</th>
<th>Relevant Programmes</th>
<th>Relevant Issues addressed</th>
<th>Methodology of current programmes we are aware of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akhtar Hameed Khan Memorial Trust</td>
<td>Small regional</td>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>• Community-led sanitation project&lt;br&gt;• E-Guard – solid waste management</td>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Capacity building of communities through training and awareness sessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association for Human Development (AHD)</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Human Rights as a development strategy&lt;br&gt;Focus on the inclusion and protection of socially marginalized populations including females&lt;br&gt;Disaster response Achieved through: 1. Awareness raising/sensitization 2. Capacity building 3. Advocacy</td>
<td>• Gender and Development&lt;br&gt;• Part of nation-wide Network for Peace and Human Rights founded in 2009 (mandated to work on violence against women and peace building).&lt;br&gt;• Grassroots awareness and capacity building – trained women and CBOs in Rawalpindi-Islamabad on conflict resolution, vocational skills, violence against women and networking</td>
<td>Human rights violations&lt;br&gt;Violence against women&lt;br&gt;Networking – access to social capital&lt;br&gt;Disaster response</td>
<td>Capacity Building of communities through training and awareness sessions&lt;br&gt;Training of ‘peace activists’ in conflict resolution skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aurat Public Information and Service Foundation</td>
<td>Large national NGO with 4 provincial headquarteres&lt;br&gt;Programme includes Rawalpindi-Islamabad&lt;br&gt;One of the largest district level networks of voluntary citizens groups across 110 districts</td>
<td>Gender equity in Pakistan’s social, political and economic spheres achieved through: 1. Information 2. Capacity Building 3. Advocacy</td>
<td>Comprehensive national research studies on:&lt;br&gt;• Customary practices leading to Gender-Based Violence&lt;br&gt;• Domestic Violence&lt;br&gt;• Sexual Harassment&lt;br&gt;• Women’s role in politics and governance at local and national levels&lt;br&gt;• Attitudes towards women&lt;br&gt;• Women’s access to economic opportunity&lt;br&gt;• The rights of marginalized women</td>
<td>Violence against women&lt;br&gt;Masculinities&lt;br&gt;The role of attitudes and discourses in violence against women&lt;br&gt;Institutionalized gender bias against women</td>
<td>Primary qualitative research: Surveys Questionnaires FDGs Training workshops&lt;br&gt;Secondary: Compilation of statistics on violence against women and female participation in various spheres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedari</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Working with women and girls for</td>
<td>• Enhancing Support for Ending Violence and</td>
<td>Violence against women – capacity</td>
<td>Primarily Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>Activities/Strategies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cavish Development Foundation</strong></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Takes an active role by working towards sustainable human development through participatory approaches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• ‘Ending Violence Against Women’ – pursuing attitudinal and legal reforms (with Bedari)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Gender and Development - Community meetings on women’s participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Interfaith harmony and peace building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Friends Foundation</strong></td>
<td>Small national NGO</td>
<td>Committed to social development and behavioural change Focus on provision of basic needs and poverty alleviation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Water and sanitation and hygiene Improvement through gender mainstreaming</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Gender mainstreaming (‘equality’) in decision making</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Madaadgar</strong></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Started as a helpline for children &amp; women suffering from violence, abuse and exploitation and branched out into newer programmes An offshoot of Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid (LHRLA).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Helpline supports and advises victims of violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Face to face legal and psychological support for victims</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Developing community surveillance systems at Union Council Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rozan Organization</strong></td>
<td>Regional, Islamabad based.</td>
<td>Working on issues related to emotional and psychological health, gender, violence against</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Aangan (Children and Youth’s programme – capacity and awareness building on rights)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Zeest (Women’s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SAIC scoping study</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discrimination against Women** - capacity building of civil society and Police; enhancing support for legal reforms (e.g. domestic violence bill); training on human rights

- Schools4Life in Islamabad – education on girl’s sexual and reproductive health rights
- Advocacy against early marriage
- ‘Self-Growth’ workshops for women

**Building and Legal/Policy Advocacy**
- Human Rights
- Gender Sensitization; Gender Mainstreaming
- Attitudes towards women

**Building through:**
- Training workshops with police and civil society
- Stage dramas
- Secondary stream in Lobbying: Campaigns and advocacy for social and legal reforms regarding the rights of women

**Cavish Development Foundation**
- National
- Takes an active role by working towards sustainable human development through participatory approaches

- Violence against women
- Institutionalised gender bias against women
- Interfaith conflict

**Work in twin cities primarily on:**
- Social Mobilization
- Community Organization
- Education
- Good Governance

**Friends Foundation**
- Small national NGO
- Committed to social development and behavioural change Focus on provision of basic needs and poverty alleviation

- Impacts of WASH
- Institutionalised gender bias against women

**Madaadgar**
- National
- Started as a helpline for children & women suffering from violence, abuse and exploitation and branched out into newer programmes An offshoot of Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid (LHRLA).

- Violence against women
- Violence against children/youth
- Trafficking
- Human Rights

**Rozan Organization**
- Regional, Islamabad based.
- Working on issues related to emotional and psychological health, gender, violence against

- Institutionalized gender bias against women
- Violence against
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Impact Areas</th>
<th>Approaches</th>
<th>Focus Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| PATTAN       | National | Committed to mainstreaming marginalized groups and women into political and economic decision-making processes at all levels through  
1. Mobilization/Coalition building  
2. Networking  
3. Capacity Building  
4. Advocacy for structural and policy change | • WASH – community driven  
• Women’s Manifesto for Gender Equality  
• Advocacy for women’s rights through theatre  
• Women Protection Project  
• Narrowing the Gender Gap in Flood Affected Districts.  
• To increase role and participation of women in political and electoral processes | Institutionalized gender bias against women  
Gender mainstreaming  
WASH Vulnerabilities to disaster | Primary focus seems to be awareness raising and capacity building on the inclusion of women in social, economic and political processes  
This includes capacity building of communities work through workshops and training |
| PIEDAR       | National | Main focus is the links between environment and development  
Created a HID (Human & Institutional Development) approach that is demand driven, gender sensitive, community-led and participatory | • Center for Environmental Education through Participatory Action Learning (CEEPAL)  
• Water & Environmental Sanitation and School Improvements | WASH  
Participatory sustainable development  
Gender mainstreaming  
Focus on education | Working in Rawalpindi mainly on educating schools about environmental management and WASH |
| Plan International | INGO | Primary focus is promoting the rights of the Child through various means including  
• Reproductive Health in adolescents  
• WASH  
• Livelihoods assistance | Human Rights  
Child Rights  
Gender | Working in unplanned settlements in Islamabad on capacity |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SACHET</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Promoting Human Development of the Disadvantaged in Gender Perspectives Strives in partnership with community, public &amp; civic society organization, to develop a society based on three core values of sustainable human development: self-esteem, freedom of choice and tolerance; a society where all have equal access to opportunities and justice irrespective of gender, color, race and status</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|              |         | • “Addressing Gender Based Violence & promoting Women Rights”.
|              |         | • Behnan De Mehfils
|              |         | • Journalist workshop on “Gender Sensitive Reporting”.
|              |         | • Fight against Dowry.
|              |         | • DoSTI (Dare to Sensitize, Train and Inform) project.
|              |         | • ‘Gender Watch’ – TV show |
|              |         | Mainstreaming WASH |
|              |         | Violence against women
|              |         | Institutionalized gender bias against women
|              |         | Dowry issues.
|              |         | Human Rights |
|              |         | Awareness raising on violence against women and their rights
|              |         | Capacity building on international human rights standards with Police, law students and media through workshops and training (Rawalpindi)
|              |         | Training of Police on instruments and methods for dealing with violence and abuse against women
|              |         | Lobbying civil society and government on creation of domestic violence bill
|              |         | Awareness raising on violence against women
|              |         | Establishment of community based support systems for survivors of violence (40 CBOs) |
| Sahil        | National | Exclusive focus on child abuse and exploitation |
| Origination  |         | • Building capacity and Increasing knowledge on child rights and protection
|              |         | • Legal aid
|              |         | • Counseling services |
|              |         | Child rights
|              |         | Child protection |
|              |         | Capacity building through establishing Child Protection Network (CPN’s) at the village level |
| Struggle for Change Organisation | National | Working against Violence and Torture, providing a full service program to the victims/survivors of torture/violence, | • Awareness raising through public meetings, seminars and reports for advocacy of Human Rights.  
• Training professionals on torture, violence and human rights abuses  
• Crisis centre for women under distress | Torture  
Human Rights Dealing with refugee populations | Rawalpindi-Islamabad not a major focus for victim support, but still available.  
Capacity building of professionals relating to the issue of violence/torture  
Counselling and legal support to victims  
Lobbying the government and Providing feedback on policy regarding human rights abuses. |
| UN-Habitat | INGO | Promotes socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities with the goal of providing adequate shelter for all. Strategy is sustainable relief and recovery leveraging investments in the emergency and recovery phases into the longer-term | • WASH - HySter for bringing behavioral change in the target communities related to Hygiene, Sanitation & Water. Focus on schools and unplanned settlements. Partnering with Friends Foundation in Rawalpindi and Plan International in Islamabad. Includes gender mainstreaming | WASH  
Vulnerability and Hazards  
Gender mainstreaming | Primary focus in the twin cities seems to be adequate access to WASH and the management of potential disasters due to climate change and the hazardous environments of unplanned settlements |
5. Violence in Pakistan’s urban centres

For the purposes of this study violence is deemed to be use of physical force, in establishing social and political norms. This definition of violence allows us to move our gaze away from spectacular violence to the much more persistent and insidious forms of everyday violence. While terrorist activity, extra judicial killings by law enforcement agencies and ethnic violence in Karachi has received much journalistic and some academic attention (Verkaaiik 2004, Gayer, 2012, Chaudhry, 2004; Ring, 2007), everyday violence has not received similar sustained analysis. We feel that it is particularly useful to distinguish between terrorism and violence to allow us to understand the long-term relationship with infrastructure. Terrorism is defined primarily as spectacular violence directed towards place destruction or place alienation (Mustafa 2005). Violence on the other hand, includes a broader range of activities as well as ends.

Many different forms or types of violence have been identified by scholars including structural violence (Galtung, 1969; Farmer, 2004; Scheper-Hughes 1992), symbolic violence (Bourdieu and Waqant, 2001), epistemic violence (Taussig, 1984), discursive violence (MacKinnon, 1993) but there is no general theory of violence. Similarly there is considerable debate about whether violence is the privilege of power or in fact, a manifestation of insecurities about power. Using Weber’s definition of the state as the entity with control over legitimate use of violence, most political scientists and theorists have treated violence as an expression of power. Extending this line of reasoning, post-structuralists have argued that the nexus of power and knowledge, residing particularly in the state,
creates multiple sites of violence both physical and cognitive. In contrast, Hannah Arendt, among others has argued that violence is directly related to a loss of or decrease in political power. This debate about the relationship between power and violence remains open and violence remains under-conceptualized despite, or perhaps because of, the wide ranging uses the term is employed for.

For our purposes we wish to draw a further distinction between violence as a product and as a process. Most often violence is treated as a product. Much academic research has looked for the causes of violence from the psychological to the political. However, recent research has emphasized the value of conceptualizing violence as a process, one that is generative of social and political norms. We find that understanding violence as a process allows greater analytical flexibility in understanding the phenomenon of everyday violence, where it becomes necessary to constitute and sustain new social and political norm.

5.1 Types of violence included in this study and examples in the Rawalpindi-Islamabad contexts

The close imbrication of social power and violence can be seen as having three distinct manifestations (Foucault, 1980; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2001; Mustafa, 2002; Chatterjee 1982 & 83);
(1) ‘naked power’ flowing from physical force and violence,
(2) ‘compensatory power’ flowing from the ability to materially reward others for compliance and
(3) ‘knowledge power’ flowing from the actors’ socialization into webs of knowledge and discourses that induce internalization of certain social relations and world views as natural and desirable.

Of the three types power/knowledge (Foucault, 1980) is the most comprehensive form of power. We consider violence as a tactic of power involving physical coercion or threat thereof, which is more an outcome of a loss of compensatory power or power/knowledge than a conduit for accumulating social power to the perpetrator (Arendt 1969; 1973). Therefore for the purposes of this study much of the analysis are driven by the undercurrent of understanding violence as evidence
of a loss of power rather than an actual source of power. With the above understanding of violence within the frameworks of power, we proceed to further unpack the tactics of violence and the causal relations that perpetuate those tactics.

This scoping report, as well as the longer-term project of which, this report is a part of, understands violence as threat or actuality of a physical act that directs or constrains the choices of its victims individually or collectively. This definition of violence is committed to understanding the phenomena as a strictly material physical act or the threat of a physical act.

From the literature we have been able to distill three aspects of violence that could inform this research;

1. violence that destroys or transforms geographical places and spaces (Mustafa 2005, Gregory and Pred 2007);
2. geographical places and infrastructure therein that enable violence (Hewitt 2001, Lefebrve 1991, Anand 2012, Ferguson 2012); and
3. structural violence (Galtung 1969).

In addition to the above, the uniquely Arendtian understanding of violence as loss of power [knowledge], suggests a fourth category of violence, which we call violence of disempowerment.

The first aspect of violence that results in place destruction and/or alienation, in terms of direct destruction of places with an emotional significance to the people or stigmatizing places is most closely associated with terrorist violence. Here space becomes the target of terror, where human victims of violence are coincidental, and spectacular destruction of places is the main objective. Place here is defined as being constituted at the intersection of physical space and the human experience, memory, and emotions associated with that space. In other words you are a victim of such terrorist violence if you are subjected to it, or fear it, not because who you are or what you have done but because of where you are (Mustafa 2005). In the context of this research we are not just concerned about spectacular violence that may destroy monumental buildings or everyday spaces
of bazaars and public transport, but also everyday public violence that may instill fear by gender, ethnicity, class or religious belief. What are the geographies of fear for women in urban Rawalpindi or Karachi and why? How do different ethnic, religious, or class groups view different urban spaces in terms of their accessibility to them or violence associated with them? These are the types of questions that arise out of this first aspect of violence where place destruction or alienation is the objective.

This kind of violence is most apparent in the literature on Pakistan’s urban areas. International Crisis Group (2014)\(^9\) and others\(^{10-11}\) highlight that not only the numbers of violent incidents (mainly terrorist) in urban centres surpassed previous figures, particularly in Karachi. Indeed, it notes the how the geographical configurations and impacts of violence come from, produce and reconstitute geographies of fear, which drive further insecurities and violence. One only has to talk with a few Pakistanis to understand the strength of the fear discourse, and one only has to view the way the middle and upper middle classes are adapting their living environments to build physical barriers (walled communities) with the rest of society, to put the fear of violence at bay, at least during home time. Ahmed, in the Tribune (24 November 2012) a ‘pathology of fear’ against external intervention from powers like the United States and India. While this pathology may be apparent, what we argue to be more striking is the fear of violence in everyday life, which destroys places and human lives (Mustafa and Brown, 2010). In fact, Fair (2009) speaks to recent findings of a sharp decline in public support in Pakistan for suicide bombings as a way to defend Islam, and suggests that this is directly related to the personal experiences and impacts of increasing suicide bombings and terrorist incidents in Pakistan. Furthermore, the terrorist groups have been categorised as a critical threat to security by the majority of respondents in such public opinion polls, especially in Sindh (home of

\(^9\) International Crisis Group (2014) claim there were 2700 fatalities from terrorism in Karachi in 2013
\(^{10}\) Pakistan Institute for Peace (2013) found 2534 incidents of terrorism across Pakistan in 2013
\(^{11}\) South Asia Watchdog Portal (2014) found 5379 fatalities in terrorism related violence in 2013, and 537 in the first month of 2014

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm
Karachi) and Punjab (home of Rawalpindi-Islamabad). At the same time there is ‘deep ambivalence’ towards the role of the state in dealing with them.

Fear and reaction drive cycles of violence which, transform spaces in Pakistan’s cities (Ahmed, 2009). From the military, to political insurgents, to private security contractors, to criminal gangs, to individual citizens, violence is a matter of everyday life and is often resolved mentally with a violent reaction which, is often followed by a violence reaction and so on so forth (Gupta, 2008; PIPS, 2013; Huffington Post Report 10 Feb 2014). Fear affects public confidence in government, and personal security on the streets; Appadurai (2006) elucidates how the fear of the unknown, when it comes to terrorism in South Asia, can further drive physical violence between different groups (fear of the other). Haleem (2003) sees the cycle further held in place by legitimised Praetorianism¹², and an ethnically fragmented society. So, state violence, particularly through military interventionism has become the norm. The disgruntled and powerless population are, as a result, easier to radicalize and seek increasingly violent means in reaction (Abou-Zahab, 2002, 2004; Mustafa, 2005).

Violence cycles are becoming more frequent Rawalpindi-Islamabad, particularly since the murder of Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi in 2007. Ahmed (2009) highlights that the suicide bomb which killed Bhutto in December 2007, led to a cycle of violent incidents between government and insurgents in the following year (182 incidents labeled as terrorism across the country), which destroyed public buildings, NGO infrastructure, private buildings and vehicles. The government reacted by prioritizing the curtailment of religious extremism in the maddrassah system. Disgruntled maddrassah students/teachers consequently besieged the ‘Lal Masjid’, threatening the government of suicide attacks. Kidnaps and murders were carried out on citizens seen to be challenging Islamic practice. A weeklong violent clash with the students in the mosque, followed by a series of suicide bomb attacks on the military led to 600 fatalities. The violent year of 2008 ended with a suicide attack on former Interior Minister Aftab Ahmed Sherpao in

¹² Excessive or abusive influence of military forces in a nation-state
Rawalpindi, killing 60 civilians, on religious festival Eid-ul-Adha (See also, Al Jazeera Witness; Pakistan's War: The Battle Within, 2009).

There is an increasing tendency towards religious sectarian violence, and displays of spectacular violence has become frequent on religious holidays. There is a complex history, politics and culture which has contributed to this trend (see Irfani, 2004, Zaman, 1998, Nasr, 2000, Grare 2007), for an in depth discussion. According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, there were 687 sectarian killings in 2013. While the violence has not spared any large minorities, there seems to be a particular violent pattern between Shia and Sunni Muslims (Haleem, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2014; Huffington Post Report, 10 Feb 2014). Although official accounts vary, gunfire between Shias, Sunnis and the police during a Shia religious procession in Rawalpindi led to significant property damage and death of 10 people with over 80 injured. The riot led to the Rawalpindi city being put under military curfew, and cellular networks were blocked for several days. While there is an increasing academic literature considering sectarian violence in Pakistan, there is little to date concerning the twin cities of Rawalpindi-Islamabad. There are a variety of discourses in the media, which consider state and police negligence as a key factor in the spread of violence. But different causes are speculated upon, including hate speech, and suppression of minority religious freedoms. What is clear, though, is how these violent eruptions transform spaces for normal citizens, who are restrained to their homes under curfew or for fear, or who become trapped in traffic when such incidents occur, or whose shops, homes and mosques are burned down. Hopefully this research will shed some light on the experiences, perceptions and reactions of such citizens in Rawalpindi-Islamabad.

The second aspect of how spatial organization produces violent geographies, draws attention, to how prison camps, surveillance, police presence, for example, may produce carceral geographies associated with the state oppression on the one hand, and urban design of living spaces which, may perpetuate gendered isolation and confinement on the other hand. To cite a more direct example of the relationship between infrastructure and violence, broad avenues may be an
essential embellishment to modern cities but their original functionality as highly effective anti-revolutionary infrastructure to provide clear line of fire to government troops, and to prevent against barricades is not irrelevant to their present day ubiquity (Ferguson 2012; Scott, 1998). Similarly square grid patterned automobile centric urban design may be standard contemporaneously, but how does that design affect female mobility in the urban form? For example. Furthermore, and of most relevance to the SAIC is how poor infrastructure and enhanced vulnerability to environmental hazards intersects with high levels of violence to define the daily lives of urban poor (e.g., see Auyero and de Lara 2012; Tranchant, 2013; Gupte, 2012). This second aspect of geographical and/or infrastructural violence helps us address some of the key research questions outlined above.

The matter of interest, is not just to expose the how infrastructure and poor basic services can enhance vulnerabilities (which often lead to violent outcomes e.g. fatalities from poor health), but also how the infrastructure/service environment shapes the way people interact with each other, sometimes resulting in violence. This vulnerability-violence nexus is then of key importance to our investigation (Tranchant, 2013).

Although there is yet to be academic literature empirically exploring the links between infrastructure and violence in our field sites Gupte et al’s (2012) work on civil violence in India is illuminating. It highlights that civil violence most often erupts in areas of poor basic service provision, with poor access to consistent livelihoods and a disenfranchisement from the state. At a closer investigation of these violence prone geographical areas, labeled ‘slums’, the authors find that within them, civil violence is more frequent in the more economically, socially and spatially vulnerable areas. On Pakistan, Malik (2009) considers the links between vulnerabilities and violence in Pakistan. She makes the link between the failure of the social contract of the state with its citizens, its consequent frustrations amongst the marginalized populations in particular and thus the creation of violence. Marginalised groups may use directed violence in order to challenge the status quo. This research project is cognizant of the fact that
violence may occur spontaneously out of such frustration. Malik notes that the most socially and economically marginalised areas of Punjab (with poor access to WASH and livelihoods) tend to be ‘fertile recruiting ground’ for violent actors.

The structural violence aspect essentially highlights how social structures or institutions may harm people by preventing them from accessing life enhancing or life-saving services (Galtung 1969). Racism, sexism, classism, elitism are often listed as examples of social structures and complicit or incompetent state institutions a manifestations of those structures, that may prevent people from living full lives and may also lead to premature death, disability or sickness. This notion of violence is very closely associated with social justice—in fact lack thereof. Whilst we are sympathetic to the political orientation of this aspect of violence, we aim, in the first instance, to focus on physical and material violence. Forms of structural violence may emerge in our ethnographic and secondary research, but at this stage it is too broad a terrain to actively pursue and command in this project.

The fourth manifestation of violence as loss of power [knowledge], which we have named, violence of disempowerment, was brought to our attention by Arendt (1973). This suggests that domination and subjugation in society, in both the public and private spheres, lead to the legitimization of violence. Arendt claims that domination starts before politics, in the home and thus in the culture and social institutions of society. The subjugated and dominated are active agents who perform their roles, “acting in concert” in a power relationship. Violence occurs, not as a tool of power, but as a manifestation of the loss of it. Peaceful existence of society occurs when actors work in concert with their perceived roles, thus power is held by consent and is driven by discourse. Everyday experiences of domination can use ‘force’; but this is distinct in her conception from violence. Domestic violence, in Pakistan, proves a relevant example. According to various research studies, discourses of masculinity include control over the movements and choices of women. Women often accept this control. When a woman digresses from this control, males often become violent towards them. This occurs because the male has lost power, and turned to physical violence. Women often
claim they deserved to experience this violence for diverging from their role and causing the male frustrations. This highlights a way in which we can try to understand manifestations of violence which, occur in the private sphere and parts of the public sphere in Pakistan. We have argued above that we understand violence in general as a case of loss of power. In this case we do however, designate it as a special category, to account for violent performances in public and private spheres that don’t necessarily fit into the categories.

We use these three manifestations of violence detailed above as a broad structure through which to categorise and understand how violence may be researchable in the Pakistan urban context? Rather than locking our research into a tight framework at this stage, we will use these to begin our investigation, but over the course of our primary research inquiry, we may tighten and refine, according to the findings that start to emerge.

5.2 Gender and Violence in Rawalpindi/Islamabad

Armed with the above understanding of the phenomena of violence and its various manifestations, we already undertook a media and NGO literature analysis in Rawalpindi/Islamabad and Karachi. Our analysis focused on incidents of physical violence or threats of physical violence resulting in bodily harm, confinement and/or constriction of mobility, while leaving out non-violent crimes, e.g., excluding fraud as opposed to extortion, and then distinguishing between seemingly violent abduction and consensual marriage and/or elopement reported as abduction. We are of course limited by the secondary data sources that we tapped for this scoping report. An understanding of the mismatch between the gaps in the data, and our ambition to capture the multiple varieties of violence in the lives of the urban poor, is perhaps the most valuable outcome of this scoping study. This understanding will be invaluable in helping us define the parameters of the primary data collection, so as to make a beginning at plugging some of the data holes that we outline below.
Rawalpindi has shown the highest reporting rates of violence against women (VAW) (754 cases between Jan-Dec 2012), according to Aurat Foundation’s statistics. Rozan (2007) has conducted some interesting work on masculinities in Rawalpindi; which speaks to the literature on power/knowledge violence (our third category for investigation). Rozan explored notions and performances of masculinity in married men and women in Union Council Rehmatabad. Discussing: masculinity, violence, sexuality and relationships, they found some pervasive perceptions, which warrant further study (as the research covered only 1 Union Council and a homogenous social group, rather than diverse groups). Firstly, sexuality was a theme that dominated most discussions, and the image of the ‘sexually potent’ male was rather strong across men. A sexual helplessness was commonly experienced amongst males when facing females, and this lead to a stronger desire to be sexually virulent. Almost all respondents expressed having experienced homosexual relations, often in order to practice for later sexual experiences with women. Rozan note that, when practiced with younger boys or males, it was often coercive.

A second strong perception of masculinity was the need to provide for the family, without depending on female financial support. This was closely linked to self respect. The view of women working was rather disapproving. A key tenet of masculinity was expressed as the man’s need to take decisions, ‘control his wife’ or female relatives (in decisions and movements) and balance the needs of his wife and family. Control was couched in discourses of extreme distrust of women and males’ roles as the upholders of decency in society; violence a necessary measure to maintain morality and tradition in society. Men would even taunt other males who allowed female relations to do acts perceived as less moral, or feminine. Although homosexual was seen as an immorality, sexual experimentation with younger boys was considered acceptable.

Violence was tightly discursively connected to ‘being a man’. Most interviewed had been involved in violent incidents with other males or groups of males, often involving a range of weapons. Machoism and posturing according to what was
deemed masculine were seen as important; negation of any feminine traits were key to their identity as males.

Interestingly, women reinforced the male-held perceptions of masculinity. They also saw males as the guardians of decisions, finances and morality within society. They highlighted how males often suffered though, as a result of these responsibilities. Men’s respect withered if finances did, and the related emotional burden was heavy, often leading to anger and violence. According to almost all married women interviewed, men often resorted to violence in their relationships, but only if the woman has done something wrong. Thus women should moderate their behavior to avoid violence. Violence was seen as acceptable if conducted in privacy and apologized for later.

This research has been very helpful in opening a field of research on the relationships between masculinities, femininities and violence in Rawalpindi-Islamabad (and wider Pakistan in fact). We can understand from it that masculinity is closely linked to notions of dominance in society and over women. Relationships are characterized by unequal power relations, and physical and verbal violence is used as a tool of control, which is deemed necessary by both women and men.

Zulfiqar and Hassan (2012) find that access to work and education outside of the home has a mediating impact on perceptions and experiences of domestic violence in a neighborhood of Rawalpindi (Lalazar). Women’s economic status is a significant predictor of abuse. A woman’s economic independence enables her to make important decisions by and for herself; also enabling her to take action (like going to police, or leaving the house of husband) against domestic violence and psychological abuse. This suggests that not only economic independence, but also experiences with different groups (social capital?) through work can break perceptions about what is acceptable behavior in the home.

While there is a dearth of research on violence against men in Rawalpindi-Islamabad, one recently published case study by Munikazim and Mohyuddin
(2012) found incidences of physical, domestic violence towards men at the hands of women. This included hitting and throwing objects. These incidents are almost never reported. Incidents where domestic violence occurred towards the woman, were often found to be in retaliation to verbal abuse which challenged masculinity, by targeting mental stresses related to livelihood or sexual potency.

Self-directed harm is also worth considering in the context of a vulnerability-violence nexus. Farooq et al (2010) investigated the issue of self-harm in Rawalpindi over the period 2007-8. They found that intentional self harm, while most commonly masked as injury by another was quite prevalent, particularly amongst males\(^\text{13}\). The researchers claim that in fact 10% of accident cases registered in hospital were actually of deliberate self harm--56.4% of these were people aged 16-25 years and they used a variety of weapons including firearms, sharp objects and poison. Only one was reported as self-harm. This is because it is not only seen as a sin in Islam but it is also punishable by law with up to 1 year in prison. The question remains, what are the drivers of deliberate self harm in the populations of Rawalpindi-Islamabad? As it is an under-reported phenomenon, ethnographic research methods may shed some light.

### 5.3 Media representation of violence

**Purpose and Method of Media Analysis**

As part of this scoping study, the reporting of violence in electronic and print media was monitored over a 90 day, between August-November 2013. The purpose of this task was to understand how violence is presented and constructed in different discourses in Pakistan and Rawalpindi-Islamabad. A range of national, local and electronic media were selected for analysis; see Table 6 for a description of the sources and the rationale.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Format</th>
<th>Remit and Publication</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Learnings from</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

\(^{13}\) 1065 victims reported injury to police, whereas 3012 presented in hospital in the same period; the large majority being males.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Reach</th>
<th>media analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Express Tribune</strong></td>
<td><strong>Print</strong></td>
<td><strong>National Daily</strong></td>
<td>Online access of Express Tribune is taking lead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Affiliation with liberal values and editorials inclined towards social liberalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>We included this paper is media monitoring as its city page has extensive coverage of violence related stories which are missing in most of the newspapers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Daily Times</strong></td>
<td><strong>Print</strong></td>
<td><strong>National Daily</strong></td>
<td>It has a very selective urban audience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Express Daily</strong></td>
<td><strong>Print</strong></td>
<td><strong>National Daily</strong></td>
<td>Claims to have a 24% circulation of Urdu Papers in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
News teams go into particular localities, conduct interviews and then present a story related to issues and problems faced by the residents.

In reporting we found no gender sensitivity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Distribution Area</th>
<th>Circulation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jhang daily</td>
<td>Print, National Daily</td>
<td>850,000 copies per day</td>
<td>Urdu newspaper which is politically conservative leaning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Included in media monitoring task due to its better coverage of social violence in twin cities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jhang claims to have maximum circulation among Urdu newspapers but its reporting generally deals with the typical national news agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very little focus on gender and urbanization related issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>With reference to violence it has very specific set of lines in which there is maximum coverage of the social dimensions about stealing and robbing etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nawa-i-Waqt</td>
<td>Print, National Daily</td>
<td>500,000 copies per day.</td>
<td>Popular Urdu newspaper which is politically conservative, religiously extreme with extensive readership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Included because it follows different discursive strategies (more so-called ethical consideration) in reporting as compare to other Urdu papers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Highly charged in propagating the nation building discourse while emphasizing the Islamic ideology of Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>With reference to our research questions, it has nominal focus and its agenda is typically national. But it has a city page which is quite useful for grasping the situation of violence in the city, although it publishes very selective stories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jahan-e-Pakistan</td>
<td>Print, Regional (in a few cities) but covering Published in the selected cities</td>
<td>Urdu Newspaper which is politically</td>
<td>A relatively new paper, which has readership in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samaa News</td>
<td>Electronic (TV)</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Gaining popularity due to its feature programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geo News</td>
<td>Electronic (TV and Website)</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>According to BBC audience survey, 36% Pakistanis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
exclusive program “Geo FIR”, which is roundup of crime and court news from across Pakistan. It covers mostly crime related news in which host attempts to break the news regarding crime in different localities. Islamabad and Rawalpindi stories are often focused.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Express News</strong></th>
<th><strong>Electronic (TV and website)</strong></th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is widely ranked second in popularity as a source of television news after Geo News.</td>
<td>It is included due to its relatively better coverage of Rawalpindi focused stories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Often broadcasts news stories related to violence, which are often ignored by other TV channels.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apart from that it has exclusive program “Shabbir to dekhe ga”, a TV show treated in a format of street theater, equipped with the techniques of re-enactment of various crime related stories. In this program there is focus on heinous crimes and public appealing issues are targeted. Re-enactment techniques publicize the crime in a unique manner in which commentator make judgments about the worth of people’s lives in over-dramatized manner.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I focused on Rawalpindi episodes, which dealt with the issue of elopement of girls and the consequent violence which both families faced.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It also conducted an episode about the vulnerability question which is relevant to people living in Katchi Abadi during monsoon.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This analysis has three main aims:

1) To explore the discursive dimensions of violence, specifically how discourses of violence are constructed and reproduced through the media in Pakistan. It digs out that what are the ‘reported’ types of violence i.e. social, political, religious, state, gender-based, and references their sources, where applicable, and based upon a categorisation that was developed through both literature review and in the early stages of the analysis. This categorisation can be found in Table 7, below;

2) To consider how manifestations of violence are reported, according to our three modes of inquiry. These were 1) Violence that destroys or transforms geographical places and spaces; 2) Geographical places and spaces therein that enable violence, and 3) Violence of disempowerment;

3) It analyses the construction of gender roles in media discourses, i.e. how definitions of women and men are constructed and enforced in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, and how discourses determine roles and actions, played by people residing in different neighbourhoods.

We began by conducting brief interviews of crime correspondents and editors of various TV channels and newspapers with special emphases on questions of gender, violence, vulnerability and WASH. This exercise helped us to understand the narratives of crime correspondents on the diverse forms of violence in the area and their relationship with gender and vulnerability. We decided to do daily monitoring of the following newspapers: Express Tribune, The Nation, Daily Express Urdu, Daily Jang, Akhba-e-Watan; and five news channels including Samaa News, Express News, News One, ARY News and Geo News. In these channels' transmissions, we focused on “news highlights”, “breaking news” and feature programmes covering Rawalpindi and Islamabad. In newspapers, City page and Crime pages were specifically targeted.
### Media Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Broad Violence Category</th>
<th>Sub-Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gendered</strong></td>
<td>Harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender Based Murder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prostitution/Trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Child Marriage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dowry-related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quarrel/Fight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WASH</strong></td>
<td>Protests (e.g. due to water supply)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sanitation-related Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Epidemics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vulnerability</strong></td>
<td>Natural Hazards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flood Damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Killed by Flood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fire Damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Murder for Economic Reasons (e.g. poverty/a financial issue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protest (Quarrel/Fight) Due to Issue of Vulnerability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other (e.g. Police Firing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
<td>Street Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quarrel/Fights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gang-Firing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Robbery/Looting/Mugging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Murder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Murder Due to Family Clashes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drugs-related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Verbal Abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extortion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorist Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Road Accident Death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Road Accident Injury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Threat of Harm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other (e.g. gambling-related)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 7: Categories of Violence Used In Media Monitoring and Analysis

Table 7 highlights the range of categories of violence found in the media analysis. Due to a limited academic literature on violence in Pakistan beyond the topics of terrorism, political violence and violence against women, we started the media analysis with an inductive and grounded approach. We outlined broad violence categories based upon broad violence literature, for example, Social Violence, Political Violence, State Violence, and so on. Of course, we were cognizant of some particular themes in our initial coding, which relate to our research questions: the vulnerability-violence nexus being an example. So, WASH and Vulnerability were defined as broad violence categories from the start. Our categorisation was left adaptable, so as new categories emerged in the analysis, they were included into the coding system. For example, Extortion was not in the initial categorisation, but was added after some weeks because it appeared to be a form of violence that was occurring in the twin cities.

| Religious | Sectarian  
|           | Against Minorities  
|           | Humiliating Another’s Beliefs  
|           | Blasphemy/Hate Speech  
|           | Murder on Religious Grounds  
|           | Other  
| State     | Police Violence  
|           | Police Murder (Torture)  
|           | Intelligence Agency Violence  
|           | Other  
| Political | Political Parties’ Violence  
|           | Political Murder  
|           | Other  
| Ethnic    | Ethnic Quarrel/Fight  
|           | Murder on Ethnic Grounds  
|           | Other  
| Other     | Anything additional to the above categories which includes violence, threat of it, or suggests forms of structural violence |
Summary of Findings

i) Dominant Categories of Violence

![Image: Pie chart showing distribution of incidents by category.]

**Figure 14: Number of Incidents by broad category of violence**

Across electronic and print media, 384 cases in the category of “social violence”\(^{14}\) were reported over the 90 day period. The most dominant of which were: theft (181 cases), followed by robbery and looting (78) and murder (37). The remainder of cases were spread amongst the social violence categories, which included street crime, gang-fighting, quarrelling, drug-related crime, verbal abuse, extortion and terrorist activity. There were zero cases reported of the following, which were also included within this broad category: street crime, murder due to family clashes and verbal abuse.

Gendered violence was the next most common form of violence with 72 cases. Within those, were 42 abduction of women cases, 17 gender-based murders (all murders of women) and 6 related to harassment and rape. Only 2 cases of domestic violence were reported.

---

\(^{14}\) See Table 7.
Moreover, in the category of vulnerability related violence 11 stories were found. Political violence, ethnic violence, religious violence and WASH-related violence are the least reported overall in the monitored media.

ii) News Agenda – Discourses and Priorities

i) Print Media

Violence is a continuously reported on phenomenon in print media. Coverage in the 5 newspapers reported and discussed a diverse range of violence, root causes and factors and also presented some suggestions for violence prevention. The analysis found a tendency towards ambiguous reporting on incidences of violence; reports would include facts like names and places, but were unclear about the nature and extent of crimes. Crime reporters attributed this (in our dialogue with them) to a lack of knowledge about the crimes, a lack of resources for crime reporters to attain these facts and sometimes a disinterest in attaining facts on crimes deemed insufficiently ‘sensational’.

Not surprisingly, when a prominent figure in the local community is a victim of violence, they are given priority and space in the newspaper. The discourses surrounding the incident can drive further violence by calling for public reaction e.g. protests. For example, the report on the murder of Transport Union leader Malik Sultan in the Daily Express on 26th August 2013, stated that the culprits and cause were unknown but the participants of the protest rally stated “the transport community has become the victim of insecure circumstances, if the murderers are not arrested immediately, then we will observe a wheel-jam strike and block the Murree road and will continue the protest until the killers are arrested.”

ii) Electronic Media

Electronic media covering Islamabad/Rawalpindi is more inclined towards the coverage of ‘heinous crimes’ such as firing among gangs, terrorist activity and homicide cases; more coverage tends to be given when there are multiple victims. They are less interested in common crimes; and predictably more interested in the dramatic. Unfortunately, they tend to compromise on ethics and violate the privacy of the victim to a greater extent than appropriate in order to produce

15 Heinous crimes stated by Editor of Samaa TV in personal interview
visual coverage of where and how the crime was committed.\textsuperscript{16} There is a strong urge for imagery and concerns regarding the mechanics of the incident. Furthermore, who is committing the crime is also an important factor, e.g., if the suspect or perpetrator is a family member or female in particular, the crime gets relatively more attention.

**Overall Standards – What is newsworthy?**

Unsurprisingly, stories with more public consumption appeal are prioritised. Electronic media displays less coverage of gendered, vulnerability and WASH related violences, when compared to print media. In both cases, reported crimes tended to be those related to the public sphere. Hence the media does not take into account types of violence which, are known to occur in the private sphere\textsuperscript{17}, like domestic violence and the vulnerability of women. More recently though there has been some attention paid to the abuse of domestic, especially female, servants.

In both print and electronic media, there is a hierarchy in terms of the heinousness or severity of crimes, which is reflected in media discourses. In fact, there are evidently very specific standards above which an act of violence is deemed newsworthy. Interviews of various correspondents and TV editors elucidated that the stories having greater impact to the public narrative (i.e. terrorism, for example) are considered more newsworthy. Obviously the idea about what is dominant in the public narrative is subjective. Media thus drives public discourses, which start from journalists’ or editors’ own discourses about society. Still, on the whole, the journalists we spoke to defined ‘impact’ in terms of newsworthiness on the basis of the story involving notable people/s or places. Violence denoted sensational or heinous often included perpetrators or victims not conventionally related with violence or masculinity discourses, like children and women. Any story about the portential for the loss of human lives would also be deemed sensational, or news-worthy\textsuperscript{18}.

\textsuperscript{16} Victim and perpetrator, both are televised and show their names and faces etc.

\textsuperscript{17} Through the work of NGOs, research and other public discourses

\textsuperscript{18} N.B. These selected TV channels are broadcasted on Cable/Internet only
Those that reach the self-perceived standard are often discussed not only in the news, but also in feature length current affairs programmes which, aim to give a voice to the victims and perpetrators of violence, and discuss the drivers of violence within society. While these are quite interesting and explorative, they do tend to push a particular agenda in terms of the understanding of and drivers of violence in the region. Further, intra-media competition leads towards sensationalism in which they show images of the blasts or bombing etc. More specifically the TV programs with re-enactment techniques like “Shabbir to Dekhe ga” etc. exaggerate the situation and present the incident according to the reflection of a program editor/ channel. In representation, specific discursive choices are also obvious which have been mentioned in media analysis.

**The Media’s Role in Perpetuating Violence in Rawalpindi and Islamabad?**

It is interesting to note that the Government of Pakistan places culpability for either outbreaks or worsening of outbreaks of violence in Rawalpindi-Islamabad on the electronic (including social) and to a lesser extent print media. They are accused of ‘fanning the flames’ by doctoring or manipulating images and pursuing aggressive discourses of retaliation and violence against other civilians or the state. For example, in the well publicized violence that occurred in Rawalpindi in November 2013’s Ashura (religious festival) processions, doctored photos emerged all over electronic and social media, with the purpose of further instigating violence.

While this phenomena has not yet faced critical inquiry in the 2013 Rawalpindi incidents, Akbar, Raza and Ali (2013) interrogated the role of the print media in perpetuating violence after the 2007 assassination of Benazir Bhutto. They found, in three daily Urdu papers (Daily Jang, Nawa-e-waqt and Express), that there is little, if any attention paid to journalistic ethics. This is apparent in the publishing of images of violence, and after incidents, pictures of dead bodies, and dead body parts as the norm. The authors claim that the main aim is to sensationalize the news and grab the readers' attention; one also has to consider what this may do to incite anger and perhaps violence in the readers.

**Overall Media Analysis**

**Types of violence across Rawalpindi-Islamabad**

This analysis finds that the print and electronic medias’ reporting of violence/crime and their types is selective and unrepresentative. Analysis
suggests that media resources are allocated to the presentation of those acts of violence/ crimes that fulfil the subjective ideal of heinous crimes. When a murder occurs, for example, it is not televised on all mainstream channels but specific channels target specific news in accordance with their news agenda. For instance, it was reported on 25 September 2013 on Express TV that in the area of Neelor Police Station of Islamabad, one person was killed and 9 injured in a firing incident. According to police, a quarrel took place between local residents and a state intelligence agency’s guard over a parking issue. The guard who fired also sustained critical injuries. This story was presented on Express News only, although it also followed a particular choice of language, which attempted to obscure the state’s role in the violence. “One person died due to firing of security guard. Initially the security guard did air firing in order to disperse the people but they did not move, so he opened straight fire which caused one causality and 9 injuries.” This story was not covered by any of the other TV channels, perhaps because Neelor is the venue of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities which are subject to extremely high levels of state security and surveillance most of the time. Thus it received very little media attention, which suggests that the independent electronic media may be reticent about confronting state intelligence agencies and their role in violence in the area.

It is pertinent to mention that this newspaper appears different from other Urdu newspapers in the sense it has a critical op-ed section but in terms of news agenda and crime representation, there is no significant difference.

Electronic media’s trend is towards the reporting of murders, drug related crimes, gang firing and child abuse. These trends are not just featured in news highlights but also current affairs programs. These programs follow different reporting strategies. A few present follow up stories with analysis and plead a particular viewpoint and a few others broadcast the story through enactments. For example, “Hum Log” is a program like a street show in which the host travels across different localities and approaches the victim and culprit with his team. It highlights the stories of ordinary citizens and their critical issues and interacts with the victims of serious crimes. It presented a story about the murder of 4 people in one family. Three sisters and one brother were killed a month earlier, and the relatives of those victims and police authorities were interviewed. The programme purported to give a voice to the voiceless poor. The host however,
proceeded to editorialize near the end of show putting the blame on lack of economic opportunity and deviance from religious practices for the murders—consonant with the standard conservative middle class narrative.

There is also a tendency to highlight ‘random’ and shocking violence, especially against children (the majority of which appear to be child abuse). Child murder and kidnapping are often presented as ‘random’, although we suspect there are social or political drivers at play (like family feuds, for example). So, these discourses could be masking the real causes of violence. For example, in the print media (The Daily Express), on 28 August, a case was reported in which a 6 year old girl was kidnapped on her way to study and hanged by unknown people, in the area of Airport Police Station. The possibilities for why this crime was committed are not endless and certainly not limited to ‘random’. Perhaps this crime was committed for revenge or to cause fear in the girl’s family. This could be due to a family feud, ethnic or political reasons, for example. It is worth noting that crimes denoted as random, may not be, yet one cannot speculate on the cause, and input that into the numerics of the media analysis. Perhaps that is why, overall, we have no reported cases of ethnic violence, violence against religious minorities, against blasphemy, or murder due to family clashes. These sorts of motivations for violence, we are more likely to learn about through the ethnographic portion of this research project, and through secondary reports.

A frequently reported category of violence is firing in public places which, suggests that firearms are used to gain or maintain material and social power and security in the twin cities. These stories not only highlight the way violence is transforming public spaces, but how discourses about them create geographies of fear and anxiety in the general public. There are many stories of firing instances reported, which paint a picture of lawlessness and chaos; for example on 23 August 2013 in the area of Shehzad Town Police Station, two unknown people on a bike came to a Madrassh (Madina-tul-ilam) and started firing, killed the manager, student and a man conducting prayer. This kind of story contributes to already pervasive discourses about religious violence between Muslims in the twin cities. Another example is an incident reported in Sector F-8 Islamabad, where two unknown persons on motorbikes open fired blindly into a crowd,
which injured a man and his baby son. Many stories of this nature are reported and surely contribute to the fear of going out into the public sphere for ordinary citizens – for you may be deliberately or randomly fired upon.

There are also sensational examples of firearm violence which gained a great deal of media attention and led to debates about the government’s capacity to protect even its most key stakeholders from violence. On 16th August 2013, an armed man held siege of a public road in Blue Area (Islamabad) with his wife and children, shooting a police officer while he criticised politicians and made a series of incoherent demands, like the proper enforcement of the Islamic system. He tried to move towards parliament using threat of violence but the police prevented him. After five hours he was talked into submission by a politician, and shot by police. The whole drama was broadcast live by majority of the private television channels, all the while TV anchors questioning and commenting on how law enforcement agencies are incapable of maintaining the security of the capital against even a single man. Such stories are major source of fear among citizens.

Another topic, which received a small amount of focussed reporting, discussed the plight of vulnerable communities during monsoon season, which covered the flood warning and post flood disaster situation. Considering the scale of vulnerability to flood hazard in the twin cities, and disasters in recent memory, it is surprising that this topic did not receive more attention. Perhaps the constituencies most commonly affected by the flood hazard: mostly minorities, working class and refugees residing in unplanned settlements, are not prioritised as ‘newsworthy’.

How might this media selectivity for topics and stakeholders be understood? The subjective construction of “newsworthiness” is shaped by news values – their criteria to determine which events come within the horizon of media visibility, and to what extent, and which do not. For example, it was reported that a two years old girl was murdered after being kidnapped. Her dead body was found after three days. This is the only story of this nature reported on TV, yet there were 45 cases of abduction and harassment monitored in print media during the same period. Why was this story, or this stakeholder prioritised over the 44

others? Perhaps it fitted with a specific discourse about violence that the news outlet wanted to purport. If we investigate the reporting methods in this case it reveals many conscious efforts to frame the story in a specific manner, regarding the parental responsibilities. The reporter stated that after the girl went missing suspects were arrested with the help of dogs. The report quoted the victim’s mother, saying that she was ready to forgive them if her daughter was found alive. When she was found deceased after three days, the mother pleaded for justice. The Samaa TV correspondent blamed the mother for bad parenting, suggesting she was ready to forgive the perpetrators because she had made the mistake of not sufficiently watching over her daughter in the first place. The ‘Crime Scene’ host asserted that, “murderers of innocent people forget about their own children while doing such acts, or maybe they don’t have kids”. The report concluded by stating that the parents were careless and the police disinterested. The media attempted to present it in a balanced way but suggested it was a murder perhaps caused by bad parenting. The police never sent the dead body for post-mortem, which raised serious concerns about not only their interest but also it being emphasised that it was a murder without considering that child abuse may have also occurred. Social science research has highlighted that children are abused in Pakistan, but it is rarely if ever reported because of societal stigmas attached with this act.

Morality bound rebukes against victims are a common theme in both the print and electronic media. This seems to be more the case in print media, which does not have the exploratory programmes of electronic media, dealing with drivers of violence in society (although they too can prove discriminatory and biased). For example, the vulnerability and power structures in society which lead people to participating in crime is often left out. Take the example of prostitution. One can argue that it is a rational behaviour to maximise income; one can also argue that it is something that vulnerable and excluded women, men and transgendered people are forced into, either coercively, or due to a difficult economic position. However, the media in Pakistan deals with them as driver of impurity and evil in society, and the language used about them is inherently biased.

An example of the above is the program “Undercover” (27 July 2013) in which presenter Zara Gul exposes the “red light areas” in Rawalpindi-Islamabad during the holy month of Ramadan. She surprises and interrogates women working in brothels and criticises them on religious grounds with statements like “You are doing all this during Ramadan, what kind of a Muslim are you?” The discourse she drives is that they are so immoral that they do not restrain even themselves in the holiest times. She completely neglects the range of socioeconomic factors which may drive people to this profession, and repeatedly denounces them as immoral and non-religious people, with statements, like, “these women have no social or economic compulsion to this but are doing this only because they found amusement in it and have become accustomed to it”…. “they have no economic issues; they are doing this out of their free will”. Indeed, when a fifteen year old girl is found working at the brothel, the presenter adds emotion to the narrative by bursting into tears to arouse the audience sentiment. Still, she does not try to reveal the potential socioeconomic reasons behind such cases and revolves the discourse around the illegality of prostitution, calling for social condemnation of these women. Here arises a question that why does media solely condemn them on religious grounds instead of finding out the social and economic drivers of these institutions. This example illustrates how the media is playing the role of a prosecutor and unfortunately does not give the accused any right to defend or to explain their “wrongful” conduct.

Geographical Distribution of Crime

Different types of crime are reported in different regions of the twin cities. In Rawalpindi main city, there are many police stations and there is variation in the nature of crimes in the range of different police stations. The numbers are not very helpful because of potential variation in populations, but we have been unable to secure the population numbers for each police stations. We will continue to seek those numbers just so as to be able to make some statement on the actual crime rate variation rather than just the raw numbers.
The table highlights that Sadiqabad, Airport and Civil Lines police stations exhibit the highest crime numbers according to the media reports. Robbery/looting are the dominant form of violence across police stations, with 78 cases. Murder is next, with 38 cases, quarrel/fight with 19, 7 cases of kidnapping and 4 cases of gang fire.

**Common Violence Categories in the Twin Cities**

As highlighted in the summary, the most common forms of crime displayed in the media are: social violence, gendered violence and vulnerability related violence. The stories and discourses behind these forms of violence will now be explored in more detail.

1. **Social Violence**
Social violence was the dominant form of violence reported in the print and electronic media, with 384 cases over the 3 month period. Figure 16 above illustrates that in the context of Islamabad-Rawalpindi cities, the dominant forms of social violence reported in print media is theft, with 181 cases. What we can deduce from the reports, as well as conversations with reporters and the local police, is that theft has been on the increase in recent years due to increasing poverty and inequality in the urban areas. Theft has become a major issue and is discussed in media reports as though ‘nobody feels secure’. Muggings (robbery/looting) were the second major form of social violence, with 78 cases. Thieves mugged people at night and day times also even at public places. People are also afraid to intervene for fear that he/she will be killed by the thieves. Armed robbery was a dominant example; for example, Jahan Pakistan, published a story on 8 July of four armed persons on bikes and entered in a shop while other
two remained outside the shop to protect their companions. They looted the 150,000 rupees, valuables and cigarettes were taken from customers and owners at gunpoint. They escaped away while firing in air and the police were yet to locate them. This is not an isolated example, there are many, and unfortunately the media tends to suggest criminals are rarely found, let alone prosecuted, which leads the reader to conclude their is either the incapacity, incompetency or disinterest of the Police or Government in bringing these criminals to justice.

Next, 36 cases of fraud and embezzlement were recorded. The discourse reasons that this crime is a rational behaviour caused by a lack of livelihood opportunities, so people use any chance to maximize their income.

**Geographical Distribution of Social Violence**

The figure below illustrates that highest ratios of social violence are reported in Sadiqaabad police station (27 cases) and among them 15 cases were of robbery/looting. Then Airport police station had second highest number of cases, 24, including theft, firing and fraud/embezzlement. These two police stations also tend to have the highest concentration of low income neighbourhoods in the city.
2. Gendered Violence

The second most common form of violence reported is gendered. This analysis considers not just the numbers reported, but the role of media in highlighting violence issues related to gender. Our categorisation frame includes the following: Harassment; Abduction; Rape; Domestic Violence; Gender based Murder; Prostitution/Trafficking; Child Marriage; Dowry Related; Quarrel/Fight; Other.

Media reports largely included abduction, rape and harassment, out of the above categories.
Figure 18: Types of Gendered Violence Exhibited in the Media

Geographical Distribution of Gendered Violence

The ratio of reported cases across police stations in Rawalpindi-Islamabad is highlighted in the below table.
An interesting finding was that the most reported form of gendered violence was ‘abduction’, with 42 cases were registered in different police stations. In Racecourse police station highest number of cases 9 was registered while at Rata Amral and Civil line police stations 5, 5 cases were recorded. This issue of abduction seems to be a current hot topic for media, and it is discussed in both print and electronic.

The findings show that total three cases of harassment and three case of rape were reported in different police stations. Some are discussed by the media, although these cases are culturally sensitive thus people hesitate to register them and disclose details, for fear of damaging their honor/reputation. It is therefore assumed that the very few cases highlighted by media are a drop in the ocean of the real numbers. Conversely, cases of abduction seem rather prevalent in the media, which leads us to consider if there is some nuance behind the meaning of ‘abduction’ whereby sometimes women’s choices are being criminalised, in other times rape perhaps being disguised as abduction. See Discussion Box 1 for further debate on this issue.
An additional, but only occasionally reported gendered violence was the public beating of women. For example, the story of the Hina Ghafoor (Reported in Newspaper), who told the police station of New town that she was working in her beauty parlour and 4 men who she named (and thus knew) entered and started to beat her. They abused (it is stated implicitly that this was sexual abuse) her and when her brother came there the criminals fled while using abusive language.

3. Vulnerability-related violence

This research project is interested in exploring how physical vulnerability to hazards, and poor basic services can lead to violence. It considers how infrastructure and environment can shape the way people not only experience harm from hazards (e.g. floods, landslides etc), but also how people interact with each other leading to violence (e.g. a violent quarrel emerging over a ceased water supply in a specific neighbourhood).
Considering the above, the media analysis found that there is, generally, no coverage of violence with connection to services and infrastructure but sometimes the issue of water availability and its cleanliness are covered. For example, a report was televised on Geo News (30 July) that WASA's 40 out of 53 water filtrations plants are not providing clean water to the citizens, which causes around 200,000 fatalities in a year. It also included that under the Capital Development Authority (CDA) only 5 plants out of 33 are providing clean water to the residents of Islamabad. It referenced a Drinking Water Research Center (University of North Carolina) report as well and highlighted that the following areas are suffering as a consequence: Sadiq Abad, Sixth Road, A Block, Satellite Town, Dhok Kala Khan, Banni Chowk, Darya Abad, Rawal Chowk, Raheem...
Abad, Khayaban-e-Sarsayad, Dhok Rata, Commercial Market, Bagh Sardara’n and Mohan pura.

Moreover, there is coverage of protests in the post-flood situation about the ineffectiveness of CDA and Rawalpindi Development Authority. Additionally, there are demands in the media reports for vaccinations to avoid epidemics from the city district government as well. Apart from these there is not any emphasis on the theme of vulnerability.

Discussion Box 2: Media Framing of Youth Violence

An additional area we considered was youth violence. First of all we consider how the media defines ‘the youth’. Reporters tend to use the word ‘girl’ or ‘boy’ if he or she is in the range of 10-20 years old. Those who are less than 10 years in case of females are labelled, “little girl” or “kamsin bachi” and in the case of males “kid” or “bacha” is used. Those who are less than two years old are called “infants”. When discussed in the media, youth violence tends to include serious violent and delinquent acts such as aggravated assault, robbery, rape, injury, death and homicide, committed by and against youth. These young persons are reported as the victims and the perpetrators. The gendered violence examples most frequently concern youth.

In print media particularly, there is no visible sign of youth violence but one can infer that most cases of violence reported in news concern youths in one way or another. Male youth, are the mostly frequent demographic involved in stealing vehicles, and drug-related crimes. Still the media does not attempt build a discourse about the issue of “youth violence” and consider the drivers of violence committed by and against the youth; it is reported with the same sensibility as other crimes. A lot of violence against youth is framed as ‘random’, and little investigation seems to be put into understanding whether there were specific drivers of the incidents.

Another common violence reported, which concerns the youth is the abduction and sexual harassment of women. Often physical ‘relations’ between male and female youth, were reported as abusive situations where the male youth was the perpetrator and female the victim, particularly in cases of abduction. There is a fear discourse built across media outlets, that if young people leave their homes without family consent then they are extremely vulnerable to abduction. This discourse gives rise to fear among women particularly, preventing women from leaving their homes. Of the 42 acts of female abduction reported, the majority of the victims were aged 14 - 26 years.

Youth also became victims of violence in the twin cities due to perceived courageousness. For instance, in the area of Rata Amral Police station, a resident of Dhok Hasoo was murdered by robbers. The boy had parked his motorbike in the street outside his home and saw that someone was taking away his bike. He ran to follow him but other partner of robber opened the fire and killed the boy. The police have registered the case. (Daily Express Urdu, 24 August 2013)

There is frequent coverage of violence against children, often exposing the faces and names of children while broadcasting the stories of their abuse. Sometimes print media also publishes the photographs of kids who are victims of the violence, further humiliating the victim, yet the media does not consider the ethical dimension.
6. Social capital

6.1 Definitions of social capital

Social Capital (SC) is a widely cited and loosely defined concept, which has gained popularity in development and academic discourses in recent decades. In 2014, there exists over 3500 articles with Social Capital in their title on the Social Sciences Citation Index. Its most commonly cited definition is: “features of social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1995:66). The terms used here are open to various conceptual interpretations, which has left the task of defining theory and measurement wide open. Social Capital began in the domain of Sociology, where theorists tried to understand how social relations, specifically networks of people/groups, may influence particular social, political or economic outcomes; the basic narrative being that social interactions between individuals or groups lead to social networks. Through increased interaction, confidence is built and reciprocal actions start. Over time, trust builds between actors, as well as common values, which lead to the formation of norms and culture. According to social capital literature, then, a community has been generated. According to theorists, then, social capital exists within this community, and it can be built up, like a ‘stock’ which grows or is reduced according to its usage. This stock is assumed to enhance the efficiency of actors to pursue specific goals (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Serageldin and Steer, 1994; Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1995; Bebbington and Perrault, 1997; Poder, 2011).

Of course, while the concept began in the domain of economic sociology; where social capital could lead to economic gain through better educational outcomes (Loury, 1977; Coleman, 1990; Bourdieu, 1986); more efficient organisations (Granovetter, 1973; 1995); higher economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997) and financial development (Guiso et al 2004). Central to most arguments was that social capital started through individual, rational self interest and through reciprocal action, trust and social norms, it became the property of groups and
networks. According to Bourdieu (1986) there are three forms of capital, economic, cultural and social; the three can be transferred or exchanged for another. Thus an individual or group with high levels of cultural or social capital can use them to secure economic outcomes e.g. access to specific employment because of one's networks, and vice versa e.g. using one’s economic means to acquire cultural or social capital. Bourdieu’s concept of the economy broadened investigation to include matters traditionally conceived of as cultural, social, political.

Henceforth, from the 1990s, the investigation of social capital branched outside economic sociology to politics, criminology, development studies, public health studies and more. Putnam (1995) introduced social capital to political science, arguing that it is a property of communities, or even nations, which is intrinsically ‘for the public good’. He argued it lead to better functioning democracies. Following on from Coleman, Social Capital inheres in relationships amongst individuals and groups, where trust, obligations, reciprocity and eventually norms develop (and are socially transferred) which allow groups within social structures to have collective efficacy: acting together to reach common goals (Putnam 2000). Putnam equates it with ‘civic virtue’ or ‘civil society’. This is the idea that well governed societies are driven by trust (the higher the level of trust in a society, the higher level of cooperation) and civic engagement (the more people become involved in associational life, the more they build trust, reciprocity and norms). In theory, then social capital, or civil society could benefit other areas, than political governance alone. Thus, the literature extended to considering the role of social capital in communities, covering in particular, but not limited to crime and health outcomes. As this research project focuses on these two areas in the urban sphere, these two fields will be briefly covered, followed by our definition of SC.

In 1942, Shaw and McKay hypothesized that income inequality in geographically bounded communities leads to social disorganization through a breakdown of social cohesion and normlessness. As a result, SC or ‘social cohesion’ were linked with rates of violence and/or crime, because they argued that communities
lacking Social Capital are less effective at enforcing informal social control (ISC) and thus preventing deviant behaviours (Sampson and Wilson, 1995). ISC is argued by Putnam to lead to better governance (public services through civil society enforcing checks and balances) and lower crime rates (an individual is less likely to commit a crime if his community punishes deviant behavior). This theory has been empirically tested in a number of ways, particularly in urban areas. The premise is that, with increased population density, increased ethnic and social heterogeneity, and more anonymity (due to these factors), it is harder to develop norms and enforce ISC (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999); thus there are less reputational costs associated with committing a crime (Sickles and Williams, 2002). There are also more opportunities for criminals to interact. In theory then, social capital is lower in urban areas (New South Wales Study, 1997). Various researchers (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, 1997; Bursick and Gramsmick, 1993; Land et al, 1990; Taylor et al, 1984; Sampson and Groves, 1989) found that law enforcement and public control is higher in communities with extensive civic engagement. In a world where INGOs were gaining more relevance, and the concepts of development and security were becoming closer linked in the discourse; Social Capital became very exciting to INGOs and policymakers. It inspired policy makers to seek new ways to promote ‘community bonds’ and social institutions.

Our study does not just consider physical forms of violence, but also ‘infrastructural violence’. This concept refers to how infrastructure – housing, roads, streets, water supply and sanitation systems – particularly in urban areas, and layered with hierarchies of power which translate into physical and psychological harm (Rogers and O’Neill, 2012). Infrastructure shapes the ways in which people interact with each other; in urban spaces this is compounded due to the density of populations and often insufficient infrastructures to support their daily lives. SC is interesting to this research as it may play a mitigating or compounding role in the translation of infrastructural issues to experienced violence. For example, SC has been linked to better health and quality of life outcomes (Kawachi et al, 1997; Marmot, 2012; Helliwell, 2002; Rose 2000; Islam et al 2006). Researchers link social capital to the socioeconomic conditions of the
places in which people live (Diez-Roux, 2001). Consequently, this makes it a more useful concept for public health and social epidemiology because it draws attention to material conditions and the policies that influence them (Carpiano, 2006). First, SC is seen as a conduit for increased access (through networks) to either health services or knowledge about lifestyle/health. Second, it can lead to greater checks and balances upon basic service providers, like government or community organizations (Knack, 1999). Thirdly, it can be a buffer in areas of high inequality (particularly in areas of minority ethnic populations), against the negative impacts of discrimination and poverty upon health (Uphoff, 2013; Pickett and Wilkinson, 2008; Pearson and Geronimous, 2011; Sun, Rehnberg and Meng, 2009). Davis (2012) sums up the role of good quality social capital in the face of urban infrastructural and armed violences as ‘resilience’ – where actors and infrastructures producing violence in insecure urban contexts can be marginalised or eliminated by various groups working cooperatively, particularly in the context of an absent or minimal state. Fundamentally, though, urban resilience is built most strongly by good, inclusive urban planning which secures livelihoods and basic services, as well as safe movement. These seems somewhat idealistic in the context of contemporary urban, and rapidly urbanising Pakistan, although there is the beginnings of work in theorizing how this may look, with work from Raman (2008) at MIT.

This study is particularly focussed on infrastructural violence, vulnerability and WASH. Are there connections between WASH delivery (or lack thereof) and experienced violence? Recent research by Rogers and Satja (2012) and Gupte (2012) in India suggests so. Previous research has also linked SC and WASH outcomes. Kahkonen (1999) finds that where government irrigations or drinking supply systems fall short, collective management by community members can lead to either better performance of the system through self-management, or pressure leading to government intervention. Similarly, with urban sanitation, whole sanitation systems have been constructed without subsidy by networks of local individuals working together in a ‘self-help’ model (OPP; Hasan, 2003; Wright, 1997). Some key success factors are collective and reciprocal actions, shared values and norms, trust and social repercussions for deviance. The benefits
of improved WASH are innumerable, particularly for the urban poor, and especially women, who tend to suffer disproportionately in terms of their health and livelihoods. Therefore, can SC mediate the violence associated with WASH? On the other hand, can SC lead to more violence? Consider the phenomena of water mafias, which are gangs who take control of water supply in urban areas and extort the public with exorbitant prices to access it (Bousquet, 2006; Giglioli and Swyngedouw, 2008; Gupte, 2012). This has been argued to exist in some of Pakistan’s urban centres, like Karachi. Social networks in the power structure are integral to the working of the mafia; corrupt politicians and government servants support their work for bribes and delay the building of new infrastructure, and that could be conceptualized as social capital as well, albeit perverse (Qutub, 2006; Mustafa, 2013).

Unfortunately, the negative forms and impacts of SC have been largely ignored in the academic and policy literature until the last decade. Until then, general assumption existed that SC brings only benefits to individuals, communities or nations (Hauberer, 2011; Rubio, 1997; Woolcock and Narayan, 2001; Portes and Mooney, 2003). The literature has generally ignored the ‘perverse’ outcomes that can result from group behaviours, such as power hierarchies which prevent social mobility or restrict individual freedoms; criminal gangs or crime syndicates; exclusion of non-members; or taking resources away from one group to give to another (Mustafa, 2005; Portes and Mooney, 2003; Rubio, 1997; Mustafa, 2005; McIlwaine and Moser, 2001; Hauberer, 2011; Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2011). Portes and Mooney (2003) highlight 4 negative consequences of SC: exclusion of outsiders; excessive claims on group members; restrictions on individual freedoms, and downward leveling norms. This research project will investigate if perverse SC plays a role in masculinities and violence in the urban sphere.

Across disciplines, SC investigation and measurement has tended to focus on the following areas:

1. **Types of network** – do they bring together people from the same (bonding) or different social groups (bridging, or linking) in order to gain or trade ‘resources’
Strength of network ties – do networks have strong links (ties) or weak ones? When there are gaps (structural holes), which person or group with enabling contacts or knowledge gains power by being an intermediary?

2. Membership of Groups - Thus membership to groups and associations (formal or informal) can leads to interaction and networks in a community whereby the membership is deemed to be enough to benefit from its networks and thus can increase the level of SC within a community

3. Generalised trust - built through interactions with those within the network
Reciprocal actions - engaging in actions which are beneficial to others will in future mean actions will be performed for your benefit

4. Shared Values and Norms - The more interactions, trust and reciprocity, the more shared values and norms emerge, which are then shared or transmitted

5. Informal Social Control - As a result of norm and value transmission, ISC can develop (provided there are not too many ‘openings’ in the network for individuals or groups with different values), where communities can hold powerful institutions to account with checks and balances, or prevent deviant behavior occurring

6. Outcomes – Did SC achieve what it set out to do? Did positive or negative outcomes occur?

Narayan and Cassidy (2001) and Hauberer (2011) argue that most commonly, SC is measured via proxy indicators of a) generalized trust (self-assessed via survey questions) and b) membership in organisations (through survey or secondary data collection). At closer glance into the vast literature, one finds that additionally, common proxies have included, c) ‘civic virtue’ via voter turnout rates and voluntary giving (e.g. donating blood or to charity) (seen as a form of reciprocal action), d) network strength through self-assessments of time and quality of certain person-person or group interactions, and e) informal social control through survey questions covering community mediation of anti-social behavior.

There has been great criticism of measurement of SC to date. It is rarely clear how SC is conceptualized, before it is measured. Survey techniques can also be greatly affected by the personal characteristics of the participants (Hauberer,
2011; Reuband, 2001). In the same line of thinking, is estimating your trust in a community/person the same as ‘doing’ trust? (Hakli, 2009; Portes and Mooney, 2003). Can survey questions really be a measure of the way a society thinks and acts collectively? Perhaps they can show an indicative correlation at a specific moment in time, but not a reliable measure of a society’s SC. Study results do tend to correspond well with outcomes that can be expected on the basis of other data on the observed social groups and communities (Glaeser et al. 2000; Delhey and Newton 2003; Rahn et al. 2003).

However, this study considers new methodologies from Human Geography in the field of SC. Geographers argue that SC research tends to homogenise space and reduce human action to a set of rational behaviours in a depoliticized environment. They call for a return to Bourdieu’s conception of SC; this time though developing more comprehensive mechanisms to analyse the power relations in which SC is constituted and reproduced. This should focus on how actors and groups gain power and how conflicts of interest are resolved within a network (Mohan, 2012; Naughton, 2012; Cannone, 2009; Hakli, 2009). Key to this method is the analysis of discourses; which are seen to develop common languages and norms. Furthermore, they can lead to ISC through either legitimizing punishment, or through power/knowledge (Appadurai, 2000; Blokland and Savage, 2008; Hakli, 2009). Naughton (2013) suggests a narrative approach, which maps out relational geometries to see how to see how actors with power can lead to structural change for whole networks. Blockland and Savage suggest analyzing how people’s social ties are locally organized, and how this affects their access to resources. All authors in this line of thinking emphasize grounded analysis, considering the power structures and discourses within their social contexts. Therefore an ethnographic approach to SC measurement is essential.

After consideration of the literature, and our research aims and constraints, we consider the following aspects of SC measurable:
A) Outcomes
   i) Efficacy – what did the person or group set out to achieve and were they successful in that endeavor?
   ii) Quality – did SC production/networks lead to positive/productive outcomes (such as reduced incidences of violent behaviours; less anxiety; increased access to services), or perverse/negative outcomes (such as increased crime/violence; prevention of individual freedoms; control over resources) – and for whom (for example, being in a gang can have positive outcomes for its members and negative outcomes for society, see McIlwaine and Moser, 2006).

B) Mechanics
   i) Associational membership – what types of different associations are people members of – informal and formal? How do these memberships affect access to power and/or resources?
   ii) Connections – what kinds of personal connections do people have within and outside of communities? How do these connections provide or prevent support, power, resources?
   iii) Informal Social Control – how does the community control deviant behaviours through either a) Discursive power (power/knowledge) leading to trust and reciprocal behaviours or b) Disciplinary power (sanctions, violence)?

Normative values – what are the common languages, norms and values within the community/network?

Figure 21 below summarizes the conceptualization of social capital in terms of the efficacy and normative values emergent from associational membership and informal social control. In other words we are not just interested in the existence of social life, of informal social controls, but in how efficacious they are and what types of normative values they encapsulate. For each of the outcomes of efficacy and normative values in the context of associational life and informal controls, specific metrics will have be developed to make a judgment on the quality of the social capital.
Figure 21: This Project’s Conceptualisation of Social Capital Mechanics

At this stage, we have decided to explore these aspects of SC through some survey questions, and participant observations. The aim is to get a grounded understanding and contextualized of the different elements of SC within the researchable communities, before prescribing a specific research tool. The biggest project ahead of us is to define the metrics and then match the appropriate methodologies with each of the outcomes.

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

7.1 Geographical Areas Proposed For This Research

A total of six field study sites have been identified for detailed research through the twin cities of Rawalpindi/Islamabad. The field study sites include, France Colony, Afghan Colony, Katarian, Dhoke Naju, Arya Mohalla and Dhoke Sayedan. In this section we will briefly outline the profile and rationale for choosing these study sites. The list of field study sites is not likely to stay static.
As new questions and research problems present themselves through the course of the research, additional field study sites may also be included.

France Colony is an informal and technically illegal shanty town in the middle of one of the most expensive and upscale neighborhoods in Islamabad and hence Pakistan. It is populated almost entirely by sanitation services workers, and labourers in the informal sector, belonging to the minority Christian community. It derives its name from the fact of being next to the former site of the French embassy to Pakistan. The neighbourhood is almost entirely on the steep slopes along the banks of Saidpur Kas, a tributary of the Lai river that flows through Rawalpindi and Islamabad. The area is highly exposed to flooding, but has a strong network of church groups as well as civil society based actors, by virtue of its proximity to the virtual epicentre of the NGO community in Pakistan. The point of selecting this site was to incorporate a lower class religious minority neighbourhood, which is researchable. In this instant a long history of developmental interventions creates data base of knowledge about the community that the ongoing research can tap to answer the research questions of concern.

Afghan Colony is another informal shanty town at Islamabad’s boundary with neighboring Rawalpindi. The neighbourhood was originally populated by Afghans but relatively recently there has also been a sizeable influx of internally displaced people from Pakistan’s tribal areas. The internally displaced people are of Pashtun ethnicity fleeing the ongoing war between Pakistani military and the Taliban in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This locality was selected because of its high concentration of Afghan refugee population, which exists in a legal limbo between legal and illegal immigrants, and the internally displaced people who have come to have a sizeable presence is many urban areas of Pakistan.

Katari is a working to lower middle class neighbourhood on the Rawalpindi side of the boundary from Afghan colony. This neighbourhood has a much more diverse ethnic make up, practically reflecting the ethnic and religious mix of the
overall city. It is populated indigenous as well as immigrant populations from all over Pakistan. The neighbourhood being in the vicinity of the main bus depot in the city, with buses coming in from all over the country is a major hub for recent immigrants. The neighbourhood is also in the flood plain of the Lai River and is often featured in the local newspapers because of flood damage and also its very high crime rate.

Further in the city is the relatively older neighbourhood of Dhoke Naju. The neighbourhood is again in the flood plain of the Lai and is mostly populated by working to lower middle class residents. The economic profile of the residents however, improves to middle class as one moves further away from the Lai. The neighbourhood was formerly a village outside of Rawalpindi, which essentially was absorbed into the city as it expanded through the 1960s. The neighbourhood has a more established urban profile unlike the informal shanty town character of France and Afghan Colonies or the peri-urban migrant character of Katarian.

The Arya Mohalla in the heart of Rawalpindi City is on the original neighbourhoods of Rawalpindi. It is characteristic of a mixed neighbourhood in terms of the economic profile of its residents. Within the same street one could find residents ranging from working to lower middle, to financially quite affluent residents. Being an old settled neighbourhood with some of the residents having lived there for generations, it offers contrasts to the newer and more peripheral neighbourhoods discussed earlier one. This temporal and class variation is going to be material to investigating possible gradients of social capital quality, access to services and vulnerability across the neighbourhoods.

Dhoke Saidan is a peri-urban neighbourhood at the southern margins of Rawalpindi. It is an area built around a former village, where the urban sprawl along the road relatively quickly gives way to agricultural fields. Some of the urban development is thanks to land grabbing by real estate mafia, but much of it is also legitimate buys by real estate speculators from the rural agricultural owners. The area is in a state of flux and unlike the France and Afghan Colonies, which fall under the CDA, Katarian, Dhoke Naju and Arya Mohalla which fall
under the civilian Tehsil Municipal Administration, Dhoke Saidan falls in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence controlled, Rawalpindi Cantonment Board. As discussed above, Cantonment Boards are often deemed to be better purveyors of services to their residents by virtue of their association with the military. The selection of this neighbourhood not only provides a genuine peri-urban neighbourhood in the sample but also ensures that the three dominant samples of institutional governance in Pakistan are accounted for.

**7.2. Gaps and Ways Forward**

This scoping report has outlined the way forward for the remainder of the more than 90% of the research effort ahead of us, by pointing out key gaps in the literature as well as providing common definitions and understandings of key concepts. We described the process and impacts of urbanization in Pakistan and argue that despite paucity of reliable numerical data, one can safely state that there are likely to be profound political changes as a consequence. We have tried to outline some of those potential changes in this report. We further outlined our understanding of violence in its spectacular, infrastructural and disempowering senses, and stated our intent to carry forward with our analyses based upon this understanding.

In addition to violence we also outlined our understanding of the concept of vulnerability, as a state of being whereby one is susceptible to suffer damage and is relatively unable to recover from the damage inflicted by environmental or social hazards. Lastly we also outlined our understanding of social capital in terms of associational life and informal social control. We contend that the efficacy of and normative values underlying associational life and informal social control are the key outcomes that should be measured to get some sense of the quality of social capital. We shall be devising specific metrics and methodologies for measuring social capital quality.

Besides the common understandings there are some gaping holes that appeared in our analysis, in terms of data and understanding. Beyond the demographic
numbers, the simple numbers for violent crimes within the twin cities are hard to come by even from the media. Although the media monitoring exercise was useful in terms of assessing the role of media in understanding and at times even fomenting violence, we need to go much deeper and need much more information to get a clearer picture. The key insight to emerge was that without in-depth ethnographic field study it is unlikely that we will be able to understand the different types, causes and impacts of violence in the twin cities. Furthermore, there are a few other quantitative data gaps that we have identified but that are peripheral to the key insight of the importance of ethnographic research in addressing our questions.

We hope that the profile of the twin cities will be useful for other practitioners operating the twin cities and perhaps even colleagues researching comparable cities in the global South. Perhaps this scoping report can be the basis of future comparative urban research.

**Note:** We gratefully acknowledge the invaluable support of our Research Assistants in Rawalpindi-Islamabad: Abdul Rehman, Rashda Khan, Sahrish Kanwal, Abdullah Subayul and Nasra Khan and contributions from temporary Research Assistants Jalal Shehzad and Huma Shad.

**References**


Action Against Hunger. (2007). *Nutritional Anthropometric Survey Rawalpindi City* (pp. 1–33).

Action Aid. (2013). Women and the City II: Combating violence against women and girls in urban public spaces - the role of public services (pp. 1–72).


____________________(2005). *City Profile: Rawalpindi/Islamabad* (pp. 1–98).

____________________(2010). *Three Years Rolling Health Plan 2010-2013: District Rawalpindi* (pp. 1–104).


Johannessen, L. M. (2013). *Cities in Developing Countries and Their Development in Response to Climate Change and Resource Scarcity*.


National Transport Research Centre. (1995). Greater Islamabad Rawalpindi Area Transportation Study (GIRATS) (pp. 1–9).


Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies. (2013). *Sectarian Violence Policy Brief* (pp. 1–3).


__________ (2012). *Social Audit of Local Governance and Delivery of Public Services* (p. 172).


