

Reframing Narratives of Statebuilding and Peacebuilding in Africa

Reframing Narratives of Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in *Rwanda*

A Baseline Study

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A case study of Rwanda

Introduction

This baseline study examines the trajectory of Rwanda's statebuilding experience. It examines the nature of the conversations that occurred in this process and what aspects of these produced violent conflict and to what extent the peace settlement addressed the root causes of violence. In particular, it assesses the type of identity issues that underlined the state building conversations and the extent to which, the settlement dealt with these identity issues. We therefore examine Rwanda's civil war that lasted from 1990-1994 and the genocide of 1994 from a historical perspective, tracing its root causes to the conversations surrounding the creation of the state of Rwanda and we discuss the settlement process to see the extent to which it deals with those root cause factors.

We argue in this paper that an examination of Rwanda over a period dating back from pre-colonial times until the 1994 genocide reveals that **Identity and reconstruction of "ideas of identity" are at the core of Rwanda's nation- and statebuilding conversation.** Those in conversation as well as the conversable spaces mutated across periods of Rwanda's history, starting from the pre-colonial period to the post-genocide phase. The identity conversation invariably underpinned other areas of Rwandan society and the emergent state, with certain identity forms and issues more dominant in the nation- and state building conversations than others.

Rwanda's historical trajectory in relation to the statebuilding conversations that pre-dated war and genocide

Identity in Rwanda's statebuilding conversation: pre-colonial origins

In pre-colonial Rwanda, the terms Tutsi, Hutu and Twa represented something radically different from what the world knew it to be in the period during and after the 1994 genocide. The concept of identity was vague and changed its meaning depending on the ruler. Various scholars on Rwanda now generally

agree that pre-colonial Rwandan society was organized around family, clans, and social class categories. Before the arrival of Germans and Belgians, the labels of Hutus, Tutsi and Twa were attached to what class a person belonged to and there are plenty of instances of migration from one group to another through inter marriage or a ruler's decision. In the pre-colonial era, family and clan associations were more important than being 'Hutu' or 'Twa'; and Hutus/Tutsi/Twa could co-exist in any one clan. Thus conversations of one's identity affiliation and belonging were more fixed on their clans than their Hutu/Tutsi and Twa identity.

Newbury indicates that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa "were old terms, but their meanings and significance and the political significance of membership in them changed significantly over time" (Newbury, 10). These terms were used to represent socio-economic classes rather than distinct ethnic groupings. Tutsi denoted those with wealth (10% of the society), Hutu those who worked for the wealthy Tutsi (86% of the population) and Twa (1%) those at the lowest ebb of the social strata (Newbury, 11).¹ As Newbury argues, the pre-colonial Rwandan society was flexible as one could change from being Hutu and Twa to become Tutsi when your wealth increased. This change could happen if a Hutu or Twa acquired more than ten cattle, or if favored by the King and given a Tutsi bride. The reverse was also true, as a Tutsi who lost cattle or lost favor with the King could become a Hutu or Twa. This change in status was called *kwi hutura* literally meaning one has become a Tutsi. Conversely, the term *Kwitutsura* explains downward mobility; a term used when one lost cattle or married into and became part of a poor Hutu family.

Newbury asserts that during Tutsi leadership, "advantages of being Tutsi and the disadvantages of being Hutu increased enormously" (ibid). She argues that these terms could not be described as a "caste" system as this invokes a kind of "rigid hierarchy" which was not the case. There was no religious ideology, or any economic occupation that distinguished Hutu and Tutsi. Both Hutus and Tutsis

¹ These statistics advanced by colonialist though these numbers can be disputed by the fact that in post-independence Rwanda there are many inter-marriages.

owned cattle, and tilled land as part of their economic activities (ibid, 12). However with arrival of the Belgians, physical traits were associated to Hutu and Tutsi terms as social classifications and established them as ethnic identities (Gasanabo, 2006, 367).

Unlike typical ethnic arrangements, which were more rigid, there was mobility upward [or downward] these socio-economic classes: Hutu or Twa could become Tutsi if they acquired more wealth; and that status could be conferred at the will of the [Tutsi] monarch.

In this period, elites, the King, his advisors and other noble men 'chiefs' and military commanders, etc managed conversations. Although women did not hold official political power, the queen mother was extremely influential on matters of leadership and governance and could contradict even top advisors or disrupt the political culture. For example, the Queen Mother Kanjogera who was from Abega clan was known to be influential in political leadership in 1896, and plotted a coup d' Etat over King Rutalindwa. King Kigeli IV had appointed Rutalindwa before his son as his first child from another queen mother. However, Kanjogera wanted her son Musinga to rule. Kanjogera's army won over that of Rutalindwa. They were all Tutsis but the two queen mothers were from different clans. Other queen mothers that followed were influential in political matters, owned land and cattle but not in such a visible role.² They forced conversations on political issues and on Kingdom structures informally. Thus we cannot completely disregard them as actors as their actions determined a new course for the country. Kanjogera's actions were selfish but nevertheless showed how important women were as actors.

Political leadership changed over different centuries and took different forms depending on the different regions of Rwanda. For example, while different clans had a King and a Kingdom in the East and West, and were all conquered by the Nyiginya central Kingdom, the Northern society was still led by the chiefs of families and was never conquered by the central Kingdom. Whenever these

² Newbury 1988, 57-59 as well as Learthen Dorsey, 1994, 345, both discuss the importance and role played by "Umugabekazi" or queen mother.

conversations turned violent, it did not tend to be among elites and the ordinary citizens, rather it was between an army from one Kingdom against another, to redefine borders of the central Kingdom that became Rwanda. We now know through proverbs and folk-tales that violence also occurred at a more localised and intra-family level (as happens within any society) but this was not necessarily caused by social, personal and ethnic differences.

Social and political identity in pre-colonial Rwanda was organized through family, lineages, clans and a mixture of other complex factors that indicated social and political belonging. Institutions, governance, and administration issues illustrate how sophisticated kingdoms structured identities. Rwanda was not only organized into kingdoms, but it was also structured in micro decentralized levels of governance. This system facilitated the channeling of information about cultural practices and economic activities among various members across social strata. Some of the institutions Newbury discusses include, three micro institutions *Inzu*, *Ubwoko*, *Umulyango*, *Ibihugu*. *Inzu* (families); this represented the smallest unit of every part of society. It included family members who could trace their relationship back approximately five generations, which was decided by identifying their family lineages. *Ubwoko* (clan); was a larger group of belonging than *inzu*, and perhaps the most significant grouping. It was made of a group of people who could trace their relationship to a common ancestor and was mapped through spoken tales. The clans were geographically dispersed due to various waves of immigration (Maquet, 33).

The system of governance that consisted of a household or *Inzu*, *Umurynago*, *Urugo*, *Umusozi* (the hill) was governed by kingdom laws. There were kingdoms in Rwanda, dominated by various identity groups in different regions in the South and North such as those of *Nkore*, *Karagwe*, and *Ndorwa* that emerged in earlier centuries (Vansina, 1961, 63). Every new group that migrated in earlier centuries (between the twelfth and eighteenth centuries) conquered and established a new political authority. Contrary to popular belief that only Tutsis were Kings or that the *Nyiginya* dynasty always occupied the throne, some historians observed that there were kingdoms, particularly in the North, that

Comment [J1]:

remained independent since the twelfth century (Lacger, 1959, 88). It was not until the late nineteenth century that *Nyinginya* kingdom under Rwabugiri conquered the Northern kingdoms with the assistance of colonialists (Kamukama, 1993, 9). King Rwabugiri was well known in popular narratives for his conquests of fighting foreigners and expanding the Kingdom of Central Rwanda to include Kingdoms from other regions. The period between 1860 and 1895 was the final and largest expansion of the boundaries of the *Nyinginya* Kingdom before the Germans colonized the area (Mamdani, 2001: 69).

The Kingdom structure included the administration of resources and tax collections. These structures have been referred to acting as clientship systems important to the Rwandan State. The issue of clientship is probably the most controversial topic in the history of pre-colonial Rwanda. Some of the earlier scholars interpret this as a system of oppression between the King's Tutsi lineage oppressing Hutus who were the poor and majority of the populace. The relationship between *Umugaragu* (the worker) and the *Shebuja* (the land owner or patron) was played out and presented in Western terms as feudalism that was then prevailing in Europe.

Another school of thought that includes scholars in post-independent Rwanda disagrees. They present this system as a form of taxes where there was an agreement between the *Umugaragua* and *Shebuja* (Newbury, 3). This remains one of the oldest unresolved contentions among scholars, despite it being the anchoring myth that is later held accountable as the cause of conflicts. This system is famously referred to as *Ubugake*. The two schools of thought disagree on whether or not a "contract" or "agreement" was reached between the two parties. Sensitive speculations exist as to whether this relationship existed only between a Tutsi chief or King and his subjects - the Hutu - or among Tutsis and among Hutus³. From analyzing various arguments, what seems clear is that there was a system of taxes, like in other kingdoms or even the modern State that changed meaning when colonialists occupied Rwanda. This system also evolved to assume different social functions and definitions in society as the dynamics of

3 See Newbury "Cohesion of oppression" 1988:30-33

power between groups also shifted meaning. Therefore, before colonialism the Rwandan kingdom had rulers, institutions, and respected land laws, and a tax system that was followed.

Thus, prior to colonization, the difference between groups and the institutions that made up Rwanda kingdoms was not based on biological, environmental, or of any scientific nature, but a social hierarchy that could be scaled. The colonial administration found a well-organized society with features that resembled those of the modern state. Given the Kingdoms complex structure, the European colonialists resorted to dividing the society into different races, ethnic identities and preferential treatment of one category against another in order to control the land and its population.

Evolution and use of identity in colonial Rwanda

The Germans arrived in *Ruanda and Urundi*, as it was then known, as part of their exploration of East Africa. However, as a result of Germany's defeat in World War I, it lost all its colonies. Belgium, being the closest colonial power in Congo, assumed the Ruanda-Urundi territories under a trusteeship permitted by the League of Nations. As the following analysis demonstrates it was Belgium, who through a system of divide and rule in order to prop and sustain their colonial project, reconfigured identity from how it was previously known.

When Belgium took control, it made a pledge to The League of Nations that it would promote development, freedom of speech and religion in Rwanda. However, beginning in 1923, Belgium administrators gradually eroded the powers of King Musinga to appoint chiefs for political leadership positions (Malvern, 2000:10). By 1931 the Belgian administration had replaced King Musinga. This was in an effort to *modernize* Rwanda; a process which seemingly had been slowed down when the King refused to adopt Christianity. He was deposed and replaced with one of his more compliant sons, Mutara Rudahigwa (Newbury, 1998, 67).

Colonialists sought to interpret the relationships among Rwandans according to their political needs. In their early interactions with Rwandans, Germans tried to accept the conversation tone set by the Kingdom but the conversations among Rwandans were too coded, fluid and not clearly defined as their Flemish and Wallon categorizations. Thus the Belgians plotted against the King and introduced new systems that would allow them to see a Rwandan society they could define, understand and therefore manage the types of conversations that would take place in society. During their reign, they introduced a new form of identity - that of Christian identity that Rwandans initially resisted because there was already a unifying religion of Ryangombe and a concept of Imana that was universally recognised by Rwandans.

However, for Belgians to decode these conversations and disrupt them, they reconfigured the spaces where these conversations took place. Thus Rwandan sites of knowledge and discussions were disvalued. These included:

- i. The evening gatherings in homes or occasionally in the King's palace where parables, new songs, proverbs and other discourses on identity were formulated
- ii. The gathering in communities to pray Ryangombe and Guterekera (to give offerings to their gods)
- iii. Gathering to Dance, to play 'igisoro', play the drum, sing for cows etc
- iv. Use of the Kinyarwanda language through comedy and art, as symbols of non-verbal conversations
- v. The secrets around the Kingdom that allowed certain conversations to remain confidential to a small elite

These sites and conversation were replaced by:

- i. The Sunday mass which was introduced especially with the arrival of white fathers who (as documented in paper 1 and 2) were very influential in shaping what terms of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa came to mean
- ii. The colonial spaces also included the formal education/schools system that glorified learning in this form and sought to give official authority to a new elite who would also set a tone on conversations. The new

elite would formulate new questions on who Rwandans were using colonial methods and an understanding that was more controllable and less fluid than their ancestors definitions

- iii. The introduction of Eurocentric political organization that discredited the Kingdom structure and secrecy around the Kingdom. This was done through, for example, the introduction of Republics, ministers, local administration and national administration etc.
- iv. Replacing the role of queen mother in society and therefore introducing a male dominated model of government that excluded women and the promoted few of the poor to elite status.

It is within these reconfigurations of society that an accelerated shift took place on what kind of conversations were taking place on identity, how those conversations happened, where they happened, who managed them and how they affected all aspects of life aspects for Rwandan society.

It was also during this process that conversations turned violent in 1959 amongst the old and the new elites. The old elites were Tutsi who had been cheated by Belgians. At their initial engagement with Rwanda, Belgians and white fathers had portrayed Tutsis as the most knowledgeable and therefore equal partners for political and economic power. But as the movements of decolonization were evolving in different African countries, Belgians switched support to forming a new Hutu elite that would control the majority. Thus, the shift in 1959 was crucial in politicizing conversations on identity among Rwandans. The Belgians had already attempted to fix these identities by carrying out scientific studies and introducing identity cards for Hutus, Tutsi and Twa.

The Belgians introduced radical changes, establishing their administration with cooperation of select chiefs, and imprisoning anyone who opposed their rule (*ibid*). It was also during this period that the Belgians turned what was a tax law into slavery. The Nyiginya chiefs who had cooperated were handed more power, and thus subsequently progressively removing power from the hands of the Hutu, this included the loss of power in what was previously the free Northern Kingdoms. The entire population, with the exception of the Royal family and

Europeans, was subjected to a form of *Ubughake, or Uburetwa*, a system of forced hard labor heavily despised by the population (Prunier, 27).

Belgium's invention of races was given visibility in the work of Jean Jacques Maquet, where race ideologies were presented as scholarly analysis. In particular the title of his book *The Premise of Inequality in Rwanda* (1961), emphasised inequalities and as one of the early scholars to write on Rwandan identity, attempted to map out the differences in Rwandan identity by looking for inequalities in the population themselves. Maquet's two-year field research involved informal interviews with missionaries, European administrators and Africans. In this research he focused on the political organization of Rwandan society at the point of their contact with European cultures around 1910. Maquet started his book by outlining Rwandans' manners, food, religious practices, systems of governance and the different groups of identities that existed in the period before European invasion. Based on his observation, he distinguished Tutsis to have been powerful lords who governed over the majority poor Hutus and protected the weak in public through the country. He interpreted *Ubughake*, comparable to the modern day tax system, as a feudal system that was also being practiced in Europe at the time (Maquet, 141). Maquet described the Tutsis as the wealthy "who do not have to participate in the manual labor of economic production by the moderate and clever exploitation of the majority" (ibid). Due to natural, biological and cultural factors, Maquet claimed that anyone born Tutsi were pre-destined to become oppressors of the Hutu population (ibid, 143). Maquet claimed the Tutsi, which he declared an "ethnic group", consisted of those who inhabited Rwanda during the third wave of immigration and who imposed their political region on the Hutu and Twa population that already occupied the territory. He calculated that the Tutsi group comprised of ten to fifteen percent of the population at the time of his study.

Despite such claims he provided no statistical data to support this statement. He pointed out that the ethnic identities of Tutsi, Hutu and Twa could be distinguished in terms of difference in their physical appearances and using

these so-called physical differences assigned a social hierarchy. Like the Catholic clergy, a Swiss national Leon Class, he identified Tutsis, as those taller, slender and lighter. According to Maquet they were the only ones who could become Kings and thus their relations with Hutus and Twa were based on oppression and subjection. He held that Hutus were short, darker, less intelligent and born to be slaves for Tutsis. To Maquet the Twa ranked the lowest on his list, he described them as “ape-like” (ibid, 146) and a less important population only useful to slave for both the Tutsis and surprisingly even for the Hutus. He concluded that Rwanda was in a social vacuum void of borders and with a history marked by ethnic conflicts between Hutus and Tutsis.

Maquet’s studies supported the Belgians’ attempt to employ divide and rule techniques to govern Rwanda (African rights, 1995, 7). In an effort to both maintain power and divide the Rwandan and Burundian population the Belgians employed every system possible. This was eventually accomplished through the employment of scientific theories that at the time predominated in Europe and the United States. These theories were used to create differences between the Hutus, Tutsis and Twa as per Maquet’s analysis. The differences were then institutionalized through the distribution of identity cards that defined one’s “ethnic identity”. Regarded as empirical knowledge, these scientific theories were followed and employed through a socialization process of teaching a certain history in the European education system that had been implemented in Rwanda for the Rwandan social classes. Myths were created and used in popular culture to reinforce the ethnic categories. The long term process that took decades to implement was successful in dividing Rwandans, creating ideas about the “other”, which would become such a prominent feature in the 1994 genocide. In order to understand the origin of this racist project that would result in a divided Rwanda in the twentieth century, it is important to examine critically the roots of categorization and classification of the human race.

The role of Race Theory

The tools used to measure the nose and skin color, the study of skulls, and theories of the effect of environment in creating differences were not unique to

Rwanda as Maquet had shown. These ideas of inequality in humans had dominated the European and American eighteenth and nineteenth Century debates on the origin of human beings and their differences or similarities of their “race.”

Following the 1735 study “*Systema naturale*” by the Swedish Carl Linnaeus which concentrated on classifying humans into different racial groups, alternative schools developed around what created the different categories (Stanton, 3). One school of thought sought to demonstrate that physical differences were a result of the environment. Reverend Dr. Samuel Stanhope Smith, a professor of moral philosophy at Princeton, New Jersey, for example, suggested exposure to the sun, or lack thereof, could determine and change skin colour (Stanton, 6-8). Such ‘unity of man’ arguments were put forward to discourage racist practices such as slavery (Stanton 11, 12).

Other scientists using craniometry to establish that essential differences and natural inequality existed among human populations critiqued these arguments, however. Studies of the physical attributes of different races through skull and body measurements claimed to expose a natural hierarchy amongst them with Caucasians justifiably dominant (Stanton; 16). In his *Account of the Regular Gradation in Man* (1799) the English surgeon Charles White (1728-1813) made one of the earliest claims that whites were naturally superior to any other races. He noted:

Where else shall we find that nobly arched head contained such a quantity of brain...? Where that variety of features, and fullness of expression; those long, flowing, graceful ring lets; that majestic beard, those rosy cheeks and coral lips? Where that... noble gait? In what other quota of the globe shall we find the blush that overspreads the soft features of the beautiful women of Europe, that emblem of modesty, of delicate feelings...? Where, except on the bosom of the European woman, two such plump and snowy white hemispheres tip with vermillion? (Stanton, 17).

Obsessions with facial features and angles emerged, such as the Dutch anatomist Pieter Camper (1722-89) determining different races possessed “dolichocephalic” (long-headed) and “brachycephalic” (broad-headed) features. A century later, Europeans would apply these ideas to distinguish the *Abatutsi* and *Abahima* of Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda. Germans, as well as Belgian colonialists, arrived in Rwanda with the belief that civilization did not exist anywhere in Africa and that whites were naturally superior.

They were surprised, however, that social structures, laws that governed the land, a King with an administration and men and women who played a role in local politics actually existed. The colonialist’s education had socialized them to believe that there was no commonality amongst different races. This scientific racism of nineteenth and twentieth century’s was manufactured by elites in European universities, distributed through research journals and popularized through newspaper articles, and convinced colonisers that whites were the superior race with a responsibility to socialize, educate, govern, and inevitably rein as superior moral beings above Africans and the non-white others.

In order to successfully rule, theories were produced to define, stratify and classify Rwandans (African Rights; 5), which fit perfectly with the previously noted racial beliefs of the colonists. Priests and explorers as well as administrators who came in contact with Rwandans expressed extreme surprise at what appeared to them as sharp physical distinctions among Rwandans; some were very tall and others were short. Unlike what was done with Congo’s diverse population the colonists could not use different language to justify defining and categorizing different ethnicities. As illustrated above, there was no difference in either the language spoken or cultural practices amongst groups in Rwanda. Hence, as a desperate attempt to understand the society through European lenses, they insisted on employing the predominant racial theories to define and classify Rwandans.

A theory on migration was devised which fit this ideology. Explorer-missionary John Hanning Speke in the late nineteenth century developed what was to be

called the “Hamitic hypothesis” which held that all forms of civilization in “nigroid” Africa – including the tall people who he referred to as “Tutsi”, the term that had been used to describe the wealthy - were brought there by the “Hamitic” race, the lowest branch of the Aryan or Caucasoid race. This theory held that Hamitic people were originally descended from the son of Noah and originated in Ethiopia (John Speke, 247). Speke produced a chronology of how the Hamitic people traversed South through Somali and beyond encountering different groups, crossed the Nile, forgot their original group names and religion and eventually discovered the rich pasture-lands of *Unyoro*, where they “founded the great kingdom of *Kittara*”(ibid).

The Hamitic theory was later advanced by race theorist Giuseppe Sergi who classified the “Tutsi” as being from the Eastern Branch of Africa together with the Maasai in Kenya and Tanzania, and the Galla of Somalia (Sergi, 41). Seligman’s *The races of Africa* (1930) asserted “that all civilization in Africa was to be credited to the Hamites” who were basically superior pastoral Europeans who arrived “better armed as well as quicker witted than the dark agricultural Negroes” (Seligman, 35).

There were contentions as to where the Tutsi had originally come from,⁴ but other explorers such as Sir Samuel Bakerm, Gaetano Casati, and the twentieth century catholic fathers such as Father Van den Burgt, Father Gorju and John Roscoe, all supported the Hamitic migration argument that they originated in the North of Africa, closer to Europe. Hutu extremists developed these theories in post independence era. They argued that Tutsis were foreigners from Ethiopia who invaded Rwanda and enslaved Hutus.

It is worth noting that statements at the time continued to be issued about the “Tutsi” as compared to the “Hutu,” with little regard for the Twa. Bishop Le Roy’s observation was typical of the time and backed by the other clergy present in Rwanda:

⁴ A member of the Catholic clergy Father Page asserted the Tutsis were descendants of the ancient Egyptians, whereas De Lacger an early colonial historian on Rwanda argued they came from Melanesia, for example.

The Bahima (a Tutsi clan) differ absolutely by the beauty of their features and their light color from the Bantu agriculturalists of an inferior type. Tall and well-proportioned, they have long thin noses, a wide brow and fine lips. They say they came from the North. Their intelligent and delicate appearance, their love of money, their capacity to adapt to any situation seems to indicate a Semitic-origin (Prunier, 6).

The Belgian Christian missionaries' were well-respected in Europe and their words and work carried a lot of weight. They were the *de facto* anthropologists who studied Rwandans and Belgian administrators often relied on their observations and took them as factual. Their analysis of Rwandan society was heavily influenced by their 'knowledge' of human classification held before arriving in Ruanda-Urundi. Their beliefs allowed them to reinforce a logic which confirmed that the Negros, wherever they are, were inferior to the Caucasian and their descendants.

With an increasing obsession with human classifications, like their predecessors European scientists came to conduct research in *Ruanda-Urundi*, studying the local's skulls and employing the same scientific methods to establish empirical differences among "Tutsi" and "Hutu" identities. Armed with tools that had been used in laboratories around the world to differentiate the Negro from the Caucasian and the Indians, their 'scientific' knowledge could justify certain political, economic, and social policies that favored one group given their "God given abilities" to rule.

In their conclusions, the colonialists ignored the complex and fluid identities and social structures existing in pre-colonial Rwanda that allowed an individual or family to change from their Hutu or Tutsi social status. As the important factor of intermarriages, which had been predominant in Rwandan society, was ignored some families were assigned an incorrect identity. At times even two households of the same *inzu, ubwoko, umuryango* were divided into different ethnic groups. This meant that it was possible to have children who were both Hutu and Tutsi within the same family.

Hamitic theory was contested and discredited in the 1950s by scholars originating from former colonized countries or African descendants in America. Two remarkable contributions were made by Cheikh Anta Diop, from continental Africa and W. E. B. Du Bois, an African American scholar, who exposed the underpinnings of the Hamitic theory in their studies of pre-colonial history and history of East Africa. Diop and Du Bois challenged the race notions that denied attributes to the civilization of African peoples in pre-colonial society (Rigby, 1996, 66). However, these ideologies had been so entrenched to the point that even the Maasai or the Bahima perceived themselves as Caucasoids related to the Dinka, and Nuer.

The Rwandan social fabric was completely destroyed by the Belgians who, using racial pseudo-scientific arguments that were prevailing in nineteenth and twentieth century Europe and the United States, embarked on a research study in Astrida. It is this research that paved way for European theorists to write books that supported their arguments that the Hutu, Tutsi, Twa were different; with differing physical, as well as cultural and psychological traits. Using the Hamitic theory, the Europeans found reasons to institutionalize meanings of identities that would see families to be forced to exist under separate identities. "Tutsi" and "Hutu" as terms have certainly existed for a long time. Rwanda was a complicated but highly organized society, which, like any other kingdom including those in Europe, faced a number of local political issues. Furthermore the entire population spoke the same language, shared religious beliefs and ate the same food. However, at the beginning of nineteenth century Belgians subjected Rwandans to a number of changes and showed preference to one small group of people, and determined the Nyiginya dynasty to govern. What followed in the period of 1950's to 1990s was the indoctrination of the youth and old alike in shaping their conceptualization of identity, both of the self and of the "other" to be regarded as an enemy.

Post-colonial Rwanda, the “learning of identity” and key triggers of violence and genocide

As indicated above, the colonialists gave new meaning to terms of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities using race science. Through these studies they were able to interpret Rwanda to further their political ambitions during colonialism. Through educational institutions that emerged yet accessible to few, the difference in one’s identity was given meaning. This occurred first in the instance where being Tutsi could increase one’s chances to go to school and thus belonging to the Hutu category meant one could not access education. In post-independence era, influenced by the colonialists, the roles were reversed by the new political and mainly Hutu dominated class. It was at this point that the Hutu and Tutsi identity were given new meanings. Similarly identity cards also facilitated stratification by ascribing ethnic identity and thus determining who was allowed into schools and better paying professions and who was not. The identity cards were such a critical piece of paper, especially in the post-independence era that some people would go to the extent of purchasing the relevant identity that at the time would allow them to access opportunity.

The church and the popular culture, such as the songs of Bikindi, offered meaning to the identities and how to act as a result of this ascribed meaning of identity. The priests, nuns, Bishops went beyond preaching and interpreting the identity difference, to offering a moral position of what actions should be taken as a result of being Hutu or Tutsi. In the case of 1994 genocide, especially the catholic clergy, they defended the Hutu cause in their pulpits, in their own churches and outside offering an example of how one could act against the Tutsi because of their Hutu identity. As an outcome of all these factors combined the population what inhabited Rwanda learn new ascribed meanings to their identities meanings, which would lead to the attempt annihilation of an entire group by the other. These points are elaborated upon in this section.

First Republic

Prior to this republic there was the first president Mbonyumutwa from January-October of 1961 who was an interim leader. He was a Hutu but had been also a Chief under the Kingdom structure. His role as president was not significant; but as a politician his physical beating in Byimana by a group of old Tutsi elites who were losing power is considered to have instigated the violence that followed in 1959. Gregoire Kayibanda who was president from 1962-1973 and was replaced by Habyarimana. Kayibanda's government was instrumental in bringing the Hutus into decision-making positions. In this period, they determined what kinds of conversations happened in public realm, the place of Tutsis and Twas in that conversation, fixing those identities that were created by Belgians to reject the Kingdom's vagueness on these conversations. Inevitably, a few Tutsis were considered for official positions but were not influential. In this period, the old elites who had now fled to neighbouring countries continued to engage, but in exile or through short term and weak insurgency attacks in rural areas.

A new identity classification also started to emerge. Although the Germans had created a bridge for Northerners to engage, the question of regionalism started to emerge. The Abanyenduga (those from the South where the first president originated) and Abacyiga (which were the Northerners) started new conversations of belonging and therefore of access to economic and social mobility. The first Republic perceived the Northerners as good military men and important 'partners' because of their hard working culture, fertile land that could provide food for other regions and their straightforwardness on expressing disagreements and social issues. Thus stereotypes were not only developed in these conversations but were also reflected in national political leadership, societal organization (marriage etc) and economic activities. This would determine the second violent change in 1973.

There were Hutu elites whose conversation tone were clearer and sought to empower the Hutu identity. These conversations were empowering to the majority in Rwanda who saw this as an opportunity to emancipate themselves from what was regarded as a Tutsi oppressive Kingdom. In this instance, only the

minority Tutsi were silenced and their importance in society was renegotiated. The Twa remained absent as they were in pre-colonial and colonial periods. Belgians were also present in these conversations but continuously took an informal role of influence using the Catholic Church, newspapers, and through missionary schools.

The role of education

Education created an important space for learning identity. Hutus who did have access to schooling during the colonial period were generally educated in Kiswahili, a language considered inferior to the assimilationist Francophone education received by Tutsi. This system served to reproduce the political and social distinction between Tutsis and Hutus at an intellectual level (Mamdani, 2001:111). Many scholars concur with Mamdani's argument that this separatist education "was not simply to prepare [the Hutu] for manual labor but also to underline the political fact that educated Hutu were not destined for common citizenship" (ibid, 89-90).

During colonization formal education was considered to be quite prestigious and reserved only for people with high social status. Not only did the import of formal education within Rwanda begin the ethnic stratification of Rwandan society by only allowing the children of Tutsi chiefs to attend schools, in addition, the introduction of ethnic identity cards in schools after 1950 by the Catholic Church push forward these ideas of ethnic division (Uvin,1997,95). The Roman Catholic Church first introduced formal education in Rwanda at the beginning of the 20th century. The main purpose of this education at this time was to first train catechists to spread Catholicism to the local population. Second, train auxiliaries to assist the colonial masters for local administration, agricultural production of cash crops for export and enforcement of labor. Thus, labor forced on peasants, resulted in the first exodus of the Rwandans into neighboring Uganda, **Tanzania and Kenya in the 1930s and 1940s.**

However, even though myths about Tutsi identity were spread and widely accepted, education was not afforded to all Tutsis. Education was given to the

few who were regarded as nobles and whom the European administration would trust power with. The preference was given to men over women. Women were left to be taught by nuns, or the wives of male missionaries on how to sew and make beautiful artifacts that were of European standard. This was despite pre-colonial Rwanda having a strong culture of art which had been produced both by men and women. In this setting, the Rwandan society was redefined even in terms of profession. The gendered lenses of Europeans suggested to Rwandan society that females were not capable of understanding the kind of learning that was taking place in a classroom.

With the political changes of 1959 also came a new education system and new ways of learning identity. In 1959 King Mutara died in a hospital. The Tutsi population, reading mischief in his death, accused the Belgians and the Hutus of killing him, causing violence to quickly spread. The Hutu population, having an advantage in terms of numbers, decimated the Tutsi as they fled the country. The Belgians replaced the Tutsi administrators with members of the Hutu population. After World War II, Rwanda became a trusteeship of the United Nations. There was a trusteeship council whose members visited Rwanda five times between 1948 and 1962 in order to push for the creation of a democracy and provision of political education for the people of Rwanda. Elections for administrative and chief levels were held in 1952 and 1953 respectively, and Tutsis won in both instances (Madame, 2001, 13). In 1957, Hutu led political movements began to campaign for the end of the Tutsi Kingdom rule. As independence played out, European administrators and Hutu elite argued that the Hutu majority and not the Tutsi minority should lead independent Rwanda. By late 1959, Hutu aggression spread throughout the country and finally in 1960 Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu, headed the provincial government. The monarchy was abolished in 1961 and on 1st July 1962 Rwanda was granted full independence (Gellately and Kierman, 2003, 330).

This political change presented a new opportunity for Rwandans to re-imagine their history and a society that would provide equal opportunities to education and re-orient ideas on ethnic identities. However, given that Belgians priests and

administrators remained, they continued to influence ideas of identity. A kind of rigidity was introduced as the former colonial administrators and priests were replaced by new ones who favored the rule of the majority, known as the Hutus. This change was influenced by a social revolution in Belgium that put the majority Walloon in power over the Flemish minority and therefore desired to replicate the same ideas in Rwanda. The new Hutu administration of the first premier minister, Mbonyumutwa, followed by that of the first Republic of Kayibanda, aligned itself with the new colonial powers to produce identity knowledge that encouraged division and hatred against the Tutsis who were considered aliens. This change in attitude and in political power facilitated the 1959 massacre that saw thousands of Tutsi homes burned, and others forced into exile. Those who remained were tortured and denied social mobility opportunities such as access to schools.

Learning about identity in schools was primarily restricted to Hutu elite; most of whom were males. They were mentored by white priests, who taught them theories and promoted them to seminaries. A few Tutsi elites, including the well respected Bishop Alex Kagame, who remained in Rwanda, managed to continue to produce knowledge about the history of the Rwandan identity.

There were a number of changes to the education sector after independence. Primary schooling, for children aged six and above, was declared free and obligatory. A number of secondary schools also helped to expand secondary education and higher education was established by opening the National University of Rwanda in 1963. It has been noted that by 1975, school enrollment at primary level had increased from 250,000 pupils at the time of independence to 386,000 pupils. At secondary school level, by this time, there were 64 schools with a student population of 11,227 students. The National University of Rwanda had six faculties; medicine, agriculture, law, social sciences, natural sciences and arts. It had a student enrollment of 619.

Despite the increase, in practice this education expansion was not available for all Rwandans. The education system remained discriminatory after

independence, this time in favor of the Hutu (commons) and against the Tutsi (royals) and Twa (pygmies). In 1978, for example, reforms to nationalize education were made. However rather than correcting the errors of the colonial legacy, attendance quotas were introduced for each ethnic group. Thus, students were no longer admitted to secondary schools on the basis of grades merit, but on the policy of quota. Article 60 of the law on public instruction stated that transition from primary to secondary school should respect the following criteria: results at national exam, the progress in the student's performance, regional, ethnic and sex balance. This was the policy of social justice (Iringaniza) that would negatively affect many Tutsi children.

Second Republic

The second Republic of Habyaramina, emerged out of these conversations and stereotypes of what regional identity meant. The Kayibanda regime ended in 1973 through a coup d'Etat by his chief of staff Habyarimana Juvenal. Habyarimana had been appointed by Kayibanda as head of the army given he was from the North and had received good colonial medical and military education in Zaire and Rwanda.

Habyarimana through the one candidate single party (MRND) elections consolidated political power and introduced a culture of fear around elections and always received an overwhelming 100% of votes. The Northerners (who were identified as Hutus and proud to have little mixed families) regarded Southerners as weak, Tutsi lovers and lazy. Although there were stereotypes for communities from other regions, the Southern and Northern identities were more visible in these conversations. Habyarimana also put a few Tutsis in power for representation purposes but also created a small house (akazu) of advisors from his hometown sub-region of Northern-West. These were the managers of mainstream and conversations allowed on public on identity, politics, economic development, military, law, parliament, society, art and religion. They dominated every sphere of Rwandan society as leaders. However, a push to open up conversation on political leadership and political parties in 1990's evolved.

Southerners who were disfranchised as well as politicians from mixed families and a few Tutsis were involved. The Twa's voice was ignored and their discussion of their own identity existed in silence. In fact under Habyarimana's government, they sought to move Twas into their own villages in a given region. The idea was introduced as a development policy but actually ended up excluding them from national conversations and instead into disengaged citizens who were rarely consulted on any matters of society, including those that directly concerned their lives.

Under the Kayibanda government's system of quotas it stated a certain number of Tutsi children could attend certain schools. Additionally, school textbooks at the time were written to portray Tutsis as "rich, foreign and oppressors" (Rutayisire, Kabano and Rubagiza, 2003, p.332). Excerpts from textbooks presented the Tutsi as foreigners from Ethiopia (as hypothesized by colonialists) and later in the genocide dehumanized them calling them names like *snake* and *cockroach*. These stereotypes also perpetuated outside of the classrooms and thus children at a young age were indoctrinated with ideologies of divisions and hatred towards the Tutsis. Developed later, under the rule of President Juvenal Habyarimana, was Commandment Six of the Hutu Ten Commandments that state, "A Hutu majority must prevail throughout the educational system (pupils, scholars, teachers) (Kangura, 1990)". Thus, not only were the Tutsis marginalized for decades through racist ideologies in schools, but their ability to participate in the education system was limited as well.

In 1980s and 1990s, this mistreatment extended to those who were of mixed ethnicities, in particular those from the southern part of Rwanda, popularly referred to as *Abanyendunga* -distinguished from "true" Hutu who were called *Abacyiga*. The teaching of identity through the education sector had been successful in educating Rwandans about meaning of their identity and how to practice their ethnic belonging to a community. Using the learned race theories and Hamitic myths, the entire Rwandan population had been clearly divided; even those with mixed ethnicities were forced to identify with one group or the other.

Until the late 1980s the state was a strong institution controlled by Hutu elite largely from the North of Abakiga, the home of President Habyarimana. The state was able to offer the best access to upward social, political and economic mobility. It not only controlled access to education, but also dominated the employment market in a country where over 90 percent of the employment was agricultural based. According to Uvin (1998, 22) “the state effectively was in charge of all fields of human endeavor and all sectors of the economy” (Uvin, 1998, 22). Further, as exemplified by Table 2, the majority of the pupils receiving education in the year 1980s were predominantly Hutus. Table 3 showcases that even foreign scholarships were distributed according to regions - affording more opportunities to those in the North, in Hutu dominated areas such as Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and to some extent Byumba.

Comment [J2]:

Particular attention should be paid here to Gisenyi, the president’s home (and his wife’s) province, which had the highest number of foreign scholarships - a total of 204. Most of the elites, afforded scholarships, travelled to France to study. When they returned they often formed part of the Hutu government and or ended up in *Akazu* as the main political advisors of the President. These scholarships did not benefit areas such as Kibuye (62), Kibungo (62) that were considered to be inhabited by the Tutsi population. It is evident that these Hutu elites practiced the Hutu identity as they understood the benefits attached to the power and wealth this identity carried. Their foreign education facilitated the learning of their identity as they immersed themselves in the colonial literature on Rwanda which was readily available in European Universities, especially in France and Belgium.

Schools Curricula

Curricula used in schools played a significant role in reinforcing these identity categories. Perhaps, even more harmful in terms of social equality and stability was the extent to which many elements of the institutional structure - teacher and pupil behavior, textbooks and curricula - inspired ethnic division and hatred. This had a particular effect on the students’ psychological development in what

could be said to be their most formative years. In the majority of schools in pre-1994 Rwanda the hidden (and not so hidden) curricula were designed to segregate and alienate ethnic minorities, ensuring cultural reproduction and safeguarding of the dominant position of a certain group (Feinberg and Soltis, 2004, 62-64).

Given the overt and underlying structural discrimination and divisive inequality, it is perhaps surprising that the international community considered Rwanda a story of development success. Before 1994 Rwanda economic progress was described as a successful model of macroeconomic development. A World Bank Report in 1982 commented that “Rwanda’s approach to economic and social development could be considered successful” (Uvin, 1998, 43, Obura, 2003, 40). Rwanda was one of the most aided countries in the world, receiving a significant amount more from donors than from private investment and commercial export revenues combined.

However, despite the presence of over 200 NGOs and bilateral and multilateral donor representatives in the country prior to 1994, not a single one denounced the official racism and development of an increasingly divided society; “not even in the 1990s when it was clear that they were [preparing] for mass killings” (Uvin, 1998,44). During the years leading up to the genocide donor agencies adopted what can only be described as a policy of “voluntary blindness” to the politics of injustice, exclusion and prejudice in Rwanda (Uvin, 2001, 177).

It is ironic that the very government that was teaching and promoting hatred actively and openly was praised by the International Community. The foreigners working with/or in Rwanda seemed to take these identity categories for granted, assuming them to be an intrinsic part of Rwandan society and thus learned to ignore the marginalization of the Tutsis and Hutus (those from the South) population that was being excluded from the country’s development agenda. The fact that the World Bank continued to provide resources for the Rwandan government was a clear indication to the Rwandan Hutu elites that their practice

of discriminating based on these ethnic categories was acceptable. In fact, it was almost like they were being rewarded for it.

The donors were operating in an apolitical, technocratic bubble that cast Rwanda as a “*development problem*” that could be and was being “solved” through planning, infrastructural development and research; projects designed and overseen by their international “experts” (Uvin, 1998, 44-46).

From 1990s the second Republic faced various challenges, including the influx of political refugees joining those of 1950s and the rise of internal opposition amongst the political parties. In 1992, the then Minister of Secondary Education opposed discrimination against Tutsi in schools, testifying the role of ethnic and regional quotas in education as a preliminary stage to the 1994 genocide. She was immediately cautioned by the regime and discriminatory quotas were radicalized. At the same time, a militia for the ruling political parties (CDR and MRND) was created. These parties taught young Hutus what it meant to be a young Hutu and how to kill the Tutsis and moderate Hutus who were proposing a so-called threat to their existence. Concurrently to Hutu rule in the government during this time extremist media was being run by those who had learned and practiced the Hutu identity, and thus subsequently grew supportive of the Movement Republican National Pour La Democratie et le Development (MRND) regime that were already infecting hatred in indoctrinated minds. Finally, the *Interahamwe* (those who attack together), a group of young rebels, were the incarnation of the discriminatory educational policy being trained to hate and kill and later would prepare and execute the 1994 genocide

The role of “identity cards”

As was the case for previous identity cards were introduced during colonial rule. However, they also continued to play an important role in influencing identity divisions in post-independence era as they used by the government of the time as an efficient way of popularizing identity knowledge. The project of assigning identity cards is an example of what James Scott calls “state simplification”. Scott’s analysis of “villigization” and “collectiveness” can be applied to the understanding of Rwanda’s case. Villigization was a system that grouped a group

of people in one area into one village. As the ideas of Scott suggests, in Rwanda state administrators employed villagization as measures to imagine and create collective identities.

The first identity cards issued in the post-independence era were for the state administration. In 1954, scientific studies had identified particular regions in Rwanda that were inhabitable to humans, such as *Nyamata*. The Tutsi communities were then moved to *Nyamata* by the new Hutu Government from various regions of Rwanda. This process of relocation meant that at times families were separated from each other. Additionally many were moved to areas known to have diseases. The identity cards illustrate two different ways of how the State simplified and popularized instructions about which people were. The first identity cards designated and gave directions as to where people could live. For example, if you were designated a Tutsi on your identity card you were indirectly being instructed to relocate to a particular region. The instruction they provided, however, was indirect as they were inaccessible in language. While the identity cards were used to designate the regions in which one could live more importantly what they really did was give instructions to others about identity. As certain ethnicities were designated to be located in a particular region, if you were aware of one's region then you could decipher their ethnicity.

The role of popular culture in the learning of identity

Rwandans who had a stake in preserving the categories and their prescribed hierarchal meaning understood the importance of employing popular culture to consolidate differences. No longer were the terms "Hutu" and "Tutsi" simply in reference to ethnic categories but they were so entrenched into society that they had real psychological and emotional implications. The terms were no longer just about quality of life but more important than what you were given for being a Hutu and Tutsi were the implications on your psyche.

The Hutu Ten Commandments, published in the popular media forum, the Kangura newspaper, were taught around villages and in different communities to offer a set of rules that would guide the Hutu population. The Ten Commandments, authored and published by Hassan Ngeze, was a document of

identity reference. They were as follows; (translated in English as they were composed in Kinyarwanda)

1. Every Hutu must know that the Tutsi woman, wherever she may be, is working for the Tutsi ethnic cause. In consequence, any Hutu is a traitor who:

- Acquires a Tutsi wife;
- Acquires a Tutsi concubine;
- Acquires a Tutsi secretary or protégée.

2. Every Hutu must know that our Hutu daughters are more worthy and more conscientious as women, as wives and as mothers. Aren't they lovely, excellent secretaries, and more honest!

3. Hutu women, be vigilant and make sure that your husbands, brothers and sons see reason.

4. All Hutus must know that all Tutsis are dishonest in business. Their only goal is ethnic superiority. We have learned this by experience from experience. In consequence, any Hutu is a traitor who:

- Forms a business alliance with a Tutsi
- Invests his own funds or public funds in a Tutsi enterprise
- Borrows money from or loans money to a Tutsi
- Grants favors to Tutsis (import licenses, bank loans, land for construction, public markets..)

5. Strategic positions such as politics, administration, economics, the military and security must be restricted to the Hutu.

6. A Hutu majority must prevail throughout the educational system (pupils, scholars, and teachers).

7. The Rwandan Army must be exclusively Hutu. The war of October 1990 has taught us that. No soldier may marry a Tutsi woman.

8. Hutu must stop taking pity on the Tutsi.

9. Hutu wherever they are must stand united, in solidarity, and concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers. Hutu within and without Rwanda must constantly search for friends and allies to the Hutu Cause, beginning with their Bantu brothers.

Hutu must constantly counter Tutsi propaganda.

Hutu must stand firm and vigilant against their common enemy: the Tutsi.

Comment [J3]:

10. The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961 and the Hutu

Ideology must be taught to Hutu of every age. Every Hutu must spread the word wherever he goes. Any Hutu who persecutes his brother Hutu for spreading and teaching this ideology is a traitor.⁵

Popular culture was used to impart the meanings of difference. In the 1990s many Rwandans had been either forced to choose a certain ethnic affiliation, or they had chosen to believe they were Hutu or Tutsi, Hutu marginalization, or corrupted an official in order to fabricate an identity card that did not correspond to their so-called prescribed identity. The fluidity in these definitions allowed many, especially those from mixed marriage, to change their identity and belonging in order to access social and economic benefits that were affiliated with a certain group at any given time. There were also those, especially from the North, who convinced of their identity, as they believed that no Mucyiga of Abacyiga Northern region could be a Tutsi.

Asked which aspect of pop culture was most influential during pre-genocide period, most of my interviewees spoke of the music Simoni Bikindi was who was very popular; his music was aired everyday in the genocide. Bikindi's song, acted in a similar manner to the Ten Commandments, providing guidelines for what could be considered a "true Hutu". Bikindi made it clear that he hated those who were sympathizers of the RPF or Tutsis. Playing the songs on the radio created an intellectual curiosity to engage and analyze Bikindi's music and its influence on teaching of the Rwandan identity, an analysis that has been left out of literature on Rwandan genocide.

The importance of his music calls for an understanding as to who he was, what his music was about, why it became successful in teaching the masses about their identity and most importantly why it was played heavily during the genocide by a radio aiming to promote hatred. Simoni Bikindi, a University graduate and talented musician from the Northern part of Rwanda, expressed in his songs his belief that he was a Hutu – an identity which had to be protected and fought for.

⁵ (Quotes from the Gisozi genocide memorial, Kigali, in field notes of summer 2009. It was published in Kinyarwanda in Kangura newspaper no 6, December 1990)

As exemplified in his lyrics analyzed below, Bikindi had mastered the art of popularizing and spreading ideas he had learned in University and other forms of education - primary and high school – which had carried the undertones of the myths about Rwandan identity that had been fabricated by the colonial powers.

Bikindi's music illustrates just one case in which artists were influential in educating the public about identity. Commencing in the 1980s Bikindi composed and performed his music with his cultural group in the tunes of traditional genres that encouraged and led his fans to dance. This included wedding songs such as *Umwumba*. Later his music became increasingly based on politically charged compositions and were more and more repeatedly played on the Rwanda Television Des Milles Collines (RTLM) radio to encourage the Hutu masses to go out and kill. In these songs his lyrics were so bloody that when heard many Tutsis expressed their feelings of displacement in the Rwandan society. Some of his most famous compositions included; *Intabaza* which was also popularly known as *Bene Sebahinzi* (The Sons of the Cultivators) - meaning that Hutus could be identified according to the colonial theories had identified as those who work as farmers, *Ingabo z' igihugu* – a song the government's army he composed to motivate soldiers who were fighting against the RPF insurgency between 1990-1994, *Nimwe mwariraye ingabo z' u Rwanda* – a song expressing the Rwandan army is the one that always won the battle, *Twazereye ingoma ya cyami na gikoronize*, - another about resisting colonialism and the oppression of kingdoms and another song, officially entitled *Akabyutso* (The Awakening) was commonly referred to as *Nanga Abahutu*, or I Hate Hutus.

These songs were analyzed by the prosecution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 2008 finding him guilty of influencing the Hutu masses to hate the Tutsis. A closer look at the verses of two of these songs provides clear examples of how the public was educated through this informal yet influential means of music. Bikindi began both of these “teaching” songs with traditional instruments - in particular the *umuduri* which was an instrument similar to the western violin. He used the *ingoma* a drum which was important in Rwandan culture. He used sounds of *amajoyi y' intore* – the bells worn on the legs of young male dancers. Before they could even interpret and understand the

Comment [J4]:

music, the use of these instruments was very significant in attracting the attention of young peoples. The majority of young Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda played, danced to and enjoyed Bikindi's music, especially whenever it was played on the radio. Bikindi was a very intelligent composer, good singer and his humor aided him to become an outstanding performer.

Nanga Abahutu

This song was composed in 1993 as the battle between the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) and the army of the Rwandan government was intensifying in the North. Bikindi composed this song to rebuke any Hutus who were known to be supporting the Tutsis-dominated RPF. During this period both Hutus and Tutsis, who were sympathizers of the RPF, were either, assassinated or imprisoned as part of a campaign to stop the *ibytso* or otherwise known as the RPF intelligence in the country.

Nanga Abahutu, nanga abahutu basebya ubuhutu.

Benwacu, Abo bahutu batiyizi, biyibagizwa icyo baricyo

Nanga abo bahutu bagenda batabona iyo bagana (x2)

I hate those Hutus, those de-hutuized Hutus, who have given up their identity, dear comrades. I hate those Hutus, those Hutus who walk blindly (x2)

Ibyo bicucu, barwana intambara batazi icyo igamije

Nanga abo bahutu abo bahutu umuntu azana kwica bakica abandi bahutu

Kandi kubanga nibyo byiza (x2)

Fools, naive Hutus committed in a war of which they do not know the cause," he has written. I hate those Hutus who can be brought to kill and who, I swear, kill Hutus, dear comrades. And if I hate them, its all for the better.

As it was the case for most of his songs, this song was easy to sing and memorize, it had an infectious rhythm and therefore at times people would play it at weddings, or at other social gatherings. This particular track called for the hatred and killing of the fellow Hutus who were not supporting the government, but

were sympathizing with the Tutsis in the country and those in the RPF rebel group. The song was also very instrumental in encouraging the youth to kill anyone, including Hutus, who were seemed to be hiding Tutsis during the genocide. This led to the killing of thousands of innocent people who had resisted the genocidal ideology of hating Tutsis. By playing it in social events, or during public government events the song inflated hatred in the masses 'minds. The song forced people to decide whether or not they hated Tutsis. It encouraged the masses to be good Hutus and to hate Tutsis who did not deserve to be liked, or associated with. In 1992 and 1993, various high schools began rioting, with many refusing to be taught by Tutsi teachers, or their Tutsi principals. The idea of hating the Tutsi became a reality when "Tutsi-like" students were being harassed in schools, both by teachers and their Hutu colleagues. The song was always sang whenever riots were held, the rioters, however, went unpunished by government authorities who allowed the hatred to continue through such vocal expression.

This song was always played on RTLM, the radio station the masses in rural areas listened to. This was problematic as they tended to be uneducated and thus followed whatever their local government official or in this case the radio dictated. In his songs Bikini continued to remind people of the stereotypes of what made a "good Hutu" – a good Hutu was considered to be very short, lighter skinned, supposedly not intelligent or well educated, but mainly those who were the majority poor agricultural farmers who do not drink milk or care for cows. In opposition he emphasized the Tutsis as very dark, tall intelligent in schools, with attractive elegant women and usually possessing many cows and enjoying drinking milk.

The role of the Catholic Church

Apart from the classroom setting church, especially the Catholic Church, assumed a central role in Rwandan education. Catholic churches met every Sunday often with two or three masses. Individuals who wanted to be considered "good Christians" went for repentance approximately three times a week if not more. Every corner of Rwanda had a catholic church. Like schools,

parishes were either headed by white fathers, or Rwandan priests who had been trained in seminaries. Rwanda was reputed to be one of the most overtly religious countries in Africa with over 80% of the population being Roman Catholic believers in between 1960's to 1990's (Peterson, 2001, 24).

Catholicism went hand-in-hand with politics and thus it was important that all the post-colonial and powerful Hutu presidents, were baptized Catholics – it was part of their identity. Every young man and woman who wanted to develop in Rwanda, needed to be baptized by the Catholic Church to be considered modern. Even with the introduction of Protestant churches in the nineteenth century, the most popular religious identity remained catholic. As it has been the case with various human societies, matters of questioning spirituality has been left to experts, often priests, or religious figures, who assume a position in society as God's representative. In the Rwandan context, priests were feared, respected, adored and at times even a bishop was worshiped and praised. A Bishop assumed similar social position that the King occupied in pre-colonial Rwanda. He had a divine appointment, which should be trusted and even feared by politicians and presidents. Each public appearance of a Bishop was often shown in media, and visits to the Vatican or visits of a Pope or Catholic cardinal were more organized than that of a European Head of State. In fact the church and state were so closely linked that this relationship was often referred to as *an umbilical relationship* (Gachuruzi, 1999, 86).

With this kind of religious indoctrination, and repeated liturgy every Sunday in foreign Latin language that was not interpreted in Kinyarwanda or French, majority of Rwandan repeated words of a priest often without questioning. This tradition allowed priests to be viewed as divine authorities both in the church and outside.

The prominence of the Church in Rwandan society was demonstrated in 1994 when certain Church officials were accused with strong evidential accounts to have participated in the killing of over 800,000 people. When the massacres

began thousands of people sought refuge and protection in the churches.⁶ This turned out to be a costly mistake as the militia used the churches as slaughterhouses. Priests, nuns and Bishops communicated moral lessons about the ethics of killing. Interpreting what identity means and how to act as a result of this understanding. In the case of the genocide they did so with large and negative ramifications. Bishops and other clergies were actively involved, both directly and indirectly, in the massacres. Sometimes this was by acting as informants while in other instances the killings were “...accepted ...carried out by individual nuns and priests,” (Peterson, 2001, 4). The Church earned itself the reputation of being a mute church for its blindness to the atrocities.

Pre-genocide Rwanda and attempt at political settlement

The pre-genocide political atmosphere of the late 1980's and early 1990s amplified the question of Tutsi refugees in neighbouring countries. As a result the dilemma of the Tutsi inside Rwanda was revived in conversations. In seeking to dominate and manage those discussions, the Akazu intellectuals sought to clarify who belonged to the Hutu identity and the privileges that should be accorded to them. In a way the 10 commandments of Hutus were an effort to reunite Hutus in all regions and disregard the regional identities that had taken root. Again these conversations were not only verbal but also through symbols of language and art like drawings of 'isuka- a hoe' and the noble professional of agriculture as unifying symbols of hutu identity.

Thus the attack of the RPA in 1990 was timely as it added to other noise that was evolving among Rwandans. It is this noise that attracted some international attention, which was in turn diminished by France. Under *Habyarimana*, France had replaced Belgium in many ways as the French influenced and were official sponsors of conversations on Hutu and more important the Northerners political power consolidation efforts. In return the French received advantageous trade and access to Rwanda's regional strategic position. The relationship between

⁶For analysis of scale of the role of the church in Rwanda, see; Carol Rittner, John K. Roth, Wendy Wittworth, *Genocide in Rwanda, Complicity of Churches?*, Paragon House, London, (2004)

governments was also primarily driven by friendships between both presidents' families of Mitterrand and Habyarimana. The UN led Arusha peace talks were a signal that the International actors were alert to the conversations that were increasingly turning violent locally and with potential regional implications.

The political settlement in Rwanda has been widely discussed by scholars across many disciplines. In reality though the political settlement processes in Rwanda are not deliberately sequenced events, this study merely categorises events in a yearly, and at times, a monthly chronological manner for purposes of describing the process. In this regard, the political settlement process in Rwanda can be classified into three main phases:

Phase one: Pre - genocide 1990-1992.

This phase began after an outbreak of civil war in 1990 when the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)—armed wing of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)—based in Uganda invaded Rwanda from the northern regions on 1 October 1990. Various scholars have identified factors that led to the invasion. Gerard Prunier observed that the political instability during President Juvénal Habyarimana reign that was occasioned by deteriorating economic conditions in the country contributed to the crisis. Prunier argues that 'shrinking' sources of revenue from agriculture and mining – a major source of enrichment for the elite led to fierce internal power struggles as competition for the declining resources intensified.⁷ This situation was further exacerbated after the government decided to increase taxes especially among peasant farmers and cutting of social services amidst threats from drought and declining food production. Moreover, the government reaction to criticism was heavy-handed and led to repressing of opposition groups and the press. Furthermore, the real or perceived support RPF in Uganda has also been identified as a trigger factor of the invasion.⁸ Mahmood Mamdani also gives an in depth analysis of Uganda's involvement in the crisis particularly

⁷ Prunier, Gérard. 1995. *The Rwanda crisis: history of a genocide*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp 84-92.

⁸ Prunier, Gerard. 1998. "The Rwandan Patriotic Front." In Clapham, Christopher S., ed. *African guerrillas*. Oxford (GB): J. Currey; Reed, Cyrus. 1996. "Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front". *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 34(3): 479-501; Otunnu, Ogenga 1999. "An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA)." In Adelman, Howard, and Astri Suhrke, eds. *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

on the crisis of citizenship and indigeneity of refugees in Uganda being the fons et origo underpinning the invasion lead-up to the invasion.⁹ The politics of indigeneity which included state-sponsored repression, exclusion, expulsion and prejudice of Rwandan migrants and refugees in Uganda led to RPF—originally a political organisation of Refugees—to organise its self militarily in 1985. The RPF initially fought alongside National Resistance Army guerrilla War led by Museveni against Obote but later launched an incursion in Rwanda.¹⁰ The RPF, was at the time, demanding the President Habyarimana's government to allow refugees to return to Rwanda, prepare for elections, adopt a new constitution, respect human rights and the rule of law as well as reduce powers of the President.¹¹ In return, the government promised political reforms and attempted to negotiate a settlement of establishing a refugee repatriation programme.¹² However, these attempts failed when it became clear to the RPF that the government was trying to covertly exploit factionalism within the RPF's army while at the same time trying to mobilise military support from foreign allies.¹³ Moreover, pressure from both the international and regional community demanding for liberalisation of governance in the state through democratisation—constitutional reforms, allowing for establishment for multi-parties and media freedoms—as a means of peace and state building, inadvertently worsened the situation in Rwanda in several ways. First and most important was that, although constitutional reforms process paved way for plurality and emergence of opposition political parties in August 1991, this process was not only façade but took place entirely within northern and southern Hutu political elites in President Habyarimana's dominant party – *Movement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement* (MRND).¹⁴ The ruling

⁹ Mamdani, Mahmood. 2001. *When victims become killers: colonialism, nativism, and the genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 159-184.

¹⁰ Reed, "Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front".

¹¹ Watson, Catherine. 1992. "War and Waiting". *Africa Report*. 37 (6): 51.

¹² Otunnu, Ogenga. 1999. "An historical analysis of the invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA)". *The Path of a Genocide: the Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. 31-49.

¹³ Help in the form of arms, financial and troops support initially came from France but also other countries like Egypt, Belgium, South Africa, Zaire, Britain, Bulgaria, Italy, Israel, and Seychelles provided arms and other military support to Rwanda's government. See Arms Project (Human Rights Watch). 1994. "Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War." New York, NY: Human Rights Watch Arms Project.

¹⁴ Kakwenzire, Joan, & Kamukama, Dixon. 1999. "The development and consolidation of extremist forces in Rwanda 1990-1994." In Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds. *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Publishers, pp. 66-68.

political elites including those in the army and civil service , not only exploited existing ethnic cleavages and regional differences between the Hutu and Tutsi to re-arm and mobilise support for 'Hutu power' but confronted with weakening dominance of the party, in 1992 they mobilised radical youth groups - *Interahamwe* in MRND to attack opposition parties. At the core of this strategy was 'racialised political discourse' aimed at ensuring survival of the state by eliminating of the political enemies [which meant the Tutsi] and reinstating Hutu dominance.¹⁵ Furthermore, opening up of the press had an opposite effect. Independence of media led to the establishment of both private press and radio owned and operated by political elites and Hutu extremist allied to MRND who eventually used it to spread Hutu Power propaganda and ideology.¹⁶ The invasion and the ensuing state-sanctioned extremism especially with the formation of Coalition pour la De'fense de la Re'publique (CDR) party, in 1992 not only re-ignited but crystallised and reinforced politicisation of ethnicity between the Hutu and Tutsi protracting political violence that destabilised the country.¹⁷ Furthermore, it is also worth noting that political processes above took place when the country was engaged in a civil war, though in a limited scale. Prunier notes that during this time, massacres were a common feature and mainly preceded political meetings during which a sensibilisation—putting peasants 'in the mood' to prepare them to kill the RPF and their sympathisers—process was carried out.¹⁸ More importantly was the manner in which the elite used the sensibilisation process to manipulate societal culture and traditional identities of the peasantry. For instance, after the political meetings the state through the ministry of interior would sanction the killings with a coded calling

¹⁵ For a detailed explanation on this see, Hintjens, Helen M. 1999. "Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda". *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 37(2): 241-286; Mamdani, 2001. *When victims become killers*: 189-211.

¹⁶ This role of the media in the pre and post genocide in Rwanda for example, use of the Hutu owned magazine, *Kangura* to spread propaganda and Radio Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) to misinform and spread hate messages, has been extensively discussed in Thompson, A. (Ed.). (2007). *The media and the Rwanda genocide*. IDRC. However, a contentious question has been whether propaganda fomented the genocide. A recent paper by David Yanagizawa-Drott gives convincing empirical analysis of the link between media and conflict and argues that of under certain conditions, propaganda spread through mass media especially one that encourages violence against defenceless and vulnerable ethnic minority groups, is capable of instigating participation in violence. See, Yanagizawa-Drott, David. "Propaganda and conflict: Theory and evidence from the Rwandan genocide." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, forthcoming (2010).

¹⁷ Langford, Peter. 2005. " The Rwandan Path to Genocide: The Genesis of the capacity of the Rwandan Post-colonial State to Organise and Unleash a project of Extermination." *Civil Wars*, 7(1), 1-27.

¹⁸ Prunier, *Op.Cit.*, pp 137-138.

for special *umuganda* (collective work session) and *bourgmestre* 'bush clearing'. Despite the double meaning in the two terms they were not only identifiable with the illiterate peasants but piggybacked on the traditional political culture of a 'systematic, centralised and unconditional obedience to authority.'¹⁹ Conversely, RPA attacks further bolstered Hutu extremism and more importantly, militarisation of the society with both the national army Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) troops and French forces.²⁰ Moreover, the Rwandan government used the tense political situation to arbitrarily arrest Tutsi intelligentsia and elite business men as well as moderate Hutu sympathisers.

"Conditions of detention were terrible, people being herded like cattle into buildings unsuitable for holding such large numbers and at times not given food or water for several days. Beatings, theft and rapes were commonplace; some of the prisoners were beaten to death simply because they happened to do something to displease a drunken guard. Between 11 and 13 October an estimated 348 Tutsi civilians were massacred and more than 500 houses burned in the Kibilira commune. None of the victims was a RPF fighter or a civilian supporter of whom there seemed to be none. In almost every case, the killings were to become only too familiar. When questioned about these events at a press conference, President Habyarimana answered 'Civilians? Why should we kill civilians if they are not involved in the fighting? There is no revolt.'²¹

Paradoxically there was massive displacement of people in most of RPF occupied territories. Nevertheless, instability from civil war led to immense suffering both from massive internal displacement, collapse of the economy. This eventually led to declaration of a ceasefire in August 1992, and the opening of negotiations between the transitional government and the RPF.²²

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p 141.

²⁰ It is estimated before the attack 1990 invasion by RPA, FAR had an arm of 5000 men. By late 1991 the FAR had increased to close to 40,000 but poorly trained but armed troops. The army suffered huge losses in offensives against RPA especially in northern regions. The state response by the regime was to create armed civilians youth militias - *interhamwe* who René Lemarchand estimated at 30,000 who were trained by the presidential guard and coordinated by the akazu (meaning 'little house in Kinyarwanda) - a core group of President Habyarimana inner circle. See, Lemarchand, Rene. 1995 "Rwanda: The rationality of genocide." *Journal of opinion*: 8-11.

²¹ Prunier. *Op. Cit.*, pp 109-10

²² Langford, "*The Rwandan Path to Genocide*," p. 14.

Arusha negotiation Phase

This phase began in June 1992, after regional and international parties made calls for negotiations between the Rwandan government and RPF.²³ Two main issues discussed here that emerged from this phase was; (1) failure of the Arusha process to move beyond sharing of power between political elites to a genuine negotiated agreement that provided lasting peace and reconciliation, and (2) the inability of external actors to assist in creation of these conditions during the process. Initially, RPF and the Rwandan coalition Government, agreed on a three month ceasefire to end hostilities but on condition that a joint political military commission is established to serve a complaints mechanism and that each party, retains the territory occupied i.e., northern region and the rest of the territory respectively; separated by neutral corridor to be monitored by an Organization of African Union (OAU) led Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG). This was later followed by a thirteen-month negotiation process, which began in July 1992 to agree on the following core principles:

- i. Establishing of the rule of law on national unity, democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights;
- ii. Formation of national army consisting of government forces and RPF;
- iii. Establishment of power-sharing framework within the framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG).

The first principle was quickly agreed on. However, elaborated by Bruce Jones the latter two issues were the cornerstone of the Arusha accord; they were repeatedly postponed due to disagreements among the political elites and eventually did not happen.²⁴ In Rwanda, the extremists within the MRND and CDR were to rally the masses against potential power sharing and reorganisation

²³ The negotiations were mediated by the Tanzanian government, in Arusha, under the mandate of Organization of African Unity (OAU). See Tekle, Amare. 1999. "The OAU: Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution." *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. 111-130. France, Belgium, Germany, United Nations and the United States attended as observers but also provided additional leverage. In addition, regional states - Uganda, Zaire and Burundi also sent observers to demonstrate regional interest.

²⁴ For a detailed explanation and analysis of the Arusha process see, Jones, Bruce. 1999. "The Arusha peace process". *The Path of a Genocide: the Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. 131-156;

of the army. A quote of Léon Mugesera, the vice president of MRND sums the tension at the time.

“The opposition parties have plotted with the enemy to make the Byumba *préfecture* fall to the *Inyenzi* [cockroaches]. [...] They have plotted to undermine our armed forces. [...] The law is quite clear on this point: ‘Any person who is guilty of acts aiming at sapping the moral of the armed forces will be condemned to death.’ What are we waiting for? [...] And what about those accomplices (*ibytso*) here who are sending children to the RPF? Why are we waiting to get rid of these families? [...] We have to take responsibility into our own hands and wipe out these hoodlums.”²⁵

Furthermore, although the Accord attempted to broadly recognise issues of systematic exclusion of the Tutsi community at national level it was less clear on modalities of how to implement divisive issues such as how to share power within the transitional government—mainly presidential powers—as well as how to integrate the government and rebel forces into on the national army.²⁶ Moreover, and more importantly, the Rwanda government regional and international actors in the Arusha process paid less attention to other on-going forms of exclusion at societal level,²⁷ and systematic forms of violence that had begun to emerge during the civil war such as issues of citizenship and discriminate forms of sexual violence.²⁸ Despite early intervention of the external actors—both regional and international—failure of the negotiation process has been blamed to setbacks of impartiality and unmotivated attitude towards the crisis particularly lack of commitment to enforce implementation of the Arusha agreement.

Two things to note with external intervention, especially the OAU mechanism, was the classical peacekeeping dilemma posed by paucity of resources to fund

²⁵ Prunier. *Op. Cit.*, p. 171-172.

²⁶ See Jones, 1999 *Arusha peace process*: 141 – 142.

²⁷ Anacleti, Odhiambo. 1996. "The Regional Response to the Rwandan Emergency". *Journal of Refugee Studies*. 9 (3): 303-311.

²⁸ Widespread atrocities were perpetuated by both the RPF and FAR. For a summary of this offensive see Prunier. *Op.Cit.*, pp 173-191.

interventions as well as idiosyncrasies of non-interference, respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. This dilemma created several challenges, which were reflected in the Rwandan crisis. First, like in many other post-cold war conflicts although there was willingness among OAU member states to deploy peacekeeping forces—in the case of Rwanda deploy NMOG to monitor the ceasefire states—most states were non-committal to funding of the force and instead OAU had to rely on western states for funds.²⁹

Second, in hindsight, while focus was directed to resolution of the conflict through negotiations and mediation, the Arusha negotiations—now colloquially termed as a ‘stillbirth’—was a futile initiative at that time for a number of reasons extensively discussed by Bruce Jones.³⁰ Two of them are important to mention here. First, was that by the time preventive diplomatic and negotiation missions were starting, the RPF had already gained an upper hand in the process from the battlefield victories against the FAR controlled territories. Second is the relative failure of regional peace processes to mitigate the conflict due to lack of neutrality. Indeed while diplomacy and mediation efforts were crucial in the conflict management process, restricting the process to this option when the violence had escalated to critical level had severe consequences among them capacity of peacekeeping forces to use force in situations of extreme hostilities.³¹ Impartiality of regional actors shifted the role to international actors—whose interest and political will to intervene in Rwanda at the time was marginal and slow to respond.³² The latter came to bedevil the implementation phase.

²⁹ Tekle, 1999. *The OAU: Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution*, pp. 111-130.

³⁰ Jones, Bruce. 2007 “Civil War, the Peace Process and Genocide in Rwanda.” In Ali, Taisier Mohamed Ahmed, and Robert O. Matthews, eds. *Civil wars in Africa: roots and resolution*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

³¹ Many observers have suggested that delays in deploying UNAMIR See, See, *Report of the independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda: 1999*. New York: United Nations, pp. 43-44.

³² Daniela Krosiak has noted that France despite their proximate connection to Rwanda elites especially those in the government, politically, they were ‘silent’ and inactive to clear structures of violence perpetuated by elites before and during the Arusha negotiation processes. See, Krosiak, Daniela. 2007. *The role of France in the Rwandan genocide*. London: Hurst, pp.154-161. Furthermore, a report of inquiry set to investigate UN intervention in Rwanda concluded that lack of political will amongst member states of the UN to contribute personnel and resources into UNAMIR contributed to its failure of preventing the genocide. See, *Report of the independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda: 1999*.

Implementation and outcome

This phase involved attempts to implement the two main protocols of the Arusha peace accord. They included: establishing the BBTG; formation of national army consisting of FAR and RPF. A UN led peacekeeping force United Nation Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was deployed, though delayed, to enforce the accord.³³ While the assassination of Burundi's President Melchior Ndadaye by Tutsi military extremists and ensuing violence and killings against of Hutu's in Burundi is said to have triggered and resonated a similar impetus for Hutu extremist forces in Rwanda, some evidence suggests on the contrary. On one hand some observers suggests of inherent flaws where opportunities to contain the violence were missed after failure of actors in the Arusha process to address the role of hard-line forces both in the Rwanda government and RPF in the process.³⁴

On the other hand some suggest that a myriad of challenges that range from of disjuncture in UNAMIR occasioned by structural challenges in UNSC systems to deliberate plans to failures in responding to deliberate and well-known government efforts subvert implementation of the peace agreement may have contributed to failure to implement the peace agreement.³⁵ While the former perspective points to the internal conversations – mainly between the elite that were on-going in Rwanda albeit at the negotiation level, the focus of such negotiations is on the short-term by ending the conflict through accommodation of elite interests.

The risk of this approach as evidenced in Rwanda, is that an elite-driven process hardly represents majority of society's interest and tend to rely on governance

³³ Although the UNSC approved deployment of UNAMIR on 5 October 1993, the peacekeeping forces did not arrive in Rwanda until 1 November. This was four months after signing of the Accord.

³⁴ Literature on this is wide but for detailed analysis see, Storey, Andy. 2012. "Structural violence and the struggle for state power in Rwanda: what Arusha got wrong". *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*. 12 (3): 7-32; Jones, 2007. *Civil War, the Peace Process and Genocide in Rwanda*. See also, Khadiagala, Gilbert M. 2002 "Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda." In Stedman, Stephen John, Donald S. Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds. *Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements*. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, pp. 463-498.

³⁵ For a detailed analysis see Adelman, Howard, and Astri Suhrke. 2004 "Rwanda." In David Malone, ed. *The UN Security Council: from the Cold War to the 21st century*. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, pp. 483-499. See also, Borton, John, Emery Brusset, and Alistair Hallam. "The international response to conflict and genocide: lessons from the Rwanda experience." *Study III: Humanitarian Aid and Effects, Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Copenhagen* (1996).

models that emphasise on short-term deals rather than long-term ideals of peace. In Rwanda this phase ended in April 1994 after political impasse between RPF and Rwanda government after the latter failed to meet part of peace agreement. This was followed by resumption of the civil war that later degenerated into the genocide against the Tutsi including the widespread sexual based violence.³⁶ In this regard, an issue that perhaps warrants further interrogation is why the political settlement paid less attention to other on-going forms of exclusion at societal level. More importantly is imperative to explore why the political settlement was unable to go accommodate not only ethnic identity contestations but those of gender and citizenship.

Having not prioritized the question of politicized identities as part of the Arusha peace agenda, the political settlement and peace agreements remained very fragile throughout the process. Thus the early 1990's period that eventually ended Habyarimana's rule was characterized by conversations to mobilize around hate, and fear of the other (the Tutsi, the foreign) that brought elites and ordinary Hutus together in a single act of the Genocide. Of course it's important to note that this was with the exception of the minority but notable Hutus who opposed the genocide ideology and even protected the Tutsis who would eventually form a new post-genocide identity of 'survivors'.

Post-genocide period: What identity issues that were part of the state-building conversation were taken into consideration in the settlement and post settlement arrangements?

The following is a summary of some key themes that emerged as issues that were at the core of the post-genocide peacebuilding efforts in Rwanda. In particular, we identify issues and questions that require further research and focus during the field research phase.

³⁶ On sexual violence during the genocide see, Nowrojee, Binaifer. 1996. *Shattered lives: sexual violence during the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath*. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Justice and reconciliation

- *Gacaca* – This was a *practical* solution to the increasingly overcrowded prison population post-genocide. It has become ‘famous’ as an example of local traditional justice. However it did not start due to a desire to use that form of justice or for moral reasons. Rather it was a *practical* solution to a complex problem.
- *Ethnicity* – As part of the reconciliation process ethnic identities are encouraged to become less meaningful and forgotten (in order to be ‘Rwandan’ instead); but as part of pursuing justice the categorisation of people retains (conscious or sub-consciously) some ethnic labelling. Zorbas (2004) states that ‘returnees’ are Tutsi RPF; ‘old refugees’ are Tutsi’s who left Rwanda pre-1990s; ‘new refugees’ are returning Hutu’s who fled to Congo post-genocide; ‘victims’ are Tutsi; ‘perpetrators’ are Hutu. Hintjens (2008) also discusses these categories as (1) survivors; (2) old caseload returnees; (3) new caseload returnees; (4) suspected genocidaires, and shows how the pursuit of justice and this labelling can exclude certain Rwandans, for example, a child of Hutu-Tutsi marriage whose parents were both killed but whose Uncle is pursued as a Killer. There is some sense from the literature of a degree of resentment that only Tutsi victims are remembered. There certainly appears to be animosity that Hutu’s are never seen as victims within the justice-reconciliation discourse – either as victims of RPF atrocities, victims of the genocide killings, or suffering/death experienced in the refugee camps post-genocide etc.
- *Role of history* – idea of ‘collective amnesia’ (Buckley-Zistel 2006), where horror of genocide is remembered but its root causes are forgotten, in order to reconcile and live side-by-side again. This might be due to degree of government coercion, fear of other group, or practical need of getting on with lives. Is it healthy to forget history in this way in order to move on? Or would analysis, understanding and acknowledgement of past be more beneficial? These are some of the questions that will form the focus of the field study.

Genocide memorials can be worthy sites of commemoration, but also invoke trauma and resentment (Ibrek 2010). Some Hutu's would prefer they were not there in order to forget the past and move on, rather than bring up history. History surely plays a part in any peace and state building process. A shared history of a nation/people can certainly help bind that country together and create some kind of national pride and consciousness, as well as a collective acknowledgement of wrongs done.

- *Economic development:* Tax systems – ‘Ubuletwa’ was a pre-colonial system that was resented by locals as they had to pay the King, and the system was later abused by the Belgians (Prunier 1995). ‘Ubudehe’ is a post-genocide system of local economic development, where communities decide which local projects require investment, and poor community members are given funds to invest but then pass on profits to the next worthy recipient (Niringiye and Ayebale 2012).
- Inequality - NURC survey indicated that economic cleavages were the most divisive feature of Rwandan society, rather than ethnicity, indicating the primary importance of economic development (evenly spread) in reconciling Rwanda.
- Role of Power (and class)- who held and yielded power was of central importance

in pre-colonial Rwanda in shaping social position and identity; ‘ethnic’ identity and labelling could shift according to your power, wealth and social role (Newbury 2006 reviewing book by Jan Vansina). Due to its extremely high population density in pre-colonial times, a high degree of social control was always needed to maintain power and stability (Prunier 1995). Likewise Ibrek 2010 says that Kagame/post-genocide state has marginalised some Tutsi survivors, again indicating that maintenance of power is the primary consideration rather than ethnic identity.

The 1959 revolution was against the powerful, rich Tutsi elites rather than ‘Tutsi’s’ generally (Newbury 1998). Did the role of power and wealth play a role

in the genocide? Or had ethnic prejudice by then become engrained and an overwhelmingly primary motivator? Hintjens 2008 cautions that the RPFs promotion of the 1950s and 60s era as being the beginning of normalising the killing of Tutsi's is worrying, as this ignores the more complex power-wealth dynamics that were at play during that time.

At Arusha, the RPF gained a lot (which the extremists greatly resented). Jones (1999) concludes this was primarily due to RPFs power on the battlefield, and their strong army and military gains. Habyarimana was forced to accept the deal only due to the relative power and strength of the RPF against the Government forces.

- *Class* – This paper has showed how colonial education was racist but also 'classist', whereby the Tutsi elite were educated, rather than just all Tutsi's. And again during the Habyarimana era textbooks labelled Tutsi's as rich (as well as foreign and oppressors), and the songs of Bikindi said Hutu's were uneducated poor farmers (with Tutsi's the opposite). This all shows that ethnic identity was always attached to wealth and position/power. Hintjens (2008) argues that Rwanda is divided by class, now more than ever, between the rich city dwellers and poor rural farmers. The poor must be given the opportunity to develop and express their own identity (which may indeed have ethnic elements) rather than being subject to government-led, top down prescriptions of what their identity is allowed to be.
- *Religion* – Peterson 2001 says from 1960's-1990's Rwanda was an overwhelmingly Catholic country, with an 'umbilical relationship' between Church and State. What role is religion and religious identity playing in Rwanda now? This is an area where this research requires more focus. A key question during field research will be to assess the degree to which religion is playing a bigger role in reconciliation and state-building.
- *Role of the 'foreigner'* – perceiving who were the rightful citizens of Rwanda and who was the 'foreign' invader clearly played a role in the genocide. But

what about the role of the genuine foreigner, i.e. non-Rwandans and the international community? The international community clearly played a role in Arusha, applying pressure to sign agreements; and was then shockingly absent during the genocide. How it is perceived and utilised now? Donor funding is of course important in this regard. But the international community has (rightly) been vilified for its lack of action in the genocide, and Kagame now often criticises outside interference, of foreigner's lack of understanding of Rwanda among other things. Does the attempted creation of a 'Rwandaness' (and suppression of Tutsi-Hutu-Twa identities) rely on, or utilise, this vilified 'foreigner'? Historically state-building elsewhere has unquestionably utilised an idea of 'foreigner' or 'other' or common enemy as a uniting factor for nation building.

We know some within the international community now criticise Kagame for lack of democratic governance whilst others heap praise on the economic and social achievements post-genocide. In his paper David says that it was surprising that the Habyarimana years were often praised as being a developmental success, despite the underlying structural discrimination etc. But Zorbas 2004 suggests a similar and dangerous situation is occurring now, whereby Kagame's economic achievement is praised in the face of discriminatory practices. Reyntjens 2011 in fact says the international community must take a massive (if not primary) role in allowing authoritarianism to emerge, which I found a somewhat arrogant conclusion which supposes donors could (and should) determine how Rwanda is governed if they put more effort in.

- *Youth* – Des Forges (1999) notes that youth played a big role in the genocide, but also that the RPF also recruited youth within Rwanda and had cells with military training operating in the country (composed of both Hutu and Tutsi). What role is the youth playing now in Rwanda? Particularly these RPF recruits? This will form part of the focus of field research.

- *Regional identity* – This paper shows how post-independence the viligisation policies meant that certain regions became associated with particular ethnicities. We need to assess how that manifests now?
- *Perpetrators* – I thought it was interesting that Buckley-Zistel 2006 says that lots of people who were jailed for killings can cause problems when they are freed and return home. They are often shocked to see people living side-by-side in relative harmony, still harbouring their own resentments. What is the role of such people? Can they be included somehow/ignored/transformed etc as part of the state-building process?

Politics of elections

- *Electoral system* – Stroh (2010) says that the Proportional Representation system in use in Rwanda (to elect a certain number of parliamentarians) provides the illusion of democracy but is in fact used as its easier to control and fake, allowing a token amount of opposition candidates in whilst maintaining RPF control.
- *Exclusion* – the perceived dominance of the RPF (if seen as 'Tutsi) and marginalisation of others ('Hutu') can stoke resentment. Jacobs 2010 worries that a system of exclusion can create a troubling idea that Tutsi's cant be trusted in politics, which was a primary thought/motivator during the genocide.
- *Women* – Rwanda has been praised for the number of women in parliament and government; but Burnet 2008 suggests there is actually a paradox of more women being present but that they lack genuine power. She argues that people at the grassroots never really understood the idea of Women's Councils in 1998 and the process was driven by elite women; and also that the women's movement has lost some momentum due to many of its leaders now becoming incorporated into state politics rather than leading civil society ventures. Burnet is positive, however, that in the long term the presence of women will have an extremely positive effect. Burnet also praises Rwandan women for skilfully operating within whatever political system they have been faced with, recognising authoritarianism but making gains

within it. This began under Habyarimana where Women's civil society groups did operate and effect some policies, and the same now occurs under Kagame. Note that interestingly, Gready 2010 counters that women had no historic role or track record of influencing policy under Habyarimana.

Key Propositions

1. Identity and reconstruction of “ideas of identity” are at the core of Rwanda’s nation- and statebuilding conversation.
2. Initial political settlement paid less attention to on-going forms of [identity based] exclusion within Rwandan society
3. There is some return to the conversations that led to civil war and genocide but there is some transmutation in issues and actors
4. Gender relationships transmuted through the historical periods from gendered participation to exclusion and later to shared leadership.