Gender and Violence in Urban Pakistan

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ABSTRACT

This report is the final output of the Safe and Inclusive Cities Programme (SAIC) project entitled ‘Gender and Violence in Urban Pakistan’. The project has focused on the material and discursive drivers of gender roles and their relevance to configuring violent geographies specifically among 12 urban working class neighborhoods of Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad. This project has investigated how frustrated gendered expectations may be complicit in driving different types of violence and how they may be tackled by addressing first, the material aspects of gender roles through improved access to public services and opportunities, and second, discursive aspects of gender roles in terms of public education and media. This report’s findings are based upon approximately two thousand four hundred questionnaire surveys, close to sixty ethnographic style interviews, participant observations, participatory photographic surveys, media monitoring, secondary literature review and some key informant interviews. The findings overwhelmingly point towards access to services and vulnerability profiles of households as major drivers of violence, as they intersect with discourses surrounding masculinities, femininities and sexualities. The core discussions and analysis in this final report are anchored in the following four themes: vulnerabilities, mobilities, access to services, and violence. This was a multi-method research project and each of the methods was chosen to address specific types of data relevant to the specific research questions.

KEYWORDS: Infrastructure, Vulnerability, Cities, Violence, Gender, Karachi, Rawalpindi-Islamabad, South Asia.
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BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION TO PROJECT

This report is the final output of the Safe and Inclusive Cities Programme (SAIC) project entitled ‘Gender and Violence in Urban Pakistan’. The project has focused on the material and discursive drivers of gender roles and their relevance to configuring violent geographies specifically among 12 urban working class neighborhoods of Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad. This project has investigated how frustrated gendered expectations may be complicit in driving different types of violence and how they may be tackled by addressing first, the material aspects of gender roles through improved access to public services and opportunities, and second, discursive aspects of gender roles in terms of public education and media. This report's findings are based upon approximately two thousand four hundred questionnaire surveys, close to sixty ethnographic style interviews, participant observations, participatory photographic surveys, media monitoring, secondary literature review and some key informant interviews. The findings overwhelmingly point towards access to services and vulnerability profiles of households as major drivers of violence, as they intersect with discourses surrounding masculinities, femininities and sexualities.

To address the admittedly ambitious broad concerns of the research the following key question was posed:

*How are discursive and material constructions of gender linked to urban violence in Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad?*

To probe further into the above research question the following sub-questions were posed:

- What kinds of violence have been experienced by the inhabitants of specified localities? How often? And by whom?
- How is violence defined and experienced by these inhabitants?
- How is private and public violence linked within these localities?

In terms of material drivers of violence, the attention has been on access to services (transport, WASH) for fulfilling some key gendered responsibilities such as care giving and livelihoods. But it is also understood that access to such services is often mediated by the quality of social capital in a community. Furthermore, the research has been particularly cognizant of the issue of social
vulnerability to environmental and social hazards and we elaborate upon the definition of vulnerability in a subsequent section of this chapter. In Pakistan, generally, people living in rural and small towns are considered the most vulnerable in terms of absolute poverty and access to infrastructure; however, a large urban center like Karachi brings with it its own particular dynamic of vulnerability. Unstable governance structures and political violence are both a cause and effect of differential and contested access to land and infrastructure in the city. While, as Pakistan's largest urban conglomeration, Karachi is a wealthy city, there are vast disparities in income and distribution of resources. The ‘unplanned’ areas as exemplified by some of the neighborhoods where we worked constitute more than 60% of the city and house the most vulnerable populations with precarious incomes and serious infrastructural issues. However, it is important to point out that vulnerability is not uniformly distributed in the unplanned areas. The so-called ‘informal’ economy has also generated a certain amount of wealth that has been invested in both privately and in the public domain. Despite such efforts, disparities of income and in terms of access to infrastructure within the unplanned areas remain.

It is estimated that Pakistan has the highest rate of urbanization in South Asia, with a projected population of 335 million by 2050, and an annual urbanization rate of 3.06%. In 2005, more than half of the total urban population of the country lived in eight urban agglomerations: Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Multan, Hyderabad, Gujranwala, and Peshawar (Figure 1.1).

**Figure 1.1: PERCENTAGE OF PAKISTAN’S URBAN POPULATION RESIDING IN EIGHT URBAN AGGLOMERATIONS WITH 750,000 OR MORE INHABITANTS, 1950-2015**

![Graph showing percentage of Pakistan's urban population residing in eight urban agglomerations with 750,000 or more inhabitants, 1950-2015.](image)

*Source: (Hasan, 2010)*
In Pakistan the proportion of urban population living in unplanned settlements or kachi abadis varies between 35%-60% and these settlements are growing fast. In Karachi, abadis increased from 212 in 1958 to more than 500 presently, and in Lahore there are more than 300 unplanned settlements (Arif & Hamid, 2009). Mustafa (2005b) finds that it is the lowest-earners and ethnic and religious minorities who live within informal neighborhoods and most settlements in Rawalpindi-Islamabad (see also Beal, 2006), many of which are located along the banks of the Lai River. Owing to the location and the informal nature of the housing, these households are very vulnerable to environmental hazards and we elaborate on this further in the analysis of our findings as presented in the ensuing chapters. The flood hazard is quite pressing, particularly in the Lai flood plain where there have been 19 major floods between 1944 and 2002, with extreme floods in 1981, 1988, 1997 and 2001 (Kamal, 2004). In 2001, 74 people died and about 400,000 people were affected; 1,087 houses were completely damaged while 2,448 were partially damaged, generating an acute refugee problem in the poorer communities of the twin cities.

Pakistan’s rapid urbanization poses major challenges in three key areas, which are interconnected: urban governance, urban poverty and urban services delivery. Even as there is economic growth in Pakistan’s cities, income distribution is highly unequal, due to an imbalanced distribution of economic opportunity and ownership of land and property. The financial assets along with an uneven access to social services like education, health, water and sanitation, economic opportunities and a failure to generate revenue for social and physical infrastructure further fuel this disparity. What is becoming clear, however, is that urbanization does play a key role in the relationship between the citizen and state in Pakistan (Anwar, 2014; Hasan & Raza, 2009; Mustafa & Sawas, 2013; Arif & Hamid, 2009). Urbanization does compound the resource-gap, service delivery, quality of life issues including crime and violence, as well as struggles for political and social power. Alternatively, it also opens up opportunities for new social and political structures to be forged, which may include (or exclude) those migrants from rural areas who previously were at the margins of the spaces where the social contract between the state and society is negotiated. Politics, whether informal or formal thus becomes an essential tenet of issues of urbanization in Pakistan (Anwar, 2014 Mustafa & Sawas, 2013).

In Karachi and in Rawalpindi-Islamabad, the impact of urbanization on services has been severe, as we show in this report. The development of infrastructure has not kept pace with urbanization and these cities have accumulated huge deficits across public services including health, WASH, utilities and transport, which adversely affect quality of life (Government Of Pakistan (GOP), 2011; N. Ahmed, 2008; Haider & Badami, 2010). For example, in 1995, GOP statistics showed that the number of people killed in traffic in the Rawalpindi-Islamabad was ten times higher than of cities in developed countries. Private car ownership is constantly increasing and public transport services, especially in Karachi, have deteriorated rapidly and to the detriment of the poor, especially women as discussed in Chapter 5. While water supply coverage has improved in recent years across Pakistan’s urban centers, sewerage has not. Furthermore, the quality of services is poor, as evidenced by intermittent water supply in cities like Karachi and limited wastewater treatment (Table 1-1).
Resultantly, residents in informal settlements have been forced to adopt a range of alternatives from constructing in-house underground storage tankers to cooperative arrangements such as awami tanks that store and distribute water to the community (N. Ahmed, 2008). Residents are also forced to purchase water directly from privately operated lorry tankers that may or may not be licensed by water utilities. The story of Karachi’s water supply is particularly salient, not only in terms of limited water supply when compared to other cities, but also in terms of a violent political economy that undergirds supply. High ‘leakage’ or ‘transmission losses’ and ‘illegal connections’ are unique characteristics that set the city’s water supply system apart from other urban centers in Pakistan. We take up this issue in Chapter 6 in terms of the linkages between WASH, vulnerability and violence.

Moreover, a chief challenge in Karachi concerns the state’s lack of information on the quality and supply of existing infrastructure as well weak coordination between union councils and the Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC). With continuous urban expansion and the rise of new settlements in the city’s periphery, a significant disconnect exists between the government’s knowledge about existing water supply and sanitation infrastructures and the mounting demands for such infrastructure in new settlements. This is further exacerbated by the continuing centralization of governance, where under the Sindh Local Government Act 2013, the power to make decisions over transport, water and garbage collection remains in the hands of the provincial government.

### 1.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In this section, we provide a brief summary of how we have conceptualized the crossroads of vulnerability and gendered violence as it frames the urban context in which the project has unfolded. For the purposes of this project violence is deemed to be use of physical force, in establishing social and political norms. This definition of violence allows us to move our gaze away from spectacular violence to the much more persistent and insidious forms of everyday violence. While terrorist activity, extra judicial killings by law enforcement agencies and ethnic violence in Karachi has received much journalistic and some academic attention (Verkaaik, 2004; Gayer, 2014; Chaudhry, 2004; Ring, 2007), everyday violence has not received similar sustained analysis. We feel that it is particularly useful to distinguish between terrorism and violence to allow us to understand the long-term relationship with infrastructure. Terrorism is defined primarily as spectacular violence directed towards place destruction or place alienation (Mustafa, 2005a). Violence on the other hand, includes a broader range of activities as well as ends. Although many different forms or types of violence

<table>
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<th>KARACHI</th>
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have been identified by scholars including structural violence (Galtung, 1969; Farmer et al., 2004; Scheper-Hughes, 1993), symbolic violence (Bourdieu & Waqant, 2001), epistemic violence (Taussig, 1984) and discursive violence (MacKinnon, 1993), there is no general theory of violence. Similarly there is considerable debate about whether violence is the privilege of power or in fact, a manifestation of insecurities about power.

Using Weber’s definition of the state as the entity with control over legitimate use of violence, most political scientists and theorists have treated violence as an expression of power. Extending this line of reasoning, post-structuralists have argued that the nexus of power and knowledge, residing particularly in the state, creates multiple sites of violence both physical and cognitive. In contrast, Hannah Arendt, among others has argued that violence is directly related to a loss of or decrease in political power. This debate about the relationship between power and violence remains open and violence remains under-conceptualized despite, or perhaps because of, the wide-ranging uses the term is employed for. Furthermore, we draw a further distinction between violence as a product and as a process. Most often violence is treated as a product. Much academic research has looked for the causes of violence from the psychological to the political. However, recent research has emphasized the value of conceptualizing violence as a process, one that is generative of social and political norms. We find that understanding violence as a process allows greater analytical flexibility in understanding the phenomenon of everyday violence, where it becomes necessary to constitute and sustain new social and political norms.

Moreover, we also consider violence as a tactic of power involving physical coercion or threat thereof, which is more an outcome of a loss of compensatory power or power/knowledge than a conduit for accumulating social power to the perpetrator (Arendt, 1969; 2013). Arendt claims that domination starts before politics in the home, and thus in the culture and social institutions of society. The subjugated and dominated are active agents who perform their roles, “acting in concert” in a power relationship. Violence occurs, not as a tool of power, but as a manifestation of the loss of it. Peaceful existence of society then occurs when actors work in accordance with their perceived roles, thus power is held by consent and is driven by discourse. Everyday experiences of domination can use ‘force’; but this is distinct in Arendt’s conception from violence. Domestic violence, in Pakistan, proves a relevant example. According to various research studies, discourses of masculinity include control over the movements and choices of women. Women often accept this control. When a woman digresses from this control, their male counterparts often become violent towards them and too often these women perceive that they deserved to experience this violence for diverging from their role and causing the male frustrations. This highlights a way in which we have endeavored to understand manifestations of violence, which occur in the private sphere and parts of the public sphere in Pakistan.

Consequentially, for the purposes of this project, much of the analysis is driven by the undercurrent of understanding violence as evidence of a loss of power rather than an actual source of power. With the above understanding of violence within the frameworks of power, we proceed to further unpack the tactics of violence and the causal relations that perpetuate those tactics. Simply put, violence is understood as a threat or actuality of a physical act that directs or constrains the choices of its victims individually or collectively. This definition of violence is committed to understanding the phenomena as a strictly material physical act or the threat of a physical act. Keeping this in mind, we argue that what is particularly striking in both cities is the fear of violence in everyday life, which
destroys places and human lives. What is increasingly evident is how poor infrastructure and enhanced vulnerability to environmental hazards intersects with high levels of violence to define the daily lives of the urban poor, especially women. Here our interest is not just to expose how infrastructure and poor basic services can enhance vulnerabilities (which often lead to violent outcomes e.g. fatalities from poor health), but also how the infrastructure/service environment shapes the way people interact with each other, sometimes resulting in violence. This vulnerability-violence nexus has been of critical importance to our investigation.

Lastly, akin to violence, the conceptualization and definition of vulnerability has generated considerable debate in the academic community. While physical scientists and engineers have typically equated it with physical exposure to extreme events and adverse outcomes, social scientists have emphasized the role of social structures and differential access to resources in making certain groups more disadvantaged in the face of disasters (Adger, 2006). Suffice it to say here, that we understand vulnerability to be more of a chronic state of being rather than an outcome of environmental extremes. We therefore define vulnerability as susceptibility to suffer damage from an environmental extreme and relative inability to recover from that damage (as per McCarthy, 2001; Mustafa, 1998). Both the susceptibility and then the ability to recover are understood to be a function of a person and group’s social positionality by virtue of ethnicity, gender, age, class and the wider political economy, hence, a key feature of the findings presented and analyzed in the ensuing chapters is how social vulnerability intersects with access to services and exposure to environmental hazards. We have used the quantitative VCI by Mustafa, Ahmed, Saroch, & Bell, (2011) to undertake a quantitative assessment of household level vulnerability in the urban field study sites. Social vulnerability profiles have been linked with the incidence of violence in the given neighborhoods. The findings also focus on the gendered social vulnerability profile at the household and community level, as well as the key drivers of vulnerability.
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF FINAL REPORT

The core discussions and analysis in this final report are anchored in the following four themes: vulnerabilities, mobilities, access to services, and violence. Beginning with Chapter 2, we provide the main data collections methods, sources and tools. This was a multi-method research project and each of the methods was chosen to address specific types of data relevant to the specific research questions.

In Chapter 3, we discuss Pakistan’s urban environment policy and provide an overview of the policy institutions and relevant governance and legislation at the national, provincial and ultimately local scales. This chapter also discusses urban governance of infrastructure services such as water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH).

Chapter 4 presents a detailed discussion on how vulnerability is produced and in turn reproduces conditions that perpetuate violence and/or spawn violent spaces and places. This chapter also discusses the rationale for using the VCI, validating the results by neighborhood and household, and how it links with quantitatively and qualitatively assessed patterns of violence recorded through the research. A key question is what might be the material pathways through which, higher vulnerability scores and profiles translate into violent geographies.

In Chapter 5, we build on the qualitative and quantitative empirical findings to set out the context and synthesized discussion of mobility through the lens of gender in Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad. Specifically, this chapter analyses gender as a mediator of mobility (physical and non-physical), an issue that has received limited policy attention in terms of linkages with violence and vulnerability in urban Pakistan.

Chapter 6 takes up the issue of how access to basic services, such as health, electricity, gas, water supply and sanitation might be linked to violent outcomes in public and private spaces and on the public-private continuum. Access to good quality basic services affects almost all segments of Pakistan’s populations, and in this chapter we discuss how the results relate to a core subset of vulnerability: access to services.

In Chapter 7, we present an analysis of the linkages between violence, and the discursive and material constructions of gender in Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad. We unpack the categories ‘public’ and ‘private’ to problematize the experiences and tactics of violence and the causal relations that perpetuate those tactics, and how these are embedded in gender dynamics that straddle the public-private continuum.

Finally in Chapter 8, we provide the conclusion and policy recommendations.
In this chapter we will outline the main data collections methods, sources and tools. This was a multi-method research project and each of the methods was chosen to address specific types of data relevant to the specific research questions. Following the discussion of the methodology we will have a section on distilling the key points about the geographical context of Karachi, Rawalpindi and Islamabad. We will conclude the chapter by outlining some of the prior work on gender and urban violence in Pakistan in general and the study urban areas in particular.

2.1 SITE SELECTION

KARACHI
In Karachi, our research is focused on three municipalities: Orangi Town, Bin Qasim Town and Jamshed Town located in Districts West, Malir and South, Figure 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 respectively. A total of 7 neighborhoods were investigated as field sites across these towns. Within each municipality, we cover different neighborhoods situated in specific union councils (UC). For instance, in Orangi Town our survey is focused on an assortment of low-income neighborhoods in three UCs: Chisti Nagar, Bilal Colony and Ghaziabad. In Jamshed Town, our survey is focused on neighborhoods that straddle the two UCs of Central Jacob Lines and Jut Lines. We collectively categorize these neighborhoods in Jamshed Town as the ‘Lines Area’.

In selecting these municipalities, which contain different kinds of neighborhoods built in the pre- and post-Partition eras, our objective was to cover the city in terms of its ongoing territorial expansion due to urban sprawl, land grabbing and political-administrative readjustments. The focus on different municipalities, neighborhoods and communities would also enable us to produce a more nuanced understanding of vulnerability in Karachi, especially where neighborhoods and communities are more vulnerable than others and why. This is all the more pertinent in the context of our plan to quantitatively capture key material, institutional and attitudinal drivers of vulnerability. Starting with Orangi Town, which lies in the northwest and borders Karachi’s rapidly urbanizing periphery of Gadap Town, we trace the trajectory of our surveys into Jamshed Town in the central part of the city and finally to Bin Qasim Town which is located in the southwest edges of the city along the Arabian Sea. All three municipalities comprise a mixture of low to middle income neighborhoods that experience moderate to severe infrastructure shortages and have histories of violence ranging from political to ethnic to sectarian and state-driven.
With 13 unions councils and a population of 730,000, Jamshed town (Figure 2.1) contains some of Karachi’s oldest neighborhoods such as Jacob Lines and Soldier Bazaar. This municipality now constitutes predominantly an Urdu-speaking or Muhajir population many of whom are Partition migrants. Hence, the well-established, lower-middle to middle income neighborhoods we have investigated in this town are juxtaposed with the newer, ‘unplanned’ settlements located on the far-flung territories of Orangi Town and Bin Qasim Town.
With 7 union councils, Bin Qasim town’s population is estimated at 315,000 and it is a heterogeneous mixture of Muhajir, Bengali, Burmese, Baloch and Sindhi ethnicities. Here we focus on a 60,000 strong Bengali-Burmese, low-income neighborhood known as Ali Akbar Shah Goth located in the UC Ibrahim Hyderi (see Figure 2.2). The huge wetland located behind this neighborhood and in close proximity to Korangi Creek serves as a massive garbage-dumping yard for the residents. The regionally powerful political party – the MQM – is the main political stakeholder in this neighborhood, especially in the recently established sub-division popularly known as New Abadi, where tenure rights remain insecure and infrastructure services are nominal. The ‘illegal’ Burmese-Rohingya and Bengali migrants live in a perpetual state of limbo in terms of not being able to secure CNIC or computerized national identity cards that are necessary for finding formal employment. Residents work predominantly as fishermen, craft persons, laborers and street hawkers. A few are factory workers. Women especially are associated with carpet weaving, piece-work, tailoring, netting, and other craftwork.
Ethnically diverse with an estimated population of 2.5 million and by far the largest settlement in our survey is Orangi Town (Figure 2.3). A neighborhood we investigated in Orangi Town is Christian Colony that comprises one of the largest concentrations of lower-income, Christian migrants from Punjab. There have been some serious incidents of religious violence between Christian residents and Sunni Tehrik (political party) supporters concerning blasphemy. Residents have also reported everyday conflicts such as disputes over garbage disposal in front of each other’s homes and even over the call to prayer (azaan). Even though such issues have been eventually resolved, the tension is still palpable. Redress has been sought via the MQM sector-in-charge’s interventions. In Orangi Town, tenure rights are highly variable with certain neighborhoods such as the more established Raes Amrohi, Ghaziabad and Christian Colony having been regularized in the 1980s, and others, such as Mansoor Nagar and Gulshan e Bihar still classified as ‘informal’ settlements with no tenure and overall dismal infrastructure services. Gulshan e Bihar also forms part of an emergent ‘peri-urban’ zone at the northwestern edges of Karachi and in this sense, exemplifies the city’s ongoing territorial adjustments. Raes Amrohi borders Baldia Town, which comprises primarily a Pakhtun population. A few years ago, extensive violence broke out between the predominantly Urdu-speaking and Punjabi residents in Raes Amrohi and the Pakhtuns from the neighboring Baldia Town. According to our respondents, many women were victims of violence and rape and residents fear this incident will repeat itself. Interestingly, redress was sought at the level of political parties such as the MQM and the Awami National Party (ANP).
Neighborhoods like Ghaziabad and Christian Colony have strong networks that range from church groups to NGOs. Ghaziabad has been the focus of infrastructure upgrading programs and community activism led by the renowned NGO, Orangi Pilot Project-Research and Training Institute (OPP-RTI). Political parties such as the MQM and Sunni Tehreek are also powerful actors in the neighborhoods investigated in Orangi Town. Residents are associated with different technical and non-technical professions and are also laborers, loom operators, craft persons, shopkeepers, home-based embroidery workers, tailors, janitors, nurses and various specialized factory technicians. Notably, for these residents physical mobility is a serious issue due to weak transport links with the city center, where most jobs and education opportunities are found.
RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD

A total of five field study sites were investigated for detailed research through the twin cities of Rawalpindi-Islamabad. The field study sites include, France Colony, Afghan Abadi, Dokh Naju, Arya Mohalla and Dokh Saidan, Figure 2.4-8 respectively.

FRANCE COLONY

Figure 2.4: FRANCE COLONY, RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD

France Colony (Figure 2.4) is an informal and technically illegal settlement in the middle of one of the most expensive and upscale neighborhoods in Islamabad. It is populated almost entirely by sanitation services workers, and laborers in the informal sector, belonging to the minority Christian community. It derives its name from the fact of being next to the former site of the French embassy to Pakistan. The neighborhood is almost entirely on the steep slopes along the banks of Saidpur Kas, a tributary of the Lai River that flows through Rawalpindi and Islamabad. The area is highly exposed to flooding, but has a strong network of church groups as well as civil society based actors, by virtue of its proximity to the virtual epicenter of the NGO community in Pakistan. The point of selecting this site was to incorporate a lower-income religious minority neighborhood, which is researchable.
Afghan Abadi (Figure 2.5) is another informal or unplanned settlement at Islamabad’s boundary with neighboring Rawalpindi. The neighborhood was originally populated by Afghans but relatively recently there has also been a sizeable influx of internally displaced people from Pakistan’s tribal areas. The internally displaced people are of Pashtun ethnicity fleeing the ongoing war between Pakistani military and the Taliban in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This locality was selected because of its high concentration of Afghan refugee population, which exists in a legal limbo between legal and illegal immigrants, and the internally displaced people who have come to have a sizeable presence in many urban areas of Pakistan. The neighborhood was however, demolished by the state authorities in August 2015, much after the completion of the fieldwork. The demolition process was quite violent involving multiple security agencies. The argument advanced was that the neighborhood harbored illegal Afghan immigrants that posed a security threat and that it was illegal.
Further in the city, is the relatively older neighborhood of Dokh Naju (Figure 2.6). The neighborhood is again in the flood plain of the Lai and is mostly populated by working to lower middle class residents. The economic profile of the residents however, improves to middle class as one moves further away from the Lai. The neighborhood was formerly a village outside of Rawalpindi, which essentially was absorbed into the city as it expanded through the 1960s. The neighborhood has a more established urban profile unlike the informal/unplanned character of France Colony and Afghan Abadi.
Arya Mohalla (Figure 2.7), located in the heart of Rawalpindi City, is one of the original neighborhoods of Rawalpindi. It is characteristic of a mixed neighborhood in terms of the economic profile of its residents. Within the same street one could find residents ranging from working to lower middle, to financially quite affluent residents. Being an old settled neighborhood with some of the residents having lived there for generations, it offers contrasts to the newer and more peripheral areas in the survey sample.
Finally, Dokh Saidan (Figure 2.9) is a peri-urban neighborhood at the southern margins of Rawalpindi. It is an area built around a former village, where the urban sprawl along the road relatively quickly gives way to agricultural fields. Some of the urban development is thanks to land grabbing by real estate mafia, but much of it is also legitimate buys by real estate speculators from the rural agricultural owners. The area is in a state of flux and unlike France Colony and Afghan Abadi, which fall under the CDA, Dokh Naju and Arya Mohalla fall under the civilian Tehsil Municipal Administration while Dokh Saidan falls in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence controlled, Rawalpindi Cantonment Board. As discussed above, Cantonment Boards are often deemed to be better purveyors of services to their residents by virtue of their association with the military. The selection of this neighborhood not only provides a genuine peri-urban area in the sample but also ensures that the three dominant samples of institutional governance in Pakistan are accounted for.
2.2 DATA COLLECTION METHODS, DATA SOURCES, TOOLS AND ANALYSIS

The data collection for the research project was based upon seven different data collection methods: (1) semi-structured questionnaire survey, (2) detailed ethnography style interviews, (3) focus group discussions, (4) participatory photography, (5) participant observation, (6) detailed literature review, and (7) media analysis. The purpose of using so many different methods was not only to triangulate the findings from one method with the other, but also to address the different types of data requirements that were endemic to the type of ambitious research project proposed. More than the method, the skill set, reflexivity and attitude of the data collectors was at a premium for the successful implementation of any of the methods, and as a result, the duration of the project was punctuated by quarterly meetings amongst the investigators and between the investigators and the field staff. In addition, the field study manager, Ms. Amiera Sawas, had weekly meetings with the staff to check on their progress. The frequent and intense interactions with the field staff were not just with regard to monitoring and course correction but more importantly to get them to think about and reflect upon how they had collected the data, what they had learnt and how their social positionality intersected with the prevalent power relations in the society to yield the type of responses that they were getting, or their interpretation of the interview scripts, questionnaires and/or other types of data.

Furthermore, the reflexive training of the field staff was the lynchpin of the methodological approach for this project, which, by its very nature, dealt with sensitive issues regarding how gender is enacted and how those enactments spawn spaces of violence. Such a research problem inevitably requires high levels of self-reflexivity, empathy, keen sense of observation and interpretive skills right at the data collection stage. Therefore through the course of the project, long stretches of time were spent asking the staff to talk about what they saw, felt and reported, and how their own personalities and life histories might be entwined with how they interacted with the research subjects. One can never claim a job done in such an enterprise but we can certainly claim to have destabilized our field staff’s world views and induced them to be more and more faithful to the accounts that the research subjects gave, during ethnographies for example, or have more thoughtful conversations during the participatory photography debriefings, or have a more critical insight on what they observed as the project progressed.

The field staff trained as described above in the first instance embarked upon a literature review of academic, and non-governmental organizations’ (NGOs) grey literature in addition to monitoring of print and electronic media in Rawalpindi-Islamabad and Karachi. The purpose of undertaking this exercise was on the one hand to build the knowledge base of the field staff about the cities they were going to help research, while on the other to also allow them to get a handle on the prior work on the cities, so as to avoid duplication of effort and most importantly to get some sense of the type, frequency and geography of violence in the city. Although we knew that there is a very high threshold of drama and intensity for a violent event to be reported by the media, we wanted to understand what were those thresholds of intensity and drama that made some violence newsworthy while others not. In addition, we wanted to understand the vocabulary and cultural tropes through which [gendered] violence is reported so as to elicit popular reaction. This exercise was critical as was the process of training the field research assistants (FRAs) to be more reflexive
gender and Violence in Urban Pakistan

about their views on gender and violence and the sources of those views. The two scoping reports for the cities of Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad were the outcome of this process.

The questionnaire survey was conceived with the intent to get basic information about different study neighborhoods and is included as Annexure Ila and Ilib of this report. Questionnaires have always been found to be very good instruments for gathering factual information about a population in addition to issues of perception, which can be captured through categorical questions (Davies, Hoggart, & Lees, 2002; Seale, Gobo, Gubrium, & Silverman, 2004. We however, made the questionnaire semi-structured, so as not to force our respondents to subscribe to our preconceived categories, e.g., of gender, or violence and so on. Instead we directed our researchers to ask open-ended questions and then code the responses in the questionnaire discretely. Frequently mentioned categories were later added to the coding after the pre-testing of the questionnaires. Secondly, some open-ended questions were also added for people to talk about, especially with regard to violence. In terms of sampling, every attempt was made to collect a purposive sample whereby higher number of young people were included in the sample in addition to maintaining a balance based upon gender and class within the neighborhood samples. A total of 2462 questionnaires were completed with 1750 in Karachi and 712 in Rawalpindi-Islamabad. Initial analysis of the demographics yielding valuable insight into the study areas is included as Annexure III for consideration. The questionnaire was also the main instrument through which information relevant to calculating the vulnerabilities and capacities index (VCI) was obtained. The VCI index devised by Mustafa et al. (2011) is a quantitative index for comparing relative social vulnerability at the household and community level and is detailed in Chapter 4. There are four iterations of the index and the one for urban households, (Annexure III), was used for the purposes of this research project. At the end, however, after the process of data cleaning through triangulation, validation, and calculation of the VCI, a total of 1979 questionnaires were used for the statistical analysis, with 1293 cases in Karachi and 686 in Rawalpindi-Islamabad. The breakdown of these cases by neighborhoods is given below in Table 2-1.

Table 2-1: CASE SUMMARY BY LOCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE SUMMARY BY LOCATION</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KARACHI</td>
<td>1293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lines Area/ Jamshed Town</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansoor Nagar/ Orangi Town</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raes Amrohi/ Orangi Town</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulshan e Bihar</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Colony/ Orangi Town</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Akbar Shah Goth/ Bin Qasim Town</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghaziabad/ Orangi Town</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD</td>
<td>686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Abadi</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arya Mohalla</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dokh Naju</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dokh Saidan</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France Colony</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition, the questionnaire surveys were supplemented with detailed ethnographic style interviews and participant observations over many months. Whilst some general questions of interest were defined for the field research assistants (FRAs), they were, however, strongly cautioned against using those questions as an interview protocol and go through them with the respondents. It was a bit of a tall order to get the FRAs to break out of the questionnaire mode, or to seek some unmediated truth through their interactions with the research subjects. But through an iterative process, we are pleased to report that most of our FRAs were able to conduct the type of ethnographies where people were able to explore perceptions of access to services, violence, and social networks in a free and open manner. The constant reminders of the issues of power, positionality, and inter-subjective nature of reality, paid dividends in terms of yielding rich and nuanced ethnographic transcripts. Approximately 62 interviews were conducted as part of this process, 32 in Rawalpindi-Islamabad and 30 in Karachi. This part of the methodology was implemented partially to triangulate the findings of the questionnaires, partially to explore the stories behind the numbers and most importantly to probe deeper into some of the ideas and issues that had cropped up through the questionnaires, or the ones that we had not thought of before at all.

The ethnographic method also included the conduct of focus group discussions (FGDs). It is well known that in questionnaires, as in interviews, people tend to express personal opinions mediated by their sense of what the researcher would find agreeable, or what might be proper to say in those contexts. When discussing collective issues, during focus group discussions people can often challenge each other’s opinions or factual narratives; it is by observing and moderating these interactions that one gets to capture the competing narratives, power relations, tensions and some semblance of confirmation and triangulation of information obtained through other means (Crang & Cook, 2007; Krueger & Casey, 2014).

Furthermore, the same set of skills as in the ethnographies, were used by the FRAs in the conduct of the participatory photography exercises. The participatory photography technique is well known and becoming increasingly popular in the conduct of ethnographic field research (Lykes, Blanche, & Hamber, 2003; McIntyre & Lykes, 2004; Gotschi, Delve, & Freyer, 2009; McIntyre, 2003; 2007; Wang, & Burris, 1997). One of the foci of the research is to understand the spatiality of violence and fear, as well as of gendered performances—a very visual project in its genus. Therefore, field notes from participant observation, were supplemented with participatory photography by a select number of willing participants in the ethnographies. A total of 15 research subjects in the two urban areas were given a camera and asked to take pictures of their lives and surroundings to tell whatever pictorial stories they wanted to tell about their neighborhoods and lives. The key themes we emphasized for them to consider were, ‘fears, comfort, irritants, sadness and happiness’. In the first instance, we asked each of the FRAs to conduct photographic essays about their day-to-day lives to get a sense of what the technique is about. We then asked each of them to debrief us about why they took the photos they took and what they meant to them. By undertaking this exercise the FRAs began to see the value of the technique. They then followed the same procedure of outlining the themes and explaining the exercise to the participants. At the end of a week or two, when the participants returned the cameras with photos in them, the RAs sat down with them and had them talk about the photos and what they meant to them individually and collectively. The spatial stories to emerge out of the participatory photographic exercise were not only insightful for us but also for the
participants, as it allowed them to reflect upon their life spaces in a new light. The exercise certainly yielded very insightful spatial stories woven around the above-mentioned themes, and we will be talking about those through the course of this report.

**ANALYSIS**

Finally, in order to establish correlations and associations, statistical analysis was carried out using SPSS version 23. For this purpose, Gulshan e Bihar was excluded due to the limited number of cases. Since, there was a total number of 102 variables in the survey on which information was collected, inevitably, the nature of the variables differed leading to variable-specific bivariate analysis being carried out in order to assess correlations and association. Table 2-2 below illustrates the variables and the tests that were used for the analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>METHODS OF BIVARIATE ANALYSIS USED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOMINAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORDINAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cramer's V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Spearman's rho (ρ)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square statistic was used for consistency as in some instances the frequency assumption for the chi-square were violated. Cramer’s V was employed due to the asymmetric nature of the variables. The values for the correlation coefficients dictate that +1.0 indicates a perfectly positive correlation, while -1.0 indicates a perfectly negative one. Although the boundaries for defining categories of the different strengths of the relationship are debatable and open to interpretation, Table 2-3 below presents the boundaries used for our purposes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spearman’s Rho (ρ)*</th>
<th>Cramer’s V**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-0.1 to 0.1</td>
<td>-0.1 to 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None or very weak</td>
<td>None or very weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.3 to -0.1 or 0.1 to 0.3</td>
<td>-0.3 to -0.1 or 0.1 to 0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.5 to -0.3 or 0.3 to 0.5</td>
<td>-0.5 to -0.3 or 0.3 to 0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1.0 to -0.5 or 0.5 to 1.0</td>
<td>-1.0 to -0.5 or 0.5 to 1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: https://explorable.com/statistical-correlation
**Source: https://www.fort.usgs.gov/LandsatSurvey/AdditionalData
### 2.3 THE HISTORICO-GEOGRAHICAL CONTEXT OF KARACHI AND RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD

Pakistan is undergoing a demographic transition to a youthful country and is experiencing the growth of rapidly expanding primary (megacities like Karachi) and secondary (smaller towns) urban centers as a result of rural-urban migrations (Mustafa & Sawas, 2013). Pakistan’s total urban population is currently 35%, with projections at 50% for 2030 (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2012). With around 70 million people living below the poverty line, concerns are regularly raised about the country’s ability to cope with population growth. Although Pakistan has not completed a census since 1998, there have been a range of different research publications from government, INGO, NGO and academic actors, which cover population demographics and urban growth; we rely on a combination of sources for reliable estimations, but we maintain a cautious attitude towards their scalability and reliability in comparison to an official census. We are also sensitive to some criticisms of the above publications (including the census), which touch upon what is counted as ‘urban’. For example, the United Nations Population Division (United Nations Population Division (UNPD), 2012) estimates that by 2025 approximately half of the country’s population will reside in cities. The Planning Commission of Pakistan contends that peri-urbanization trends have already pushed the country towards the 50% mark. Take Karachi, for example, some urban planners posit that approximately half of the population resides more than 10 km from the city center (Qureshi, 2010) – this may not have been counted as urban in official censuses or research, but the lives of these residents are almost certainly urban in character. In the 1981 Census the definition of ‘urban’ changed, to include only areas designated as part of municipal corporations and cantonment boards. This change in definition led to approximately 1462 communities with populations exceeding 5000 being classified as rural, when perhaps they should have been counted as urban. In cities like Lahore, new administrative boundaries did not account for contiguous small towns that enjoy strong economic and physical linkages with the city. If these populations had been added, Lahore’s overall population estimate would have jumped from 5 to 7 million people. Therefore there is arguably an under-representation of the urban, which has socio-economic and political consequences.

Broadly speaking, both internal and international migration encompassing displacement and resettlement is the legacy of two partitions that have shaped Pakistan: 1947, the year of independence and the partitioning from India; and 1971, when the secession of East Pakistan led to the creation of the modern nation-state of Bangladesh. More recently, millions of Afghan refugees, have fled conflict towards Pakistan’s urban centers, firstly around 1992 (around 4 million) and then in 2001 (around 2 million); this makes Pakistan host to one of the largest refugee population in the world (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2013). Their mass movement into the cities has no doubt had social and political impacts. For example 600,000 eventually settled in the city of Karachi; the majority of these refugees are ethnically Pashtun, and their migration to Karachi has quickly increased the ethnic Pashtun population to around 25% (Ur Rehman, 2013), challenging the socio-political balance of power (Kronenfeld, 2008).

The 1998 census revealed nearly 40% of total urban growth in Pakistan was due to internal migration (Haider, 2006). And while it declined in the period between the 1981 and 1998 censuses, this may have since increased due to new displacements and movements associated with the protracted
conflicts in Afghanistan as well as in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). In the new millennium, despite sketchy statistical data on the changing dynamics of rural-urban, inter-, intra-provincial and international migrations, case studies suggest within Pakistan both international and internal mobility remains unrestricted (e.g. see Hasan & Raza, 2009; Memon, 2006).

Moreover, recent research, suggests a general increase of those living below the poverty line to 37.33% in 2010-2011 with increases in rural areas from 30.74% to 39.42% and in large cities from 14.7% to 24.03% between 2005 and 2011, respectively (Jamal, 2013a; 2013b). Increased incidence of poverty has been observed in urban areas with greater vulnerability noted in secondary cities and small towns. Approximately 45% of residents of small towns have been categorized as poor across all provinces. Urban poverty is estimated to have risen from 27.70% to 34.09% in between 2005-2011 (Jamal, 2013a), but is still half that of rural poverty, which is around 39.37% (and which also rose by 8.52% in the same time period). This means that even though poverty is rising in urban areas, they remain more attractive as settlement options for migrants than the rural areas.

KARACHI

The annexation of Sindh in 1843 and the making of Karachi as the provincial capital had rested on British plans to construct a ‘trooping town’ and a port that would serve as the gateway to Afghanistan, Punjab and western parts of British India. By the early twentieth century Karachi had become a major commercial center and the third largest port in British India. It was also an attractive destination for traders drawn from the coastal districts of the Subcontinent. Due to this cosmopolitanism that colonialism had catalyzed, Karachi came to be regarded as a bridgehead of imperial culture and modernity set apart from its rural hinterland. This wedge between Karachi and its hinterland has amplified over the decades, more so since Partition; a prominent feature being its marking as a Muhajir city.

Today Karachi is Pakistan’s largest metropolis and the center of finance and commerce. With an estimated population of 21 million, Karachi is considered one of Asia’s fastest growing cities. Its population density is 17,325 persons per square kilometer compared with 12,700 in Lagos and 9,500 in Mexico City (Cox, 2012). In 2007, its per capita output exceeded the national average by 50% and the provincial average by around 80%. Karachi accounts for a third of the total national output in large-scale manufacturing, 24% in finance and insurance, and 20% in transport, storage and communications. The city is also valued for government-revenue generation. While it accounted for 14.5% of domestic output, approximately 54% of all central government tax revenues were collected in Karachi. As a port city, Karachi’s monopoly over sea bound trade makes it a prime site for the collection of custom duties. Moreover, being the point of import/manufacture of a large proportion of the goods that attract sales tax, Karachi is a high contributor to the national sales tax. Finally, because of its role in hosting the largest population employed in manufacturing, retail trading and services, Karachi is also the highest contributor to the central government’s income tax revenue.

With the implementation in 2001 of the Sindh Local Government Ordinance, metropolitan Karachi experienced major territorial readjustments. Declared a ‘city district’, Karachi was divided into 18 downs and 5 districts (Figure 2.9). A sixth district, Korangi, was recently added in October 2013 in the course of new territorial adjustments that are taking place in the post-May 2013 election phase. Each town is governed by an elected municipal administration that is responsible for infrastructure, spatial
planning and municipal services. Towns are further subdivided into 178 localities that are governed by elected union councils or UCs.

Although the effects of urbanization are not so different from other cities in Asia, certain issues nevertheless set Karachi apart. A major issue concerns the city’s strategic role in the regional conflict in Afghanistan, which has had a direct impact on Karachi’s political-economy: first in terms of the circulation of drugs and arms, second in terms of migration as more and more people displaced from Afghanistan and the northwestern regions of Pakistan have moved to Karachi, and lastly in the practice of land-ownership, where 13 different authorities ranging from the military and federal government to provincial and local organizations compete in the city’s planning and management, and often encroach on each other’s jurisdictions sparking conflicts (Hasan, Ahmed, Raza, & Sadiq, 2013). In addition, the asymmetrical relationship between the city and its hinterland, a dynamic shaped by post-Partition politics and the subsequent rise of urban-based Muhajirs who have demographically and electorally outnumbered ‘native’ Sindhi and Baloch populations, has also been a major cause for concern. Given Karachi contains 62% of Sindh’s urban population and 30% of its total population, and employs 71% of the province’s total industrial labor force, this dynamic has enormous bearing on Sindh’s political-economy which is driven by Karachi, an increasingly heterogeneous city in contrast to Pakistan’s other urban centers. This asymmetry has triggered conflicts concerning the control for city’s resources as well the nature of governance and political representation at district, provincial and federal levels.

Figure 2.9: KARACHI TOWNS AND DISTRICTS

![Map of Karachi towns and districts](image_url)
Since the 1960s, the extensive migration of Pashto-speaking populations from Pakistan's northwestern regions, and the arrival from Punjab of white-collar, skilled and semi-skilled workers to support the city's rapidly expanding services sector have changed Karachi's as well as Sindh's demographic balance. The socioeconomic and demographic impacts these migratory movements catalyzed were intense as caste organizations and professional networks weakened and local-national political contexts shifted. Unsurprisingly, Karachi's ethnic conflicts remain rooted in the historic demographic transformation.

In the decades before Partition, Karachi's urban space and social life were characterized by heterogeneity and a level of compactness in which elites and workers had lived in close proximity. Even though physical separation between the elite and working class was pervasive under colonial rule, the patterns of segregation changed significantly in the post-Partition era, where social control was a key factor driving the military state's interventions. The shifting of working class populations and migrant-refugees to the city's periphery represented an all-out effort to find a solution for the chaotic post-Partition environment and attendant social tensions. A significant effect of this early planning was a disjunction that emerged between the city's central areas meant for the upper and middle classes and the peripheral areas meant for the poor or working class.

Under General Ayub Khan's military regime (1958-1969), the 1958 Greater Karachi Resettlement Plan was implemented to re-engineer urban space and social life in the city center. The main thrust of the plan was to resettle refugee- migrant populations by moving them from the city's center and relocating them in satellite towns such as Landhi-Korangi and New Karachi that are situated on the eastern and northern fringes. With the advent of industrialization, Karachi was fast emerging as a key industrial center attracting new waves of migrant-workers from all over Pakistan. The 1958 Plan endeavored to strategically interlink two objectives: resettle migrant-refugees and simultaneously develop industrial estates adjacent to the satellite towns, thus serving the demands of both labor and capital. In these efforts, the 1958 Plan symbolized an ambitious urban undertaking that transformed patterns of segregation and settlement, and encompassed considerable demolition, inner city slum clearance, and the deliberate driving out from the city center of a predominantly working class population.

Since industrialization scarcely kept pace with the grand plan to build industrial estates near satellite towns where infrastructure service provision was negligible, the resettled populations soon found themselves isolated and unemployed. Unsurprisingly, many attempted to move back to the city center or to sell their new homes. With no land available for squatting in the city center, the corridors that connected the center with the periphery soon witnessed the rise of unplanned settlements. With continuous rural-urban and inter-provincial migration especially from Pakistan's northwestern regions, and the exodus of the working class to the city's fringes, the trend of unplanned settlements accelerated resulting in a pattern of urban sprawl that now dominates Karachi's development. Notably, with this trend a new avenue of homeownership has also opened up for low-income groups: through brokers and lower echelons of the state, subdivisions of land become available for sale on the city's periphery (Anwar, 2014; Hasan, 1987; Hasan & Mohib, 2003). Hence, since the sixties Karachi has become a city in which people of different classes are separated not only by housing arrangements and quality of life, but also by widespread distance.
Even though early planning endeavors are understood as emblematic of state failure due to the unsuccessful resettlement schemes, conventional interpretations (Hasan, 1987) have missed a key point: the unplanned city that has emerged as a consequence of the early planning is constitutive of the rationally planned city. The expansion of the periphery through the proliferation of unplanned settlements has been guaranteed by a state that has granted the ‘unplanned’ exceptional status as ‘illegal’. Legal uncertainty has fixed unplanned settlements in a way that land tenure for the poor is always defined and facilitated on the basis of executive fiat. Since the 1980s, different decrees under different regimes have been passed and suspended on the basis of executive discretion, i.e. the Sindh Katchi Abadis Act 1987 that set out the criteria for the formalization of unplanned settlements, and the Sindh Gothabad Act 1987, 2008 and so forth. These decrees for land regularization also encompass exceptions such as a minimum of 40 households must be established in order to become eligible for regularization. Those who reside in the unplanned settlements never receive any kind of financing to build their own houses. Typically, people build houses by taking loans from brokers, family members or moneylenders. House construction can take decades with infrastructure provision lagging unless community based organizations and NGOs intervene through self-help schemes.

Today unplanned settlements define the city’s spatial landscape and remain critical in housing over 60% of its population (Table 2-4). Unplanned settlements or katchi abadis have grown at twice the rate of planned settlements, and Karachi’s urban expansion continues to follow the historical pattern of urban sprawl through the subdivision of land and the construction of unplanned settlements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2-4: POPULATION OF KARACHI’S UNPLANNED SETTLEMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (millions)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000,000 2,600,000 4,901,067 8,540,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227,000 356,000 700,152 1,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 43 50 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: Hasan (2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Metropolitan Karachi is a more complex region today than what it was in the 20th Century. Even though the dynamics of territorial expansion provide a useful lens for understanding the spread of vulnerability and social segregation, the patterns of urbanization and land-use are beginning to change again as Karachi’s peripheral regions are also attracting new, upscale real-estate development schemes. These schemes are situated along new infrastructure corridors such as the Super Highway where the city’s rapidly expanding middle and upper-middle class population is
expected to reside. To what extent this trend will shape the city’s future is uncertain. However, of significance is the increasing desire of middle and upper middle class groups to live in well-serviced areas that are also securitized. In the context of Karachi’s violence and elite anxieties with crime and social decay, noteworthy is how this trend symbolizes new ways of creating and maintaining distance between social classes.

RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD
The Rawalpindi-Islamabad metropolitan area consists of two cities, Rawalpindi, a historic city and Islamabad, a planned modern city established in 1962. Commonly referred to as the ‘twin cities’, they are socially and economically connected, despite very different development and administrative histories (Figure 2.10).

Figure 2.10: GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD
Rawalpindi is situated in a district of the same name, in Punjab Province in northwest Pakistan. It spans 5,286 square kilometers. It is surrounded by Islamabad Capital Territory and the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPK) to the north, by Attock district to the west, by Chakwal and Jhelum districts to the south and Azad-Jammu Kashmir (AJK) State to the east. The district is divided into 7 Tehsils, Rawalpindi city comprising one.

Both cities are positioned on the southern slopes of the northwestern extremities of the Himalayas. The rivers Indus and the Jhelum run to the south and north, of the twin cities respectively, and their tributaries run through the cities’ settlements. Historically, Rawalpindi was a small trading town, which transformed to a major city in 1851 when the British army made it a military cantonment. Rawalpindi’s population grew rapidly, more than tripling from 52,000 in 1880 to 185,000 in 1940 (Specht, 1983 in Hull, 2012). Three residential and business areas emerged: the indigenous city, ‘civil lines’ – areas for civil servants, and ‘cantonment’ -for military. The latter two surrounded the indigenous spaces from the west, east and south.

Rawalpindi’s architectural and social structures are centered around Mohallas, which are basically neighborhoods. They are separated by bazaars, which serve as gathering places of diverse people for trading and manufacturing (Hull, 2012). Short, narrow, unnamed roads, or ‘lanes’ run through the residential areas of Mohallas, providing residents a sense of privacy and security. ‘Chowks’, the intersections of the lanes, provide social gathering spaces. In terms of administrative and physical governance, this set up proved difficult for the British and post-colonial governments. Not only was it hard to map, in terms of geography and demographics, it was hard to police and to provide basic services to. Urban planning was not part of Rawalpindi’s growth, despite discourses suggesting it would be in the 1970s and 80s (Maria & Imran, 2006).

After the founding of Pakistan in 1947, debate began about moving the administrative capital of Pakistan, to a new space in Karachi, or elsewhere. A special commission for the location of the Federal Capital, under the military dictatorship of Ayub Khan, decided in 1960 that Rawalpindi District would be a more appropriate location for the new capital, because Karachi’s rapid commercial development made it hard to separate administrative and business interests. This recommendation was contentious and political (Daechsel, 2013). In turn, a new city, called ‘Islamabad’ was established in 1962, 14 kilometers away from Rawalpindi city – close enough to be linked to the city, but with enough of a green belt between the two to prevent attempts at ‘corruption’ in new governance institutions from Pakistani society (Yakas, 2001; Mahsud, 2007). The planning job was given to Greek modernist architect, Constantinos Doxiadis. He aimed for Islamabad and Rawalpindi to expand indefinitely on parallel rays out from their centers, forever divided by a green belt, a transport system, and a linear industrial zone (Hull, 2012). Ultimately, Doxiadis aimed at providing a socially inclusive living space, which would be sustainable in the face of rapid urbanization.

Resultantly, Islamabad is set out in a grid format, with 11 sectors, each 4 square miles, extending southwest from the Margalla Hills. The eastern most part is the catchment area of Rawal Lake. In contrast to Rawalpindi’s example, where community facilities exist at the juncture of lanes, in this plan, schools, medical centers, mosques and shops became each sector’s central point. Numbered streets exist within each sector, and large avenues extended across and between them. The linear nucleus, the ‘Blue Area’ was designed on an expanding axis, to provide a shopping and meeting place for all residents. Homes existed within sectors, which were grouped at a single distance...
alongside this axis, meaning that while the center itself grew into a certain direction, new sectors could be added without increasing the distance between them and the center. This grid system, or ‘dynapolis’, could then extend outwards as per the need for urban growth. A major aim was to reduce traffic, and having the blue area expand out that way would prevent gridlock at a central point; a problem experienced in Rawalpindi (Hull, 2012). Further, having major roads, like the Islamabad highway traversing the side of the city in straight lines, would increase efficiency and speed of transport.

However, Islamabad never grew at the pace that it was expected to – and a lot of population growth occurred either in Rawalpindi, peri-urban areas, or in unplanned settlements in and around the grid-structure (Daechsel, 2013). Thus while the aspired for urban growth would happen in a clean, sustainable grid-like structure, most growth occurred out of Rawalpindi city in a spider-web like way from the nucleus, leading to the governance and traffic issues Doxiadis was trying to avoid (Maria & Imran, 2006). As a result, Pakistan’s political stakeholders, and the elite, were not interested in building a socially inclusive living space – more in providing housing for civil servants and the rich, with distance from other social classes – mainly refugees. This meant that the city developed, but the Doxiadis’ vision was ‘misplaced’; leading to an urban space characterized by social segregation. This has become starker in the recent context of rapid migrations to the city.

According to government figures, Rawalpindi and Islamabad cities, together, house over 4 million people. It has been argued, though, that the ground reality suggests a population closer to 5 million as many settlements classified as ‘rural’ in census data had actually developed mainly urban characteristics (Rural Development Policy Institute (RDPI), 2013). Rawalpindi district’s population increased by 36% between the 1981 (2,121,450) and 1998 (3,363,911) censuses. In 1998, 53% were counted as urban; 49% male and 51% female. And although we cannot rely on figures calculated outside of the census, some reports put the population at 4,430,000 people in 2012 (2,466,000 urban; 1,939,000 rural). Population density supposedly increased from 636 to 1146 people per Km Sq. in Rawalpindi (GOP, 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; Government of the Punjab, 2012). In comparison, Islamabad city was reported to have a population of 529,180 in 1998; an increase of 159% on the 1981 figure of 204,364. A 2011 housing survey conducted by the Census Department and Directorate of Education conjectured that the city’s population has more than doubled since 1998, estimating it at 2 million people.

Rawalpindi has a young population, with 44% under 15 years in 1998. Health indicators in Rawalpindi-Islamabad are higher than that of the rest of the Punjab. The infant mortality rate in Rawalpindi district is estimated to be 55 per thousand live births, compared to 77/1000 in the province. This can be attributed somewhat to better access to education and healthcare than other districts. Both Rawalpindi and Islamabad’s urban areas exhibit high literacy rates: at 87% for males and 68% for females over 10 years in Rawalpindi (World Health Organization (WHO), 2010). Islamabad city has the highest literacy rates in the country at 86%, and the highest school enrollment rates (GOP, 2009).

Population growth in the Rawalpindi-Islamabad conurbation has not just been driven by natural factors, but also migrations due to: the search for economic opportunity, natural disasters and socio-political conflict in other regions. The twin cities offer migrants the promise of economic opportunity, more social equality and access to basic services. There has been large-scale migration from rural areas, to Rawalpindi-Islamabad cities, experiencing a total in-migration of around 1,063,576
people by the 1998 census and an urban population growth rate of around 3.46. Migrants include those whose rural livelihoods have been destroyed by the impacts of climate change and pollution (Kugelman, 2013), many finding shelter in the flood plain and tributaries of the Lai River (Mustafa, 2005b). Others leave rural areas, or other provinces to escape conflicts, either between ethnic groups, or between the government and insurgents. Migration has also happened due to natural disasters, like the 2005 earthquake in northern Pakistan, where Rawalpindi-Islamabad were the nearest cities offering quality health care and other facilities, which naturally attracted internally displaced peoples as well as NGOs.

Finally, international migrants, mostly from Afghanistan have flowed into the twin cities as a result of the 1990 Soviet, and 2001 US-led invasions of their country (Kugelman, 2013). A complex dimension in unplanned settlements in Rawalpindi-Islamabad is the living combination of Afghan refugees and local populations. Despite significant integration into the local society and economy, local administrations find it challenging to fulfill their municipal needs (RDPI, 2013).

Although they are historically and geographically tied, Islamabad and Rawalpindi cities have completely different governance institutions. Rawalpindi is separated administratively into Rawal and Pothohar towns - The Rawalpindi City Government manages Rawal Town whereas a quasi-military administration, the Cantonment Board, manages the other. Rawal town is divided into 46 union councils, each with an elected nazim (coordinating public sector work). Pothohar town mostly comprises military barracks and rural areas; only one of its union councils contains unplanned settlements (Haider, Haider, & Badami, 2013). The Rawalpindi Development Authority (RDA) is largely responsible for managing development and urbanization processes.

Urbanization has impacted the twin cities through (i) Changes to the land structures and use patterns; (ii) Growth of unplanned settlements which has led to environmental degradation and vulnerability; (iii) Increased rates of poverty and inequality; (iv) Impacts on service provision which impact health and quality of life; and (v) Perceived increase in crime/violence.

In Islamabad, a property boom in the early 2000s shot up housing unit prices, making them, on the whole, unaffordable for lower income migrants. NGOs and media claim that there currently stands a shortage of 60,000 housing units; consequently informal settlements have increased. Although the CDA has planned to develop affordable housing in sector I, this has yet to commence. According to the CDA (2015), there are approximately 84,591 people living in 42 Katchi Abadis in Islamabad city of varying sizes; 10 of which the CDA recognizes as legitimate for provision of water supply, electricity, gas and sewerage, as part of a ‘slum upgrading project’. The remaining are deemed illegal and discouraged by the government, which takes measures to prevent their development.

Rawalpindi has exhibited an urban growth rate of around 4% per year (Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2005). While there has been faster population growth than in islamabad city, as per the comparatively lesser governance and human resourcing of the ancient city, there has been less work on documenting unplanned settlements there. In 2009, the Directorate General of Katchi Abadis and Urban Improvement, Local Government and Rural Development Department claimed that there were 8 Katchi Abadis in Rawalpindi (Anwar, Hussain, Nosheen, & Nawaz, 2010); all of which are actively discouraged by the RDA.
Furthermore, Rawalpindi-Islamabad is located within a moderate risk earthquake zone and has experienced a long history of earthquakes. In the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, a modern apartment building in Islamabad collapsed, killing 78 people. Should another earthquake of the same intensity (7.6 Richter) occur, residents of unplanned settlements could be particularly exposed to dangerous building collapses, not to mention landslides, particularly for those living on riverbanks. When faced with hazardous conditions, the narrow streets make it difficult for rescue vehicles to gain access, and bottlenecks occur. Sewage floods the streets, exposing residents to even higher disease risk. The compounding nature of economic, social and physical vulnerabilities in these settlements makes the impacts of floods and other hazards potentially disastrous.

While unemployment is not a significant issue in the twin cities, there is a youth demographic bulge, an increasingly educated population without employment. According to NGO Action Against Food Hunger (ACF) (2007), this creates frustrations amongst the youth. Gender discrimination against female employment is also apparent. According to Saboor, Khan, Hussain, Ali, & Mahmood, (2015) the twin cities exhibited an increase in the ‘multi-dimensional poverty index’ (MDPI); which looks at a range of deprivations extending beyond just income and assets, i.e. hunger, malnutrition, poor WASH access, illiteracy, inadequate health services, marginalization and exploitation (Alkire & Santos, 2010). Migrant and minority communities, in particular, struggle to attain livelihood security, and daily wage labor is their most common option. Excluded from the socio-economic mainstream, refugee and religious minorities, especially, rely on garbage collection and manual labor as income sources (Beal, 2006). According to ACF (2007), daily wage labor is used by 38% of residents of the twin cities. Fortunately, daily wage laborers are said to have quite consistent work compared to other urban areas, yet the psychological burden of insecure livelihoods looms.

Furthermore, the changing context of the twin cities is being linked to perceived growth in experienced crime/violence. The narrative follows that: with increasing population density, reduced access to basic services, greater vulnerability and financial/livelihood insecurities, if one considers crime as a rational choice then there is a greater impetus for committing crimes. Another way of looking at this is that infrastructural violence could be on the rise because physical and psychological harms are increasingly being experienced, due to the infrastructure of everyday life (Rodgers & O’Neill, 2012; Ferguson, 2012; Anand, 2012).

### 2.4 PRIOR WORK ON GENDER AND URBAN VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN

The review of available literature carried out in this study reveals that everyday violence is often seen taking three distinct manifestations:

- **Spectacular violence** - that instills fear and destroys or transforms geographical places and spaces;
- **Infrastructural violence** - violence generated through the organization of space and infrastructure in particular ways;
- **Violence of disempowerment** - flowing from Arendt (1973), is violence as loss of power.
There is a fourth type of violence often seen in the literature, i.e. structural violence, but for a variety of reasons this type will not be covered in this project.

A more informed analysis of risks and specifically the geographical dimensions of violence could be understood by utilizing the concept of vulnerability. The term here is taken to mean the susceptibility to suffer damage from environmental hazards and extremes, and the ability of households and communities to recover from them. Hence ethnicity, class, gender, age, and associated political economy factors are central to this particular understanding. Based on recent developments within the field, the Vulnerabilities and Capacities Index (VCI) (Mustafa et al., 2011) has been selected as an appropriate metric to assess the vulnerability profiles of households and the neighborhoods chosen for this research project.

VIOLENCE
The close imbrications of social power and violence can be seen as having three distinct elements (Foucault, 1980; Bourdieu, 1986; Mustafa 2002; Chatterjee, 1982a; 1982b); (1) ‘naked power’ flowing from physical force and violence, (2) ‘compensatory power’ flowing from the ability to materially reward others for compliance and (3) ‘knowledge power’ flowing from the actors’ socialization into webs of knowledge and discourses that induce internalization of certain social relations and world views as natural and desirable. Of the three types power/knowledge (Foucault, 1980) is the most comprehensive form of power. For our purposes, we understand violence as threat or actuality of a physical act that directs or constrains the choices of its victims individually or collectively.

Furthermore, from the literature we have been able to distill three key aspects of violence: (1) violence that destroys or transforms geographical places and spaces (Mustafa, 2005a; Gregory & Pred, 2007); (2) geographical places and infrastructure therein that enable violence (Hewitt, 2001; Lefebvre, 1991; Anand, 2012; Ferguson, 2012); and (3) structural violence (Galtung, 1969). The first aspect of violence that results in place destruction and/or alienation, in terms of direct destruction of places with an emotional significance to the people or stigmatizing places is most closely associated with terrorist violence. Here space becomes the target of terror, where human victims of violence are coincidental, and spectacular destruction of places is the main objective. Place here is defined as being constituted at the intersection of physical space and the human experience, memory, and emotions associated with that space. In other words you are a victim of such terrorist violence if you are subjected to it, or fear it, not because who you are or what you have done but because of where you are (Mustafa, 2005a).

This kind of violence is most apparent in the literature on Pakistan’s urban areas. International Crisis Group (2014) and others highlight that not only the numbers of violent incidents (mainly terrorist) in urban centers surpassed previous figures, particularly in Karachi. Indeed, it notes how the geographical configurations and impacts of violence come from, produce and reconstitute geographies of fear, which drive further insecurities and violence. One only has to talk with a few Pakistanis to understand the strength of the fear discourse, and one only has to view the way the middle and upper middle classes are adapting their living environments to build physical barriers (gated communities) with the rest of society, to put the fear of violence at bay, at least during home time. Fair (2009) speaks to recent findings of a sharp decline in public support in Pakistan for suicide
bombings as a way to defend Islam, and suggests that this is directly related to the personal experiences and impacts of increasing suicide bombings and terrorist incidents in Pakistan. Furthermore, the terrorist groups have been categorized as a critical threat to security by the majority of respondents in such public opinion polls, especially in Sindh (home of Karachi) and Punjab (home of Rawalpindi-Islamabad). Fear affects public confidence in government, and personal security on the streets; Appadurai (2006) elucidates how the fear of the unknown, when it comes to terrorism in South Asia, can further drive physical violence between different groups (fear of the other). Haleem (2003) sees the cycle further held in place by legitimized Praetorianism, and an ethnically fragmented society. So, state violence, particularly through military interventionism has become the norm. The disgruntled and powerless population may be, as a result, easier to radicalize and may seek increasingly violent means in reaction (Zahab, 2002, 2004; Mustafa, 2005a).

Violence cycles are becoming more frequent in Rawalpindi-Islamabad, particularly since the murder of Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi in 2007. Ahmed (2008) highlights that the suicide bomb which killed Bhutto in December 2007, led to a cycle of violent incidents between government and insurgents in the following year (182 incidents labeled as terrorism across the country), which destroyed public buildings, NGO infrastructure, private buildings and vehicles. The government reacted by prioritizing the curtailment of religious extremism in the madrassa system. Disgruntled madrassa students/teachers consequently besieged the ‘Lal Masjid’, threatening the government of suicide attacks. Kidnaps and murders were carried out on citizens seen to be challenging Islamic practice. A week-long violent clash with the students in the mosque, followed by a series of suicide bomb attacks on the military led to 600 fatalities. The violent year of 2008 ended with a suicide attack on former Interior Minister Aftab Ahmed Sherpao in Rawalpindi, killing 60 civilians, on the religious festival of Eid-ul-Adha (See also, Al Jazeera Witness, 2008).

There is an increasing tendency towards religious sectarian violence, and displays of spectacular violence have become frequent on religious holidays. According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, there were 687 sectarian killings in 2013. While the violence has not spared any large minorities, there seems to be a particular violent pattern between Shia and Sunni Muslims (Haleem, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2014; Huffington Post, 2014). While there is an increasing academic literature considering sectarian violence in Pakistan, there is little to date concerning the twin cities of Rawalpindi-Islamabad. There are a variety of discourses in the media, which consider state and police negligence as a key factor in the spread of violence, different causes are speculated upon, including hate speech, and suppression of minority religious freedoms. What is clear, though, is how these violent eruptions transform spaces for normal citizens, who are restrained to their homes under curfew or for fear, or who become trapped in traffic when such incidents occur, or whose shops, homes and mosques are burned down.

The second aspect of how spatial organization produces violent geographies. This draws attention, to how prison camps, surveillance and police presence, for example, may produce carceral geographies associated with the state oppression on the one hand, and urban design of living spaces, which may perpetuate gendered isolation and confinement on the other. To cite a more direct example of the relationship between infrastructure and violence, broad avenues may be an essential embellishment to modern cities but their original functionality as highly effective anti-revolutionary infrastructure to provide clear line of fire to government troops, and to prevent against barricades is not irrelevant to their present day ubiquity (Ferguson, 2012; Scott, 1998).
Similarly square grid patterned automobile centric urban design may be standard contemporaneously, but how does that design affect female mobility in the urban form? Furthermore, and of most relevance to the SAIC is how poor infrastructure and enhanced vulnerability to environmental hazards intersects with high levels of violence to define the daily lives of urban poor (e.g., see Auyero & de Lara, 2012; Tranchant, 2013a; 2013b; Gupte, Justino, & Tranchant, 2012).

The structural violence aspect essentially highlights how social structures or institutions may harm people by preventing them from accessing life enhancing or life-saving services (Galtung, 1969). Racism, sexism, classism, elitism are often listed as examples of social structures and complicit or incompetent state institutions a manifestations of those structures, that may prevent people from living full lives and may also lead to premature death, disability or sickness. This notion of violence is very closely associated with social justice—in fact lack thereof. Whilst we are sympathetic to the political orientation of this aspect of violence, we aim, in the first instance, to focus on physical and material violence.

GENDER AND VIOLENCE IN KARACHI

Within the overall context of gender inequality in Pakistan, violence against women in a large metropolis like Karachi unfolds in the complex urban scenario, which is defined by economic vulnerability, state and political violence, social and spatial marginalization and massive infrastructure provision issues. Even though studies have shown that domestic violence against women cuts across all socio-economic classes, in public space and public life, class plays a significant role in intensifying or mitigating the violence experienced by women. Rising inequality and income disparity has meant that working class and low-income women have had to take on the role of providers and to step out of the home. The first challenge women face, however, regardless of whether they work or not, is in accessing basic infrastructure. Lack of access to drinking water means women often have to walk long distances from home to find water. Low-income women in public space are vulnerable to harassment and threats of violence. Taking public transportation is also considered as an undertaking fraught with dangers of harassment, as we discuss in Chapter 5.

Furthermore, women who are part of the workforce face harassment and intimidation at work. Factory women-workers are particularly vulnerable, and a study on women workers in Karachi indicates that violent unrest in the city is given as an excuse by employers to lay them off. In the same study anecdotal evidence based on interviews with women in low-income settlements like Orangi, Gadap and Lyari shows that women have been kidnapped during riots. Further, households have been scared to lodge FIRs with the police due to mistrust of the authorities. In addition, families were also afraid of reporting the crime for fear of violent repercussions from the perpetrators as well as the community at large, due to entrenched patriarchal norms (HomeNet Pakistan, 2011).

War Against Rape (WAR), the most active NGO working on violence against women (VAW) in urban areas (particularly in Karachi), has identified rape as reaching “endemic” levels in Pakistan and as one of the least reported crimes. They have also identified that domestic violence occurs across all socio-economic, educational and racial groups in Pakistan. Khan & Zaman’s (2011) perceptive study on rape and domestic violence and especially the attitudinal dimension of the criminal justice system shows
how deep-rooted are the presumptions and pre-judgments about survivors of rape and domestic violence in Pakistan. The study’s focus on rape cases recorded by WAR in Karachi, and interviews with police (male and female), medico-legal officers, judges and lawyers makes it an invaluable resource for understanding how sexual violence is perceived and defined by public officials, and how disempowering their attitudes are toward women. Furthermore, Khan & Zaman’s study correctly underscores that the public sphere or the criminal justice system undergirds the socio-cultural context and reflects the dominant norms that govern gender and society in Pakistan and speaks to our concerns about the violence of disempowerment.

In addition, WAR also generates statistics on the age of the victims as well as individual stories of abuse. While this data is extremely valuable, it is limited in the sense that only those victims are being tracked that come into contact with the state, either through FIRs lodged with the police or those who undergo medical examinations or MLEs. In order to develop a comprehensive picture of the prevalence of gender-based violence in communities across the city, surveys need to go beyond those cases that acquire a ‘medico-juridical’ legitimacy through the act of reporting and registering with the state.

In addition to NGOs like WAR, there are others that also operate in Karachi such as Aurat Foundation, Panah, Human Rights Commission Pakistan (HRCP), Visionary Foundation Pakistan, Darul Sukoon and Bint-e-Fatima. These NGOs are involved in generating publications and statistics on gender violence and also organizing outreach programs that push for awareness raising campaigns. NGOs like Panah have emerged out of the tumultuous and highly discriminatory era of General Zia ul Haq (1978-1988) when women in Pakistan suffered a huge setback in terms of new legislation, specifically the implementation of Islamic injunctions such as the notorious Hudood Ordinances promulgated in 1979. The most controversial of the ordinances are the two laws pertaining to sexual offences, i.e. the Zina and Qazf Ordinances that encompasses the rules and legal principles that govern the proof of facts in a legal proceeding. This law has been understood as intrinsically misogynistic as its application has resulted in women being convicted of adultery/fornication if they report a case of rape. Their report is treated as a confession. Moreover, these laws’ judicial application has also made it easier to get away with crimes against women such as honor killings and the general degradation and humiliation of women in Pakistani society. Predictably women’s rights activists have been against the law and have demanded a safeguard. In 2006 under General Pervaiz Musharraf’s military regime, heated parliamentary debates between the liberal parliamentarians and the more conservative ulema led to a compromise in the shape of the Women’s Protection Act, 2006. Even though substantial changes have been made in the Hudood Ordinances, key challenges remain. For instance in 2013 the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) rejected the act and decreed DNA tests unacceptable as primary evidence in rape cases.

Ultimately, an element that is missing in present approaches towards tracking gender-based violence is attention to existing social networks, especially women’s networks and the role they perform in negotiating gender roles as well as dispute settlement for women on an everyday basis. An ethnographic approach allows this. It would be interesting to learn if there are instances where women seek and successfully negotiate regress for wrongs based on gender-discrimination, without recourse to state institutions. In addition, even though there is a focus on the economic costs of VAW there is less attention given to a deeper analysis of the economic context and its links to VAW.
GENDER AND VIOLENCE IN RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD

Rawalpindi has shown the highest reporting rates of violence against women (VAW) (754 cases between Jan-Dec 2012), according to Aurat Foundation's statistics. Rozan (2007) has conducted some interesting work on masculinities in Rawalpindi; which speaks to the literature on power/knowledge violence. Rozan explored notions and performances of masculinity in married men and women in Union Council Rehmatabad. Discussing masculinity, violence, sexuality and relationships, they found some pervasive perceptions, which warrant further study (as the research covered only one Union Council and a homogenous social group, rather than diverse groups). Firstly, sexuality was a theme that dominated most discussions, and the image of the 'sexually potent' male was rather strong across men. A sexual helplessness was commonly experienced amongst males when facing females, and this lead to a stronger desire to be sexually virulent. A majority of respondents in this sample expressed having experienced homosexual relations, often in order to practice for later sexual experiences with women. Rozan note that, when practiced with younger boys or males, it was often coercive.

A second strong perception of masculinity was the need to provide for the family, without depending on female financial support. This was closely linked to self-respect. The view of women working was rather disapproving. A key tenet of masculinity was expressed as the man’s need to take decisions, ‘control his wife’ or female relatives (in decisions and movements) and balance the needs of his wife and family. Control was couched in discourses of extreme distrust of women and男性’ roles as the upholders of decency in society; violence a necessary measure to maintain morality and tradition in society. Men would even taunt other males who allowed female relations to do acts perceived as less moral, or feminine. Although homosexuality was seen as immoral, sexual experimentation with younger boys was considered acceptable.

Violence was tightly discursively connected to ‘being a man’. Most interviewed had been involved in violent incidents with other males or groups of males, often involving a range of weapons. Machoism and posturing according to what was deemed masculine were seen as important; negation of any feminine traits were key to their identity as males.

Interestingly, women reinforced the male-held perceptions of masculinity. They also saw males as the guardians of decisions, finances and morality within society. They highlighted how males often suffered though, as a result of these responsibilities. Men’s respect withered if finances did, and the related emotional burden was heavy, often leading to anger and violence. According to almost all married women interviewed, men often resorted to violence in their relationships, but only if the woman has done something wrong. Thus women should moderate their behavior to avoid violence. Violence was seen as acceptable if conducted in privacy and apologized for later.

This research has been very helpful in opening a field of research on the relationships between masculinities, femininities and violence in Rawalpindi-Islamabad (and wider Pakistan in fact). We can understand from it that masculinity is closely linked to notions of dominance in society and over women. Unequal power relations characterize relationships, and physical and verbal violence is used as a tool of control, which is deemed necessary by both women and men.
Zulfiqar & Hassan (2012) find that access to work and education outside of the home has a mediating impact on perceptions and experiences of domestic violence in a neighborhood of Rawalpindi (Lalazar). Women’s economic status is a significant predictor of abuse. A woman’s economic independence enables her to make important decisions by and for herself; also enabling her to take action (like going to police, or leaving the house of husband) against domestic violence and psychological abuse. This suggests that not only economic independence, but also experiences with different groups through work can break perceptions about what is acceptable behavior in the home.

While there is a dearth of research on violence against men in Rawalpindi-Islamabad, one recently published case study by Munirkazimi & Mohyuddin (2012) found incidences of physical, domestic violence towards men at the hands of women. This included hitting and throwing objects. These incidents are almost never reported. Incidents where domestic violence occurred towards the women were often found to be in retaliation to verbal abuse that challenged masculinity, by targeting mental stresses related to livelihood or sexual potency.

Self-directed harm is also worth considering in the context of a vulnerability-violence nexus. Farooq et al. (2010) investigated the issue of self-harm in Rawalpindi over the period 2007-8. They found that intentional self-harm, while most commonly masked, as injury by another was quite prevalent, particularly amongst males. The researchers claim that in fact 10% of accident cases registered in hospital were actually of deliberate self-harm—56.4% of these were people aged 16-25 years and they used a variety of weapons including firearms, sharp objects and poison. Only one was reported as self-harm. This is because it is not only seen as a sin in Islam but it is also punishable by law with up to 1 year in prison. The question remains, what are the drivers of deliberate self-harm in the populations of Rawalpindi-Islamabad? As it is an under-reported phenomenon, ethnographic research methods may shed some light.

Ultimately, understanding gendered violence in urban Pakistan requires going beyond just looking at the experiences of women and girls. While there has been some very interesting research and attention given to the plight of women in Pakistan (see International Crisis Group, 2015), it is the expectations, performances and experiences of men, women and transgenders, which should be illuminated in order to understand how violence is manifested.

2.5 CONCLUSION

- In this chapter we have introduced the neighborhoods that were selected for the purpose of the research.
- We outlined the main data collections methods, sources and tools that were employed.
- Key points about the historico-geographical context of Karachi, Rawalpindi and Islamabad were discussed.
- Prior work on gender and urban violence in Pakistan in general and the study urban areas in particular were also outlined in the final section.
Pakistan's urban policy environment is a mixture of state and non-state institutions interacting with an increasingly vocal civil society and a fragmented structure of local governance. This chapter gives an overview of the policy institutions and relevant governance and legislation at the national, provincial and ultimately local scales. It also discusses urban governance of infrastructure services such as water and hygiene (WASH). The attention will not just be towards state institutions, important as they may be in terms of their legitimacy and efficacy, but also towards the emerging key civil society actors that not only influence urban governance policy through their advocacy role, but also through their direct service delivery to locally vulnerable populations, e.g. residents in informal or unplanned settlements. In the following section 3.2, we provide an overview of the climate of urban governance of the past few decades; in section 3.3 we expand in greater detail about the local contexts of urban governance and related challenges in Karachi and in Rawalpindi-Islamabad. Finally, we conclude with some basic observations.

3.1 CLIMATE OF URBAN GOVERNANCE

Pakistan is a federal republic comprising four provinces: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan. These provinces are divided into 111 districts, 397 towns and 6044 union councils, which are the lowest tier of government. Since independence, Pakistan has relied on a centralized federal government with its bureaucracy and military elites mimicking the institutional and organizational style of the colonial state (Jalal, 1995). Amid confined room for democratic development, authoritarian tradition and military rule have shaped Pakistan’s governance structures leading to an unabashed reliance on centralized, elite-backed visions and in turn further undermining democratic efforts. However, the passing in 2010 of the 18th Amendment which pushes for a center-provincial power-sharing arrangement signals a commitment to decentralizing power from the federal level, though whether that power decentralization will go down to the local level in any substantial manner remains to be seen. Furthermore, 2013 marked a profound change in the status quo when a civilian elected government completed its term and a new civilian elected government took power. However, despite a democratic turn and new power-sharing arrangements, governance structures remain mired in controversy. Longstanding demands over the division of resources and for the reorganization of provinces along ethno-linguistic lines, and delayed local government elections are still pervasive nationally.
Moreover, pertinent to note is that Pakistan has not completed a census since 1998 and this has had an impact on urban governance. The 2011 census was barely underway when it was suddenly postponed for various reasons ranging from resource constraints to political interference in Sindh and Baluchistan. How the ‘urban’ is classified has great implications for governance: an accurate representation of the urban through censuses is expected to lead to a shift in the nation’s electoral balance, away from rural toward urban electorates. This is significant given that Pakistan has traditionally been governed by rural elites whose political power has depended on a captive workforce-cum-electorate. The political consequences of urbanization present new electoral opportunities for both urban-based political parties, such as the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), new contenders such as Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) as well as for coalitions of religious-political parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami. Urbanization in Pakistan also poses major economic challenges in terms of employment opportunities and provision of basic infrastructure services in addition to a lingering low-income housing crisis, which has only intensified alongside the inadequate provision of infrastructure.

When the Devolution Plan was implemented across Pakistan in 2001, all three levels of local government were given considerable autonomy to raise funds and plan and implement physical and social developments. The purpose of the devolution plan was to provide a more locally grounded, responsive and accountable government, interfacing with citizens through ‘Citizen Community Boards’ (CCBs) and ‘Community Based Organizations’ (CBOs) (Cheema & Mohmand, 2006), thereby positioning citizens to actively participate in decision-making processes and development work. Although elected local governments had existed previously, they had limited powers and the provincial or federal departments carried out key decisions. Under the new system, District and City Governments are run by the nazim and the District Coordinating Officer (DCO), the latter reporting directly to the head of Federal Government (Zaidi, 2005). Cheema & Mohmand (2006) note that the terms of devolution were not explicitly set out, which created confusion about roles and responsibilities and either gaps in power, or overlaps between local, provincial and federal governments. These findings are supported in consequent studies looking at whether the Local Government Ordinance has created new opportunities for participation and community ‘empowerment’ (i.e. Ahmed & Abu Talib, 2013). There was also the emergence of new inter-governmental political linkages and systems of patronage, which affected policy implementation and ‘re-centralized’ the power structure (Cheema & Mohmand, 2007). While the local government system that materialized has been criticized for showing little commitment to upholding the needs of local constituencies, and local government officials have been disparaged for being involved in patronage networks and for channeling funds through CCBs for private interests, still corruption at the district tier hardly surpasses the extensive rent-seeking behavior that has long existed at the provincial and federal tiers.

Furthermore, in this process, the roles of the zila nazim and the District Coordinating Officer (DCO) became significant, with the DCO overseeing the functioning of all government departments in the district. Although devolution presented new opportunities to improve service delivery, for instance in Sindh and Punjab, water supply was devolved to the local Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA), it also brought new challenges concerning the management of water and sanitation, where the provincial government controlled planning and implementation prior to the 2001 devolution plan. Ultimately, the new system was in a process of experimentation when it was suspended under the
former President Zardari’s government in 2008. Critics claimed the bureaucracy had been made subservient to the nazims who had allegedly acquired too much power. Studies carried out in certain UCs of Punjab suggest that clan and caste grouping had increased as a result of the devolution plan and development had become more unequal as nazims had invested in areas where votes were guaranteed. Similarly, media reports indicate community, labor and peasant boards provided for in the plan had not materialized.

In terms of women’s participation, a significant change that was introduced under the 2001 Local Government Ordinance was the reservation of 33% seats for women at all tiers of local government. This included direct election to the lowest tier of local government, i.e. the union councils. The NGO Aurat Foundation estimates that in Pakistan overall 90% of these seats were occupied, and around 32,222 women were elected as union councilors (Aurat Foundation 2007; 2008). Most NGOs and international donor agencies lauded this participation as a sign of empowerment and a positive signpost leading towards greater gender mainstreaming in the political process. However, the deeply entrenched gender bias in state and political leadership was revealed in the subsequent 2005 local bodies election. That was when women’s reserved seat at the local bodies level were reduced as a result of a general reduction in directly elected union councilor seats – from 21 to 13 (Mezzara, Aftab, & Yusuf, 2010). Critics have also pointed to the fact that, especially in rural areas, those women who did get elected remained bound to patriarchal family and clan interests. The kind of dynamics underlying women’s participation, as a large cadre of union councilors created in urban areas, especially in cities like Karachi, remains unexamined.

Moreover, when Musharraf was removed from power in 2008, the devolution system remained in flux, and the passing of the 18th amendment of the constitution in 2010, aimed to revisit and reinstate the governments’ roles and responsibilities, giving political, financial and administrative authority to elected representatives of local government. However, to begin this process there needed to be free and fair local government elections, which have recently been concluded in December 2015 in Karachi after considerable delays. In light of these recent elections, Karachi has seen the resurgence of the leading regional political party, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement or MQM that has promised the city will fare better under its authority, through the restoration of powers of local government. However, the road to decentralization remains mired in center-province-district tensions concerning the sharing of powers and the ongoing centralization of governance. Under the Sindh Local Government Act 2013, the power to make decisions over transport, water and garbage collection continue to remain in the hands of the provincial government. This implies that governmental institutions, such as the Sindh Building Control Authority, Sindh Solid Waste Management Board, Sindh Transport and Mass Transit Department and especially the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB), have limited powers of decision-making as well as limited capacity to raise financial resources. Furthermore, Sindh’s local bodies have a limited role as councils for supervision, monitoring and regulation of core service delivery areas, such education, health, water and sanitation.
3.2 CITY CONTEXTS

In Sindh, urban governance tensions are visible in terms of the regional politics that undergird the province’s and by default Karachi’s governance, and allude to new political aspirations tied with the devolution of power and decentralization policies implemented under General Musharraf’s military regime (2000-2008). The lingering effects of Musharraf’s devolution plan, which was suspended during former president Asif Ali Zardari’s civilian regime (2008-2013), are significant. In Sindh the effects are manifest in the heightened demands of different political and ethnic groups seeking realignments in center-provincial and intra-provincial powers. The most trenchant demands for local government reforms have been put forth by the MQM, which has demanded a return to the 2001 devolution system. Such demands have been challenged by Sindhi nationalist parties, such as Sindh Tarraqi Pasand and Jeay Sindh Qami Mahaz, who view devolution/decentralization as a means through which the MQM aims to gain wider control of the city, leading to further deepening of long-standing cleavages between urban Sindh and the extensive hinterland.

In the post-devolution phase, the Karachi-based MQM, experienced a landslide victory in the 2005 local election, a dynamic that has manifested itself yet again in the December 2015 elections with the MQM winning 137 of the 209 union committees in all six districts of the city – a clear sweep. In 2005, the appointment of a charismatic mayor, Mustafa Kamal, ushered in an era of global aspirations and entrepreneurial ambitions nourished by ‘Dubai Dreams’ to remake Karachi a world-class city. But the devolution of power in Sindh has been understood as symbolic of the MQM taking control of the city. Subsequently, after the 2008 elections and Pakistan’s turn to democracy, the local government system was suspended under the regime of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), which has reinstalled the old provincial/bureaucratic system of governance. Since then political parties in Sindh have been at loggerheads about the precise nature of local governance, with some parties legislating for a hybrid system (part bureaucratic, part decentralized) e.g. the Sindh Local Government Ordinance 2013.

Given the ongoing tensions over the nature of local governance, certain challenges remain at the heart of the urban policy environment. A major challenge concerns the supply and management of water and sanitation services. Generally speaking in Pakistan there is no federal ministry for sanitation and water supply. Multiple government agencies at federal, provincial and local levels share this role and NGOs like the Orangi Pilot Project Research and Training Institute (OPP-RTI) who are also working in this sector. In Karachi, responsibilities for water supply and sanitation are distributed amongst the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation or KMC (formerly City District Government Karachi or CDGK) and the Karachi Water & Sewerage Board (KWSB). In Karachi, the sanitation program of the OPP-RTI is considered a success story as they have carved out a niche in this sector, notably in terms of selling its sanitation and water supply model to the state. Furthermore, NGO-state discursive connections have improved somewhat, whereby the OPP-RTI’s technical designs supported by citizens’ lobby groups have enabled the KWSB senior officials to discount multi-million dollar ‘mega projects’ in favor of a flexible approach in WASH programs. The OPP-RTI’s success also rests on the emphasis it places on issues of ‘corruption’ concerning government-led sanitation projects, for instance government officials proposing high estimates that entail profit margins to be distributed to vested parties (Bano, 2008). By underscoring low-cost alternatives that are not built on corruption, the NGO sells its model to both community and government officials. A key ‘incentive’ the NGO gives community members is by linking improved
sanitation with gains in property values. The OPP-RTI’s impact has been wide-ranging in low-income settlements like Orangi Town, where the NGO pioneered in the 1980s its low-cost sanitation model. The austere model has enabled low-income households to finance, manage and maintain sanitary latrines in their homes as well as underground sewerage lines in lanes in secondary sewers.

However, despite such innovations, the provision of water and sanitation remain a huge challenge. The quality of services is poor, as evidenced by intermittent water supply in Karachi and limited wastewater treatment. As already elaborated in the introductory chapter, this process has forced residents to adopt a range of alternatives. Furthermore and as discussed in Chapter 1, we emphasize here again that the violent political-economy of Karachi’s water supply system is set apart from other urban centers in Pakistan. Karachi’s notorious ‘water mafia’ is known to operate all over the city. By siphoning water from the KWSB’s bulk distribution system, the water mafia thrives on a highly lucrative business of reselling stolen water to millions of residents especially those in low-income settlements. The ‘mafia’ is a constellation of state and non-state actors that operate ‘illegal’ hydrants and water tankers. A key aspect of the mafia’s activities entails the manipulation of public water valves through which water flows to neighborhoods. By deliberately closing water valves in key locations, trucking firms team up with corrupt bureaucrats and politicians to shutdown public supply. This enables them to sell water to residents through water tankers (Rahman et al., 2008a; 2008b). The water mafia’s presence is most discernible in low-income settlements and in newly emerging unplanned communities. Typically, a low-income family can spend as much as a quarter of its income on buying water through illicit arrangements. In March 2013, Perween Rahman the Director of the NGO, OPP-RTI, was gunned down in a target killing. Perween’s death has been linked with the threats she had received when the OPP-RTI unearthed extensive illegal water connections in Karachi’s unplanned settlements. This situation highlights a fundamental contradiction: informal infrastructure networks enable most of the infrastructure provision in unplanned settlements while at the same time being implicated in violent geographies.

In July and August 2013, high incidences of WASH related cases were reported in media due to dengue outbreaks, infrastructure breakdowns and monsoon related citywide flooding. Malik (2009) considers the links between vulnerabilities and violence in Pakistan. She makes the link between the failure of the social contract of the state with its citizens, its consequent frustrations amongst the marginalized populations in particular and thus the creation of violence. A chief challenge in metropolitan Karachi concerns the state’s lack of information on the quality and supply of existing infrastructure as well weak coordination between UCs and the KMC. Moreover, with continuous urban expansion and the rise of new settlements in the periphery, a significant disconnect exists between the government’s knowledge about existing water supply and sanitation infrastructures and the mounting demands for such infrastructure in new settlements. This is further exacerbated by the suspension in 2008 of the local governance system and the ensuing lack of clarity concerning functions and responsibilities particularly for solid waste management at the neighborhood level.

In the case of Rawalpindi-Islamabad, Maria & Imran (2006) find that there is no coordination between the governance institutions responsible for planning, infrastructure provision and urbanization. In the urban area of Rawalpindi, the federal government has no formal control over planning or development. Rawalpindi has significantly less financial and human resources than
Islamabad, despite a larger population and more rapid urban sprawl. While Rawalpindi is the main supplier of shelter to Federal government and corporate sector workers in Islamabad, it is the main recipient of solid and liquid waste pollution from upstream Islamabad as well as being principally affected by the flood hazard in the Lai. In fact, Mustafa (2005b) considers the governance institutions of the twin cities from a river-basin and exposure to hazards perspective; the upper basin being governed by the federally controlled Directorates of the Capital Development Authority (CDA); the middle basin falling under the Rawalpindi Tehsil Municipal Authority and the provincially controlled Rawalpindi Development Authority (RDA); and the lower basin returning to federal control, under the Rawalpindi and Chaklala Cantonment Boards (RCB and CCB). In light of such social, economic and environmental linkages, the lack of coordination between the civic leadership of the two cities is a particularly disturbing feature of the institutional landscape of the twin cities.

Ultimately, the devolution of powers from federal to provincial and local governments in 2001 put the RDA under the authority of Rawalpindi City District Government. Rawalpindi city also comes under the remit of the Punjab and Housing Physical Planning Department. Islamabad city is home to the federal governance institutions, and its development is managed by the Capital Development Authority (CDA). The CDA is primarily staffed and led by federally appointed bureaucrats that are presumed to not have the political and skill limitations of provincially run or elected municipalities. The CDA has of late, however, come under scrutiny for fraudulent behavior regarding dummy housing schemes and the resettlement of ‘affectees’ from villages which used to exist where the sector-system now sits (Hull, 2012).

In terms of governance, Rawalpindi city’s water supply and sewerage is supposedly delivered by the government’s Water and Sanitation Agency (RWASA), created in 1992 to meet the needs of the rapidly growing population. Solid waste management was previously dealt with by the Sanitation Department, which was abolished in 2013, to make way for the Rawalpindi Waste Management Company (RWMC). Policymakers, with the support of the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and other donors, are attempting to ‘professionalize’ [their language] services and make service providers accountable to service delivery performance mechanisms. By 2010 RWASA was serving approximately 1.1 million people through 0.1 million household piped water connections (WSP, 2010a; 2010b). Despite accountability to both local and provincial governments, The World Bank (WSP, 2010a; 2010b) finds few checks and balances on RWASA’s performance. Furthermore, in 2005, the WSP concluded that 8 cities of Punjab (including Rawalpindi) suffer from insufficient WASH services, which is a major impediment to their economic development. Rawalpindi and Islamabad’s urban populations rely on surface water from the Rawal and Khanpur Dams and groundwater accessed through tubewells from the Rawal Lake and Lai Rivers with the Capital Development Authority (CDA) being the responsible agency for water supply and sewerage in Islamabad.

The impact of insufficient government waste management services is obvious: a RWASA survey of water quality in 2007 found 64% of samples from piped household connections in Rawalpindi city were unfit for human consumption, due to contaminated water lines and seepage from wastewater (WSP, 2008; RWASA, 2009). Government data on Islamabad found that 20 of 27 tubewells monitored in 2005-6, distributed water which was unfit for human consumption (Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR), 2007). Another study found that 50% of the 240 ground water tubewells in Rawalpindi-Islamabad produced bacteriologically contaminated water (Islam, Cheema, & Ahmed, 2008). While RWASA has since brought this figure down to 26% by upgrading the quality of the water
lines (preventing seepage), the problem of liquid and solid waste remains in both cities. Frequent complaints are made about gaps in supply, as well as leaking pipes and dirty water (RWASA, 2009). In 2011 RWASA found that water quality had deteriorated due to anthropogenic changes and new illegal connections and hospital records of gastrointestinal diseases and complaints confirmed this. Islamabad is a better planned and managed city in the sense of its water supply and sanitation system, particularly solid waste management, yet contamination of the water supply remains a big issue.

3.3 CONCLUSION

Despite facing infrastructural shortages of a very large-scale in recent years, and despite recognition of the need for greater coordination between planning and urbanization and a management system focused on infrastructural improvements, Pakistan’s ability to effectively manage the urban policy environment remains highly fragmented and weak. The attempt to introduce new governance structures such as devolution of power and decentralization has been undermined by resource and capacity constraints, and continuing tensions between the national and regional political parties over the nature of urban governance. As discussed earlier, infrastructure development has not kept pace with urbanization, and cities like Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad have accumulated huge deficits across public services including health, WASH, utilities and transport, which adversely affect quality of life (GOP, 2011; ADB, 2007; Haider & Badami, 2010). Numerous policies and plans have been formulated addressing risk reduction in the provision of water supply, for instance; a National Sanitation Policy and a National Drinking Water Policy were approved in 2006 and 2009, respectively, with the objective to improve water and sanitation coverage and quality. Recently policies concerning WASH and the role of local government have been updated in light of the 18th Constitutional Amendment. Despite such efforts, the level of annual investment remains below what is considered necessary to achieve a significant increase in access and service quality. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the specific and pressing needs of poor, urban populations continue to be neglected.
VULNERABILITY, GENDER, AND VIOLENCE

Vulnerability is embedded in everyday life and is not necessarily linked to episodic extreme events (Hewitt 1983b, Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004). Therefore it is an important lens through which, one can apprehend the risks and dangers embedded in daily life. The question for us was how vulnerability might be produced, and in turn reproduce, conditions that perpetuate violence and/or spawn violent spaces and places. As the discussion above indicates one of the major challenges in vulnerability studies has been to assess it in such a way that it becomes measurable by researchers with average levels of education and training and then the results comprehensible by most decision makers in policy environments. Mustafa et al. (2011) devised a quantitative VCI, which was used for vulnerability assessment in the field study sites to get a sense of the respondent household’s relative vulnerability levels. In this chapter we will be discussing the rationale for using the VCI, validating the results by neighborhood and household, and finally how it links to quantitatively and qualitatively assessed patterns of violence recorded through the research. The issue here is not just the associations between vulnerability and violence but also what might be the material pathways through which, higher vulnerability scores and profiles translate into violent geographies.

4.1 VULNERABILITIES AND CAPACITIES INDEX

As mentioned above, in this research we understand vulnerability to be socially driven as a result of patterns of material and social marginalization and political economic factors. We are using the quantitative VCI by Mustafa et al. (2011) to undertake a quantitative assessment of household level vulnerability in the urban field study sites. The VCI identifies twelve drivers of vulnerability, which are divided into three categories as listed below.
• material - individual assets, livelihoods, education, and exposure to hazard;
• institutional - social networks, extra-local kinship ties, infrastructure, warning systems, employment and minority status;
• attitudinal vulnerability - knowledge and sense of empowerment\(^1\).

The VCI was chosen over other vulnerability indices for a number of reasons: one, the architecture of the VCI is simple and analytically encompasses three important dimensions of vulnerability (material, institutional and attitudinal). Two, it provides a robust comparative metric of vulnerability that is easy to understand. And three, it is a peer reviewed and field-tested tool that therefore has academic credibility.

Weights assigned to material, institutional and attitudinal vulnerabilities are 35, 50 and 15 respectively. The maximum VCI score is 100. While the weightages of the three categories are fixed, there is flexibility in assigning weightages to the variables within each category. Annexure I gives summary tables of the urban household level VCI used to do the vulnerability scoring.

The weights assigned to each of the variables were based upon theoretically informed judgments on their contribution to vulnerability, and on consultations with field researchers and study managers. These variables were incorporated in the household and community survey questionnaires (see Annexure IIa and IIb). The quantitative data from the household surveys together with some information from key informant interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) were used to calculate the VCIs at community and household levels. Figure 4.1 shows the box plots for household level vulnerability in each of the neighborhoods across Rawalpindi-Islamabad and Karachi.

\(^1\) Previous research has linked ‘sense of empowerment’ to vulnerability and capacity (Delica-Willison and Willison, 2004). Mustafa et al (2011) note that for the VCI this specifically refers to perceived access to local and regional power structures and a personal sense of efficacy in terms of participation in local decision-making.
Figure 4.1: BOX PLOTS FOR HOUSEHOLD VCI SCORES BY NEIGHBORHOODS ACROSS RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD AND KARACHI.
It is important to note that VCI is a tool for comparative analysis rather than an absolute indicator of vulnerability. A higher VCI score would mean a higher level of vulnerability and vice versa. However, while interpreting the results of the VCI survey the following constraints must be borne in mind:

- Vulnerability is a dynamic process but the VCI score can only capture a snapshot in time of the state of vulnerability;
- VCI categories and weightages thereof are based upon the South Asian experience. Some of the categories and weightages thereof may have to be modified for different contexts.
- VCI scores are for comparative purposes. The score by itself does not mean anything. Therefore, it is important that there is consistency in applying the weightages across field sites.
- VCI’s simplicity and ease of use is its strength but could also be a weakness in the sense that it will inevitably miss some inter-linkages and nuances of the drivers of vulnerability.
- VCI scores are meant to be used in conjunction with narrative/qualitative vulnerability analysis, not instead of them. Sometimes, there may be a temptation to dispense with the qualitative analysis altogether, which must be resisted.

The above limitations notwithstanding, VCI scores can provide a simplified snapshot of differential vulnerability that can be an invaluable tool for action. But beyond action for our purposes the VCI score helps us rank the neighborhoods and households and then explore the associations that might be there with regard to factors extraneous to the architecture of the VCI. If the objective is to find drivers of violence, then associations with gendered vulnerability (which is part of the architecture of the VCI) will help us understand how vulnerability might bear upon the creation of violent geographies. We turn to that question below after we have briefly validated the VCI scores in the following section, by comparing them with ethnographic evidence for the same households to see if they match in their assessments of household vulnerability and experience of violence.

4.2 VALIDATING THE VCI

In this section we discuss selected cases of high and low VCI scores from Rawalpindi-Islamabad and Karachi to compare our quantitative VCI based vulnerability assessment with the ethnographic data that we have collected on each of the households. Our first case study is of a male respondent in the Dokh Naju area of Rawalpindi. Dokh Naju is a highly exposed neighborhood of lower middle class and working class residents. The neighborhood is ethnically mixed, with a majority being of indigenous Punjabi/Potowari residents, whilst most of the rest of the respondents are migrants from different parts of the country and are of mixed ethnic backgrounds. Mr. Syed is a small businessman with a construction business and he had one of the lowest VCI scores – 40 - in our sample. He is 33 years old with two children. Both he and his wife have 10 years of schooling, which is equivalent to a Pakistani secondary school certificate. He deems himself an activist in the neighborhood with a leadership role in the affairs of the community, thereby showing a high level of empowerment. His income vulnerability score is high because he is the sole breadwinner, but his household educational vulnerability is low because of his wife being educated. Although he is not part of any formal
networks, his extended family lives non-locally and can be a source of help. He is a homeowner and has enough assets to sustain him through tough times. His house also happens to be little further away from the banks of the Lai and is hence less exposed to the flood hazard as well as the solid and liquid waste nuisance that pollutes the Lai all year around.

Unlike Syed, there is the case of 20 year old Ayesha in Ali Akbar Shah Goth, Karachi, a Bengali-Burmese, married mother of 7 and pregnant at the time of the interview. Her VCI score is a high 77. Her husband is a part-time fisherman, who has not been able to go fishing for the past couple of seasons because of some complications at the docks. Her part-time job as a factory worker is also unstable. She used to contribute to the family income by weaving carpets, but has stopped for a long time because she did not think she was getting enough compensation from her brother-in-law who was contracting her services. She has had multiple pregnancies, and has a number of medical complications arising as a result and from malnutrition, but she is terrified of going to the hospital, less so because of the expense and more so for fear of the humiliation that she has suffered herself and has heard others suffering at the hands of the medical staff.

“When my seventh month completed, I went to the hospital for an ultrasound; they told me to get a hospital visiting card. They told me that for this I have to get four intravenous doses of iron. He told me that the hospital would not file my case, until I get the intravenous iron. They told me how could I give birth when I am too weak and have deficiencies in both water and blood. I told this to my husband and he brought fruits and milk for me, so that I could overcome the deficiencies. So I borrowed money and got the iron drip. . . . I am afraid of hospitals; they give extra and heavy doses of medicines. At home you have the support of mother and sisters, they all are sitting next to you, motivating you, in hospital this is not the case. In hospital if you cry or shout out from pain “kitni gandi gali dety hain, kitna beizzat krty hain”[they swear at you with dirty invectives and humiliate you]. Is it not better that you give birth at home?”

-Ayesha, female, 20, Ali Akbar Shah Goth/BQT, Karachi

Ayesha has tremendous difficulty getting water in her household for domestic use and drinking. Her main source for domestic water is a donkey cart water seller. Her mobility is severely limited because of cultural sanctions on women of her ethnicity working outside of her home. In fact, she is downright envious of other ethnicities in Karachi who allow their women to work outside. She has access to informal networks in her neighborhood and she has been a victim of violence as her biological father was murdered in her childhood during a robbery. Her sense of empowerment is minimal, as she says herself:
“The same way it was not in my fate to read, or to eat well, how could it be in the fate of my children”?

-Ayesha, female, 20, Ali Akbar Shah Goth/BQT, Karachi

Nobody in Ayesha's family has a computerized national identification card (CNIC), which is a prerequisite for her family to access any of the state services or to even be recognized by the state as legitimate citizens of the country. She says that they cannot muster the Rs.10,000 bribe that the tout insists they need to get the cards.

The story of Ayesha is somewhat reflected in the case of Zulekha who has a VCI score of 75. She lives in the Afghan Abadi, which was an informal settlement at the outskirts of Islamabad, largely populated by migrants from the KP province. She is an illiterate mother of two who lived in an extended family of 30 in the same household at the time of the interview. Since the interview, three of her brother-in-laws’ families had moved out, leaving behind ten people in her household, before the whole neighborhood was demolished in the summer of 2015 by the local authorities. Her husband is a day laborer in the local fruit and vegetable market. None of the household members are literate and even the children have not been to school because they do not have proper documentation [Form B], which is a pre-requisite for admission. She does not have a CNIC because of the cultural sensitivity of purdah and because her husband maintains that as a woman she does not need one, thereby making her practically invisible in the eyes of the state,

“We females don’t have ID cards because our males say that we can’t bring you to the office. There are a lot of males in the ID card office and they also take pictures. Our men say that they have their ID cards, so we women do not need to have it.”

-Zulekha, female, Afghan Abadi, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

The overall picture of Afghan Abadi, which was demolished by state authorities as highlighted in Chapter 2, is quite dismal in terms of access to services and infrastructure and that inevitably shows in the VCI profile of Zulekha. Her exceptionally high VCI score that classifies her household as extremely vulnerable is because of lack of education, empowerment, and lack of any networks, which could be a source of support extra-locally. She and the women in her household are frequently subjected to extreme forms of violence and hence her mindset of helplessness is exceptionally poignant. And it is not just that she is subjected to violence, the males in her household are also frequently picked up by the police, and subjected to violence, not only resulting in mental stress but also lost income.

At the opposite end of the VCI spectrum is the case of Sana in Dokh Naju with a score of 40 indicating low vulnerability. Sana is a 27-year-old single woman living in a joint family system with her disabled father, mother, an adult brother, a sister, who is separated from her husband, and her daughter. Her older brother died in a bomb blast in 2013. Sana’s father was a prosperous businessman before he
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suffered a severe stroke. Although she professes desperate financial difficulties, her household does have multiple sources of income e.g., rent from family owned shops, a car which runs on rent, brother's salary and sister's clothes stitching business. Her father was a sociable man and as long as he was healthy they enjoyed an active social life and support of the neighbors. But since his illness their social capital has declined significantly and this has further been accentuated by her families' paranoid restrictions on her mobility. As a consequence she is limited in her choice of jobs, despite having a masters' degree and a desire to get a job, and would happily accept a job closer to her place of residence. Her neighborhood enjoys reasonably good infrastructure, and her home is quite far away from the endemic flood hazard in the neighborhood. In this instance the issues of limited mobility, though not as much as in Afghan Abadi, illness in the family, and the heartbreak of losing an adult sibling does not add up to a high vulnerability score because of the high levels of male and female education, multiple sources of income, high valued property, and low exposure to local flood hazard.

The above four cases at the different ends of the vulnerability spectrum are presented to validate the urban VCI scores, which have earlier been validated for rural applications of the technique (e.g., see SPDC, 2015). The scores offer a reasonably accurate picture of social vulnerability at the household level in the urban areas. In the following section we discuss the relationship between violence and vulnerability.

4.3 VULNERABILITY AND VIOLENCE

From the very outset, the quantitative data on type of violence shows clear patterns between Karachi and the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad. In case of Karachi overwhelming number of respondents, more than 88% in almost all neighborhoods, except Gulshan e Bihar, reported a household member, or self, having been a victim of violence by strangers only, and by strangers and household members/family/acquaintances. This indicates very high levels of criminal violence in the city (Figure 4.2). On the other hand however, in Rawalpindi-Islamabad less than 35% of the respondents reported having been subjected to criminal violence by strangers in all the neighborhoods with the exception of Afghan Abadi, where about 43% of the respondents reported being victimized by strangers.
Again from the above plot it is obvious that much higher proportion of people in Karachi suffer from violence from strangers. We will discuss the causes of the relatively higher proportion in the case of Afghan Abadi below, but in terms of the sharp differences in the source of violence between the two cities, the VCI scores give some clue at the citywide level. Figures 4.3-5, plot the comparative VCI scores between the two cities for material, institutional and attitudinal vulnerability.
Figure 4.3: COMPARATIVE MATERIAL VULNERABILITY FREQUENCIES BETWEEN KARACHI AND RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD SAMPLES
Figure 4.4: COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL VULNERABILITY FREQUENCIES BETWEEN KARACHI AND RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD

![Graph showing institutional vulnerability frequencies between Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad.](image)

Figure 4.5: COMPARATIVE ATTITUDINAL VULNERABILITY FREQUENCIES BETWEEN KARACHI AND RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD

![Graph showing attitudinal vulnerability frequencies between Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad.](image)
The frequencies are obviously higher for Karachi because it is a bigger sample. But it is to be noted that there is virtually no difference in the attitudinal vulnerability distribution between Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad. In case of material vulnerability there is a relatively even distribution of vulnerability scores in the Rawalpindi-Islamabad sample while the Karachi sample has much more of a normal/bell shaped distribution indicating a concentration of frequencies between the second and the third quartile of the scoring range. In terms of institutional vulnerability however, there is a similar pattern of distribution except that Karachi has overall higher institutional vulnerability than Rawalpindi-Islamabad. This one clear pattern might explain the difference in the sources of violence between the two urban areas.

Institutional vulnerability is about social capital and the infrastructure and services that the state can and should provide. The state of access to infrastructure was visibly inferior in case of the poorer neighborhoods of Karachi than in case of Rawalpindi, something that has been pointed to in chapter 5 as well. In terms of social capital however, in case of Karachi, the machinations of the local political parties and their almost synergistic relationship with criminal elements at the local scale has spawned distinct ultra-violent geographies—something that many respondents often pointed out.

“There is a wave of fear in our area. There was a firing incident that happened yesterday [two policemen were killed]. There are drug dealers in the area, and the police are with them in this dirty game. Political parties are also involved in this”

-Male, Ali Akbar Shah Goth/BQT, Karachi

“The situation is very bad. I have to work very hard to earn money. The other day the political party people, by force, ate my fruits that I was selling. If I ask for money I know they will beat me.”

-Male, Ali Akbar Shah Goth/BQT, Karachi

But there is no inevitability about this pattern of violence in Karachi at least. As soon as the state decides to take action and enforce its writ the situation can improve dramatically as it did with the start of the paramilitary operation in Karachi in August 2013.

“Nothing much happens now [since the start of the paramilitary operation]. The thieves have left the neighborhood.”

-Male, Ali Akbar Shah Goth/BQT, Karachi
“Nothing happens when political workers are kept under control. When party workers fight violence happens. Otherwise it’s all peaceful [since the paramilitary operation].”

-Male, Ali Akbar Shah Goth/BQT, Karachi

“Violence was very common in the past but not now as the party workers have gone under ground.”

-Male, Ali Akbar Shah Goth/BQT, Karachi

We even got a chance to speak to some of the henchmen of one such party and his tale of being an extortionist for the party, and subsequently escaping the clutches of the party and his neighborhood to build a new life for himself in the outer periphery of the city is an interesting story in itself. We have discussed the case in chapter five.

In addition to the above, we did undertake Spearman’s Rho association test for non-parametric variables between categorized VCI scores and susceptibility to suffer violence. Unsurprisingly we found statistically significant (at more than 99% confidence level) but weak associations in only four neighborhoods, Mansoor Nagar, Christian Colony and Ghaziabad in Karachi and Afghan Abadi in Islamabad (Table 4-1 below).

Table 4-1: CORRELATION BETWEEN VCI AND VICTIM OF VIOLENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Spearman’s Rho statistic</th>
<th>p-value (2 tailed)</th>
<th>Correlation Strength</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>-0.103</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansoor Nagar/OT</td>
<td>-0.265</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Colony/OT</td>
<td>-0.286</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghaziabad/OT</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi-Islamabad</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Abadi</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Not finding associations was unsurprising in other neighborhoods because the experience of violence was almost universal across the two cities and neighborhoods, as shown in Figure 4.8 below. Where we do have less violence reported, it is more a function of reporting than any substantially less experience of violence, e.g., Ali Akbar Shah Goth. Therefore in the absence of any variance in experience of violence it is unlikely that we will find associations. Nevertheless, it is
interesting to note that the correlation between vulnerability and violence is negative in Karachi, i.e., households with higher VCI scores are less likely to be victims of violence, while in Islamabad, higher VCI scores are associated with the increased likelihood of being a victim of violence. This makes sense because in Karachi most of the violence is petty crime, and the most vulnerable are unlikely to be attractive targets for criminal violence. It is the less vulnerable who have the resources for them to be attractive targets. In Afghan Abadi, where much of the violence is also domestic, there is a positive correlation between violence and vulnerability. This trend is further confirmed with the significant, but weak, positive associations we found in some neighborhoods between domestic violence and vulnerability (Table 4-2 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Spearman's Rho statistic</th>
<th>p-value (2 tailed)</th>
<th>Correlation Strength</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansoor Nagar/OT</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi-Islamabad</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Abadi</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dokh Naju</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

In the following section we turn to disentangling the stories behind some of the associations that we have discussed in this section.

4.4 DISENTANGLING VULNERABILITY AND VIOLENCE ASSOCIATIONS

As mentioned in Figure 4.1 above, three neighborhoods; Ali Akbar Shah Goth and Christian Colony in Karachi; and Afghan Abadi in Islamabad, have the highest vulnerability profile of all the surveyed neighborhoods, with Afghan Abadi and Ali Akbar Shah Goth having an average VCI score of 70, indicating extremely high vulnerability. On the other hand, in terms of violence, more than 70% of the respondents across all the neighborhoods of the three cities reported having a household member subjected to violence with the highest percentage reported in Raes Amrohi (89%) in Karachi and Afghan Abadi (86%) in Islamabad (Figure 4.6 below). The Lines Area neighborhood in Karachi is an exception where about 55% reported being victims of violence and unexpectedly this also presented in Ali Akbar Shah Goth, an extremely vulnerable neighborhood, which reported a relatively lower 67%. With regard to Lines Area the finding is not as surprising, although the neighborhoods we worked in are low-income, overall the area is located very centrally in Karachi and is close to many
relatively posh neighborhoods with a good presence of the state and its security apparatus. Furthermore the poverty levels in this neighborhood are relatively low with good infrastructure; hence the Lines Area also has a low vulnerability score comparable to Arya Mohallah and Dokh Saidan in Rawalpindi—the other two neighborhoods with moderate to low vulnerability profile.

Figure 4.6: PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS REPORTING HAVING BEEN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE BY NEIGHBORHOOD ACROSS KARACHI AND RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD.

The other neighborhood of Ali Akbar Shah Goth has relatively lower reporting of violence in the questionnaire because we had tremendous difficulty initially in gaining the trust of the community in order for them to speak frankly to the research team. Consequently, many of the respondents were reluctant to discuss their experience of violence initially or any kind of risk to them. For example 17% of the respondents said that they had no risks natural or otherwise to themselves or their families and 19% refused to give any answer to the question about violence in their neighborhood. The ethnographic and photographic evidence from the neighborhood, however, bears out that in fact, if anything, this is a highly violent neighborhood with endemic domestic and criminal violence. However, the domestic violence is so prevalent that many of the women and men in particular did not even consider it as anything out of the ordinary and probably did not think that domestic violence even merited mention as specifically violence against them, as outlined in the questionnaire.
For example whilst not many respondents in Ali Akbar Shah Goth reported being a victim of domestic violence, it was pervasive enough that many respondents frequently listed it as a frequent occurrence in the area—even if they themselves were not victims of it.

“There is a family in a house adjacent to our home. They beat their daughter in law very badly. Couple of times I intervene to sort out the matter. One day they beat her so badly that she was not able to walk for a week.”

-Male, Ali Akbar Shah Goth/BQT, Karachi

The ethnographic evidence is unequivocal with regard to intersecting incidences of state, infrastructural and violence of disempowerment occurring in this neighbourhood and the other highly vulnerable ones, Afghan Abadi and Christian Colony. Given Ali Akbar Shah Goth’s proximity to the Arabian Sea, it is highly exposed to coastal storms surges, but beyond that environmental hazard the community is exposed to social hazards of violence, unemployment, drugs, crime, lack of adequate water supply and lack of a warning system and other infrastructure for evacuation or for bringing in supplies. Underpinning this hazard profile is the fundamental issue of the invisibility of the mostly Burmese-Rohingya and Bengali population to the state, by virtue of their inability to secure the Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC), which becomes the basis for claims made by the citizens of Pakistan on the state in terms of access to health, education and employment (Anwar, 2013b). Much of the violence then is also an outcome of this, where unemployed youth are pushed into being extortionists and gangsters, because they have no expectations from the state and the political parties, e.g., the MQM provide them with the modicum of power and the ability to play their masculine bread earning roles. The example of Kabir (fictitious name) is illustrative in this regard.

“Burmi-Bengali boys of a certain age 18 – 30 have lots of problems. Their elders and parents made fishing their major income source. Catch fish, distribute fish. The boys however, don’t want to do this kind of work. They want to work during the day and stay at home at night. They don’t want to go on the fishing launches that take you for 6 to 7 days that requires day and night work. They prefer working in factories like garments, hosiery etc. But even in these jobs there is stress. The biggest challenge is of the identity card, which NADRA refuses to make for us. The CNIC is necessary to get a job in factory and these boys’ parents also don’t have ID cards. If there is no NIC card then a proper job is not possible. You can’t buy a ticket to travel, children can’t be admitted in school, you can’t get a birth certificate, if...”

“...you marry there is an issue with your nikahnama (marriage certificate), can’t open a bank account, can’t rent a house, cannot get ownership papers for a property. When young boys will not get their citizenship rights, and they will be made mehroom (deprived) then what pathways are left for them?”

-Male, Ali Akbar Shah Goth/BQT, Karachi
The above quote obviously emphasizes the importance of the CNIC in the career prospect of a young man in Pakistan in general and the community in particular. But there is also the undercurrent of a desire to insert oneself into the industrial urban society, which now surrounds them. Their parents with their fishing livelihoods in the informal sector were probably not as dependent upon the state to realize their ambitions and livelihoods. The newer generation with its ambitions and the desire to make claims upon the state and the society certainly is.

NIC is not just a conduit for men to realize their masculine roles as breadwinners but also a means for them to consummate their citizenship. In case of the Afghan Abadi, which was highly exposed to flood hazard, because it now no longer exists, having been demolished by the authorities in the summer of 2015, CNIC was also a conduit for insecure masculinity to violently enforce a certain vulnerable and dependent version of femininity. For example:

_Interviewer: “You don’t feel the need for an NIC for registering marriage or traveling?”_

_Respondent: “. . .(laughing) You are talking about travel so let me tell you that I never travel anywhere since I migrated here. I only travel to the hospital near us in the city. Our males don’t allow us to go to the market and do all the grocery shopping themselves. Our males are very aggressive if we don’t obey them, they start beating us without any reason or explanation.”_

-Female, Afghan Abadi, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

The males of Afghan Abadi are mostly day labourers at the nearby vegetable market. They have quite fragile livelihoods, the perpetual threat of eviction—which was realized in summer 2015 - large families living in small rooms, and very high exposure to flood hazard from the neighboring stream Lai. The connection between the extreme vulnerability and lack of power was not lost upon the respondents in the Afghan Abadi.

_“Our houses are made of mud (you can see), which create problems during heavy rain. We live in dirt and our children play in dirt and then get sick. We don’t have any hospital facility here. I think all this violence because our life is miserable. Being a female I feel that women have no importance in men’s lives. I see my neighbors and relatives beating and abusing their women. But man is the pillar of home and a bread earner so we have to endure all that.”_

-Female, Afghan Abadi, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

The lives of the men in Afghan Abadi are difficult to say the least as they at times live 10 to a room in cramped quarters. Furthermore, ever since the escalation of the war on terror, and its epicenter in North-Western Pakistani Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the locals of Afghan Abadi have particularly come under suspicion for engaging in criminal and terror related activity.
“Police is the biggest threat for us. If you want to know how by all means come by at 7 in the morning. You will come to know what they actually do. On daily basis they arrest people from community and ask for money from their families. If we don’t provide them money they send our persons in jail and from there they are released through bail and payment of more money.”

-Female, Afghan Abadi, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

Because of their linguistic and ethnic affinity with the Afghans even their Pakistani credentials are under suspicion. Therefore the interaction of the community with the Pakistani state is largely negative, not just in terms of frequent raids, arrests and denial of basic services, but almost in terms of routinized violence. Image 4.1 for example shows the routinized violence that the males of Afghan Abadi face on a daily basis.

Image 4.1: A POLICEMAN ON THE BEAT IN THE VEGETABLE MARKET FOLLOWED BY STREET KIDS.
The picture is that of a police officer being followed by street children from the area. The police officer goes on a round in the vegetable market and routinely turns over the fruit and vegetable carts of the vendors and laborers. The children are almost like crows following a predator, because they end up picking up and stealing the fruits, vegetables or any other items that fall to the ground and are thereby deemed fair game by them. This photo was taken by a resident of the area as part of his participatory photography exercise. It is also this perverse behavior of the state that contributes to the higher institutional vulnerability of the neighborhood and hence also to the violence by strangers, primarily state representatives.

All of the stresses of the Afghan Abadi, when they overlap with an extremely misogynistic cultural narrative, inevitably lead to extreme violence. But it is not specific to the Pashtuns from the North-Western Pakistan. In Karachi too, in Ali Akbar Shah Goth or even in the Christian Colony, gendered violence is sometimes as intense but is spawned by different cultural narratives. For example in Ali Akbar Ali Shah Goth, for young women to run off and marry of their own choice with young boys is routine practice. Eighteen-year-old Hareem, a mother of one child from her second marriage is a case in point. She married her first husband by running off with him and entering a court marriage paid for by her own savings. As she suffered physical abuse at her first husband’s house, she separated from him and came back to her father’s house, where she earned her living by making bridal dresses. Here again her father and brothers abused her as the quote below illustrates:

“Sometimes the [tailor] master from where I got work did not pay me on time. Due to delay I was not able to give money to my father on time so he beat me for this.”

[Her friend added] “As she married for love, her father said you earn and feed yourself and feed us as well.”

[Hareem continued] “I have to give money to my father as well. I have a brother who is younger than me–my friend here knew him. He also used to beat me severely. Because of all these people I married again.”

-Hareem and Friend, females, 18, Akbar Ali Shah Goth/BQT, Karachi

But her second marriage was not a bed of roses either. Here too her personal circumstances intersected with the environment of political violence and hooliganism in her neighborhood to make her a victim of violence once more. Her second husband used to be friends with her first husband and they had both courted her together. So when she separated from her first husband her second husband to be, started courting her again. Once there was a physical altercation between her first husband and her second husband outside her house, as the first husband was visiting her for reconciliation. Her second husband to be, at the time, called in the help of MQM people with whom
he was close, and had the first husband severely beaten up. The word however got around that she was the one who had called in the MQM with the following consequences:

“Amin [1st husband] came to me, he wanted to take me home but I refused, so he said, “If you will not come then stay here for the rest of your life”. After saying this he went away. When he came outside into the lane, Fahim [2nd husband to be] was standing there. Amin said to him: ‘What are you doing here?’ Fahim replied, ‘for as long as I live, I will keep on standing here.’ On hearing this Amin slapped him. Fahim then called the political party workers who came straightway to beat Amin.

“On hearing of the incident Amin's family assumed that I was the one who called the party workers. So they came here to beat me, to take revenge. The family misunderstood and assumed that the political workers had killed Amin, and they assumed that political party had taken their revenge as Amin had already killed a man in Ali Akbar Goth and that is why he was not living here.

“Amin's sisters dragged me in the street, by my hair, and then beat me up. My mother was expecting at the time and she suffered a miscarriage in this melee. Amin's sisters were continuously beating me and crying loudly.”

-Hareem, female, 18, Akbar Ali Shah Goth/BQT, Karachi

In this instance, as in the case of other women we interviewed, they had the agency to marry of their own accord, often to escape violence at home. But even there, often as second wives, they had to face violence not only by their new families but by previous ones as well. Women were also exploited sexually by interlocutors with the state who facilitated marriage, divorce, and police related proceedings. In Hareem’s case her sister was a victim of acid throwing by her former husband. Her case was picked up by a television anchor and evidently she got her attacker arrested and also got compensation from the channel. She too remarried her lover, and was now living with her new husband. Her case was also pursued by a local interlocutor with the government, who extracted material and sexual favors from the women and their families for his services.

In Ali Akbar Shah Goth polygamy and run-away court marriages appear to be common and people at times dream about having a conventional marriage. Hareem and many women like her are subjected to domestic violence, not just by husbands and in-laws but also by their own families. This violence often becomes the cause for running away and entering into another marriage, which often also turns violent, partially because of the stigma attached to run-away marriage despite its mundane frequency. The supposed ‘loose character’ of such women becomes the reason by all to humiliate them. Besides this, there is also the institutional violence, in terms of having to give sexual favors to interlocutors with the state or infrastructural violence when one has to make major financial sacrifices to gain access to water as documented in one of the earlier chapters. So in this case
domestic, institutional and infrastructural violence overlap to create the violent geographies of the men and women of Ali Akbar Shah Goth.

Furthermore, in Christian colony, Orangi Town, the other high vulnerability area, the high score is driven largely by high levels of unemployment, poor infrastructure and the minority status of the community. Unlike Ali Akbar Shah Goth, Ghaziabad or many other neighborhoods of Karachi, there is not much of a tradition of artisan work like stitching, embroidery or garments cottage industry in this neighborhood. Many of the residents are, as the name suggests, of the minority Christian faith and are migrants from Punjab or interior Sindh. They tend to be more inclined towards attaining jobs as domestic workers, nurses, sanitary workers and small time business. It is in the attainment of such jobs that they tend to run into the religious discrimination aspect.

“When we search for jobs outside our community, we can’t really find any, even if we go looking for the job of an ayah [maid]. People first ask are you a Muslim or a Christian. Religion matters. If we say we are Christian, then it is likely we will not find a job. I have suffered so much. If I work in this mohallah I will find a job for Rs 400 sweeping. I have looked for jobs outside and have experienced this difference. I looked in Moti Mahal, Ziauddin Hospital. I was frustrated everywhere, and never found a job (bauhout dhakay khai, milee kahee naheen). I also went to bungalows looking for work as a housemaid, for Rs 1500, but left because the pay was barely enough to cover transport expense. In Ziauddin I was finding something for Rs 2500 per month but working for 12 hours per day, as a cleaner.”

-Antonomous FGD participant, Christian Colony/OT, Karachi

The low-income status at times directly contributes to violence, especially domestic violence, as reported by the survey respondents. Here the strains of gaining expensive access to such basic amenities, like water, couple with the expense of children’s education to cause domestic strife.

“Now if the husband returns all tired after a day's work. There is no water in the house, food hasn’t been cooked and then if the wife says, children’s school fee has to be paid—it will cause a fight. The husband is going to say, shall we pay for their food or their fee. There is no need to get them educated. Have them stay at home, what the hell are they going to accomplish by getting an education?”

-Maria, female, Christian Colony/OT, Karachi

The above scenario works, assuming that the husband has a job, which is often not the case. The modal income vulnerability for the neighborhood is 10 while the average is 8.5, indicating highly unstable and fragile livelihoods. This too leads to violence domestically.

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“My children are in school. But my house is being run by my brother in law. My husband goes to work but God knows what he does. When I ask him, he takes a danda [stick] and threatens me, or beats me, and the children. My household conditions are very bad. I too am looking for a job, anything small.”

-Female FGD participant, Christian Colony/OT, Karachi

This lack of jobs is then coupled with perpetual insecurity with regard to threats of religious violence hanging over their heads particularly with regard to the blasphemy laws of the country as illustrated below.

“In street 3 there was a Bengali Muslim whose neighbor was a Christian. The Christian’s roof was of concrete while the Muslim’s roof was of corrugated iron. The little child of the Christian would often urinate into the open yard of the Bengali. The kid was 9 years old. The Muslim complained many times to the Christian to stop his son. Last time it so happened that the child urinated on the corrugated iron and the urine dripped into the Muslim’s room. The Bengali Muslim said that the urine dripped on to a copy of the Quran, and as soon as he said that, all hell broke loose. Thank God the thing did not go too far. The Muslim Nazim (councilor), Member Provincial Assembly (MPA) came over, as did the Rangers and the police and fired tear gas shells at the gathered crowd, after which it dispersed. Since then everybody is very careful and on the edge, so that people live well with each other. At the moment the Christian Committee people are all political and members of the MQM. It is because of that [MQM] membership that things get controlled quickly and do not worsen.”

-William, male, 25, Christian Colony/OT, Karachi

The neighborhood is the stronghold of MQM, which is an important conduit for the community for political participation, and gaining patronage and protection. But that patronage and protection come at a price. MQM also runs an all-encompassing extortion and protection money system in the neighborhood, which on the one hand becomes a source of providing authority and money to the young unemployed men of the area, while on the other, a license to engage in hooliganism and extortion without fear of repercussions.

“Youth is highly into the politics. You see if a boy gets inducted [in a party] he tries to bring all his friends into the same loop and here is how it goes. They want to make money quick, they want to be famous, and they want to intimidate people and get respect. Their parents
The same ethos also, hinder many people’s ability to make a livelihood when they cannot afford to meet the universal extortion demands of the political parties, e.g., one of our respondents could not run his tailoring business because he could not afford to meet the extortion demands of the MQM.

Although there are specialized religious and philanthropic organizations operating within the community, the high vulnerability profile of the community is also driven by low levels of reported social networks. This is partially because of the low level of credibility that many of these organizations enjoy in the community and their hierarchical structure, where the elites capture the resources, with little flowing down to the general public. It is small wonder then that the community demonstrates a high vulnerability score, 8 out of the highest possible score of 10, based upon lack of social networks.

In Christian colony then, the high vulnerability is driven by high levels of material vulnerability driven by high levels of unemployment. The violence in the neighborhood at the domestic level is driven by such high vulnerability. There is also the aspect of infrastructural violence that we document in chapter 5, which also has a strong gender dimension. At the public level, the same level of unemployment and the insecure life that the community lives by virtue of being a religious minority, in an environment charged with religious sensitivities drives the violence. The community seeks protection against religious persecution through its allegiance to the MQM, but the same allegiance costs the community in terms of extortion and gang violence with the party workers. We summarize the contrasts between the high vulnerability neighborhoods discussed in this chapter, and the larger lessons of this chapter in the concluding section below.

4.5 CONCLUSION

The VCI method used to measure the vulnerability of the households and communities in the sample yields results that are consistent with the vulnerability profiles of the households and communities assessed through other methods. The VCI method can therefore be a useful low cost way of measuring vulnerability and ranking the threat levels that communities might face, not just from environmental, but also social hazards. We discussed in detail three neighborhoods, which had the highest household vulnerability scores, one in Islamabad, and the other two in Karachi.

The neighborhoods had high levels of violence, though in case of Ali Akbar Shah Goth those violence levels were not reflected in the quantitative data, partially because of the initial trust deficit that the survey teams had to overcome in order to induce people to speak more frankly about such issues. In the Afghan Abadi, which has ironically since been razed by the authorities, the main drivers of violence are the misogynistic cultural ethos coupled with fragile livelihoods and high levels of direct state violence. Part of the fragility of the community also derives from their inability to gain legitimacy from the state as citizens through the acquisition of a national identity card (NIC). The NIC
issue was as urgent for the Burmese-Rohinga and Bengali community in Ali Akbar Shah Goth as it was for thePashtuns of the Afghan Abadi. Both were perceived to be populated by foreigners even though they were Pakistani by all accounts. In Ali Akbar Shah Goth, women did exercise their agency to make personal choices like marriage and love affairs, but those choices also carried a stigma of them being ‘loose’ and led to being subjected to violence. Repeat marriages were also a way to escape one violent situation, only to end up in another. These patterns of gender violence intersected with the gang violence carried out under the protection of dominant political parties in the neighborhood, just the same as in the Christian Colony. In the Christian colony the high levels of unemployment translated into high domestic violence and the need for protection and patronage threw the community into the hands of the dominant political party, which on the one hand protected them, but also extorted them for that protection.

We summarize the main findings of this chapter below:

- VCI is a robust instrument to compare the relative vulnerability of households and neighborhoods. It can provide a good indicator of the vulnerability to environmental and social hazards.
- Higher vulnerability seems to be associated with higher levels of violence, especially random criminal and state violence.
- Higher vulnerability scores are largely a function of institutional vulnerability.
- State’s absence in terms of providing social protection, infrastructure and other facilities seem to be a cause of higher levels of more intense violence in the study neighborhoods.
- In case of Afghan Abadi, besides culture, the state is the direct perpetrator of violence.
- In case of Ali Akbar Shah Goth, despite women’s apparent agency to decide upon personal matters, they are still exposed to violence both publically and in the domestic sphere.
- In both Christian Colony and Ali Akbar Shah Goth, gang violence under political protection often intersects with the domestic sphere to spawn geographies of intense gendered violence.
- In case of the Christian Colony, as in case of the Ali Akbar Shah Goth, the protection and patronage of the politically powerful comes at a price of exposure to their violence.
- In the case of Christian colony much of the vulnerability is driven by unemployment, because there are limited sources of income through household cottage industry, as in case of Ali Akbar Shah Goth.

In light of the above major findings, a number of policy prescriptions could suggest themselves, but those prescriptions will have to be neighborhood specific. The VCI instrument could be useful as a diagnostic, which could help identify priority areas and households. The patterns of violence that emerge largely refer to the (perverse) role of the state, or the absence of it in the first instance. This is particularly through the lack of access to basic instruments, such as the CNIC, to make claims on the state. In the second instance they point to the lack of services job training, counseling and training for women in particular to protect them against the cycles of violence they find themselves in. The themes highlighted in this chapter will be further reinforced by the following chapters.
regarding the importance of infrastructure, services and mobilities in the geographies of violence. For now this chapter has highlighted a more encompassing metric of vulnerability through which to understand violence.
Building on our qualitative and quantitative empirical findings, this chapter sets out the context and synthesized discussion of mobility through the lens of gender in Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad. Specifically, it analyses gender as a mediator of mobility, an issue that has received limited policy attention in terms of linkages with violence and vulnerability in urban Pakistan. Mobility is understood not only as literal physical movement such as transport, but also as a socialized movement or a contextualized activity imbued with meaning and power in urban space (Uteng, 2009; Urry, 2004; Uteng & Cresswell, 2004). An analysis of mobility is basically about gender and its performative iterations, which are culturally, socially, geographically, and politically different and dynamic. But mobility is not always a matter of choice; for many it is a matter of fate determined by multiple factors such as class, geography and access to resources that shape mobility levels within cities. How then do women and men manage their lives in Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad in terms of spatial mobilities? How might this generate perceptions of fear and violence? How differentiated are physical and gendered mobilities between diverse neighborhoods and across cities?

The structure of this chapter is as follows: In section 5.1 a brief sketch of gendered mobilities is presented to identify associated meanings. In section 5.2, we use quantitative and qualitative data to describe the state of respondents’ access to transport across diverse neighborhoods within and between cities. In 5.3, we discuss how the discursive and the material interact to conflate mobility and masculinity in a broader context of violence. This dynamic is operationalized through various interconnected spaces: the home, the street and the city. Gendered mobilities become crucial in the navigation of different spaces, specifically the delineation of certain spaces as safe and others as dangerous becomes a key part of everyday discourses of being (im)mobile women and men in both cities. We draw some conclusions in section 5.4.

5.1 MOBILITIES AND ASSOCIATED MEANINGS

Mobility is truly a hallmark of our modern times and its positive coding as progress and freedom are universally accepted. But mobility is often constrained through the restriction of movement, control and risk. The crossroads of mobility and gender are complex and infused with power and contested understandings of what constitutes social, material, political and cultural relations. Moreover, the performative dimension of gender and its resultant interpretations have an enormous bearing on physical movement and its meaning and experiences. Mobility is constructed and experienced in a gendered way and contributes to the reproduction and contestation of gender itself. How mobility is
given meaning through discourse and representation matters considerably as these are differentiated by gender. Mobilities are experienced and practiced differently by men, women and transgenders and this process is constantly in a state of flux. How mobility is enacted and embodied also matters as it goes beyond the trope of seeing women as static and men as mobile, instead understanding this difference as reproducing power relations that produce such differences in the first place (Uteng & Cresswell, 2004).

In Pakistani society and generally across South Asia, masculinity is often coded as mobile and femininity as static and these constructions exist in relation to one another and generate a differentiated gendered mobility for managing daily lives (Srivastava, 2012). Masculinity stands in a relationship of superiority to feminine identity and is often represented as possessing characteristics that are the binary opposite of feminine identity. However, masculinity mediated through complex social relations is oppressive not only towards women but also men who deviate from dominant notions of class, and socio-cultural settings. These key points are central to our analysis of how gendered mobilities disable and enable as well as modify violent processes, and how material and cultural struggles over gender norms influence the causes and consequences of mobility.

The overlap between gendered mobilities and space is an important one. In our everyday lives, the categorization of public and private play a key role in the beliefs held about how society works or should work. Hence, it is not uncommon to understand certain spaces, for instance the street, as public and others, such as the home, as private. Even though there is no strict geography of the public and private, there still are certain behavioral norms in terms of seeing the ‘public’ as the natural preserve of men. In this ideal, men are expected to move easily between the public and private, and women’s mobility may be interpreted as transgression. This has a bearing on how we understand and address violence against both men and women in specific instances, e.g. in the street, in the home, an issue that is further explored in Chapter 7. If the public sphere is understood as ‘masculinized’, then exploring the relationship between gendered mobilities and violence throws light on the causes and nature of gender-based violence in public spaces, and that too in an urban context that is conditioned by a complex, historical continuum of violence.

Furthermore, daily travel also exhibits patterns that are gendered in behavioral and spatial terms. In the Anglo-American context, feminist geographers (Bondi & Rose, 2003) long ago pointed out that the analysis of daily travel patterns cannot be gender blind and that gender-differentiated roles related to spatial-temporal organization of familial activities create a greater burden on women in terms of fulfilling these roles, and lead to significantly different modes of travel, transport choices (car, rickshaw, motorcycle, bus) and travel behavior (Hanson & Hanson, 1981; Fox, 1983). How then does transport cater to women’s and men’s aspirations for freedom in the city?

Pertinent here are male notions of what constitutes violence and how these guide both men’s and women’s recognition and negotiation of it. For instance in Karachi a young woman who experiences harassment on her way to work or home may consider it a trivial matter because her father suggests she must learn to live with it. Or else to avoid risk or harassment, she invokes strategies of self-protection and behavioral constraints such as veiling or travelling with male relatives or a group of female companions and uses specific types of transport perceived as secure. Although such self-imposed cautionary practices hardly ever work, they are nonetheless continually evoked as the primary response to all manners of harassment and abuse thereby limiting mobility significantly.
Simultaneously, male-to-male sexual harassment also further complicates the performance of masculinity, for instance child abuse. In a similar vein, the involvement of young men in neighborhood politics heightens local residents’ anxiety. Both men and women take preventive measures to avoid daily journeys through certain streets and neighborhoods where male political party workers or ‘loafers’ are seen to linger. Moreover, for young men, feelings of frustration prevail when the only outlet for leisure is a shopping mall where mobility is constrained due to elite perceptions that the presence of such men undermines security.

In highlighting such dynamics, our intention is not to suggest that gendered mobilities and urban space simply disadvantage women more than men or representationally exclude them. Numerous female respondents perceive the city as a contradictory space that can be appropriated by them and we underscore this in our ensuing discussion. However, the issues of risk, anxiety and fear in the context of violence, material scarcities and poor social and physical infrastructures continue to undergird the relatively differentiated experiences of men’s and women’s mobilities in Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad. The experiences are inextricably bound up with the historical shaping of these cities, their structurally unequal landscapes, complex political-economies and violent forms of neighborhood politics, as elaborated already in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.

In the following two sections, we delve into the gendered mobilities of our respondents and their perceptions about access to transport and roads. The evidence presented here provides insight into the realities governing the daily mobilities of men and women in Rawalpindi-Islamabad and Karachi. In using a gendered perspective, we put into focus the differences between men and women in terms of their mobility practices across different spaces, attitudes towards work, transport and travel behavior, preferred modes of travel, diversity in perceptions of risk associated with (im)mobility in given neighborhoods, and the geographical, social and political-economic factors relating to the diversity in perceptions and experiences. We will however note that we did not come across enough transgendered respondents in our sample, at least in Karachi, to make them a subject of analysis for the purposes of this chapter. This in no way indicates our indifference towards the mobility issues that they may confront; it is simply a function of their limited representation in our sample (all 3 transgendered respondents are to be found in the samples in Rawalpindi). Box 1 below highlights the experiences of these transgendered respondents, and aims to shed light on the realities faced by such individuals.
BOX 1: TRANSGENDER MOBILITIES

For transgender persons or khusras, restrictions on mobility begin within the household where gender roles are often framed within dominant, hetero-normative constructions. In urban Pakistan, transgender persons live in precarious conditions. Their lives are organized in structurally discriminated conditions in terms of access to services, such as education, health and livelihoods. Above all, they are excluded due to their gendered embodiment and performance. Riaz, a 40-year-old transgender, reveals an internalization of hetero-normativity and feelings of self-loathing, as she stated in an informal conversation: “Allah has gifted you with a proper gender. If I show you my nude body, you will feel scared and will not be able to eat for three days.” Riaz explained such feelings are embedded in a process of socialization:

“I have not seen even the face of my parents. When I grew up a little, my mother came to know that I am a transgender…. This is the picture of my mother with me, hanging on the wall behind you. I have hung my picture below hers, in her feet... Now, my mother has passed away. I met her before her death for one hour.”

A majority of transgender persons have migrated to Rawalpindi-Islamabad from different parts of the Punjab, KP and Azad Kashmir. Usually the head of a transgender family is a guru and socialization is organized around the dera. In conventional terms, a dera is a meeting point usually for men in Punjab. But for a transgender person, deras are living places or business centers and socializing or meeting points. According to a transgender respondent:

Dera is an important place because our friends visit us here, [we] sit here, chat to each other, smoke cigarettes [laughter], merrymaking, we cook together, eat together, we enjoy it here. This is the place where we can invite our friends, and even receive invitations for functions…. Our beloved zenamay friends or saheliyan (girlfriends) come to see us, we show hospitality and welcome them with warmth and have private fun and chat, instead of standing on the road, where we are being watched, teased and cursed. This place holds a very special status, it is where we socialize and even get support in the times of trouble.

During the fieldwork, our transgender respondents explained that their lives revolve around the dera, a place that unites them as a family and offers a sense of protection. But the lack of education in the transgender community puts limits on livelihood options. It is often the guru who pinpoints ways of earning a living for instance through dhinga (begging), or tolabazaar or bidhaee. Dhinga and tolabazaar are the traditional ways to earn a living in the transgender community in Rawalpindi. A sangat (group) of zenana (women) visit assigned areas in the city asking for money from shopkeepers, passersby and at traffic signals. The guru organizes groups or sangats and apportions them different parts of the city, from residential to commercial zones and especially traffic signal points. A transgender in Arya Mohallah, R-I, explained that sanguts rotate in different areas and this provides an equal opportunity for targeting both affluent and modest neighborhoods in the city.

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2 Tola means a sangat or group of transgender and bazar means market.
3 Bidhaee is congratulatory expression on the occasion of happiness.
Livelihoods based on bidhaee involve a transgender group visit to a private residence to celebrate the occasion of marriage or birth by singing and dancing. Shamim, a 30-year-old transgender from Arya Mohallah, R-I, explained that through bidhaee she was able to earn thousands of rupees, especially on the occasion of the birth of a son in a given family. Transgender experiences of dhinga and tolabaare reveals diverse stories of everyday verbal violence, compassion and their interactions with heterosexual society. Shamim highlighted that “It is easy to convince the women as opposed to the men who are always unkind. They bully us, use dirty language and engage us in physical fights. I can tell you that sometimes the men don’t give the money until we [fellow khusras and me] show them our body parts.”

In urban Pakistan, dhinga or begging has become the most visible source of earnings in the transgender community. But begging is an unstable source because the guru, who maintains the dera, takes a sizable cut from the daily earnings. Since transgenders cannot maintain a stable income through begging alone, some turn to prostitution. According to Aroma, a 24-year-old transgender from Arya Mohallah, R-I, prostitution is on the rise:

“Poverty is the only reason. We do not want to go outside the dera. Our preference is to stay in the dera instead of roaming around for money…. [But] you know, one cannot survive on few hundred rupees or a thousand rupees of kherat (donations)....”

Correspondingly, for a vast majority of the transgenders in Arya Mohallah, prostitution has become a reliable source of earnings. Shamim explained: “We don’t want to go for paasha (prostitution) but the reason is hopelessness and poverty….the majority of them is forced into it, abused and raped.” Shamim further explained that prostitution was not appreciated within the transgender community and those who are engaged in it, are perceived as ‘do number’ (second rate) khusras.

Aside from the livelihood or economic constraints, transgender persons also experience restrictions in terms of everyday, physical movements within the city. Shamim’s case illustrates this point:

“I tell you a recent story…. I had to go to Islamabad from here [Liaquat Bagh]. I thought to go on Metro Bus, purchased a token, and went to the terminal. As you know there are two gates. I tried to get in through the first door; there were men. At the very moment they saw me, they started to laugh. I felt nervous and moved towards the next door. There were women in that section and as soon as I stepped in, I saw their expressions changing, as if they felt scared. I could not deal with the situation and stayed outside. Meanwhile the bus left.”

Our transgender respondents emphasized feeling powerless in terms of accessing government institutions. They explained that the guru is the only person who takes care of them and resolves disputes on their behalf, for instance pertaining to renting a house or lodging a complaint with a government department for interrupted electricity or water supply. The prospect of visiting a government office is perceived as a daunting task because a transgender person will be laughed at or humiliated. Furthermore, the appearance of transgenders on the streets is criminalized and they are treated as sex-workers or are penalized by the police. Consequently, transgender persons rely increasingly on their guru. For instance, Bubli Malik, a well-known guru, has registered a local NGO Wajood in Rawalpindi. The NGO works for the welfare of the transgender community and offers employment opportunities. Bubli Malik herself is running the cafeteria of the National College of Arts, Rawalpindi. Wajood and similar organizations are helping the transgender community to interact with the wider civil society and to facilitate their economic and physical mobility.

3 http://dw.com/p/tHed0
5.2 PHYSICAL MOBILITY

Our analyses of men's and women's attitudes, perceptions and practices of mobility reveal that at a basic level restrictions on both men's and women's mobility pivot on a combination of factors ranging from access to transport, income levels, location of neighborhood and overall political-economic conditions of each city. Even though the men and women under analysis belong roughly to the same income levels, mobilities still vary between neighborhoods and cities. Lack of car ownership leads to dependence on public transport such as buses and rickshaws. Other motorized forms of private transport such as motorcycles are also relied upon, but motorcycle ownership is not universal across households. We underscore that buses in urban Pakistan are structurally built in favor of men; they are clearly segregated and 70% - 80% of the area inside the bus is dedicated for men and the remainder is for women. This is, in a way, a reflection of the larger mobility dynamic in terms of the sheer difference in numbers and can sometimes even have harmful consequences for the females. On occasions, if the bus is really full and it is rush hour with a lot of people waiting to commute, the bus driver will force the women out of the bus and onto the street to make room for the men. A male respondent highlighted plainly this issue.

"The bus [driver] also does not stop for women because he knows that instead of one women, he can stuff four men in the same space. And sometimes if there are only one or two women in the front part of the bus, and a lot of men come, he will simply make them get off to accommodate the men, because that means more money for him."

-Umar, male, 42, Ghaziabad/OT, Karachi

In Pakistan's cities, daily commutes to and from work are often constrained by limited access to public transport and poor condition of roads. We can glean from Figure 5.1 that in Karachi and in Rawalpindi-Islamabad nearly 50% of respondents report no, poor or moderate access to transport and 68% report no, poor or moderate access to metalled roads. As indicated in Figure 5.2, this is more pronounced in Karachi where over 44% of respondents report poor or no access to transport and in Rawalpindi-Islamabad only 8% of respondents report no or poor access. Similarly, in Rawalpindi-Islamabad 17% of respondents report no or poor access to metalled roads and in Karachi 82% report same. Overall, 71% of respondents in Rawalpindi-Islamabad report good access to transport and only 18% in Karachi report the same. In Karachi, the higher share of poor or no access reflects severe infrastructural constraints associated with weak transport connectivity to the city center and a violent political-economy that has a strong bearing on respondents' travel behavior.
Figure 5.1: ACCESS TO TRANSPORT AND ROADS IN KARACHI AND RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD

Figure 5.2: ACCESS TO TRANSPORT AND ROADS IN KARACHI AND RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD
Moreover, in Karachi, in locations such as Orangi Town and Bin Qasim Town that are situated in the northwestern and southeastern edges of the city, residents confront long commutes to jobs that are found predominantly in the city center. Infrastructural disconnect is severe and access to transport often depends on roads that are generally in a state of neglect. Furthermore, in Orangi Town transport access is problematized by a political-economic situation in which residents, in order to commute to the city center, must negotiate certain transport corridors that have been deeply affected by Karachi’s historical ethnic violence. In Orangi Town, the junction of Banaras Chowk - a major transport hub - and its surrounding neighborhoods are dominated by Pakhtuns. Ethnic violence between Mohajirs and Pakhtuns has erupted frequently at this junction. Across the five neighborhoods surveyed in Orangi Town, our male and female respondents who commute to factories and attend colleges and universities in the city center, continually emphasized that travelling via Banaras Chowk always carried a high risk of being exposed to violence. Female respondents were particularly emphatic and a 25 year old from Ghaziabad, Orangi Town, explained:

“My family does not allow me to go to college now. One day when I was returning home after taking an exam, the city situation changed suddenly, everything shutdown in Banaras and violence erupted along with firing and torching of rubber tires. There was no public transport on the road. My friend and I were trapped on our way home but fortunately she had a mobile phone. She immediately called her brother who picked us from Banaras and dropped me home. My family was panicked because just standing at the Banaras junction poses a tremendous risk. After that incident my family has not permitted me to study further as that would mean commuting via Banaras to another part of the city.”

-Female, 25, Ghaziabad/OT, Karachi

In contrast, such complex dynamics between transport links, historically violent geographies and mobility are not pervasive in Rawalpindi-Islamabad, although there is difficulty posed by the transport police for residents in certain settlements such as Afghan Abadi. The differences between the two cities in terms of basic transport and road infrastructure is further accentuated when we examine respondents’ perceptions concerning ‘good access’ to all weather or metalled roads. As illustrated in Figure 5.2 (shown above), in Rawalpindi-Islamabad 51% of respondents report good access to all weather roads whereas in Karachi only 6% report the same. These are strong associations that indicate grave infrastructural constraints across low-income neighborhoods in Karachi when compared with Rawalpindi-Islamabad.

Furthermore, Table 5.1 below presents the gendered perception regarding access to transportation services and infrastructure. In Karachi, we find a strong evidence (p<0.001) of a moderate strength of association between gender and the adequacy of transportation access as measured by the Likert Scale. In addition, 42.4% of the male respondents ranked the access as ‘moderate’ while 43.7% of the female respondents ranked the same as ‘poor’. Rawalpindi-Islamabad, in contrast, exhibit a strong evidence (p<0.005) of a weak strength of association between gender and the adequacy of transportation access, where 63.2% of the males ranked the access as ‘good’ and 80.1% of women
also ranked the same as ‘good’. This further reiterates the divide between the two geographical locations as discussed earlier.

Table 5.1: GENDERED PERCEPTION OF ACCESS TO TRANSPORTATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENDERED PERCEPTION OF ACCESS TO TRANSPORTATION</th>
<th>Likelihood Ratio Chi Square</th>
<th>Sig (2-tailed)</th>
<th>Cramer’s V</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGGREGATE</td>
<td>199.522</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.313**</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>36.3% Moderate</td>
<td>47.9% Good</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>KARACHI</td>
<td>204.241</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.390**</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>42.4% Moderate</td>
<td>43.7% Poor</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lines Area/ JT</td>
<td>47.130</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.589**</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>43.1% Good</td>
<td>58.2% Excellent</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansoor Nagar/ OT</td>
<td>41.550</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.406**</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>37.2% Moderate</td>
<td>57.9% Poor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Raes Amrohi/ OT</td>
<td>88.842</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.651**</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>72.9% Moderate</td>
<td>48.9% Good</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christian Colony/ OT</td>
<td>54.077</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.551**</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>79.6% Moderate</td>
<td>50.0% Poor</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Akbar Shah Goth/BQT</td>
<td>95.363</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.473**</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>63.6% Poor</td>
<td>50.3% Poor</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghaziabad/ OT</td>
<td>38.625</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.471**</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>41.0% Moderate</td>
<td>53.3% Poor</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD</td>
<td>43.446</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.243**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>63.2% Good</td>
<td>80.1% Good</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghan Abadi</td>
<td>24.378</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.387**</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>42.6% Good</td>
<td>70.6% Good</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arya Mohalla</td>
<td>8.254</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
<td>55.6% Good</td>
<td>65.1% Good</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dokh Saidan</td>
<td>13.806</td>
<td>0.003**</td>
<td>0.278**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>73.3% Good</td>
<td>89.5% Good</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Significant at the 0.01 (99%) level (2-Tailed)

1 Likert scale used: 1-No Access; 2-Poor; 3-Moderate; 4-Good; 5-Excellent

Respondents’ perceptions about transport and road accessibility across different neighborhoods in both cities are further broken down for visual presentation in Figures 5.3-6. These tables indicate variations in perceptions across a range of income levels and types of settlements. Certain neighborhoods such as Afghan Abadi in Rawalpindi-Islamabad and Mansoor Nagar, Ghaziabad, Raes Amrohi in Orangi Town and others in Karachi indicate weak transport access and these are associated with diverse factors ranging from income levels, settlement type (legal/illegal), location and overall embedding in the city’s political-economy.
From Figure 5.3 we can glean that 42% of respondents in Afghan Abadi report a higher incidence of no, poor or moderate access to transport. In the remaining four neighborhoods, 16% to 32% of respondents report no, poor or moderate access to transport. The variation in perceptions between neighborhoods reflects differences in settlement types with Afghan Abadi being the poorest and most vulnerable settlement. The slightly higher share for Arya Mohallah reflects the low-lying location of the neighborhood, even though it is in the city center. The roadways frequently get flooded even from moderate rains—hence the perception of the poor quality of transportation access. Still, if we consider in aggregate terms the respondents’ perceptions across all neighborhoods, overall they report ‘good’ access to transport with France Colony and Dokh Saidan showing the highest incidence.
When we turn to male and female respondents’ perceptions about all-weather roads in Rawalpindi-Islamabad (Figure 5.4), 22% and 26% in Afghan Abadi and Dokh Naju, respectively, report poor access and in the remaining neighborhoods 4% to 18% of respondents report the same. Overall, 43% to 63% of respondents report relatively good access to all weather roads and this reflects the better state of infrastructure in Rawalpindi-Islamabad, the headquarters of the affluent Pakistani armed forces and the federal capitals respectively.

From Figure 5.5 below, it can be gleaned that across the seven neighborhoods surveyed in Karachi, it is primarily in the Lines Area (Jamshed Town) where respondents report a relatively rosy picture of physical mobility. In the Lines Area only 10% of respondents report no or poor access to transport whereas in the remaining 6 neighborhoods, 36% to 72% report no or poor access. This variation in perceptions reflects the diverse geographies of neighborhoods with certain neighborhoods such as the Lines Area situated in the city’s center and the remaining neighborhoods located in far-flung regions or emergent peri-urban zones. Over the past decade, Karachi has continued to expand in territorial terms but without concomitant upgrading of roads and transport networks for facilitating connectivity between new peri-urban settlements and the city center. Nevertheless, Karachi’s violent political conditions have also impacted female mobility within the Lines Area.
“The transportation system is terrible. I had to change two buses to reach college and you know there have been bombing incidents. Whenever I entered a bus, I start reciting holy verses for my safety. I suffered a lot in the commute. Sometimes buses were stopped during the journey and passengers were told they couldn't travel any further. Often this happened due to strikes. Buses would then change their routes and sometimes we were told that the bus was not working properly and half way through the journey we had to disembark and find another way to get to college or back home. It's really terrible situation, for females especially. Sometimes I didn't even know in which road I was standing.”

-Amna, female, 24, Lines Area/JT, Karachi

Figure 5.5: ACCESS TO TRANSPORT ACROSS NEIGHBORHOODS IN KARACHI

When we examine Figure 5.6 below concerning perceptions about all-weather roads, 5% to 29% of respondent’s report poor or no access across the seven neighborhoods surveyed in Karachi. However, 18% of respondents in Lines Area report good access in comparison with 2% to 8% of respondents in the remaining neighborhoods. Again, these variations in perceptions indicate the uneven transport conditions across Karachi’s territorial adjustments and the related political-economic dynamics of governance, as discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
Finally, and as a caveat, we note that across both cities, respondents who reported good and excellent access to transport also reported fewer experiences of violence as delineated below in Figure 5.7. We do not suggest there is a clear-cut correlation here but merely highlight that the findings for some of the neighborhoods are statistically significant as illustrated in Table 5.2 where Lines Area (Khi) and Ghaziabad (Khi) are both found to have moderate negative correlations. Here households that have a tendency of being victims of violence are associated with perceptions of inadequate infrastructure for transportation. Interestingly, Christian Colony (Khi) and Dokh Naju (Rwp/IsI) present a positive relationship indicating that households that have a tendency of being victims of violence are associated with perceptions of infrastructure for transportation that is superior in quality. Perhaps this is an issue that could be investigated further in future projects.
Set within the broader context of constrained and uneven physical mobilities, we now turn to a discussion of gendered mobilities. We focus on respondents’ perceptions, aspirations and discourses of (im)mobility across various interconnected spaces in Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad.
5.3 GENDERED MOBILITIES

As women and men move through different spaces – homes, streets, neighborhoods and the larger city - their movements indicate different ways in which mobility is operationalized. What then of the working class woman who is a factory worker or a nurse? Or the young men loitering in streets? Or the young lovers who transgress cultural and social norms to seek freedom in the city? More often than not, female mobilities produce anxieties with many people feeling that young women should not step out of the home or travel far or work. Moreover, her femininity, which is made obvious by the shape of her body, may constitute a risk to her as imagined from the point of view of men; she might fear being followed and threatened by strangers or young men loitering in streets. Or it is feared she may become morally corrupt if she stays outside for too long? Amongst many respondents, discourses of respectability paint a pleasant picture of family life as the source of a moral culture in which women form the bedrock of social stability. Home is seen as the locus of moral individuals, the place of masculine dominion and femininity undergirds the space of domesticity and the peace that men crave. As a female respondent in Afghan Abadi underscored: “Male is the pillar of home and bread earner that’s why we have to tolerate [violence].”

There is at play here a geography of fear associated with the outside as gendered mobilities unfold across diverse spaces: home, neighborhood and the larger city. In these different spaces, the discursive and the material intersect to conflate mobility and masculinity in the broader context of violence. Other than the obvious distinction between the home as private and the outside as public, the streets and neighborhoods in a settlement as compared to the larger context of the city, represent an interiorized world, a transitional space which can both facilitate and curtail certain kinds of mobilities, as can be seen in our field studies. Yet, fear and violence are not always connected with the outside or the public. As we discuss in Chapter 7, the ‘inside’ or the private/domestic is often a violent space and numerous respondents highlight the home as a space where they sense a lack of safety.

HOME

Negotiations over mobility both within and outside the home pivot on gendered constructions of male and female behavior, a dynamic that is invigorated by different contexts such as marital status, education levels, religion, age, ethnicity, and vulnerability. The operationalization of mobility through gender norms is unearthed from our personal interviews with men and women 18 to 55 years. Constrained mobilities and their negative implications persist across all neighborhoods in both cities. But gendered access to resources (time, skills, money, networks and technology) is highly differentiated between men and women and this is visible, for instance, in the way in which the home and the ‘outside’ are negotiated. Salma, 20, single, from Ghaziabad (OT), Karachi, is studying Intermediate. Since her mother’s death and her elder sisters’ marriages, Salma bears the double burden of managing her education and the household, which now consists of two brothers and her Father. Salma’s day begins early with a series of chores that include preparing breakfast and the rest of the day’s meals for the whole family, attending to them and serving a steady stream of guests. In between these chores she somehow finds time to study.
“After Asar prayer I go to the coaching center. On my way back I prepare the evening tea and alongside make the rotis. And if I get the time, I study or watch TV. I sleep after everyone gets back home at night and this can be as late as 2:00 am.”

-Salma, female, 20, Ghaziabad/OT, Karachi

Even though the study center is located in close proximity to her home, Salma is not permitted to walk outside alone, but must be accompanied by her brother. “My Father says don’t go alone as the situation is not good.” Salma’s Father is a community activist and his notion of what constitutes violence guides Salma’s recognition and negotiation of it. But Salma’s recognition of violence and how it constrains mobility is also guided by her female friends’ perceptions:

“Yes, it’s dangerous especially nowadays; it’s very risky. A few days back two of my friends were going together when some boys started following them back to their houses. When my friends reached their lane, the boys on the motorbike snatched my friend’s handbag and fled. All her documents and mobile phone were in that bag. The boys also taunt and mock girls and shout at them and this is harassment. Sometimes when I have to go alone and my brother is unavailable, then these boys shout at me but I have to ignore them. Now we say: they are barking so let them bark. If we give them importance and tell our parents, we wouldn’t be able to continue our education.”

-Salma, female, 20, Ghaziabad/OT, Karachi

During our fieldwork, masculine and feminine mobilities were reported differently in narratives that are embedded in power relations. A 26-year-old female respondent from Arya Mohallah, Rawalpindi-Islamabad, stated that she walks fast and looks straight or down whilst walking in the streets. She fears that someone might snatch her cell phone that contains her photographs, which could be misused. She compromises on her visibility by observing Purdah. Even though she talked enthusiastically about her desire to move around and partake in leisurely activities such as swimming and horse riding, her physical appearance or specifically her feminine body and her parents’ attitude remain obstacles according to her. In the home, family and relatives are a constituent part of social capital for reducing vulnerability. But they are also a key component in policing the mobility of young women. Several young women emphasized that working outside the home, especially alongside men was not possible due to family pressure. Amna, 24, university educated and a resident of Lines Area, Karachi, explained:
“My family does not allow me to do any job; actually they don’t allow me to do work with gents. Even though this should not happen. …. Unfortunately we have to follow our family norms and culture.”

-Amna, female, 24, Lines Area/JT, Karachi

If we extend the notion of mobility to women’s and men’s abilities to exercise choice in recreational activities, there are instances in which female respondents report stepping out of the home to pursue such activities. But the geography of low-income neighborhoods in Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad is such that there is a pervasive lack of recreational services especially for young women. Parks and other public spaces tend to be male dominated and suggest greater opportunities are available for young men. Samuel, from France Colony (Rawalpindi-Islamabad), narrated his leisure activities:

“We used to ride on bikes but now I am not studying. So I do not have many friends anymore... but I still visit F-9 Park. There are many things to see. For instance, there are girls from every social class. We also visit Jinnah Super and Super Market, but the highest level of poondi [ogling/checking out] is in Centaurus Mall.”

-Samuel, male, 22, France Colony, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

We suggest there are certain types of mobilities, mostly masculine, that impact the immobility of other genders and these gendered mobilities are inextricably bound with social norms, class and ethnicity. Political conditions of the city also impact mobility and this is certainly more pronounced in Karachi. A Bengali fisherman from Ali Akbar Shah Goth, Karachi, explained thus:

“There is no park as such in our area. But I have relatives who live at another place, so we visit them. Children feel happy this way. Earlier, I used to take them to the zoo but we seldom visit it now because of fear of any problem. Roads may become blocked. In order to avoid this, I take children to a relative’s place and we come back after a one-night stay.”

-Ghulam Rasool, male, 32, Ali Akbar Shah Goth/BQT, Karachi

STREETS, NEIGHBORHOODS
In all neighborhoods, we observed men, women and even transgenders moving in the streets, going to shops to buy daily goods or embarking on work commutes. The most visible difference between the genders is primarily in terms of embodiment as reflected in women veiling themselves and this practice is fairly ubiquitous across all neighborhoods in both cities. Perceptions about lack of security and feelings of fear about public spaces and related impact on mobility were ever-present in all
conversations with our female respondents in both cities. Although some male respondents also reported feeling unsafe ‘outside’ the home. Ghulam Rasool from Ali Akbar Shah Goth, summed up his feelings by saying: “I stay happy when I am in my home because every place outside is redolent with fear.” Ghulam Rasool feared his neighborhood’s violent politics; the constant firing and fighting that erupts between different religious and political party representatives, and especially the involvement of young men in such conflicts. He continued:

“There is a group of loafer boys that is roaming in the area. They scare me because I am afraid encountering them may make situation worse. Loss of life is frustrating. Threatening slogans written on walls trigger a lot of fear in me. Religious slogans entailing enmity and hatred are also inscribed on walls. Somebody writes ‘wahabi kafir’ while others have written ‘shia kafir’. Seeing this and reading this brings fear to my heart.”

-Ghulam Rasool, male, 32, Ali Akbar Shah Goth/BQT, Karachi

But Ghulam Rasool’s feelings of fear and constrained mobility in his neighborhood lanes are also associated with the conflicts that arise between young men over young women. He remarked:

“A few days ago, there was a serious fight in our street among youngsters. It was very hard to end this fight…. Reason of fight was a girl. Girl used to come home from school and on the way a boy was involved in passing strange remarks to her. When things became hard for the girl to endure, she informed of this matter at her home. Girl’s brother beat that boy…. There was firing as well but luckily no one got hurt, otherwise a life would have been lost.”

-Ghulam Rasool, male, 32, Ali Akbar Shah Goth/BQT, Karachi

Nevertheless, for young women like Amna, 24, from Lines Area it is not so much the immediate neighborhood that poses a threat to her mobility, but the spaces that lie beyond or the larger city. Amna explained that women would feel less vulnerable if they hung out in groups when negotiating the city.

Technology also has a bearing on gendered mobilities. Internet and cellular technology is easily accessible to all and considered equal for all. Still, in urban Pakistan, such technology also makes visible the embedded power relations in the construction of gender relations. These ‘secular’ technologies have facilitated mobility in terms of strengthening social capital and providing succor for young lovers, and for men and women stranded in situations where public transport is suddenly shut down. Marium, 18, from Ghaziabad, Karachi, explained: The young, single woman who keeps a mobile phone, her family is perceived as modern. She is seen as someone whose family has given her freedom. Marium’s own mobile phone, which enables her to keep in touch with family when commuting to college, is constantly under surveillance. She claimed that her family, especially her brothers…
“...can anytime inspect my phone and I must hand it over. Even though my brothers are younger than me. This happens because neighbors might say that your sister must be involved with someone, and this creates doubt. If I get a message from an unknown number then it will be considered my fault, that I must be the perpetrator. But I don’t have permission to check my brothers’ phones.”

-Marium, male, 18, Ghaziabad/OT, Karachi

Young men boast about their cell phone conversations with ‘girlfriends’ but such conversations are also perceived as a source of moral corruption and violence in neighborhoods.

“Cheap mobile phone packages are also one reason to spoil the environment. If someone has a girl's cell number then they talk for hours. In case somebody else gets that number as well then the same story starts with other guy too. This is also a major reason for quarrels. Many people have been arrested due to such issues as well”.

-Kashif, male, 18, Arya Mohalla, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

Similarly, Samuel, 22, from France Colony, Rawalpindi-Islamabad, underscored:

“Here behind every quarrel or conflict, pussy is involved... Every girl has cell phone, so you know what happens. They exploit boys and get money from them and often cause the fight. Here, numbers of girls keep getting exchanged and often a boy comes in conflict with someone who teases his girl... . Girls are very corrupt. They have relations.”

-Samuel, male, 22, France Colony, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

Salma from Ghaziabad, Karachi, was gifted a cell phone by her fiancée so they could communicate as he works and lives in a factory far off. Salma explained:

“My Father has kept it [the cell phone] in a locker and has told me to use it after my marriage. If a girl has a mobile phone she is considered immoral.”

-Salma, female, 20, Ghaziabad/OT, Karachi
In our surveys in Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad, many respondents claimed that young women who owned or carried with them mobile phones were likely to forge illicit relations with men. They implied that mobile phones were somehow spurring on love marriages, which, as a female respondent, 53, underscored, have “become the culture; no lane, no neighborhood is safe from this curse.”

CITY

In both cities, restrictions on women’s mobility are pervasive and this is particularly so for adolescent women. Women above a certain age, for instance 40, can move around with fewer restrictions and it is likely that they will not consider it necessary to veil themselves. Moreover, women from Christian households report fewer restrictions on mobility. As a female respondent from Christian Colony, Karachi, explained: “We feel the difference as we are more liberal with the female mobility.” But the city is also a space where transgression is possible for young women. Broadly speaking, in Pakistani society women generally lack power in exercising choices concerning their sexuality and marriage decisions. Media narratives suggest if young women take independent decisions for marriage, such actions are often criminalized. Print media regularly reports about young women being kidnapped. In our analysis about such incidents, we ascertained that when women leave their homes with their elect male partners, they also take along with them some money. This suggests young women might leave with parental consent, yet families register cases of kidnapping to safeguard their honor. Women’s marriage choices are often criminalized and at times there are extra-judicial acts of killing or acid throwing or persistent violence over such choices.

Hareem, 18, a Burmi-Bengali who resides in Ali Akbar Shah Goth, Karachi, illustrates this dynamic. Married twice and each time against her parents’ wishes, Hareem explained: “[I] ran away with Amin Kabeer for the court marriage. I financed for the court marriage.” But it is also in the city where Hareem found a way to divorce her first husband when he became violent. Hareem’s neighbor who worked in the local courts helped negotiate the divorce process. Shortly thereafter Hareem found her second husband, Fahim, who was already married:

“I have a long affair with Fahim... [he] used to follow me when I used to go to school. We did not talk but wrote letters to each other, we can read and write so we made the most of it. Once we fell in love we started talking with each other.... This time opposition was greater than the last time that I had court marriage again. Even now he [Father] do not like me and do not want to see my face. Only my mother came and visit me. My in-laws do not like me either.”

-Hareem, female, 18, Ali Akbar Shah Goth/BQT, Karachi

Hareem’s story is hardly unique. In Ali Akbar Shah Goth and in various neighborhoods across both cities, young men and women from diverse ethnicities and religions have talked about marriages of their choice and circumventing socio-religious boundaries to realize their marriage aspirations. Hidden love affairs, polygamy and court marriages are not uncommon and young men and women
often fantasize about weddings where there will be a feast for all to enjoy. Hareem’s marriage choices have facilitated her movements through the city; first by leaving the confines of her Father’s home in Ali Akbar Shah Goth and moving to the upscale Defence Housing Society where her financially well-to-do, husband Amin lived with his extended family, and then returning after the divorce to her Father’s home. But these movements have cast Hareem as a ‘rebellious’ girl in the eyes of her immediate family and neighbors. Hareem has experienced extensive physical violence at the hands of her Father, younger brothers and her ex-in-laws and present husband. Still, for Hareem, the city is an exciting place that offers many opportunities, for instance to find work, earn a bit of money and become independent. When discussing her unemployed husband’s plans to relocate to a small town outside Karachi, Hareem felt certain that she would lose her freedom: “I am telling Fahim to go and to leave me here and visit me twice a month... but he cannot live without me”.

The idea of ghairat (honor) also reinforces a particular mode of mobility that is gendered in nature. The choices available to young women and men are different in every aspect, for instance making friends or loitering and hanging around, talking freely in public places. Sumayya, 23, resides in Dokh Naju, Rawalpindi-Islamabad, and her case is illustrative. Alluding to a hostile gaze that objectifies women and produces a sense of fear and shapes their mobility, she articulated her experience of leaving home: “Here in the city... people do not show respect. They stare and follow you (from street to wherever you go). They tease you from motorbikes and pass comments. And if you are wearing veil, sometimes it is taken in a completely different way [perceived as a prostitute]. Even though travel patterns are inherently gender blind, yet men and women have different experiences. Summaya shared her travel experience:

“I use public transport, the drivers and conductors stare at women indecently. The drivers touch us whenever they change the gear. Not only did I experience this myself but also heard about this practice from many people.”

-Sumayya, female, 23, Dokh Naju, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

Given that a majority of low-income residents in Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad rely on public transport, the overall state of infrastructure does not appear to facilitate women’s mobility and this happens despite the fact that in cities like Rawalpindi-Islamabad the government has introduced a multi-billion dollar Metro Bus Service.

5.4 CONCLUSION

The above discussion of the physical and gendered mobilities paints a complex picture of how men and women move about in the urban environment in the study of neighborhoods and cities. The discussion points to pervasive and intense physical and sexual anxieties for both men and women and that these anxieties are shot through with notions of risk and an underlying fear of violence. Male and female anxieties are further heightened by the weak transportation infrastructure prevalent in both cities, and this is certainly more pronounced in Karachi. The discussion points to
important convergences and divergences between gendered mobility dynamics and violence in these cities.

We briefly summarize the key insights below:

• Access to good transportation links strongly impacts physical mobility for both men and women.
• Violence unfolds in different spatial scales that represent particular kinds of social environments: the home, the neighborhood and the city. Each space both engenders and constrains different kinds of mobilities for men and women.
• While certain customary norms seem to dictate and control women’s mobility, there is also a space of transgression in which young women step out to conduct affairs, whether through participation in the increasingly accessible consumer world of cellphones or running away with their partners.
• Where the home can be seen primarily as a space of safety and often does act as such, it is also the primary site of violence women suffer from family members which often unfolds routinely on an everyday basis.
• The inner lanes and streets of the neighborhood are the site of struggles to maintain social norms and guard against transgression. While inner streets represent an interiorized world of familiarity where neighbors know and protect each other, it is also where major anxieties about transgressing social norms around gender and sexuality erupt into conflict.
• While the larger city represents an escape from this interiorized world, it is also a site of exposure to the impersonal and at the same time threatening masculine gaze of society at large as well as the state.

The discussion in this chapter is based on evidence that cautions us against using physical transport as a sole proxy for mobility. While infrastructure services such as good quality transport and roads and diverse forms of environmentally sustainable transport (buses, rickshaws, motorcycles, bicycles and more) are an important determinant of spatial mobility for men and women, and the state’s provision of such services is clearly vital, there are, nevertheless, important gendered dimensions of mobility and linkages with violence that impose restrictions on female mobility in urban environments. This gendered theme has been highlighted through the qualitative evidence gleaned from ethnographies, participant observation and focus group discussions as presented in this and other chapters. Finally, we suggest that an attentiveness to different spatial scales and their complex interactions with each other is crucial for a deeper understanding of how gendered mobilities and violence unfold in a dense urban environment.
6 ACCESS TO SERVICES & VIOLENCE

This project researched the different drivers of everyday violence in Pakistan’s urban spaces. While the links between access to certain resources and violence have certainly been investigated by various scholars (Le Billon, 2001; Homer-Dixon, 2001; Bannon & Collier, 2003; Collier, & Hoeffler, 2004; Angrist & Kugler, 2008; Collier, 2010; Berman, Couttenier, Rohner, & Thoenig, 2014), there has previously been a dearth of research into how access to basic services, such as health, electricity, gas, water supply and sanitation – especially in the urban sphere - might be linked to violent outcomes in public and private spaces and on the public-private continuum. The dearth in access to good quality basic services affects almost all segments of Pakistan’s society. This research looked at 12 low income neighborhoods in Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad, where basic service gaps were thus very likely to be a major feature of everyday life, making it a ripe arena to observe how these resource gaps interplay with performances of gender, perhaps inciting violent outcomes. One way of conceptualizing this is through the vulnerability-violence nexus (as outlined in chapter 4): how does the social vulnerability profile link with the incidence of violence in the neighborhoods? The current chapter will outline the results, specifically related to a core subset of vulnerability - access to services.

As outlined in our introductory chapter, there are different conceptualizations of how violence occurs and impacts people and places. One contemporary conceptualization was of particular interest to this project – infrastructural violence. Rogers and O'Neill (2012) explore, in their special edition, how poor infrastructure can be used as a form of social exclusion, which changes the way in which poor people experience daily life and interact. This denial of their citizenship rights to basic services and infrastructure causes greater livelihood and food insecurities, public health issues, enhanced vulnerability to environmental hazards – and the consequent frustrations associated with those challenging life experiences. This contributes to and/or intersects with local violence to define the daily lives of urban poor (Auyero & de Lara, 2012; Tranchant, 2013a; 2013b; Gupte et al., 2012). The key interest for us, in this research was how the infrastructure/service environment shapes the way people interact with each other, sometimes resulting in violence. This vulnerability-violence nexus is of key importance to our investigation (Tranchant 2013a; 2013b).

Ultimately, urbanization impacts almost all facets of life in Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad. Demographic, economic, land use and social changes are concurrent with environmental degradation and amplified vulnerabilities, poor service provision, and an increase in poverty and inequality, especially in informal settlements and migrant and minority communities. Perhaps the most defining aspect of every day life in Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad’s low-income neighborhoods is a daily struggle around accessing basic services and infrastructure. This includes access to energy resources like electricity and gas, education, health services, livelihoods, water supply, sanitation, hygiene (WASH) and transport. This chapter will pay particular attention to WASH due to the overwhelming conflict and violence dynamics associated with it. Transport was also a major issue in that regard, but that has been dealt with in Chapter 5.
6.1 PUBLIC SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Basic public services were, on the whole, rated by respondents as of poor quality (if they existed at all), and our observations confirmed this. Respondents rated police protection as poor to non-existent 69% of the time in Karachi and 70% in Rawalpindi-Islamabad. In fact, the police service provided a source of violence and anxiety across the 12 neighborhoods, but especially in the two neighborhoods deemed to be inhabited by illegitimate citizens – Afghan Abadi (Islamabad) and Ali Akbar Shah Goth (AAG, Karachi). As detailed in earlier chapters, Afghan Abadi was inhabited by predominantly internally displaced people from the northern areas of Khyber Pahtunkhwa, which have been greatly affected by the ‘war on terror’. Respondents, mainly, moved to the city for security and livelihood opportunities, but unfortunately neither prevailed, due to their labeling as illegal Afghan migrants. In AAG, residents have been largely born and raised there, but are of Burmese-Bengali ethnicity, which is deemed by many state and non-state actors to be a ‘non-Pakistani’ ethnicity. In both cases, the denial of residents’ citizenship rights is so pervasive that basic services are difficult to impossible to access. In Afghan Abadi especially, there was a perverse police presence, which was enforced violently on a daily basis to surveil, intimidate and threaten residents, preventing them being able to make a livelihood and feeling physically secure. This has been discussed in earlier chapters, so we will now move on to other public services.

Figure 6.1: RATINGS OF ACCESS TO PUBLIC SERVICES IN RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD
When you explore the bar charts (Figure 6.1-2) for individual neighborhoods, you see lots of variance as to the ratings of different services, but nevertheless, the overall picture is very poor for basic services across the cities. Aside from water, sanitation, hygiene, and transport – the other public service which was a major source of anxiety and conflict for residents across the two cities was electricity supply. We asked respondents to rate access next to some other key basic resource services, as above. In Rawalpindi-Islamabad, some of the more historic and formal settlements rated electricity supply fairly well, but informal settlements, especially Afghan Abadi had particular problems (Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.2: RATINGS OF ACCESS TO PUBLIC SERVICES IN KARACHI

![Diagram of Access to Public Services in Karachi]

Figure 6.3: RATINGS OF BASIC SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN AFGHAN ABADI

![Diagram of Basic Services and Infrastructure in Afghan Abadi]
In France Colony, residents had set up their own informal electricity system, which had to be shared by groups of households. This posed particular problems between neighbors, which at times could lead to conflict over control, billing and supply. The lack of electricity provided a political vacuum in which powerful actors have been able to intervene and gain greater authority – for perhaps good or for bad. Considering how the example of water supply in Karachi prevails, through violent water mafias (to be discussed later), these basic service vacuums in which non-state actors can intervene, can lead to problems associated with the accumulation of unaccountable and representative informal power and conflict later.

“In our area only J. Salak is making efforts for the poor people. For example five years ago there was no electricity but now because of him we are enjoying the electricity facility. Even our government never solved our any single issue we always go for J. Salak no one else.”

-Fozia, female, 30, France Colony, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

Furthermore, as electricity is needed to ensure the pumping of water into the household, during times of ‘load-shedding’, the knock on effect on water and family and neighborly relations can be problematic.

“First it is difficult to get access to water because we do not have our own connection. We get it through the connection of our neighbor, although we have a cable which turns on the motor and uses our own electricity. But it is continuous source of conflict within the whole streets. During the days of load shedding, it becomes a hell of quarrels. Everyone wants to fill their tanks but nobody has patience.”

-Samuel, male, 22, France Colony, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

The problem of electricity provision is more pervasive in Karachi, where it affects formal settlements too. Amna, a 24 year old in Lines Area, tells a familiar tale of its knock on effect to water supply and livelihoods.

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Interviewer: “What about electricity in your area?”

Amna [angry tone]: “We are facing 7 to 8 hours load-shedding on a daily basis. In summer this tends to be longer. It is very difficult to live through the summer season but no one is able to do anything. Sometimes we forget to start our motor pump for water supply and when the electricity is gone, we don’t have any water supply. My Father gets very angry if we don’t have water due to careless behavior, like if we waste our water during daily activities and household chores, for instance washing clothes and even some time he keeps an eye on our bathing time and he insisted not to take baths on a daily basis. When we have a shortage of water my brother claimed that they (my students) are using washroom again and again and waste all the water and my father starts getting angry with me.”

-Amna, female, 24, Lines Area/JT, Karachi

Figure 6.4: RATINGS OF BASIC SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE ACROSS KARACHI

Load shedding is a huge problem in the daily lives of residents in urban Pakistan – and especially in Karachi compared with Rawalpindi-Islamabad (Figure 6.4). Regardless of social status, one can expect to experience load shedding for a number of hours per day. However, this research highlights that the poorer the neighborhood, and the lower on the rungs of social power, the longer the time period appears to be. Furthermore, low-income residents of Karachi cannot afford the generators that the middle and upper classes use during particularly hot seasons. Respondents told us that load shedding could go on for up to 12 hours per day – and this became a huge hindrance to their ability to go about their daily lives due to its impact on households, businesses and physical sense of wellbeing (Image 6.1).
Residents face the anxiety associated with having to continue paying government electricity bills, despite such insufficient and sporadic service. Like in France Colony and Afghan Abadi, residents of several neighborhoods in Karachi have installed a ‘kunda’ system (informal). The management of which can be a source of disputes. Furthermore, the system itself is hazardous, especially to children who are unaware of the danger it presents them. In Karachi, residents are particularly concerned that the government prices keep rising with no rationale, yet they feel they have no choice but to pay the bills. This is a significant driver of household and food insecurity, as the bill often averages higher than the daily wages being brought in to the household. Residents put this down to corruption from the government actors, and it continues to fuel their resentment and disenfranchisement with the state.

“Electricity bills that are issued monthly really scare me. Bill is appropriate for 2 months but there is a spontaneous change in third month and a bill of 5 thousand is issued. We are bound to pay it. Bill is another form of bribe.”

-Ghulam Rasool, male, 32, Ali Akbar Shah Goth/BQT, Karachi
6.2 WATER SUPPLY, SANITATION AND HYGIENE

Water, supply, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) can be understood as a core subset of vulnerability, due to their life-sustaining properties and impact upon quality of life. Across all of the 12 neighborhoods, in both urban agglomerations, WASH was a significant issue, with respondents labeling different aspects of it as some of the biggest problems in their lives. The links between WASH and violence are under-researched, and this section hopes to elucidate how these links play out in the everyday lives of urban residents in the neighborhoods.

Traditionally, in Pakistani society, WASH has been deemed women’s work (Meinzen-Dick, & Zwartteveen, 1998; Halvorson, 2003; 2004). The ability to manage WASH at the household level is seen as a core aspect of female identity, across the heterogeneous cultures of Pakistan. In rural areas, women typically go to collect water from the nearby sources in their villages. However, as the country has urbanized, males are playing a role in ensuring the payment for water is transacted, due to restrictions on female mobility in urban and peri-urban spaces. Thus, the ability to acquire a safe and sufficient water supply at the domestic level has become part of the male identity. These gendered roles in water, as they intersect with socio-political dynamics and inequality, can drive forms of public and private violence. These will be outlined in the following section.

There is an interesting contrast between the cities in terms of how WASH problems are linked with violence. Despite Pakistan’s attainment of the Millennium Development Goal targets for water and sanitation, poor access to both remains part of daily life in both of the cities. In Karachi, in 6 out of 7 neighborhoods - water service gaps, non-potable water and a devastating economy of both public and private-supplied water pose major sources of stress and conflict for residents. In the 7th neighborhood in the Lines Area, Jamshed Town, water supply poses a minor threat, but the major WASH threat is posed by sanitation. Residents must face extremely poor solid waste management, which affects hygiene, health and the quality of household water supply.

On the other hand, in Rawalpindi-Islamabad, the experience and threat of floods and consequent health (diseases and epidemics) and economic (damage to the home and livelihoods) implications pose the major problem for residents, while they do also struggle with WASH gaps too.

This stark difference can be observed in Figures 6.5 and 6.6 below. We asked residents to list their main risks and/or threats related to violence.
Figure 6.5 demonstrates that according to the residents of the 7 Karachi neighborhoods we surveyed, in terms of violence-related threats: target killing and gunfire (26%), street robbery (21%) and extortion and violence from political workers (9%) are the biggest threats. This is not to say residents don’t suffer from violence linked to WASH, in fact around 4% listed it as their major threat. Furthermore, the violence perceived to be linked to WASH in Karachi neighborhoods, while it does differ to some extent across them, tends to be driven by a ‘water mafia’ comprising, generally, the same stakeholders from political parties, state institutions, and the illegal economy, who pose major threats in terms of the three listed in the above graph. This will be further discussed below, in section 6.3.
Figure 6.6 illustrates that WASH related issues have become a paramount threat for the residents of Rawalpindi-Islamabad, in terms of the manifestation of what they deem to be violence. Seventy-eight percent of respondents listed floods and resultant epidemics and diseases as the biggest threat, due to the dramatic impacts of floods on their homes, health and livelihoods in recent years.

In our initial survey of 2462 households, we asked respondents to rate their access to WASH, and its impacts upon health, expenditure and quality of life. Furthermore, we asked them to indicate whether they, or a family member, had been a victim of violence. Statistical analysis revealed a significant relationship between access to Water Supply and Sanitation and experience of violence. This correlation was prevalent in 7 of the 12 neighborhoods as illustrated in Table 6-2 below. Here, a clear distinction can be made between the two cities in the correlation relationship. In Karachi, households having a tendency of being victims of violence were found to be associated with inadequate infrastructure for water supply and sanitation, especially in Lines Area where this relationship was found to be strong and moderate respectively. Christina Colony, however, was an exception as an inverse relationship was found. On the other hand, Rawalpindi/Islamabad exhibited positive relationships, indicating that households having a tendency of being victims of violence were associated with improved infrastructure for water supply and sanitation.
### Table 6-1: CORRELATION BETWEEN WASH AND VIOLENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WATER SUPPLY &amp; VIOLENCE</th>
<th>Spearman's Rho statistic</th>
<th>p-value (2 tailed)</th>
<th>Correlation Strength</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VCI</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>-0.292</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lines Area/JT</td>
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<td>0.000**</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansoor Nagar/OT</td>
<td>-0.169</td>
<td>0.010**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raes Amrohi/OT</td>
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<td>0.044</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Akbar Shah Goth/BQT</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghaziabad/OT</td>
<td>-0.264</td>
<td>0.001**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi/Islamabad</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Abadi</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dokh Naju</td>
<td>0.415</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SANITATION &amp; VIOLENCE</th>
<th>Spearman's Rho statistic</th>
<th>p-value (2 tailed)</th>
<th>Correlation Strength</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
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<td>0.000**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lines Area/JT</td>
<td>-0.487</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Colony/OT</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghaziabad/OT</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi/Islamabad</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arya Mohalla</td>
<td>0.275</td>
<td>0.004**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dokh Saidan</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Our ethnographic research confirmed this effect; in fact suggesting the WASH-Violence linkage existed in all neighborhoods, at different intensities. It was through the observation of respondents’ daily lives, and a continuing dialogue with them that these impacts were observed and expressed – even where initial surveys did not show a statistically significant correlation.

The following section will outline how WASH is linked with violence in different ways across the two cities and 12 neighborhoods.
WATER SUPPLY

Mustafa et al. (2013) and Herald Magazine (2014) have elucidated the linkages between water supply and conflict in Karachi. The city needs 1000 million gallons of water, daily, to support its population, but supplies around half that. Karachi’s population has been subjected to continuous problems related to basic supply of water, its quality, cost, and an increasingly violent illegal economy, which surrounds it.

Access gaps form a daily part of life in both cities. In Karachi, households in 6/7 neighborhoods suffer with gaps in government supply. This ranges from no supply at all, to broken supply with water coming once or twice in a fortnight, and for 30-60 minutes. This is caused by, either a lack of supply on the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board’s (KWSB) end, faulty pipes, which continue to be within KWSB’s remit, or illegal extraction of the supply before it reaches the neighborhoods. Respondents find this to be a significant burden on the household, affecting food consumption and hygiene. Consequently, families have to turn to either illegal connections, which are not necessarily potable, or private tanker supply, which can prove rather expensive.

“Without water there is no life. We get water first then food, as water is the most important. Even if kids, while playing, throw water at each other we, the elders, get angry as we buy water and we cannot afford to waste it. I have to take great care and keep an eye on the kids so that they will not waste water while bathing. During some seasons water gets very expensive, for one water tanker we pay between Rs1000 to Rs1200 and now it’s settled at Rs800. Even if water is supplied after every 15 days even for one hour it can be sufficient for us. But now the water is supplied for 1 hour during the power break down, when you cannot pump or store it so the supply becomes useless. Sometimes I spend all my night collecting water from the line as the supply is non continuous.”

- Shaista, female, 53, Ghaziabad/OT, Karachi

Despite government service gaps, households continue to receive regular bills from KWSB, which is a huge source of frustration for such residents. Statistical analysis carried out indicates a positive correlation in Lines Area/JT and Christian Colony/OT, (p-value: 0.000 and 0.024 respectively), where households with WASH impacts larger in magnitude on private services expenditure are associated with being victims of violence. It is claimed by the KWSB that 40% of its customers fail to pay their bills, which is a reason for poor water supply (Herald, 2014). Conversely, the large majority of our respondents in Karachi told us that they have always faced poor, but worsening water supply; nonetheless many of them feel pressured to continue paying their bills. One private tanker can range from 900-2000 PKR and, while we can’t be certain about average household income (due to the informal nature of the economy and other factors), we can be sure that this expense, on top of government bills, makes water a huge household expense in such low income communities.
“Masses do not even get water. We pay the tanker to get water and monthly we pay a 200 PKR bill to the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB). Women of this area also conducted a rally [protest] for water. The day the rally was held, water supply was resumed half an hour and then it ended again. How much we can fight. Men stay silent, because of the fear that they might kill. Here people are shoot for trivial matters. It is a pathetic situation. You can assume that we have lost our freedom. We are not breathing in free air, we should be given freedom.”

-Nadra, female, Mansoor Nagar/OT, Karachi

Nadra tells a familiar story. The dual cost of water drains household expenses and increases anxiety and frustration within the home. Attempts to hold the KWSB to account have proved to be futile for many respondents in Karachi. Female respondents express the fear that this frustration may drive their male family members to become violent outside of the home. Salma shares the example of the violent assault of the male responsible for controlling the public water valve.

Salma: “Water scarcity is a major issue. There is very little water supply [she stresses ‘little’]. Every week we buy water from a water tanker. ‘abhı bhi girnay hi wala hai, pani bikul khatam hai’ (when it seems about to come, it stops). Every month we buy 4 to 5 water tankers and each tanker costs Rs 1200. But now the price has come down to Rs 900.”

Interviewer: “Did you go to anyone to complain about the water service?”

Salma: “When my father goes to the ‘valve man’, he is never available. This might be because as few days back the valve man was beaten up by different groups of people from the community. They were beating him because of the water supply problem. After, he ran off. They claim there is no water in the pump but they are actually selling water. Even women in groups go to the water office and protest for water. Sometimes they have thrown stones at the office building. Such that police has had to intervene to stop the mob.”

-Salma, female, 20, Ghaziabad/OT, Karachi

While all seven of the neighborhoods in Karachi are eligible for government water supply, in Islamabad two are informal settlements who are not recognized as eligible – Afghan Abadi in sector I-11/4, home to Pakistani and Afghan Pashtuns, and France Colony in sector F-7/4, home to a Christian minority community. Despite living next to wealthy neighborhoods with continuous water supply, in both areas, residents must rely on open water sources, self-dug wells and boreholes. The failure of the government to recognize these settlements and hence provide a potable water supply is a serious problem and source of aggravation.

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“Everyone is poor here; other than poor people, no one can live here. If you visit this area in the summer season, you cannot even spend ten minutes here. There is no power or water supply... We have gone many times [to complain to government] but no one listens to us. They threw us out of their offices. When the CDA [Capital Development Authority] comes here, all of us old people, children and men come out on the road and protest. What else can we do?”

-Arshad Khan, male, Afghan Abadi, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

There is the potential for this issue to break into violence between civilians and government agents, as demonstrated in Karachi. In fact, prior to this research, protests against the government offices had become violent in parts of Karachi – a trend evident in other parts of South Asia too (Mustafa et al, 2014). Furthermore, in a desperate situation where males and females are trying to live up to their respective roles viz a viz water, conflicts between resident can – and have - emerged, in both Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad.

“We, ten houses, fill water tanks via a motor using our own electricity connection. We share the water connection, but that often causes quarrels. One argues that the other has consumed more water (as compared to others) and that is why the bill has exceeded. People fight over water here, but they resolve the issue and then start communicating with each other. There are quarrels in the households.”

-Tahira, female, France Colony, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

Our researchers, after spending two years conducting ethnographic research in these communities, noted that in Rawalpindi-Islamabad’s communities’ fights among females are settled easily but between males fights become problematic. Challenges to male’s public reputations can become very serious and sometimes result in violent male-on-male interchanges, for the purpose of living up to masculine ideals of strength and dominance.

Arguments between women over water are more common in France Colony where female mobility is less restricted than in the other neighborhoods and hence women are expected to go out to collect the water.
Interviewer: “Last time when we visited your locality some women were aggressive towards each other in the street. What was the reason behind this?”

Fozia: “Yes you are right, they were arguing because of the lack of water facility. Actually here we use supply water which is available after one day and sometimes we are deprived from water for a long time. That’s why the day when supply water is available everyone try to be first to get water. We were also treated very badly by one of neighbors [regarding this issue].”

-Fozia, female, France Colony, Rawalindi-Islamabad

Rawalpindi’s formal settlements: Arya Mohalla, Dokh Naju and Dokh Saidan, are eligible for government supply but face similar, although less pronounced, gaps in the service like in Karachi. Residents have to face shortages for several days at a time, which are a cause of stress because the gaps are unpredictable and hence families must find secondary solutions quickly in order to continue life as usual. This can include water tankers, or extraction from open water sources, and then a trip to the local filtration plants, of which the closest is 2km away.

“The water supply system is so unpredictable that if today, there is water, we do not know if there will be water for the next four days. And in summer season, they do not supply water at all for six days. If they supply here, they will shut down the supply instantly from another area and vice versa. So we have to call for the water tanker, which costs us five to six hundred rupees... These tankers belong to those who (powerful state and non-state actors) are the in-charge of tube-well. They will close the water supply of government or CDA, and they would say that motor has died, and government sponsored tankers are out of order. Then they will publicize their tankers that today the cost of tanker is five hundred rupees... We pay three hundred rupees for the water bill but if we call for water tankers, it costs us almost sixteen hundred rupees.”

-Ghalib, male, 60, Dokh Saidan, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

As explained, typically, the quest for potable water in the public sphere is a male responsibility. This creates difficulties for female-headed households, or households where the males are unwell or unavailable, as women must break from their designated private sphere, in order to source water. Although elderly women are admired in this circumstance, there are repercussions for teenage and adult women, who are still perceived of as within the age span of sexual activity. Dominant discourses about the lack of security for women in the public sphere (especially from sexual harassment and kidnap) encourage them to feel very stressed about the prospect. Furthermore, due to such gendered ideals, women (of this age span) in the public sphere often face challenges to their
reputations as ‘good’ or moral women. The consequences of which can impact their physical security, and their offers of marriage proposals. If their public reputations affect marriage proposals, this can have dire consequences for their standing within the home. These complex interconnected issues mean that children are often sent out to collect water in their place.

*Summaya: “There is a filter in the neighborhood but the water from that filter is not clean. We bring water from Chah-i-Sultan. It is situated five km from here.”*

*Interviewer: “Who fetches the water?”*

*Summaya: “My brother; and it is the responsibility of male members to fetch water. But I have seen little girls fetching the water. The reason behind this is that there are no male members in their families. Otherwise there are filters installed in the neighborhood. Many little girls fetch water from there. There is a long queue and often these children fight with each other.”*

*Interviewer: “Why do they fight?”*

*Summaya: “They fight because of the turn; that this is my turn to fill the bucket. This looks like an ordinary task but when you have to go there to fetch water three times a day, every day, people get irritated.”*

*Summaya, female, 23, Dokh Naju, Rawalpindi-Islamabad*

There is certainly a social capital of water supply, which has interesting positive and negative impacts for the residents of the 12 neighborhoods. Wider families and neighbors provide a source of support during a water supply shortage. Families often go to these networks for small quantities of water supply, while they source other options. When the whole neighborhood is affected, in places like - Christian Colony, Mansoor Nagar, and Ghaziabad in Karachi, and France Colony and Afghan Abadi in Islamabad – community members come together to develop their own solutions, through developing wells or tubewells. However, their management during times where water flow is low can become a source of contention. Additionally, intra-community power dynamics come in to play when they are left to manage their own water supply. There is usually one family, or male, responsible for guarding the tap/access to the water. This group/person typically holds a high level of social. Controlling access to water becomes a method of re-producing this power. The consequences of this dynamic can lead to violent arguments between neighbors.
“All the neighbors collectively have done a boring in my neighbor's house for brackish water; we all contributed and paid for that. In spite of paying to that family for water, they do not give sufficient water to the people, they have a monopoly over it – especially with my family. That's why there is a tension between the people in street. They are paying but not getting the water they paid for. People do complain and fight with them; there are so many examples of people beating up the water wall men or electricity suppliers. Whoever does fight and beat them are provided water and electricity but the people of my street do not do that. In spite of protesting, nothing happened [for us]. I don't like the people of Orangi and Karachi, Bahawalpur was better.”

-Ruby, female, 23, Christian Colony/OT, Karachi

On the other hand the increased tension within the home can cause conflict and at times, domestic violence. The line between public and private becomes blurred even further when we consider the case of water supply – it in fact operates more like a continuum. The payment for water is seen as the males remit, but the ability for females to conduct their household chores becomes compromised without water supply, both of these hampered responsibilities become a source of conflict within the family. The frustrations associated with public life, especially living up to masculine ideals, clash with the frustrations associated with private life, and expectations of femininities, resulting in conflict.

“Baji we do not have water, we need money for this. A donkey cart cost 200 PKR for water. My husband gave me ‘my’ mobile phone and asked me to give it to my friend Gul Bahar [so she can sell it for water]. I gave the phone to her; she kept it with her for 4 hours. My husband got angry with me that what is taking her so long “uski wajha sy mjhy do laga bhi di”. (He slapped me twice just because of it). And Gul Bahar returned the phone without even selling it. My husband is jobless, we need money. We do not have a single drop of water in the water tank. I can only borrow a little quantity of water from my parent’s household. Despite their house is in depression, they get access to water every time but I cannot borrow it. My father is angry, “agar mein zada pani laye to meri tangay tor dey gi” [If I take excess water he will break my leg].”

-Hareem, female, 18, Ali Akbar Shah Goth/BQT, Karachi
“It is very difficult to live through the summer season but no one is able to do anything. Sometimes we forget to start our motor pump for water supply and when the electricity is gone, we don’t have any water supply. My Father gets very angry if we don’t have water due to careless behavior, like if we waste our water during daily activities and home chores, for instance washing clothes and even some time he keeps an eye on our bathing time and he insisted not to take bath on daily basis and when we have shortage of water my brother claimed that they (my student) are using washroom again and again and waste all the water and my father starts getting very annoyed with me.”

-Amna, female, 24, Lines Area/JT, Karachi

Psychological violence is a hugely salient term with respondents in both Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad (to be discussed in more detail in chapter 7), who describe how the stresses of everyday life bleed into the home in sometimes violent ways,

“Violence against women is present in our community. Men are the victims of psychological violence; women are the victims of physical violence. This violence stems from the fact that the unemployment is high these days, that men face a lot of mental anguish, and then they come home and take that frustration out on their wives.”

-Ashfaq, male, 40, Lines Area/JT, Karachi

The tension over water supply and its unnecessary expense has been described by some respondents as a form of psychological violence.

“Is this not psychological violence? Just before, we were talking about water, right? A man comes home from work after a long day of hardship, and then he finds that there is no water in his house. Even his family has spent the whole day at home, worrying about water. So, even this is a form of violence.”

-Umar, male, 42, Ghaziabad/OT, Karachi

This frustration, and psychological violence, is amplified by the fact that residents of both urban agglomerations are well aware that the operation of water mafias and their allegiance (albeit under the radar) with government service providers, is a major driver of the massive cost of water. This phenomenon is evident across all neighborhoods in both cities. However, their operations tend to be more related to violent outcomes in Karachi. Anecdotal and journalistic reports state that the tanker
mafia extract water from the government supply, contributing to the water shortages, and even collude with government officers to shut supply, in order to increase demand for their service. They sell water at prices as high as 5 times that of government supply. Government supply can range from 200-500 PKR per month, where as one tankers is typically sold at between 1000-2500 PKR in Karachi, and 500-1000KR in Rawalpindi-Islamabad, depending on the neighborhood and time of year. In our research, through participatory photography, residents of Karachi produced photographic evidence of this process, in our participatory photography research. The accompanying words are theirs.
Residents know that, if it weren’t for the illegal tapping of water supply and the collusion with government, they would not have to face such extensive service gaps and such extortionate water prices.

“Now, these people are actually involved in selling water privately. They connect a valve illegally to the water hydrant and then fill the tankers from the hydrant. This is a racket. We cannot complain in KWSB (Karachi Water and Sewerage Board) because everyone there belongs to the party.”

-Mr. Azad, male, 34, Mansoor Nagar/OT, Karachi

It is even more frustrating that, at least in Karachi, it is political workers who are involved in the water mafias. Political workers, according to our respondents in Karachi, are one of the major sources of violence, extortion and problems in the neighborhoods. Their role in the water mafia means residents are afraid to challenge the prices, or question their role in the illegal tapping of government supply – for fear that they will be threatened or hurt in response. Water mafias are known to have operated violently in Karachi, and are alleged to have murdered several activists, including Perween Rahman, former director of the renowned NGO – the Orangi Pilot Project Research and Training Institute (OPP-RTI). Residents contain their frustrations for fear of the consequences.

“If this water problem gets resolved then we will be at peace. [“ab pani ka kharcha to ik izafi kharcha hy na, ap samjhiya ya haram may jara hy, 1200, 1300 Rs haram may jarahy hain”] Expenditure on water is an extra load on. Its payment is illegal. We are paying an extra 1200-1300 PKR that is illegal. Even sometimes the valve man will demand that each household pay him 20-30 PKR and then he will regulate the water supply. This is extra payment to valve man and then there is the extra payment that is also going to the tanker service. In addition we have to pay the water bill as well.”

-Salma, female, 20, Ghaziabad/OT, Karachi

Again, social capital can be a useful response in neighborhoods where people come together to try and work out a solution. In Ghaziabad, for example, residents have developed a small NGO, Technical Training & Research Center (TTRC), who are invested in developing a communal water supply solution through boring. However, they are limited with what they can do, because the illegal tapping of water is so extensive it limits accessible groundwater. Umar, 42 years old, explains.
“Coincidently we just had a meeting yesterday night at 1:00 am which involved many people. Things have gotten really bad because of this heat wave and everyone knows that they will get worse, so there is an element of tension in the neighborhood. Just two months ago, the cost of a single water tanker was about Rs. 700, but now, because of the heat, the cost has gone up to Rs. 1,500! And even then, the water is of questionable quality. If you want good, sweet (meetha) water, you need to pay up to Rs. 2,100. In this heat, even a small family needs at least two tankers per month, that’s Rs. 3000 spent just like that, and most people here earn only about 8,000 – 9,000 PKR per month.

“People are worried. Last night, that group came here because they wanted a loan to install a pump to get boring water in their street. We had an intense discussion about which papers were to be signed; documents that needed to be gathered and how the saving group and TTRC would give them interest free loans for all of this. This should be more than enough to give you an idea of the current situation in regards to water. Sometimes the water comes after 20 – 22 days, or once in a month, and when it does come there is no electricity, but when there is electricity, you don’t have water. And God forbid if you do ever have electricity the pressure of the water supply is just not enough. That’s how things stand right now; we are being forced to buy really expensive water. And even if you are really careful about how much water you use and ration it out, you will at the least need one tanker each month. Naturally, people are tired and worried and they believe that the government is the root cause of all their problems. They complain that we don’t get water in our faucets, so where do those tankers get it from? And the only thing they can do is pray and ask God to give them water. So, this is the situation, and in the last few months this has become a real crisis, and we really do think that this is a crisis. People have no idea who to go to; our local representatives? The valve man? No one seems to be listening. The local residents try to work out something on their own, like the pump we talked about, but there’s a limit to what they can accomplish.”

-Umar, male, 42, Karachi

So, what are the outlets for these people?

“The situation is so bad because of corruption. The tankers buy the water that we are supposed to get and sell it to us. We have been crippled because of this. They must get their water from somewhere too, right? Why can’t we get that directly? It is the responsibility of the government to supply basic things like medicine and water, but our government has failed us.”

-Aslam, male, 57, Ghaziabad/OT, Karachi
The failure of government to ensure reliable and potable water supply to residents of low-income neighborhoods in Pakistan’s cities, intersects with the political economy and gendered ideals, to become a driver of different sources of everyday violence.

**SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT**
While the linkages between water supply and violence have been discussed in the past, albeit briefly, the linkages between solid waste management and violence are completely under-researched. This research project found that solid waste management (SWM) is a huge problem for the majority of residents across the 12 neighborhoods.

“**There’s a garbage dump right behind the mosque, which emits a really bad smell all day long. We can’t even open the back gate because of the smell.”**

- Abbas Qadri, male, Orangi Town, Karachi

Image 6.3: GARBAGE DUMP. PHOTO BY: ABBAS QADRI, MALE, ORANGI TOWN, KARACHI
Poor SWM affects quality of life in urban Pakistan. The presence of solid waste, its smell, and the consequent hygiene impacts were immediately noticeable to us as researchers. Imagine the way it must affect quality of life for residents of these neighborhoods on a daily basis. One of our researchers noted,

“When I first crossed the entrance, I immediately sensed a strong smell of garbage all over the place. I observed children playing in the lanes, which were unpaved, garbage bags were scattered in almost every vacant place. There were open sewage lines and a strong smell of sewage water.”

-SAIC Research Assistant on Lines Area/JT, Karachi

In a very patronizing narrative, middle class, elite groups and policymakers at times comment that, ‘these people are used to living in these conditions’, as if to suggest they do not pose a problem. Our research suggested this was not the case at all. Solid waste was one of the biggest issues raised by residents. In Karachi, the Municipal Corporation is formally responsible for SWM, although since
February 2015 (after the completion of our fieldwork) Sindh’s provincial government hired a private company to deal with this issue, removing KMC’s mandate. During our research period, garbage collection was irregular and insufficient across the 7 neighborhoods we investigated in Karachi, and residents had to find their own solutions (i.e. hiring a sweeper or disposing of waste themselves), because their applications and protests to the KMC and their members of parliament were having little tangible impact. The KMC provided small bins for waste disposal, in some of the neighborhoods, but they quickly get filled up, leaving empty plots, the streets and nearby open water sources to be polluted with waste.

“There is no proper system of garbage collection, we hire persons [for SWM]; we pay them 100 Rs. per month but in spite of that they do not show up for many days then we are compelled to dispose it by ourselves. We throw garbage in “Kachra Kundi” installed by Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (K.M.C). But there are only a few, and are not adequate for the need of the area. Due to this people throw in open spaces. Even in front of the “Kachra Kundi” there is a small hotel, where food is cooked and provided and people sit there and eat that food.”

-Ruby, female, 23, Christian Colony/OT, Karachi

Orangi Town is home to the OPP-RTI that launched a solid and liquid waste management programme organized and managed by the community. It is interesting that despite its history as a very successful project, the problem of poor SWM is still pervasive. All four Orangi neighborhoods demonstrated very poor SWM practices. Some respondents felt that this was due to the increasing impact of local politics on the everyday management of basic services.

“This system stayed on track till 2005 and every street and town used to be clean. Every person used to clean his area and in this way, a 450 feet street was cleaned within 10 minutes. Garbage was dumped in main bin, which was cleaned after every day by KMC. All of us cleaned our streets in a time of 10 minutes only. In 2006, political parties took over and social workers had to subside. And the same situation arose: no cleanliness, re-occurrence of negative and peace-destroying acts and killing social workers.”

-Mumtaz Ansari, female, 27, Mansoor Nagar/OT, Karachi

There exists a culture of poor sanitation, most residents do not state that they are used to living amongst solid waste, but they feel they have no other option. Some are increasingly frustrated by this and try to re-initiate self-help schemes, with little success. These residents perceive poor SWM as detrimental to health, business, and social status. Twenty-four year old Amna, for example, feels it is preventing her from getting marriage offers, which is a source of stress for her father in particular, who remains financially responsible for his daughters until they are married.
“My Father is very active in keeping our lanes clean but unfortunately the families in this building, especially those who rent flats, don’t bother to dispose garbage in a proper way or to hire a sweeper and no one agrees to cooperate in this issue because most of our neighbors consider it as a waste of money to hire any sweeper in the long run. If my father tries to stop any one they straightforward reply, who are you to stop us. They just throw it out in the lanes. It is almost impossible to solve this issue because everyone blames each other and no one accepts that this is their deed and we can’t invite any of our friends to our home due to this muddy condition of the lane and even my mother has reservations that I could not get any good proposals until and unless we leave this area because cultured families would not approach us in existing neighborhood. If anyone throws garbage in front of another person’s gate, this can become a major issue.”

-Amna, female, 24, Lines Area/JT, Karachi

The circumstances are similar in Rawalpindi-Islamabad, where the Rawalpindi Waste Management Company (RWMC) and the Capital Development Authority (CDA), respectively, are mandated to manage solid waste. Despite most of the residents of France Colony being employed by the CDA – their services do not extend there, or to Afghan Abadi, as the settlements are not regularized. It is thus not surprising that those two informal settlements have acute problems with solid waste, and dispose of it in empty plots and the nearby nala.
In Dokh Saidan, Rawalpindi, the SWM situation varies by street. In some, RMWC sweepers tend to the waste on a daily basis, whereas in other streets, their presence is much less frequent. Furthermore, as shown in Karachi, personal responsibility for SWM varies by street and household. This can become a source of conflict between households, particularly when one tries to keep the street clean and the other disposes of waste there.

“I will not tell you lies and will speak honestly that the garbage system is not good everywhere in the colony like our neighborhood. Some people throw garbage in the streets openly or in the nala nearby due to which most of the people are in conflict with each other and frequently people become ill from the germs spread by that dirt.”

-Fozia's Mother, female, Dokh Saidan, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

Even the sweepers and the government agencies in Rawalpindi-Islamabad are throwing the garbage into the Nala Lai, or into empty plots.
“The street is getting filthy. Some people throw garbage in front of others’ homes, which leads to quarrels. Dogs scatter this garbage in the night and street gets filled with garbage at morning. It will be better if people either hand it over to the sweeper or throw it themselves at a proper place. The sweeper also throws it into Lai. There isn’t any other place... everywhere there are houses and plazas. Now, the people who are living adjacent to the Lai, they must be affected by it. If the truck of the Municipal Committee collects the garbage and throws it somewhere else then there wouldn’t be any problem. Because of this there arises a bad smell out of the Lai, but there isn’t any other option.”

-Amir, male, Dokh Saidan, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

Arya Mohalla and Dokh Naju also suffer from heterogenous levels of poor SWM. While water supply can be entirely blamed upon government and water mafias, in the case of solid waste it is a little different. It may be within the government’s remit to collect waste, but it is also deemed a household responsibility to dispose of it correctly, without harming anyone else.

“There is no proper garbage collection here. People throw garbage into open places. It creates a bad smell and irritation.”

-Maria, female, 26, Dokh Naju, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

Image 6.8: INADEQUATE GARBAGE COLLECTION. PHOTO BY: MARIA, FEMALE, 26, DOKH NAJU, RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD
This is especially an expectation in neighborhoods like France Colony and Afghan Abadi where there is no formal service provision. Henceforth, SWM becomes, more frequently an issue, which triggers conflicts and violence between neighbors. This is pronounced in places with greater political economies of gendered violence, like Arya Mohalla, where one of the primary displays of masculinities comes through physical violence, domination, and posturing with weapons. In this scenario the conditions are ripe for a matter of SWM to escalate into violent conflict between male residents.

*Interviewer: “What are the reasons, which cause abuses or fights?”*

*Aatif: “Here, there is another factor and that is there are no bins to dispose of garbage here. Everyone throws it in the nullah. My shop is right beside the nullah. If we stop someone doing it then they will ask if the nullah is my personal property. So these conditions often end in verbal abuse or fights. Moreover, there is an empty plot here where people throw garbage. Neighbors, who live in front of it, often get angry about this. What can anyone say here? Everyone pretends to be the don. Here there is no life for a decent person. Men, women, children, everyone, gets affected by the prevalence of violence here. There is no work without pistols or weapons.”*

-Aatif, male, 30, Arya Mohalla, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

Other respondents of Arya Mohalla confirmed that fights over garbage throwing are common and risk becoming serious. Some suggested that people deliberately throw garbage in front of others’ houses and business in order to irritate them,

*“If we stop someone for throwing garbage, they will throw some smelly thing in front of our house. And this can happen at any time of day or night, and the only purpose of this would be to irritate us.”*

-Kaleem, male, 25, Arya Mohalla, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

Respondents acknowledge the culture of poor sanitation but, like in Karachi, rarely act to change it. In Arya Mohalla there is the presence of a sweeper, but we observed, and respondents told us, that regardless of that, they would still throw their garbage in the Nala Lai. This makes it a very unsanitary water source, yet remains a place where the poorest residents bathe and wash their clothes during water shortages.
Image 6.9: RESIDENTS BATHE IN ARYA MOHALLA, RAWALPINDI-ISLAMabad

Interviewer: “What is the condition of your street?”

Summaya: “Please do not ask this. I get angry in the morning. You may have seen while coming here that there are gutters everywhere in the street and they are not even covered. There are piles of garbage on the sides of sewerage lines. And about smell, it is everywhere. I say it to my father that look, there is garbage in the sewerage lines, but he replies that you should away from these sewerage lines. Now you tell me is this the solution to the problem.”

-Summaya, female, 23, Dokh Naju, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

The problem of solid waste is pervasive in urban Pakistan and forms a source of frustration and violence in many ways. It reflects the notion of ‘infrastructural violence’ outlined by Rogers and O’Neill (2012), where infrastructure (or lack thereof) influences how people interact. The absence of SWM, as it overlays social political contexts, leads residents of low-income neighborhoods to feel frustrated and fight over solid waste. A proper SWM system would be a step towards reducing this infrastructural violence.
LIQUID WASTE MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH

The problem of liquid waste, its link to public health and violence is also underexplored in research. Liquid waste is prevalent across the 12 neighborhoods, at different intensities throughout the year. It is a real concern for residents, who are frustrated with its impacts on public health and consequently livelihoods and human security.

In 5 of the 12 neighborhoods (Lines Area, Christian Colony and Ghaziabad in Karachi; Arya Mohalla and France Colony in Rawalpindi-Islamabad) there was a statistically significant correlation between WASH impacts upon health and experience of violence. So, the more WASH negatively affected health, the more likely respondents were to have reported experiencing violence.

This can be explained in two manifestations. First, the impact upon public health has been attributed by many respondents as a form of psychological violence. Second, the way in which ill health then affects livelihoods (in these vulnerable households) has been described as a trigger for domestic violence, and this also feeds into broader conflicts over resources. Figure 6.7 below illustrates the types of violence experienced in Dokh Naju, a neighborhood frequently suffering from floods. Here, the females and males would narrate the story that floods were the major trigger for physical and psychological domestic violence.
Figure 6.7: CHARACTERIZATION OF VIOLENCE IN DOKH NAJU

Image 6.11: WOMEN’S DAILY DUTIES DURING THE FLOOD SEASON. PHOTO BY: PARTICIPATORY PHOTOGRAPHY, DOKH SAIDAN, RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD

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Statistical analysis supported this claim, by revealing a positive correlation between WASH impacts upon livelihoods and experience of violence (Table 6-2). This relationship was present in 3 neighborhoods in Karachi and 4 in Rawalpindi-Islamabad, indicating that the more poor solid and liquid waste affect people’s ability to go to work (through causing ill health), the more likely they are to experience violence.

**Table 6-2: WASH IMPACT ON LIVELIHOOD AND VIOLENCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spearman’s Rho statistic</th>
<th>p-value (2 tailed)</th>
<th>Correlation Strength</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VCI</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lines Area</td>
<td>0.355</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raes Amrohi</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghaziabad</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi/Islamabad</td>
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<td>0.000**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Abadi</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>0.002**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arya Mohalla</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dokh Naju</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.009**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France Colony</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)**

In “his life’s greatest tragedy” both of his sons died because of a [hygiene-related] sickness 12 years ago. They had been ill for some time, but he did not have enough money to get them treated properly, and was only giving them anti-pain pills and some general medicine. When one got violently ill, and started vomiting until he died, he rushed the other one to the nearest hospital but sadly he could not make it, and his other son died in his lap. He believes that this tragedy has shaped him more than anything else in his life; where he saw hope before; he now only sees despair and pessimism.

-Aslam, male, Ghaziabad, Karachi

The above quote highlights how issues of liquid waste in vulnerable communities have led to the needless deaths of two sons. Aslam, their father characterizes his experience as psychological violence, because the problem of seepage (where sewage bleeds into the water supply) should be dealt with by the government. Furthermore, due to his socio-economic situation, he could not afford...
the medications his sons needed. Now he suffers the psychological trauma of losing two of his children this way, and he fears for the rest of his family due to the precarious liquid waste system, which still exists.

The impact of poor LWM on livelihoods can be severe and frustrating. Husnain owns a pharmacy in a neighborhood in the Lines Area, Jamshed Town, Karachi, and business is frequently disrupted by the build up of stagnant water after heavy rains. This is causing him to go into debt.

“If you just take a look outside this shop you can see how serious [this problem] it is yourself. If it rains lightly even once, this street isn’t free of water for at least six months! And then when the children here play on the streets, they get very serious illnesses because of all the dirty water and sewage. It also seriously harms my business. It had been here for three, four months and believe me, I went into a loss of about Rs. 3000, 4000 because patients do not want to go to a medicine shop which is surrounded by such dirt and filth.”

-Husnain, male, 54, Pharmacy Owner, Lines Area/JT, Karachi

The phenomenon of flooding is linked to violent outcomes in both cities.

Whenever it rains, the people living here always face a lot of serious problems. Normal life is disturbed for at least a whole week. You see, when it rains, all the water flows down from the main Shahrah-e-Faisal road and ends up here. Many people who live here find that their homes are full of dirty water, and it is so bad that some families who leave their houses for a week or two until the water subsides on its own. No one from the government even attempts to help us in this regard, despite our repeated complaints to the local MNA head. It was even worse before we built that wall around that sewer, because the water that overflowed from there was especially harmful.

-Husnain, male, 54, Pharmacy Owner, Lines Area/JT, Karachi

Ethnographies highlight that in neighborhoods like France Colony and Dokh Naju, for example, which are located on the banks of the Nala Lai, when flooding occurs their infrastructure is not able to cope with it. They face the destruction of homes and belongings, and raised floodwater can remain for days and even weeks. Emergency services are unable to reach homes due to the water level and the narrowness of the lanes, leaving households to fend for themselves.
Interviewer: “You mentioned that you spent one year paying rent because of flood [which destroyed your house]. So, what would you do in future? Is there any precautionary measures you can take?”

Sadia: “When the lai overflows it’s dangerous and we came to know that flood might affect us again so I sent my children to their grandmother house which is located in other area and safe. But now my daughters getting young so last years I did not sent them anywhere. Our house located slightly on height so we are safe sometimes from flood but the houses nearby us are really affected every year due to flood. Every year and half portion of each house becomes drowned.”

Interviewer: “So are you feeling secure to live here?”

Sadia: “Not at all but what we can do Poor people are feeling happy to have houses they don’t care how they will manage with such hazards.”

-Sadia, female, Dokh Naju, Rawalpindi-Islamabad
When faced with dealing with the destruction of their belongings alone, like in ill health, residents are under immense stress, which becomes particularly pronounced when it affects the male breadwinners’ abilities to go to work. Some families are forced to locate to a new house and pay additional rent. Due to the financial vulnerability of these residents, missing a day, or a few days of work can have a severe impact upon food security. Residents in Rawalpindi-Islamabad told us that this can drive domestic violence between frustrated males and their female members of the household. Ultimately, the male’s inability to ensure food security becomes a challenge to their masculinity and an issue of shame, which, if challenged by his female relatives, can trigger violence.

“Sometimes I spend 3, 4 days without food, but can’t bring myself to beg because of the humiliation and guilt I felt while begging. It has been my personal experience that people do give money, but they always ridicule you first. They only really help you after they are dead.”

-Aslam, male, 57, Ghaziabad/OT, Karachi

“We (men) can do the labor and work hard, we can do the hardest of labors, we can do the meanest job but we will not allow our women to go out. We provide them with good food and enjoyment, and it is all inside the home.”

-Qaiser, male, 36, Dokh Saidan, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

“Our houses are made of mud (you can see) which create problems in the heavy rain. We are facing dirt our children are playing in dirt and get ill. We don't have any hospital facility here. I think this all is violence because our life is not comfortable. Being a female I feel that females have no importance in males’ lives. I saw my neighbors and relatives that they are beating and abusing by their males. But male is the pillar of home and bread earner that’s why we have to tolerate it.”

-Zuliha, female, Afghan Abadi, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

Another way in which liquid waste can be linked to violence is through the political economy of its management. This is more prevalent in Karachi, where respondents allege that actors in the illegal economy are giving KWSB bribes to fail to address the problems of (both water, and) liquid waste, so as to maintain a political vacuum in which they can act to gain power and capital.
“Water from sewerage can be found everywhere. Earlier people used to clean it themselves. But ever since the posts of counselors have been allocated, people gave up on their efforts and attached their hopes to city unions and counselors. They have closed their office a long time ago. This is one of the reasons for pathetic situation of the area and street. In other towns, people from the street themselves take part in clearing sewerage and keeping their town clean. The situation in Mansoor Nagar is due to people who are a part of political parties. It is being done to ensure the continuity of benefits for other people who are running illegal businesses. They are getting their bribe. Water sale gives them bribes as well. The water and sewerage department is under the influence of such a strong political party that no one can dare to speak against it. All these issues are extremely complex.”

-Mumtaz Ansari, 27, Mansoor Nagar/OT, Karachi

Another narrative, at least in Orangi Town, Karachi explains that residents had previously constructed a liquid waste management system with the support of the OPP-RTI. A great deal of hard work and time were expended by residents on each street in order to develop this system. However, the government has failed to do its part in terms of maintaining the ‘external’ hardware needed to ensure the system worked sustainably.

6.3 CONCLUSION

The above discussion illustrates the intertwined nature of access to public services and infrastructure with everyday violence in urban Pakistan. Ultimately, there are pervasive basic service gaps, especially in electricity, transport and WASH, which are some of the causes of gendered frustrations, which lead to public and private violence. The concept of infrastructural violence is a useful lens with which to analyze and understand the conflict and violence dynamics orchestrated and/or driven by infrastructure and services. We briefly summarize the findings below:

- Residents across the cities rate public services poorly – especially the police service, which is claimed and observed to be a major driver of violence in informal settlements
- Electricity load shedding is a very stressful issue which impacts wellbeing, business operation and food security
- WASH is a driver of conflict and violence in both cities – but the dynamics of which vary
- 6/7 neighborhoods in Karachi face gaps in government water supply, so turn to private run (mafia run) water tankers, which operate violently
- Despite service gaps, government billing continues for electricity and water supply. Combined with having to pay for private supply, these bills become sources of significant anxiety and disenfranchisement in Karachi particularly
• In Rawalpindi, informal settlements must develop their own water supply systems or rely on open groundwater sources. Communal solutions can drive violence between neighbors in times of scarcity.
• The impact of poor access to potable water on gendered expectations and household dynamics can lead to domestic violence.
• Solid waste management is poor to non-existent across the cities and neighborhoods. The impact on quality of life, public health and medical expenses is immense. Many respondents listed solid waste as the number one cause of problems and conflict in their neighborhoods.
• Solid waste is used as a tool to incite and continue conflict.
• Poor liquid waste management, especially during times of flood, causes psychological violence (due to the threat of flood and stagnant water), and domestic violence within the home.

This research makes evident that the pressure of living in an environment with poor or non-existent basic services impedes upon peoples’ abilities to live life in a secure way, where they can make a sustainable livelihood. The result of which, as it intersects with gender and the local context, can often be violent. A strong case can be made to governments, donors and organizations that by focusing on improving access public services and infrastructure – particularly electricity, transportation and WASH – cycles of violence can mitigated for and incentives to participate in the informal economy will reduce. However, this needs to be done in an equitable and inclusive manner to prevent the (all too common) capture and control of basic service programmes by local elites.
In this chapter we present an analysis of the linkages between violence, and the discursive and material constructions of gender in Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad. As already emphasized in Chapter 1, for the purposes of our project violence is deemed to be the use of physical force, or threat thereof gratuitously, to ensure compliance. This definition of violence allows us to focus on the much more persistent and insidious forms of everyday violence that instill fear and anxiety on the basis of gender, ethnicity, class or religious belief. What are the geographies of fear for women, men or transgendered in Rawalpindi-Islamabad or Karachi and why? How do different ethnic, religious, or class groups view different urban spaces in terms of their accessibility to them or violence associated with them? We subscribe to the Arendtian notion of violence, understanding it not only as symptomatic of a loss of power, but also as a tactic of power involving physical coercion or threat thereof, which is more an outcome of a loss of compensatory power or power/knowledge than a conduit for accumulating social power to the perpetrator (Arendt 1969; 2013).

With the above understanding of violence, we unpack in the following sections, the experiences and tactics of violence and the causal relations that perpetuate those tactics, and how these are embedded in gender dynamics that straddle the public-private divide. As already highlighted in Chapter 5 and reiterated here, the categories public and private play a key role in the beliefs held about how society works or should work. Thus it is not uncommon to understand certain spaces, for instance the street, as public and others, such as the home, as private. However, the public and the private are not oppositional but complementary spheres (Srivastava, 2012). This has an important bearing on how we understand and address violence against men and women in specific instances, e.g. in the street, in the home. If the public sphere is understood as ‘masculinized’, then exploring the relationship between gender and violence throws light on the causes and nature of gender-based violence in public and private spaces. In doing so, we can better understand the hostility that women often confront if they place themselves in the imagined public sphere where masculine anxiety guards the public as a realm of men (Srivastava, 2012). This is particularly pertinent in a context: where masculinity is closely linked to notions of dominance in society and over women; and where relationships are characterized by unequal power relations; and physical and verbal violence is used as a tool of control deemed necessary by both women and men. A further distinction we make is between ‘private’ and ‘domestic’ or the latter as a space of intimacy where violence is often rendered as a part of everyday life, or where a woman may live with a violent partner. While women may have autonomy over the private (for instance a woman who owns her own home), this may not be the case when it comes to the domestic, a space shared with the husband and extended family or in-laws. In the ensuing discussion, we use the terms ‘private’ and ‘domestic’ interchangeably.
Finally, we reflect on how spatial organization at the street and home levels produces violent geographies. In doing so, we draw attention to issues of surveillance and police presence that may be associated with state oppression on the one hand, and urban design, which may perpetuate gendered isolation and confinement on the other. We define place as being constituted at the intersection of physical space and the human experience, memory, and emotions associated with that space.

7.1 INTERNAL/EXTERNAL VIOLENCE DATA ACROSS CITIES & NEIGHBORHOODS

As mentioned before the public/private, internal/external divide is not as tidy as it might be envisioned in the nuclear family households—say in the West or amongst the middle and upper class households in South Asia. In our data sample, too often the physical structure of living quarters often had ten to twenty residents belonging to an extended family living in as little as one room. As a result, the notion of a private space becomes a little fluid, especially since those spaces are not only highly vulnerable to intrusions by the law enforcement arms of the state, but also external actors who give little regard to the physical boundaries of a household, e.g. as mentioned earlier, the case of Hareem who was dragged out of her house in Ali Akbar Shah Goth, Karachi, and beaten with impunity. Likewise, in Afghan Abadi, Islamabad, the intrusion of the police at odd hours into the physical premises for search and seizure are altogether a frequent occurrence. Furthermore, being subjected to violence in front of extended family members and children distinctly lends a semi-public feel to the sense of humiliation that the victims of violence suffer, especially women, therefore, the following statistics that we present below should be understood in the context of the amorphous and subjective boundaries of the public and private and internal/external violence. Violence by those you know and from acquaintances, may be assumed to be in private, but experientially it may very well be public for the victim and in terms of optics where close neighbors get to observe and know about the humiliation of the victims. Similarly, violence by strangers may be assumed to be in public, but it could be quite private when one is abducted and subjected to torture in some basement, or public when one is humiliated for the edification of the onlookers too, as is often the case.

Fear and reaction drive cycles of violence that transform spaces in Pakistan’s cities. From the military, to political insurgents, to private security contractors, to criminal gangs, to individual citizens, violence is a matter of everyday life and is often resolved mentally with a violent reaction. Fear affects public confidence in government, and personal security on the streets. State violence, particularly through military interventionism has become the norm in Pakistan's cities. Our quantitative and qualitative analysis has focused on incidents of physical violence or threats of physical violence resulting in bodily harm, confinement and/or constriction of mobility as well as non-violent forms such as extortion. From the very outset the quantitative data on types of violence shows clear patterns between Karachi and the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad (Figure 7.1).
In the case of Karachi, an overwhelming number of respondents, more than 88% in almost all neighborhoods except Gulshan e Bihar reported a household member or themselves as having been a victim of violence by strangers only, and by strangers and household members/family/acquaintances. This indicates very high levels of criminal violence in the city. On the other hand however, in Rawalpindi-Islamabad less than 35% of the respondents reported having been subjected to criminal violence by strangers in all the neighborhoods with the exception of Afghan Abadi where about 43% of the respondents reported being victimized by strangers. A further breakdown of ‘Sources of violence' by neighborhoods is given below in Figures 7.2 and 7.3.
Figure 7.2: SOURCE OF VIOLENCE BY NEIGHBORHOOD - KARACHI

Source of violence by neighbourhood- Karachi

Figure 7.3: SOURCE OF VIOLENCE IN RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD

Source of violence by neighbourhood - Rawalpindi-Islamabad
Assessing the patterns raises questions as to the differential nature of violence experienced in each city and across neighborhoods and the private-public divide. In Figures 7.4-6 below, where ‘Types of violence experienced’ is visually presented, we can see again that Karachi significantly outweighs Rawalpindi-Islamabad on petty and political violence, whereas the reverse happens with psychological violence (and religious violence but the 10% of respondents reporting this in Rawalpindi-Islamabad still remain low). While a glance at the local news might answer why political violence appears to be higher in Karachi – due to the nature of political instability in the city, characterized by warring political parties and mafia groups, as well as an aggressive state-led paramilitary operation to crack down on terrorism in the city - our qualitative research has shed light on this concept of psychological violence in Rawalpindi-Islamabad.

Figure 7.4: TYPES OF VIOLENCE EXPERIENCED
Figure 7.5: TYPES OF VIOLENCE EXPERIENCED – RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD

![Rawalpindi-Islamabad Violence Types Chart]

Figure 7.6: TYPES OF VIOLENCE EXPERIENCED - KARACHI

![Karachi Violence Types Chart]
Furthermore, statistically significant results of gendered dimensions of incidences of violence within households are given below in Table 7-1. Although somewhat intuitive, the results clearly indicate a correlation between gender and the occurrence of violence within the household, especially in Rawalpindi-Islamabad, where there is a statistically significant (p<0.001) and ‘strong’ correlation (Cramer’s V > 0.5) between gender and violence within households. In Rawalpindi-Islamabad less than 17% of the men reported violence within the households, while more than 88% of the women reported the same.

Table 7-1: GENDERED EXPERIENCED VIOLENCE WITHIN HOUSEHOLDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gendered Experienced Violence Within Households</th>
<th>Likelihood Ratio Chi Square</th>
<th>Sig (2-tailed)</th>
<th>Cramer’s V</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>% Within Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate</td>
<td>418.044</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.483**</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>6.3% 48.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>12.951</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.116**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>4.3% 10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansoor Nagar/Orangi Town</td>
<td>9.054</td>
<td>0.003**</td>
<td>0.203**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>0.9% 9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Colony/Orangi Town</td>
<td>7.108</td>
<td>0.008**</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>0.0% 6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Akbar Shah Goth/Bin Qasim Town</td>
<td>7.234</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
<td>0.170**</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>6.7% 17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi-Islamabad</td>
<td>526.833</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.815**</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>9.9% 91.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Abadi</td>
<td>125.496</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.892**</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>3.3% 92.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arya Mohalla</td>
<td>103.576</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.903**</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>4.8% 95.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dokh Naju</td>
<td>117.294</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.807**</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>14.3% 94.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dokh Saidan</td>
<td>85.633</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.715**</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>16.7% 88.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France Colony</td>
<td>96.471</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.783**</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>10.1% 88.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant at the 0.01 (99%) level (2-Tailed)

The above wider picture of the pervasiveness of violence and the sources thereof across the urban areas and the neighborhoods should be borne in mind, as we proceed to explore the stories behind the numbers in the sections below.

7.2 STORIES BEHIND THE NUMBERS
During survey collection we found that psychological violence was a very salient term that respondents understood and many felt they experienced, particularly in Rawalpindi-Islamabad. Our aim has been to understand what respondents understand to be violent experiences, and communicate that to key stakeholders. Pertinent here is one respondent’s summary.
Interviewer: “What is violence according to you?”

Respondent: “To me, oppression is of two types: physical and mental. 70% of oppression is mental in nature whereas 30% is physical. Both are equally dangerous and both forms of oppression are mainly characterized by dependency. For instance, mental oppression may give rise to blood pressure, diabetes, paralysis, heart attack, fights and disputes and ultimate dissatisfaction. Physical oppression involves mutually inflicted fights, murders, life-threats from robbers at night, danger to property, wealth and respect. All this is commonly happening and they also happen under political supervision. In fact, under the supervision of government!”

-Male, 32, Ali Akbar Shah Goth/BQT, Karachi

As one may notice that the above quote is from Karachi, even though people in Rawalpindi-Islamabad were much more likely to report psychological violence than in Karachi. Our ethnographies as well as questionnaires indicated that psychological violence was as pervasive in Karachi as in Rawalpindi-Islamabad, as per the above definition, but people were less likely to tick off the box in the questionnaire for it in Karachi. The only explanation we can suggest is that with the pervasiveness of physical violence, especially by strangers, e.g., political parties’ workers, criminals and households, people perhaps understood it as a subset of all of those physical threats. In Rawalpindi-Islamabad, with a generally lower incidence of violence by strangers, the perception of psychological violence was more pronounced and not occluded by the physical actuality of it.

Some of the key drivers of psychological violence were: abusive relationship with in-laws, limited mobility (for women in particular), expectation of being a breadwinner (especially for men), and the risk of environmental hazards. Psychological violence was most often chosen by women, in fact, 71% of the people who reported psychological violence were in fact, women. The main driver was relationship with in-laws:

“My sister’s in-laws are not comfortable with her [respondent’s sister]. So her husband left her here. There were fights. Her husband could not get a visa [work visa for some foreign country]. She was being taunted daily that it was his luck that they got a child, but her luck had ruined his visa prospects. She came here (to her parents) due to this daily quarrel. Her husband has left her. My sister was very disturbed due to these fights so we took her in here.”

-Sana, female, 26, Dokh Saidan, Rawalpindi-Islamabad
“It is obvious that in most cases the woman is the victim of violence because she is the one who is more vulnerable. She is a victim of the violence inside the house. The people who are ignorant and live their lives like animals perpetrate violence on women. A man is able to overcome problems but a woman is weak so due care should be given to her. A woman should get her rights and be respected in the home. Some people are against the education of women, which is wrong.”

-Fayyaz, male, Dokh Saidan, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

In the first of the two quotes above, the woman’s sister was threatened by violence during the fights with the in-laws. There is no evidence to suggest that the threat ever actually came to pass, however, given our understanding of violence as also a perception or threat of the use of force, we maintain that this qualifies. In the second quote a male from a somewhat patriarchal perspective describes females as weak, but nevertheless acknowledges the rampant threat or exercise of violence against women in the homes. Additionally, the quote suggests a solution in the form of education. Several others too expressed a need for greater education opportunities for women in order to give them the chance to lessen their vulnerability. However, these were being hampered due to mobility issues for women, as discussed in Chapter 5. Women discussed experiencing psychological violence in the context of the continual threat of physical use of force by husbands and in-laws for being unable to perform their domestic duties in providing a clean home with sufficient food and comfort for their families, as documented in chapter 6. But restricted mobilities too are deemed to be a source of psychological violence by women, and are anchored in three core narratives: one is that women are vulnerable to the daily violence in the streets (i.e. firings, bomb blasts, petty crime, theft etc.).

“I can’t allow her (my daughter) to go outside in the street because the environment is not good for girls here. I can tell you a story of woman and her daughters with whom I met myself and they told me their situation. The woman, in Haji camp, went to pick up her daughters from school, and when they were walking home two men on bikes snatched her shawl (dupata) and then in the next round they snatched her daughters’ veil very openly! Now the woman and her daughters are so scared they don’t even go outside the home. Her daughters even left their education.”

-Sehmina, female, 45, Arya Mohalla, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

The second core narrative is that males harass women, leaving them exposed to fear of sexual violence in the streets. In Arya Mohalla, Rawalpindi, our male respondents characterized sexual harassment in public spaces as ‘poondi’: in the male parlance a playful act of sexually harassing women in public spaces.
“People are so very perverted here (smiling). In every problem, the matter revolves around girls.”

-Kashif, male, 22, Arya Mohalla, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

Even here the perversion is explained by the males with reference to a certain patriarchal interpretation of religion, which leads us to the third narrative that women who go out of the home are more likely to engage in activities defined by society as haram or culturally inappropriate, such as certain kinds of relationships that are socially stigmatized, thus their families can and should restrict them from venturing out for work, education or other purposes (unless accompanied). As a young woman in Ghaziabad explained:

“No I don’t feel myself very empowered, as I am a girl and I have so many limitations. I want to get higher education; I want to go to university level. My father supports me but my mother doesn't encourage me as she perceives that for the girls matriculation is enough. I am facing a great deal of opposition from my maternal relatives as well, especially uncles. They think, the girl who gets more education, they marry the persons of their own choice and they feel superior and rebel the family norms. My mother says, if I will get more education than the boys of neighborhood or family, who will marry me? She often says that, I am already educated enough, I should stop now getting more education.”

-Female, 20, Ghaziabad/OT, Karachi

We have already examined in depth in Chapter 5 the mobility issue as it pertains to physical and gender dynamics. Many males argued that pious women tend to stay in the home, and, as a species, are not made by God to roam in the public sphere, e.g.,

“Verbal abuse, fights and staring at women are important social dangers here. Truly speaking, our religion has given the most important status to women but sadly we are illiterate, non-educated. The society is sick but women are sick too. Those women who are decent, when they go to offices, they change because the environment there is different and not decent.... Women have lessened their dignity themselves and somewhat it is due to our thinking. Men’s eyes have hair of pig. And when devil is with you, then intercourse with eyes happen. So according to me, the real status of woman should be in Purdah.”

-Aatif, male, 30, Arya Mohalla, Rawalpindi-Islamabad
While the above quote blames the women, it also holds male sexuality as culpable, but more so because what is suggested here is lack of education and possibly men’s supposed stereotypical male desire. Many women characterized this control of their mobility as a form of violence, that they were unable to live full lives or allow their daughters to do the same. Knowing education can play a role in reducing a woman’s vulnerability to violence in the home, many mothers lamented that they could not educate their daughters due to these risks.

“My daughter is a graduate but I cannot let her do a job due to the security issues in our area. I cannot let her keep a mobile phone as people will consider her of bad character.”

-Female, 40, Mansoor Nagar/OT, Karachi

But part of the rampant gendered violence and stress is also an outcome of the transformation of the society. Gradually in Pakistan, the marriage age has been increasing and because of the pressures of a monetized, urbanized economy, women are increasingly compelled to enter the job market. So for the first time in its history, urban Pakistan is seeing a cohort of marriageable age women in particular who have not been pressed into an arranged marriage in their teens. Consequently, there is a lag between the agrarian patriarchal values of the society and the compulsions of an urbanized society. In there then, the question of personal choices when it comes to marriage also become a source of psychological violence.

“Disrespecting and humiliating women can be seen. I have loved a girl and that girl loves me as well. If we want we can marry on our own but we want to marry with the consent of our parents. Our parents do not want this. They also oppress the girl. Her parents also confiscated her mobile from her so we do not have contact but still we manage to talk somehow. We meet every Sunday in church. What can be said?! Our society has become like this. They do not allow the union of two hearts. We want to live together but they do not let us.”

-William, male, 25, Christian Colony/OT, Karachi

There is an element of psychological violence in both Rawalpindi-Islamabad and Karachi, which is commonly faced by males, yet impacts upon females in the private sphere. The masculine ideal of being able to provide sufficient finance for the whole family, without female members having to work, creates greater pressure on males in cities where unemployment is high. This social pressure can often lead to aggression by males in the home, an aggression that females often attribute to being their fault, for not sufficiently managing resources and their household responsibilities.
“My father becomes so tense about the water bill. He tells us not to use water all day – but how can we perform our duties without it? We cannot go outside for water. When the bill comes we try to hide it from him, otherwise he beats my mother and me a lot because of his frustration.”

-Female, 24, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

“Violence against women is present in our community. Men are the victims of psychological violence; women are the victims of physical violence. This violence stems from the fact that the unemployment is high these days, and men face a lot of mental anguish, and then they come home and take that frustration out on their wives.”

-Ashfaq, male, 40, Lines Area/JT, Karachi

Beyond the socially induced hazards there was the additional factor of the pervasive environmental hazard of floods in Rawalpindi-Islamabad, which was not as prominent in Karachi. Respondents in Rawalpindi-Islamabad were terrified of the next bout of severe flooding. They told us that they faced psychological violence due to this constant fear, and incidences of domestic violence would increase due to the strain faced by women and men during these difficult times.

The lai (stream) has a disastrous impact on our lives. I am suffering badly due to floods in the lai; it’s kind of a mental torture for me and my husband all the time.

-Rafiya, female, 42, Dokh Saidan, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

Sadia: “When the lai overflows it’s dangerous and we came to know that floods might affect us again so I sent my children to their grandmother’s house which is located in another area and safe... every year and half portions of each house are usually drowned.”

Interviewer: So are you feeling secure to live here?

Sadia: “Not at all but what we can do?! Poor people are feeling happy to have houses they don’t care how they will manage with such hazards... there is no one to help others because everyone indulged in their own problems – everything happens if you help yourself.”

-Sadia, female, 35, Dokh Naju, Rawalpindi-Islamabad
Furthermore, in addition to the above dimensions of psychological violence there is the pervasive threat of violence in Karachi, in particular of criminal and state violence. We have already spoken of the demolition of the Afghan Abadi and people’s earlier apprehensions about that in one of the earlier chapters. But even other residents of informal settlements in Islamabad, in particular, live under a daily threat of eviction and witness frequent forays by the Capital Development Authority (CDA), the main civic agency of Islamabad, to demolish one structure or another, e.g. in the largely Christian community of France Colony, where most of the city’s sanitation workers live, a woman had the following to say:

“If there is no justice, how can peace prevail? This government has done a lot of injustice. There is so much inflation that a poor person cannot survive. Then it was threatening to demolish our homes, God bless Jay Salik that he did not let him demolish... We face this risk that if our shantytowns are demolished, then where will we go? We are now used to this place. We have settled here. This is what worries us.”

-Tahira, female, 39, France Colony, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

Simultaneously, in addition to this threat there is the actuality of frequent arrests and extortion by the police (discussed earlier).

“At least we have jobs in the Mandi and a place to live. Although we do face problems here, especially from police but we have to bear this because we can’t leave this place now... The police is the biggest threat for us. If you want to know how, then come at 7 o’clock in the morning. You will come to know what they actually do. On a daily basis they arrest people from community and ask for money from their families. If we don’t provide them money they send our persons to jail and from there they released through bail.”

-Mother and Son, Afghan Abadi, Rawalpindi-Islamabad

In Karachi however, the high handedness of the state is sub-contracted out to political parties, which are in power at different tiers of government and then the criminal elements that operate under their protection, something that has been documented well in the literature (Gayer, 2014). The political parties and the state almost work on the pattern of a public-private partnership. The pervasive environment of violence and fear that these political parties perpetuate has been documented all through this report, but bear a brief reminder here, as per the following series of quotes:
“This area is violent. We do our tailoring business in hiding. If anybody came to know about our business, then the political worker will send us an extortion slip. One of my neighbors received a slip of Rupees 5 lakh (500,000). They left this area. My brother in law was illegally detained by the police. They released him after we paid them money.”

-Male, 26, Mansoor Nagar/OT, Karachi

Interviewer: What sort of incidences of violence do you hear in your everyday routine?

Salma: “Theft, snatching, firing, people who go to work but never return alive. Finding dead bodies and worsening law and order situation in the city.”

-Salma, female, 20, Ghaziabad/OT, Karachi

“In my neighborhood the state of violence is same as the other parts of Orangi; target killing is common as a daily routine. The incidents of theft and handbag snatching have increased in past months. There was an incident of handbag snatching that occurred recently. A girl was passing in the street; she was a student in a local coaching center. Some young boys came and snatched her bag and fled. There are people who work for peace building but they are not serious. They only work to be famous; they are champions of words but not actions.”

-Sabir, male, 27, Ghaziabad/OT, Karachi

“Nine of my cell phones have been snatched.”

-Male, 30, Lines Area/JT, Karachi

Respondents spoke of a sincere fear of and frustration with political party workers, who dominate the neighborhoods through terror. One of the most common interactions is forced donations through visits to homes or businesses asking for payments using the language of zakat or fitrah (obligatory religious donations). People who refuse are often the victims of violence. Our research has shown that masculinities are key to the membership of such political parties. They attract young males in their teens and give them the resources and a platform upon which they can display their masculinity, aggression and power through petty criminal activity as documented in Chapter 4 and illustrated by the quotes below.
Aslam: “Almost everyone in Orangi Town is extorted by a political party. If you don’t give them the skin of the goat you sacrificed, then next time you’ll be killed too.”

Interviewer: “Who does good in the neighborhood?”

Aslam: “There is no one to do good work. If someone does rise up to do it, the political party members will use a bullet to silence him.”

-Aslam, male, 57, Ghaziabad/OT, Karachi

“When I was coming back from work, teenagers riding a motorcycle took everything from me at gunpoint and beat me up badly. None of the passers-by helped me. All of this is done by the political party members.”

-Male, 39, Lines Area/JT, Karachi

Murdering non-compliant members of the community or people who might be from a different political party or people who might have the potential to upstage the dominance of the one dominant political party were often murdered. The pervasiveness of such murders, commonly referred to as ‘target killing’, made perpetual headlines for Karachi until the most recent operation by the military and the paramilitary Rangers since August 2013. The following quotes illustrate the extent of this practice.

“There is a threat, risk that has penetrated deep into our hearts. The risk of target killing. Being a school owner I am always under such threat. My family is looking forward to relocating from here. There was another school owner who received a bhatta parchi (extortion slip). His son was a cancer patient. That person ran a very good school but couldn’t pay any cash. He spent all his money on his child’s treatment. That man was killed a few days later for nonpayment. Some schools here have received the bhatta parchi. Unknown persons have even fired on these schools. So we have formed a committee to resolve this issue by including some big political names. The main thing in Pakistan is that people do not get punishment for their crimes. The way people get severe punishment in Saudi Arabia. This must be the case in Pakistan also so people must have some sort of fear before committing a crime. Democracy and dictatorship both are good if they have justice in their system. Here a man killed eight persons without any fear of getting caught. Even when he got arrested, he has surety of being released on some sort of false guarantee. While the innocent get arrested and punished for doing nothing.”

-Stephan, male, 35, Christian Colony/OT, Karachi
“All people of Christian colony must give a monthly bribe. Water supply works in the same way as well. A street that has party workers will receive a water supply of 2 hours; where there is no worker there is no water. In this party, young boys are mainly involved in loitering and when the police does a crackdown they are successful in hiding. Addictive drugs are commonly used by these boys. All this is because of the party. We can say nothing to these boys. Their network is very strong. They respect no one. It is better to remain silent. The law is being enforced under the flag of political parties and bribes go to both. Youngsters are being murdered openly. Political parties in Karachi are doing politics on corpses. Nobody asks why this is happening but they are concerned whether he belongs to this party or he belonged to that party. Humanity has ended.”

-William, male, 25, Christian Colony/OT, Karachi

The public aspect of the public-private partnership in perpetrating violence manifests itself through police extortion, especially in Karachi. The law and order situation and the rangers operation, according to respondents, appears to create justifications for police to arrest people on false charges and demand bribes for their release. This is often done at night or early in the morning. The bribes are financially crippling for many.

“My home was robbed once. I experienced difficulty over my land ownership. I had to pay police a big bribe to retain ownership. The police take the wrong people, blame them for something and then ask for ransom.”

-Male, 23, Mansoor Nagar/OT, Karachi

“The police?! For all I know, he who robbed my house was a policeman. I’ll tell you something, some of the biggest robbers and thieves here are the police themselves. They always look for their own benefit. During Ramadan, they randomly stop you and ask for edhi (money presented on religious holiday). In some areas, they even pick up teenage boys and then extort their parents for money. How can anyone complain to the police when they themselves are breaking the law?”

-Aslam, male, 57, Ghaziabad/OT, Karachi
Interestingly, Shahid, a police officer who resides in Mansoor Nagar, Orangi Town, underscored how bribes and political interference had become a common dynamic in policing Karachi:

“Political party workers are the people who propagate violence. The guardians of peace are taking bribes themselves. The task of the police is to keep the peace and to punish terrorists and dons according to the law. What are they doing? We have seen that they have been killed too. The real problem is that the police had given so much space to the sources of violence that they have become stronger now. The police have become weak. The providers of justice have also become the victims of political influence. Terrorists were caught, they were sent to jail, but they are released. How can there be justice? The recruitments (in any department) are on political basis. Officials work according to their affiliations with their political party. The police station is on the bid. The highest bidders get to work in it. What work can be done by the police officer who has paid to be a police officer?”

-Shahid, 40, Police Officer, male, Mansoor Nagar/OT, Karachi

The above should convey some sense of the public/private, internal/external types of violence at play in the urban areas we studied for this research project. The boundaries of private are intricately imbricated with the boundaries of the public and defy tidy demarcation. Some of the trends like extortion by police or gangsters, petty crime or threats of eviction are perhaps endemic to many large cities of the global South. However, the types of cultural, generational, political and gendered tensions that mediate the relationship between public and private violent spaces are heavily context specific. In the following section, we turn to the evidence from the participatory photography exercises to elucidate some more of the context within which space and the violence or protection it engenders is experienced.

7.3 IF PICTURES COULD SPEAK
The participatory photography exercise yielded a rich trope of stories and images around those narratives that govern the everyday lives of the participants in the exercise. Most of the stories and images related to personal and public spaces, but the dominant running themes were with regard to the lack of services such as water, solid and liquid waste disposal, transport, electricity, livelihoods, labor and nutrition. We discussed some of those stories and images in the foregoing chapters. Here however, we want to elucidate specific themes of gender identities and performances, which subsequently get woven into the following images on aspirations and violence. Images 7.1 and 7.2 from Dokh Saidan and Afghan Abadi illustrate the archetypes of masculinity and femininity as captured by the local photographers. The Dokh Saidan photograph of the young man is that of the cousin of the female photographer who took the photo. The photographer is a married woman in her late twenties. Her husband is a day laborer. Her comments when talking about this photograph were that, this is the age when young people should be getting an education, instead they get involved with bad company, because of which they do drugs and chase after girls for love and
essentially waste their lives away. This photograph in our view illustrates the feminine view and perhaps experience of masculinity in its youth. One could interpret the photograph in many ways, as we have. We could talk about it, but we will just let the photo speak for itself.

The second photograph (Image 7.2) was taken by the little girl’s proud father in the former Afghan Abadi in I-11/4 sector of Islamabad. The father was a community leader and an activist of the left wing Awami Workers’ Party. In this instance the little girl is playing at being a bride. Again we will let the photograph speak for itself.

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Images 7.3-6 were taken by a young woman of 20 in Ali Akbar Shah Goth, Karachi. The photographer is not married and has ten years of education. Her household depends upon carpet weaving for income. She said about Images 7.4.3 and 7.4.4 that that were her ways of seeing the world from the confines of her home. But even there, her brother is thinking about raising the wall on the stairs in Image 7.4.4 to maintain *purdah* (veil) for the house. The photographer is quite obviously not thrilled about the prospect of that, but the photo does speak to the claustrophobic confinement that women are often subjected to in the name of their chastity. It is somewhat indicative that her brother would think about spending money on raising the wall while the family’s finances are tight enough that it took them an entire year of saving to buy the goat named Rani in Image 7.4.5. In fact, the photographer is very proud of her goat and effusively declared that “I love her—my sweet goat”; the goat is one of the joys in the photographer’s life, the view in Image 7.4.6 is the other. She said about the photo: “When I am depressed, I go to my rooftop and see this view. It reminds me how beautiful life is. It rejuvenates me.”
Image 7.7 below is a selfie that the photographer took of himself. He is the local pastor in the Christian Colony, in Karachi. Initially this was the only photo he turned in for his photography exercise. He was very depressed because the day he took this photo, March 15th, 2015, twin bomb blasts in the Yohanabad neighborhood of Lahore had killed a number of Christian worshipers in those churches. He did not elaborate why he just took a selfie to express his despondency at the news of the bomb blast. We have a few hypotheses, e.g., that he might want us to look at him as a Christian pastor and reflect upon how precarious his existence is, but again in this instant, the viewers can also draw their own conclusions.
Image 7.8 is by a male 42-year-old resident of Orangi town in Karachi. It shows a legal water pump operated by the para-military Rangers. Many of the photographic essays from Karachi stressed the water supply problem in their neighborhoods and squarely blamed the tanker mafia for stealing the water that should really be supplied to the consumers and which is instead channeled to the tankers, who then sell the same water to the consumers they stole them from. The photographer said the following about the photo:

“This is a legal hydrant so you cannot go close or else the Rangers take the camera. There is no difference between a legal or illegal hydrant, the result is the same.”

-Male photographer, Orangi town, Circa 2015

Image 7.8: A PARA-MILITARY RANGERS’ OPERATED WATER PUMP FOR TANKERS IN ORANGI TOWN

The authors of this report have rarely been as scared as when they were going past water pumps in Karachi, which were either under the control of one political party or another, or of the state. The photograph speaks to the complicity of the state in depriving citizens of basic services and then using its monopoly over violence to intimidate and coerce them. It is in fact remarkable that a mundane water pump is a place of fear and exclusion in a city like Karachi. This is a theme that we have spoken of quite extensively in this chapter, and if this photograph could talk, it would probably convey the same message. For now we can just see the photograph, which to our mind is more than adequate.
7.4 CONCLUSION

The above analysis and discussion of everyday violence and its linkages with the discursive and material constructions of gender present a multifaceted picture of the fear, anxieties and carceral geographies that are associated with different forms of oppression across genders and the private-public divide. The discussion also points to violence as a category that is highly contextual. In the case of Karachi, violence has become dramatically sensational; there have been huge ethnic clashes, dozens of suicide bombings, daily target-kilings, bloody bouts between political parties and the military. So violence as understood in a city like Karachi is definitely going to be different from a city like Rawalpindi-Islamabad, which does not have the same kind of socio-political tensions. Notably, the above analysis has underscored the importance of understanding the ‘public’ and ‘private’ as complementary rather than oppositional, and in doing so we have drawn attention to the nuanced nature of external/internal violence in an everyday context.

We briefly summarize the key insights below:

- There is historical and contemporary specificity in the way violence unfolds in different urban contexts.
- Differences between cities’ violence indicators highlight the context specific nature of city’s political economy.
- In Karachi, an overwhelming number of respondents, more than 88%, reported being a victim of violence by strangers only, and by strangers and household members/family/acquaintances.
- In Rawalpindi-Islamabad, 35% of respondents reported being subjected to violence by strangers.
- Karachi outweighs Rawalpindi-Islamabad on petty and political violence.
- A higher incidence of psychological violence is reported for Rawalpindi-Islamabad, although it is pervasive in Karachi as well.
- Psychological violence is an almost necessary by-product of physical violence, so it is relatively easy to establish a causal relationship. But this relationship is not clear-cut in so far as we presume mistakenly that by erasing the physical aspect of violence all forms of psychological violence will also cease.
- Women described experiencing psychological violence in the context of constrained mobilities, sexual harassment and continual threat of use of force by husbands and extended family especially within the domestic/private sphere.
- The pervasive environment of violence and fear from political parties was particularly acute in Karachi, although state violence (paramilitary force, police) is pervasive in both cities.

Finally, we underscore again that the boundaries of private are intricately imbricated with the boundaries of the public, and in this context the internal/external types of violence at play in both cities are mediated by gendered, political and generational as well as cultural complexities and tensions. Hence, the relationships between public and private violence spaces are heavily context specific.
CONCLUSION: SOME REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Whenever friends and family asked one of the researchers on this team about what the project was about, he would jokingly say that we proposed to find and bring mermaids from Mars back to Ottawa. So our challenges, as the joke went, were inter alia, find a way to get to Mars, find mermaids there, and bring them back alive to planet Earth. The point of the joke was to underscore the conceptual enormity and the empirical ephemerality of the job we had set ourselves. We were to find and identify enactments of femininities and masculinities; their spatialities and geographies; and how they were driven by experiences of vulnerability, mobility, service provision and, finally, violence. Hopefully the reader will therefore excuse the less than hilarious joke we shared with many patient friends for more than two years. As this report illustrates, thanks to the efforts of our field staff, cooperation of our research subjects, and no small number of intense emotional outbursts, we were able to collect multiple types of data that spoke to our intellectual concerns. The report has provided the context of the two urban areas, Rawalpindi-Islamabad and Karachi, and argued as to why their profile could be considered an archetype of medium and mega urban areas in the global South. After outlining our multi-pronged research methodology, we presented evidence and analysis thereof, to weave a narrative at the intersection of violence, gender and the themes of vulnerability, mobility, service provision and finally discursive and material constructions of gender.

The questionnaires, key informant interviews, literature review, ethnographic methods and participatory photography yielded a collage of numbers, images, text and impressions. The four substantive chapters have been an exercise in morphing that collage into a canvass with more coherent story lines. We have summarized the main insights of each of the chapters at the end of each one of them, so we are not going to list every one of our findings again, though we will revisit the most important of them below. Nevertheless some broad-brush reflections are in order.

First, we were surprised at how pervasive the experience of violence is in urban Pakistan and how it varies between the two cities. While residents of Rawalpindi-Islamabad mostly faced violence from people they knew, in Karachi, residents were much more likely to experience violence from strangers, i.e., mostly criminal and political violence. We were also impressed that during the lifetime of our project, the people of Karachi went from assuming that the environment of fear and violence they lived in will continue into perpetuity to experiencing and imagining life with significantly lower
levels of violence. Calm and peace, in the residents of Karachi’s parlance was restored quickly, in a matter of days or a few months. The paramilitary forces or Rangers-led security operation in Karachi was launched in August 2013 and is still ongoing. We could not but help wonder if Pakistan probably does not have a fragile state, but rather a very perverse one. How many states in the world can bring down violent crime in a city of 21 million, by 80-90% in less than two years and then keep it there? The corollary being that for all those years the state allowed violence to fester and then washed everything clean with a fire hose when it wanted to? Why it did, is a story for another time, and tangential to the main focus of this report. The point however, is that the power of the Pakistani state can be underestimated at one’s own peril. But the malice of the state can also perhaps, not be overestimated for one’s own safety.

Secondly, during the course of our research one of our field study sites, Afghan Abadi was violently attacked by police and paramilitary forces, and all of it was bulldozed, and its residents evicted. The plea was that they were living there illegally and that they were not even citizens of Pakistan. Here again the experience of many respondents from Afghan Abadi, Ali Akbar Shah Goth and many other places resonates. The state in its wisdom gave a blanket certificate of alienation and criminality to all the residents, based upon their ethnicities, but more probably upon their class. The denial of CNIC, left little choice but illegality and violence, for those who did not have it in the poorer segments of the population of the two urban areas. We did not realize how a simple document could have such transformative effects on people’s lives. We also did not realize how ruthless the state could be in the selective application of the law on illegal squatting. Some of the most powerful politicians in Pakistan live in technically illegal squatter settlements, such as Bani Galla in Islamabad. But nothing happens to their mansions.

Thirdly, we were somewhat reassured by the evidence that in fact, vulnerability, and lack of access to services such as water supply and solid waste removal, were associated with higher violence levels. So the idea is that there are material drivers to violence, which if addressed could mitigate it. This finding is complementary to our documentation of gender discourses, which have to intersect with the material conditions to spawn violence. But even addressing just the material part could help break the coupling.

Fourthly, even though we did not research this aspect specifically, we were struck by how pervasive debilitating illnesses were in the poorer neighborhood and with, at times, catastrophic effects on family finances, children’s education and on women in particular. Beyond the routine and well known maternity-related complications faced by most, we were surprised how often a household had an adult with stroke or some other unexplained disease which had thrown the household into the throes of desperation and at times exposed them to violence by criminals or even by household members. The state of public health and public health education, we have to highlight as an area that we did not directly investigate but as a result of our research, believe there might be some important linkages to violence, that were not within our purview to investigate.

________________________

Fifthly, masculinities and femininities are in states of flux. The question of physical mobility and electronic communications is one of the battlegrounds where these notions are being contested. Mobility is not only an outcome of masculine or feminine subjectivity, but also a conduit through which that subjectivity is shaped. At a very concrete level, the demand for safe access to appropriate transportation for women, so that they can engage with the city and all of its opportunities is undeniable. But on the other hand the other dimensions of mobility in the shape of modes of communication from mobile phones to the internet, need to be thought of in gendered terms in urban Pakistan.

Lastly, and most importantly, it should be no surprise that Pakistani society is undergoing a transition. Perhaps for the first time in its history there are young men and especially women who are of reproductive age and are not married. The census numbers are not available yet, but according to GOP (1998a; 1998b; 1998c), the marriage age for women in Karachi has gone from 18 years, according to the 1982 Census, to 26 in early 2000s. The society can have its nostalgic gendered notions of piety, chastity, propriety and family life, but those notions are increasingly out of sync with the material reality of living in highly monetized, neo-liberalized mega-cities like Karachi. Women are transgressing traditional boundaries of sexuality and married life, often in the face of intense violence and confinement at worst, and disapproving resignation at best. Old stories about Pakistani society are no longer working. We need to understand this new reality, particularly how it is imbricated by the sexual politics and desire at the household, street and community level. In this respect we would particularly like to highlight the experience of the transgender community we have mentioned. Perhaps focusing on these very marginalized and excluded gender groups would be one way of getting the society overall to confront the contradictions between its material conditions and its discursive tools for engaging with those conditions.

With the above reflections we turn to list the main findings of our research as follows:

- The VCI is a good predictor of the incidence of violence. The higher the vulnerability, the greater the incidence of violence.
- Gender roles are often enacted violently both my males and females.
- Domestic water supply is a major source of gendered violence.
- Solid waste is a major source of anxiety and even community conflict.
- Transport is a major source of violence especially in Karachi where it limits women's mobility and career and education choices.
- Alcohol and drugs are a form of escapism from the realities of everyday life in low-income communities and a source of gendered violence.
- The state is a major perpetrator of violence and a cause of social violence.
- Violent geographies are different between Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad.
- Denial of citizenship rights leaves little choice but violence for some ethnic minorities.
• Women’s worldliness is limited but the violence does not always remain uncontested. Women are increasingly taking charge and fighting back by making personal choices without the approval of other household members.

In light of the above major findings, some of the following recommendations suggest themselves in the short to medium term that might be useful to think about:

• Gender ‘empowerment’ programs have to take into account the new realities of masculinity, femininity and aspirations of urban Pakistanis. They must be designed by or with these stakeholders in order to understand their needs and aspirations.

• Vulnerability assessments as a routinized form of data collection could yield benefits for disaster risk management and response and resource targeting as well as help in understanding the geography of violence and its drivers.

• Facilitating citizenship registration can help mitigate violence.

• Transport, solid waste disposal and domestic water supply for the poor are priority sectors.

• Urban Pakistanis need avenues for creativity and self-expression in order to channel their frustrations and develop capacities to aspire to whatever future they so desire.

• There needs to be resources put into the development of secure and comfortable transitional places (shelters) for female and transgendered victims of violence, so that they can escape a violent situation, obtain legal support and plan for a safer future.

• Public education through theatre and electronic media could helpfully focus on the changing masculinities and femininities and help usher debates on the disconnect between the imperatives of contemporary urban living in Pakistan and the gendered discourses surrounding notions of propriety, chastity, and mobility.

• Women in urban Pakistan do confront and contest violence against them. But one of their biggest vulnerabilities is the lack of shelter outside of the family networks. Many NGOs and to a very limited extent the government provides shelter to abused women. The government shelters however, as per the law treat them as criminals to be partially incarcerated within the confines of the shelter for their own protection. The NGO ones are also restrictive and too limited in their coverage in any case. Focus on providing support and shelter to abused women and transgender persons could be a step towards opening up greater options for them to escape cycles of violence and exploitation.

• The vernacular and Urdu newspaper journalists, in particular, must be targeted for training programs on how to report gendered violence related news stories. So far the Urdu newspapers often tend to criminalize or scandalize women’s personal choices so as to make them appear as loose or at fault in cases of elopement, abduction, honor killing, rape etc. Some balance or nuance in the reporting could significantly help undermine the general air of societal opprobrium that surrounds any women exercising their choices in opposition to their families’ wishes.
All of the above major findings are embedded in our concern with understanding how 21st century urban Pakistani men, women, youth and transgenders are defining their sexuality, gender identities and notions of masculinity and femininity. We find that new notions of gendering, drawing upon hybrid global consumerist and local traditionalist discourses are in fact spawning new spaces and geographies of violence. While the city is becoming constricted in the process for some, it is also opening up new opportunities for others. Availing those opportunities however, is fraught with violence, which appropriate policy interventions could address. The challenge is, how to defeat the experience and discourse of the city as a space of peril for men, women and transgenders and instead promote its discursive and material construction as a space of opportunity for all.
# ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AJK</td>
<td>Azad-Jammu Kashmir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCB</td>
<td>Citizen Community Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCB</td>
<td>Chaklala Cantonment Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Capital Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CII</td>
<td>Council of Islamic Ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNIC</td>
<td>Computerized National Identification Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCO</td>
<td>District Coordinating Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIR</td>
<td>First Information Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>Field Research Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRCP</td>
<td>Human Rights Commission Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHI</td>
<td>Karachi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMC</td>
<td>Karachi Municipal Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMC</td>
<td>Karachi Metropolitan Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPK</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWSB</td>
<td>Karachi Water and Sewerage Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDPI</td>
<td>Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>Medical Licensing Exams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MQM</td>
<td>Muttahida Qaumi Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>National Identity Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPP-RTI</td>
<td>Orangi Pilot Project Research and Training Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PML-N</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistan People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTI</td>
<td>Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCB</td>
<td>Rawalpindi Cantonment Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDA</td>
<td>Rawalpindi Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDPI</td>
<td>Rural Development Policy Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWASA</td>
<td>Rawalpindi Water and Sanitation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWMC</td>
<td>Rawalpindi Waste Management Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWP/ISL</td>
<td>Rawalpindi-Islamabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAIC</td>
<td>Safe and Inclusive Cities Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMA</td>
<td>Tehsil Municipal Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UC</td>
<td>Union Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAW</td>
<td>Violence Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCI</td>
<td>Vulnerabilities and Capacities Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAR</td>
<td>War Against Rape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


Al Jazeera Witness (2008) Pakistan’s War: The Battle Within. [www.youtube.com/watch?v=30tGS-xDJgo](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=30tGS-xDJgo)


## ANNEXURE I  
A COMPOSITE VULNERABILITIES AND CAPACITIES INDEX FOR THE HOUSEHOLD LEVEL IN URBAN AREAS (UH–VCI)

### MATERIAL VULNERABILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material vulnerabilities</th>
<th>Vul</th>
<th>Cap</th>
<th>Observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income source:</strong> start value</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Start value represents 100% dependency on local level employment or productive asset.</td>
<td>+8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Add 2 to the score if the income sources are unstable (for example, day labor).</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Subtract 2 if the local income sources are stable and insensitive to local hazard.</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lower score by 1 for every 10% of non-local income reported.</td>
<td>-1(per)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Educational attainment:</strong> start value</td>
<td>+10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Start value represents no member of the household being literate.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lower score by 1 for every 5 years of schooling of the most educated male member of the household.</td>
<td>-1(per)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lower score by 2 for each female member’s 5 years of schooling.</td>
<td>-2(per)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assets:</strong> start value</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Start value represents no immediately fungible assets.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lower score by 1 for every PKR 40,000 of appropriate fungible assets. Will have to be calibrated empirically</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exposure:</strong> start value</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Start value represents location in high likelihood impact area relative to the prime hazard.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lower score by 1 for every level of decreased impact likelihood between household location and high impact likelihood area.</td>
<td>-1(per)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lower score by 1 for each instance of hazard mitigation.</td>
<td>-1 per</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• VERY HIGH</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• HIGH</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• MODERATE</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• LOW</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NO EFFECT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Institutional vulnerabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vul</th>
<th>Cap</th>
<th>Observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Social networks: start value</td>
<td>+10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Start value represents no household memberships in ethnic, caste, professional or Religious organizations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lower score by 1 for each organization a household member belongs to.</td>
<td>-1 per</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• For each organization that has provided assistance in the past, lower the score by 2 times the proportion of respondents reporting the organization to be efficacious.</td>
<td>-2x(prop)per</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Extra-local kinship ties: start value</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Start value represents no extra local kinship ties.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lower score by 2 for every family member living extra-locally.</td>
<td>-2 per</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lower score by 1 for every non-immediate family member living extra-locally.</td>
<td>-1 per</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Infrastructure: start value</td>
<td>+16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Start value represents lack of access to water, telecommunications, electricity, Roads and healthcare.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lower score by 4 if household located near a sealed, all-weather road OR</td>
<td>-4 or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lower score by 2 if household located near a seasonal road</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lower score by 2 if household has access to clean drinking water.</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lower score by 4 if household and street have proper sanitation system and garbage collection and no open sewers (if only one condition is met then lower score by a proportion)</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lower score by 4 if household can access a local medical facility.</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lower score by 2 if household has electricity.</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Warning systems: start value</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Start value represents lack of a warning system, or warning system that the household is not aware of or does not trust.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lower score by 4 if warning system exists and is trusted.</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Earning members in a household: start value</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Start value represents a household with only one earning member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Add 5 to score if single-parent-headed household</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lower score by 1 for every additional earning member</td>
<td>-1 per</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Membership of disadvantaged lower caste, religious or ethnic minority</td>
<td>+5</td>
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### ATTITUDINAL VULNERABILITIES

<table>
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<th>Attitudinal vulnerabilities</th>
<th>Vul</th>
<th>Cap</th>
<th>Observation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sense of empowerment:</strong> start value</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Start value represents no participation in or access to leadership structure at any level.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Lower score by 10 if household is self-declared community leader and/or has declared active participation in community decision-making.</td>
<td>-10</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Lower score by 10 if household has declared access to regional or national leadership structure.</td>
<td>-10</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Knowledge:</strong> start value</td>
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<td>+5</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Start value represents lack of knowledge about potential hazards.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Lower score by 1 for every type of hazard and related potential impacts accurately listed by respondents.</td>
<td>-1 per</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Total vulnerability score |  |  | |
| Total capacity score |  |  | |
| Combined vulnerability and capacity score |  |  | |
| Highest possible vulnerability and capacity score | 100 |  | |
ANNEXURE IIa – URBAN HOUSEHOLD SURVEY (English)

Questionnaire

Basic Information
1. Age:
2. Gender: Male [1], Female [2]
3. Location:
5. Number of people in the household:
6. Number of earning members in the household: (Male) (Female) (Child)
7. Sources of Income: [to be coded as the range of employment becomes clear - probe what type of work they do to estimate income bracket]

7.b Income bracket: Low [1], Lower middle [2], middle [3], upper middle [4], upper [5]

8. a. Educational attainment of the most educated person in the household:
8. b. What is your educational attainment?
8. c. Gender of most educated person in household (Male) (Female)


10. Could you please list some of the main risks you perceive to be threatening your household and community? [To be coded as the range of risks is known]

Institutional Vulnerabilities
11. Are you a member of any formal or informal group/organization?
    State-run [1], NGO [2], Religious organization [3], Other [4]

12. Have the groups and networks you are a member of benefited you and/or your neighborhood (any help/support provided)? No [1] Yes [2]
b. How did you gain support from them?
12. In your circle of friends and acquaintances would you include people who are different to you? E.g.:  
   e. Much higher social status than you  [1] No, [2] Yes  
   f. Of a different ethnic group  [1] No, [2] Yes  
   g. Of a different political persuasion  [1] No, [2] Yes  
   h. Of a different gender  [1] No, [2] Yes  
   i. Of a different generation  [1] No, [2] Yes  
   j. Other ____________________________  

K. Please note down qualitative information about their circle of friends and acquaintances  

13. How did you meet/get to know them?  

14. Can you list any instances of collective activities with them? [to be coded as the range of responses is known]  

15. Has your larger family been a source of support and help to you? No [1] Yes [2]  

16. b. How/To what extent?  

17. How would you rate your access to the following services:  
   a. Police Protection  
   b. Ambulance service  
   c. Fire brigade  
   d. Community arbitration  

18. Infrastructure:
Gender and Violence in Urban Pakistan

19. To what extent have water, sanitation and hygiene issues (WASH – include solid waste issues in this) in your neighbourhood affected the following:

A huge extent | A significant amount | A moderate amount | A small amount | Not at all


a. Health
b. Expense on private services (e.g. bottled water, street sweeper, self-financed latrines)
c. Expense for medical treatments
d. Livelihood (e.g. ability to go and work)
e. Conflict issues (e.g. conflict in the home, quarrels with other community members, quarrels with government)

20. Are you aware of any hazard warning systems in your neighborhood? No [1], Yes [2]

b. How would you rate its effectiveness? Excellent [5], Good [4], Moderate [3], Poor [2], Ineffective [1]

21. Have you or your family member ever been a victim of violence? No [1], Yes [2]

a. By whom?

i. From a household member No [1], Yes [2]
ii. From acquaintances No [1], Yes [2]
iii. From wider family conflict No [1], Yes [2]
iv. From a stranger No [1], Yes [2]

b. Type of violence

i. Petty crime No [1], Yes [2]
ii. Political No [1], Yes [2]
iii. State violence No [1], Yes [2]

22. If yes, who did you go to for support?

22. b. Please elaborate (Probe who was supportive; which person/organization/network)

23. How would you characterize the incidence of violence in your neighborhood?
[To be coded as the range of responses are known]

b. Do you own a weapon?
No [1], Yes [2]

24. Would you describe yourself as better off, more empowered, and/or able to address personal and community issues better than others in your neighborhood?
No [1], Yes [2], Don’t Know [3]

25. How would you describe the qualities of a man/woman?
[To be coded as the range of responses is known]
ANNEXURE IIb – URBAN HOUSEHOLD SURVEY
(Urdu)

سوال نمبر 1: عمر

سوال نمبر 2: جنس مرد(1) خواتین(2)

سوال نمبر 3: محل و قومیت چاں/کیا؟

سوال نمبر 2: عزت چاں؟ یاد شدی اور شدی (1) یاد شدی اور نیچہ (2) اور نیچہ شدی (3) یاد شدی (4) یاد شدی اور نیچہ شدی

سوال نمبر 1: شدی/عزت کی اعداد

سوال نمبر 2: مرد/کہاں کی اعداد

سوال نمبر 3: دیگر کہاں مرد کی اعداد

سوال نمبر 4: دیگر کہاں خواتین کی اعداد

سوال نمبر 5: دیگر کہاں خواتین کی اعداد

سوال نمبر 6: دیگر کہاں خواتین کی اعداد

سوال نمبر 7: دیگر کہاں خواتین کی اعداد

سوال نمبر 8: دیگر کہاں خواتین کی اعداد

سوال نمبر 9: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 10: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 11: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 12: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 13: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 14: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 15: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 16: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 17: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 18: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 19: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 20: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 21: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 22: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 23: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 24: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 25: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 26: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 27: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

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سوال نمبر 35: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

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سوال نمبر 37: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 38: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 39: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 40: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 41: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 42: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 43: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 44: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

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سوال نمبر 86: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

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سوال نمبر 96: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 97: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 98: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 99: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟

سوال نمبر 100: کا بھی تاریخ چاں؟
### Q12
1. कोई मानव का किसी भी समय के लिए या किसी भी जगह अपने मौलिक हकों का उल्लंघन करने वाले को विभिन्न प्रकार के कारणों से रूपांतरित किया जा सकता है।
   - ना | ना | ना | ना | ना | ना |
   - ना | ना | ना | ना | ना | ना |
   - ना | ना | ना | ना | ना | ना |

### Q13
1. विभिन्न प्रकार के रूपांतरित होने के लिए किसी समय का उल्लंघन करने वाले को कैसे रूपांतरित किया जा सकता है?
   - (1) कैसे?
   - (2) कैसे?

### Q14
1. किसी भी व्यक्ति के लिए ज्यादा समय का उल्लंघन करने वाले को कैसे रूपांतरित किया जा सकता है?
   - (1) कैसे?
   - (2) कैसे?

### Q15
1. किसी भी समय के लिए या किसी भी जगह अपने मौलिक हकों का उल्लंघन करने वाले को कैसे रूपांतरित किया जा सकता है?
   - (1) कैसे?
   - (2) कैसे?

### Q16
1. किसी भी समय के लिए या किसी भी जगह अपने मौलिक हकों का उल्लंघन करने वाले को कैसे रूपांतरित किया जा सकता है?
   - (1) कैसे?
   - (2) कैसे?

---

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Gender and Violence in Urban Pakistan

### Question 17

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### Question 18

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### Question 19

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Solving 17: Mention the five kinds of forms of violence that are prevalent between...

Solving 18: The reasons...

Solving 19: Any other relationship that is part of your health services...
ANNEXURE III – GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION

NUMBER OF PEOPLE RESIDING IN ONE HOUSEHOLD

![Graphical representation showing the number of people residing in one household.](image)
EARNERS PER HOUSEHOLD

No. Male Earners per Household

- Karachi
- Rawalpindi-Islamabad
- All

No. Female Earners per Household

- All
- Karachi
- Rawalpindi-Islamabad
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

Highest Education Attainment of Males per Household (%)

Highest Education Attainment of Females per Household (%)

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Source of Livelihood Rawalpindi-Islamabad (%)
INCOME BRACKET

Income bracket - All (%)

- Low: 44%, 44%
- Lower Middle: 11%, 0%
- Middle: 0%, 1%
- Upper Middle: 6%, 0%
- Other: 0%, 1%

Income bracket - Karachi

- Low: 55%, 54%
- Lower Middle: 43%, 47%
- Middle: 53%, 44%
- Upper Middle: 53%, 45%
- Other: 16%, 0%

Karachi

Income bracket - Rawalpindi-Islamabad

- Low: 30%, 22%
- Lower Middle: 1%, 0%
- Middle: 1%, 0%
- Upper Middle: 30%, 22%
- Other: 0%, 0%

KARACHI

Gender and Violence in Urban Pakistan
EMPOWERMENT

Would you describe yourself as better off, more empowered, and/or able to address personal and community issues better than others in your neighborhood? (%)

- **Yes**
- **No**
- **Don't know**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
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<td>Rawalpindi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamabad</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
KARACHI

Would you describe yourself as better off, more empowered, and/or able to address personal and community issues better than others in your neighborhood? Karachi (%)

RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD

Would you describe yourself as better off, more empowered, and/or able to address personal and community issues better than others in your neighborhood? Rawalpindi-Islamabad (%)

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GROUP/ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP

Are you a member of any formal or informal group/organization?

KARACHI

Karachi

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RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD

BENEFITS OF MEMBERSHIP

Have the groups and networks you are a member of benefitted you and/or your neighborhood? (%)

- All: 89% Yes, 11% No
- Karachi: 98% Yes, 2% No
- Rawalpindi-Islamabad: 63% Yes, 37% No
KARACHI

![Graph showing gender and violence in Karachi]

RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD

![Graph showing gender and violence in Rawalpindi-Islamabad]
TYPE OF SUPPORT FROM MEMBERSHIP GROUPS

**KARACHI**

How did you gain support from them? (KARACHI)

- Financial support
- Under conditions of emergency
- Moral support

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Financial Support</th>
<th>Under Conditions of Emergency</th>
<th>Moral Support</th>
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Gender and Violence in Urban Pakistan

RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD

How did you gain support from them? Rawalpindi-Islamabad (%)

- Financial support
- Under conditions of emergency
- Moral support

Afghan Abadi Arya Mohalla Dokh Naju Dokh Saidan France Colony

FAMILY SUPPORT

KARACHI

Has your larger family been a source of support and help to you? (%)

- No
- Yes

Lines Area Mansor Nagar Raes Amrohi Gulshan e Bihar Christian Colony Ali Akbar Shah Goth Ghaziabad
Has your larger family been a source of support and help to you? (%)

**RAWALPINDI-ISL**

**Type of Support from Larger Family**

**KARACHI**
RAWALPINDI-ISL

Has your larger family been a source of support and help to you? (%)

- Financial Support
- Under Condition of Emergency
- Moral Support

- 100%
- 90%
- 80%
- 70%
- 60%
- 50%
- 40%
- 30%
- 20%
- 10%
- 0%

Afghan Abadi Arya Mohalla Dokh Naju Dokh Saidan France Colony

FRIENDS/NEIGHBORS SUPPORT

KARACHI

Has your larger friends/neighbors been a source of support and help to you? (%)

- No
- Yes

- 100%
- 90%
- 80%
- 70%
- 60%
- 50%
- 40%
- 30%
- 20%
- 10%
- 0%

Lines Area Mansor Nagar Raes Amrohi Gulshan e Bihar Christian Colony Ali Akbar Shah Goth Ghaziabad
Has your larger friends/neighbors been a source of support and help to you? (%)

- **Afghan Abadi**
- **Arya Mohalla**
- **Dokh Naju**
- **Dokh Saidan**
- **France Colony**

**RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD**

**TYPE OF SUPPORT FROM LARGER FRIENDS/NEIGHBORS**

**KARACHI**

Has your larger friends/neighbors been a source of support and help to you? (%)

- **Financial Support**
- **Under Condition of Emergency**
- **Moral Support**

**Lines Area**
**Mansor Nagar**
**Raes Amrohi**
**Gulshan e Bihar**
**Christian Colony**
**Ali Akbar Shah Goth**
**Ghaziabad**
RAWALPINDI-ISLAMABAD

Has your larger friends/neighbors been a source of support and help to you? (%)

- Afghan Abadi
- Arya Mohalla
- Dokh Naju
- Dokh Saidan
- France Colony

- Financial Support
- Under Condition of Emergency
- Moral Support