Urbanization, Gender & Violence in Millennial Karachi: A Scoping Study

Dr Nausheen H. Anwar, Dr Daanish Mustafa, Ms Sarwat Viqar, Ms Amiera Sawas, Dr Humeira Iqtidar

Department of Geography, King’s College London

©2013 by the Author(s)
This paper is posted at King’s College London, Department of Geography at http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/geography/research/epd/workingpapers.aspx
Urbanization, Gender & Violence in Millennial Karachi: A Scoping Study

Lead Author: Dr. Nausheen H. Anwar

Co-Authors: Dr. Daanish Mustafa, Ms. Sarwat Viqar, Ms. Amiera Sawas, Dr. Humeira Iqtidar

February 2014
# Contents

1. Executive Summary .......................................................... 3
   1.1 Study Context and Research Agenda .................................. 3
   1.2 Key Findings of this Scoping Study .................................. 4
      Literature review .......................................................... 4
      Media Analysis ........................................................... 6
   1.3 Primary Research Agenda ............................................. 7

2. Introduction ........................................................................... 8
   2.1 What is The SAIC project ............................................... 8
   2.2 Purpose and objectives .................................................. 10
   2.3 Methodology ................................................................ 10

3. Urbanization in Pakistan ...................................................... 11
   3.1 Trends in Urbanization in Pakistan ................................... 12
      Natural Change .............................................................. 13
      Migration ......................................................................... 16
      Governance ...................................................................... 20
      Urban Sprawl .................................................................. 22
   3.2 The Impacts of Urbanization in Karachi ........................... 23
   3.3 Planning Karachi ............................................................ 27

4. Basic services and Infrastructure ........................................... 34
   4.1 Summary of Basic Services ............................................. 34
   4.2 Water, Sanitation, Hygiene (WASH) and Health ................ 37
   4.3 NGO Landscape in Karachi and Types of Assistance ........ 40

5. Violence in Pakistan’s Urban Centers ................................... 43
   5.1 Types of Violence included in this Study ......................... 43
   5.2 Media representation of gender & violence in Karachi ........ 48
   5.3 Summary of Findings ..................................................... 57
   5.4 Gender and Violence in Karachi ...................................... 65

6. Vulnerability and social capital ............................................. 72
   6.1 Definitions of vulnerability ............................................. 72
   6.2 Measuring vulnerability – tools and populations ............... 72
   6.3 Karachi’s vulnerable populations ..................................... 73
   6.4 Definitions of social capital ............................................. 75

7. Conclusions and Recommendations .................................... 83
   7.1 Geographical areas proposed for this project ................. 83
   7.2 Key stakeholders ......................................................... 86
   7.3 Gaps & Way forward ..................................................... 86

References ............................................................................. 87
1. Executive Summary

1.1 Study Context and Research Agenda

This scoping study is part of a research project entitled ‘Gender and Violence in Urban Pakistan’. This is one of 15 projects being conducted across the world which form the larger Safe and Inclusive Cities Project (SAIC). Co-funded by the International Development Research Center in Canada (IDRC) and the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), SAIC is directed towards understanding the drivers of violence in the urban areas of the global South so as to inform evidence-based policy making for safe and inclusive cities. This project, on urban Pakistan, focuses on the material and discursive drivers of gender roles and their relevance to configuring violent geographies specifically among urban working class neighbourhoods of Karachi and the twin cities of Rawalpindi/Islamabad. The research is primarily concerned with investigating how frustrated gendered expectations may be complicit in driving different types of violence in urban areas. The project is also concerned with addressing first, the material aspects of gender roles through improved access to public services and opportunities, and second, discursive aspects of gender roles in terms of public discourse, education and media.

The purpose of this scoping study is to bring together existing knowledge on the process of urbanization, and the interplay of gender roles, vulnerabilities, and violence in Pakistan. With an awareness of existing knowledge and knowledge gaps, the research team has been able to form a research protocol with a view to exploring known links and gaps in knowledge on the aforementioned themes. Methodologically, the study undertakes a review of the academic and policy related literatures, combined with a 3 month media analysis of selected print and online newspapers, television and radio which are relevant to national and local discourses about violence in Rawalpindi-Islamabad.

By undertaking an analysis of such links between urbanization and violence, this study concludes that various types of urban geographies and the associated infrastructure therein enable or produce distinct forms of violence in Pakistan. In definitional terms, violence here is understood as the use of or threat of physical force in attaining particular aims. This understanding of violence allows an analytical distinction between ‘violence as a product’ and ‘violence as a process’.
An accompanying expansion of focus led to the inclusion not only of spectacular forms of violence (like terrorism), which is quite common in Pakistan, but also the much more common, persistent and understudied forms of everyday violence.

1.2 Key Findings of this Scoping Study

i) Literature review

Types of violence

The review of available literature carried out in this study reveals that everyday violence is often seen taking three distinct manifestations:

- **Spectacular violence** - that instills fear and destroys or transforms geographical places and spaces;
- **Infrastructural violence** - violence generated through the organization of space and infrastructure in particular ways;
- **Violence of disempowerment** - flowing from Arendt (1973), is violence as loss of power.

There is a fourth type of violence often seen in the literature, i.e. structural violence, but for a variety of reasons this type will not be covered in this project.

Vulnerability-Violence Nexus

A more informed analysis of risks and specifically the geographical dimensions of violence could be understood by utilizing the concept of vulnerability. The term here is taken to mean the susceptibility to suffer damage from environmental hazards and extremes, and the ability of households and communities to recover from them. Hence ethnicity, class, gender, age, and associated political economy factors are central to this particular understanding. Based on recent developments within the field, the Vulnerabilities and Capacities Index (VCI) (Mustafa et al, 2010) has been selected as an appropriate metric to assess the vulnerability profiles of households and the neighbourhoods chosen for this research project.

Social Capital Quality and Violence
The final area of focus is a review of the literature on social capital, and the various ways that the concept has been studied in the context of urbanization, gender, and violence. This discussion opens up several interesting questions such as:

- Can social capital be used to enhance service delivery, specifically in water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH)?
- Can poor quality social capital, also labelled as anti-social capital, instigate different forms of violence?

The literature review also informs the direction taken by this research in problematizing traditional ways of measuring social capital, and drawing distinctions based on the quality of social capital, rather than the mere accumulation of it.

The challenge outlined is that aspects of social capital need to be examined and measured through various ways, which are best suited to capture its efficacy and quality. The aim here is to get a grounded and contextualized understanding of the different elements of social capital, of both the positive and the perverse kinds, that emerge in the shape of associations, trust, interpersonal connections, and informal social control within geographically bounded, but undoubtedly globally interconnected neighborhoods and communities.

**Urbanization, gender and violence in Karachi**

Finally, the empirical literature on the themes and areas central to the larger project reveal several important facets. Pakistan currently has the highest rates of urbanization in South Asia, with a projected population of 335 million by 2050, and an annual urbanization rate of 3.06%. In consequence of this demographic and economic transformation, the city of Karachi has witnessed significant changes in social formations, as well as land structure and use patterns. Karachi is Pakistan’s largest city; according to estimations its population grew 115% between 1998-2011, from 9.8 - 21.2 million people. Its economic imprint is far larger than any other metropolitan centre in the country. Its volatile and incredibly violent political economy has been shaped by regional factors and migrations, following the two Afghan wars, and the rise of unplanned settlements, which house nearly 60% of the city’s population.
The most obvious violence outcomes related to Karachi’s urbanization are:

- The proliferation of guns, drugs and criminal gangs;
- The rise of ethnic and communal violence, which resulted in nearly 2000 killings last year, and;
- The continued perpetuation of environmental and infrastructural degradation, leading to increased insecurity in the daily lives of residents.

All of this operates in a context where the state often acts as a ‘private’ actor by colluding with various gangs, and where law and order institutions, such as the Rangers, are some of the primary actors complicit in the different forms of violence taking place.

ii) Media Analysis

A complementary examination of primary news sources, undertaken to explore the discursive dimensions of violence and the construction of gender roles, both male and female, finds that media reportage is fraught with jingoism and deeply embedded ethnic, sectarian and religious bias. The rhetoric of terrorism is used often and conflated with other kinds of violence, even everyday criminality. In Karachi, particularly with a high-level of everyday violence, the label of ‘terrorist’ often serves to criminalize and pathologize groups who are marginalized in terms of ethnicity and class. This extends to the way certain areas of the city are represented as inherently violent.

The review, which covered a period of four months, highlights several key points:

The discourse is focused on ‘targetted killings’ in Karachi, with extortion and terrorism, state violence and social violence subsuming religious, political and especially gender violence.

Other forms of violence captured include violence related to water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), and violence that emerged as a result of specific vulnerabilities, such as natural hazards and socio-economic risks.

Media coverage of state violence, especially that which is carried out by the Rangers, paints a relatively rosy picture. Rangers officials are often highlighted as taking part in ‘targetted operations’ aiming to bring down the incidents of targeted killings, extortion, and kidnapping. There is little to no coverage or
Mention of the kind of fear and violence instilled by such state authorities in low-income areas.

A distinctive feature of both print and electronic media is the underreporting of gender related violence, a subject that the media barely highlights particularly in relation to domestic or intimate partner violence (physical, sexual and/or psychological abuse). The media’s lack of constructive engagement with, or deliberate neglect of, domestic violence is especially striking given that experts have found such violence to be an “extremely common phenomenon in Karachi” and prevalent in households with the least resources.

In the instances where gender related violence is reported, women are portrayed as either voiceless victims, or immoral or impure ‘temptresses’. The focus of stories is mostly on harassment, rape and abductions where girls/women are portrayed as victims, or on cases where a husband has killed his wife’s lover, portraying such incidents as the outcome of the woman’s aberrant or immoral behavior. There is a question over whether reports about abductions could be, in some cases, examples where women have exercised their choice in terms of romantic partner, but this choice has been vindicated by her family and thus reported as abduction. In our media tracking, we observed approximately 161 incidents of gender related violence across all print and electronic news sources. Within this category, gender-based murder stories were most prevalent, followed by rape and domestic violence. Only 10 incidents of abductions were reported in that time period.

Through such coverage, it can be said that the media plays a role in society’s understanding of particular kinds of gender roles, and the moral over and undertones attached to particular kinds of behavior.

1.3 Primary Research Agenda

For the purpose of a detailed examination of urban social transformations and extant trends in gender and violence, a total of three sub-municipalities have been chosen in Karachi. These are Orangi Town, Bin Qasim Town, and Jamshed Town. All three municipalities comprise a mixture of low to middle income neighborhoods that experience moderate to severe infrastructure shortages and have histories of violence ranging from political to ethnic to sectarian and state-driven. The project will employ a mixed methods approach, using questionnaires
to capture first the vulnerability profiles of households and neighbourhoods. Then, through further interviews and ethnographic methods, it will explore the multiple linkages between vulnerability, gender roles, social capital, and the types of violence that take place within these neighborhoods.

This scoping study serves as the first step towards the larger project. It can act as a resource base for those who are concerned with issues such as gender, social capital, infrastructure and violence across urban Pakistan and more specifically in Karachi. More broadly, we hope that this review of the literature and the profile of the city will be useful for others researching similar dynamics in cities in the global South.

2. Introduction

2.1 What is The SAIC project

The Safe and Inclusive Cities Project (SAIC) is a multi-country project directed towards understanding the drivers of violence in the urban areas of the global South so as to inform evidence based policy making for safe and inclusive cities. The project is co-funded by Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and UK’s Department for International Development (DFID). A consortium led by the Institute of Business Administration (IBA) with the Department of Geography, King’s College, London (KCL) successfully bid for a contract to research gender and violence in urban Pakistan, focusing on the mega-urban centre of Karachi and the mid-level urban conurbation of Rawalpindi and Islamabad.

The ongoing research on gender and violence will investigate the material and discursive drivers of gender roles and their relevance to configuring violent geographies specifically among urban youth in 4-6 working class neighborhoods of Karachi and Rawalpindi/Islamabad. The concern is primarily to investigate how frustrated gendered expectations may be complicit in driving different types of violence and how they may be tackled by addressing first, the material aspects of gender roles through improved access to public services and opportunities, and second, discursive aspects of gender roles in terms of public education and media. To address these broad concerns the research posed the following research questions:
1. How are discursive and material constructions of gender linked to urban violence in Karachi and Rawalpindi/Islamabad?

To address the above research question the following sub-questions are posed:
- What kinds of violence have been experienced by the inhabitants of specified localities? How often and by whom?
- How is violence defined and experienced by these inhabitants?
- How is private and public violence linked within these localities?

In terms of material drivers of violence the attention is on access to services for fulfilling some key gendered responsibilities such as care giving and livelihoods. But it is also understood that access to such services is often mediated through the quality of social capital in a community. Accordingly the research asks:

2. How could the quality of social capital and access to higher quality social capital be improved for the poorer residents of Rawalpindi/Islamabad and Karachi?

To address the above question in a conceptual and then in a policy response mode the research poses the following sub-questions:
- What are the possible metrics for defining social capital quality?
- What are the gendered pathways to accessing high quality social capital?

The research is also focussed on the issue of social vulnerability to environmental and social hazards. Accordingly there is a concern with how social vulnerability intersects with access to services and exposure to environmental hazards. Therefore the research asks:

3. How does the social vulnerability profile link with the incidence of violence in the poorer neighborhoods?
- What is the gendered social vulnerability profile at the household and community level?
- What are the key drivers of vulnerability and what policy interventions could address them?
This scoping study is a first step towards addressing the research questions outlined above. The rationale for this scoping study is outlined in the sub-section below.

### 2.2 Purpose and objectives

The scoping study has been carried out with the following purpose in mind:

1. Provide a preliminary assessment of the contours of urbanization trends, violence and vulnerability in the Karachi context.
2. Highlight the representation of gender and violence in print and electronic media.
3. Highlight the NGO discourses on gender and violence.

This study also lays out certain objectives that undergird the broader SAIC project. These objectives are:

1. Map key literature and concepts and the main sources and types of evidence available.
2. Produce a ‘history’ that contextualizes Karachi’s post-Independence political-economy of urbanization and infrastructure provision in relation to the changing institutional landscape.
3. Review concepts and the relationship between vulnerability and social capital.

By contextualizing both purpose and objectives, this scoping study endeavors to identify what we know and do not know, and to set this within policy and research contexts as we move forward in implementing the larger project.

### 2.3 Methodology

This study relies on a comprehensive examination of secondary literature on Karachi’s urbanization, attendant pressures on infrastructure and the complexities of its post independence political-economy that has contributed to the contemporary dynamics of violence. This includes sources such as academic papers, NGO reports, human rights reports and legal reports. The methodology also relies on primary sources for tracking print and electronic media reports encompassing a period of 120 days (July – October 2013) for different categories of violence, as well government policy reports, statistics and exploratory interviews with journalists, NGO representatives, police officials and community activists.
3. **Urbanization in Pakistan**

Pakistan has the highest rates of urbanization in South Asia, with a projected population of 335 million by 2050, and an annual urbanization rate of 3.06% (Table 1). In Sindh and Punjab almost half the populations are already urbanized, while in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Baluchistan provinces the level is significantly lower (16.87% and 23.89%, respectively), but catching up. More than half of the total urban population of the country lived in 2005 in eight urban agglomerations: Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Multan, Hyderabad, Gujranwala, and Peshawar (Figure 1).

Pakistan is undergoing a demographic transition to a youthful country and is experiencing the growth of rapidly expanding primary (megacities like Karachi) and secondary (smaller towns) urban centers as a result of rural–urban migrations (Mustafa and Sawas 2013). Karachi’s population is estimated to have grown 155% between 1998 and 2011, from 9.8 – 21.2 million residents\(^1\). This means it may be the fastest growing city in the world (Hasan, 2014). While Pakistan’s largest cities continue growing, an interesting development in recent years has been the growth of smaller cities of between half to one million inhabitants (Hasan and Raza 2010). These towns are expected (Burki 2011) to more than double in size between 2000 and 2025. Pakistan’s total urban population is around 35%, with projections at 50% for 2030 (UNDP 2012). Around 70 million people are living below the poverty line and extensive concerns have been raised about the country’s ability to cope with population growth. New challenges are emerging for government in terms of service delivery, particularly in urban areas (Kugelman and Hathaway 2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total %</th>
<th>Rural %</th>
<th>Urban %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) According to the government’s 2011 pre-census house count.

\(^2\) Rupees 2,248 and 1,854 per capita per month are used as poverty cut-off points for urban and
Sources: Various GOP Census Reports; Hasan & Mohib (2003)

3.1 Trends in Urbanization in Pakistan

We unpack urbanization trends through the lens of (1) natural change; (2) migration; (3) governance and (4) sprawl, all key dynamics that taken together have significant implications for cities such as Karachi and Rawalpindi/Islamabad. We explore each separately and then move on to a specific discussion of how these affect Karachi. First, it is pertinent to note that Pakistan has not completed a census since 1998. The 2011 census was barely underway when it was suddenly postponed for various reasons ranging from resource constraints to political interference in Sindh and Baluchistan. There have been a range of different research publications from government, INGO, NGO and academic actors since, which cover population demographics and urban growth; thus we rely on a combination of sources for reliable estimations, but we maintain a cautious attitude towards their scalability and reliability in comparison to an official census.

We are also sensitive to some criticisms of the above publications (including the census), which touch upon what is counted as ‘urban’. For example, the United Nations Population Division (UNPD 2012) estimates that by 2025 approximately half of the country’s population will reside in cities. The Planning Commission of Pakistan contends that peri-urbanization trends have already pushed the country towards the 50% mark. Take Karachi, for example, some urban planners posit that approximately half of the population resides more than 10 km from the city.
centre (Qureshi 2010) – this may not have been counted as urban in official censuses or research, but the lives of these residents are almost certainly urban in character. In the 1981 Census the definition of ‘urban’ changed, to include only areas designated as part of municipal corporations and cantonment boards. In the province of Punjab, this change in definition led to approximately 1462 communities with populations exceeding 5000 being classified as rural, when perhaps they should have been counted as urban. In cities like Lahore, new administrative boundaries did not account for contiguous small towns that enjoy strong economic and physical linkages with the city. If these populations had been added, Lahore’s overall population estimate would have jumped from 5 to 7 million people (Ali 2003). Therefore there is arguably an under-representation of the urban, which has socio-economic and political consequences.

The ‘urban question’ in Pakistan is, then, a contentious one. This is not only due to methodological conundrums about defining the ‘urban’, but also such classification entails important outcomes for the national political-economy. We remain aware that an accurate picture of urbanization in the country is unlikely, whilst small towns and urbanizing rural areas are systematically misrepresented as rural. The methodology for classifying the ‘urban’ has important implications for the national political landscape, in terms of job quotas, electoral constituency delineations, and formal municipal governance structures. Unfortunately, these political implications (shifting power balances and resources from rural to urban) may have something to do with this misrepresentation; this will be discussed under the governance section.

**Natural Change**

The expansion of Pakistan’s population began in the early decades of the 20th century and accelerated after Independence from British colonial rule in 1947. In the immediate aftermath of Independence, expansion was predicated on the unprecedented population movements across the India-Pakistan borders. From the late fifties until the seventies, urbanization quickened due to the introduction of green revolution technologies that displaced small producers and landless labor, and also due to industrialization that had catalyzed rural-to-urban and inter-provincial migrations geared toward new industrial urban nodes such as Karachi. Today, Pakistan is ranked as the world’s sixth most populous country. When compared with countries in South Asia, Pakistan’s annual population growth rate is deemed ‘alarmingly high’ (Khan 2010). The decades between 1950
and 2012 have witnessed a five-fold increase in Pakistan's population to approximately 187 million (Table 2).

### Table 2: Demographic Trends 1951 – 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>187.34</td>
<td>91.10</td>
<td>96.23</td>
<td>67.32</td>
<td>119.68</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>64.5 64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>156.26</td>
<td>75.14</td>
<td>81.09</td>
<td>53.85</td>
<td>102.41</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>63.9 63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>133.32</td>
<td>64.16</td>
<td>60.17</td>
<td>43.32</td>
<td>90.00</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>62.7 60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>84.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>65.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>42.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>33.74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: SDPI (2008); GOP, Federal Bureau of Statistics; CIA World Factbook; UNPD (2008); various GOP Census Reports.

A combination of declining mortality, improvements in public health and lower incidence of epidemics and famines has contributed to population expansion. Even though there is extensive uncertainty about Pakistan's future population trends, experts (Sathar et al 2013) project a fertility decline with the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) decreasing to 2.3 in 2027. Between 1950 and 2000, Pakistan's population was estimated as very young with 60% below the age of 25. This age structure has remained stable moving into the new millennium, and not only is it expected to sustain Pakistan's 'population momentum' (Sathar et al 2013) but also presents challenges viz. employment opportunities. Pakistan's 'youth bulge' with an estimated 60% of the nation's population below the age of 30 years, denotes a demographic transition with an urban bias. With a median age at 20, the profile of future urban population will continue to be 'young'. Urban centers will be highly congested as large and growing young population would migrate for education and skill development prospects as well as for seeking employment opportunities.
Accompanying these demographic adjustments is an increasing literacy rate especially in urban areas (Table 3). Between 1981 and 1998, the urban literacy rate increased from 47.12% to 63.08%, with female literacy jumping from 37% to 55% percent. These changes denote the substantial investments made by the private sector in primary and secondary education. Moreover, during the same period there was a marked change in the married population, which declined from 64% to 58% in urban areas (Table 4). The most substantial decline was noted in the 15-24 ages cohort with an overall decrease from 27% to 21%, and specifically for women this rate fell from 42% to 30%. Experts suggest these changes signal strong correlations between declining fertility, increasing literacy and the rising trend of working women in urban areas.

**Table 3: Literacy Rate 1981 to 1998 with Karachi & Rawalpindi/Islamabad Breakdowns**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total literacy</td>
<td>23.17</td>
<td>17.33</td>
<td>47.12</td>
<td>43.92</td>
<td>63.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>35.05</td>
<td>26.24</td>
<td>55.32</td>
<td>54.81</td>
<td>70.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>15.99</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>37.27</td>
<td>32.02</td>
<td>55.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4: Married Population 1981 – 1998 with Karachi & Rawalpindi/Islamabad Breakdowns**

* N.B. Rawalpindi aged 15-24 years breakdown is taken from PSLM 2010/11 and not the District and City Census reports, which do not include that age breakdown. This may account for higher literacy ratio as compared to 1998 census figures, which populate the rest of the table.
Migration

Broadly speaking, migration or movement encompassing displacement and resettlement is the legacy of two Partitions that have shaped Pakistan: 1947 or the year that marked independence from British rule and led to the partitioning of India and the birth of Pakistan; and 1971 when the secession of East Pakistan led to the creation of the modern nation-state of Bangladesh. These partitions have involved millions of people moving continually between points of arrival and departure. In 1947, nearly 4.7 million Sikhs and Hindus left Pakistan for India, and in contrast 6.5 million *muhajirs* (migrants) left India for Pakistan. This event pushed Sindh’s population up by 6% with the two main cities of Hyderabad and Karachi being affected the most. Between 1941 and 1951, the urban populations of these increased by cities a staggering 150%. In contrast, northern regions such as the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) registered a population decline from 18% in 1941 to 11% in 1951. This happened not only due to the departure of Hindu populations from the new territory of Pakistan, but also migrants from India did not settle in regions like KP, preferring to make home in cities like Karachi, Hyderabad (Sindh) and Lahore and Rawalpindi (Punjab). Cultural-linguistic commonalities with the new migrants, and matters of political economy and infrastructure made the provinces of Sindh and Punjab natural choices (Ansari 2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National %</td>
<td>Rural %</td>
<td>Urban %</td>
<td>National %</td>
<td>Rural %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 – 24 Years:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>34.99</td>
<td>35.71</td>
<td>27.07</td>
<td>29.03</td>
<td>32.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>21.05</td>
<td>50.74</td>
<td>21.04</td>
<td>16.07</td>
<td>47.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35.71</td>
<td>21.04</td>
<td>16.07</td>
<td>47.23</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27.07</td>
<td>50.74</td>
<td>21.04</td>
<td>16.07</td>
<td>47.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.03</td>
<td>21.04</td>
<td>16.07</td>
<td>47.23</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32.27</td>
<td>21.04</td>
<td>16.07</td>
<td>47.23</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>21.04</td>
<td>16.07</td>
<td>47.23</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.59</td>
<td>21.04</td>
<td>16.07</td>
<td>47.23</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17.56</td>
<td>21.04</td>
<td>16.07</td>
<td>47.23</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17.24</td>
<td>21.04</td>
<td>16.07</td>
<td>47.23</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 15 Years:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>68.75</td>
<td>70.58</td>
<td>64.46</td>
<td>63.04</td>
<td>65.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>65.24</td>
<td>72.24</td>
<td>66.97</td>
<td>61.36</td>
<td>59.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70.58</td>
<td>72.24</td>
<td>66.97</td>
<td>61.36</td>
<td>59.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64.46</td>
<td>72.24</td>
<td>66.97</td>
<td>61.36</td>
<td>59.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63.04</td>
<td>72.24</td>
<td>66.97</td>
<td>61.36</td>
<td>59.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65.58</td>
<td>72.24</td>
<td>66.97</td>
<td>61.36</td>
<td>59.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58.38</td>
<td>72.24</td>
<td>66.97</td>
<td>61.36</td>
<td>59.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56.13</td>
<td>72.24</td>
<td>66.97</td>
<td>61.36</td>
<td>59.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58.20</td>
<td>72.24</td>
<td>66.97</td>
<td>61.36</td>
<td>59.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60.52</td>
<td>72.24</td>
<td>66.97</td>
<td>61.36</td>
<td>59.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More recently, millions of Afghan refugees have fled conflict towards Pakistan’s urban centers, firstly around 1992 (around 4 million) and then in 2001 (around 2 million); this makes Pakistan host to the largest refugee population in the world (UNHCR 2013). Their mass movement into the cities has no doubt had social and political impacts. For example 600,000 eventually settled in the city of Karachi; the majority of these refugees are ethnically Pakhtun, and their migration to Karachi has quickly increased the ethnic Pakhtun population to around 25% (Ur Rehman 2013), challenging the socio-political balance of power (Kronenfeld 2008).

The 1998 census revealed nearly 45% of total urban growth in Pakistan was due to natural increase and 40% due to internal migration. Even though internal migration declined in the period between the 1981 and 1998 censuses, this may have changed due to new displacements and migratory movements associated with the protracted conflicts in Afghanistan as well as in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Intensifying migratory movements may also be related to the deep structural changes underway in rural Sindh where caste systems are breaking down and village societies are in a state of flux. In the new millennium, data on the changing dynamics of rural-urban, inter-, intra-provincial and international migrations remains sketchy given there has been no national population census held since the last one took place in 1998. The 2011 census was barely underway when it was suddenly postponed due to numerous reasons ranging from resource constraints to political interference in the provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan. Nevertheless, case studies (Raza & Hasan 2009; Memon 2005) suggest within Pakistan both international and internal mobility remains unrestricted.

The 1998 Census and recent reports suggest migration takes place predominantly from those areas that are impoverished or where there is intense pressure on land and resources, or where industrialization has not taken place, for instance in interior Sindh and in Baluchistan where high poverty incidences are predicted. According to the Government of Pakistan (GoP) poverty rose from 17% in the late 1980s to 34.5% in 2001-02 and then declined to around 22% in 2005-06. This decline was noted both for rural and urban areas: rural from 39.3% to 27%, and urban from 22.7% to 13.1% (Jamal 2005). Even though urban poverty has stood
Urbanization, Gender & Violence in Millennial Karachi: SAIC Scoping Study

at less than half of rural poverty, recent poverty measures indicate there has been an overall increase in the percent of Pakistan’s population living below the poverty line. Recent research suggests a general increase to 37.33% in 2010-2011 against 29.76% in 2004-2005, with poverty in rural areas up from 30.74% to 39.42% and in urban areas or in large cities such as Karachi up from 14.7% to 24.03% (Jamal 2013). This means that even though poverty is rising in urban areas, they remain more attractive as settlement options for migrants than the rural areas.

In its recent Annual Report (2013) the State Bank of Pakistan estimates that populations in urban centers are poorer than rural areas, and that inequality has been on the rise for the past decade. The Report states: “The distribution of both income and consumption is highly skewed in urban areas, and this inequality is rising over time”. The report further states the top 20% of urban households receive 60% of total income and in contrast the bottom20% share only 5% of total income and expenditures. Notably, the Report’s contrarian position underscores that the commonly held assumption of an urban-rural divide based on increasing economic prosperity may be of limited significance in Pakistan's urban context.

For the landless, who account for more than half of the rural population, migration to the city seems like the only option in the face of fluctuations in wages, demands for wage labor and food prices (Gazdar 2002; Memon 2005; Hasan and Raza 2009). As a result, these migrants find ways to settle in their new urban sphere, mostly in ‘unplanned settlements’ where service provision is weak and there is greater exposure to vulnerability in terms of a variety of health impacts and hazards (Ghani 2009). At least one in every three city dwellers in Pakistan lives in conditions that are slum-like, where residents have limited access to decent shelter and a minimum of basic amenities. Residents in unplanned settlements often find work in the informal economy and rely on systems of brokerage for building homes and getting access to infrastructure. In Pakistan, in terms of the proportion of urban population living in unplanned settlements or katchi abadis varies between 35 and 60 percent. The growth of these ‘Abadis' in cities such as Karachi has particularly been massive. In Karachi abadis increased from 212 in 1958 to more than 500 presently (Arif and Hamid 2008). In cities

---

2 Rupees 2,248 and 1,854 per capita per month are used as poverty cut-off points for urban and rural areas, respectively.
such as Lahore, there are more than 300 unplanned settlements and in Faisalabad at least 40 percent of the population lives in such abadis.

In many cities, the informal economy accounts for as much as 60% of employment of the urban population and may well serve the needs of an equally high proportion of citizens through the provision of goods and services. The rapid urbanization poses major challenges in three key areas, which are interconnected, including urban governance, urban poverty and urban services delivery. Even in incidences of economic growth in Pakistan’s cities, income distribution is highly unequal, due to an unequal distribution of economic opportunity, ownership of land and property and financial assets and an uneven access to social services like education, health, water and sanitation and economic opportunities and a failure to generate revenue for social and physical infrastructure.

Something to consider is the gender dynamics of urbanization, poverty and inequality in developing world cities. UN-Habitat (2003) highlights a new phenomenon called the ‘feminization of urban poverty’. According to their research, most of the migrants who end up living in vulnerable circumstances in cities tend to be women. For example, women who walk an average of 3 kilometers a day to collect water, endure the indignities and dangers of unhygienic toilets, shared by hundreds; who are most vulnerable to crime and violence. UN-HABITAT identifies women, children, widow, and female-headed households as the most vulnerable groups among the poor.

What is becoming clear, is that urbanization does play a key role in the relationship between the citizen and state in Pakistan (Ali 2013; Hasan and Raza 2009; Mustafa and Sawas 2013; Arif and Hamid 2009). Urbanization does compound resource-gap, service delivery and quality of life issues including crime and violence, as well as struggles for political and social power. But it also opens up opportunities for new social and political structures to be forged, which may include (or exclude) those migrants from rural areas who previously were at the margins of the spaces where the social contract between the state and society is negotiated. Politics, whether informal or formal thus becomes an essential tenet of issues of urbanization in Pakistan (Anwar 2014; Mustafa and Sawas, 2013).
Pakistan is a federal republic comprising four provinces: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan. These provinces are divided into 111 districts, 397 towns and 6044 unions which are the lowest tier of government. Since independence from British rule in 1947, Pakistan has relied on centralized structures of federal governance. Its bureaucracy and military elites have copied the institutional and organizational style of the colonial state (Jalal 1995). With little room for democratic articulation, authoritarian tradition and military rule have shaped the structures of governance. This has meant not only an unabashed reliance on centralized, elite-backed visions but also the undermining of democratic efforts. However, the year 2008 marked a profound change for Pakistan’s political institutions. The restoration of democracy, the ensuing completion of a civilian government’s political term in 2013, and the ensuing election of a new government have altogether changed the balance of power within the federal system. The passing in 2010 of the 18th Amendment which pushes for center-provincial power sharing arrangement signals a commitment to improving the role of local government and the empowerment of local communities (Adeney 2012).

Despite a democratic turn and new power-sharing arrangements, governance structures remain mired in controversy. Longstanding demands over the division of resources and for the reorganization of provinces along ethno-linguistic lines, and delayed local government elections are still pervasive. Coming back to the earlier point, regarding controversy over how the ‘urban’ is classified and its great implications for governance: an accurate representation of the urban through censuses is expected to lead to a shift in the nation’s electoral balance, away from rural toward urban electorates. This is significant given that Pakistan has traditionally been governed by rural elites whose political power has depended on a captive workforce-cum-electorate. The political consequences of urbanization present new electoral opportunities for both urban-based political parties, such as the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), new contenders such as Tehreek-e-Insaf as well as for coalitions of religio-political parties such as the Difa-e-Pakistan Council. Urbanization in Pakistan also poses major economic challenges in terms of employment opportunities and provision of basic infrastructure services. Pakistani cities have long-suffered a housing crisis, which has intensified along with the inadequate provision of infrastructure.
Governance tensions are visible in terms of the regional politics that undergird Sindh’s and by default Karachi’s governance, and speak to new political aspirations tied with the devolution of power and decentralization policies implemented under General Pervaiz Musharraf’s military regime (1999-2007). The lingering effects of Musharraf’s devolution plan, which was suspended during former president Asif Ali Zardari’s civilian regime (2008-2013), are significant. In provinces like Sindh the effects are manifest in the heightened demands of different political and ethnic groups seeking realignments in center-provincial and intra-provincial powers. In Karachi the most trenchant demands for local government reforms have been put forth by the regional ruling party, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) which has demanded a return to the 2001 devolution system. Such demands have been challenged by Sindhi nationalist parties such as Sindh Tarraqi Pasand and Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz who view devolution/decentralization as a means through which the MQM aims to gain wider control of the city, leading to further deepening of long-standing cleavages between urban Sindh and the extensive hinterland.

When the Devolution Plan was implemented across Pakistan in 2001, all three levels of local government were given considerable autonomy to raise funds and plan and implement physical and social developments. In this process, the roles of the zila nazim and the District Coordinating Officer (DCO) became significant. The DCO oversaw the functioning of all government departments in the district. Devolution presented new opportunities to improve service delivery. For instance, in Sindh and Punjab, water supply was devolved to the local Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA). But devolution also brought new challenges concerning the management of water and sanitation. We discuss this issue in greater detail in section 6 on basic services and WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene). Prior to the 2001 devolution plan, planning and implementation were controlled by the provincial government. The new system was in a process of experimentation when it was suspended under Zardari’s government. Critics claimed the bureaucracy had been made subservient to the nazims who had allegedly acquired too much power. Studies carried out in certain UCs of Punjab suggest that clan and caste grouping and patron-client factions have increased as a result of the devolution plan and development has become more unequal as nazims have invested in areas where votes were guaranteed (Cheema & Mohmand...
In terms of women’s participation, a significant change that was introduced under the 2001 Local Government Ordinance was the reservation of 33% seats for women at all tiers of local government. This included direct election to the lowest tier of local government, i.e. the union councils (NCSW 2010). Aurat Foundation estimates that in Pakistan overall 90% of these seats were occupied and around 32,222 women were elected as union councilors.\(^3\) Most NGOS and international donor agencies lauded this participation as a sign of empowerment and a positive signpost leading towards greater gender mainstreaming in the political process. However, the deeply entrenched gender bias in state and political leadership was revealed in the subsequent 2005 local bodies election, when women’s reserved seat at the local bodies level were reduced as a result of a general reduction in directly elected union councilor seats – from 21 to 13 (Mezzara et al 2010). Critics have also pointed to the fact that, especially in rural areas, those women who did get elected remained bound to patriarchal family and clan interests. What kind of dynamics women’s participation as a large cadre of union councilors created in urban areas, especially in cities like Karachi, is an issue that is unexamined.

**Urban Sprawl**

In Pakistan, urban sprawl is extensive and encompasses two dynamics: state policies for population dispersal and conversion of agricultural to urban land. Migration and population dispersal have created significant changes in the morphology of Pakistan’s urban centers. From the twin cities of Islamabad-Rawalpindi to Faisalabad, Lahore and Karachi, the effects of urban sprawl are palpable in the outward expansion of metropolitan regions or the area’s contiguous urban development. Since urban areas in Pakistan face an acute shortage of housing for low-income groups, with an overall housing deficit of 5 million, typically it is the unemployed, homeless or poor migrants who find affordable shelter on the city’s expanding periphery. State policies to launch new housing schemes in peri-urban areas (Khan 2009)\(^4\) generate sprawl often through the conversion of agricultural land (Anwar 2014). Such planning projects tend to

---

\(^3\) Aurat Foundation Annual Reports 2006 & 2007.

bypass environment-impact assessments resulting in longstanding peri-urban communities being deprived of land and livelihood. Unsurprisingly, sprawl has also led to automobile-dependency with little investment in public transport.

In Karachi the pattern of population density and urban sprawl has been changing continuously since Partition in 1947. Since the 1980s, state-led middle-income housing schemes such as Taiser Town and Khuda Ki Basti, and unplanned settlements such Orangi Town and Baldia in the western regions have expanded the metropolitan boundaries by swallowing up public and agricultural land. As Karachi’s population density gradient has declined (Akhtar & Dhanani 2013), the development of new roads and flyovers and more recently extensive conversion of rural into urban land (OPP-RTI 2013) have further redefined the city’s metropolitan limits. It is to a discussion of the impacts of urbanization on Karachi that we now turn.

### 3.2 The Impacts of Urbanization in Karachi

The annexation of Sindh in 1843 and the making of Karachi as the provincial capital had rested on British plans to construct a ‘trooping town’ and a port that would serve as the gateway to Afghanistan, Punjab and western parts of British India. Particularly, it was Britain’s competition with imperial Russia during the Great Game (1813-1907) that amplified the need to construct a modern port near Central Asia. Today Karachi serves as a key nodal point for the movement of supplies and equipment for NATO and American forces in Afghanistan. By the early twentieth century Karachi had become a major commercial center and the third largest port in British India. It was also an attractive destination for traders drawn from the coastal districts of the Subcontinent. Under colonial rule Karachi emerged not as an industrial center but as a commercial port oriented to the metropolitan economy and exposed to planning strategies that optimized its function within a colonial world economy. Due to this cosmopolitanism that colonialism had catalyzed, Karachi came to be regarded as a bridgehead of imperial culture and modernity set apart from its rural hinterland. This wedge between Karachi and its hinterland has amplified over the decades, more so since Partition; a prominent feature being its marking as a Muhajir city.

Today Karachi is Pakistan’s largest metropolis and the center of finance and commerce. In 2007, its per capita output exceeded the national average by 50%
Urbanization, Gender & Violence in Millennial Karachi: SAIC Scoping Study

and the provincial average by around 80%. Karachi accounts for a third of the total national output in large-scale manufacturing, 24 percent in finance and insurance, and 20 percent in transport, storage and communications. The city is also valued for government-revenue generation. While it accounted for 14.5 percent of domestic output, approximately 54 percent of all central government tax revenues were collected in Karachi. As a port city, Karachi’s monopoly over sea bound trade makes it a prime site for the collection of custom duties. Moreover, being the point of import/manufacture of a large proportion of the goods that attract sales tax, Karachi is a high contributor to national sales tax. Finally, hosting the largest population employed in manufacturing, retail-trading and services, Karachi is also the highest contributor to the central government’s income tax revenue.

With an estimated population of 21 million, Karachi is considered one of Asia’s fastest growing cities. Its population density is 17,325 persons per square kilometer compared with 12,700 in Lagos and 9,500 in Mexico City (Cox 2012). Karachi’s population estimations vary considerably and in large part this is due to the lack of a census since 1998. In Table 5 below, the lower figure of 13.5 million is based on a conservative growth rate of 3.5% as reported in the 1998 census, whereas the higher figure of 21 million is based on the preliminary results of the 2011 House Listing Survey.

### Table 5: Estimating Karachi’s Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>21 million</td>
<td>House Listing Survey, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>13.5 million</td>
<td>Pakistan Economic Survey, 2009-2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the implementation in 2001 of the Sindh Local Government Ordinance, metropolitan Karachi experienced major territorial readjustments. Declared a ‘city district’, Karachi was divided into 18 downs and 5 districts (Map 1). A sixth district, Korangi, was recently added in October 2013 in the course of new territorial adjustments that are taking place in the post-May 2013 election phase. Each town is governed by an elected municipal administration that is responsible for infrastructure, spatial planning and municipal services. Towns are further subdivided into 178 localities that are governed by elected union councils or UCs.
These are the core of the local government system. The 2001 devolution and attendant territorial adjustments signaled a major departure from the inherited colonial system of governance: centralized, bureaucratically oriented and provincially controlled.

Map 1: Karachi Towns and Districts

Source: Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, 2013

The impacts of urbanization on Karachi are complex and significant. Although these effects are not so different from other cities in Asia, certain issues nevertheless set Karachi apart. An issue concerns the city’s strategic role in the regional conflict in Afghanistan, which has had a direct impact on Karachi’s political-economy: first in terms of the circulation of drugs and arms and second in terms of migration as more and more people displaced from Afghanistan and the northwestern regions of Pakistan have moved to Karachi, seeking shelter and livelihoods. Another concerns the highly fragmented nature of land-ownership in which 13 different authorities ranging from the military and federal government to provincial and local organizations compete in the city’s planning and management, and often encroach on each other's jurisdictions sparking conflicts (Hasan et al 2013.) Yet another effect concerns the asymmetrical relationship between the city and its hinterland, a dynamic shaped by post-Partition politics and the subsequent rise of urban-based Muhajirs who have demographically and electorally outnumbered ‘native’ Sindhi and Baloch populations. Given Karachi
Urbanization, Gender & Violence in Millennial Karachi: SAIC Scoping Study

contains 62% of Sindh’s urban population and 30% of its total population, and employs 71% of the province’s total industrial labor force, this dynamic has enormous bearing on Sindh’s political-economy which is driven by Karachi, an increasingly heterogeneous city in contrast to Pakistan’s other urban centers. This asymmetry has triggered conflicts concerning the control for city’s resources as well the nature of governance and political representation at district, provincial and federal levels.

In the post-devolution phase, the Karachi-based regional party the MQM experienced a landslide victory in the 2005 local election. Its representatives were propelled to the helm of city government and the appointment of a charismatic mayor, Mustafa Kamal, ushered in an era of global aspirations and entrepreneurial ambitions nourished by ‘Dubai Dreams’ to remake Karachi a world-class city. But the devolution of power in Sindh was understood as symbolic of the MQM taking control of the city. Subsequently, after the 2008 elections and Pakistan’s turn to democracy, the local government system was suspended under the regime of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) that reinstated the old provincial/bureaucratic system of governance. Since then political parties in Sindh have been at loggerheads about the precise nature of local governance, with some parties legislating for a hybrid system (part bureaucratic-part decentralized) e.g. the Sindh Local Government Ordinance 2013. Nevertheless, much confusion remains and the MQM and PPP representatives continue to accuse each other of pursuing unilateral agendas.⁵

According to the 1998 Census, approximately 64% of all internal migrants had migrated to urban areas and 25% had left for cities like Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi where employment opportunities can be found. The most consistent and leading internal migration pattern is from the province of KP to Sindh, with migrants gravitating toward Karachi where there is continual demand for unskilled and skilled labor. In recent years this pattern has intensified due to the effects of the US-led ‘war on terror’, drone strikes and Pakistan military-led operations which have displaced hundreds of people both in the KP and in the contiguous FATA. Again, due to the lack of population census, there are no clear cut statistics on the number of internally displaced refugees from KP and

---

FATA and their settlement trajectories. However, small-scale case studies (Anwar 2014) and media reports indicate displaced refugees have found employment and settled in cities like Karachi.

Karachi’s unrelenting expansion is fueled by natural growth and particularly by rural-urban, inter-provincial, and transnational migrations. The constant dynamics of displacement, settlement and movement incessantly reshape the city’s geography and socio-economic landscape. Since the 1960s, the extensive migration of Pushto-speaking populations from Pakistan’s northwestern regions, and the arrival from Punjab of white-collar, skilled and semi-skilled workers to support the city’s rapidly expanding services sector have changed Karachi’s as well as Sindh’s demographic balance. Migratory aspects of urbanization are also predicated on the effects of Partition in 1947 when the city’s and the province’s demographic dynamic changed considerably due to the influx of 600,000 Urdu-speaking Muslim refugee-migrants or muhajirs from the northern and western territories of India. Between 1947 and 1951 the city’s population increased by 145% triggering not only a massive housing crisis but also transforming the cityscape and political-economy. The crisis of housing provision for Partition refugees/muhajirs was the single most significant issue that surfaced both at the provincial and federal levels (Ansari 2005; Zamindar 2007; Daechsel 2011).

The socioeconomic and demographic impacts these migratory movements catalyzed were intense as caste organizations and professional networks weakened and local-national political contexts shifted. In Sindh, such change divided indigenous Sindhi-speaking populations from the newcomers or the Urdu-speaking muhajirs, and set the stage for Karachi’s violent political-economy (Gayer 2007; Ansari 2005; Verkaaik 2004). Unsurprisingly, Karachi’s ethnic conflicts remain rooted in the historic demographic transformation. The 1998 census also revealed 42% of Sindh’s urban population was Urdu-speaking whereas only 2% in rural areas spoke the language. Sindh’s linguistic divide is reflected in contemporary regional politics, with the muhajir population traditionally aligning with the center and the Sindhis demanding political autonomy and governance decentralization (Sayed 1995).

3.3 Planning Karachi
Under General Ayub Khan’s military regime (1958-1969), the 1958 Greater Karachi Resettlement Plan was implemented to re-engineer urban space and social life in the city center. The main thrust of the plan was to resettle refugee-migrant populations by moving them from the city’s center and relocating them in satellite towns such as Landhi-Korangi and New Karachi that are situated on the eastern and northern fringes. With the advent of industrialization, Karachi was fast emerging as a key industrial center attracting new waves of migrant-workers from all over Pakistan. The 1958 Plan endeavored to strategically interlink two objectives: resettle migrant-refugees and simultaneously develop industrial estates adjacent to the satellite towns, thus serving the demands of both labor and capital. In these efforts, the 1958 Plan symbolized an ambitious urban undertaking that transformed patterns of segregation and settlement, and encompassed considerable demolition, inner city slum clearance and the deliberate driving out from the city center of a predominantly working class population.

In the decades before Partition, Karachi’s urban space and social life were characterized by heterogeneity and a level of compactness in which elites and workers had lived in close proximity. During colonial rule the elites had occupied the most central parts of the city, for instance Civil Lines and Saddar and social segregation was constituted through housing arrangements (Lari & Lari 1997) that did not favor the poor. Akin to cities in South Asia and Latin America, in Karachi too colonial officers were preoccupied with health and sanitation issues that enabled them to organize urban space and to diagnose the city’s disorders. Even though physical separation between the elite and working class was pervasive under colonial rule, the patterns of segregation changed significantly in the post-Partition era. While concerns with sanitation remained important, social control was a key factor driving the military state’s interventions. The shifting of working class populations and migrant-refugees to the city’s periphery represented an all out effort to find a solution for the chaotic post-Partition environment and attendant social tensions. A significant effect of this early planning was a disjunction that emerged between the city’s central areas meant for the upper and middle classes and the peripheral areas meant for the poor or working class.

Since industrialization scarcely kept pace with the grand plan to build industrial estates near satellite towns where infrastructure service provision was negligible, the resettled populations soon found themselves isolated and unemployed. Unsurprisingly, many attempted to move back to the city center or to sell their new homes. With no land available for squatting in the city center, the corridors that connected the center with the periphery soon witnessed the rise of unplanned settlements. With continuous rural-urban and inter-provincial migration especially from Pakistan’s northwestern regions, and the exodus of the working class to the city’s fringes, the trend of unplanned settlements accelerated resulting in a pattern of urban sprawl that now dominates Karachi’s development.

Notably, with this trend a new avenue of homeownership has also opened up for low-income groups: through brokers and lower echelons of the state, subdivisions of land become available for sale on the city’s periphery. Hence, since the sixties Karachi has become a city in which people of different classes are separated not only by housing arrangements and quality of life, but also by widespread distance.

Even though early planning endeavors are understood as emblematic of state failure due to the unsuccessful resettlement schemes, conventional interpretations (Hasan 1987) have missed a key point: the unplanned city that has emerged as a consequence of the early planning is constitutive of the rationally planned city. The expansion of the periphery through the proliferation of unplanned settlements has been guaranteed by a state that has granted the ‘unplanned’ exceptional status as ‘illegal’. Legal uncertainty has fixed unplanned settlements in a way that land tenure for the poor is always defined and facilitated on the basis of executive fiat. Since the 1980s, different decrees under different regimes have been passed and suspended on the basis of executive discretion, i.e. the Sindh Katchi Abadis Act 1987 that set out the criteria for the formalization of unplanned settlements, and the Sindh Gothabad Act 1987, 2008 and so forth. These decrees for land regularization also encompass exceptions such as a minimum of 40 households must be established in order to become eligible for regularization. Those who reside in the unplanned settlements never receive any kind of financing to build their own houses. Typically, people build houses by taking loans from brokers, family members or moneylenders. House construction
can take decades with infrastructure provision lagging unless community based organizations and NGOs intervene through self-help schemes.

Today unplanned settlements define the city’s spatial landscape and remain critical in housing over 60% of its population (Table 6). Unplanned settlements or *katchi abadis* have grown at twice the rate of planned settlements, and Karachi’s urban expansion continues to follow the historical pattern of urban sprawl through the subdivision of land and the construction of unplanned settlements.

**Table 6: Population of Karachi’s Unplanned Settlements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
<td>4,901,067</td>
<td>8,540,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Households</td>
<td></td>
<td>227,000</td>
<td>356,000</td>
<td>700,152</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Population</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hasan (2010)

The new pattern of urbanization based on urban sprawl that emerged after Partition has defined Karachi as a city dispersed along a center-periphery continuum. The key characteristics of this continuum are: (1) For the working class, extensive distances from place of employment with an average three hours commute; (2) Dispersion and low density in unplanned settlements in the periphery mixed with increasingly high density in older settlements due to rising land prices; (3) Dependence on bus transport for the working class whereas middle and upper class use automobiles; (4) Weak provision of infrastructure in unplanned settlements; (5) Intensifying spatial divide between working class and middle and upper classes as former live farther away in the periphery and the latter tend to reside in securitized and well-served suburban housing estates located in close proximity to the city center; and (6) Higher concentrations of wealth in the suburban estates of the city where new areas of commerce and services have emerged. The combination of (a) urban sprawl through the expansion of new unplanned settlements and (b) densification in older low income settlements are generating extensive problems due to lack of infrastructure, especially the increasing gap in water demand and supply and
sewage and hygiene-related issues that exacerbate the discomforts of everyday life.

Unplanned settlements are understood as Karachi’s most intractable problem and its tangible expressions are places like Bin Qasim Town and Orangi Town, which is a cluster of 13 low to middle income, unplanned settlements housing both old and new migrants, families and businesses that have flourished and lived there for generations. Orangi Town continues to expand with new unplanned settlements emerging and with levels of infrastructural deprivation and associated vulnerabilities remaining high. The settlement originally served a working class population employed in the nearby Sindh Industrial Estate (SITE) which was established shortly after Partition. In the hierarchy of Karachi’s unplanned settlements, Orangi Town’s sheer sprawl and ethnically diverse 1.5 - 2 million inhabitants puts it in a category akin to large settlements like Dharavi in Mumbai. Precarious infrastructure has led to the proliferation of community based organizations and NGO interventions to upgrade water supply and sewage systems (Rehman et al 2008).
View of neighborhood in Bin Qasim Town with Arabian Sea in distance
Metropolitan Karachi is a more complex region today than what it was in the 20th Century. Even though the centre-periphery continuum is very useful for understanding the spread of vulnerability and social segregation, the patterns of
urbanization and land-use are beginning to change again as Karachi’s peripheral regions are also attracting new, upscale real-estate development schemes. These schemes are situated along new infrastructure corridors such as the Super Highway where the city’s rapidly expanding middle and upper-middle class population is expected to reside. To what extent this trend will shape the city’s future is uncertain. However, of significance is the increasing desire of middle and upper middle class groups to live in well-serviced areas that are also securitized. In the context of Karachi’s violence and elite anxieties with crime and social decay, noteworthy is how this trend symbolizes new ways of creating and maintaining distance between social classes.

4. Basic services and Infrastructure

4.1 Summary of Basic Services

In this section we provide a summary of basic services. Our focus on infrastructure services such as sanitation and water connects with our project’s specific objective to understand how gendered access to WASH and vulnerability to hazards contribute to geographies of violence. We direct our attention to how social vulnerability intersects with access to infrastructure services. In this section we provide an overview of infrastructure services in urban Pakistan and then move on to a discussion of the Karachi context in terms of (1) state provision; (2) non-state practices; and (3) infrastructure vulnerabilities and poverty in low-income settlements.

The supply and management of water and sanitation services in Pakistan are fragmented and present many challenges. According to the ADB (2007), Pakistan is on target with meeting its MDG goals for water supply and sanitation. Even though the country’s share of population with access to piped water has increased from 85% in 1990 to 92% in 2010, this does not suggest that the water from such sources is safe to consume. During the same period, the share with access to piped sewer system also increased from 27% to 48%. In urban Pakistan, there has been considerable innovation in community-led and NGO-driven interventions concerning water supply and sanitation. In cities like Karachi, the sanitation program of the Orangi Pilot Project Research and Training Institute
(OPP-RTI) is considered a success story. Despite such innovations the provision of water and sanitation remain a huge challenge. The quality of services is poor, as evidenced by intermittent water supply in cities like Karachi and limited wastewater treatment (Table 7). This has forced residents to adopt a range of alternatives from constructing in-house underground storage tankers to cooperative arrangements such as awami tanks that store and distribute water to the community (Ahmed 2003). Residents are also forced to purchase water directly from privately operated lorry tankers that may or may not be licensed by water utilities. The story of Karachi’s water supply is particularly salient, not only in terms of limited water supply when compared to other cities, but also in terms of a violent political-economy that undergirds supply. High ‘leakage’ or ‘transmission losses’ and ‘illegal connections’ are unique characteristics that set the city’s water supply system apart from other urban centers in Pakistan. We elaborate this point in an ensuing section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7: Hours of Daily Water Supply in Major Pakistani Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In Pakistani cities poor drinking water quality and sanitation leads to outbreaks of waterborne diseases such as dengue. According to a recent study conducted by the United Nations (2012), contaminated water contributes to 40% of deaths in Pakistan. The economic impact of inadequate sanitation has been estimated at Rs 120 billion, equivalent to 1.8 percent of Pakistan's GDP.7 A National Sanitation Policy and a National Drinking Water Policy were approved in 2006 and 2009, respectively, with the objective to improve water and sanitation coverage and quality. Recently policies concerning WASH and the role of local government have been updated in light of the 18th Constitutional Amendment. Nevertheless, the level of annual investment remains below what is considered necessary to achieve a significant increase in access and service quality.

---

Poor sanitation and water supply is uneven especially when observed across the land-ownership spectrum. In Karachi, unplanned settlements have weakest access to water supply, sanitation and garbage collection services. In contrast, upper income areas are facilitated by waste disposal arrangements and experience negligible interruptions in water supply. Given over 60% of Karachi’s population reside in unplanned settlements where infrastructure provision is weakest, improvised arrangements often result in the disposal of sewage into natural drainage systems. In Karachi the planned sewage system, which is under stress due to inadequate maintenance, serves only 40% of the population. Moreover, less than 15% of the waste water and sewage produced is treated (Rehman et al. 2008). The untreated sewage finds its way into the Arabian Sea and Karachi’s shoreline is noted for its ever-increasing pollution.

Since the crafting of the *Pakistan Approaches to Total Sanitation* (PATS), an ‘integrated’ approach to sanitation and water has been sought with the support of provincial governments and civil society partnerships. Even the *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper* (GOP 2003) calls for greater NGO and civil society participation in planning and implementation. In the province of Sindh, the Sindh Cities Improvement Programme (SCIP) seeks to improve the quality of water and wastewater and solid waste management. However, in Karachi the rolling out of such policies and capacity building has been slow and partly delayed by the protracted conflict over the future of local government. In Pakistan, there is no federal ministry for sanitation and water supply. Multiple government agencies at federal, provincial and local levels share this role and NGOs like the OPP-RTI are also working in this sector. In Karachi responsibilities for water supply and sanitation are distributed amongst the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation or KMC (formerly City District Government Karachi or CDGK) and the Karachi Water & Sewerage Board (KW&SB).

1) Storm drains & natural channels or *nalas* are the responsibility of the city (KMC), town and Union Councils (UC). At the UC level, mayors are responsible for overseeing the completion of drainage projects within their jurisdictions. But UC capacities are limited and there is no qualified staff to support political representatives (Welle 2006; Ahmed 2003, 2006).

2) Sewerage system is outsourced to the semi-autonomous KW&SB which is responsible for construction, improvement and maintenance and operation of sewage works and industrial waste disposal systems. KWSB has two wings: (a) sewerage maintenance (b) sewerage development.
3) At the federal level, other agencies include the Ministry of Environment, Health, Planning and Development, Rural Development and Housing and Works.

### 4.2 Water, Sanitation, Hygiene (WASH) and Health

A chief challenge in metropolitan Karachi concerns the state’s lack of information on the quality and supply of existing infrastructure as well weak coordination between UCs and the KMC. Moreover, with continuous urban expansion and the rise of new settlements in the periphery, a significant disconnect exists between the government’s knowledge about existing water supply and sanitation infrastructures and the mounting demands for such infrastructure in new settlements. This is further exacerbated by the suspension in 2008 of the local governance system and the ensuing lack of clarity concerning functions and responsibilities particularly for solid waste management at the neighborhood level. It is estimated that of the total household solid waste generated daily in the City District around 4,500 tons is lifted and of this, not more than 2,000 tons is delivered to one of the two designated city ‘landfill’ sites. The rest is either recovered for recycling (an estimated 1,500 tons per day) or is disposed by burning or by dumping into open drains or onto roadsides or open land (an estimated 1,400 tons) often situated in close proximity to low-income settlements.

---

**Waste dumps - Bin Qasim Town & Orangi Town**

*Source: Authors’ Own*

---

There are several shortcomings associated with this form of disposal, notably environmental and public health hazards such as lack of fencing that attracts waste pickers who are often children; waste is located near outlets that flow into
the Arabian Sea or are located in close proximity to residential areas. Typically waste water becomes stagnant at the dumpsite and mixes with collected waste that gradually seeps into the sandy soil and penetrates into the groundwater. The garbage is not enclosed and recycling by the local government is not currently pursued, for instance in the above-photographed neighborhoods that are situated in Bin Qasim Town and Orangi Town.

Overall in Karachi, nearly 55,000 families are estimated as dependant on the informal solid waste recycling industry for their livelihood and with more than 1,000 operating units, the industry is estimated to be worth Rs 1.2 billion per annum (Ali 2000). Garbage dumping is pervasive in the city and is most discernible across low-income settlements where heaps of refuse is not an uncommon sight especially in front of houses or on open lands where children play football and cricket amidst it and thus are exposed to health hazards. Typically, the dumped garbage is an amalgamation of residential, commercial and medical waste. However, the challenge of garbage disposal and blocked drainage systems is not only relevant at the neighborhood scale but also at the broader metropolitan level where disrupted traffic flows and flooding are habitual. Significant is the blockage of the city’s main nalas due to recent road construction in the District South and District Central, where most of the drains are located. The construction of the Mai Kolachi bypass that connects the central business areas with posh residential suburbs, has led to the blockage of the city’s two main drains. Water is now forced through a small 60-foot nalla into the Arabian Sea. This means it takes nearly ten times longer for the city’s drainage system to work effectively depending on rainfall and high tides at sea. This situation is further exacerbated by the construction of unplanned settlements on key drainage channels (Ahmed 2008). Similarly, the blockage of storm drains due to the construction of signal-free corridors, expanding neighborhoods and swallowing up of service roads compounds the problem.

4.3 NGO Landscape in Karachi and Types of Assistance

Water supply and sanitation are a major entry point for community mobilization, NGO interventions and social change in Karachi. Before we discuss this, we underscore that international donor-funded projects are generally considered a ‘failure’ in the Karachi context. This has paved the way for NGO interventions, increased state-society dialogue and extensive community mobilization. According to the NGO OPP-RTI, costly sanitation-sewerage projects funded by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have been squandered in Karachi. Donor funded projects are classified as ‘failed’ largely due to disconnect from the prevailing needs of the sector, lack of consultation with communities and stakeholders, and hiring expensive foreign consultants. An example of high costs of donor-funded projects is the Korangi Waste Water Management Project (KWWMP) in Karachi. Experts write:

“ Its cost was estimated at US$ 100 billion and US$ 25 million was to be the contribution of the Sindh government. A cheaper alternative design by the OPP-RTI, which incorporated the existing system into the design and suggested the rehabilitation of existing trunks and disposals rather than the building of new ones led to civil society objections to the loan. The OPP-RTI proposal worked out to less than US$ 20 million. On the basis of this the Sindh Governor cancelled the ADB loan…” (Hasan 2006:9)

This has enabled NGOs like the OPP-RTI to carve out a niche in this sector, notably in terms of selling its sanitation and water supply model to the state. Consequently, NGO- state discursive connections have improved somewhat whereby the OPP-RTI’s technical designs supported by citizens’ lobby groups have enabled KWSB senior officials to discount multi-million dollar ‘mega projects’ in favor of a flexible approach in WASH programs. This has also meant the KWSB has increased its reliance on seeking funding through federal and provincial government. OPP-RTI’s success also rests on the emphasis it places on issues of ‘corruption’ concerning government-led sanitation projects, for instance government officials proposing high estimates that entail profit margins to be distributed to vested parties (Bano 2008). By underscoring low-cost alternatives that are not built on corruption, the NGO sells its model to both community and government officials. A key ‘incentive’ the NGO gives community members is by linking improved sanitation with gains in property values (Bano 2008).
For the past few decades, the OPP-RTI has been actively involved in the provision of water and sanitation in Karachi’s low-income settlements. Its globally renowned low-cost sanitation model has worked effectively through community mobilization and state involvement. In Karachi, the OPP-RTI’s impact has been extensive in low income settlements like Orangi Town, where the NGO pioneered in the 1980s its low-cost sanitation model. The austere model has enabled low income households to finance, manage and maintain sanitary latrines in their homes as well as underground sewerage lines in lanes in secondary sewers. In turn, the state has been responsible for providing main sewers and treatment plants: “Direct assistance to communities by the OPP and the demonstration effect of its work have benefited over 108,000 households (over 865,000 people) in nearly 7,600 lanes, representing almost 90% of the entire settlement of Orangi.” (Rehman et al 2008) The model has now been extended to Karachi’s rapidly urbanizing periphery where villages or goths are transforming into low and middle-income settlements (OPP-RTI 2013; Anwar 2013).

Despite NGO interventions and community mobilization in certain towns, city-wide water supply, sanitation and hygiene provision still remains poor especially in low-income settlements. Certainly in places like Orangi Town residents in specific neighborhoods have successfully organized sanitation/water supply on ‘self-help’ basis, and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) in neighborhoods such as Ghaziabad where one of our Research Assistants resides and is a community activist, have a long history of NGOs involvement and community participation in provision. Even local union councilors have been active facilitators despite vested interests to secure votes. In Ghaziabad, residents have demanded from the local councilor a system for cleaner water and to arrange for water tanker delivery system. This type of process (Bano 2008) is differentiated from ‘artificial’ mobilization through NGOs, labeled instead as ‘indigenous’ mobilization of community lobbying for state officials. Notwithstanding such positive efforts water supply in Karachi remains embedded in a precarious and violent political economy. Karachi’s notorious ‘water mafia’ is known to operate all over the city. By siphoning water from the KW&SB’s bulk distribution system, the water mafia thrives on a highly lucrative business of reselling stolen water to millions of residents especially those in low-income settlements. The ‘mafia’ is a constellation of state and non-state actors that operate ‘illegal’ hydrants and water tankers. A key aspect of the mafia’s activities
entails the manipulation of public water valves through which water flows to neighborhoods. By deliberately closing water valves in key locations, trucking firms team up with corrupt bureaucrats and politicians to shutdown public supply. This enables them to sell water to residents through water tankers (Rahman 2008).

The sale of water through illicit channels allegedly generates US $43 million per annum. According to KW&SB officials, Karachi requires 1100 mgd of water but receives only 450 mgd largely due to water siphoning. The water mafia’s presence is most discernible in low-income settlements and in newly emerging unplanned communities in the periphery. Typically, a low-income family can spend as much as a quarter of its income on buying water through illicit arrangements. Despite extensive talk of closing down illegal hydrants across the city, limited action is taken by law enforcement agencies against the water mafia. In March 2013, Perween Rahman the Director of the NGO, OPP-RTI, was gunned down in a target killing. Perween’s death has been linked with the threats she had received when the OPP-RTI unearthed extensive illegal water connections in Karachi’s unplanned settlements. This situation highlights a fundamental contradiction - informal infrastructure networks enable most of the infrastructure provision in unplanned settlements while at the same time being implicated in violent geographies. There is a need for more information on exactly how these networks function and what arrangements of power support them.

5. Violence in Pakistan’s Urban Centers

5.1 Types of Violence included in this Study

For the purposes of this study violence is deemed to be use of force, physical or structural, in establishing social and political norms. This definition of violence allows us to move our gaze away from spectacular violence to the much more persistent and insidious forms of everyday violence. While terrorist activity, extra judicial killings by law enforcement agencies and ethnic violence in Karachi has received much journalistic and some academic attention (Verkaik 2004; Gayer 2007; Chaudhry 2004), everyday violence has not received similar sustained analysis. We feel that it is particularly useful to distinguish between terrorism and
violence to allow us to understand the long-term relationship with infrastructure. Terrorism is defined primarily as the attempt to achieve political power through attacks on a civilian population. Violence on the other hand, includes a broader range of activities as well as ends.

Many different forms or types of violence have been identified by scholars including structural violence (Galtung 1997; Scheper-Hughes 1993), symbolic violence (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), epistemic violence, discursive violence, but there is no general theory of violence. Similarly there is considerable debate about whether violence is the privilege of power or in fact, a manifestation of insecurities about power. Using Weber's definition of the state as the entity with control over legitimate use of violence, most political scientists and theorists have treated violence as an expression of power. Extending this line of reasoning, post-structuralists have argued that the nexus of power and knowledge, residing particularly in the state, creates multiple sites of violence both physical and cognitive. In contrast, Hannah Arendt, among others has argued that violence is directly related to a loss of or decrease in political power. This debate about the relationship between power and violence remains open and violence remains under-conceptualized despite, or perhaps because of, the wide ranging uses the term is employed for.

For our purposes we wish to draw a further distinction between violence as a product and as a process. Most often violence is treated as a product. Much academic research has looked for the causes of violence from the psychological to the political. However, recent research has emphasized the value of conceptualizing violence as a process, one that is generative of social and political norms. We find that understanding violence as a process allows greater analytical flexibility in understanding the phenomenon of everyday violence, where it becomes necessary to constitute and sustain new social and political norm.

The close imbrications of social power and violence can be seen as having three distinct elements (Foucault 1980; Bourdieu 1986; Mustafa 2002; Chatterjee 1982a, 1982b) ; (1) ‘naked power’ flowing from physical force and violence, (2) ‘compensatory power’ flowing from the ability to materially reward others for compliance and (3) and ‘knowledge power’ flowing from the actors’ socialization into webs of knowledge and discourses that induce internalization of certain
social relations and world views as natural and desirable. Of the three types of power/knowledge (Foucault 1980) is the most comprehensive form of power. This scoping report as well as the longer term project of which this report is a part, understands violence as threat or actuality of a physical act that directs or constrains the choices of its victims individually or collectively.

From the literature we have been able to distill three key aspects of violence that could inform this research: (1) violence that destroys or transforms geographical places and spaces (Mustafa 2005; Gregory and Pred 2007); (2) geographical places and infrastructure therein that enable violence (Hewitt 2001; Lefebrve 1991; Anand 2012; Ferguson 2012); and (3) structural violence (Galtung 1969). The first aspect of violence that results in place destruction and/or alienation, in terms of direct destruction of places with an emotional significance to the people or stigmatizing places is most closely associated with terrorist violence. Here space becomes the target of terror, where human victims of violence are coincidental, and spectacular destruction of places is the main objective. Place here is defined as being constituted at the intersection of physical space and the human experience, memory, and emotions associated with that space. In other words you are a victim of such terrorist violence if you are subjected to it, or fear it, not because who you are or what you have done but because of where you are (Mustafa 2005).

In the context of this research we are not just concerned about spectacular violence that may destroy monumental buildings or everyday spaces of bazaars and public transport, but also everyday public violence that may instill fear by gender, ethnicity, class or religious belief. What are the geographies of fear for women in urban Rawalpindi or Karachi, and why? How do different ethnic, religious or class groups view specific urban spaces in terms of their accessibility to them or violence associated with them? These are the types of questions that arise out of this first aspect of violence where place destruction or alienation is the objective.

The second aspect of how spatial organization produces violent geographies, draws attention, to how prison camps, surveillance, police presence, for example, may produce carceral geographies associated with the state oppression on the one hand, and urban design of living spaces which, may perpetuate gendered isolation
and confinement on the other hand. To cite a more direct example of the relationship between infrastructure and violence, broad avenues may be an essential embellishment to modern cities but their original functionality as highly effective anti-revolutionary infrastructure to provide clear line of fire to government troops, and to prevent against barricades is not irrelevant to their present day ubiquity (Ferguson 2012; Scott 1998). Similarly square grid patterned automobile centric urban design may be standard contemporaneously, but how does that design affect female mobility in the urban form?

Furthermore, and of most relevance to the SAIC is how poor infrastructure and enhanced vulnerability to environmental hazards intersects with high levels of violence to define the daily lives of urban poor (Auyero and de Lara 2012; Tranchant 2013; Gupte 2012). This second aspect of geographical and/or infrastructural violence helps us address some of the key research questions outlined above. The matter of interest, is not just to expose the how infrastructure and poor basic services can enhance vulnerabilities (which often lead to violent outcomes e.g. fatalities from poor health), but also how the infrastructure/service environment shapes the way people interact with each other, sometimes resulting in violence. This vulnerability-violence nexus is then of key importance to our investigation (Tranchant 2013).

Although there is yet to be academic literature empirically exploring the links between infrastructure and violence in our field sites Gupte et al.’s (2012) work on civil violence in India is illuminating. It highlights that civil violence most often erupts in areas of poor basic service provision, with poor access to consistent livelihoods and a disenfranchisement from the state. At a closer investigation of these violence prone geographical areas, labeled ‘slums’, the authors find that within them, civil violence is more frequent in the more economically, socially and spatially vulnerable areas. On Pakistan, Malik (2009) considers the links between vulnerabilities and violence in Pakistan. She makes the link between the failure of the social contract of the state with its citizens, its consequent frustrations amongst the marginalized populations in particular and thus the creation of violence. Marginalized groups may use directed violence in order to challenge the status quo. This research project is cognizant of the fact that violence may occur spontaneously out of such frustration. Malik notes that the
most socially and economically marginalized areas of Punjab (with poor access to WASH and livelihoods) tend to be ‘fertile recruiting ground’ for violent actors.

The structural violence aspect essentially highlights how social structures or institutions may harm people by preventing them from accessing life enhancing or life saving services (Galtung 1969). Racism, sexism, classism, elitism are often listed as examples of social structures and complicit or incompetent state institutions a manifestations of those structures, that may prevent people from living full lives and may also lead to premature death, disability or sickness. This notion of violence is very closely associated with social justice—in fact lack thereof. We are sympathetic to the political orientation of this aspect of violence. We aim, in the first instance, to focus on physical and material violence.

The fourth manifestation of violence as loss of power [knowledge], which we have named, violence of disempowerment, was brought to our attention by Arendt (1973), who suggests that domination and subjugation in society, in both the public and private spheres, lead to the legitimization of violence. Arendt claims that domination starts before politics, in the home and thus in the culture and social institutions of society. The subjugated and dominated are active agents who perform their roles, “acting in concert” in a power relationship. Violence occurs, not as a tool of power, but as a manifestation of the loss of it. Peaceful existence of society occurs when actors work in concert with their perceived roles, thus power is held by consent and is driven by discourse. Everyday experiences of domination can use ‘force’; but this is distinct in her conception from violence.

Domestic violence, in Pakistan, proves a relevant example. According to various research studies, discourses of masculinity include control over the movements and choices of women. Women often accept this control. When a woman digresses from this control, males often become violent towards them. This occurs because the male has lost power, and turned to physical violence. Women often claim they deserved to experience this violence for diverging from their role and causing the male frustrations. This highlights a way in which we can try to understand manifestations of violence, which occur in the private sphere and parts of the public sphere in Pakistan. We have argued above that we understand violence in general as a case of loss of power. In this case we do however, designate it as a special category, to account for violent performances in public
and private spheres that don’t necessarily fit into the categories we have distilled from the literature.

Armed with the above understanding of the phenomena of violence and its various aspects, we undertook media and NGO literature analysis in Rawalpindi/Islamabad and Karachi. In our analysis we only included incidents of physical violence or threats of physical violence resulting in bodily harm, confinement and/or constriction of mobility, while leaving out non-violent crimes, e.g., excluding theft as opposed to robbery, or excluding fraud as opposed to extortion, and then distinguishing between seemingly violent abduction and consensual marriage and/or elopement reported as abduction. We are of course limited by the secondary data sources that we tapped for this scoping report. An understanding of the mismatch between the glaring gaps in the data, and our ambitions about capturing the multiple varieties of violence in the lives of the urban poor, is perhaps the most valuable outcome of this scoping study. This understanding will be invaluable in helping us define the parameters of the primary data collection, so as to make a beginning at plugging some of the data holes that we outline below.

5.2 Media representation of gender & violence in Karachi

Presently, Karachi is considered one of the most violent cities in the world. Its ‘deadliest’ year on record is 2013 with 2,700 casualties mostly in the guise of ‘target killings’ and nearly 40% of business taking flight due to extortion rackets or ‘forced political donations’ (ICG 2014). Since Karachi generates $21 million in daily tax revenues, the slightest disruption in the city’s economic activities affects the national economy. Citywide outbreaks of violence routinely lead to industrial and market shutdowns and disruptions in daily trade as well industry losses estimated at $31.5 million and $73.6 million, respectively. Policymakers who have identified economic stability as a key component of Pakistan’s national stability look to improving Karachi’s security.

Even though Pakistan’s other urban centers suffer similar challenges, Karachi’s violence rate is considerably higher with social, state and political violence overlapping in complex ways. Given the blurred boundaries between criminal groups, militants, mainstream political parties and state representatives such as police, Karachi’s multifaceted political-economy in which violence inhere
Urbanization, Gender & Violence in Millennial Karachi: SAIC Scoping Study

resonates with dynamics found in other South Asian cities such as Mumbai, although Karachi has a higher homicide rate (Table 8). Karachi’s homicide rate has risen steadily over the past few decades, reaching 12.3 per 100,000 people in recent years. Karachi also exhibits levels of violence that are proximate to Latin American cities such as Sao Paolo, Mexico City and Bogota where organized crime and drugs have long ravaged these urban centers, where firearms are involved in the majority incidences of murder, and where violent crime is often correlated with poverty and spatial-social segregation. Ironically, the police has consistently failed in law enforcement and that too in a context where it is competing for the same resources, land, water, smuggling, that are coveted by illicit, criminal forces. Karachi’s criminal gangs draw strength from the lower echelons of the state – local police, civil administration and military – whereby collusion facilitates crimes like kidnappings and extortion and overall violence. The police’s inability to enforce law and even to protect itself has led to ham-fisted state interventions such as special operations carried out by paramilitary groups or the Rangers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CITIES</th>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico City</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogota</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumbai</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Broadly speaking, Karachi’s violent political-economy can be contextualized in terms of the ethnic divisions and planning practices that emerged in the aftermath of Partition. Although conflict has consistently marked the city’s landscape with ethnic conflagrations, labor protests and state-led violence pervasive throughout

---

the 1960s and early 1970s and continuing today, there have also been exceptional flashpoints, such as 1985 and 2007 that stand out as potent reminders of the complexity of violence in which state and non-state dynamics overlap. May 12, 2007 is noteworthy for the lawyers’ movement and mass demonstrations that took place in Karachi and were directed against the military regime. The peaceful demonstrations were quickly subsumed by violence allegedly spurred on by the military regime and its ally, the regionally strong political party, the MQM. The ethnic riots of 1985 are significant because they point not only to Karachi’s and by extension Pakistan’s changing political-economy, but also to a city strained by poor infrastructure services with hazardous consequences for the residents of unplanned settlements. The riots of 1985 started in Orangi Town, which is a sprawling unplanned settlement of approximately 2 million residents. The conflict had centered on infrastructure issues, notably on the inadequate public transportation system (Gayer 2007). Shaikh (1997) cites the strain placed on Karachi’s population as a result of the congestion and inadequate public transportation system as a major cause of such violence. Although Karachi had witnessed sectarian and ethnic riots such as anti-Ahmedi riots in the 1950s and 1969-70, anti-Pakhtun riots in 1965, and Sindhi-Muhajir riots in 1972-73, the 1985 riots and the subsequent 1986 riots between Pakhtuns and Muhajirs were unprecedented in the level of cruelty exhibited as well as the extent of the death and destruction.

According to certain scholars (Chaudhry 2004) the impact on Karachi’s marginalized residents, for instance Muhajir women whose sons, husbands and other close male relatives had been killed in the armed conflict that had stretched from 1985 to the late 1990s, has led to a normalization of violence in everyday life. This is especially the case for those women who reside in low-income settlements and have been continually exposed to changing configurations of violence: from structural and systemic to physical and direct. Drawing on interviews with 58 Muhajir women as part of a larger project among six South Asian feminist researchers, the author privileged women’s views about Karachi’s conflict to make visible the extensive reach of violence into the private sphere of the ‘home’.

In this context, we ask what is the representation of gender and violence in the media; how is violence talked about in the Karachi context? What are its different
Media discourses around violence are particularly significant as they are embedded in normative understandings of security, nationalism and religiosity. Analyzing the multifaceted representations of violence in the media is important because individuals draw on these sources when constructing understandings of issues such as violence against women or the urban poor. Certainly, the media is the most dominant and frequently used resource for understanding social issues. Given the trajectory of strong state control, media in Pakistan was subject to a high degree of censorship for most of its history. The proliferation of private media, mostly in the form of television channels is a relatively recent phenomenon. The relatively liberal distribution of media licenses is attributed to General Pervaiz Musharraf’s (1999-2008) era. Musharraf pursued a softer policy on media control, mainly to provide a façade of legitimacy for an otherwise unconstitutional military government. Apart from formal state control, even during periods of democratic rule, the media has been subject to partisan pressure from the ruling political party.

Presently, private news and entertainment channels proliferate. Given the contentious nature of political life in Pakistan, media reportage is also fraught with competing viewpoints often expressed in jingoistic terms. While multiple opinions are given voice the tone is often stentorian, reflecting deeply embedded ethnic, sectarian and religious bias. The rhetoric of terrorism is used often and conflated with other kinds of violence, even everyday criminality. Particularly in Karachi with a high-level of everyday violence, the label of ‘terrorist’ often serves to criminalize and pathologize groups who are marginalized in terms of ethnicity and class. This extends to the way certain areas of the city are represented as inherently violent.

For instance, newspaper accounts highlight the different ways the media portrays the relationship between low-income settlements in Gadap Town and Orangi Town and violence. In the first, such settlements are portrayed as the locus of violence, instigating a coordinated Rangers’ and police action to retake control for the state. The second reports on the reaction of residents to perceived police injustice — however, typically, the story portrays the youths, mostly poor young men, as being involved in the drug or arms trade, thereby justifying their deaths and accusing low-income residents of being accomplices. The third depicts the
residents as innocent victims. Notably, all three types of accounts show that violence is integral to daily life of residents in low-income settlements.

As part of this scoping study, we monitored for 120 days (July to October) the reporting of violence in the media. We focused on 8 Urdu and English newspapers and 3 news channels to observe incidences of categories of violence reported and the associated discourse. Table 9 provides a description of the media sources and rationale for selection.

### Table 9: News Sources & Rationale for Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Frequency &amp; Scope</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Focus/Tone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dawn</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>National with online access.</td>
<td>English language; Established in Karachi in pre-Partition era hence oldest and most widely read.</td>
<td>Comprehensive coverage of crime and violence related issues with special section on Karachi. Liberal leaning discourse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Express Tribune</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>National with online access</td>
<td>English language in partnership with International New York Times.</td>
<td>Detailed coverage of crime with daily special section on Karachi. Crime statistics broken down by police station but reporting style is standardized for all stories. Liberal leaning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The News</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>International and National circulation with online access.</td>
<td>Considered largest English language newspaper in Pakistan.</td>
<td>Comprehensive reporting on crime coverage; reporting of rape and abduction cases; everyday violence as well as on terrorism related violence; Liberal leaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nation</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>National with online access</td>
<td>English language; limited circulation primarily to urban audience.</td>
<td>Selective reporting on violence in Karachi with extensive focus on Rangers’ operations, encounter killings, extortion cases; liberal leaning and casts itself as a ‘secular’ voice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nawa-e-Waqt</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>National with online access and wide circulation across urban centers.</td>
<td>Urdu language; established in pre-Partition era; considered most widely read and most influential Urdu</td>
<td>Carries a city page on Karachi useful for understanding broader contours of violence; discourse is center-right and paper touts itself as the guardian of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Circulation and Language Details</td>
<td>Reporting Style</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ummat</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>Urban-based, Karachi-based, Urdu language; useful for understanding religiously oriented discourse on violence and related gender issues.</td>
<td>Conservative, Islamist stance in which party is frequently reported as linked with corruption, crime and violence; noted for its ethnic/sectarian rhetoric e.g. anti-Ahmadi and anti-Ismaili.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jang</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>National with online access. Considered largest Urdu language newspaper in Pakistan with a circulation of over 800,000 copies per day.</td>
<td>Politically conservative leaning; selective reporting on violence with primary focus on Karachi’s target killings and Rangers’ operations and encounter killings.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jur’rat</td>
<td>Print</td>
<td>Daily, city-based. Urdu language with city-wide circulation.</td>
<td>Detailed reporting on Karachi’s crime and violence; politically partisan; focus on target killings as well as less spectacular forms of violence e.g. land mafia, extortion. Conservative stance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunya News</td>
<td>Electronic</td>
<td>Privately-owned, national channel emphasis on current affairs. Urdu language, popular for live streaming and breaking news.</td>
<td>Selective reporting devoted to investigative style on crime and violence in Karachi. Consistent focus on ethnic cleansing operations in which MQM and by extension Urdu-speaking people are noted as being targeted by Rangers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geo</td>
<td>Electronic</td>
<td>Reporting in specific programs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As we set out to explore the discursive dimension of violence, we noted in our coverage of 120 days of media tracking that overall the discourse was focused on ‘targeted killings’ in Karachi, with extortion and terrorism, paramilitary operations/state violence and social violence subsuming sectarian, political and ethnic conflict and especially gender violence. Target killings in Karachi are politically motivated and signal how different political parties settle ‘scores’ with each other. In the Charts (1-4) that show percentage wise figures, we provide aggregate monthly breakdowns across different categories of violence. The breakdown of categories/sub-categories is provided in Table 10. We began our enquiry in a grounded manner and outlined broad violence categories based upon broad violence literature, for example, Social Violence, Political Violence, State Violence, and so on. We were aware of certain themes in our initial coding, which relate to our research questions: the vulnerability-violence nexus being an example. So, WASH and Vulnerability were defined as broad violence categories from the start. Our categorisations are adaptable, so as new categories emerged in the analysis, we included these into the coding system. For example, Extortion, Target Killing, Bomb Blasts and Rangers’ Operations/Illegal Detentions were not in the initial categorisation, but were added after some weeks as they appeared to be a form of violence occurring consistently in Karachi.
Table 10: Categories of Violence Used In Media Monitoring and Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Broad Violence Category</th>
<th>Sub-Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Harassment&lt;br&gt;Abduction&lt;br&gt;Rape&lt;br&gt;Domestic Violence&lt;br&gt;Gender Based Murder&lt;br&gt;Prostitution/Trafficking&lt;br&gt;Child Marriage&lt;br&gt;Dowry-related&lt;br&gt;Quarrel/Fight&lt;br&gt;Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Protests (e.g. due to water supply)&lt;br&gt;Sanitation-related Violence&lt;br&gt;Epidemics&lt;br&gt;Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>Natural Hazards&lt;br&gt;Flood Damage&lt;br&gt;Killed by Flood&lt;br&gt;Fire Damage&lt;br&gt;Murder for Economic Reasons (e.g. poverty/a financial issue)&lt;br&gt;Protest (Quarrel/Fight) Due to Issue of Vulnerability&lt;br&gt;Other (e.g. Police Firing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Street Crime&lt;br&gt;Theft&lt;br&gt;Quarrel/Fights&lt;br&gt;Gang-Firing&lt;br&gt;Robbery/Looting/Mugging&lt;br&gt;Murder&lt;br&gt;Murder Due to Family Clashes&lt;br&gt;Drugs-related&lt;br&gt;Verbal Abuse&lt;br&gt;Extortion&lt;br&gt;Terrorist Activity&lt;br&gt;Targeted Killing&lt;br&gt;Murder due to Random Firing&lt;br&gt;Road Accident Death&lt;br&gt;Road Accident Injury&lt;br&gt;Kidnapping&lt;br&gt;Threat of Harm&lt;br&gt;Other (e.g. gambling-related)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Sectarian&lt;br&gt;Against Minorities&lt;br&gt;Humiliating Another's Beliefs&lt;br&gt;Blasphemy/Hate Speech&lt;br&gt;Murder on Religious Grounds&lt;br&gt;Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Police Violence&lt;br&gt;Police Murder (Torture)&lt;br&gt;Intelligence Agency Violence&lt;br&gt;Rangers' Operations/Illegal Detentions&lt;br&gt;Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In tracking media discourses of violence, we were predominantly interested in understanding (1) the linkage between violence and the city’s geography and (2) how gender related violence is projected in the media, as well as how men and women are represented. This connects with the mode of inquiry we have presented earlier concerning manifestations of violence. Along with the daily monitoring of newspapers and channels (Table 9), we also conducted interviews with journalists and police officials to help us understand how the narratives are constructed and how crime sources are tapped into.

Crime statistics in Karachi are sourced primarily from the Sindh/Karachi police. Crime figures are regularly uploaded on its website that does not provide a town-wise breakdown, preferring instead to report figures that are delineated district-wise. Consequently, it is difficult to ascertain the variation of crime and violence at a micro-scale or across towns and neighborhoods. We use media discourse as a proxy to get a sense of those towns that are reported frequently as ‘dangerous’ or ‘violent’. Although we are cautious such discourse is predicated upon the media securing statistics from the police, which happen to be the dominant stakeholder in the construction of discourse on crime and violence.

The Citizens Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) is another source of crime statistics, covering categories such as ‘targeted killings’ and ‘kidnappings’. Interestingly, CPLC’s focus on car thefts – ‘four wheelers’ , ‘two wheelers’- and ‘mobile phone snatchings’ has been viewed by certain civil society groups as designed to cater to middle and upper-middle class anxieties.  

11 The authors’ assertions concerning CPLC are based on observations made while attending various seminars organized in Karachi by the well-established NGO, Shehri. In a seminar on
CPLC data the ‘dangerous places of crime’ are, then, by default those areas where people own certain kinds of property. Notably, such data conceals state violence that is directed toward specific groups and areas in the city.

**Summary of Findings**

In July and August 2013, we observed high incidences of WASH related cases reported in media due to dengue outbreaks, infrastructure breakdowns and monsoon related city-wide flooding. Vulnerability cases encompassed narratives about food retailers who, in the month of Ramadan, were securing illicit profits by overcharging customers, as well as some suicide cases and protests concerning the city’s law and order situation. In District South, protests lingered on for days in Lyari Town where the Rangers’ killing of a leading ‘strong man’, Saqib Boxer, drew local crowds and politicians belonging to the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Even though Boxer’s ‘targeted killing’ was viewed by many as state-driven execution, electronic media such as Geo News reported the incident as follows: “Spokesman Sindh Rangers Monday maintained that Saqib Boxer has been involved in many serious crime including killings and extortion, and the Rangers did not execute him as a specific target but he was killed as a result of exchange of fire during a search operation.” It is evident such discourse quickly blurs the line between categories such as ‘targeted killings’ and ‘encounter killings’.

Stories about social violence focused on incidents such as murder due to enmity, targeted killings, extortion, kidnappings as well as firing among gangs and robbery and looting. Targeted killings in Karachi are pervasive and the police have suggested these are often the result of personal conflicts. News channels like GEO News have derided the police for making such claims, and instead emphasized these are backed by political parties’ who are in turn supported by state officials. Just in the first week of July in electronic media tracking, we observed 80 incidents of targeted killings. The stories referenced areas such as Lyari and Saddar in District South, Gadap Town and Sohrab Goth in District Malir, and New Karachi in District Central. In the subsequent weeks, we observed target killings reported for areas such as Orangi Town in District West and Bin Qasim Town in District Malir. Hence, the reported spatial-geographical police reforms held in January 2011 involving representatives of CPLC, Shehri, journalists and community activists from low-income settlements such as Orangi Town, the CPLC was chided for its ‘middle class’ bias and disengagement with Karachi’s poor neighborhoods.
trajectory of targeted killings keeps shifting back and forth between the city’s center and periphery, and this dynamic is embedded in complex local political-economies that intersect with regional, national and international currents.

Increased observations in media of state violence reflect the exceptional situation that defines Karachi’s current political-economy wherein Rangers’ operations, illegal detentions and ‘encounter killings’ have sought in recent months to bring ‘order’ to the city. Pie charts 1 – 4 show the accelerated pace of state violence in Karachi over a period of 120 days. In certain months, categories such as gender, ethnic, political and religious violence barely register in terms of incidents reported.
Chart 2 - August 2013

- Social Violence: 42%
- State Violence: 26%
- WASH: 7%
- Religious Violence: 1%
- Gender: 1%
- Vulnerability: 15%
- Political Violence: 8%
- Ethnic Violence: 0%

Chart 3 - September 2013
Thus far media discourse has constructed a relatively rosy picture of Rangers’ interventions in Karachi. Across the different newspapers and channels we covered, it was consistently reported that since August 2013, Rangers in conjunction with police have launched over 6,000 raids to recover weapons (assault rifles, pistols, machine guns) to bring down the incidents of targeted killings, extortion and kidnappings. Media reports allege the raids have enabled law enforcement agencies to reduce targeted killings by approximately 65%.\(^\text{12}\)

The ‘Karachi Operation’ has been welcomed particularly by the city’s financial and business sectors that are often the object of extortionist demands. However, the ‘raids’ have also generated a sense of fear amongst residents especially those living in low-income settlements where Rangers’ operations are often directed. We were able to get a sense of this lingering ‘on ground’ fear during our fieldwork in neighborhoods in Orangi Town and Bin Qasim Town, where residents openly (and at times not so openly) talked about Rangers and police interventions, knocking down doors and arresting young men. Such ham-fisted interventions are not new to Karachi and resonate with the army-led operations or ‘Operation Cleanup’ launched in the late 1990s to ‘clean-up’ Karachi by decimating the power of the regional political party, the MQM.

In the print media, discourse surrounding arrests in connection with the Rangers’ operations comes across as a ‘numbers game’. From 100 to as much as 200 arrests per day are reported across different papers. The daily statistics are secured directly from police officials who are the main stakeholders in the numbers game. Daily arrests and weapons recovery are also talked about in a sensationalized manner especially in the electronic media where reporters can linger on for hours discussing such stories. Breaking news regularly covers the arrest of ‘terrorists’ and accomplices and recovery of weapons. In a breaking news story titled “Truckload of weapons seized: Terror Bid Foiled’, a Dunya News reporter’s camera scanned urgently and repeatedly a huge desk stacked with weapons, ammunition and guarded by police officers. Such stories have cachet with an audience that is keen to see Karachi’s law and order situation improve, and above all its police force take charge.

Those arrested are categorized through an assortment of labels ranging from militants, extortionists, and target killers to kidnappers, gamblers, foreigners and fugitives. In late September when Rangers’ operations were beginning to step up, the arrest of political workers belonging to the MQM generated extensive hype in print and electronic media about ‘wrongful arrests’ and workers’ misrepresentation as terrorists. Noteworthy is how the electronic media, e.g. GEO News has ‘aided’ Rangers’ operations by running special investigative reports that provide detailed coverage of certain union councils where terror cells are allegedly hiding and hence require ‘cleansing’. Indubitably, such stories appeal to an audience watching or reading stories that call for greater police
intervention in ‘their’ city. Stories that are not considered newsworthy and are hence scarcely reported concern for instance the shadowy relationship between policemen and extortionists. Our conversations with journalists revealed how this nexus is ignored or ‘underreported’. According to a journalist, police stations across different parts of the city have an arrangement whereby a fixed rate is paid either monthly or daily to a beater. The beaters are from the police service. Through this arrangement, specific police chowkis are compensated between Rs 15,000 to Rs. 50,000 per day to enable the ‘protection’ of illicit activities. The beaters were also known as Mokil or those officials who were permitted by the police to run criminal activities from within chowki precincts. Currently across the city’s different police chowkis 21 beaters have been assigned for money collection.

Recently, media discourse has shifted its attention toward highlighting the increasing absence of police in Karachi. In print media, some reporters have alleged that the restoration of Rangers’ operations is leading to the gradual withdrawal of the local police from Karachi’s landscape and to the expansion of private militia. Newspapers like Nation report the Ranger’s targeted operations against ‘terrorists’ have led to attacks on local police who have literally vanished from the city: “Law-enforcers have almost vanished from the city following the frequent attacks against the police and rangers by terrorists who are seeking revenge for the killing of their associates in the targeted operation in Karachi. As many as 92 policemen have so far been killed since the start of intelligence based targeted operation against the criminals five months ago on September 5 last year. At least 50 law enforcers were killed in targeted killing and bomb blasts in the ongoing year alone.”

Such discourse highlights specific geographies as particularly violent and by default prone to Rangers’ operations: “The areas of District West and District Malir considered as the strongholds of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). A police station there remained locked for 24 hours. Police officials wished to be anonymous revealed that the law enforces were now focusing on catching the target and sectarian killers hiding in the political folds than encountering the hardened terrorists affiliated with militant outfits.”

13 ‘Urban Battleground’, Dawn.com, 3 February 2014
15 Ibid.
Typically in District West and District Malir the neighborhoods that are constantly emphasized as dangerous zones are Orangi Town, Gadap Town, Bin Qasim and Baldia Town. These towns also happen to abound with low- to lower middle-income neighborhoods where Pakhtun populations, including recently displaced migrants from FATA, reside. Additionally, in District South the town of Lyari has been the object of media attention. Lyari’s gang wars, political rivalries between the MQM and the Pakistan’s People’s Party (PPP) and highly extortionist local political-economy catalyzed in September 2013 the displacement of over 400 families belonging to the minority Katchi community. Following this, media reports called for increased interventions by the Rangers’ to protect or safeguard the displaced families.

In the 120 days of tracking both electronic and print media, we observed a distinctive feature is the underreporting of gender related violence, a subject which the media barely highlights particularly in relation to domestic or intimate partner violence (physical, sexual and/or psychological abuse). The media’s lack of constructive engagement with or deliberate neglect of domestic violence is especially striking given that experts have found such violence to be an “extremely common phenomenon in Karachi” and prevalent in households with least resources (Ali at al 2011). In large part this reflects the extent of normalization of certain types of violence directed against women; a violence that is seen as a normal part of everyday life. In the instances where gender related violence is reported, the observations and related discourse are focused mostly on harassment, rape and abductions where girls/women are portrayed as victims or on cases where a husband has killed his wife’s lover, portraying such incidents as the outcome of the woman’s aberrant or immoral behavior. In our media tracking, we observed approximately 161 incidents of gender related violence across all print and electronic news sources. Gender-based murder stories were most prevalent, followed by rape and domestic violence. Only 10 incidents of abductions were reported in that time period (Table 11). Incidents that fell in the gender-based murder category encompassed stories such as a young woman killed by her fiancé who had forced her family into agreeing to her early marriage; a woman killed by her husband who suspected infidelity; a young woman killed by her family for eloping with a man; both husband and wife killed for marrying without consent of family members; or a young woman raped and murdered.
In instances where abduction cases were reported, these were framed in conflicting terms: first parents reported to police their daughters were abducted or taken against their wills, and then there were simultaneous reports the women actually ran away because they were being forced to marry older men for money. Some stories reported the women fled homes as they preferred court marriages of their own choice. In two stories young women were reported as having presented ‘Free Will’ certificates in court. In another story, a young couple, Mohammad Tariq and Humera, who had married against her family’s consent, were forcibly separated after her parents lodged a kidnapping case against the husband. Fearing for her life, the wife moved to a women’s shelter run by the NGO Panah. The outcome of the case was reported: “The woman was brought to the court and she deposed that she was neither kidnapped nor forced into marriage, and that she got married of her free will. After taking the statement of the woman on record, the judge allowed her to go with her spouse, and quashed the criminal proceedings against the petitioner.” Such stories indicate the extent and depth of uncertainty that undergirds abduction cases and the degree of speculation that exists in terms of conceding a woman’s choice as legitimate.
Domestic violence incidents ranged from stories about acid throwing in which a woman was severely burnt by a family member, or cases where a quarrel between husband and wife led to extended family members intervening by deliberately setting on fire the couple’s young children. Here a private dispute between a couple quickly escalated into a full-fledged family clash that nearly cost the life of two children. A hot topic for media these days are rape and abduction cases involving minor girls, something both print and electronic media cover consistently. Such cases elicit strong condemnation with society’s moral and ethical dilemmas highlighted. A high profile story concerned the discovery of a 14 year old girl's dead body in a well-known beach in Karachi. When the story unfolded, it became clear the girl had been abducted by her father’s second cousins, and the motive was to earn ransom money from the father who had recently sold valuable property.

English and Urdu print media cover gender related abduction, rape and murder cases by deploying terms like “Teenage girl raped”, “Teenaged girl torched by brother-in-law”, “Girl kidnapped from Karachi”, “Mother of four strangled by ‘lover’”, “School girl sexually abused and killed”, and by constantly emphasizing the victim’s age and marital status. It appears the younger the victim and the more bruised and battered her body, the more sympathetic and morally indignant is the tone of the story. Interestingly, rape incidents involving women who have survived appear to be under-reported. Perhaps here the stigma of rape and fear of violators returning to the scene are particularly salient as young women often prefer not to report the incident. Certainly, in a story reported by Dawn, a 15 year old college student was kidnapped by a rickshaw driver, raped and found lying unconscious in an upper-middle class neighborhood. Even though the hospital where she was treated reported the case to the local police, her family did not formally lodge a FIR. NGOs in Karachi (and generally across Pakistan) contend rape or sexual violence is rising with the most vulnerable to such violence belonging in the age group 17 to 23 (WAR Factsheet 2010).

5.4 Gender and Violence in Karachi

Within the overall context of gender inequality in Pakistan, violence against women in a large metropolis like Karachi unfolds in the complex urban scenario
outlined in the sections above, which is defined by economic vulnerability, state and political violence, social and spatial marginalization and massive infrastructure provision issues. Even though studies have shown that domestic violence against women cuts across all socio-economic classes, in public space and public life, class plays a significant role in intensifying or mitigating the violence experienced by women. Rising inequality and income disparity has meant that working class and low-income women have had to take on the role of providers and to step out of the home. The first challenge women face, however, regardless of whether they work or not, is in accessing basic infrastructure. Lack of access to drinking water means women often have to walk long distances from home to find water. Low-income women in public space are vulnerable to harassment and threats of violence. Taking public transportation is also considered as an undertaking fraught with dangers of harassment.

Women who are part of the workforce face harassment and intimidation at work. Factory women-workers are particularly vulnerable, and a study on women workers in Karachi indicates that violent unrest in the city is provided as an excuse by employers to lay them off. In the same study anecdotal evidence based on interviews with women in low-income settlements like Orangi, Gadap and Lyari shows that women have been kidnapped during riots. Further, households have been scared to lodge FIRs with the police due to mistrust of the authorities. In addition, families were also afraid of reporting the crime for fear of violent repercussions from the perpetrators as well as the community at large, due to entrenched patriarchal norms (HomeNet 2011).

War Against Rape (WAR) is the most active NGO working on violence against women (VAW) in urban areas, particularly in Karachi. WAR has identified rape as reaching “endemic” levels in Pakistan and as one of the least reported crimes. They have also identified that domestic violence occurs across all socio-economic, educational and racial groups in Pakistan. A major focus of their work is to intervene in cases of sexual violence to aid victims in seeking legal redress as well as medical help and psychotherapeutic counseling. According to WAR, systemic bias against women in the police and the judiciary is one of the strongest obstacles for victims seeking justice in cases of sexual violence. This bias reveals itself at various stages of the procedures required to seek justice and includes dismissal and disbelief of the victim, blaming the victim for the crime, delays in
conducting medical examinations and if the case does go to court, the propensity of judges to either dismiss the case or favor the male perpetrators by allowing “compensatory” justice in the form of payoffs to the victim or victim’s family.

Khan & Zaman’s (2011) perceptive study on rape and domestic violence and especially the attitudinal dimension of the criminal justice system shows how deep-rooted are the presumptions and pre-judgments about survivors of rape and domestic violence in Pakistan. The study’s focus on rape cases recorded by WAR in Karachi, and interviews with police (male and female), medico-legal officers, judges and lawyers makes it an invaluable resource for understanding how sexual violence is perceived and defined by public officials, and how disempowering their attitudes are toward women. Describing how police officers make a decision to investigate a rape case, the authors write:

“Officers said that a substantial burden of proof rests almost completely on the shoulders of the alleged victims of rape. Factors that work in her favor include: arriving promptly at the police station “in a wretched state”, “confused and not normal”, being accompanied by someone, and having bruises and signs of physical violence on her. Factors that will predispose the police to disbelieve her include: lack of bruises on the complainant’s body, and dressing and speaking like a “second-rate woman”. If the woman has any previous history of a criminal case, that may work against her as well. If and when the police decide to investigate a case, the scene of the alleged rape must also display signs of a struggle and some disarray. If it does not, then the police officers say they assume the woman is lying.” (2011:24)

Even more revealing is the attitudinal behavior of medico-legal officers whose continued reliance on key texts such as Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology that was used in the colonial era to conduct examinations on rape victims, highlight hoary presumptions about victims and perpetrators’ behavior. Notably, the subjective views of police surgeons and medical examiners show how attitudes toward ‘authentic’ cases are shaped by dominant norms concerning a woman’s behavior and role in society. For example:

“The Police Surgeon held the view if a woman comes in for an examination in a calm and collected state, or if she is excessively emotional, or appears to be shy or coy, then she is regarded with suspicion. Those who are unconscious or badly
injured are taken the most seriously. He was of the view that a woman who is “raped” can be at fault for that as well. For example, it is usually her fault if she was alone at the time of the rape, knows the rapist, or had invited him over.” (2011:30)

According to a female medical examiner, “girls that are bold and go out of their homes to meet men, it means they come from unhappy homes and have working mothers and fathers who are drug addicts – increasing the odds of being raped. Real victims will not come in to the hospital alone, because they will be too distressed, so those that do are likely to have left home on their own initiative, indicating that no rape actually took place”. (29)

Such attitudes have a definitive impact on a victim’s pursuit of justice. In a highly contested domain of what is/is not ‘authentic’ rape, lawyers’ perceptions and assumptions are equally revealing. A male district public prosecutor stated most rape cases are simply not real and “….involve some other disputes and false evidence of rape is submitted. Other disputes can mean land or property disputes, but also cases of girls eloping and parents filing rape charges to save face.” (34)

Khan & Zaman’s study correctly underscores that the public sphere or the criminal justice system undergirds the socio-cultural context and reflects the dominant norms that govern gender and society in Pakistan. Moreover, their study speaks to our concerns about the violence of disempowerment which we outlined in an earlier section of this study.

Reform of the health sector is also a key focus of NGOs like WAR and Aurat Foundation. According to them sexual violence is not recognized as a serious health care issue and the few protocols that do exist for dealing with victims of sexual violence exhibit the same biases and misperceptions about gender roles as the legal and judicial systems. Healthcare professionals are prone to pass judgment on whether the victim suffered a sexual assault or not, which is not for them to determine. Hence the NGOs recommend the development of Sexual Assault Documentation Protocols and advocate for its adoption by the provincial health ministries. Thus, their approach favors the institutionalization of medico-legal procedures and its documentation in state structures.

In studies undertaken in Karachi, WAR has brought attention to the role of the police which is the first point of contact for rape victims seeking redress. They have pointed to the low numbers of women police officers, 3000 out of a total
force of 35,000, as being a strong deterrent towards creating a favorable atmosphere for victims filing police reports. A general lack of trust in not only the police, but the state in general has also been found by them as a strong reason why people do not seek state support.

“People across all towns reflected feelings of distrust and apprehension towards the criminal justice system, especially the police. They all preferred either keeping the matter private by seeking justice through informal systems such as Muhalla Committees, or through local, religious or political leaders in their community.”

(WAR factsheet – Jan-Dec, 2011)

In tracking number of reported cases of sexual assaults across the city (Table 12), WAR identifies areas where there are higher numbers of reported cases than others. For example, for Jan-June, 2010, the highest number of sexual violence incidents reported was in Korangi Town (15%). These statistics are valuable for developing a spatial mapping of gender-based violence across the city. Although the data is sparse at this point and covers only the past three years, yet an initial overview indicates that sexual violence cases are fairly spread out over the city across neighborhoods with very different class and ethnic make-up. What could be useful in locating sexual violence within the wider urban dynamic would be more detailed data that correlates the profiles of specific neighborhoods with the reported cases of violence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Highest % of Reported Cases of Sexual Violence</th>
<th>Town</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan – June 2012</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>Gulshan-e-Iqbal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>Clifton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan – June 2011</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>Bin Qasim Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>Orangi Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan- June 2010</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Korangi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>Landhi, Gadap, Gulshan-e-Iqbal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WAR factsheets for 2012, 2011 & 2010

In addition WAR also generates statistics on the age of the victims as well as individual stories of abuse. While this data is extremely valuable, it is limited in the sense that only those victims are being tracked who come into contact with the state, either through FIRS lodged with the police or those who undergo medical examinations or MLEs. In order to develop a comprehensive picture of
the prevalence of gender-based violence in communities across the city, surveys need to go beyond those cases that acquire a ‘medico-juridical’ legitimacy through the act of reporting and registering with the state.

In addition to NGOs like WAR, there are others that also operate in Karachi such as Aurat Foundation, Panah, Human Rights Commission Pakistan (HRCP), Visionary Foundation Pakistan, Darul Sukoon and Bint-e-Fatima. These NGOs are involved in generating publications and statistics on gender violence and also organizing outreach programs that push for awareness raising campaigns. NGOs like Panah have emerged out of the tumultuous and highly discriminatory era of General Zia ul Haq (1978-1988) when women in Pakistan suffered a huge setback in terms of new legislation, specifically the implementation of Islamic injunctions such as the notorious Hudood Ordinances promulgated in 1979.

The most controversial of the ordinances are the two laws pertaining to sexual offences, i.e. the Zina and Qazf Ordinances that encompasses the rules and legal principles that govern the proof of facts in a legal proceeding. This law has been understood as intrinsically misogynistic as its application has resulted in women being convicted of adultery/fornication if they report a case of rape. Their report is treated as a confession. Moreover, these laws’ judicial application has also made it easier to get away with crimes against women such as honor killings and the general degradation and humiliation of women in Pakistani society. Predictably women’s rights activists have been against the law and have demanded a safeguard.

In 2006 under General Pervaiz Musharraf’s military regime, heated parliamentary debates between the liberal parliamentarians and the more conservative ulema led to a compromise in the shape of the Women’s Protection Act, 2006. Even though substantial changes have been made in the Hudood
Ordinances, key challenges remain. For instance in 2013 the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) rejected the act and decreed DNA tests unacceptable as primary evidence in rape cases.16

Thus General Zia’s regime was a turning point for activists and lawyers legislating for women’s rights, and NGOs like Panah emerged in this contested space. In Karachi, Panah’s shelters provide physical, psychological and legal support to women and their children. Some shelters are able to secure support from local police stations and maintain an atmosphere of tight security. Women who seek shelter have survived attempted honor killings, suffered domestic abuse, were forcibly thrown away from their homes due to family clashes, have been raped, divorced, separated or have left their homes for a marriage of choice. The majority of women who seek refuge in shelters are between the ages of 18 to 40 years. When we asked a Panah trustee how they treat their residents, we were told:

“We organize different activities for these women like formal and informal education, skill learning, and beautician course. We aim to make these victims empowered by giving them these skills, so that if they get back home they can earn to fulfill their needs. When they leave from here their outlook is different; they are confident and they can do something for themselves in terms of a livelihood.”

When asked the reason for domestic violence in Pakistan, an NGO representative underscored patriarchy as a leading problem. They also highlighted masculinity and attitudes towards women as a cause for their secondary status:

“The man is seen as a bread winner and therefore has a superior status in society. We don’t teach men to have balance and equality in relationships. If a woman gives him cold bread or improperly cooked food then he beats her. There are no support systems for women. Even educated women suffer in silence. In our social settings, we accept domestic violence; a light slap on the woman's cheek and a few verbal assaults are not considered harmful. Even parents find this acceptable, and bit by bit, the threshold for domestic violence keeps on increasing. And then one day she has no choice but to leave her home.”

16 “CII rules out DNA as primary evidence in rape cases”, Dawn.com 23 September 2013.
However, an element that is missing in present approaches towards tracking gender-based violence is attention to existing social networks, especially women’s networks and the role they perform in negotiating gender roles as well as dispute settlement for women on an everyday basis. An ethnographic approach allows this. It would be interesting to learn if there are instances where women seek and successfully negotiate regress for wrongs based on gender-discrimination, without recourse to state institutions. In addition, even though there is a focus on the economic costs of VAW there is less attention given to a deeper analysis of the economic context and its links to VAW.

6. Vulnerability and social capital

6.1 Definitions of vulnerability

The conceptualization and definition of vulnerability has generated considerable debate in the academic community. While physical scientists and engineers have typically equated it with physical exposure to extreme events and adverse outcomes, social scientists have emphasized the role of social structures and differential access to resources in making certain groups more disadvantaged in the face of disasters (Adger 2006). Some have attempted to bridge the gap between the physical and social scientific perspectives by proposing the concept of a ‘vulnerability of place’, where biophysical exposure intersects with political, economic and social factors to generate specific configurations of vulnerability (Cutter 1996; Cutter et al. 2000). A detailed discussion of the various nuances of the definition of vulnerability is a little beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say here, that we understand vulnerability to be more of a chronic state of being rather than an outcome of environmental extremes. We therefore define vulnerability as susceptibility to suffer damage from an environmental extreme and relative inability to recover from that damage (as per McCarthy et al., 2001; Mustafa 1998). Both the susceptibility, and then the ability to recover are understood to be a function of a person and group’s social positionality by virtue of ethnicity, gender, age and class and the wider political economy.

6.2 Measuring vulnerability – tools and populations

The concept of vulnerability has been one of the most important additions to hazards research in the last three decades. Vulnerability analyses from multiple
theoretical perspectives have enriched our understanding of the patterns and causes of damage resulting from environmental extremes. The contribution of vulnerability analyses to the policy realm, however, has been peripheral at best. Policy makers and researchers often operate in different frameworks and have different goals. Three areas of contention help to explain the lack of integration of academic vulnerability analyses into policy: 1) policy makers are generally concerned with aggregate populations at the meso and macro-national scales, while vulnerability analysts are usually interested in household and community differentiation at the micro and meso scales (Mustafa 2002, 2004; Pelling 2003); 2) many vulnerability analysts are concerned with systematic change and fundamental inequities in the prevailing political and economic structures that policy makers represent and reproduce (Hewitt 1983; Wisner et al. 2004); and 3) most policy makers need simple, generalized, actionable, preferably quantitative information for input into policy process, while the work of most vulnerability analysts results in spatially and temporally nuanced, complex, generally qualitative information directed towards understanding causation rather than prescribing action (for example, Watts and Bohle, 1993; Swift, 1989).

Most attempts at measuring vulnerability have equated vulnerability with physical exposure or have drawn upon large national level indicators of social development. But those quantitative measures have typically not been very successful at capturing the local level variations in vulnerability. Mustafa et al. (2010) have suggested a quantitative Vulnerability and Capacities Index (VCI) for quantitatively capturing the key material, institutional and attitudinal drivers of vulnerability. Much of the vulnerability assessment in Karachi and in Rawalpindi/Islamabad will be based upon the urban version of that quantitative index. For details of the reasoning for the choice of indicators of vulnerability and the weights assigned to them please see Mustafa et al. (2010). Suffice it to say here that social networks and the social capital inhering in those networks are deemed to be one of the drivers of vulnerability. We shall discuss the social capital profile of the cities in the sub-section below, after we have outlined the vulnerability profile from prior research in the following section.

6.3 Karachi’s vulnerable populations

Whereas in Pakistan overall people living in rural and small towns are considered the most vulnerable in terms of absolute poverty and access to infrastructure, yet
Urbanization, Gender & Violence in Millennial Karachi: SAIC Scoping Study

a large urban centre like Karachi brings its own particular dynamic of vulnerability. As has been outlined at length in earlier sections, unstable governance structures and political violence are both a cause and effect of differential and contested access to land and infrastructure in the city. While, as Pakistan’s largest urban conglomeration, Karachi is a wealthy city, yet there are vast disparities in income and distribution of resources. The ‘unplanned’ areas that constitute more than 60% of the city house the most vulnerable populations with precarious incomes and serious infrastructure issues.

However it is important to point out that vulnerability is not uniformly distributed in the unplanned areas. The so-called ‘informal’ economy has also generated a certain amount of wealth that has been invested both privately and in the public domain. There are disparities of income and in terms of access to infrastructure within the unplanned areas. A study linking ethnicity with socio-economic status in Karachi shows disparities in income and assets amongst groups belonging to different ethnic backgrounds. The results show Muhajir and Punjabi households having the highest economic assets and Pakhtuns and Baloch as having the lowest (Mehar 1998). In the same study unemployment rates across ethnic groups show Baloch with the lowest rate of 50% and Pakhtuns of 22%.

Another source of social vulnerability in Karachi are forced evictions as a result of municipal restructuring and resettlement policies that are tied to large-scale infrastructure projects that have been undertaken over the past two decades. The Lyari Expressway Project has resulted in large scale displacement of vulnerable populations living very close to the dried-up Lyari riverbed. The Urban Resource Centre estimates that the city government demolished 16,542 housing units to make way for this project and 3000 of the families that were evicted did not receive compensation money or the promised piece of land as part of the resettlement package. The Karachi Circular Railway is another project that has and will generate further displacement. Resettlement policies have been criticized for not providing adequate and convenient housing and infrastructure facilities. Often evicted families are resettled in far-flung and peripheral areas of the city where the promised infrastructure is either absent or slow to develop. The loss of livelihoods has affected not only men but women as well. Women have lost opportunities for finding livelihood because of the large distances involved in
navigating their way around the city. School and health facilities in resettled areas are often devoid of staff (Yunus 2013).

Karachi has a substantial refugee population that generally inhabits the peripheral regions of the city where housing and infrastructure access is minimal. Although Karachi has always had large flows of migrants and refugees, starting with partition in 1947, yet there is great differentiation in terms of the way refugees at different times and different eras have been accommodated. Presently Afghan, Bengali and Burmese refugees find themselves in situations of worst vulnerability in the city (Anwar 2013; Alimia 2012). Lack of formal citizenship rights and lack of documentation adds a further layer of precarity as they remain in danger of further displacement and removal and are unable to access employment and state services.

Women in low-income communities, as detailed in the section on gender and violence, are vulnerable not just in terms of precarity of livelihood but domestic violence as well as violence in the public sphere. Gender further exacerbates all of the vulnerabilities outlined above and increases the vulnerability of women who, in addition to being poor, belong to the ‘wrong’ ethnicity, are forcibly evicted or displaced or are refugees.

6.4 Definitions of social capital

Social Capital (SC) is a widely cited and loosely defined concept, which has gained popularity in development and academic discourses in recent decades. In 2014, there exist over 3500 articles with Social Capital in their title on the Social Sciences Citation Index. Its most commonly cited definition is: “features of social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995:66). The terms used here are open to various conceptual interpretations, which has left the task of defining theory and measurement wide open. Social Capital began in the domain of Sociology, where theorists tried to understand how social relations, specifically networks of people/groups, may influence particular social, political or economic outcomes; the basic narrative being that social interactions between individuals or groups lead to social networks. Through increased interaction, confidence is built and reciprocal actions start. Over time, trust builds between actors, as well as
common values, which lead to the formation of norms and culture. According to social capital literature, then, a community has been generated. According to theorists, then, social capital exists within this community, and it can be built up, like a ‘stock’ which grows or is reduced according to its usage. This stock is assumed to enhance the efficiency of actors to pursue specific goals (Serageldin and Steer 1994; Coleman 1990; Putnam, 1995; Bebbington and Perrault 1999; Poder 2011).

The concept began in the domain of economic sociology: where social capital could lead to economic gain through better educational outcomes (Loury 1977; Coleman 1990; Bourdieu 1986); more efficient organizations (Granovetter 1973; 1985); higher economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997) and financial development (Guiso et al 2004). Central to most arguments was that social capital started through individual, rational self interest and through reciprocal action, trust and social norms, it became the property of groups and networks. According to Bourdieu (1986) there are three forms of capital, economic, cultural and social; the three can be transferred or exchanged for another. Thus an individual or group with high levels of cultural or social capital can use them to secure economic outcomes e.g. access to specific employment because of one’s networks, and vice versa e.g. using one’s economic means to acquire cultural or social capital. Bourdieu’s concept of the economy broadened investigation to include matters traditionally conceived of as cultural, social, political.

Henceforth, from the 1990s, the investigation of social capital branched outside economic sociology to politics, criminology, development studies, public health studies and more. Putnam (1995) introduced social capital to political science, arguing that it is a property of communities, or even nations, which is intrinsically ‘for the public good’. He argued it lead to better functioning democracies. Following on from Coleman, Social Capital inheres in relationships amongst individuals and groups, where trust, obligations, reciprocity and eventually norms develop (and are socially transferred) which allow groups within social structures to have collective efficacy: acting together to reach common goals (Putnam 2000). Putnam equates it with ‘civic virtue’ or ‘civil society’. This is the idea that well governed societies are driven by trust (the higher the level of trust in a society, the higher level of cooperation) and civic engagement (the more people become involved in associational life, the more they build trust, reciprocity and
Urbanization, Gender & Violence in Millennial Karachi: SAIC Scoping Study

norms). In theory, then social capital, or civil society could benefit other areas, than political governance alone. Thus, the literature extended to considering the role of social capital in communities, covering in particular, but not limited to crime and health outcomes. As this research project focuses on these two areas in the urban sphere, these two fields will be briefly covered, followed by our definition of SC.

In 1942, Shaw and McKay hypothesized that income inequality in geographically bounded communities leads to social disorganization through a breakdown of social cohesion and normlessness. As a result, SC or ‘social cohesion’ were linked with rates of violence and/or crime, because they argued that communities lacking Social Capital are less effective at enforcing informal social control (ISC) and thus preventing deviant behaviors (Sampson and Wilson 1995). ISC is argued by Putnam to lead to better governance (public services through civil society enforcing checks and balances) and lower crime rates (an individual is less likely to commit a crime if his community punishes deviant behavior). This theory has been empirically tested in a number of ways, particularly in urban areas. The premise is that, with increased population density, increased ethnic and social heterogeneity, and more anonymity (due to these factors), it is harder to develop norms and enforce ISC (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999); thus there are less reputational costs associated with committing a crime (Sickles and Williams 2002). There are also more opportunities for criminals to interact. In theory then, social capital is lower in urban areas (New South Wales Study 1997). Various researchers (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997; Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Land et al 1990; Taylor et al 1984; Sampson and Groves 1989) found that law enforcement and public control is higher in communities with extensive civic engagement. In a world where INGOs were gaining more relevance, and the concepts of development and security were becoming closer linked in the discourse; Social Capital became very exciting to INGOs and policymakers. It inspired policy makers to seek new ways to promote ‘community bonds’ and social institutions.

Our study does not just consider physical forms of violence, but also ‘infrastructural violence’. This concept refers to how infrastructure – housing, roads, streets, water supply and sanitation systems – particularly in urban areas, are layered with hierarchies of power which translate into physical and
psychological harm (Rodgers and O’Neill 2012). Infrastructure shapes the ways in which people interact with each other; in urban spaces this is compounded due to the density of populations and often insufficient infrastructures to support their daily lives. SC is interesting to this research as it may play a mitigating or compounding role in the translation of infrastructural issues to experienced violence. For example, SC has been linked to better health and quality of life outcomes (Kawachi et al 1997; Marmot 2012; Helliwell 2002; Rose 2000; Islam et al 2006). Researchers link social capital to the socioeconomic conditions of the places in which people live (Diez-Roux 2001). Consequently, this makes it a more useful concept for public health and social epidemiology because it draws attention to material conditions and the policies that influence them (Carpiano 2006).

First, SC is seen as a conduit for increased access (through networks) to either health services or knowledge about lifestyle/health. Second, it can lead to greater checks and balances upon basic service providers, like government or community organizations (Knack 1999). Thirdly, it can be a buffer in areas of high inequality (particularly in areas of minority ethnic populations), against the negative impacts of discrimination and poverty upon health (Uphoff 2013; Pickett and Wilkinson 2010; Pearson and Geronimous 2011; Sun, Rehnberg and Meng 2009). Davis (2012) sums up the role of good quality social capital in the face of urban infrastructural and armed violence as ‘resilience’ – where actors and infrastructures producing violence in insecure urban contexts can be marginalized or eliminated by various groups working cooperatively, particularly in the context of an absent or minimal state. Fundamentally, though, urban resilience is built most strongly by good, inclusive urban planning which secures livelihoods and basic services, as well as safe movement. These seems somewhat idealistic in the context of contemporary urban, and rapidly urbanizing Pakistan, although there is the beginnings of work in theorizing how this may look, with work from Raman (2008) at MIT.

Out study is particularly focused on infrastructural violence, vulnerability and WASH. Are there connections between WASH delivery (or lack thereof) and experiences of violence? Recent research by Rogers and Satja (2012) and Gupte (2012) in India suggests so. Previous research has also linked SC and WASH outcomes. Kahkonen (1999) finds that where government irrigations or drinking
supply systems fall short, collective management by community members can lead to either better performance of the system through self-management, or pressure leading to government intervention. Similarly, with urban sanitation, whole sanitation systems have been constructed without subsidy by networks of local individuals working together in a ‘self-help’ model (Hasan 2003; Wright 1997).

Some key success factors are collective and reciprocal actions, shared values and norms, trust and social repercussions for deviance. The benefits of improved WASH are innumerable, particularly for the urban poor, and especially women, who tend to suffer disproportionately in terms of their health and livelihoods. Therefore, can SC mediate the violence associated with WASH? On the other hand, can SC lead to more violence? Consider the phenomena of water mafias, which are gangs who take control of water supply in urban areas and extort the public with exorbitant prices to access it (Bousquet 2006; Giglioli and Swyngedouw 2008; Gupte 2012). This has been argued to exist in some of Pakistan’s urban centers, like Karachi. Social networks in the power structure are integral to the working of the mafia; corrupt politicians and government servants support their work for bribes and delay the building of new infrastructure, and that could be conceptualized as social capital as well, albeit perverse (Qutub 2006; Mustafa 2013).

Unfortunately, the negative forms and impacts of SC have been largely ignored in the academic and policy literature until the last decade. Until then, general assumption existed that SC brings only benefits to individuals, communities or nations (Hauberer 2011; Rubio 1997; Woolcock and Narayan 2001; Portes and Mooney 2003). The literature has generally ignored the ‘perverse’ outcomes that can result from group behaviors, such as power hierarchies which prevent social mobility or restrict individual freedoms; criminal gangs or crime syndicates; exclusion of non-members; or taking resources away from one group to give to another (Mustafa 2005; Portes and Mooney 2003; Rubio 1997; Mustafa 2005; McIlwaine and Moser 2001; Hauberer 2011; Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2011). Portes and Mooney (2003) highlight 4 negative consequences of SC: exclusion of outsiders; excessive claims on group members; restrictions on individual freedoms, and downward leveling norms. This research project will investigate if perverse SC plays a role in masculinities and violence in the urban sphere.
Across disciplines, SC investigation and measurement has tended to focus on the following areas:

1. **Types of network** – do they bring together people from the same (bonding) or different social groups (bridging, or linking) in order to gain or trade ‘resources’

Strength of network ties – do networks have strong links (ties) or weak ones? When there are gaps (structural holes), which person or group with enabling contacts or knowledge gains power by being an intermediary?

2. **Membership of Groups** - Thus membership to groups and associations (formal or informal) can leads to interaction and networks in a community whereby the membership is deemed to be enough to benefit from its networks and thus can increase the level of SC within a community

3. **Generalised trust** - built through interactions with those within the network

Reciprocal actions - engaging in actions which are beneficial to others will in future mean actions will be performed for your benefit

4. **Shared Values and Norms** - The more interactions, trust and reciprocity, the more shared values and norms emerge, which are then shared or transmitted

5. **Informal Social Control** - As a result of norm and value transmission, ISC can develop (provided there are not too many ‘openings’ in the network for individuals or groups with different values), where communities can hold powerful institutions to account with checks and balances, or prevent deviant behavior occurring

6. **Outcomes** – Did SC achieve what it set out to do? Did positive or negative outcomes occur?

Narayan and Cassidy (2001) and Hauberer (2011) argue that most commonly, SC is measured via proxy indicators of a) generalized trust (self-assessed via survey questions) and b) membership in organisations (through survey or secondary data collection). At closer glance into the vast literature, one finds that additionally, common proxies have included, c) ‘civic virtue’ via voter turnout rates and voluntary giving (e.g. donating blood or to charity) (seen as a form of reciprocal action), d) network strength through self-assessments of time and quality of certain person-person or group interactions, and e) informal social control through survey questions covering community mediation of anti-social behavior.
There has been great criticism of measurement of SC to date. It is rarely clear how SC is conceptualized, before it is measured. Survey techniques can also be greatly affected by the personal characteristics of the participants (Hauberer 2011; Reuband 2001). In the same line of thinking, is estimating your trust in a community/person the same as ‘doing’ trust? (Hakli 2009; Portes & Mooney 2003). Can survey questions really be a measure of the way a society thinks and acts collectively? Perhaps they can show an indicative correlation at a specific moment in time, but not a reliable measure of a society’s SC. Study results do tend to correspond well with outcomes that can be expected on the basis of other data on the observed social groups and communities (Glaeser et al. 2000; Delhey and Newton 2003; Rahn et al. 2003).

However, our study considers new methodologies from Human Geography in the field of SC. Geographers argue that SC research tends to homogenize space and reduce human action to a set of rational behaviors in a depoliticized environment. They call for a return to Bourdieu’s conception of SC; this time though developing more comprehensive mechanisms to analyze the power relations in which SC is constituted and reproduced. This should focus on how actors and groups gain power and how conflicts of interest are resolved within a network (Mohan 2012; Naughton 2013; Cannone 2009; Hakli 2009). Key to this method is the analysis of discourses; which are seen to develop common languages and norms. Furthermore, they can lead to ISC through either legitimizing punishment, or through power/knowledge (Appadurai 2001; Blokland and Savage 2008; Hakli 2009). Naughton (2013) suggests a narrative approach, which maps out relational geometries to see how to see how actors with power can lead to structural change for whole networks. Blockland and Savage suggest analyzing how people’s social ties are locally organized, and how this affects their access to resources. All authors in this line of thinking emphasize grounded analysis, considering the power structures and discourses within their social contexts. Therefore an ethnographic approach to SC measurement is essential.

After consideration of the literature, and our research aims and constraints, we consider the following aspects of SC measurable:

**A) Outcomes**

**i) Efficacy** – what did the person or group set out to achieve and were they successful in that endeavor?
ii) Quality – did SC production/networks lead to positive/productive outcomes (such as reduced incidences of violent behaviors; less anxiety; increased access to services), or perverse/negative outcomes (such as increased crime/violence; prevention of individual freedoms; control over resources) – and for whom (for example, being in a gang can have positive outcomes for its members and negative outcomes for society, see McIlwaine and Moser 2006).

B) Mechanics

i) Associational membership – what types of different associations are people members of – informal and formal? How do these memberships affect access to power and/or resources?

ii) Connections – what kinds of personal connections do people have within and outside of communities? How do these connections provide or prevent support, power, and resources?

iii) Informal Social Control – how does the community control deviant behaviors through either a) Discursive power (power/knowledge) leading to trust and reciprocal behaviors or b) Disciplinary power (sanctions, violence)?

Normative values – what are the common languages, norms and values within the community/network?

Figure 3 below summarizes the conceptualization of social capital in terms of the efficacy and normative values emergent from associational membership and informal social control. In other words we are not just interested in the existence of social life, of informal social controls, but in how efficacious they are and what types of normative values they encapsulate. For each of the outcomes of efficacy and normative values in the context of associational life and informal controls, specific metrics will have to be developed to make a judgment on the quality of the social capital.
At this stage, we have decided to explore these aspects of SC through some survey questions, and participant observations. The aim is to get a grounded understanding and contextualized of the different elements of SC within the researchable communities, before prescribing a specific research tool. The biggest project ahead of us is to define the metrics and then match the appropriate methodologies with each of the outcomes.

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

7.1 Geographical areas proposed for this project

In Karachi, our research is focused on three municipalities: Orangi Town, Bin Qasim Town and Jamshed Town located in Districts West, Malir and East, respectively (Maps 2, 3, 4). Within each municipality, we cover different neighborhoods situated in specific union councils (UC). For instance, in Orangi
Town our survey is focused on an assortment of low-income neighborhoods in three UCs: Chisti Nagar, Bilal Colony and Ghaziabad.
In selecting these municipalities which contain different kinds of neighborhoods built in the pre- and post-Partition eras, our objective is to cover the city in terms of its center-periphery continuum. The focus on different municipalities, neighborhoods and communities will also enable us to produce a more nuanced understanding of vulnerability in Karachi, especially which neighborhoods and communities are more vulnerable than others and why. This is all the more pertinent in the context of our plan to quantitatively capture key material, institutional and attitudinal drivers of vulnerability. Starting with Orangi Town which lies in the northwest and borders Karachi’s rapidly urbanizing periphery of Gadap Town, we trace the trajectory of our surveys into Jamshed Town in the central part of the city and finally to Bin Qasim Town which is located in the southwest along the Arabian Sea. With a population of 730,000, Jamshed Town (Map 3) contains some of Karachi’s oldest neighborhoods such as Jacob Lines and Soldier Bazaar. This municipality now constitutes predominantly an Urdu-speaking or Muhajir population many of whom are Partition migrants.

Bin Qasim town’s population is estimated at 315,000 and it is a heterogeneous mixture of Muhajir, Bengali, Burmese, Baloch and Sindhi ethnicities. Here we focus on a 60,000 strong Bengali-Burmese low-income neighborhood known as Ali Akbar Shah goth located in the UC Ibrahim Hyderi (See Map 4). Ethnically diverse with an estimated population of 2 million, the largest settlement in our survey is Orangi Town (Map 2). All three municipalities comprise a mixture of
low to middle income neighborhoods that experience moderate to severe infrastructure shortages and have histories of violence ranging from political to ethnic to sectarian and state-driven. In our surveys of these neighborhoods, we apply a mix-methods approach that encompasses detailed surveys/questionnaires, open-ended interviews, focus groups and ethnographies. Even though we are attentive to individuals and households, we also include community activists, local government representatives and local political party counselors as well as police.

**7.2 Key stakeholders**

At this juncture, our key partners in Karachi encompass community activists who have extensive experience working in community-based water supply and sanitation projects in settlements such as Orangi Town and in collaboration with the OPP-RTI. Through such efforts, we are partnering with the OPP-RTI for facilitating our research work on land tenure systems and provision of sanitation in the Orangi Town’s newest settlements. Going forward, we also plan to share with OPP-RTI our research findings. We also aim to partner with the NGO War AGAIN Rape (WAR) and to link up with the District Inspector General (DIG), Sindh, for the sharing of information/data on gender and violence and particularly its spatial/geographical contours in Karachi.

**7.3 Gaps & Way forward**

As we move forward with the larger project, we underscore first the need to probe further certain gaps in knowledge. These pertain to factors that should be taken into consideration when investigating drivers of violence and its correlation with gender roles in Karachi. These are:

- The heterogeneous nature of Karachi’s population that is continuously reproduced through different trajectories of migration into the city.
- The changing nature of Karachi’s political economy and its implications for gender roles: despite rising inequality it is also Pakistan’s economic powerhouse, generating jobs and incomes with increasing numbers of working women participating in both homebased and factory work and in the public sphere.
- The multiple and contradictory systems of governance which are constantly in flux.
• Infrastructure as a political issue that is firmly embedded in questions of power in terms of the control of its supply. This pertains especially to Karachi where the provision of infrastructure such as water is implicated in violent geographies. We need further information on exactly how the networks that undergird supply function and what are the arrangements of power supporting them.

• The existence and increasing proliferation of non-state forms of authority, whether political parties, criminal networks sourced by drugs and extortion, who are also involved in the illicit delivery of land and services. The threat of violence as well as actual violence is an instrument to facilitate this process.

Informed by the above points, we are attentive to the following three issues/questions:

1) The way social networks operate at a very local level to facilitate or hinder access to infrastructure and resources to households.

2) The relationship of households to both state and non-state authority and differences in the way both men and women forge these relationships.

3) In what situations does violence emerge and what is its role in facilitating or hindering access to infrastructure? What kind of effect does this violence have on men and women? Who is more vulnerable?

Note: We acknowledge the invaluable assistance of our Research Assistants in Karachi: Sidra Hussain, Ainne Siddiqui, Kulsum Baloch, Shamsuddin, Affan Iqbal and Mir Reza Ali.

References


Urbanization, Gender & Violence in Millennial Karachi: SAIC Scoping Study


_________________________, Finance Division, *Pakistan Economic Survey 2009-10*.

_________________________, *Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (PDHS) 2007*

_________________________, *Pakistan Demographic Survey (PDS) 2007*

_________________________, *Population Policy of Pakistan 2002*


Background

The study was conducted by the Architect and Planning Consultant 37-D, Muhammad Ali Society, Karachi – 75350.


Mapping of Women Home-Based Workers in Five Towns of Karachi.


Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Rose, R. (2000) How much does social capital add to individual health? Social Science and Medicine, 51(9): 1421-35


Sun, Xiaojie, Rehnberg, Clas & Meng, Qingyue (2009) *International Journal for Equity in Health* 8, pp.2.


