

ALC COURSE NARRATIVE

Reframing Theories of Peace and State-building in Africa

OUTLINE

The course aims to familiarise ALC Fellows and students with the dominant ways of approaching peace and security in Africa in general and peace building and state building in particular. It seeks to provide a nuanced way of approaching these issues based on the research that the ALC with the support of the Canadian Centre for International Development undertook on the topic of 'reframing narratives of peacebuilding and state-building in Africa' focusing on five African countries (Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda). The course assumes that Fellows do not have substantive knowledge of topics related with the existing terrains of peacebuilding and state-building in Africa and hence is designed accordingly. It seeks to acquaint trainees with the peace building and state-building landscape of Africa and reframe it in light of the ALC research teams' findings. Hence, it engages the idea of what state-building and peacebuilding mean in Africa and problematizes the existing understanding of the two categories of analysis and practices.

Learning outcomes

At the end of the course ALC fellows will be able to:

- Engage the theory and practices of state and peace building in Africa;
- Analyse state and peace building dynamics in countries of Africa;
- Develop the analytical skill necessary to devise and give guidance on programmatic areas of intervention in a country of their academic and practical interest;
- Appreciate the divergent narratives underpinning state and peace building in Africa;
- Evaluate and make judgement on the 'state' of state building and peace building in Africa in general and their country of interest in particular

The course is designed to bridge the academic and policy world by focusing on thematic areas that have direct and practical relevance to policies, and by using approaches suited to that end. Trainees are encouraged to approach the praxis of state and peace building in Africa through analytical lenses that will be discussed in the process of delivering the course.

Learning Objects

- Identifying key currents in the peace building and state building dynamics of Africa;
- Recognize the complex and interacting nature of the drivers of wars in Africa;
- Single out core issues that shape trajectories of state building in Africa;
- Understand the distinctive features of post-conflict peacebuilding and state-building in Africa and their determinants;
- Analyze strengths and shortcomings of post-conflict peacebuilding and state-building in Africa;

Training Methodology

The course will be delivered using a combination of active lectures, trainee presentations and scenario building exercises. The lecture will be delivered in a manner that enables trainees to develop the skill of connecting the concepts and theories with their actual experiences. They will also have a short presentation on selected topics relating to areas they want to have greater acquaintance with. In addition to these, there will be scenario drawing exercises on selected themes of state and peace building in Africa.

Course structure

Introduction

Unit One: Peacebuilding and State-building Conversations

Lesson one: Re-conceptualising Peacebuilding and state-building in Africa

Lesson two: Notion of Conversation

Unit two: Theorizing causes of conflict in Africa

Lesson Three: What African conflicts are about? a deeper look

Lesson Four: Who and when is rebellion?

Unit Three: Theorising post-conflict peacebuilding

Lesson Five: Stages of conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa

Lesson Six: Should post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa mean anything other than liberal peace?

Lesson Seven: Inclusionary politics and leadership in Africa

Lesson Eight: Economic growth and peacebuilding

Lesson Nine: Features and determinants of post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa

Lesson Ten: what explain success in addressing root causes?

Unit Four: State-building

Lesson Eleven: To what extents the manner African state are formed shaped their trajectories?

Lesson Twelve: Pre-conflict statehood and state-building trajectories in Africa

Lesson Thirteen: Post-conflict state-building and trajectories of statehood in Africa

Unit Five: Connecting peace and state-building: Some concluding reflections

Reframing Theories of Peacebuilding and State-building

Course Narrative

Introduction

The dominant narrative in extant literature constructs state-building and peacebuilding as separate but inter-related endeavours that are opportunistically linked by the incident of armed conflict, which offers the possibility to intervene in the process of state-building. In its recent incarnation the conventional way approaches the two as parallel, complementary and occasionally conflicting agenda. State-building is often understood to be achieved by means of violence and war drawing from European experience and peace building is a supposedly peaceful endeavour of strengthening structures and processes that tend to solidify peace. The possibility of war laying the conditions for peace is not assumed to be part of peacebuilding even with the realisation that contemporary peacebuilding manifests itself in multidimensional peace keeping operations where peacekeepers intervene to make peace and peace builders work in tandem to capitalize on that. Galtung (1996) in his book *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* inform us that peace has to be achieved or violence of different sorts be attenuated through an essentially peaceful means deploying the approaches of non-violent peaceful action. However, even he recommends, at times, as a virus is given in the form of vaccination to prevent diseases, it might be almost important to use violence to keep the body politic peaceful.

Whatever the case, peacebuilding is construed as acts, policies, and measures that sustain and strengthen the structure of peace, which directly leads to the notion of peace. The kind of structure to be instituted and the kind of peace they undergird is largely framed in terms of liberal democracy and free market system that results in liberal peace. Three central issues relating to this major narrative of peace building are essential to point out in light of the overall aim of this course. The first issue is the connection between peacebuilding and state-building. Second, the possibility of contradictions and trade-offs between the short

term goal of stabilisation and the long term goal of social transformation. Finally, the underpinning assumptions the liberal notions of peace are based.

The major narrative sees state-building as an essential tool of peacebuilding and hence the two are merged together. Liberal ideas of building the state are being considered as part and parcel of peacebuilding. The mainstream literature thus dominantly sees peacebuilding in terms of crafting and institutionalising architectures of peace. However, it rarely presents peacebuilding as a separate agenda from which institutions upholding it (the state) evolve except adding certain issues of consideration in the course of ending war, which includes themes such as DDR and transitional justice and reconciliation. Therefore, the dominant approach to peacebuilding overlooks the deeper issues involved in the process of institutionalisation at the core of which is the difficulty to chart a non-violent inter-elite and elite society conversation and without which institutionalisation will be shallow. It underestimates the fact that ultimately institutionalisation is centrally all about the messy political processes involved in inter-elite and inter-society conversation and that peace building entails shifting such conversations in non-violent directions.

Institutionalising liberal democratic states is assumed to lead to a path of sustainable and peaceful state without any trade-off between the short term objective of achieving negative peace and the long term goal of laying a secure foundation for peace. Relying on a generic notion of peace the prevailing approaches do not foresee trade-offs involved in values related with efficiency, effectiveness, inclusion, equality, justice, freedom and others. In fact, the dominant paradigm is based on the assumptions that structures and institutional underpinnings that entrench positive peace are not really in contradiction with efforts geared at short term stabilisation. However, there is indeed a contradiction between the short term goal of achieving peace and stability and the long term goal of instituting structural peace. Positive peace involves dismantling structures of domination, exclusion, exploitation, and marginalisation, and to be certain this phenomenon did not hang on the air; there are actors benefiting or even internalising the norms generated by these structures and hence rarely such changes come about in a peaceful way. This renders the standard definition of peacebuilding understood as achieving and sustaining peace by

means of liberal statebuilding dubious in its intention and ineffective in its action. It is by no means clear whether the goal should be achieving short term stabilisation thereby sacrificing the future for the present or promoting long term structural transformation thereby risking instability in the present, a goal peace building seeks to achieve. This also bring the notion of human agency to the foreground as the transformative agenda, if peacebuilding is assumed to refer to the later, would not be implemented by local actors if they do not have commitment to such values.

Hence, the scholarly terrain approaches peacebuilding either in terms of the limited goal of building negative peace and hence the institutions of the state would be designed and assessed with this goals in mind, or it is perceived in terms of undertaking measures that are deeply transformative, which, as noted above, could be in conflict with the short term requisite for peace and requires external actor that is able and willing to undertake such measures. Peace and state building are value laden concepts our definition of which also justifies certain courses of action and de-legitimize others. This generates dilemmas in defining the two concepts: if defined narrowly to express the short term goal of stabilisation it might preclude actions that would have been deeply transformative, and if defined to refer deeper transformation in state and society it begs the question of who will bring this in the face of grime reality prevalent in post conflict contexts. The liberal peace aims to evade this by assuming that liberal democratic systems are the surest way for short term stability and long term transformation. However, the assumptions the framework is based, namely acquiring power through elections, and exercising it in a manner that is respectful of individual rights, do not exist in many part of Africa and hence its frequent failure to bring the ideals it desires to achieve. And this necessitates alternative conception of peace and state building in Africa that does not assume consensus on the underpinning elements of liberalism.

The study from which this course was developed sought to redefine peacebuilding differently and look at its conflict prevention potentials. As such this course provides a fresh way of looking at peacebuilding and its connection with state-building taking the trajectories of African states before, during and after a conflict. To this end, it identifies certain driving issues that shape the peace and state building dynamics of African countries

based on the trajectories of five African states.

These issues or the lack thereof, as will be revealed, are at the core of these states descent into violence and hence post-conflict dynamics need to be assessed based on progress along these core issues. Peacebuilding understood this way is firmly anchored in and inextricably linked with state-building. This course particularly presents peacebuilding as the forging of consensus among elites and through time among the entire society on how power should be acquired and with what limit it should be exercised. Given the crisis liberal peace is facing and the lack of alternative perceived in some quarter, revisiting the peacebuilding and state-building terrain in Africa and exploring alternative way of approaching the issue of peace and security in Africa is imperative, and doing so is the object this course aims to achieve.

Unit One: Lesson one: Re-conceptualizing Peacebuilding and state-building in Africa

State-building and peacebuilding in Africa, first and foremost, are about creating inter-elite and societal consensus on the acceptable means of acquiring power and the limit within which it should be exercised. Since having such consensus takes time and requires conversations (a notion elaborated in the next lesson), in the initial stage, it would be sufficient for this consensus to be limited to the elites level to the extent it includes groups that progressively mobilise to be part of the consensus. This is predicated on the assumption that in the interaction between the masses and the elites, the elites seem to still be in the lead. This means that they have more influence than their followers, and hence they have the capacity to diffuse the elite consensus down to the people in their everyday life. If checking how power is to be acquired and within what limit it should be exercised cannot be decided from below, then the seemingly best way to go forward, is to forge it from above with the assumption that the two levels as neither completely separate nor necessarily contradictory. It is also not impossible, though difficult, to build consensus on this point at the elites and masses level at the same time. State-building and peacebuilding are essentially about developing, expanding and adjusting this consensus through time. The more people accept the consensus the more stable a nation could be and this consensus is not meant to remain constant. Demand will arise, pressure for change will crop up as there is power shift in society up on which a given consensus is based and hence necessitating adjustments in the consensuses. There will be those who are losing and gaining relative to others and hence power change brings change in gain and loss which requires shift in the principles of the consensus.

Consensus over how power is to be acquired may remain relatively stable for a long time as elections have been such an instrument in the Western world for such a long time, whereas the limit within which it could be exercised has evolved through time. The question to be raised, at this juncture, is whether there is any viable alternative other than elections to decide how power should be acquired our answer of which is in the affirmative. There can, for example be, collective election where the group represents the

person who will be electing their representative.

The entire village, for example, may agree to let someone on their behalf undertake the task of electing prospective administrators from the elites. Even which position requires an elected position can be determined through such an agreement. This seems an intellectual fantasy, but if one observes the operation of institution in post-conflict countries the idea is not entirely inconceivable and totally unintelligible. In many post-conflict contexts, there are parliaments but they perform little oversight functions; there are courts, but very few people get justice from such mechanisms; there is an army and police, but they are out there to protect the elites and not necessarily the masses. Given these, whether they exist or not do not make a big difference in the life of the masses. Crafting institutions of whatever sort thus requires this consensus at least by the majority of the elites and this may not necessarily result in liberal democratic institutions.

Thus we define peacebuilding as conversation between actors that could affect the courses of a nation about the terms under which they will be living together and hence the type of institutions that would mediate their relations and the relations with those excluded as well as the overall philosophy of the kind of political-economic community to be built. These conversations may not be explicitly stated but are embedded in the everyday interactions of elites. We therefore defined state-building as building institutions of governance and inculcating their legitimacy. In this approach the relation between peacebuilding and state-building is such that the deeper structures of state-building are to be found in the undertakings of peacebuilding in the sense that institutionalisation of governance practices follows from, and is hinged up on, the everyday interaction of those governed by it.

There is an argument that the state has been built through violence which is usually made in connection with the European experience. There are a number of nuances to be made about this scholarly tendency. To begin with, the violence has been externally directed and hence might have shifted the balance in the negotiation processes between actors that would chart the peace building and state-making processes. Secondly, even if we extrapolate that this logic of 'war making states' applies to internal conflicts (which our position is does not directly lead but could contribute in removing those who would have

obstruct the process) this usually does not hold with those who are vanquished. The state's institutions may be strengthened and even could avoid major violence by defeating a section of society. But can it reconcile with, and gain the legitimacy of, those vanquished both physically and in spirit? That is difficult to accept and it is that reason why conflicts re-erupt after being buried in oppressive structures for a long period of time. When propitious situation arises that could either weaken the structures of control, or increased the depth of grievances for a particular group, or widen the number of aggrieved people and/ or a favourable situation for rejecting those authorities then violence re-erupt. This is hardly a novel assertion as many give explanations for civil war in terms of factors creating grievances, opportunity to rebel, and weakening the capacity of the state. Their approach, however, leads to the unintended consequence of directing policy measures to those areas rather than to the understanding the underlying assumptions and practices generating these factors. Consequently the prevailing conceptualisation of peacebuilding and state-building in Africa fails to capture the deeper level conversations upon which state-building need to be based. This leads us to the procedural dimension of the issue related with the forging of consensus which is the focus of the next lesson.

Lesson two: Notion of Conversation

Forging consensus requires constant conversations. State-building whatever way defined is achieved through conversations of some sort, the nature of which may vary from country to country or sub-nationally within country or even with issue areas. The conversation might only be between elites or between elite and society. The elite-society conversation might also be a dictate of one over the other. Peacebuilding is all about charting a conversation (mostly peaceful one) about the constitution of society that is, that the terms its participant live together. In this regard, we have to differentiate the concern of elites and the mass; in any situation where the interest of one, mainly the elites, outweigh the other in this case the masses.

However, let us point first that the elite-mass dichotomy is extremely crude way of approaching the topic as lines of exclusion and inclusion, participation and marginalisation

often overlap and are also complex. There would be no system that completely relies on the interests of the elites at the expense of the masses. There will invariably be willing acquiescence of those who are ruled and again mostly they do not keep silent though this does not mean they engage in overt acts of violence. The elite will have those from the mass that maintain and render the structures of domination as though it is natural. The embedded culture of obedience to authority in Ethiopia, the ethnicisation of politics in many part of Africa but notably in Kenya indicates this tendency.

Conversation is essential in forging consensus on how power should be acquired and with what limit it should be exercised. Conversation represents a number of interactions and processes, and it is not restricted to structured, overt and delineated verbal dialogues, discussions or exchanges that occur between varieties of actors within society. Rather, it refers to wide-ranging interactions among groups in society – however unstructured, unseen, inexplicit and violent the conversations are – and their resulting signifiers. We see these as particular forms of conversations, which occur especially in situations where power asymmetry is rife not least between populations and those in positions of authority, who preside over them.

These conversations can be said to be about state-building when certain types of issues are at the heart of those conversations and when there is an indication that they are occurring between particular segments of society. For example, existential issues, where the physical or material survival of a group might be at stake; the functioning of state institutions and the degree to which they are responsive to the needs of the larger population; and access to channels of power and resources, among a variety of other issues. As such, when citizens create alternative systems of response to needs deemed to have been neglected by their governments or those in authority there is an important conversation to be found therein. This is notwithstanding that the absence of a satisfactory response system has not been explicitly stated or requested. These conversations might be occurring between particular groups and their government; between groups with competing demands in terms of access to state resources; and typically, elite groupings struggling for the control of machinery of government, among other things.

References

- Call, Charles T. 2008. "Building States to Build Peace? A Critical Analysis". *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*. 4 (2): 60-74.
- Cooper, Neil, Mandy Turner, and Michael Pugh. 2011. The end of history and the last liberal peacebuilder: a reply to Roland Paris. *Review of international studies* 37(4): 1995-2007
- Galtung, Johan. 1996. *Peace by peaceful means: peace and conflict, development and civilization*. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute.
- Keating, Thomas F., and W. Andy Knight. 2004. *Building sustainable peace*. Edmonton, Alta: University of Alberta Press.
- Matyók, Thomas, Jessica Senehi, and Sean Byrne. 2011. *Critical issues in peace and conflict studies: theory, practice, and pedagogy*. Lanham, Md: Lexington Books.
- Paris, Roland. 2004. *At war's end: building peace after civil conflict*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- Ramsbotham, Oliver. 2010. *Transforming violent conflict: radical disagreement, dialogue and survival*. London: Routledge.
- Richmond, Oliver P. 2010. *Palgrave advances in peacebuilding: critical developments and approaches*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Roland Paris. 2010. Saving Liberal peace building, *Review of International Studies*, 36(2): 337-365,
- Tony Karbo 2010. Peace Building in Africa. In Francis, David J. ed. *Peace and conflict in Africa*. London: Zed Books.

Unit two: Theorising causes of conflict in Africa

Lesson Three: What African conflicts are about? A deeper look

Analysing the cause of war is difficult because different people from different strata of society engage in a war for different reasons and with different aims. This poses difficulty in analysing causes of war and begs question as to the issues and areas to look at when analysing causes of war. Should it, for example, be the narratives the organization under which people of different motives coalesce? Or should it be an analysis of an objective situation a researcher thinks people are aware about, ascribe their situation to the power they are fighting against and hence want to bring change in that situation? Research goes either way as some look at narratives of grievances related to exclusion, marginalisation, and expropriation. Others look at situations connected with poverty, unemployment, lack of education, resources base or even topography. Rather than focusing on causes dissected in terms of discrete categories it might be worth looking at trajectories, processes, and evolutions and identify if there indeed are similar patterns.

The causes of conflict in Africa cannot be reduced to a single factor. Our research indicates that more or less similar sets of factors interact and combined with contingent human decision to result in the outbreak of war. However, the mechanism through which these factors work and the extent of their relevance may vary from case to case. The most salient factors are economic decline, exclusionary politics often manifested in terms of patronage politics based on ethnicity and external factors mainly those associated with neighbouring countries.

Economic decline reduces the resource available for patronage and hence a reduction of the clients commitment for the patron. Patron-client relationship, as indicated by many others, is based on the logic that the patron provides protection and/or financial backings in return of which the client is expected to owe allegiance to the patron. However, it should be noted that patron-clientism should not be viewed as a fixed category; rather it has to be seen as denoting a relationship without assuming that the identity of the actors acting as patrons and clients is fixed. Someone who is a client in one relationship could be a patron

in relation to another individual who is in lower position. Since this kind of relationship needs some selection criteria, the usual way is to recruit those assumed to be trustful and hence the resort to ethnic networks and ties. Patron-clientism may not by itself result in conflict so long as there is sufficient economic resource to have as many clients as possible. The problem, however, is when resources get dwindled during periods of economic crises. Under such circumstances, the elites at higher level enter into competition to have greater control over resources and hence maintain their clientalistic network intact. This fierce competition generates discontent within the elite and resort to violence by those who believe that they are denied what they legitimately deserve. Economic crisis, at the same time, also means that there will be frustration within the population and hence there will be as many disgruntled individuals who could easily be cannon fodders in the elite's war. Economic decline also has an effect of weakening the state and its capacity of addressing grievances. All these factors might be present and yet a conflict may not erupt and hence what we are providing here is not an iron law; it simply is a probabilistic trend in a country sliding into conflict. External factors mainly situations in neighbouring countries seems to have important effect in the onset of civil wars. A brief narration of how war has emerged in few countries is important in illustrating the extent these factors played out in a given context.

In Cote d'ivoire, Houphouet-Boigny was ruling based on a patronage system. Nevertheless, since his regime was registering positive economic growth the country was atypically stable in a region plagued by war and instability. However, following his death and in the face of declining economy, fierce elite competition sets in that is based on the instrumentalisation of ethnicity. This increased the salience of the notion of *ivoirie*, who is genuinely Ivoirian as opposed to migrants, and political exclusion began to be advocated along that line. The country began to be plagued by coup and finally rebellion erupted up in the Northern part of the country. In Sierra Leone, a different yet substantively very similar process was unfolding in the 1990s. The country has been characterised by repressive and corrupt politics. The natural resources of which the country is endowed have been used to enrich the elites and their clientilistic networks that excluded the youths and communities from which the natural resources were being extracted. In 1990, the war

in Liberia easily diffused into Sierra Leone when the then Charles Taylor supported the Revolutionary United Front to invade Sierra Leone. Again, this conflict erupted in a situation of economic crises that was fuelled by the structural adjustment programme.

The Rwandan case is also not different from the others. Since independence there have been pervasive practices of constructing and reifying ethnic identity, mainly Hutu and Tutsi identity using the media, popular culture, identity card, education and the practice of officials. This resulted in the migration of large number of Tutsi who have been discriminated against and excluded from political power. With the decline of the economy in the late 80s intense power competition ensued among the contending political actors. At the same time sections of the Tutsi refugee who were in exile fought in support of Yoweri Museveni. These forces organized their power and aggressively fought against the regime in Rwanda. In Ethiopia, the centralisation of power by both the imperial regime and the Derg that dominantly originated from one ethnic group excluded other elites. Uniquely from other African countries the Ethiopian state was forged by the elites of the country and hence the builders of modern Ethiopia imposed their culture on peoples who were conquered. This generated its own contradictions eventually resulting in the emergence of revolutionary insurgents.

Thus a more or less related set of factors underpin the conflict in Africa though the degree of influence of each factors and the mechanism they led to violence vary from cases to cases. Most of these conflicts are about the state and over what it can and should do. The factors can be categorised into elites level and mass level factors and that the two groups engage in violence for different ends. While the elite level factors can be resolved without addressing the mass level factors and the reason that push them to violence, it is almost impossible to bring negotiated peace unless and otherwise the interests of the elites are satisfied. The best that can be done is a partial peace. This explains the almost incomplete and mixed outcomes of all settlements.

Lesson Four: Who and when is rebellion?

We still do not have a complete picture of the composition of rebel recruits except the leadership of most of these organisations. If anything the available research tell us is that rebellion could be initiated by dissident students, those within the military, those in exile in neighbouring countries, and those who join them could be of various background. For example in cote d'Ivoire the rebellion was initially started by those who were members of the army whereas in Ethiopia it was lead by Marxist inspired student movements. In Sierra Leone it was the youth who were not satisfied with the governance failure that was prevalent in the previous regimes. Delving deep into rebel organisations and dissecting how they are organised with what motive and governed by what principles is important in order to understand rebellion and their consequences.

Regarding the when question, it is plainly true that rebellion is more prevalent during period of transition. One underpinning element of the cases is that outright war occurs during periods of transition. The question then is what it is about transition that leads to military solution? One hypothesis would be that the process of transition is opened when the accumulated problems seems no longer solvable through the normal course of politics. The other has it that external factors render some adjustment imperative. A theory synthesising these views would have strong explanatory power. Accordingly, the factors leading to conflict might first be seen as recognition of the need for transition and secondly one's that room is opened there is no guarantee that the new order would be smoothly established. Society might degenerate into violence as competing groups would demand more from the arrangement that would be instituted. A further question then is why some transition leads to a peaceful outcome while others do not do so and why some transitions result in protracted process of violence, negotiation and renegotiation while others do not do so? A question not far from this is why some conflicts are protracted than others? Transition are moments in which human agency is visibly manifested and as such conflict of alternative visions, claims, demands, and resource access are likely to arise during this period. Structures and institutions have a sobering effect when they are not shaken.

References

- Azarya, Victor. 2003. "Ethnicity and conflict management in post-colonial Africa". *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*. 9 (3): 1-24.
- Bayart, Jean-François. 1993. *The state in Africa: the politics of the belly*. London: Longman
- Bøås, Morten, and Kevin C. Dunn. 2007. *African guerrillas: raging against the machine*. Boulder (Colo.): Lynne Reihner Publisher
- Braathen, Einar, Morten Bøås, and Gjermund Sæther. 2000. *Ethnicity kills?: the politics of war, peace, and ethnicity in SubSaharan Africa*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Chauveau, Jean-Pierre, and Paul Richards. 2008. "West African Insurgencies in Agrarian Perspective: Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone Compared". *Journal of Agrarian Change*. 8 (4): 515-552.
- Cramer, Christopher. 1997. "*Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing*": exploring growth, distribution and conflict linkages. Department of Economics, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
- Jenkins, Sarah. 2012. "Ethnicity, violence, and the immigrant-guest metaphor in Kenya". *African Affairs : the Journal of the Royal African Society*. 111 (445): 576-596.
- Markakis, John. 1998. *Resource conflict in the Horn of Africa*. London: Sage..
- Straus, Scott. 2012. "Wars do end!: changing patterns of political violence in sub-Saharan Africa". *African Affairs : the Journal of the Royal African Society*. 111 (443): 179-201.
- Uvin, Peter. 1998. *Aiding violence: the development enterprise in Rwanda*. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.
- Whitaker, Beth Elise. 2005. "Citizens and foreigners: democratization and the politics of exclusion in Africa". *African Studies Review*. 48 (1): 109-126.

Unit Three: Theorising post conflict peacebuilding

Lesson Five: Stages of conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa

It is important to comment on the appropriateness and normative implications of the pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict labels before appropriating the post-conflict peacebuilding discourse uncritically. These labelling is based on the assumption that in the trajectories of states experiencing violent conflict, it is possible to identify phases where there was no armed conflict. This then is followed by a situation of armed confrontation and finally culminating in the settlement of the conflict leading to a post-conflict phase. The idea that high level armed conflict, as an aberrant feature of society, can be identified in its beginning and ending is neither illogical nor unachievable. However, the problem is in the assumption that pre-conflict and post-conflict phase are said to be peaceful as opposed to the conflict phase. Two observations need to be pointed out in this regard: First, this assumption is based on a particular understanding of peace, war and violence and hence it is ideologically loaded. Reducing peace to the absence of open and large scale warfare often leave out of analysis the immense and innumerable direct and indirect violence the consequence of which is comparable to the large scale armed conflict, to say the least. The case study countries indicate that there were deep rooted problems in the governance of these societies and their overall inter-elite, inter-society and elite-society relations before the outbreak of the war was deeply problematic. In Rwanda there was ethnic exclusion both in the political and economic sphere before the war; and in Cote d'Ivoire there was ethnic favouritism. While in Kenya ethnic favouritism was coupled with land expropriation and repression, in Sierra Leone there was societal exclusion mainly the youth and the community leading to war. In Ethiopia there was not only exclusion but also outright low intensity rebellion in many places before the outbreak of large scale armed conflicts. Thus it should be noted that what we call pre-conflict is no less benign than the conflict stage and state building should not be construed as returning state and society to their pre-conflict stage which most contemporary peace and state building endeavours attempt to do so in practice if not in intent. Nor does the post-conflict stage is immune from violence of various

sort and hence the pre-conflict-post conflict conundrum is better viewed as a spectrum through which the forms and intensity of violence vary.

Lesson Six: should post-conflict peace building in Africa mean anything other than liberal peace?

Examined in light of the causes of African conflict, peace building would essentially be about introducing inclusionary politics and achieving broad based economic growth and hence this session focuses on the problematique of inclusionary politics in Africa and the critique of liberal approach to inclusionary state and peace. Power in general and political power in particular is essentially about inclusion and exclusion. This would help us to reframe the notion of inclusionary politics in Africa. This issue is very important, at one level, because many of the conflicts and the state making and unmaking processes are about the terms of inclusion and inclusion. One of the major issues raised in this regard is that political parties are not programmatic, that they play divisive politics, and that they form networks of patronage that undermine the institutions of the state, weaken the state's institution, erode their legitimacy, and leads to conflict. To the extent that class and ethnic division are the primary line of division in society, it would be difficult to expect political parties to organize on any other division that would not give them political traction. Organising power along ethnic lines may not be inherently flawed to the extent that the policy arising thereof are implemented along the state's formal institutional channel, and so long as there is commitment to the rule of law. Moreover, the term of exclusion should not violate certain consensually agreed entitlements of excluded groups. Viewed this way the problem in Africa is not as much the pervasiveness of exclusion (which is also common in developed democracies) as it is the absence of consensus on the acceptable limit of power and the standards within which the state's leadership can act and cannot act. Hence, state-building in Africa needs to go beyond establishing institutions or even introducing liberal democratic frameworks.

The liberal democratic regimes of (in)(ex)clusion is based on at least two assumptions: First, election would be accepted to be the primary vehicle for determining who should rule

and who should not; and second it assumes that whoever comes to power certain basic individual rights should not be violated and they should be respected for all sections of the society. There are also a range of derivative principles such as power has to be divided along the legislative, executive and judiciary bodies and that one serves as a countervailing force on the other. However, the experience in Africa indicates that elections are not always considered to be the only acceptable way of determining who should rule. The experience of post-election violence and controversy over electoral fraud indicate that the values of this principle are yet to be internalised by many African elites and masses. The elites obviously would not attempt manipulating electoral results if their supporters are ready to accept electoral results and oppose any attempt of manipulations. This phenomenon is connected with the broader issue of the lack of differentiation between, and the fusion of, power and wealth, politics and economics. The absence of any economically distinguished class would mean that there would be little class division upon which parties would form their programme. This also means that the state elite is the only elite that is well organised and endowed with wealth, which mainly is due to its association with the state and the use of the states institution to its own enrichment and therefore losing power is perceived to be forfeiting privileges associated with holding power.

The second assumption is not also widely accepted in Africa. To begin with, the notion of the 'individual' might have different understanding in the Africa socio-cultural milieu than the standard Western tradition that view the individual as an autonomous agent and society as the sum of the individuals constituting it. Most African cultures, though difficult to generalise, are collectivist in their nature as exemplified by the Ubuntu ideal of 'I am because we are'. The gains of an individual are assumed to be the gains of the group one belong as African society is 'a community of sharing'. This culture of sharing give rise to what observers of African politics called patron-clientism signifying its less benign effects. However, this collectivist morality could also be used to widen the 'moral community of sharing' to the nation as a whole, and principles of governance driven from that could be instituted.

The aim here is not to indicate that the liberal model of governance is inherently wrong or even cannot be applied to the African context. The point rather is to show that the underpinning assumptions of liberal democratic governance are not prevalent in many of the countries for which such form of governance are promoted. The quick-fix nature of externally driven interventions and the early exit of external interveners attenuate the crystallization of such assumptions and hence relapse to 'politics of the usual'.

Lesson Seven: Inclusionary politics and leadership in Africa

These states can be made inclusionary enough to the extent that there will be no seriously disenchanted section of the society that formed a compact group of its own outside the state and challenge political order when propitious time arises. In this process, individual and/or institutional leadership at various levels is quite crucial to set society on a positive course on state and peace building. This, we can reveal, by the lines of contestation and norms of legitimation political actors deploy in the course of political competition. The tests of leadership are times that are trying, meaning that situations that dwindle the level of access to resources which includes economic crisis and electoral periods with all the uncertainties they generate. During such occurrences leaders might opt for an easy way of manipulating ethnic identities or the hard way of confronting the challenge with all the attendant consequences this might entail. To be sure, the likely consequence would not be good for them either way: if they opt to follow the former a divisive politics sets in which inevitably results in inter-group violence with the possibility of their leadership being violently overthrown; if pursued the latter they are to confront a grim reality that they have not performed up to the expectation of their constituency and even might be implicated in crimes and corruption and hence are likely to be thrown to jail. Thus the extent they set society on a positive course on state building and peacebuilding and the attendant strategy pursued in that course vary depending on variables such as leadership quality (individual and/or institutional), the extent and depth of demand for change, strategies and tactics of excluded actors, and legitimising ideology chosen, the sheer number of tasks to be undertaken after conflict.

Lesson Eight: Economic growth and peacebuilding

However crucial inclusionary politics might be, it will not be sufficient for peace in poor countries of Africa. Economic growth in general and broad based one in particular is equally important in the process of building peaceful state and society. Most of the conflicts arise during economic crisis partly because crises induced scarcity intensifies inter-elite competition, and challenges the prevailing truce among elites. The conflict during such crisis, however, may not be simply because of the lack of resources as such; the need to adjust principles of distribution and making decision over 'who gets what and when' might be as important as the competition for the dwindling resources. Whatever the case, state and peace building in Africa is also about recording positive economic growth. There often is an assertion that growth that is not equitable or broad based exacerbates conflict. Houphouet-Boigny of cote d'Ivoire ruled the country until his death peacefully though the economic growth registered under his regime, it is claimed, benefited his own ethnic bases. Broad based growth is obviously desirable in itself; however, the issue should not be approached as an either or option.

Lesson Nine: Features of post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa

This session will provide a conceptual sketch of features of post conflict peace building. These conceptual sketches are partly based on whether the drivers of the conflict are point of post-conflict discussion, and secondly the extent the factors located at different levels is addressed. The causes of conflict might be located at the mass level or at the elite level and that a given post-conflict peacebuilding may primarily target some factors at one level to the detriment of other factors located at another level. Finally, there are factors generated by the conflicts that need to be addressed and hence the extent the question of transitional justice is addressed and the issue of national reconciliation progressed can add yet another conceptual lens to describe features of post-conflict peace building. The lesson also explore factors that are responsible for the peacebuilding endeavours to have the shape they presently have in regard of which we look at the nature of the war, the way it terminates, and the level of involvement of external actors in the peace building process.

Assessed based on these classificatory schemes

one common feature of post-conflict peace building in Africa is that it selectively targeted some issues over the others the prioritization of which appears to be regardless of the peace implications of the issue. While all the countries studied as part of ALC-IDRC research made progresses in addressing issues that have been at the core of their descent into conflict, there still are a number of issues demanding consideration and the results achieved so far are by no means irreversible. There is also variation in post-conflict peace building performance among the five countries and as such the quality of peace observed has a distinct feature reflecting the social consensus it is based. In Cote d'Ivoire, post-conflict peace building was primarily concerned with power sharing and was overwhelmingly characterized by a 'fixation' on election as if it would heal all the ills the state and society was suffering. The process resolved the elite level problem for awhile notwithstanding its failure to address the mass level factors related to the economy and citizenship. Even the elite level equilibrium break down with the 2010 election when Laurent Gbagbo refused to leave power one's his opponent was declared the winner as a result of which the country descended into civil war for the second time until Gbagob's force was defeated and he was arrested. His successor took a number of measures to set the country on a positive course by improving the economy (mass level factor), promoting national unity (mass level factor), and confronting the issue of citizenship. However, the peace building project has been pursued to date without changing the pre-existing institutions and hence the process was not accompanied with institutional restructuring. In Rwanda the post-conflict peace building agenda was spearheaded by the winning Rwandan People Patriotic Front. Due to the nature of the conflict, it faced a huge challenge in tackling past abuses for which it used Gacaca courts. Sympathizers and supporters of the Hutu power—an ideology that caused the genocide—were excluded from the government whereas other political actors were given the opportunity to get representation in the transition process. There appears to be good progress in addressing the root causes especially those located at the mass level: The economy is broadly inclusive and growing, ethnic divisiveness is replaced by national unity, and there was major institutional innovation.

In Ethiopia there was major institutional innovation and the root causes of the conflict were confronted but not fundamentally addressed and thus the limited nature ethno-religious autonomy notwithstanding fairly robust economic growth. Ethno-nationalism and discrimination based on ethnicity is still rife, repression and human rights violation as rampant as ever, and politics is still exclusionary. Hence, while elite level factors remain unaddressed due to the exclusionary nature of the regime, factors located at the mass level are partly addressed. In stark contrast to the cases mentioned above, in which state-building agenda is driven by domestic actors, in Sierra Leone it is lead by external actors. A range of institutions were introduced, and election is placed as the only means to acquire power. The management of natural resource boosts the economy and benefited the community from which the resource is extracted. It seems the Sierra Leone approach seems to face both the mass level and elite level factors and show basic progress in many respect though success is by no means irreversible.

Lesson Ten: what explain success in addressing root causes?

Institutional restructuring—though by no means sufficient institutional restructuring seems to have some contribution in explaining change as those countries that venture in institutional innovation and undertook restructuring accordingly made better progress in addressing the causes of the conflict. All Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone undertook institutional innovation and all made significant progress, while in Cote d'Ivoire there has been little institutional restructuring and the peace achieved thereof is still fragile.

External involvement--- the result in this regard is inconclusive. In Cote d'Ivoire, it undermined the possibility of even arriving at a settlement. It is only a domestically engineered peace agreement that set the context for national election which however was followed by violence. In Sierra Leone it clearly helped the peace building process without which the state and society would have found it difficult to come up with a workable formula under which they live together. Ethiopia and Rwanda achieved their transition without significant external actors' involvement.

The nature of the settlement---this seems to affect the feature of the post-conflict peace building. A war ended through military victory seems to address the mass level factors but fail to avert elite level causes of conflict since one side of the contestant is destroyed and its elite sympathizer repressed. Hence, politics is likely to be exclusionary of the elites whereas at the same time the state attempts to foster closer relation with people at the grassroots level. Internally driven negotiated settlements tend to focus on and address elite level factor no matter what the length of time the agreement sticks (we have only one case). The progress made by president Alassane Quattara after militarily defeating Gbagbo and his inclusion of others as well as a good measure of progress is a sign of hope, but it is too early to judge. Externally led peacebuilding seems to target both elite level and mass level factors, but its result might be easily reversed ones the external actor leave the scene.

The nature of the war—those with long and protracted war are likely to introduce a series of new institutions as the earlier one are tattered by the conflict and their legitimacy totally eroded and this it seems helped to somehow start with a new foundations.

While these could be taken as factors that would potentially affect the outcomes of peace building efforts, making generalization requires widening the range of cases so that the extent and manner these factors mediate success and failure in addressing the drivers of African conflict would be set on firm empirical foundation.

References

- Campioni, Maddalena, and Patrick Noack. 2012. *Rwanda fast forward: social, economic, military and reconciliation prospects*. . Hounsmill: Plgrave Mcmillan.
- De Oliveira, Ricardo Soares.2011.Illiberal peacebuilding in Angola.*The journal of modern African studies* 49(2): 287-314.
- Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. 2006. *Making war and building peace United Nations peace operations*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Dupuy, Kendra, and Helga Malmin Binningsbø..2008. *Power-Sharing and Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone*. PRIO

Macdonald, Anne. 2013. *Local Understandings and Experiences of Transitional Justice: A review of the evidence.*

McCandless, Erin, and Tony Karbo. 2011. *Peace, conflict, and development in Africa a reader.* Addis Ababa: University for Peace, Africa Programme

Paris, Roland. 2004. *At war's end: building peace after civil conflict.* Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Sesay, Amadu. 2009. *Post-war regimes and state reconstruction in Liberia and Sierra Leone.* Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.

Tony Karbo 2010. *Peace Building in Africa.* In Francis, David J. ed. *Peace and conflict in Africa.* London: Zed Books.

Udson, Heidi. 2009. "Peacebuilding Through a Gender Lens and the Challenges of Implementation in Rwanda and Côte d'Ivoire". *Security Studies.* 18 (2): 287-318.

Unit Four: State-building

Lesson Eleven: To what extents the manner African state are formed shaped their trajectories?

The effect of the manner in which African states are formed on their subsequent trajectories is much dubious than it is frequently claimed. A fairly tale, which it should be noted is right, contends that African states are artificial creation in the sense that their international boundaries are imposed upon them by artificially dividing communities of similar identities on different side of states` border. However, the process of bordering is a dynamic process and thus it is a project than an accomplished occurrence and any border no matter how natural it seems always divide people who rather identify themselves to be similar. Thus the weight ascribed to the artificiality of African borders may not be as high as many claim. The other point that aims to explain the nature and, we can add, the trajectories of African states is in terms of their colonial origin and the institutional structure inherited from colonialism. This is arguably significantly shaping the trajectories of these states for a long time to come. Colonial institutions were designed with the object of facilitating exploitation and resource expropriation. During independence these institutions were inherited by the indigenou elites without any re-structuring and hence the African states remained essentially machines of self-enrichment, resource expropriation and exploitation. Our case studies all mention the significance of colonialism and colonial inheritance in shaping subsequent trajectories, be it the bequeathing of ethnic dominance in Sierra Leone, freezing the Hutu-Tutsi hierarchical divide, or the inheritance of France's power concentrating institutional structures in Cote d'Ivoire. Similarly Ethiopia's state-building trajectories is indicated to be uniquely affected by its peculiar past of having a long history and keeping colonialism at bay. Seen in this light the manner of formation of African states seems to have significant effect on the subsequent trajectories of state building.

However, such assertions need a few qualifications. To begin with many of these post-colonial states introduced, albeit briefly, multiparty politics in their early independence

history; it is only later that African democracy was shattered by coups and communist inspired revolutionary movements. Moreover, the global development seems to have more influence than the manner of formation of African states in shaping their trajectories of statehood. The 1970s oil crises, the accumulated debt burden which was borrowed with cheap interest rate to be paid later with high interest rate and their inability to do so, the subsequent economic crises and the structural adjustment measures introduced to ameliorate this, and the international sovereignty regime have all influenced the state building trajectories of these states higher than their colonial origin. The case study countries experienced their civil war during this period of economic decline which in the end led to the introduction of some form of institutional innovation and a change of governance practice. Nevertheless, the exclusionary nature of these states, their elite's vulnerability to ethnic manipulation, and governance through informal networks rather than using the channels of the state's institution was in existent long before the outbreak of violence and it can be said these practice are to some extent carry over of colonialism. African states certainly inherited oppressive institutions and normative structure they based upon.

Most important of all, we have to see the effect of colonial inheritance in terms of its influence over our theoretical assumption of the need to forge consensus on 'how power should be acquired and with what limit it should be exercised'. In this matter colonialism sets little precedent that would help these states start their state building projects on a positive course. In some African states, independence was achieved by liberation forces that were able to acquire power through blood and iron and the limit of that exercise would be determined by the limit over the iron and blood independent fronts command. And thus the possibility of consensus over these central issues was foreclosed at the outset. This certainly was true for Angola wherein the war of independence was followed by two decades of fighting between the major contending parties. In other states where electoral politics was introduced, the consensus did not get much traction and hence most returned to authoritarianism within a decade. Thus the state-building trajectories of African states was distinctively characterised by a lack of consensus on the acceptable means of acquiring power and the limit within which it should be exercised. Since, the

state's institutions are not based on these underpinning consensus. Political leaders flagrantly violate them, act outside the framework set by them, and at times subvert them for their own political ends. In Rwanda the state was used to entrench and normalise or even persecute ethnic groups; in Sierra Leone these institutions were used to enrich the elites and undertake atrocious crimes; in Kenya they have been used to repress dissenters and expropriate the helpless. In Ethiopia they were at the disposal of the rulers to entrench extreme forms of centralization, exclusion and ethnic marginalisation.

Lesson Twelve: Pre-conflict statehood and state building trajectories in Africa

The pre-conflict African states, as seen in the previous lesson, were therefore deeply problematic even before the outbreak of the war. In fact the war is just one episode of the countless lower level violent processes the society in these countries had been afflicted with. These states were characterised by exclusionary politics usually along ethnic lines and power was not always channelled through the state's institutions, which rather was centralised by a coterie of elites who rely on informal networks. Because of these, political leaders gradually lost sympathy from both their population and the international community and the state became a prize to win for some whereas it is a predator to be avoided for others. The management of the economy, by such kind of state, to state the obvious was mediated by their exclusionary political praxis and hence the states were bound to fracture sooner or later and when it did so it was to be in devastating ways.

Lesson Thirteen: Post-conflict state building and trajectories of statehood in Africa

The conflict African states faced added a number of other challenges that shaped the nature of the post-conflict state. The manner in which issues arising from the conflict are dealt with shapes the nature of the post conflict states in many respects. Almost all states undertook measures of transitional justice with varying degrees of effectiveness and legitimacy. While in some cases it is hailed to be necessary though still short of its potential, in others it gave rise to notions of victor's justice thereby setting ground for another round of discontent.

The post-conflict states display divergent features

in the manner of their governance and the outcomes of governance practices. While all in principle have constitutions that accept basic rights of citizens, in actuality, some of the countries paid lip services to these basic rights; neither the population seems to be ready to value these rights for their own sake. Countries that ended the war through military victory tend to have strong state institutions, strong in their capacity for mobilisation, resource extraction and provision of services. But they tend to be weak in their ability to garner legitimacy by accommodating contending elites. There also seems to be a close connection between and at times the fusion of party and state in those countries that pursued their peacebuilding and state-building agenda after military victory. This is because the winning party dominates the government of the post-conflict state, and its desire to maintain that hegemony by enfeebling political opponents. A related point is that since they came to power through military victory of the elites, in such a state the elites feel that they are entitled to rule as long as they do it without being encumbered by democratic norms. The polarisation of the society and the elites during the war, and the consequent destruction of one side also mean that these elites face little resistance in their drive for political hegemony.

Finally, there still are problems on forging consensus regarding how power should be acquired and with what limit it should be exercised in many of the African states. Informants from Cote d'Ivoire, for instance, indicated to the research team focusing on the country that there is too much focus on elections. They think that though elections are important they would not solve fundamental issues of the country. In Sierra Leone, there is the view that politics is going along party lines and hence state institutions are being sidelined in the process. On the other hand, in Rwanda there seems to be higher trust in the government than opposition parties. This, however, does not necessarily mean the existence of consensus over the principles stated above.

References

- Barbara, Julien. 2008. "Rethinking neo-liberal state building: building post-conflict development states". *Development in Practice*. 18 (3): 307-318.
- Campioni, Maddalena, and Patrick Noack. 2012. *Rwanda fast forward: social, economic, military and reconciliation prospects*. . Hounsmill: Plgrave Mcmillan.
- Clapham, Christopher S. 1996. *Africa and the international system: the politics of state survival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hesselbein, Gabi, F. Golooba-Mutebi, and James Putzel. 2006. *Economic and political foundations of state making in Africa: understanding state reconstruction*. London: Crisis States Research Centre
- Joseph, Richard A. 1999. *State, conflict, and democracy in Africa*. Boulder, Colo: Lynner. Rienner.
- Migdal, Joel S. 1988. *Strong societies and weak states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Ottaway, Marina. 1999. *Africa's new leaders: democracy or state reconstruction?* Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Pita Agbese and George Kieh Ed. 2007. *Reconstructing African states*. Palgrave: New York.
- Sesay, Amadu. 2009. *Post-war regimes and state reconstruction in Liberia and Sierra Leone*. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.
- Wai, Zubairu. 2012. "Neo-patrimonialism and the discourse of state failure in Africa". *Review of African Political Economy*. 39 (131): 27-43.

Unit Five: Connecting peace and state building: Some concluding reflections

In section one, we posited the relation between peacebuilding and state-building and we problematize the conventional way of approaching the subject. These two concepts are presented at times complementary, contradictory and overlapping. This in part is connected with pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict division of the trajectories of states that faced major war. Peacebuilding defined as an essentially post-conflict phenomenon would be different from that defined to include activities at the pre-conflict stages of a conflict. In a pre-conflict stage peace building endeavours do not have to grapple with the issue of transitional justice and societal reconciliation, elements that are at the core of post-conflict peacebuilding. We indicated that the definitions of peacebuilding proffered in the scholarly terrain are more applicable and are actually drawn based on experience of post-conflict countries. We have also provided that peacebuilding in Africa is essentially about channelling conversations to forge consensus over how power is to be acquired and with what limit it should be exercised. Statebuilding entails strengthening the institutions of the state and developing their legitimacy. While building consensus on the acquisition and exercise of power may not necessarily guarantee peace and stability in and of itself, it will result in state institutions that are not flagrantly and unabashedly exclusionary and institutions that are able and willing to bring economic improvement for the masses of its people. We believe our definition applies for the pre and post conflict spectrum and reorient the criteria used to evaluate successes and failures in peace and state building that is not based on the extent they resemble liberal democratic societies.

Understood this way peace building is anchored in, and inextricably connected with, state building, the two having a synergetic interactions. While inter-elite, elite-society and inter-society consensus on the basic issues of the acquisition and manner of exercise of power to a significant extent shapes the nature and trajectories of statehood, the states institution in turn influence the subsequent dynamics of consensual politics. Thus, building consensus is not an end in itself; the aim rather is that institutions and governance practices that are based on these consensuses tend to address issues that are at the core of the state building trajectories of many of African countries as the lack of consensus is behind the ailments of

many of these states. This session concludes requesting trainees' reflections on the challenges and prospects of building consensus over how power should be acquired and with what limit it should be exercised. Trainees will also be required to brainstorm the kind of state institutions and governance practices that will emerge based on these consensuses. A further point of reflection will be the extent external actors and factors obstruct the development of such consensuses.