Global Narrative Report

People, Places and Infrastructure: Countering urban violence and promoting justice in Mumbai, Rio, and Durban

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Acknowledgments

The Global Narrative is an attempt to converge into a comparative framework the findings of a cross regional research titled ‘People, places and infrastructure: Countering urban violence and promoting justice in Mumbai, Rio, and Durban’ undertaken by three research teams, namely - Instituto de Pesquisa e Planejamento Urbano e Regional (IPPUR), Rio de Janeiro and University of KwaZulu Natal, Durban and Centre for Urban Policy and Governance (CUPG), Tata Institute for Social Sciences, Mumbai.

It draws heavily from the documentation produced at the levels of the teams and across partners as part of the three year project, and most significantly from each of the case studies that provide the empirical grounding to enable and add rigour to such a synthesis and comparison. It thus acknowledges the contribution of each of the team members across the project partners.

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>Central Business District</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>IDRC</td>
<td>International Development Research Centre</td>
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**RIO**

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>UPP</td>
<td>Police Pacification Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGI</td>
<td>Real Estate Registry of Rio de Janeiro</td>
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<tr>
<td>VLT</td>
<td>Light Rail Metro</td>
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<td>CDURP</td>
<td>Urban Development Company of the Port Region of Rio de Janeiro</td>
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**DURBAN**

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>GAA</td>
<td>Group Areas Act (1950)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCC</td>
<td>Durban City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNG</td>
<td>Breaking New Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEE</td>
<td>Black Economic Empowerment</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution (1996)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDCEA</td>
<td>South Durban Community Environmental Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAT</td>
<td>Warwick market Triangle</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDB</td>
<td>South Durban Basin</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAPS</td>
<td>Public Order Policing</td>
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<td>SAPS</td>
<td>South African Police Service</td>
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<td>NDoH</td>
<td>National Department of Housing</td>
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**MUMBAI**

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>TISS</td>
<td>Tata Institute of Social Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCR</td>
<td>Development Control Regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>JVLR</td>
<td>Jogeshwari Vikhroli Link Road</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLA</td>
<td>Member of Legislative Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMC</td>
<td>Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ULCRA</td>
<td>Urban Land Ceiling &amp; Regulation Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUTP</td>
<td>Mumbai Urban Transport Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMRDA</td>
<td>Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUIP</td>
<td>Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADR</td>
<td>Additional Development Rights</td>
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<td>TDR</td>
<td>Transfer of Development Rights</td>
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<td>SRA</td>
<td>Slum Rehabilitation Act</td>
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<td>SRS</td>
<td>Slum Rehabilitation Scheme</td>
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<tr>
<td>R &amp; R</td>
<td>Resettlement and Rehabilitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRVC</td>
<td>Mumbai Rail Vikas Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSRDC</td>
<td>Maharashtra State Roads Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSI</td>
<td>Floor Space Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTSU</td>
<td>Mumbai Transport Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRS</td>
<td>Slum Rehabilitation Scheme</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTP</td>
<td>Right to Pee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ULB</td>
<td>Urban Local Body</td>
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<td>VVMC</td>
<td>Vasai Virar Municipal Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDCO</td>
<td>City and Industrial Development Corporation</td>
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<td>HSVA</td>
<td>Hamara Shaher Vikas Abhiyan</td>
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1 Introduction

This report combines, compares and contrasts the findings of a three-year, cross regional research on “People, Places and Infrastructure: Countering Urban Violence and Promoting Peace in Mumbai, Rio and Durban” funded by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) as part of their Safe And Inclusive Cities project. The project brought together research teams from three cities of the Global South, namely Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, Durban in South Africa and Mumbai in India who explored, through city profiles and case studies, the trajectory of socio-spatial transformations in their respective cities over the past two to three decades, and especially after the advent of neoliberalism. More particularly, it undertook to study the playing out of spatial (in)justice and the place of violence within the processes of socio-spatial transformations engineered by an alliance of the state and market forces.

This report sets up a conversation between the diverse case studies from the three cities within a common theoretical framework. Some of the concepts involved – socio-spatial transformation, violence, spatial justice – together formed the framework within which the entire project was conceptualized in the proposal. The findings of the cases suggest a fit with the Lefebvrian theory of the production of space. This is not surprising since Lefebvre, speaking from a concern with justice, focuses on the phenomenon of a socio-spatial transformation facilitated by the state in alliance with the market, as well as the violences involved in the process.

Chapter Two (the next chapter) elaborates on the theoretical framework and its key concepts. Chapter Three presents city level narratives, highlighting findings from each case with a consolidation at each city level. Chapter Four integrates findings across cities into the theoretical framework while opening up possibilities for future enquiry.
2 Theoretical Framework

This section presents a broad theoretical framework that remains close to the original conceptualization of the research while also drawing on the analysis and theorization that researchers developed. It begins with Lefebvre’s account of the production of space under ‘neocapitalism’, which provides an explanatory matrix within which concepts of socio-spatial transformation, violence, peace and spatial justice are elaborated.

2.1 Socio-spatial transformation through ‘the production of space’

Henri Lefebvre’s (1991) theory of the production of space provides a useful frame for integrating the diverse socio-spatial transformations presented in the city narratives to follow. Lefebvre argues that under conditions of what we recognize today as neoliberalism, the state aligns with the market to facilitate the production of space itself. This is an important transition, that from producing things in space to producing space itself, an aspect of which Harvey (2001) has elucidated as the ‘spatio-temporal fix’. Space in Lefebvre’s formulation is a system of relations encompassing social and natural realms (and therefore, also incorporating time). The production of space is, thus, the creation of new systems of social and spatial relations often in the same natural space or location in or outside existing cities. Its objectives are simultaneously economic and political: enabling accumulation and reinforcing control. To achieve this, idealized representations of space that privilege its instrumental and commodity characteristics – or abstract space in general – is sought to be imposed on existing social space (which includes natural, as well as lived space) everywhere. The ‘substance’ of this dominant abstract space is a new system of social and spatial relations organized by rationalities simultaneously founded on the axioms of accumulation and political control. These rationalities seek to reorganize the physical environment (in terms of its infrastructural provisions, configuration, scale and materiality, and symbolism); the rhythm of repetitive practices that it activates and nurtures; the demographic distributions across space; the social, economic and political relations that are practiced and sedimented through these changes above over time. Aspects of this reconfiguration might be directly intended, while others are collateral outcomes. Lefebvre argues that there is a violence immanent to the abstract space
that is sought to be imposed on the existing social space. Moreover, as the city narratives demonstrate, such transformations require significant state involvement in different ways.

2.2 State - Market Axis

As Lefebvre argues, the alliance between the state and the market drives contemporary socio-spatial transformations, reinforcing urban social structures and guiding practices that maintain and produce injustice, inequality, insecurity and violence. The concept of the ‘state-market axis’ calls attention to one concrete manifestation of a practiced ideology often referred to as neoliberalism.

Peck & Tickell (2002, p. 381) identify free trade, flexible labour, active individualism, as three core values organizing neoliberal ideology. They note neoliberal ‘antipathy to all kinds of Keynesian and/or collectivist strategies’, and note two facets that emerged in the US and Western Europe as phases: roll-back and roll-out neoliberalism (Peck & Tickell, 2002, pp. 388-). Where roll-back cut back government especially institutions of social welfare, roll-out created new institutions to respond to the crises in transport, food, pollution etc traceable to governance failures of Thatcher/Reagan’s roll-back neoliberalism. These represent two different stimuli, external (to a country) crises for the former, and internal for the latter. The authors argue that the crisis caused by the former, led to the latter. Thus this represents both neoliberalism’s frailty as well as deepening, both visible in accounts from the three cities.

‘No longer concerned narrowly with the mobilization and extension of markets (and market logics), neoliberalism is increasingly associated with the political foregrounding of new modes of “social” and penal policymaking, concerned specifically with the aggressive reregulation, disciplining, and containment of those marginalized or dispossessed by the neoliberalization of the 1980s’ (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 389)

The authors believe that cities have been the biggest visible victims of the neoliberal collaboration between the state and market, which involves an interesting deception for them: ‘While rhetorically antistatist, neoliberals have proved adept at the (mis)use of state power in the pursuit of these goals’ (2002, p. 381). They also argue that although neoliberalism is
increasingly pervasive, it must be seen both as locally specific in forms it takes, as well as connected to extralocal processes (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 382). It manifests on the ground in a variety of ways and requires understanding how aspects of it are locally articulated and experienced on the ground by different social groups. This understanding recognizes that global and larger regional processes are increasingly mediated through social/cultural meanings, actors and experience at the local level (Burawoy 2000).

The neoliberal expression of the state-market axis, as an alliance, matters tremendously. The state has the sovereign authority to decide where and whether the law applies. It is the state that makes the distinction between bare life and recognized life. Thus it is the state that claims the authority to confer the status of being more than ‘bare life’ and also take it away at will. This is the power of exception that Agamben (2005) invokes.

2.3 Violence

As noted, Lefebvre considers violence central to the process through which space is produced by the state-market axis. Johan Galtung offers a broad definition of the term which is particularly useful in identifying the variety of forms violence takes: ‘violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations’ (Galtung, 1969, p. 168). He explicitly rejects the idea that violence is only somatic, and is always intentionally enacted by an actor on a human being, for if we accept this limited conceptualization of violence, and peace is considered its negation, ‘too little is rejected when peace is held up as an ideal’. Making space in his conceptualization for the range of violence from the personal to the structural ‘violence is here defined as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is. Violence is that which increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance’. Galtung (ibid) offers an extremely wide but closely argued multi-dimensional typology of violence organized around multiple axes – personal-structural, direct-indirect – and also dwells on the intersections between them as well as the relationship between the poles of every conceptual axis.
For Braud (1993), any violence has a psychological dimension. This dimension is essential to define violence as such, since it "establishes meaning to suffering, supported or imposed." So there is never physical violence without subjective violence (although the latter can take place regardless of former), which, ultimately it is predominant, since the perception of violence continues, as humiliation (for example), regardless of termination of physical violence. Symbolic violence prepares the ground for enacting physical violence and simultaneously distorts the victim’s self-representation. The dominant groups thus feel "authorized" to attack the devalued. Anthropologists have argued that violence in volatile spaces is mimetic -- it produces and reproduces itself (Das 1990, Schepers-Hughes and Bourgois 2004). Freire (1968) explores how oppression has been justified and how it is overcome through a mutual process between the "oppressor" and the "oppressed" (oppressors–oppressed distinction). Freire admits that the powerless in society can be frightened of freedom. He writes, "Freedom is acquired by conquest, not by gift. It must be pursued constantly and responsibly…." Freire states that the oppressed may internalize the oppressor. "But almost always, during the initial stage of the struggle, the oppressed, instead of striving for liberation, tend themselves to become oppressors, or 'sub-oppressors'”.

Both physical and structural violence, is produced and reproduced with a specific agenda -- to stifle resistant voices and to manufacture consent. In turn, violence is also used as resistance against these dominant forces. Hence, here violence is both a message and means (Eckert 2001) of attaining power.

Certain social groups are more likely to suffer structural violence under neoliberalism. Farmer (1996, 2001) notes a strong correlation between neoliberalism, structural violence, poverty and suffering and highlights that even in democratic societies the poor are marginalized and are voiceless in their situation: “The poor are not only more likely to suffer, they are more likely to have their suffering silenced” (Farmer, 1996: 280). Farmer (2001) also calls for geographically broad and historically deep studies that acknowledge the political economy in order to establish links between the visible inequalities and poverties and the invisible (neoliberal) structures of violence inherent within a society. For instance, the calculated deregulation of the state - roll-back neoliberalism – has meant the absence of services, law and order and justice as traditionally discharged by the state system and, instead, service by
middlemen, the imposition of street justice (Gillespie 2013), vigilantism and violence with impunity.

We therefore need to differentiate between the violence of the weak and the systematic violence that is meted out to marginal territories (deemed “illegal” for instance) which the state as a functioning system has withdrawn, and all services have to be negotiated through different middlemen who enact the paradox of often being sources of violence and the only shields against it (Hansen and Verkaaik 2009).

### 2.4 Spatial Justice

Questions about who directs the neoliberal socio-spatial transformations, who reaps their benefits, who experiences what kind of violence, and why, are ultimately questions about the spatial (in)justices involved in the socio-spatial transformation. Ed Soja has argued that ‘[i]n the broadest sense, spatial (in)justice refers to an intentional and focused emphasis on the spatial or geographical aspects of justice and injustice’ (Soja, 2009). He says that ‘there is always a relevant spatial dimension to justice while at the same time all geographies have expressions of justice and injustice built into them’. The emphasis on the idea of spatial justice draws on three core realities: we are all spatial beings; ‘space is socially produced and can therefore be socially changed’; ‘the spatial shapes the social as much as the social shapes the spatial’.

Soja’s pioneering discussion of the concept of spatial justice suggests that two aspects of any situation must be examined in considering its (in)justice, spatial or otherwise: the process through which the situation arises, and the outcomes. In examining spatial justice, the process and the outcomes to be considered must be both social and spatial. Whereas John Rawls’ (1971) theory of justice focuses on outcomes, Soja credits Harvey for calling attention to the justice of the processes through which (un)just outcomes emerge. About Rawls’s focus on developing a universal theory that would be independent of specific biases operating in a real situation anywhere, Soja says:

‘What actually generates the injustices to be dealt with by law was thereby submerged and subordinated to the alleviation of legally defined “unacceptable outcomes” and the pursuit of
what constitutes the immediate wider good. How the wider good was defined, at least in Rawls’ original formulations, tended to reflect existing conditions, with all their built-in and built-up unfairness and socio-spatial inequality’ (Soja, 2010, p. 76).

Inequality, especially as it is accumulated in different domains and structures organizing social life, is thus identified by Soja as a pivotal presence in any condition of (in)justice. It should be noted that Soja’s own view of justice is ultimately limited to the political economic frame (i.e. it is about the ‘distributive’ dimension), which following Young (2011) we could argue needs to be supplemented by a view centred on difference (gender, caste, race etc). Young argues that a relation of domination and oppression (in contrast to that of distributive justice) is important to study in relation to difference, and not just in relation to class. She suggests that attention be paid to processes of domination and oppression of those marked by difference. A coordination or intersection of the distributive and difference centred perspectives on spatial justice may thus be envisaged as a more comprehensive methodology for a discussion of spatial justice.

The spatial injustices (using different terms) effected by neoliberalism, do not represent a terminus of social process as Lefebvre and Soja suggest in their different ways. Lefebvre argues that the contradictions between the abstract space being imposed and the lived space of those it oppresses contains the seeds of a new kind of space of productive tension, a ‘differential space’. This is a space of resistance (as much as of festival), and promises an opening to a corrective re-transformation. It therefore becomes important to examine practices of resistance, subversion and counter-transformation that identify and exploit contradictions, moments of rupture or the ‘spaces of hope’, in search of greater justice. We can recall Galtung’s argument that the prevalence of social justice is central to a broad conception of peace is important in this regard. Resistance of injustice, as well as the production of a viable, stable and minimally nurturing rhythm social life in the face of high vulnerability, can thus be considered important steps towards the production of a meaningful peace.
3 Narratives of Socio-spatial Transformations – 3 Cities

This chapter provides an overview of findings from case studies in each of the three cities.

3.1 Rio de Janeiro

It is believed that in the period between approximately 1980 and 2003, several important changes altered Brazil’s economic trajectory and with it, the dimensions of Brazilian inequality. This phase was preceded by the creation of the Guanabara State in 1960 (made up solely by the city of Rio de Janeiro while keeping the province of Rio de Janeiro separate) that saw several projects and activities designed to offset the political and economic losses suffered by Rio city in the midst of the process that included the creation of Brasília and the negative impact of the restatement of Sao Paulo as the epicenter of the country’s investments, industrialization and urbanization. In the 1970s, as one of the military dictatorship’s attempts to break the resistance of opposition and in the wake of the full force of centralized planning in the federal government, a new state of Rio de Janeiro was formed by merging Guanabara state with the province of Rio de Janeiro. Major tasks for urbanization were assigned to the military. The economic stagnation of the 1980s stimulated socio-spatial segregation of the city due to the increase in distances between the core city and its segments of concentrated poverty. In the wake of democratization movements, the country witnessed diffusion of various kinds of associative movements - resistance due to non-payment by the Housing Finance System, land regularization and supply of urban needs. These processes of organization and claimmaking made significant contributions to the National Constituent Assembly of 1988 and brought the need to improve public administration and urban living conditions into the political agenda of the state. Since re-democratization in the 1980s, the country has made significant progress in its urban development policies, including legal instruments to ensure people’s right to the city.

The city of Rio de Janeiro embarked upon implementation of neoliberal policies in the 1990s under the presidentship of Fernando Collor de Mello with the opening of the economy to external markets and the beginning of the privatization process of state enterprises. These
corresponded to the outsourcing of labour, the casualization of labour relations and partial privatization of public service management. It also resulted in several socio-spatial transformations and the pursuit of particular forms of production and management of cities, redefining the terms of the urban question. In the last decade, the state has overturned its own experience-informed policy of no evictions (that came to be seen as problematic in urban as well as economic and political terms post the evictions of 1902-1906 and 1961 to 1965) to one of pro-evictions under the administration of the Mayor Eduardo Paes (2008 onward). The city has witnessed an aggressive spurt of large urban transformation projects that have written into their plans the removal of slum communities to make space for real estate and private projects in the name of strategic urban planning and enhancing the city’s competitiveness. This has been accompanied by a change in political vocabulary and conduct of urban policy by aligning these interventions to a national pride in hosting global events such as the FIFA World Cup and Olympics and to a larger pursuit of boosting the local economy and benefiting all of society.

The three case studies from Rio de Janeiro focus on:

- The efforts towards removing the Vila Autódromo Community in order to construct the nearby Olympic Park.
- The actions and reactions to the installation of Police Pacification Units (components of a state program of public security) in the Favela da Maré; and
- The urban intervention of the Morro da Providência (part of the urban renewal project of the Porto Maravilha)

3.1.1 Mega-projects, Real Estate Development and Resistance against Eviction in Vila Autodromo

Vila Autodromo exists on state owned lands that have housed slums for over 40 years, and where an earlier project for low income housing by the State has rapidly given way to a series of new urban development schemes with the announcement of the 2016 Olympic games in Rio de Janeiro. The Pan American Games (2007) was held in Barra da Tijuca, a newly expanded area of the city. This area got further impetus with preparation for the 2016 Olympic Games. The Olympic Park is in a region called "New Barra", a place of intense real estate
investment. This explains the pressure for removal of Vila Autódromo which is one of the few low-income communities in the vicinity. Local residents complain that on the one hand the state is giving away public land (New Barra) to private players at very low rates (this land is later to be developed and sold for a handsome profit as high end residential housing) and on the other hand displacing poor communities even when they possess legal title to their land as in the case of Vila Autodromo. Such a global event has enabled the political and institutional alignment between the three spheres of political power – city of Rio de Janeiro (municipal level), the State of Rio de Janeiro (state level) and Brazil (federal level), who have overcome differences in party lines and ideology to coalesce in a common policy agenda.

The state market axis is also revealed in the serious irregularities that make up the entire process of pushing through public private partnerships for the Olympic park project- no Environmental Impact Assessments carried out; no Neighborhood Impact Studies undertaken or made public, legal protocols abandoned (several buildings were targeted to induce "order shock", with demolitions carried out without prior authorization from the judiciary) and fast tracking put into motion under the ‘realization of Olympic project of urgency’ (neoliberal space of exception). All these measures have been adopted by the contravention of the 99-year Use Concession Agreement (“My land Project” - 1993 and “RJ / Our State Our land” - 1994) and the right to RGI (Real Estate registry of Rio de Janeiro), or the virtue of this area being earlier declared as an area of special interest.

In Villa Autodromo, the state has resorted to uproot the communities through various tactics including incentivisation (where compensations offered to relocate have been very high, and have risen as the time for the 2016 Olympics draws nearer); dismantling of public services (water, electricity); violent, irregular demolitions and assault on valuable community infrastructure that were produced with significant community investments – trees, community areas and a safe neighbourhood free of violence and drug dealing; intimidation and psychological pressure (frequent visits by municipal officers to individual homes, increasing presence of municipal and security personnel in the neighbourhoods, marking of homes, constant references to a depleting stock of resettlement houses that could be availed in alternate locations), dividing resistance (within communities as well as within families-even reaching out to children who could convince their older generations to accept the benefit of
relocation); and weakening collective voice (devaluing legal defense by public defenders).
The communities have suffered symbolic violence and stigmatization as their resistance has
been stripped of its local relevance and framed as opposing the national pride that global
events such as the Olympics can potentially amplify in citizens of the nation at large. This
symbolic violence finds a direct spatial expression in the city and real estate investors in the
Olympic Park area seeking the removal of Vila Autódromo as a measure of aesthetic repair as
well as environmental damage control.

In the face of all of this, the community has put up a strong resistance through mass public
demonstrations, getting visibility for their plight in in the ‘Big’ Media (BBC/CNN) as well as
social media, reaching out to the city by putting up images depicting Vila Autodromo before
and after the city hall interventions and most importantly, through their ‘Plano Popular’. This
is a plan of local development that the communities have themselves come up with in
response to a challenge by the Mayor, for which they have sought the help of experts. Despite
the costing of this plan being much less than many resettlement housing projects made by the
government, demolitions and removals have continued from around mid 2014. Many gave
way but a group of about 40 out of the 500 continue to live there and fight for the cause of
better compensation. The struggle has weakened and for those who remain, it is a continuing
dilemma of how much there is to lose and how much they can still retain.

3.1.2 Actions and reactions to the installation of Pacifying Police Units in the Favela da
Maré

Favela Mare is a low lying area of Rio de Janeiro that originally took form as a settlement on
stilts in difficult marshy peripheries of the city. The construction of Brasilia Avenue in its
vicinity in the 1940’s soon added construction labourers and migrants to the settlement. The
first major spatial transformation of the settlement occurred in 1979, through the
implementation the sub-housing eradication program (Promorar, starting in 1979 through the
National Bank of Housing and extending into the 1980s) that moved houses on stilts to those
on landfills in Mare area. Expectations that the creation of the Maré district (1994) would
bring urbanisation, and importantly, services to this area in proportion to its spatial and
demographic share have however been proven wrong. The annexation of the favela by
dominant criminal gangs dates back to the 1970’s when it featured as one of the many
residential areas across the city that was brought under the control of the Red Command. What started with illegal practices of marijuana trading and small caliber weaponry trafficking has now made way for cocaine and heavy guns.

Maré has seen an intensification of pacification processes in the wake of the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games. The favela has now turned into an urban war zone, where Army barracks have been put up among the settlements since 2008 in a pacification process. To the two rival gangs Red command and Third Commons (which is understood to have linkages with a corrupt police), there is now added a third command ‘Friends of Friends’ with even stronger links with the police. Clashes with different security forces and between rival trafficking gangs often take form of gruesome, visual demonstrations of violence on the streets, making acute the uncertainty and the intimate experience of violence at a daily level. The individual, family and neighbourhood experiences of the people now include armored tanks, helicopters, assault rifles, barricades, endless shootings, uninvestigated arrests, raids on homes without warrants, torture, humiliation, explicit racism, countless violations without research, and the absence of legal process or punishment to implicate any police or military action. Children are sometimes victims, caught between crossfire or killed by knives, and old people suffer trauma brought on by an increasingly threatening police militia. Police have immunity for their action through legislation that justifies the killing of a suspect by police and thus outright, even random killing is legitimised as an act of caution.

Maré is representative of a larger phenomenon of a state market alliance in favelas that is revealed in the close ties between corrupt police and drug gangs in illicit drug dealings. In several other favelas deals are known to be struck between gangs and the government too in contracting of public works in the community. Such control has sometimes meant that services in favelas are cheap or come completely free enroute many informal arrangements. This makes up the concession part of the gang’s strategy of ‘coercion and concession’ administered through their presence in resolving family and neighbourhood disputes, delivery of services such as basic food baskets, electricity, gas connections (replacement of the welfare state). People tend to hate police (state) more than the gangs as they are perceived as more violent and hostile to the local communities, as also by virtue of them not being service providers like drug dealers. Subjectivities emerge in a gradation between love (preference)
and hate (rejection) perceived for and from the various faces of oppression (forms of institutions) that make the life of the communities an endless experience of violence and uncertainty. A resident hints at love toward gang members by linking love to the expectation that the problem will be solved (thereby hate for the military police at two levels- where no end to the assault is anticipated in the capacity of the community themselves and 2) as it being a component of a public security strategy that cannot actually contemplate the favela in its totality, and cannot be a solution in itself). Hate is also identified within the police by understanding them as ‘poor who have no reason for hatred toward poor and thus treat community members simply as targets’ or in the form of aggressiveness that can be attributed (perhaps) to some personal experience of prejudice or social stigmas. The Army is considered better than the military police by being perceived as ‘less aggressive (letting residents circulate while the police simply enter and start shooting), ‘quieter’, or by understanding them as ‘young and fearful in an unknown area amid strangers, and thus getting increasing violent as pacification processes intensify’. Subjectivity is also strongly expressed in the differential treatment by the army and police whereby suspicion and criminalization worsens when it comes to black residents and generates ratings between “black”, “lighter” or “darker” in certain situations, reinforcing the stigma and racial prejudice embedded in Brazilian society.

A fundamental inversion of the role of the police occurs as one that eliminates rather than protects, while the presence of the state remains limited to this power apparatus and ensures in turn that private companies may operate in providing private or public services. Here, as across several other parts of the city, pacification processes reveal themselves as occupation projects, and as the pacified favelas adjacent to the coast such as Vidigal and Rocinha seem to indicate, the state of being pacified can signal the entry of market, where rents and house prices surge. Evidences clearly point to a higher concentration of UPPs in slums close to elite or speculation-friendly areas such as the vicinities of the Olympic Park and key transportation routes. In the logic that public safety becomes legitimate in detriment of the other, pacification processes can be understood as an act of pacifying the ‘othering’ other whereby the killing by state security agencies is consented by those who “feel relieved” or “vindicated” by state forces in places that are networked into the drug and crime economy.
3.1.3 Urban Intervention in Morro da Providência

Morro da Providência is recognised as the oldest informal settlement in the city. The occupation of these lands began in colonial times, with “quilombos” that housed runaway slaves and also newly freed slaves. During the Republic, Providência housed some of the soldiers who fought in the War of Canudos. The settlement has seen proposed, and has yet escaped several plans for its demolition through the beginning of the 20th century, including the massive favela-clearance drive of the 1960’s-70’s. However, home to an increasing number of favela dwellers, basic services such as electricity and water have been slow to reach. The drug trafficking gangs have been active here since the past few decades, which lead in 2010 to a Police Pacification Unit (UPP). The location is privileged in relation to the city center (CBD), the administrative center of the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro City, and to key transport nodes.

Most significantly, it is an area included in the Porto Maravilha Project, a large-scale urban port revitalisation project which is also the country’s first public-private partnership (PPP). Under the Morar Carioca project, the components of the project that lay in Morro da Providencia are a cable car, the Inclined Plane, the Motovia, the historic center: the oratory, the sports center and housing units (these form part of a larger tourist development plan), which together required the removal of 832 houses (3,000 people). By replacing an older, ineffective Residents Association, the affected residents of Morro da Providencia formed a larger collective by the name of Residents Commission, which was successful in getting works suspended through an injunction. The injunction required City Hall to present the works execution plan, information about the projects and to undertake the public hearings required by the Morar Carioca project. However, the project of the cable car that was prioritised over all other components of the project including the improvement of sanitation and housing was completed even without the necessary documentation, with the argument that it was already in the finalisation process. Negotiations then ensued with the City Hall over the period between August and October 2013, which eventually lead to the signing of an agreement. The final agreement however revealed itself as a subverted form of the agreed one - it announced the cancellation of the injunction that stopped the works, but added that the City Hall would pay reparations to families should they need to undertake new removals. In
the meanwhile, infrastructural works in downtown Rio de Janeiro related to the VLT (Rail Light Vehicle), created several uncertainties in traffic flow, leaving almost all routes to Morro da Providência damaged and difficult to use. The communities perceive this as a means to make them life difficult for them. Soon after, works related to the Motovia which had led to removal of around 40 houses was abandoned. While this was as much due to the drying up of funds, the City Hall attributed it to the injunction. The unfolding of the entire situation has emulated that in Vila Autodromo- exclusion of local communities in consultation, dividing public opinion (by rejecting the community’s demands for representation and emphasising that each of the affected household would be dealt with individually), incompetent site assessments and an attempt to fast track the process by passing a complementary law that set up the Urban Development Company of the Port Region of Rio de Janeiro (CDURP).

3.1.4 Reflections from Rio

The case studies from Rio present the story of spatial injustice and experience of violence, and a clear agenda of the state in perpetuating this through predominantly two kinds of strategies -

1) Interventions in the built environment – achieved largely through provisioning of urban infrastructure to enable new centralities and territorial transformation. This is clearly undertaken in aid of capital accumulation as indicated by the nature of projects (Olympic Parks, Port Complexes, Tourist Centres) and the commitment of public resources (land and state’s own resources in acquiring it) to private property-ship and market.

2) By exerting control and inducing social discipline necessary for the safety of private capital in areas identified as sources of disorder. This in turn is achieved dually- by increased investments in and direct physical intervention through intensified police action (in the name of pacification) and tightening of criminal law, as well as by adopting a rhetoric of order to which the right to build in communities and the very nature of life in the communities is subordinate.

In Rio, it is argued that it is inequality rather than poverty that is the operative concept in a discussion on violence and spatial justice. Here, inequality is created through the widespread

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1 A mixed economy company, controlled by City Hall, with the task of implementing and managing the granting of the public works and services in the Port Region and managing the property and financial resources for the Porto Maravilha project.
use of binaries – such as legal/illegal, criminal/police, asphalt/shantytown, favela/non favela, as a specific device that operates as an unequal distribution of social violence. Just as significant as the inequalities are also the ways and means by which different social groups express their relationship with this violence. Moreover, by ascribing violence as legitimate and illegitimate through hegemonic perpetuation of dominant values, violence itself becomes an inequitable resource.

Inequality is also sensed in conditions of participation in conflicts and negotiations, and in the language with which the state communicates with the communities. The residents of Vila Autodromo have been offered a single fate of having to move. This has been communicated to them through different means and sources including various state actors- may they be municipal or security officers in their repeated reference that the community would be left ‘nowhere’ if they chose to stay. Beyond protocol and the formal precepts of the state, this is expressive of a certain mode of operation by the representatives of public administration that not only reveals specific meanings and justifications, but extends an embodiment of the state itself in the presence of certain groups and their territories. A gorier experience of the same is that of the ‘Caveirão’ in Mare which are specially designed state combat vehicles adorned with images of a skull with sticks (symbol of public police, adopted from South African Aparthied state), that enter the residential neighbourhoods shooting and announcing their presence through threatening messages relayed on amplified speakers such as: "Run, the Caveirão has arrived!", "I came here to seek your soul". These have succeeded in creating terror, antagonism and hate. In a particularly disturbing incident, an elderly women succumbed to trauma induced death upon her encounter with such displays. Thus, beyond the symbolic, there is intense proliferation of real physical violence that is let loose on the citizens through such interventions.

Vila Autodromo is denied its value as a violence and drug-free neighbourhood as a product of the labour of its communities, despite the state justifying its aggravated police action in other favelas with the objective of pacifying those very occurrences. Its alternative popular plan that proposed urbanization and upgradation has not been met with any kind of response from the Mayor and other city authorities. The state has consistently only offered incentive or threat towards leaving. All of these reveal the state’s key facilitation in releasing the public lands to
private commitment. Such messages cumulatively perpetuate a sense of inequality and uncertainty of their own situation versus the entire city’s urbanization project.

In Rio, symbolic violence, as also the violent sociability of armed action in favelas closely coupled with state illegality in terms of exception constantly serve to alter the people’s experience of their own existence, one that is inherently violent in its infliction. As seen across the case studies, the State has used its technologies of power that aim to ‘manage’ or to ‘pacify’ by force or by tricking them into persuasion. All of the above, in varied ways, transition subjects from ‘outside the law’ to ‘within the law’. This frames and also triggers certain identities, which then pre-disposes them to disciplinary practices and violence. Rio’s experiences articulate mega events/projects as amalgamations of large urban projects as a particular form of urban change that alter the life of the city, have multi-dimensional impact and are concentrated in time-space (disruptive and discontinuous). This, in turn calls upon a multi-dimensional approach to capture its contours and respond to them.

3.2 Durban

Durban speaks of a long history of contestations over the right to live and work in the city. The apartheid era unleashed acute experiences of discrimination and repression that included segregation and exclusion, when black male workers were considered to be temporary sojourners in white urban spaces. These were heralded by the Urban Areas Act (1923) and the male migrant labour system. A few decades later, the Group Areas Act (1950) banished (through forced displacement and relocation) the settled and established black communities to the distant periphery, thereby imparting the city its distinct fragmented socio-physical spatiality of settlements of different racial groups segregated through vast(empty) buffer zones. The city, considered to derive a unique kind of multiculturalism with its mix of English, indigenous Zulus and Indians (descendants of indentured labour), has also nurtured incipient racial and ethnic tensions that have often translated into violence and conflict.

Durban witnessed a vibrant era of collective action in the late 1980s and early 1990s, that played a significant role in bringing about the dawn of democratisation. The mid-1990s, understood as the true beginnings of a non-apartheid era was one that had inherited a development crisis illustrated by the rapid population growth, a slow economic growth rate,
housing backlogs, an increasing number of informal settlements (and related land claims, increasing poverty, high unemployment rates, an inadequate supply of basic services to the majority of the population as also increasing endemic violence since the 1980s (increasing crime).

The post-apartheid era, which is in focus here, heralded the phase of reconstruction, development and planning. As a socio economic programme, the Reconstruction and Redevelopment Programme (RDP) was targeted at addressing the socio-spatial injustice and inequalities associated with impress of apartheid, but expectations from which nosedived with its rapid succession by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic strategy in 1996, and the adoption of neoliberal policies with the argument that they would benefit the poor through the trickle-down theory. Globally oriented industrialization and creating a climate conducive for foreign investment have come at the cost of deindustrialization, wage moderation and erosion of social welfare. The nature of top-down dictatorial decision-making, lack of participation, use of force and the potential for violence display remarkable continuities with the apartheid and post-apartheid eras. The abolition of apartheid is often articulated as ‘a void’, an absence leading to confusion about whom to blame for conditions that seem little improved, in turn and often, leading to people turning in on one another. Ethnic and racial conflict and contestation between Africans and Indians now expands to include widespread, violent dissent against illegal African immigrants (xenophobia), complicated by what is considered a result of the country’s negotiated transition to democracy, where majority was achieved also through co-option of traditionalist leaders and apartheid bureaucracy.

It is against the back drop of these that the four case studies from Durban have set out to chart the plight of the city’s poor and marginalized amidst the state’s purported goals of democratization, deracialization, desegregation and integration.

- The first is the Durban South displacement, where expansion plans for a port complex are threatening displacement of local communities and aggravating environmental risk
- The second focuses on the plans by Durban Metro for replacing the historic Warwick Market with a Mall, at the cost of several low income informal traders
- The third case focuses on Development and Violence in Cato Manor.
• The fourth case is a micro observation of Social Cohesion in a public housing project in Mount Moriah

3.2.1 Site of Economic and Environmental Violence- South Durban Port

The South Durban Port is South Africa’s biggest single location-specific investment project. It proposes an eight-fold expansion of South Durban’s port-petrochemical complex over the next three decades. The institutional violence can be discussed at the macro scale in terms of economic violence inherent to executing projects of massive scale that involve significant economic costs and risks to be borne by the state\(^2\) (despite experiences and evidences of such projects yielding few trickle down benefits to the lower classes and peoples) and threat to existing livelihoods (at one level, in the form of systematic deindustrialization since the early 1990s that has contributed to unemployment, and at another, through the destruction of existing neighbourhoods and livelihoods such as small scale farmers in the South Durban port area). The third is in the strategic use of its legitimate force (police action) to quell resistance, at times through enhanced action (attacking protestors) and at times through deliberate inaction. Spatial injustice to the local communities is meted out by subjecting to displacement without any alternative plans for resettlement.

The South Durban Port has been bolstered by a state rationale of ‘expanding job provision’ that is considered simultaneously weak and farcical on one hand (considering that there existed evidences of its economic irrationality and financial unfeasibility), and strong (in its sheer persistence by the state in the face of protests and counter argument) on the other. Mapping the trajectory of the threatened communities across the cases reveals their vulnerability to multiple displacements and conflicts brought on by the complex intersections of their race and class identities as deployed often by the state at discretion. Most of the residents of South Durban are Indians and Africans who were originally displaced from Cato Manor.

\(^2\) The SDB serves as an addition to other such projects that have typically entailed very generous state-supported subsidies, usually associated with mining (Free State Goldfields), smelters (Alusaf, Columbus), airports and ports (Richards Bay, Saldanha, Coega), mega-dams (Gariep, Lesotho), coal-fired powerplants and other energy projects (Mossgas, Sasol oil-from coal) and special projects (sports stadiums and the Gautrain).
Moreover, the imminent threat and uncertainty to the homes and livelihoods of south Durban residents (any stake to permanence) is coded into state plans, where it has been on the agenda of the Durban City Council for the past 50 years.\(^3\) In fact, in the post-apartheid era, there were suggestions that Clairwood was being industrialized by stealth through a process of deliberate decline and dereliction, with about 73 percent of residential sites were being illegally used for commercial and industrial purposes in defiance of zoning regulations. It is in these areas where community life and the strength of resistance is being threatened by an increasingly hostile built environment. For residents of South Durban Port area, apart from the increased levels of pollution, there is threat from intensive trucking activity that has seen several accidents and loss of life from the communities.

To counter the scale of damage and disruption of people’s lives and livelihoods, a public campaign has been initiated by a local civil society network, the South Durban Community Environmental Alliance (SDCEA), which is not just raising voice against the devastative project and demanding financial sanctions against it, but has also produced an ecologically-sensitive, labour-intensive economic and social strategy for the South Durban Basin.

### 3.2.2 Displacement as Violence - Warwick Market

The Warwick market Triangle (WAT) is one of the oldest mixed-community areas in Durban and represents a city centre for a majority of low income residents and workers. In January 2009 the City Council announced its plans to build a large shopping mall in Warwick Junction at the Early Morning Market (EMM), threatening the livelihoods of most street traders in the area. The Warwick market proposal lacked adequate and timely information sharing as well as open, competitive tenders and its stakeholders revealed a concentration of members of the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and absence of the local traders. Social mobilization and demonstrations by protesting communities were violently cracked down by use of police force, and there were attempts to weaken resistance by polarizing public opinion as well as the internal cohesion of protestors by playing the racial card. The displacement of South Africans of Indian decent is understood to lie at the core of the Warwick mall project. The political pro-

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3 In October 1964, the City Engineer, C.G. Hands contended that in order to promote “industrial expansion in the City … it can be expected that the following net acreages of land will become available in the future: Clairwood Flats 310 acres ...(p. 40), … Merebank-Wenthworth Housing Scheme area (when houses have been amortised) 740 acres (p.41)” (Hands, 1964).
black empowerment message has a history of being deployed against Indians by elite African mercantile class, often at the cost of illegal, poor Africans.

In the case of Warwick market, the ostensible logic of the redevelopment was two-fold: cleaning up an illegal, ‘disruptive’, and dirty space (sanitization folding into an imaging of the city to receive a globally prestigious sporting event – FIFA 2010), and the plan of traffic infrastructure being improved by the public private partnership that would build the mall. Stigmatization and techno efficiency were thus conjoined to affect a transfer of territory from the existing communities in aid of accumulation, and manufacture consent.

While the contractual agreements between the state and the private players in both the SDB port and Warwick market redevelopment projects are perceived to have been ‘done deals’ prior to their public announcements, their fast tracking in implementation has been further aided by the state by way of flawed/incompetent/completely absent Environmental Impact Assessments and bypassing critical processes of transparency and participation.

The proposal met with strong community resistance where traders, street vendors, unions, civics, NGOS, architects, planners, academics and researchers came together to condemn the destruction and displacement. While these protests have succeeded in stalling the project, the market has been allowed to decline without maintenance and drainage after the withdrawal of the developers, encouraging belief that the intention is to make the working conditions of the traders so unbearable that they will ultimately leave the market on their own. This is a strong and violent inversion of the widely acknowledged community-municipality collaboration that had led to an organised, efficient, vibrant and inclusive ‘natural’ market that had come of its own post the successful Irump planning process of 1995. It also delivers a severe blow to the demonstrated possibilities of gender inclusive planning in a South African urban landscape where women have long suffered systemic violence and vulnerability owing to their gender, class and racial identity.

The nature of public participation and collectivization with respect to different aspects of Warwick Market thus offers both hope and despair. While the poor and the disadvantaged in Warwick Avenue were largely marginalized through limited participatory opportunities, a
positive outcome in opposing relocation has been the emergence of non-racial solidarity, this
despite efforts by the state to instigate division and manufacture consent along racial lines.

3.2.3 Development and Violence in Cato Manor

Cato manor has a complex history of violence, dispossession and resistance. It remains till
date, a highly contested space in central Durban. Traditionally a mixed area, the story of Cato
Manor is traced back to its appropriation from a physically challenging terrain to a thriving
farming economy by Indians having served their indenture periods, and later to a market
economy of housing and trade where Indian farmers illegally leased their lands to African
middlemen who subleased them to low income Africans often displaced from areas within the
Durban City Council. While it fell outside the purview of the DCC, it was also was tolerated
by it as it housed cheap labour. Even after its incorporation into the DCC, there was no
extension of public services to the area, and Indians filled in the role by providing land, bus
services and retail outlets. This nature of occupation was disturbed by way of subsequent and
contradictory land tenure regulations (Asiatic Land Tenure Act (Ghetto Act) of 1946 where
Cato Manor was zoned for Indian ownership and occupation, and the Group Areas Act (1950)
pushed by the native affairs administration, where it was zoned white. The substantial scale of
evictions of both Africans and Indians that followed the GAA act in 1958-65, often aided by
police action, were resisted by the affected communities through their own means and
appeals\textsuperscript{4}. All of these were thwarted owing to lack of political leadership and in the face of
regressive state apparatus. The largely exploitative relationship and thus incipient tensions
between the land owning Indian and low income Africans have also escalated into ethnic riots
as witnessed in 1949 and the Inanda riots of 1985, both of which led to a substantial outflux of
Indians. These have, at different times, seen the support of interests outside the community
such as the KwaZulu government (wanting to incorporate Inanda), the central state and
African business interests (wanting a share of the squatter economy and the ousting of Indian
competition).

\textsuperscript{4}Illegal African migrants raised the concern over threat to livelihoods while the Indian political organisations
resisted by appealing against the attack to their community life and investments in placemaking, and utilised
peaceful measures which included recourse to law, passive resistance and appeals to India and the United
Nations
In the 1980s, Cato Manor became a highly contested terrain, with stakes claimed by competing interests (new people moving in from metropolitan peripheries, existing Indians (who succeeded in gaining a public housing scheme for themselves), as well as claims by historically displaced communities. The 1990s brought hope with the Restitution Act and the implementation of Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP), where communities felt that the allotment of housing, even if poorly made, was a step into better life and integration. However, the allotments were usurped by a corrupt ANC, leaving out several needy communities, and in fact forcing them to leave the lands they have resided in for over a decade. The community has since been engaged in various forms of protest and appeal, through the use of peaceful and violent strategies. The shack dwellers movement has in turn witnessed intimidation, arrest and assassination of its leaders over the years. The communities are subjected to evictions (sometimes by politically affiliated armed mobs), beatings, torture, arrest and killing (often at time of eviction even by the state’s own apparatus). The death of a 17 year old girl in a round of gunfire during protest occurred in the presence of a range of policing agencies - POP (Public Order Policing), Metro police and SAP (South African Police). The story of Cato manor continues raise the crucial question as to whether violence can serve as a tool of protest to achieve socio-spatial transformation and justice.

3.2.4 Social Cohesion in a Public Housing Project in Mount Moriah

Mt Moriah is a newly established low income human settlement in the city of Durban comprising primarily informal dwellers. Representing a more updated version of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, Mt. Moriah was born out of an experimental project by the National Department of Housing (NDoH) to promote livable and sustainable human settlements. It was envisaged to be founded on the “Breaking New Ground” (BNG) principles with an aim to ensure that the project design and layout conform to the principles of promoting sustainable and liveable human settlements.

That it was an infill site that brought together people from different informal settlements by moving them up on waiting lists, meant that community participation was not considered possible in the way that it is in insitu developments. This particular case study further explores the extent to which social networks, livelihoods and social cohesion are compromised or promoted in insitu developments. However by following housing standards, several in-situ
projects project necessitated the displacement of some residents in trying to maintain density as per available space. The decisions on this were usually the site for much political contestation and negotiation. The discussion holds valuable insights on community participation – how it can be relegated to a political (not planning) level to lend legitimacy on the pretext of following protocol, of participants being reduced to data collectors and data informers, of being resource intensive a process, and in the process – not a sustainable practice.

In the infill site of Mt. Moriah, Continued capacity challenges at the municipality level, general lack of alignment between departments and municipalities, fragmentation of policies and programmes at different levels of government were some of the bureaucratic challenges for the project. Creating infill projects adjacent to existing residential sites provided opportunity for sharing of social infrastructure such as schools (these new amenities were difficult to produce alongside the housing stock) but at the same time presented technical challenges of plugging into existing service lines (sewer, storm water, water supply pipes, electricity grids and roads) that can only accommodate limited service loads. The costs of constructing in physically challenging infill sites have been disproportionate to the cost of the construction itself, challenging the notion of ‘sustainable low cost mass housing’. While indicating that their current house sizes were not adequate to accommodate present or future members of their families, the community members expressed that they did not possess the adequate financial resources to could enable them to extend their houses as the difficulty of the infill site raised construction costs and there was bleak possibility of availing bank loans owing to their low incomes. This points to the possibility of informal backyard shack developments in the near future.

3.2.5 Reflections from Durban

The state-market axis in post-apartheid South Africa gains strong articulation in a state that espouses neoliberal values in translating its commitment to act both for wider socio spatial equity and create the necessary condition that will best sustain the city economy. Implemented in mega project mode with strong involvement of private actors in implementation, these values got enshrined into state objectives through the adoption of the macroeconomic policy of Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)(1996). GEAR clearly outlined that
economic development would be led by the private sector; there would be privatization of state owned enterprises and a component of cost recovery. The strong influence of international and big capital alignments in guiding the state’s strategic choices that thus followed can be deciphered through the nature of projects, the actors involved (Durban Metro, the provincial government and Transnet in the case of the South Durban Port, and BEE in Warwick Market) and the nature of triggers used to initiate some of these large projects (like FIFA 2010). The state has set out to enable accumulation by making lands available for such projects at the cost of displacing existing communities and dismantling their livelihoods, while committing itself to public investment in projects that hold out more economic risk and negligible trickle down economic benefits to the existing poor.

The range of violences from bodily and direct to indirect and structural become evident in the cases in Durban. Different scales of the state and its planning/governance initiatives seen driving this violence. In fact, the geography of uneven development in South Africa is understood as a legacy of its encounter with numerous social engineering projects (e.g. colonialism, Apartheid, democratization). It is argued that post-apartheid economic and social policies deracialized but nonetheless preserved the class divisions of the late apartheid distribution regime by extending it beyond its White historical base to include a small, emerging African middle class and the organized African working class. In the meanwhile, social and economic disparities have worsened, but are ignored in the interest of economic maturation. Inequality has heightened its potential threats including crime and social exclusion. The New Apartheid of South Africa now finds expression both in increased socio-spatial segregation and forms of social polarization and deepens as much out of a fear of crime than crime itself. Criminal and horrific, xenophobia is essentially an instance of poor people who have been written out of the development story of the country turning on another poor people through a spatial assertion on rights and resources. The convergence of indirect economic and direct immigration policy outcomes or initiatives lead to xenophobia, but it has been used by the ruling classes to articulate the message that their priority is their own people, and divert the understanding of the city and people’s problems as a result of its elite and discriminatory policies to that as foreigners who are stealing their space and livelihoods.

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5 There is a marked focus on mega-projects such as the International Convention Centre, the uShaka Marine Park, sport stadiums, malls, and new port developments.
Challenging the criminalization of violence from below, a strategic and tactical question is raised by the author in the case of the Durban Port - whether grassroots activists’ commitment to physical non-violence is going to be sustained against the system’s growing economic and ecological violence, and potential recourse to the kinds of police violence witnessed in so many other sites. Despondency however lies in the fact that violence is mainly a means to achieving partial transformation as a lot of the development-induced displacements could not be violently opposed within proximate geography since the thought behind them is often transnational, if not global. Further, when the infliction of violence was invisibilized through structural inequalities and a hegemonic neoliberal regime, violence, especially physical violence, was often the only means for the poor to make themselves visible and heard.

3.3 Mumbai

As the country opened itself formally to and through liberalization in 1991, the city of Mumbai had already seen the dismantling of its manufacturing core and its replacement by real estate as the new industry. Riots 6, redevelopment, and the emerging city region brought on significant changes to the city’s spatial patterns through this period. While the new geography did not have a complex and layered social segregation, it nevertheless suggests segregation on the basis of just a few parameters. There is clearly class-affluence on the West, and poverty in the East. Dalits live in a corridor along the Northeast, and Muslims in a few tight pockets in Central Mumbai and the suburbs. All these can be seen as symptoms of a city ‘at risk’ in multiple ways.

By the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, the state-market axis began to turn, with wider power and space for the latter to operate. This entailed a liberalization of the land regime that was brought in through multiple means that initially existed within the framework of existing legislature and regulatory regime (such as provisioning of special exemptions from Urban Land Ceiling & Regulation Act (ULCRA) and the exemption of about 283 plots of land from reservations under the Development Plan of 1991). This was the time when the aim was to

6 The 1992 riots not only led to social fragmentation, it also led to altered spatial geographies and ghettoisation of the Muslims and a conceptualisation of the ‘other’. After the riots, many Muslims, who lived in certain pockets in Hindu dominated areas, moved to locales such as Nappada, Mohammed Ali Road, Bhendi Bazar, and Millat Nagar in Central Mumbai, and began staying there (Chatterjee, 2005).
make Mumbai a world class city with world class infrastructure, and the state (sub national government) started playing a substantial role in steering urban development projects. Addressing inequalities, exclusion and social welfare fell off the state agenda and infrastructure transformation swelled as the biggest item on the budget. The MUTP and MUIP subsequently displaced thousands of people. Massive demolitions and evictions were carried out in the city over the period 2001-04. The resulting public dissent however, encouraged a change in strategy from eviction to rehabilitation. Redevelopment, garbed as pro poor and a solution to the city’s dearth of affordable homes, was devised as a magic formulation where instruments such as Additional Development Rights (ADR) and Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) were used to lure real estate developers into an otherwise discouraging profit prospect of providing housing for low income groups. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, new institutional forms emerged that allowed for more direct engagement of the state in private partnership for provision of crucial public services, without direct accountability to the people (SRA, MRVC, MTSU) and legislature, and dominated by bureaucrats and technical experts in close liaison with the private sector-consultants. The ULCRA act was repealed in 2008 and the Rent Control Act was revised. In their place emerged other such as The Slum Dada Act that criminalized slums and the poor and were in favour of the propertied class. Redevelopment, which embarked on its application with slums, old government housing colonies and dilapidated housing has since extended to arenas such as developing parking spaces and gardens, generating public rental housing and other public amenities, as well as for tackling what is considered a massive problem of unauthorized housing in the city. This has been important in manufacturing consent and encouraging investment toward it from market and the elite and middle class. All of these, accompanied by the loss of shared spaces and the erosion of public culture, have contributed to a city where everyday life has become uncertain and peace is fragile.

It is against the backdrop of several of the above that the four case studies from Mumbai have set out to articulate the nature of violence and social spatial injustice that lie engrained in such processes. The studies have been undertaken at meso and/or micro scale. The meso scale

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7 In 2001-2002 a massive demolition in Sanjay Gandhi Park displaced 80,000 people. In 2003-2004, large scale evictions throughout the city were responsible for destroying more than 100000 houses and clearing 300 acres of land.
allows the observation of the particular case study area through its relationship with the city and its transformation, and the micro scale enables the use of qualitative methods to understand narratives of place-making, resistance, violence, agency and negotiations in relation to city-making and the intimate experiences of socio spatial transformations. Together, they help unravel the heterogeneity and differentiation in the experience of violence and injustice.

The cases from Mumbai are:

- Periphery in the core city – Kamathipura
- City building and new modes of politics and planning in the periphery – Vasai V
- The place of spatial justice- what Jogeshwari Vikhroli Link Road has meant for informal settlements
- Remodeling the urban periphery: The Case of M-East ward in Mumbai

3.3.1 **Periphery in the core city – Kamathipura**

Kamathipura, is the oldest red light district in the centre of the Island city of Mumbai, with a long history of existence and connectedness to the city. It was named after its inhabitants, the Kamathis, or migrants from Telengana, who were deployed as construction workers in building the colonial city. At the time, it was on the periphery of the fortified colonial city. Following complaints by the native elites and the ruling population, the European commercial sex workers were driven out of neighbourhoods in the Fort city and settled in Kamathipura, which was then given the status of a “tolerated zone” where sex work, though illegal, could carry on. It gradually transformed into an area of thriving sex trade post 1864, and over subsequent decades got surrounded by a concentration of mills and residences of mill workers. The sex related economy comprised theatres, cinemas, mujras, lotteries, restaurants and late night liquor shops, perfume stores and paan stores, laundry stores, tailoring stores etc that was deeply entrenched within the 16 lanes of Kamathipura but spilled out and covered a much larger area, providing multiple avenues of informal work to various groups of urban poor populations who were cast away from the formal circuits of capital. Post the 90s however, this space began to shrink as brothel based sex work and the related economy declined due a combination of the onslaught of AIDS epidemic, decline of the mills, raids by the police and a
new moral economy that sought to sanitize Kamathipura and recover its value as a “decent” residential area in the heart of Mumbai.

The lack of regulation and the selective application of criminal laws in the case of this particular neighbourhood has always kept this space open for multiple negotiations of the claims to space. Thus at the building level, tenants have subdivided rooms and leased them out to sub tenants. At the street level, several means of occupation such as scrap collection and recycling, timber recycling, dyeing of jeans, eateries, informal tailors shops etc. are to be found jostling with each other for some legitimate control over the use of the street.

The neighbourhood is considerably dilapidated, overcrowded and unsanitary. Over 90% of the buildings are Cessed buildings, built before 1969 and are in a state of utter disrepair because of the low rents paid by tenants to landlords. Many of the buildings don’t have space for water storage or toilets. The drainage system is rudimentary. At the neighbourhood level, because builders since the colonial era have maximized space for building tenements, there is an absolute lack of open spaces and severe congestion on the narrow lanes. Thus, since the 1950’s several attempts have been made by the State to intervene in this space but with little success as each subsequent plan of slum removal, urban renewal, or cluster redevelopment has been met with limited success and a lot of resistance from various social groups entrenched in the socio-economic fabric of the neighbourhood.

Post the 1980s, Kamathipura has seen the emergence of different coalitions of state and the market in order to capture the exchange value in Kamathipura given that the areas immediately adjacent to it had seen a buoyant land market. This was enabled through the dilution of development control rules and guidelines that allowed private developers to avail extra FSI, and other incentives in order to attract investors into the area that had a depressed land value given its reputation as a red light area. In the meantime, however, the informal economy had undergone several changes post the conversion of mills to malls and real estate projects in the island city. As many workers found themselves jobless and unable to penetrate the circuits of the new corporate economy, it led to a proliferation of small scale manufacturing that transformed the brothels into spaces of manufacturing. As brothels were converted to more lucrative commercial uses with the complicity of the landlords, sex workers were forced to leave and were dispersed across the whole of the metropolitan area with
particular concentration in far out suburbs of Vashi, Nallasopara, Thane etc. However, street based sex work continued and in fact increased in Kamathipura during the same time, with commercial street based sex work becoming much more visible, precarious and dangerous, inviting a new set of violence from police and residents.

The history of redevelopment itself reveals however that the very lack of regulations have turned against the state’s own plans for any singular or top down driven plans of redevelopment. Redevelopment has been challenged by the sheer complexity of multiple tenancies and claims, the extreme density and congestion, the influence of the Rent Control Act in deteriorating these buildings and the informal system of Pagri that allows the transfer of the use and rights to property. Nevertheless, the threat of large scale redevelopment, backed by the State through private developers has opened up a new arena of players where uneasy alignments and unsteady coalitions are being forged between powerful landlord groups and established residents of Kamathipura to effect redevelopment themselves and thus realize the highest values/profit margins from redevelopment. These alliances are shrewdly crafted leaving out the bulk of tenants, shop keepers, Muslim landlords or tenants and the sex workers on grounds of profit maximization and also on grounds of aspiring towards a certain vision of redevelopment and neighbourhood change that does not include unwanted social groups. This fragmentation of communities in Kamathipura over the increasingly commodified redevelopment agenda has led to the emergence of new intermediaries such as agents or fronts of developers who try to resolve property disputes etc. but with the motive of getting consent for redevelopment and becoming brokers for larger developers. Paradoxically, it has also led to the strengthening of caste and community based organizations – e.g. the Padmashali community, the Telegu speaking land lords association in matters of controlling space, tenancy, managing property disputes. There is increasing and widening gulf between the large number of Hindu inhabitants and the Muslim residents and property owners, shops keepers who inhabit the edges of Kamathipura, especially post the riots which shook neighbouring areas of Nagpada and Bhendi Bazaar which are considered as largely Muslim dominated ghettos. In the face of all of this, community associations are also being formed on the basis of livelihoods – such as the street market association on 8th and 9th lane in order to
collectively protect their informal trade in the face of the advance of real estate driven capital and efforts to sanitize the space of Kamathipura in order to draw in private investments.

Thus while plans are being discussed, tenants are rallying together to resist redevelopment agendas that exclude them. Many tenants (especially the sex workers, small shop keepers) are being threatened or their occupancy rights bought over through the use of informal goons and the threat of physical violence, and intensified police raids. Signature campaigns and media campaigns are being used to criminalise sex workers, the homeless population, and the migrant male workers and evict them from Kamathipura. Public amenities which are extremely scarce in the overcrowded neighbourhood are also being secured and controlled by dominant groups or coalitions thus making life more precarious in Kamathipura for the poorest of the poor – open spaces are guarded, streets have more active police presence, municipal hospital has shut down and one of the municipal schools is undergoing a redevelopment and transformation, displacing not only students but also many NGOs that had taken refuge in these structures. However, the path to redevelopment is at best thorny with residents highly sceptical of the ability of the State to offer rehabilitation and complete the project in time (there are residents of Kamathipura who have been waiting in transit camps for 40 years for redeveloped apartments). Neither do residents trust the private sector – half constructed, or simply demolished buildings bear witness to the ways in which residents have been duped by unscrupulous private developers who have absconded with their money or have been unable to build the redeveloped buildings because of lack of permissions from BMC. Given the real estate industry is also facing a global crises, private investors are also reluctant to sink in their money in Kamathipura where the fragmentation and coalitions can cause several delays and extended negotiations in the project.

3.3.2 City building and new modes of politics and planning in the periphery – Vasai Virar

Vasai Virar in the northern periphery of the MMR presents the story of socio-spatial transformation from a set of villages and small towns to a Municipal Corporation over the recent decades. The case argues that states of exception exist in the urbanizing peripheries (of cities) as they are seen as marginal spaces, operating outside normal laws. Understanding the nature and consequences of states of exception is enabled by analysis along three registers:
new kinds of states or regimes of governance that drive processes of accumulation, subject formation and (illegal) city building; the development of large infrastructure/cultural projects that break down and re-make place; and of contestations from within its own territory. Overall the case reveals that urbanization has been the motor of accumulation for a regime of rule that is driven by a configuration of ‘big men’ or informal sovereigns with close ties to wielders of power within the state government and the formation of the urban local government has served to direct this real estatization and secure legitimacy for rule.

A north south railway line through the region has separated a resource rich (especially in water) west populated by relatively affluent and educated land owners pursuing horticulture and floriculture, from a more resource challenged, low lying east featuring communities pursuing marginal livelihoods such as subsistence farming and salt pan work. The region has maintained strong connections with the city of Mumbai through the presence of the railway line that enabled movement of rural produce from the agricultural west and later of people moving into the region in search of affordable locations that could maintain their commute to the city for work, as well as a coastline that served as a safe harbour for the smuggling activities that were a significant part of Mumbai’s economy up to the 1990’s. Further, the implementation of the urban land ceiling and regulation Act (ULCRA) in Mumbai marked a turning point in the fortunes of Vasai-Virar. Developers who no longer could assemble large parcels of land for development in Mumbai, started eying Vasai-Virar with interest. The convergence of builder and politician interests in opening up this region for development was revealed by large-scale conversion of land use (from green zone to urbanizable zone) using planning instruments such as the development plan and a change in guard (MMRDA to CIDCO) that would allow greater state control over the quantum of development. The state market alliance was manifest in the fact that land transactions and escalation in land prices preceded the official announcements of the development plan and DCRs.

Accumulation and rule has directly deployed actual and threatened physical and structural violence. The region saw two broad contestations in the face of this informal and violent urbanization - one totally against urbanization from a coalition of adivasis (tribals) and residents of villages from the coastal areas supported by the Church, and the other pro urban growth which was backed by informal sovereigns along with regional politicians, builders and
the commuting working population. Several objections were raised in the preparation of the Development Plan that finally succeeded in creating a new planning zone, the plantation zone, that aimed to maintain the existing character of the region and curb urbanization. Having encountered the highly organized resistance of a coalition of local groups, the informal sovereign realized the need for possessing stronger sovereign authority to more effectively make rules and control how development could take place in the region. This revealed a turning point in the regime of rule, propelling greater attention to winning at electoral democracy and forming an urban local body (ULB). In 2009 the Vasai Virar Municipal Corporation was formed that today effectively rules over the entire region, including those villages that had formerly resisted urbanization.

Through its control of the VVMC the regime gained control over land use planning that was critical to its growth (Roy 2009). At the regional level, the regime used its sovereign power to build political alliances with the state government and thereby give itself territorial flexibility to change land use, permit unauthorized construction in zones designated as ‘no development’ and selectively promote large commercial and infrastructure projects in certain territories. Locally, within the VVMC, the regime has relied on differentiated techniques of rule calibrated according to different social groups tied to specific territories. This has led to an uneven geography differentiated by legality, governance, built form, real estate values and infrastructure. The three territory-level narratives highlight different configurations of rule and their consequences in areas that are vulnerable because they have been deemed “illegal” although settled through the complicity of the state.

Territory narratives reveal several local informal sovereigns in a complex web of middlemen and power brokers who facilitate states of exception, a key part of the regime’s strategy. These have been responsible for extending housing and services to thousands of migrants in the city (without any accompaniment of political rights), in the process offering members of these sovereign networks a share in the expropriation from a vibrant local industry of (illegal) construction and brokerage set in motion through the suspension of zoning and building regulations and explicit state patronage. Along with privately provided services (land, water, housing), control over the same populations has been maintained through a range of disciplinary measures, such as surveillance and the always implicit threat of violence. The
regime has also used its ‘stateness’ to innovate developmental visions building on aspirations, lifestyles and attitudes of a new middle class, a state project that has acquired near hegemonic competence. The trajectory from informal sovereignty to formal statehood reveals very important shifts in ideology, ambition and strategy of the regime while retaining the core of the regime’s earlier style of governance, one embedded in violence. The use of symbolic violence is to be decoded from the developmental visions propagated by this regime that are anchored by infrastructure, real estate and cultural projects and are potent in building consensus among the ruled. It has been critical in maintaining sovereignty over a splintered socio-spatial geography ruled by multiple, overlapping sovereignties that are unstable and competing.

The tremendous gulf between developmental visions and the actual situation of rule has engendered a range of responses from local groups, including resistance, compromise and negotiation. New modes of acting and being political emerge through construction of new kinds of citizens-in-the-making, circuits of power and conflicts. We see the construction of citizens-in-the-making in Sai Society, who claim for themselves the role of ‘public servants’ that clean up the garbage of Mumbai and therefore are deserving of citizenship. We see the crafting of a rebellious counter-narrative to the planned and ordered ‘main’ city in Santosh Bhuvan where entrepreneurial ‘migrants’ see themselves as city builders. Opposing ‘migrants’ are the locals who propagate a nativist politics built on the notion of ‘bhumiputra’. At the city-level, we see the conscious construction of the ‘middle class citizen’ by the regime, an identity that cuts across the stratified geographies of Vasai- Virar to iron out differences and position the consumer-citizen as an ally of neoliberal capitalism. As Fernandes (2006) argues, the potency of this new category of ‘middle class’ is in the promise it holds to all other groups that they can become a part of it. Thus lower caste and class groups who had little hope of owning land or being upwardly mobile in earlier dispensations now have a new set of opportunities open to them via this regime. These new modes of politics, however, do not constitute real resistance to deliberate deregulation by the ruling regime and hold out little hope for a more inclusive and just city.
3.3.3 The place of spatial justice- what Jogeshwari Vikhroli Link Road has meant for informal settlements

This case study investigates the trajectories of place related to the settling of an informal place, its disruption by a new road project (Jogeshwari-Vikhroli Link Road in Mumbai) and the challenges of making a viable place out of the abstract space of a resettlement colony.

Jogeshwari Vikhroli Link Road is a classic case of a sound urban planning project in the abstract, certain consequences of whose realization reveal limitations and flaws at two levels: in the postulates and cognitive framework organizing urban planning activity as a whole in Mumbai, as well as the specific manner in which plans are realized. Proposed as part of a road transportation plan for Mumbai developed by an American transportation planning firm, Wilbur Smith Associates, in 1962, it was incorporated into the first Development Plan of Mumbai in 1964. JVLR is a plan intervention that is designed to improve the instrumental value of a larger space for enabling economic productivity. Its implementation reveals a state trying to corporatise with a rationale of upgrading and producing efficiency. Outsourcing of a critical aspect of Resettlement & Rehabilitation to an NGO in the case of the JVLR further reveals the adoption of a mechanism of corporate consolidation in the governance and management of state infrastructure projects.

JVLR’s technical logic as an East-West link road connecting two arterial North-South road corridors in a linear city is impeccable, however a significant fact remains in that JVLR finds a neat and crucial placement in opening up national and regional interconnectivity. The Development Plan 1991 already envisaged commercial and residential real estate development around JVLR, and thus the real estate boom in the Jogeshwari to Vikhroli following the road widening is codified into the Development Plan. However, the state enabled this further by allowing changes in land use on selected developers’ plots from ‘No Development Zone’ (via ‘Recreational’) to ‘Residential’ to spur this boom, while denying this very change to abutting slums, though the latter were adversely affected by the project. The consequences for the affected residents of informal settlements are particularly worth studying since the widening of JVLR is accepted as a relatively progressive Resettlement & Rehabilitation policy.
The erasure of an informal settlement (comprised largely by Dalit families) to make way for the road project and the subsequent resettlement has had tremendous impact on the socio-cultural life of this community. There were four rounds of demolitions in the informal community which increased their vulnerability. The first of these involved the bringing down of a community toilet being used by the residents of the slums. Protests against the callousness of the actual process were met with direct and indirect violence police violence, including a lathi charge (like a baton charge), and the registration of criminal cases against peaceful protestors and bystanders that have dragged on through rituals of humiliation at regular hearings for a decade without signs of closure. Double displacement has occurred for the many households who could not cope with the economic and social challenges of staying in the R&R colony. These involved the loss of social networks, solidarities and support systems themselves constituting a socio-economic form of violence. Creation of housing federations in the resettlement colony becomes difficult, and social connections are refigured and erased. These households have thus seen an increasing sense of economic and place related precarity. Meanwhile, as the people experienced a loss of their territory, real estate prices around the JVLR have grown seven times since.

The place making process is argued to be an important object of enquiry for discussions of spatial justice. In terms of ‘product’, place – as a nurturing, valued and collectively produced web of socio-spatial networks of resources, affects and dependencies – emerges through this research as a crucial infrastructure of subsistence in the informal settlements. At stake is also the sunk investment in process. The making of a viable place in the course of living together in the face of state hostility and neglect has involved tremendous effort, courage, cost, risk and collective action. Apart from a physical stabilization and upgradation of the landscape and built environment, the making of informal place in these communities also involved the production of peace out of a lawless social terrain. The road project has involved the undoing of much of this effort through the erasure of social amenities (open spaces erased by the road) and the disruption of social ties and networks both nurtured and built up over time. It reveals that while it lacks robust and meaningful modes of addressing the subsistence related needs and claims of the property-less urban poor, the planning and governance system has little hesitation in destroying what the value that they produce against the odds.
3.3.4 Remodeling the urban periphery: The case of M-East ward in Mumbai

With its focus on a particular administrative sub division of Mumbai, narratives from M-ward east seek to chronicle the story of the slum in relation to the city of Mumbai. M-ward occupies a de-facto periphery on the eastern waterfront of Mumbai, which has been the location of several undesirable activities for the city - dumping ground, abattoir and polluting industries like oil, nuclear, chemical etc. This ward is also the site of various Institutional populations such as the Beggar’s home, reception home for orphan children, mentally challenged children etc. The area has the lowest Human Development Index (HDI) in Mumbai based on the 2009 Human Development Report. The population composition of this ward has a large number of muslims, migrants from various parts of the country. Most of the residents are Dalits.

From the 1970’s, the ward has been the resettlement location for slum communities evicted from central and western parts of the city in what was deemed as a planned endeavour, but in reality revealed itself as a mere physical dislocation of communities, leaving them with to live with scant amenities and disregard by the State. These now exist alongside autoconstructed settlements by migrants to the city and others in need/search of the affordance that peripheral locations offer in proximity to the city-system. Some of them are second and third generation residents of the area.

The four different settlements that make up the initial part of the case study reveal themselves as fairly distinguished from each other in their historical trajectory, resources, demography and kinds/levels of social organization. In this, they fundamentally contest their blanket categorization as slums. Yet the very same attributes reveal some similarities. Most of them (except Ghatla) reveal difficult, peripheral terrains identified by/for poor and marginal communities for settlement and the construction of homes with great personal investment of resource and resilience. This is regardless of whether the move to the locations was voluntary or orchestrated by a state authority. Almost all of them reveal internal spatial organization that maintains the most marginal castes at the most disadvantaged locations. Each has seen the engagement of a network of actors who have made the house a physical reality for the one seeking it – debris suppliers (often from the municipal corporation officers who had the greatest supply of it), bhais, landlords, police, all of whose involvement differs in the varied
stages of the settlement process. While the access to services is differential, each reveals some lack of the same.

Their story also reveals that prior to the 1990s, while the slum was very much an anomaly, the state showed greater tolerance to it. The property market was not vibrant till the close of the millennium, Floor Space Indices (FSI) were low and spaces were available. Moreover, the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme of 1991 failed to generate much enthusiasm in private developers owing to the low land values in the ward at the time. However, in the 2000’s, the state entered the ward in a big way especially through the resettlement schemes related to MUTP and MUIP. With its direct incentive offered as increased FSI through TDR, redevelopment had several takers and as of 2005, almost 64% of all slum TDR generated throughout Mumbai city was from M East ward (2005). Over 13 resettlement colonies were constructed in the ward for rehabilitation of households impacted by infrastructure projects in the city. Transit camps made to temporarily house Project Affected Persons (PAPS) from major transport projects with an NGO serving as a facilitating agency have eventually turned into permanent, uncertain, underserviced homes for several of the relocated communities, with neither state agencies nor the NGO willing to show accountability for the fact of their contentious ownership or transfer. Across the ward, 133 SRA schemes now create zones of speculation (Resettlement Colonies), uncertainty (Transit Camp), prospective speculation (Ghatla, Vashi Naka) and risk and struggle zones (Mandala).

The impact of this on socio spatial transformation of the ward has been tremendous. Housing has now become the axis of service provision with other services receding into the background. The advent of redevelopment schemes has resulted in a tremendous appreciation of house prices in slums, pushing the slums themselves out of the reach of their original seekers. There has also been a change in nature of service provision with an important transition from the patron-client to service provider-customer model. Livelihoods and space are transforming by new transport infrastructure for the city that cuts through the settlements. There is a change in demography and livelihood as migrants now include those from far flung parts of India. While labour earlier served the city, it now serves the settlement itself. The huge population introduced through the resettlement programme has further added to the
competition for livelihoods in the area, resulting in patterns of criminalised, highly risky livelihoods with few prospects for mobility and decent life.

The M East ward case study articulates the slum as writ with violence in its very existence – in its being perpetually perceived as a site of illegality, immorality and crime and the moral and legal sanction around the state’s acts to exclude it from services or protection. The socio spatial transformation of these areas reveals some very special features of violence experienced particularly in the contemporary time. They are a) How the state does not appear directly in the forms of violence experienced for example, demolitions are carried out either with the help of developers (in case of SRA) or NGOs (in case of resettlement). Its appearance as a direct service provider has reduced too (CBOs in case of sanitation maintenance, sheer absence in case of schools, health care). There is thus a far greater presence of intermediaries of various kinds. The overall outcome is highly diffused accountability and responsibility b) The insecurity of life within the slum has increased several times over. The possibilities of decent livelihoods and finding a secure house have become more remote. On the other hand, the far reduced presence of state has meant that the language of inclusion has increased but the actual services are just not there on ground. In terms of health, women are forced to adopt private options due to lack of adequate public services in the vicinity. Even the few services that exist do not offer complete health care solutions c) The brunt of these is largely borne by women and children in disproportionate amounts.

3.4 Reflections from Mumbai

As the case studies reveal, the spatial fix in Mumbai has been translated not by projects but by policy, the case in point being the redevelopment policies playing the field in M ward and Kamathipura, and the dynamics of the ULCRA that capitalized on the land pressures created thus in Mumbai to enable real estatization in a completely new geography of Vasai Virar. The Development plan too has been used as a means to enable spatial reconfigurations, as made evident in the experiences of JVLR and Vasai Virar. While in several other predominant cities of the Global South, the advent of neoliberalization has also seen a strong presence of international players and transnational entities that have pushed for large scale urban transformations (such as port complexes and mega sporting events), in Mumbai these have
revealed limited outcomes in both scope and implementation (these have, in parts, been the result of a natural resistance that the dynamics that Mumbai’s density and settlement structures have exerted on these projects). With reference to the case studies, the involvement of the World Bank as a key funder has, even if unexpectedly, played damper to the State’s redevelopment and re-imaging ambitions. In the case of Kamathipura, the World Bank rejected the state’s proposal for redevelopment through a reminder that it was too specific and not suitable for ‘replication’. In the case of MUTP, World Bank brought in its past experience of the Narmada Bachao Andolan in India to produce its desired replication through a fairly progressive R & R policy.\(^8\) However, in this context, the afterlife of the project at the city level is particularly important in revealing the state-market axis. Though JVLR itself was planned by the municipal corporation originally, the project set the stage for a complete de-democratization of transport infrastructure development in Mumbai after the mid-1990s with parastatals like MMRDA and MSRDC making decisions on new road projects and metro, elevated rail that affected the city and its more vulnerable dwellers directly. This is most directly reflected in the fact that the progressive aspects of the R&R policy for MUTP adopted at the insistence of the World Bank, were quickly omitted in the subsequent Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project (MUIP) which only built roads and was funded by the MMRDA itself. It reveals a clear privileging by the state of its responsibilities for enabling economic activity over possible ones for enabling subsistence and meaningful social reproduction of the poor, or even in displaying commitment to any level to spatial justice for the poor that it constantly mobilizes its apparatus to displace.

Invisibilization has been one of the prime means by way of which violence and inequality is introduced and perpetuated into the lives of the poor and marginalized. Such invisibilization is evident in the inadequate incorporation of ground-real details of areas like M ward (E) in official census and in incorrect land use representation on development plans that often show these areas as non-residential or homogenous continuities. In Kamathipura, the powerful combination in a physically contained area of madams-police- traffickers-landlords-pimps has long invisibilized both the presence of and the violence experienced by women, girls, trans-genders and even men who are forced, coerced, controlled, threatened into submission,

\(^8\) It also realigned the focus of the city’s transport infrastructure on to the existing suburban railways rather than new road projects.
prevented and tricked from escape. In more recent times, the loss of their residential quarters to the proliferation of small scale industrial activity in Kamathipura has been accompanied by the gradual dismantling of NGOs, schools and clinics that had succeeded in making connections with them to serve as social infrastructure within this invisible existence. Several of the sex workers have dispersed to peripheral locations of the city, and with it, to greater invisibility and precarity. In what holds policy level implication, the lack of review of settlement conditions and the near complete withdrawal of state in provisioning of services in resettlement colonies can be understood through the same lens.

The slippage of place (sometimes effecting a transfer of territory for accumulation) has often continued way beneath and beyond the scale and immediacy of demolitions, evictions and outright loss of property and community experience. In locations such as JVLR, beautification of parks dismantles its use as playgrounds for slum youth while renaming of public places sends out messages of control to be picked up by communities of othered religious and minority groups. Both here and in M East ward, the mobility of women has been severely hampered by the introduction of large scale road infrastructure physically disrupting their daily routines of access to public services as also their social relations. In M East ward, the constant appropriation by groups of young men of pockets along crucial public routes and utilities, within undefined land uses regularly found interspersed within settlement colonies and even in immediately unavoidable collective spaces such as basements of resettlement buildings, has severe implications for women for whom the public domain not just shrinks, but also engenders high possibilities of violence through eve teasing, molestation and humiliation in the realm of the everyday. The need to access a fundamental and scarce resource such as water pushes the women right into these spaces of insecurity, fear and abuse almost on a daily basis. In Makrandnagar of Vasai Virar, this perceived threat to their womenfolk from teeming populations of single migrant men by the native community is addressed through precautionary measures of restricting women’s access to the outside beyond daylight hours and encouraging their travel in and around the neighbourhood in groups.

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9 This registers in a high number of female school dropouts.
Cumulatively, across several locations, these reveal the emergence of strongly coded masculine public spaces. This is to be decoded not just in the domination of physical space by activities of young men, but also in a performance of a hyper masculinity through particular dressing styles, language and a heightened engagement in displaying networking skills and expressing one’s expanse of influence. In Vasai Virar, it is worth focusing not just on such performance of masculinity, but also how it enables circulation of a certain charisma of violence where stories of murders, gang wars and violent exploits are celebrated, making the spaces much more volatile. Most significantly, these young men play a crucial link in circulating local knowledge, keeping the area under close surveillance and also acting as middlemen for the community. Their induction and patronage by political parties is a common phenomenon across several of the case studies. In Kamathipura, these have replaced the earlier more violent gangs that ran smuggling, bootlegging and trafficking operations in the area and often even dispensing a rough street justice and kept peace within the neighbourhood through actual acts of physical violence.

It is not just the role played by transmitters of local knowledge, but the significance of such knowledge production as well as the control over it that deserves attention. Much of this can be attributed to the air of speculation about promised windfalls which is the other side of the coin of uncertainty across the city/all case studies. Along JVLR, impending demolitions along the still unbuilt service road, with nobody claiming to know for sure where ‘the line’ passes through suspends the communities in fear and anticipation - some hope to lose their houses to gain an RR flat, and others fear it. However, the new accessibility bestowed upon all parts of the landscape through JVLR has also spurred redevelopment in the informal settlements along it, and developers’ offices are mushrooming in settlements as instruments of persuasion and coercion for consent. Resistant communities are being broken up through bribery and intimidation. In M East ward, an air of uncertainty prevails as newer Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R & R) schemes are announced and forceful evictions are regular feature. The presence of as many as 121 Slum Rehabilitation Schemes has further fragmented communities, which are often ambling to favour one developer over another.

Yet, amidst all of these, new modes of resistance emerge from these very margins. The Right to Pee campaign, which began as an appeal by women of M-East ward against discrimination
that women face with respect to use of urinals has now turned into a city wide campaign to ensure safe, free and adequate toilet facilities for women in the city. The formal city level campaign called ‘Hamara Shaher Vikas Abhiyan (HSVA) has brought together as many as 30 organizations across the city to contest the invisibilization of slum communities and their modes of existence and living in Existing Land Use (ELU) representations, and has also made proposals for inclusion of real needs such as enhancing transport linkages and local market areas, as well as goals of justice and peace in the pursuit of other city goals that Development Plans set out to enshrine and code.

The movements have seen fair success, their outcomes are yet to be determined and while it can be argued that their real success may constantly be rendered bleak by the expansion and power of the real estate economy, they nevertheless indicate that claims to the city shall exist alongside the perseverance of slums against the city’s grain. Even as they are made through highly unequal transactions, these are an echo of right to city that extends beyond the right to housing.
4 Conclusion

The production of space in the three cities has important convergences in the underlying patterns in spite of a diversity of starting points. The historical trajectories of Rio de Janeiro and Durban reveal important moments of rupture in the 1980s and early 1990s from previous undemocratic rule to a process of re-democratization and commitment to everyone’s right to the city and anti-apartheid struggles respectively. But the creation of progressive laws were not proof against the turn to neoliberalism and a state that is highly discriminatory. Mumbai, on the other hand, has had a policy of greater tolerance/accommodation by the state pre-90s which has shown significant change with the introduction of a much harsher regime to the poor post the liberalization of the economy. Despite these differences in starting points and explicitly stated ideological commitment, in all three cities outcomes in the neoliberal era are quite similar: the emergence of a strengthened state-market axis and a socio-spatial restructuring that has exacerbated inequalities and increased vulnerability of a usually poor population.

Moreover, the distribution of costs and benefits accompanying, or organizing, this process has been lopsided. The immediate and long term benefits of the transformations are clearly designed to chiefly benefit local and global elites. At the same time, the local poor have borne very high costs of acute and enduring kinds, starting with spatial costs involved in the loss of neighbourhoods, homes, amenities and, in general, the tenuous certainties and peace of a productive social life they have struggled to build for themselves in all the cities. Among the poor, women, in particular, have borne an even greater burden of the costs, thus indicating an increasing telescoping of inequalities in the social structure of the three cities. These offer useful indications of the extent and depth of spatial injustices that have been experienced in the global south since the advent of neoliberalism.

The active role of the state in driving the socio-spatial transformations to benefit local and international interests tied to capital accumulation is a common feature across the three cities. This suggests that the issue of safety and violence in cities of the global south needs to be approached differently from the usual focus on crime and public safety. The range of violences unleashed in the course of the urban transformations in the three cities studied here
suggests the alarming conclusion that increasingly the poor are not safe from the state especially if their interests obstruct the state’s agendas of accelerating economic accumulation and strengthening its own political control over its territory.

The rest of this chapter is organized as a series of thematic discussions drawing on diverse bodies of theory, but related to insights from the study. Theoretical and empirical strands from each thematic section can be potentially tied up with many others. Consequently, the final thematic discussion of spatial justice broadly within a Lefebvrian frame, is meant more to open up a space for further reflection.

4.1 The unequal space of exception

Inequality is coded into the historical DNA of urban governance in all three cities. It is actually the pivot on which the state-market axis turns in effecting transformations. The practice of the state has been to deliberately nurture (as benefactor or tolerator) and maintain states of exception, only to later prey on these very spaces of exception to enable various spatial fixes. These exceptions clearly demonstrate inequality, one that is purposeful and produced. The cases outline many different kinds of ‘exceptional’ spaces and ‘exceptional’ power. Agamben (2005) focuses on the power of the state as sovereign authority to declare and maintain exceptions and to change them at will. States of exception are exemplified by the ‘emergency’ powers which states possess to suspend laws under extraordinary circumstances, such as in the case of the Olympic Park project in Rio de Janeiro or the Durban Port. States of exception can arguably also be seen in spaces defined as marginal or outside normal laws, such as revealed by the case of Vasai Virar or Favela de Mare.

Ong (2000) has extended the idea of exceptions through her concept of graduated sovereignty which she sees as the differential treatment of different spatial territories and segments of the population, one that is typically done in relation to market calculations. The exceptional nature of rule is essential to what the state is and manifests in a variety of ways. On the one hand ‘marginal’ areas (often classified as ‘slums’) receive unequal distribution of public resources. Regulations are suspended to enable their occupation by the police with the justification of combating crime and ‘civilizing’ them and this leads to their loss of autonomy and the generation of violence, as in Favela de Mare. Many of these are also located on valuable land
in the core of the city amenable for redevelopment at huge profits – they are therefore areas that are also targeted for displacement for infrastructure projects. These are places where the face and services of the state are absent, thus ensuring the presence of a range of intermediaries; it is important to note that intermediaries often use public resources and draw on public authority to reinforce their legitimacy as in Vasai Virar. This however, involves complex tradeoffs faced by different groups while availing services in a state of ‘bare life’: between being allowed to settle but not being provided the building blocks of citizenship (that is, voter ID cards, basic services, or the right to demand them).

On the other hand, mega infrastructure or sporting projects are viewed as transnational or ‘foreign’ territories where certain aspects of state power and authority are handed over to large (foreign) corporations (Ong 2000). Legal protocols are subsumed and extra-legal measures in state actions take place routinely. These become clearly visible in Villa Autodromo, Durban Port, Warwick Market and Morro da Providencia where environmental site and socio impact assessments, norms for transparency and public participation and judicial authorization of demolitions have been clearly bypassed. In the case of the Olympic Park in Rio, the project was pushed through with complete disregard for other state agreements and policies that had been earlier won through community mobilizations. It also rises to the fore in M ward where transit housing was created on contentious land which has now been disowned by the entire range of state agencies- those involved in its creation, and those who are the courts of appeal. Planning and policy instruments routinely provide the framework to systematize such inequalities and irregularities.

Consent for states of exception is built both through the use of disciplinary measures as well as symbolic discourse. Both these entail tremendous violence. Durban has revealed how the state-market axis has used xenophobia and the message of pro-African economic empowerment as a strategy to divide and rule. Other strategies of divide and rule have been through incentivization and weakening resistance and social mobilization. Symbolic discourse on the other hand has proved to be potent and versatile: marshalling national pride (in Rio), providing opportunity for higher materialistic standards while also doing away with the ‘unsanitary’ presence of local trading practices (in Warwick market), ‘expanding job provision’ (South Durban Port), focusing on infrastructure building using the rhetoric of
‘development’ or regional pride while consciously eliding the goal of social reproduction and spatial justice to the poor in JVL.

Across locations, long durations of uncertainty have been inaugurated by developmental activity by the state. In M-ward and Durban, communities have faced multiple displacements, where their removal from one location has almost never been accompanied with an assurance of not being subjected to another. In the case of M-ward, Cheetah Camp presents an example of the state resettling its own resettled colonies without any legal assurances. At city level, the uncertainty is rife in the constantly shifting cut off dates for slum regularization. Uncertainty also seeps in for long durations after the initiation of large infrastructure projects. In JVL lack of knowledge about where exactly ‘the line’ of the service road is located on the ground leaves the local communities in fear and anticipation of having their homes and shops demolished. In Morro da Providencia, delayed and abandoned infrastructural projects have led to despondency amongst citizens, and compelled some of them to consider leaving. In Warwick market, the deterioration in public services after the cancellation of the upgradation project has led to uncertainty amongst the original trading community as to the future of their livelihoods. Being suspended for decades in what was meant to be an intermediate solution for shelter, communities in transit settlements of M ward and Kamathipura experience extreme uncertainty both of their future as well as their status for claim making in the present. In Vasai Virar, housing created in industrial and green zones through illegal and informal arrangements has left the possibility open for altering their situation of living. What this points to is that alliances of the state under ‘roll-back neoliberalism’ (whether with the market or NGOs) have not only failed to reduce the vulnerability of the poor and marginalized, but have deepened it in many instances, especially through perpetuating uncertainty. This serves to weaken resistance, and also open up a space for speculation, as clearly seen in Villa Autodromo, M East Ward and Kamathipura.

The state has used its legitimate monopoly over violence, (through the use of its policing/security forces) to create exceptional states of subjectivity. One of the means is by proliferation of ambiguous authorities with the right to violence, for example the layers of combat forces deployed in Mare - Army, police, military police, UPP. On the other hand, experiences of xenophobia in Durban point to the creation of exception by police through
absence or inaction, where the local police has diverted responsibility of protecting African immigrants to the Community Policing Forum. While riots have led to community members of religious groups in M East ward and other parts of Mumbai seeking the safety of each other’s proximity, these have invited enhanced surveillance and policing. And yet while several of these settlements are ‘policed over’, the engagement of police in ensuring safety and wellbeing of community members within them has been minimal. Criminalization of violence from below has also created the ground for exceptional deployment of force in shack dweller’s experiences of protest and police action in the case of Cato manor.

4.2 Violences of transformation

The thoroughness and scale of socio-spatial transformation underway necessarily entails violence in many forms, both as instrument and outcome. Violences range from direct physical violence on resisting or passive human bodies to the most non-physical and structural kinds. The latter range from visibly increased poverty, deprivation and marginalization, experience of inequality and injustice, to the less tangible but profoundly influential disruption of historically stabilized socio-spatial urban fabrics of practice. Symbolic violence, deployed along axes of class and difference, is an important force in this process. It causes collective and individual suffering, through the humiliation of communities reinforcing their self-perception as inferior and helpless relative to the state-market axis. These perceptions are produced through the state-market axis’s use of notions like legal informality, or delinquency, to stigmatize and marginalize the community and its supporters. Such symbolic violence also enables the state to ignore marginalized communities and their demands in realizing the projects of worlding the city. Media exacerbate this by reinforcing the dominant narrative and invisibilizing those affected. Moreover, one kind of violence – say, that of displacement – often leads to others: increasing socio-economic deprivation, or the loss of the sustaining urban fabrics caused by urban transformation and the stress of remaking such fabrics against the odds in unfavorable settings, have in turn often led to increased public crime and private violences. These violences (and the uneven geographies of fear and repression they produce at multiple scales) are borne disproportionately by multiply vulnerable groups like poor women.
The legal status of violence – whether undertaken by and through the state or directly by other social, political and market actors – has often been independent of the nature of its authorship. That is, the state as well as the market have used many available means of transformation (and therefore of violence) whether understood as legal/illegal or legitimate/illegitimate. This may involve producing or tolerating ambiguous ‘authorities’ who possess the right to enact various kinds of violences, resulting in many space where the state is absent being served with street justice rather than Constitutional justice.

Experiences and strategies across case studies suggest that irrespective of the controlling formation, the bodily agents of violence are drawn from (or produced out of) the same urban poor group that is also the object of violence. They are also often both co-habitants of the particular communities involved. This suggests one of the routes by which the largely political and economic objectives of state and market players reconfigure specific social relations within the very communities, centering local social power and legitimization of individuals and small groups on the capacity for violence against one’s own community.

The slippery reality of violence is perhaps best exemplified in the conditions of enduring uncertainty that the project of socio-spatial transformation often leads to. The long drawn process of transformative projects is organized around anxiety and speculation, from which the ambiguous authorities mentioned earlier also look to profit. In spaces like Vasai Virar or Mare, on the other hand, a permanent condition of uncertainty is tolerated or maintained informally by the state or some of its actors, routinizing psychological violence at the urban scale.

4.3 The (state-market) axis of neoliberalism

At the heart of the premise of states of exceptions is the neoliberal state with its power to exclude. Since the onset of neoliberalization in the global south, the state along with diverse non-state actors has engineered and enabled fundamental socio-spatial transformations in urban regions. We have termed this the state-market axis. The state-market axis is changeful, and while it varies in its form and content, it indubitably furthers the production of space and the emergence of a space economy under contemporary capitalism. What are the sorts of
visible transformations enabling these goals (significantly spatial), and what are the mechanisms, impacts and outcomes (predominantly social)?

In Rio de Janeiro there is a proactive core of the state-market axis comprising several agents and interests but brought together by their commitment to building large infrastructure and disciplining areas deemed disorderly through police action and stringent criminal law for the safety of investors and private capital. The language of order and public safety seems to have overtaken the right to build and right to life of communities. Programs of law and order allow political elites to reassert state authority and strengthen legitimacy given the deficit that hits them when they retreat from providing social and economic welfare. The use of the rhetoric of crisis or technical expertise or ‘realization of Olympic project of urgency’ has enabled the state to both privatize services and push through large infrastructure projects. Ultimately, the Rio case study argues that the city is seen as a profitable commodity to be sold as a space for profitable investment, and patriotism and pride for the city (that is representing the country in the world) are sentiments that bind solidarity around this vision.

In Mumbai, plans, policies and infrastructure projects are used to achieve spatial fixes. In M Ward and Kamathipura it is redevelopment policy that reconfigures the relation between state and the slum/community; in Vasai Virar it is the deployment of ULCRA to informally produce space in the newly emerging city. The JVLR case represents how a large infrastructure project (with World Bank funds) effects spatial reconfiguration for real estate development. What is striking about the cases is that displacement of some is at the heart of this production of new space (redevelopment) for others and this is accompanied by a re-engineering of governance architecture (corporatization of the state- eg MUIP) to enable depoliticization and de-democratization.

In Durban, mega projects with strong involvement of private actors (international capital) such as the Durban port and Warwick market, are the main vehicle by which the state-market axis effects socio-spatial transformations. These projects are embedded in and given impetus by neoliberal objectives and values as enshrined in the state’s GEAR (1996). Here significant economic risks are borne by the state with few trickle down benefits to the poor. Indeed, mega projects displace existing communities and dismantle their livelihoods while committing itself to public investment in projects that are highly financially risky. Overall, the state-market axis
is viewed as furthering a segregation regime even post the apartheid era driven by a coalition of interests including the civic and rate paying classes who wanted to maintain their property values.

It is crucial to note that the neoliberal state is not a monolithic or homogenous one but multifarious and sometimes conflicted; it involves diverse institutional and individual actors at different scales with varying accountability to citizens and democratically elected institutions. The case of Mumbai highlights the wide range this takes with market players and domestic/global capital being integrated at different stages of policy design and implementation; an extreme form of integration is seen in the assemblage of political party, state system (Vasai Virar Municipal Corporation) and business conglomerate with a nonprofit division in the case of Vasai Virar. Despite contradictions and even conflicts, the logic of the southern state’s developmental plans is increasingly shaped by the advice and assistance of a range of market and NGO actors endorsed by (international) capital. Additionally, parastatal agencies have emerged as an important type of institutional actor who creates platforms for collaboration between the supra-local state and technologists of market and expert values, for promoting and implementing big urban projects.

This internally contradictory nature of the state also offers possibilities of justice. For instance, in general, when (global) capital allies with the state city governments are weakened, the city becomes less ‘public’ (since one objective is also to privatize) and as a result poor groups feel the pinch the most. However, in Durban there is actually a very interesting historical trajectory of how the Durban City Council has always displayed some initiative in acknowledging or accommodating African and Indian claims to settlement (especially in contending the Group Areas Act), but has been instantly bogged down by a strong central state or in some cases, cost implications, thus presenting an ambivalent stand. This is one indication of the fact that the local state in the urban is one major hope and possibility for the poor. In India Urban Local Bodies are on the frontlines – they face mobilizations by poor groups and urban local politics is the major avenue through which poor groups have some claim to the city. This is also the domain where women are mandated to occupy 50% of seats in the ULB (through a ‘reservations’ policy) and thus possess at least the potential for greater say in decision making. Could the city and city level politics be the rallying point for new movements for justice?...
4.4 Dynamics of spatial justice

The socio-spatial transformation of each of the three cities studied here can be seen as the Lefebvrian production of a new space simultaneously at multiple scales, including the global and the local. The production of a new space implies the production of new physical, social, economic and political relationships. Proceeding from situated histories of inequality, these diverse projects of producing a new space appear to have a common orientation: enabling accumulation of economic and political power with institutions and formations that always appear to transcend locality. Under neoliberalism, the sovereign power of the state (its monopoly over legitimate violence, as well as its power to make laws and determine legality) has been deployed as the pivot upon which the production of a new, ever more global, space turns. In the process, the most marginalized and urban poor groups have experienced a range of violences, to which they have responded with claims to justice in many ways. The general injustice of this situation is thus clear in terms of the factors (embedded inequality, state-market axis) that drive the unequal and enduring distribution of costs (violence, displacement, increasing vulnerabilities) and benefits (economic and power accumulation). However, Soja (2010) urges us to figure out what exactly the spatial dimension of justice is in a given situation.

To be human is to exist spatially and socially. The key dimensions of spatiality for this discussion could thus be identified as body, place and space. These help to foreground (not fetishise) the spatiality interwoven into conditions and processes that are also always socio-temporal in nature. For Lefebvre (1991), social space issues forth from the body. Bodies are the ultimate datum towards which the intersecting vectors of violences converge, with some bodies, like those of women, being at greater risk than others. Disproportionate spatial concentration of environmental and infrastructural deprivations and hazards has long marked the places of the poor and assailed their bodies slowly over time in cities of the Global South (as of the North). But the neoliberal socio-spatial transformation underway has intensified the direct and indirect physical violences experienced by the body and being of the poor citizen. More fundamentally, the right to be physically present in the city – one form of the right to the city – itself is increasingly being taken away from the urban poor.
Place, its materiality, sociality and discursive status are central to this purchase the poor have in the city. Instantiating (Auge, 1995)’s argument about the production of place, in all three cities the urban poor and marginalized have historically engendered the social through (often uncoordinated) co-presence, and produced ‘good enough’ places (Fullilove, 1996) out of the inhospitable conditions and at much cost to body and being. The neoliberal state has brought in an approach of reduction to the places of the poor, either to questions of legality, or to the promise of future economic and political value of the land under such places to the nation.

Different different governance instruments and occasions – redevelopment policy in Mumbai, the Olympic projects in Rio, or the economically unpromising new port in south Durban – have been conceived of to carefully choke, erase, and fragment places. Discourse itself has been steered to forge consent for this process within middle class civil society through, for instance, increasing stigmatization of otherwise viable places through labels like ‘slum’, or allegations of them being obstructions to economic progress for all. In fact, the cases reveal that these places are considered marginal, and treated as exceptions by the state. This notion of marginal transcends a purely geographical understanding re-signifying and recasting social relations between people, informal places and the city.

But what is the new space that is sought to be produced through the assault on place, and the wider urban transformations studied here? The research here suggests that it is a social space in which the state and especially capital’s territory expands even as that of the already spatially deprived poor and marginalized shrinks. The notion of territory, here, includes the geographical space of mobility as well as of the right to park and occupy. Whereas the state seeks to saturate its political territory with control, capital seeks to produce an increasingly global territory of operation. This double movement necessarily involves the domination, erasure, impoverishment, and fragmentation of places produced by the poor by the state acting in favor of capital and market. Thus, cities may well be ‘the most visibly denuded victims of roll-back neoliberalism’ (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 393), but they are also simultaneously hyper-constructed to offer capital its ‘spatio-temporal fix’. This double movement is the key spatio-temporal dimension of justice that the research here calls attention to.

A discussion of spatial justice must also be one of spatial struggle. Soja (2009), drawing on Lefebvre, observes that ‘space is socially produced and can therefore be socially changed’.
The urban poor have adopted varied strategies historically to make varied places for themselves in the city against the grain of its political economy. The making of place has been simultaneously an attempt at producing peace, however vulnerable such a peace always remains to the ascribed exceptionality of informal places and their related infrastructural impoverishment and illegality. It has also been one form of asserting their right to the city through incremental production of place and citizenship. Not surprisingly, across the three cities, resistance against the various violences and injustices of the ongoing socio-spatial transformation has issued forth from the old and new places of the poor, and the very corporeality of their being.

Thus, women have been at the forefront in several social mobilizations resisting direct or indirect violence, as in the shack dwellers movement in Cato Manor, in the collaborative planning and management of the Warwick market, in the ‘Right to Pee’ movement of M Ward. They have also shown great resilience at the forefront of several mobilizations in Mare, Warwick market and M Ward and JVLR. This, even as, they often face the greater brunt of direct and indirect violence related to the urban transformations.

If Galtung (1969) is right in claiming that social justice is necessary to achieve peace, conceived broadly, the struggle of the poor over place, and for productive presence in the city, is a struggle for peace. It may also be considered the struggle to create a new counter-space, and yields momentarily, what Lefebvre (1991) calls a ‘differential space’. This is the space in which contradictions immanent to the imposed abstract space are realized in the form of contestation, subversion and appropriation (by those it oppresses) that disturbances its intended instrumentality and homogeneity. The struggle may even involve explicit physical violence by the poor who see it as the only means of drawing the attention to themselves as in Durban. Yet, this struggle is promising, not merely in relation to the hazy contours of a more just social space that it seeks to discover and invent afresh in the current situation. It is more important as a struggle to hold on to a democracy fast slipping away - a struggle explicitly, if partly, located in the spatial dimension.
The section on city narratives draws completely from the case studies undertaken by the team members. It is referenced thus to the case authors.


Fernandes, L. (2006) *India’s New Middle Class*, University of Minnesota Press


Prepared for the Khayelitsha Commission: Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police
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