RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CROSSFIRE

THE ROLE OF GRASSROOTS SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS IN SITUATIONS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN PERU

MICHAEI L. SMITH
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RURAL DEVELOPMENT
IN THE CROSSFIRE

The Role of Grassroots Support Organizations
in Situations of Political Violence in Peru

by

Michael L. Smith
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FOREWORD

This work offers a fresh and critical view of attempts to transform the rural areas of a Third World country. It is an account of the hopes, achievements, and failures of people trying to help people in a context of poverty, violence, and oblivion.

During the last decades, a number of voluntary organizations have increased their activities in Latin America and the Third World in response to a growing awareness of the fact that the traditional programs of development, centred in the state, are not capable of meeting the most critical needs. Peru is one of the countries where these organizations — called grassroots support organizations (GSOs) by the author — have multiplied and developed in a significant way. These groups started to play a crucial role in urban and rural areas, within a context characterized by instability of government policies and their implementation due to economic policy variations, bureaucratic bottlenecks, and political changes. Some of their efforts were directed toward overcoming a critical problem: the lack of community-based organizations as appropriate interlocutors in state initiatives. The simple placing of infrastructure or services at people's disposal had proved to be insufficient. Thus, GSOs embarked on local programs with the support of external donors and local partners.

However, these programs have faced a number of difficulties. Sometimes they have ignored the fact that they are part of a local political and social environment that has its own codes and dynamics, sometimes separated from national politics. The introduction of new elements from outside the established networks of power alters the local coalition of forces and may disrupt the structure of local interests. For instance, the appearance of GSOs can be threatening to merchants, local authorities, and state programs. These GSOs' activities can also be perceived as fronts for political activism. Unfortunately, GSOs do not always have the time and resources to reflect on the circumstances of their own work, thus falling into pragmatism and voluntarism.

In Peru, Colombia, Central America, several African countries, and other parts of the world, a situation prone to political and social violence complicates the work of GSOs. In countries like Peru, Colombia, and El Salvador, insurgent groups have claimed a stake in the countryside. Ironically, the GSOs' emphasis on programs targeted at cases of extreme poverty and underdevelopment has made them potential competitors to insurgent groups, and has also separated them from the protective functions of the state. The emergence of a drug-dealing network increased violence in many poor areas and the risks for GSOs. On the other side, the police and army have frequently regarded GSOs as destabilizers, if not outright allies of insurgents. As the conflict escalates, GSOs and the people they aim to assist are caught in the crossfire. This situation has often resulted in tragedy. Rural promoters, local leaders, and simple people have been put to death, paying an unjust price for their search for dignity and well-being.

This situation has jeopardized rural development programs and development-oriented research in many rural areas of the region. Michael L. Smith's incisive analysis discloses the complexity of the problem, but he also discusses the simplicity of the solution: the
fair and simple involvement of the people in the projects that will affect their own destiny and, as he says, the moral courage of GSOs to face self-criticism and correction.

This work is of particular importance to the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and to the organizations working for the development of the Third World, for it teaches about cooperation, understanding, and genuine partnership. It complements other efforts supported by the Centre aimed at studying the role of self-help organizations in Chile and local municipal reforms, evaluating nongovernmental organizations’ experiences in Central America and the Caribbean, and making inventories of NGOs. This work will provide, not only a thorough knowledge of the current tragic events in Peru, but also enlightenment about how to implement rural development programs more appropriately in the Third World.

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The broader analysis of Peruvian belligerent groups was made possible by a research and writing grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation’s Program on Peace and International Cooperation. The investigation was carried out from mid-1987 to mid-1989. This research provided field experience in Ayacucho, Cajamarca, Puno, and Cusco.

I wish to thank Marcial Rubio, Elmer Galván, and Luis Román for having suffered through the reading of a preliminary and confused draft of this report. The hours spent talking about my errors and misunderstandings helped clarify key concepts. They broadened my perspective at a crucial point in the investigation by giving me feedback from their professional experience in rural development and turned the report into a more professional product. Naturally, any remaining mistakes or misconceptions lie in my hard-headed benightedness and the vexing complexities of Peruvian reality, rural development, and political violence.

I would also like to thank Manuel Iguíñez, Ricardo Vega, Tiziano Zanelli, Steven Judd, Alfredo Stecher, Enrique Moya, Vera Gianotten, and Ton DeWit for much insight into the challenges of rural development in Peru. Many other sources, including local partners in promotion programs, will remain unmentioned for security reasons.
INTRODUCTION

Grassroots support organizations (GSOs) or development promotion centres have played a crucial role in rural development in Peru.¹ Their impact goes far beyond the amount of funds invested in the countryside. They have served as social laboratories in efforts to break through the bottlenecks of development in the Peruvian Andes. They have frequently provided a safety net and a catalyst for grassroots organizations and local communities. By mustering strength and resources, the emerging social groups have staked a claim as protagonists on the regional and national stages.

Since 1980, a rising tide of political violence has swept across the country. By the end of the decade, the conflict had cost nearly 20,000 lives and billions of dollars in damages. The social and political dynamics set loose by this trend have called into question the viability of civilian institutions and democratic government itself. They have also blocked development prospects in rural areas of the country. Naturally, this violence touches the centres along with Peruvian society and the communities that are the objective of their programs. Indeed, they have found, at times, that they become targets for the belligerent forces.

The sharp rise in violence in late 1988 drove home to GSOs and other institutions a disturbing fact: violence was going to be a constant shadow in their work. This realization was disconcerting. Awareness of its full consequence has just started to sink in. The threat from political violence touches the centres in several ways. It puts them in jeopardy as institutions in their own right, reducing their capacity to carry out their programs and it poses a serious impediment to development in the midst of Peru's worst crisis this century.

On a personal plane, violence puts into question private development work as an option for channelling an individual preoccupation for the well-being of underprivileged sectors into practical actions and organization, as a professional career option and as a way of life. Peru is not unique in having an unconventional war or low-intensity conflict take place in its territory. Peruvian GSOs and foreign consultants, however, have found no literature on the role of development agencies in situations of political violence. Perhaps, such evaluations about grassroots support organizations and centres exist, but remain in internal documents due to their sensitive nature.

This paper addresses this vacuum by contributing to an evaluation of GSOs, local partners, funding agencies, and other interested parties and how they can fulfill their roles. Because Peru is under extreme social, political, and economic duress, it offers an opportunity to examine the practices of these organizations in conceiving,

¹ We prefer to use "grassroots support organization" over the more common term, nongovernmental organization (NGO). Although used frequently for private, nonprofit organizations, the term is so generic that it does not adequately define the nature and functions of the institutions under examination in this paper. "Centre" is used to refer to broader institutions: research centres, human rights organizations, etc.
planning, and putting into action programs for rural development. This situation requires a reassessment of many assumptions that staff members and experts take for granted. It is also our opinion that much of this questioning may be applicable to development programs in general.

The aim of this report is not to examine specific rural development programs or practices. This task lies beyond the author's capacity. It aims to survey GSOs within the context of political violence. However, we may comment on some aspects that have a direct bearing on the report. The report is divided into five sections:

1. A general discussion of Peruvian GSOs over the past two decades with special emphasis on how political violence has affected their work. We will discuss the major incidents involving GSOs and belligerent groups, without being comprehensive. When pertinent, we will also mention other development programs.

2. A description of the belligerent forces operating in Peru and how they perceive GSOs.

3. Two case studies: Ayacucho and Puno.

4. An analysis of GSOs in local settings, and the social and political forces that build up around them.

5. Conclusions.

In addition, the text contains a series of underlined remarks. We felt that it was more important to highlight them in context rather than to extract them into the conclusions. Due to the length of the text and treatment of the issues, they tended to get lost in the case studies and general discussion.

The body of this paper comes from interviews with centre staff working in rural areas. I consulted a bibliography on rural development and subversive violence in Peru. Although dispersed and little known, there is a growing body of work that made this investigation easier. In past research, I found it important to keep a geographical orientation in case studies. I carried out fieldwork in Puno and Cusco (June 1989) and Cajamarca (July-August 1989). Because I had visited both sites previously, the fieldwork was propitious in leading me to crucial areas of analysis. I drew source material on Ayacucho from three trips to the city before the consulting work.

This essay aims to provide a systemization of material on centres and political violence with enough background information to aid donor agencies and GSOs to understand the domestic situation and make more informed decisions about funding and executing Peruvian projects. Second, we draft preliminary conclusions about the situation, with the understanding that they are tentative and prone to simplification. Third, we provide a few elements that, hopefully, might be applicable to other societies that are facing armed conflicts. However, this report is not intended as a manual for operating in zones of political violence. Local and national conditions vary widely.
SECTION 1

GRASSROOTS SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS IN PERU

Today, there are nearly 400 promotion centres in Peru. The institutional weight and national presence of these centres have few parallels in Latin America. Only in Chile, Bolivia, and Brazil do grassroots support organizations (GSOs) play such a prominent role.

Centres may vary over a wide range of organization and permanency. Some are small, ephemeral entities put together by an individual or group for a specific program and ending when financing runs out. Others are permanent institutions with long-term goals and the means to generate resources. Centres may also have institutional links to ecclesiastic entities or international private development agencies, or they may be independent, seeking their own funding.

Activities can range from pure academic research to installation of community infrastructure. GSOs concentrate on providing programs and services in working-class neighbourhoods (barriadas), rural communities, or specific sectors of the urban population (women, street vendors, cottage industries, district and provincial municipal governments). GSOs usually work within a limited geographic territory — a shantytown, a campesino community or a valley — identifying underprivileged groups and helping to elaborate survival strategies. Some GSOs have centred their work on aiding broader organizations (union federations, campesino organizations, and the like, known in Peru as gremios) to strengthen their positions before a state with strong authoritarian traits. Others centres concentrate on specific activities, like human rights, communication, education, or health. Several of the larger centres combine all these aspects in their programs.

In general, GSOs try to reach low-income, underprivileged groups with varying degrees of organization. However, these target groups do not represent the "poorest of the poor" in Peru. They have acquired resources and organization for improving their own conditions. The GSOs try to help them use these advantages better. These target groups are often called beneficiaries, an unfortunate term. They make contributions in time and effort that surpass the monetary investment of donor agencies and centres. In this report, we will refer to them as local partners.

The strongest GSOs can influence regional or national politics through dialogue with government officials, institutions, and local constituencies. The Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA) in Piura and the Centro de Estudios Rurales Andinos Bartolomé de las Casas in Cusco are examples of regional influence. DESCOr-Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo, the Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Participación (CEDEP), the Centro de Investigación, Educación y Desarrollo (CIED), the Centro de Información y Desarrollo Integral de Autogestión (CIDIAG), and the Fundación para el Desarrollo Nacional (FDN) are
examples of Lima-based institutions that have acquired national stature and influence (Carroll et al. 1990).

Financing for GSO activities comes from international sources, mainly European and North American donor agencies. Most funding is for 1 to 3 years. A few sources provide long-term funding. In 1984, about 50 international donors were providing $6–8 million a year in funding (Padró 1988: 30). By 1987, this rose to $24.4 million according to the Instituto de Planificación Nacional, and represented 15% of international technical cooperation to Peru that year (Boutrou 1989: 14).

The growth of GSOs into a national institutional force with its own interests and goals has been due to Peru’s peculiar development over the past three decades. In 1968, the armed forces under General Juan Velasco Alvarado overthrew the government of President Fernando Belaúnde. For the next 12 years, military rule shaped the early experience of GSOs, their staff, and constituencies. The Velasco regime broke many stereotypes about Latin American military regimes. It carried out a series of major reforms, the most important being a far-reaching agrarian reform. In 1975, the military regime, then, under General Francisco Morales Bermúdez began to pull back from its most radical positions. It also dismantled or reduced public entities aimed at social and economic reform. After a massive strike in July 1977, protesting price increases and other economic measures, the military began a political process to hand over power to a civilian government.

There were probably no more than 30–40 centres before 1977 (Padró 1988: 46). Three years later, a group of centres founded the Asociación Nacional de Centros (ANC) as a coordinating body.

Several factors influenced the growth of GSOs during this initial period. The Catholic Church hierarchy began acting on the doctrinal innovations set down in the Vatican Council II in 1962–65 and the Medellín (Colombia) conference in 1968 to bring church rites and practices into step with the times. This also meant that the church was no longer a secure pillar of the status quo. In fact, the Catholic Church played a leading role in setting up a tradition of independent development programs, even in the 1950s (Padró 1988: 46). Theology of liberation and the teachings of Paolo Freire increased popular education efforts. Second, the national universities set up “social projection” programs to give practical application to their teaching. These contacts gradually changed from efforts to make the university present in the community to the more permanent goal of promotion. As the universities lost public funding, many groups or individuals found ways to continue their work. Third, Cooperación Popular under the Belaúnde government and the Sistema Nacional de la Movilización Social (SINAMOS) under Velasco provided practical experience in development work. The Velasco regime’s reforms created or coalesced new grassroots organizations, like neighbourhood development groups, peasant communities, cooperatives, agrarian leagues, and the labour community (a profit-sharing, co-management scheme for industry, mining, and other companies). These three factors gave centres a generational characteristic, as well as a common political, ideological, and social experience (Carroll et al. 1990). They also marked the general left-wing character of GSOs and centres. This sentiment would eventually mature into a tacit or explicit support for Izquierda Unida (IU), the left-wing coalition founded in September 1980.
The GSOs and other centres have, in turn, influenced the formation of the nationalist Marxist left. Many of their staff played a key role in overcoming the left's initial reluctance to accept small-scale development programs as more than reformist patches to the capitalist system. They led the way to providing concrete, pragmatic solutions to local problems, generating more respect for grassroots organizations and providing employment to left-wing militants.

During the same period, this generation of politically and socially motivated groups and individuals met with another social phenomenon. During the 1960s and 1970s, grassroots organizations of many kinds bloomed in Peru. Although some, like campesino communities, had existed for centuries, others emerged in the new marginal urban areas, many in direct response to the needs of the inhabitants. In the late 1970s, the category of barriada — a low-income neighbourhood begun when land was seized by homeless squatters, frequently migrants — came to take its place alongside more traditional social groups, like peasants, students, and workers. Soup kitchens, mothers' clubs, and street vendor guilds, for example, did not exist before 1975. It was an opportunity that opened virgin ground for urban and rural development work. Grassroots organizations grew faster and broader than the GSOs' capacity to meet their needs (Velarde 1988: 194).

GSOs became a new way of linking political and methodological preoccupations with local communities, organizations, and the popular movement in Peru. Political activists came out of hiding and took public roles in the centres, linking up with the progressive wing of the Catholic Church, the new superior levels of organization, political parties, or the emerging social groups. It would eventually lead to an effort to rethink the country and its future.

The Democratic Opening

In 1980, Peru returned to civilian rule. President Fernando Belaúnde and Acci6n Popular (AP), with junior partner the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC), shifted toward a more market-oriented, liberal economic policy. The government, however, still maintained a populist approach on many issues. Three major social and political changes marked this period. First, subversive violence began in Ayacucho, disconcerting the Belaúnde administration. Second, in 1982, agrarian federations staged a national protest strike against the Belaúnde administration's policies on land ownership, foodstuff pricing, and agricultural credit for the first time in Peru's history. In 1983, the Latin American debt crisis rocked Peru, throwing the government's economic policy into inconsistency. These three factors led to a dramatic decline in economic growth and living standards. Within this context, GSOs were likely to be pulled into increasingly contentious situations, especially given the implicit and explicit commitments in their programs.

The first attack against a GSO took place in Puno. In August 1981, a group of 40 masked men attacked the headquarters of the Instituto de Educación Rural (IER) Palermo, located at an experimental farm outside the town of Juli. After terrorizing five women and a priest, the group broke windows, threw a homemade bomb into the
residence, and ransacked the Institute’s offices. A month later, a bomb exploded at the Juli prelature headquarters and home of the Maryknoll prelate Albert Koenigsknecht. Near the door of the prelature offices, police found a letter threatening to assassinate all missionary personnel of the prelature, if they didn’t abandon their work and leave the area immediately. Campesino communities and organizations throughout the area expressed their outrage through communiques and radio announcements.

The local church leaders had a hard time convincing outsiders that the attacks came from a group called Sendero Luminoso. Apparently, Sendero had enlisted the support of a local Maoist splinter group in setting up its first cells. However, an alternative explanation was that local power groups, deeply hostile to the progressive Puno church, were behind some of the harassing action. Sur-Andino bishops said that these rural power elites frequently used the excuse of subversive violence to take reprisals against reform-oriented groups in the region. Church authorities now lean toward the Sendero option. Either way, proactive development work had stirred up a violent response (Judd 1987: 167-169).

However, during the Belaúnde period, most subversive activity was concentrated in Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurímac departments, a region of secular poverty and relative isolation.

In mid-1982, the agricultural extension centre of Allpachaka, run by the University of Huamanga, suffered an attack by Sendero. The incident provoked the first retreat of GSOs from the most distant part of the Ayacucho countryside (see Section 3: Two Case Studies for a more detailed account of this incident).

In January 1983, President Belaúnde authorized the armed forces to take over control of Ayacucho. This escalation in the counter-insurgency effort introduced a semi-autonomous element into the complex constellation of forces vying for the upper hand in the central Sierra conflict zone. However, the Belaúnde administration never gave the armed forces a clear mandate to carry out its duties, a precise draft of counter-insurgency policy, or the resources to attain its objectives.

This period also revealed a common experience among centres operating in areas of conflict: security forces frequently see them and their staff as outsiders, political provocateurs, and, worst of all, likely ringleaders of subversive activities.

In May 1983, hooded army troops broke into the house of Jaime Urrutia, a university professor and the director of the Instituto de Estudios Rurales José María Arguedas in Ayacucho and detained him for 14 days. They held him at the military garrison (Los Cabitos) and later transferred him to the investigative police station. The military worked under the assumption that the Senderista insurrection was too efficient to be the inspiration of the local population. There had to be foreign involvement. Urrutia had raised suspicions because foreigners, mainly journalists, frequently visited his house at odd hours. The military tortured him as part of their interrogation. Due to the immediate response of foreign journalists, the University of Huamanga, and human rights organizations in Lima, security forces released Urrutia with no further explanation for the detention.
A similar incident took place in Andahuaylas province, Apurímac. Four employees of the Centro de Investigación y Capacitación Campesina (CICCA) were detained and tortured for 3 days. The military and police in the zone were convinced that CICCA was aiding and abetting Sendero, especially through its legal aid and training activities with campesinos. After the release of the workers, CICCA withdrew from the province.

In June and July 1983, Belaúnde accused "scientific or humanitarian institutions with pompous names" of serving as conduits for funds to Sendero and other subversive groups. They were also responsible for spreading foreign ideologies (DESCO 1990: 401-403). The books of several research centres were examined by the police. The government never produced evidence to back up these accusations. The Ministry of the Interior frequently asked GSO directors to clarify their activities.  

Toward the end of Belaúnde's term, a serious incident involving the Centro de Investigación y Promoción Amazónica (CIPA) took place in Lagunas, Yurimaguas (Loreto). In June 1985, a Senderista cell began guerrilla operations. The police wiped out the column quickly. Authorities accused three CIPA staff members of being the "masterminds" behind the guerrillas. CIPA had recently relocated the work group from the Tambo river region in Junín, where they had felt pressured by the increasing presence of Sendero and security forces. One CIPA staff member was Daniel Rodríguez, son of Army General Leonidas Rodríguez who had ordered troops to crush a Lima police mutiny in February 1974. The police held a special grudge against him. All three staffers were subjected to physical and psychological abuse and torture. CIPA mustered a campaign to save its workers from extended court proceedings. Finally, charges were dismissed. No charges were brought against the police officers responsible for the abuse and torture.

Toward the end of the Belaúnde administration, Sendero began to expand its guerrilla activities outside the Ayacucho region. Parts of Cerro de Pasco and Huanuco came under emergency military control.

Perhaps the most important development for GSOs during the Belaúnde period was the opening to new democratic institutions. Freely elected district and provincial municipal governments created new arenas for cooperation between emerging political forces and development promotion centres. In 1980 and more so in 1983, GSOs established agreements with local governments, mainly headed by Izquierda Unida (IU) mayors, to provide advice and programs for grassroots survival groups, like mothers' clubs, soup kitchens, and street vendors. GSO staff members were elected to councils and served as advisors to IU municipal governments.

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2 The search for foreign involvement to blame for subversion has not focused exclusively on centres: priests and nuns, university professors, governments (e.g., Cuba), human rights organizations, news media, and drug traffickers have been singled out. Belaúnde and many other politicians in AP, PPC, and Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana could not conceive of Peruvians taking the political initiative to rebel against the established order.
The Dusk of Populism

In 1985, President Alan García and the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) won the general election. The general political environment lurched to the left. The Peruvian electorate gave 70% of their votes to APRA and the IU. García made overtures to the Peruvian intelligentsia, receiving the tacit support of several centres and explicit cooperation from individual members. Public administration also attracted GSO professionals to help draft and put into action a new set of policies and programs.

García’s aggressive, populist approach during his first 3 years posed serious problems for many centres because the president launched proposals that came right out of the GSOs’ scripts. It threw many centres and Izquierda Unida itself off balance. Microregional development schemes, agrarian credit and programs for cheap inputs and farming equipment, temporary employment programs for communal works were among the ideas incorporated into the government repertoire. Other proposals, like public health, never got past the planning stage. In a sense, many GSOs were basing their small-scale development programs on a perennial deficiency of the Peruvian state, assuming responsibilities that, under normal conditions, would be considered government activities. If the state regained viability (as seemed possible in 1986–87), then the GSOs would be superfluous.

However, the García administration suffered from a Jekyll-and-Hyde personality. Although García and his closest collaborators fell within the political spectrum shared by GSOs, APRA’s and local leadership were more conservative, leading to continued brushes with centres. APRA wanted the undisputed allegiance of grassroots organizations. Their corporativist intentions and appetites required a realignment of grassroots organizations with the state in its local manifestation, condensed in the role of the party. Local authorities and party officials frequently made assistance programs conditional on political subservience. In May 1986, Aprista Deputy Rómulo León Alegria accused 75 research and promotion centres of being fronts for instigating armed struggle, although he directed most attacks against the Partido Unificado Mariateguista (PUM), in IU’s radical wing (DESCO 1990: 460–461). A congressional investigation began, but never drafted findings. These accusations came at a highly troubled period in Puno when peasants, with the backing of the Sur-Andino Catholic Church, IU parties and several centres, were seizing land from inefficient agrarian cooperatives.

In 1988, the ANC counted 360 centres in the country, of which 103 were members of the organization. There were six regional assemblies, but few of them met regularly (ANC 1988: 4).

In September 1988, the García administration was no longer able to sustain its risky economic policy of indiscriminate subsidy, patronage, and deficit spending. A new economic policy led to a recession and hyperinflation, which rose from 63% in 1986 and 114% in 1987 to 1722% in 1988 and 2775% in 1989. This created huge price distortions, especially in exchanges between urban and rural producers and consumers.
Regional protest strikes, mainly organized by farmers and peasants, illustrated the increasing unrest in the countryside. Agrarian strikes lasting up to a month shook Puno, Cusco, Pucallpa, Huaraz, and San Martin. GSOs often found themselves involved in protests, as advisors to peasant federations, as intermediaries with the government, and as communication channels, because several centres had radio programs. The government frequently regarded the most outspoken, action-oriented centres as instigators of the conflicts.

In February 1989, police raided the offices of the Instituto de Investigación y Apoyo al Desarrollo de Ucayali (IIADU), causing damages. The striking agrarian federation and Lima politicians had used these offices as strike headquarters. The centre overstepped its commitment to peasants because it lost control of its intervention in the strike and did not draw a clear line between support and activism, development experts say.

Among other problems, the state had minimal funds for investment. In some areas, like Cusco, the centres probably handled more funds than the government (Haudry de Soucy 1990: 253). The political instability of the Aprista government added another perturbing factor for GSOs trying to work in coordination with the state. Constant changes in government personnel, declining resources, policy voids, and political rivalries made the government almost inert. There were also widespread signs of corruption from top to bottom in the government. By raising awareness and strengthening grassroots organizations, the GSOs seemed to be rallying the opposition against the government and making it more critical. GSO programs were also a point of comparison with the deficiencies of state programs (Carroll et al. 1990).

The state withdrew because it had almost no operating or investment funds and because of the threat of subversive violence. Bilateral and multinational programs retreated from many areas. For instance, in the Pucallpa area of the Amazon jungle, five bilateral programs were suspended or withdrawn in 1989. This retreat meant that Peruvian GSOs were left alone to face the threat.

Rural Development as a Military Target

The economic upheaval also kicked off a major escalation in political violence. It began to force GSOs and other development programs to withdraw from the countryside. Sendero’s presence bore down on the spine of the Andes, from the northern pivot of Huamachuco-Cajabamba (La Libertad and Cajamarca departments) to the highland provinces of Cusco. In Puno, Sendero had already gained from a conflict between peasants and cooperatives (see Section 3 for a more detailed account). Sendero also moved into the Amazon region, mainly in the upper Huallaga valley. It took advantage of the social dynamics produced by the cocaine drug trade. Another subversive group, the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA), also set up guerrilla actions.

Perhaps, the most striking retreat of state authority, security forces, and development centres took place in Junín in early 1989. The regional centres thought
there was no need to worry. They argued that the zone was different from the subsistence campesinos of the Ayacucho emergency zone. They cited the market-wise campesinos as examples of the healthy confluence of Indian, Mestizo, and Creole racial currents. The campesinos had a long history of cultural resistance and struggle to recover their land, requiring strong communal organization. The associated enterprises of the zone were prosperous, frequently cited as examples of how the military's agrarian reform could succeed if the right conditions were present (Manrique 1989, Sánchez 1989).

Because Junín is located next to Huancavelica and Ayacucho, Sendero had a presence in the zone, but most locals explained this as a spillover from the emergency zone and the need to pass through the zone to move farther north. Many staff members thought that Sendero would not attack their projects and programs because they were on the "right side," working to improve living conditions and crop yields of the peasants.

However, there were signs that Sendero was escalating its presence. Centres began receiving warnings and threats to stay out of specific areas of the highlands. In June 1988, Sendero killed two staff members of a subcontractor of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). One was an American citizen (Caretas, 20 June 1988). The centres believed that the reasons for this attack were the U.S. association and specific practices of the work team. In August 1988, Sendero raided and destroyed a project at Jarpa in the highlands above Huancayo, which was run by Jesuit priests. The centres shrugged off the incident because the Jarpa project was located in a strategic point of the high plateau. Another centre lost a vehicle because Sendero stole it to use as a car bomb. An additional complication was that most of the Junín centres had split off from a larger centre, leaving a feeling of distrust among the centres, an unwillingness to share information, and resistance to ceding terrain to rival centres.

In late November 1988, Sendero's escalation of activities and tactics forced the government to place the zone under state of emergency and to send in army troops. Even that did not press centres into action. However, when Sendero abducted and assassinated Manuel Soto of the Centro de Investigación Campesina y Educación Popular (CICEP) and Víctor Lozano, a campesino leader of Canicapi, in January 1989, the perception changed immediately. Soto was on the ANC board. Soto and the local campesino federation had been spearheading a political proposal to redistribute the land monopolized by associated enterprises of the zone. The restructuring initiative had the backing of PUM and was an attempt to apply a strategy that had proved successful in Puno. By mid-year, of the 14 centres in the zone, 4 remained.

A Lima research centre leveled the following criticism against Junín's GSOs during this period (Democracia y Socialismo 1989: 24):

The GSOs that play an important role of popular support and promotion showed discoordination, inter-institutional jealousy and lack of new, clear perspectives in their work in the emergency or political violence zones, where they necessarily should change their roles of behaviour and action.
Sendero was not only attacking military and political targets, it was disputing control of the region with MRTA. Several armed clashes occurred, as well as fights in the university. Confrontation also occurred in other areas (upper Huallaga and Lima).

Elsewhere, the alarm had sounded for other GSOs. In December 1988, Sendero killed two foreign staff members and a Peruvian worker of the Centro Internacional de Cooperación para el Desarrollo Agrícola (CICDA), a French development promotion centre that operates in Peru under a program for international technical cooperation. The incident took place in Haquira, Apurímac department. In addition to the three CICDA workers and two civilians killed in the incident, another 50 people were killed in the zone within a month. These were lieutenant governors, campesino leaders, and cattle thieves. Sendero slit their throats.

Senderista leaders spoke against the centres, calling them "lackeys of Yankee and social imperialism." The reason for the killings was that Sendero had entered into the Third Stage, during which outside assistance would be forced out of the country. CICDA had not been threatened or forewarned to leave the community. The three staff members were not even offered the pretense of a "people's trial." The Senderistas said that campesino organizations not aligned with Sendero Luminoso would also be subject to reprisals. The language was not ideological and the leader tried to speak so as to be understood by campesino inhabitants.

A CICDA official said that there were three main reasons for the attack against CICDA staffers: the institution was highly visible, but isolated in a zone that had strategic value for Sendero; two of the field staff were French; and CICDA associated itself with the proposal to organize rondas campesinas. This last point was the "straw that broke the camel's back." It was a policy that clashed directly with Sendero's own proposal for the zone.

CICDA decided to shut down its operations in the southern Andes, including well-established programs in la Union and Condesuyo provinces (Arequipa), Chumbivilcas province (Cusco), and a new program in Espinar (Cusco), as well as Haquira. It transferred as many programs as possible to their local partners and other centres in the region and reduced its staff from 40-50 to 5, all based in Lima.

In response to this increased menace to multilateral, bilateral, and grassroots development efforts in the conflict zones, the García administration failed to show even minimum courtesy, much less the wish to draft guidelines or strategies. It signalled to foreign missions and their governments that it did not care about the risk to foreign field staff or the viability of development programs.

In May 1989, Sendero attacked the installations of Instituto de Educación Rural Waqrarí, a Catholic Church-run centre in Puno (see Section 3). Two months later, another Senderista column attacked and looted installations of the Instituto de Desarrollo del Medio Ambiente (IDMA) in Ambo, Huanuco, burning its tractors and installations and leaving a message that heavy machinery could not be used in the future. Within 2 months, the IDMA redrafted its program, pulling back from the high reaches of the mountains and housing its staff in a nearby town, but continuing to operate in the zone.
In Lima and other major cities, centres working with urban programs found themselves in the same situation. In mid-1989, El Diario published a series of articles attacking centres, staff members, and local partners by name.

During late 1989 and early 1990, the election campaigns for municipal, regional, legislative, and presidential races led most GSOs to cut back their activities and keep a low profile. In June 1990, however, two staff members of CEDEP, a consultant, and a local livestock owner were killed in Puno. They had gone to Melgar province to purchase alpaca herds for their program in Ancash department. The incident seems to be a case of "the wrong place at the wrong time;" they met a Senderista column near the town of Nufioa. CEDEP does not have operations in Puno, so it is unlikely that Sendero would have targeted the CEDEP staff members.

For 3 years (1987-89), Peru had the privilege of topping the list of countries in which forced disappearances were denounced internationally. In 1990, 300 people disappeared. In March 1990, human rights organizations were attacked by right-wing paramilitary squads. Amnesty International and the Andean Commission of Jurists were both hit. The International Red Cross, which provides relief assistance in emergency zones for people forced to move due to internal conflicts and prisoners, was also bombed. The International Red Cross has been refused permission to work in Ayacucho on several occasions.

These trends shook Peruvian centres to their cores. Efforts to join forces had been sporadic. The ANC grew substantially, in part as a mediator with the government to defuse misunderstandings and disputes over the role of GSOs. In August 1989, a group of 21 organizations plus the ANC set up InterCentros to pool their resources and talents in dealing with specific themes, among them, political violence. One of the ANC's handicaps is that it is hard for it to draft a shared policy to confront the crisis because of its democratic nature. Each centre, no matter what its size, importance, type of programs, location, or political leaning, has one vote and an equal say in the running of the ANC. Its strength is in its representation of a broad cross-section of centres. InterCentros is based on the stature of its associates, among the elite of the independent research centres, university centres, and GSOs. Its objective is to make an impact on state policy (see InterCentro's first communiqué, La Republica, 13 August 1989).

GSO leaders say that there were more and more reports in 1989 that donor agencies were cutting back or stopping their support of Peruvian GSOs due to the political upheaval and the difficulty in monitoring programs.

By the end of the García period, the political climate had changed dramatically. Novelist Mario Vargas Llosa emerged as the right-centre presidential candidate. An alliance of his Libertad Movement, AP, and PPC seemed sure to win the general election. Vargas Llosa promised a "revolution of modernization" based on market-oriented economic policies, a drastic cutback of bureaucracy and state intervention in the economy, and a more receptive approach to foreign investment and the international financial community.
However, the aggressive and, at times, arrogant campaign of Vargas Llosa and his allies led to a voter backlash, combined with a sanction of all political parties. APRA had shrunk to die-hard supporters, still about 20% of the electorate. IU had divided into two blocks, a radical faction with the old name and a more moderate alliance rallied around the presidential candidacy of Alfonso Barrantes (Movimiento de Izquierda Socialista). This split had an impact on promotion centres because GSOs had worked with an IU mystique. The beneficiary of this political shift was a wild-card presidential candidate, Alberto Fujimori and his Cambio 90 movement. In a presidential run-off with Vargas Llosa in early June, Fujimori won.

This political surprise was the most visible sign of a breakdown of predictable formulas for Peru. The existence of five regional governments (as of January 1990) and the setting up of seven more following April 1990 regional elections opened possibilities for new cooperative between centres and local governments, as well as a potential for administrative chaos and bankrupt services.

**Summing Up Three Decades**

We should keep in mind several trends among GSOs over the past two decades. Generally, the centres' staff support the left, but not a particular party. Because strong party affiliation could create internal conflicts, centres created an ethos in which the common cause was the left and Izquierda Unida, but not a party. However, this ethos was damaged by the build-up to the 1990 general election campaign and the temptation to use resources to favour one side or another in the power struggle within IU. The split between IU and Izquierda Socialista left centres in the lurch because they found the political split latent within them.

However, it should also be noted that the rise in political violence has erased many of the petty rivalries among centres and their staffs. The external threat from Sendero Luminoso has made it possible for coordination, pooling of information, and joint analysis, which would have been inconceivable 10 years ago.

The apparent left-wing monopoly of GSOs and other centres was not as complete as sometimes appeared. Grassroots organizations did not care about the ideologic or program differences between the two left-wing groups and sought another political option, voting for Alberto Fujimori and Cambio 90. Aside from programs backed by Catholic, Protestant, and Evangelical churches, there was a small, growing group of centres associated with the centre-right. The Instituto Libertad y Democracia, Habitad Peru Siglo XXI, Fundación Ulloa, Acción Comunitaria del Peru, and ADIM came into existence in the 1980s. They are generally linked to American financing, like USAID, PACT, Acción-AITEC, and the Inter-American Foundation (Carroll et al. 1990). This trend emerged out of the recognition that the right-centre needed to recapture an intellectual space that had been a virtual monopoly of the left-wing intelligentsia.

The effort was a success. The right-centre groups had lagged in working with grassroots organizations. During the run-off election between Vargas Llosa and
Fujimori, FREDEMO's attempt to project a social program in marginal areas came off as lame and opportunistic. An exception is Violeta Correa, the wife of former president Fernando Belaúnde, who works with shantytown communal kitchens, continuing a program that began as an outgrowth of her role as First Lady. Another interesting ramification is that several of these centres have started working with Peruvian funding from Peruvian corporations, foundations, and private donors, thus opening the prospect of reducing dependence on foreign financing for some centres.

Perhaps more important than the political ramifications of the centres has been their evolution into institutions in their own right, independent of their local partners, donor agencies, and political parties. The original proposals for a radical change in Peruvian society (with evident political connotations and implicit party options) have given way to positions more attuned to the complexities of government and program execution. This is a sign of maturity, but also holds the risk of missing the real objectives of the programs. Self-perpetuation of the institutions may take precedence over effective development of grassroots organizations.

During the transition period leading up to the transfer of power to Fujimori, the staff of many centres contributed to rounding out Fujimori's policies and programs. For the first time, perhaps, the government-elect saw that centres had viable proposals and experience. Because Fujimori designated technology as one of his campaign planks, there was a natural opening for more collaboration, especially since centres with specialized programs have created networks and coordinating committees that may become active participants in the dialogue between government and sectoral interests (micro and small businesses, farmers, and peasants). In forming his first cabinet, Fujimori appointed four ministers with ample experience in working with the centres: Guido Pennano in Industry, Carlos Amat y Leon in Agriculture, Fernando Sánchez Albavera in Energy and Mines, and Gloria Helfer in Education. With the drastic economic adjustment program executed by the Fujimori administration, the government called on GSOs to aid in putting together a social emergency program to get relief assistance to the most impoverished sectors to guarantee their survival.

Centres have also played innovative roles in modernizing thinking about development. They have played a significant role in devising, testing, and reformulating strategies in rural and urban areas. For instance, the reassessing of Andean agricultural techniques has, in part, been due to centres' critique of modern agricultural processes in the Andes and a rescuing and reevaluation of the campesinos' traditional methods. They have also inserted a series of new criteria, such as ecological guidelines, into rural development.

Another contribution that has not received attention is as a training ground for a new talent pool. In the past year, in which some foreign donor agencies have shifted their rural development emphasis from Peru to Ecuador and Bolivia where explicit political violence is not a variable, donor agencies have recruited experienced Peruvian staff to work in and direct their programs. Peru has provided human resources for alternative rural and urban development in marginal areas.

Over this past decade, the centres have struggled to maintain their work in the conflict zones as long as possible. They have found the means of carrying on with their
work. Yet this resistance has frequently meant stubbornly digging in their heels and not carrying out an in-depth criticism of their work and roles.

The response of grassroots support organizations has been varied. Some of the more introverted GSOs have withdrawn in shock and confusion. Their chief reaction has been to take precautionary measures and shift into a defensive position to weather out the storm. This fits more neatly into the general situation of uncertainty and lack of horizons. A third group of centres takes a more aggressive stand. They believe that they, and the rest of civilian society, cannot remain passive in this dispute. The centres have to convince their local partners that their lives, communities, accomplishments, and projects are at stake and that affirmative action is necessary.

Each of these approaches has its handicaps and faults, even though it may reflect the centre’s resources, commitment, and circumstances. The cautious middle ground may be to question their framework for rural development and the role of local partners and may be full of hesitation and vacillation. The more aggressive line is based on political commitment and is less uncertain of its methods.

As pointed out by Haudry (1990: 254–272), GSOs are not really dealing in "development." Development in its broadest sense requires long-term government policy stability, public investment, and other factors. GSOs and even most government programs are small-scale investment programs. They are laboratories or pilot projects to open new horizons for grassroots development. These experiments are free for any institution, public or private, Peruvian or foreign, to draw on for more ambitious endeavours. For that reason, it is extremely important for GSOs to leave footprints where they have ventured. The avalanche of violence threatens to wipe out their marks across large areas of Peru.

The issues of development in Peru are not problems about technology or production; rather, they are political and social. The question is how to make large sectors of the population active participants in their destiny. The spiral of violence set off by Sendero Luminoso and accelerated by the blind responses of Peruvian security and other forces has realigned the country. A veteran advisor calls it an "axis of war." Until GSOs, and Peruvian society as a whole, understand that this axis of war requires a critical reassessment of development programs, democracy, popular participation, and government representation, the efforts to alleviate poverty and marginalization will yield meagre fruit.
SECTION 2

THE WARRING FACTIONS

In 1980, the Communist Party of Peru (PCP), known as Sendero Luminoso (shining path), gave a violent tug on the frayed fabric of impoverished Ayacucho and the snag was felt throughout the woof and warp of Peru. Although violence has been a factor in the past 500 years, linked to deeply rooted social, economic, ethnic, and structural problems, Peruvian society has faced a major escalation this decade. Although other Latin American countries meet similar threats to the viability of their civilian institutions, Peru faces an especially complex array of adversaries. This trend has also introduced an erratic, unpredictable variable, combined with a breakdown of the normal channels for conflict resolution (Senate Committee 1989, for example, contains a detailed analysis of the social, economic, and political roots to violence in Peru).

One measure of how far the situation has degenerated comes from the United States government. Because of terrorist activities, the State Department has placed Peru in the same risk category as El Salvador, Colombia, and Lebanon. Although there are substantial differences in the quality and nature of political violence in these countries, this classification is due to the incidence or number of terrorist acts. Other foreign governments have arrived at the same conclusion about Peru's condition. For Europe, this classification can have a direct impact on GSO funding because many donor agencies have matched-funding agreements with their governments.

In the past 40 years, grassroots organizations, like campesinos and urban squatters, have employed tactics not sanctioned by the law and even acts of force to achieve their goals. They have, however, usually avoided outright and systematic violence in the pursuit of their objectives.

Because of the nature of this low-intensity conflict and the threat of institutionalizing violence as a political instrument, we will describe the major players whom grassroots organizations and their support agencies must face in the field.

Communist Party of Peru: Sendero Luminoso

The communist party came into being in 1970, breaking off from the Maoist Communist Party of Peru (Bandera Roja or red flag). The central core of Sendero, however, actually existed as the regional committee of the original communist party since 1964. Its main recruiting centre was the National University of San Cristobal of Huamanga and the public school system in the area. The key leader and thinker behind it is Abimael Guzmán, known by his nom de guerre, Chairman Gonzalo.
In the mid-1970s, Sendero's leaders decided that the time had come to start an armed uprising along the lines drafted by Mao Zedong in China. This decision required strengthening and fine-tuning a national party structure for the task. The principal regional (Ayacucho) and metropolitan Lima committees were the backbone of the organization; four other regional organizations started the gradual process of building its war machine.

Because party-sanctioned ideology has the weight of the Bible, it determines how local cadres will observe and interpret reality. According to Sendero, Peru is a semi-feudal, semi-colonial society in which a form of bureaucratic capitalism holds sway. In more comprehensible terms, Peru is an underdeveloped, Third World country in which power is still wielded through semi-feudal means (control of the land) and subordinated to imperialistic powers. The economy is dominated by monopolistic and mercantile intermediaries for world powers that use the state to exploit the population (PCP 1988: II, 4-5).

Sendero believes that in Peru conditions have matured for staging armed struggle and the one missing factor over the past 100 years — a revolutionary leader in the form of the Communist Party of Peru — has emerged.

Sendero holds out a utopian prospect of a world made anew through revolutionary struggle within a timeframe of a few decades. In the society that Sendero will create, all failings would disappear: children would not starve to death, men would not commit adultery or get drunk, and mothers would not abandon their children. At a grassroots level, this kind of message has appeal and impact, compared to the breakdown of moral and ethic standards, corruption, and chaos prevailing in large parts of Peru. This ideal future world, however, must first be won.

What does this mean in practical terms for rural development? Sendero's Maoist ideology, accentuated by Guzmán's thinking, requires a prolonged rural guerrilla war, drawing on the peasantry as a social base. This objective requires breaking the hold of semi-feudalism on the peasantry. Another target is imperialist dominion of rural areas (PCP 1988: II, 5-6). From Sendero's sectarian view, grassroots support organizations represent an attempt by imperialist powers (predominantly European and American governments and donor agencies) to strengthen the imprisoning chains of capitalism in rural Peru.

In September 1989, *El Diario*, a semi-official mouthpiece for Sendero, came out with a full condemnation of centres, relief work, and charity efforts, including the Catholic Church:

Imperialism and social imperialism, through the furtherance of their "promotion centres," intend to replace the tasks that correspond to this State to realize in public works. (This is) an attitude which fulfils one of the objectives of counterinsurgency policy by encouraging pacifism, the conciliation of classes and free (unremunerated) work, diverting the people's struggle towards electoral idiocy.

For Sendero, the presence of development programs, either through government or nongovernment agencies, is a crucial juncture in the evolution of capitalism in rural areas. It is the point at which rural producers become locked into
It is better for rural communities to regress to stone-age conditions than start a process that would lead to stronger ties to a bourgeois society.

This schematic interpretation of Peruvian reality, however, would remain a bizarre exercise in the dark arts of dialectic materialism if Sendero did not match it with an astutely designed and meticulously planned military strategy for taking power. Sendero starts with a flexible military-political strategy designed to work within the complex geographical, economic, and social setting of the Andes. It carefully builds up from grassroots levels, taking full advantage of local conflicts. Sendero exploits urban-rural tensions (issues like demand for public services and spending, the capitalist market, and land conflicts). It makes consistent, organized use of violence to intimidate and consolidate alternative authority. It disrupts the chance of other political options from emerging or taking root in the local setting. It proposes a long-term societal model that aims to integrate society through its armed struggle and it uses effective pedagogical mechanisms to help it increase its membership and propound its ideology under adverse conditions (Smith 1991).

Sendero has concentrated its resources on creating a military apparatus capable of sustaining a revolution against the existing state. It is characterized by the single-minded subordination of the party, its cadres, and resources to its military and political goals. This militarization has permitted Sendero to demonstrate a close, measurable relation among objectives, actions, and results. Second, it has a vertical, authoritarian structure and cell organization that has been almost impossible to infiltrate or break. The party leadership constitute a stable, permanent war staff, held in strategic reserve. This provides long-term planning "strategically centralized and tactically decentralized" and constant evaluation of the situation. Third, there is an absolute rejection of all organizations that do not subordinate themselves to the militarized party (Smith 1991). An outgrowth of militarization is that "the Party's work with masses is carried out through the Army" (PCP 1988: IV, 1).

Unlike most left-wing parties, Sendero has never used centres as instruments of its political strategy, although its members or sympathizers may have worked in them for short periods. This policy may be changing. Luis Arce Borja, the former director of El Diario, held a conference in Belgium in 1989, shortly after the killing of the two French development volunteers in Haquira, Apurímac. When pressed to explain why Sendero had assassinated the foreign volunteers, he claimed that six donor agencies were working for the García administration, IU, ideological, and political infiltration. "If you travel with and support García Pérez and his counter-insurgency and criminal plans, naturally you convert yourself into a target of the revolution, just as a campesino does when he goes over to the ranks of the Army" (Quehacer, No. 59, 30-2).

Senderista pointmen, including Arce Borja, had approached European donor agencies. His remarks were more revealing than their inquiries had been. There have also been reports from some rural provinces of new promotion centres opening as a front for Senderista activity, although this may be a defensive mechanism of provincial societies to reject unknown outsiders.

Carlos Ivan Degregori (1989) says that because Sendero has defined Peru as semi-feudal, it encounters other phenomena in the Andes that do not fit into its vision.
On his Long March, Mao did not meet engineers repairing power pylons, agronomists doing extension work, and anthropologists advising campesino federations. "I consider that the degree of violence which SL develops is so great, among other causes, because it has to adapt reality to the idea and for this they not only have to stop time but turn it back" (Degregori 1989; 22).

From Sendero’s perspective, GSOs, grassroots organizations, and rural development, along with political parties, religion, and decadent bourgeois governments, are "a pile of garbage traditionally inherited which we must clear away gradually," (PCP 1988: V, 5, citing Engels). These kinds of institutions and groups are the waste products of history or obstacles in the way of revolutionary creation.

In the final analysis, all projects and institutions not anointed by and subservient to Sendero will eventually come into its sights. With such a long "hit list," however, Sendero has a backlog of targets. Much depends on priorities and circumstances as to how often the guerrilla group sets its sights on GSOs and their local partners. Shining Path has preferred to chip away at the vulnerable underpinnings of Peruvian society, rather than stage an all-out assault on the government. It aims to wipe out the state and capitalism even if that means condemning the populace to stone-age subsistence.

Sendero operates in the Andes from Huamachuco province of la Libertad department in the north down to Apurimac, encroaching on the western slopes around Lima. Its southern pole of development is in Puno, in the provinces of Azangaro and Melgar. It also operates in broad swaths of the jungle, like upper and central Huallaga, the Apurimac-Tambo river valleys (Ayacucho and Junín departments). Sendero claims that it has spread its tentacles to all 24 departments of the country. However, Sendero has been unsuccessful in the northern Sierra, including most of Cajamarca, Piura, and Amazonas. It has also failed repeatedly to penetrate Cusco.

Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru

MRTA owes its political position to Sendero. The first 3 years of the Senderista offensive were disconcerting. Sendero showed that it was possible to engage in guerrilla warfare against a government that had inherent weaknesses. The protracted debate within the Marxist left as to whether the subjective and objective conditions for revolution were present was settled. Sendero, through its ruthless tactics and sectarian ideology, pushed back the frontier of tolerable political activities. The MRTA leaders thought that Sendero was giving armed revolution a bad name.

MRTA was constructed from the Marxist splinter groups that remained loyal to the premise that effective social change would only come through armed violence. They were dissident factions that rejected the enthusiasm of mainstream parties for legitimate politics, including participation in elections and Congress. The initial spark actually came during the chaotic 1980 negotiations to form a broad left-wing coalition (Alianza Revolucionario de Izquierda, ARI). The coalition collapsed, but the seeds and contacts for sedition were prepared. Their initial actions seemed like Robin Hood gestures, bank robberies and distributing "expropriated goods" in shantytowns. It even apologized publicly for killing a policeman in front of an embassy.
When it took action in early 1984, it was, in effect, preparing for the day when the rest of the Marxist left would have to go underground. It was a commonly held belief in left-wing circles in the early 1980s that Belaúnde would not serve out his term and a coup d'état would send the Marxist parties back into clandestine activities. MRTA would be the armed wing of IU.

MRTA finances its operations through bank robberies, extortion, contributions through the sale of bonds, and other activities. MRTA applies this same practice to businessmen and shopkeepers. It may also receive financing and assistance from abroad, probably from Cuba.

The organization has international contacts, which disturb the Peruvian military. It fits into the Latin American tradition of romantic guerrillas, which has its roots in Cuba (Fidel Castro and Che Guevara), Argentina (the Montoneros), and Nicaragua (the Sandinistas). Some members went to Nicaragua to fight on the side of the Sandinistas in the late 1970s. For a time, the MRTA integrated the Batallón América with the Colombian M-19 and the Ecuadorian Viva Alfar, Carajo. Two Peruvians died fighting in Colombia. It has contacts with other insurgent groups, like the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) in El Salvador. It may also have received arms from abroad. Its strategies and actions fit neatly into the pattern of insurgent groups in Latin America (see González 1989 for a more detailed account of MRTA's founding and development).

However, with the falling fortunes of armed insurrections in the region, MRTA is finding that its role models and international allies are moving away from the political use of violence.

MRTA has steered clear of attacking GSOs and their local partners. It has sent letters and visited GSOs requesting contributions to its cause. MRTA leaders have worked in GSOs. An MRTA founder helped set up a major Lima centre in the mid-1970s. A minority of the smaller centres and individual staff may hold some sympathies for MRTA. Because MRTA expects an authoritarian or military regime in Peru's future, it does not want to antagonize potential allies should other left-wing forces decide on guerrilla warfare.

In other words, MRTA follows a war logic different from Sendero's. It may use centres as a cover for activists in a zone, but centres are not a means of penetration. It may collect information through its activists, but GSOs do not serve as purveyors of intelligence.

The Unidad Democrática Popular (UDP), a coalition of splinter groups operating outside the united left, has thinly disguised sympathies toward MRTA. It functions as its political arm. UDP has concentrated its political efforts on militant union federations, like miners, and some campesino organizations. It also participates within the national popular assembly. A weekly magazine, Cambio, serves as its public outlet.

MRTA originally confined its activities to urban areas and coastal pockets (Lima, Ica, Chimbote, Trujillo). In November 1987, MRTA opened up its first full-scale
guerrilla front in the Huallaga valley. The occupation of San José de Sisa took place with heavy media coverage and even interviews with column commanders. It has since expanded its area of operation to the middle, lower Huallaga and lower Mayo valleys, the Ene-Penene river basin, and Junín in the central Sierra.

It has frequently tried to pressure the government into increasing investment in its base areas. It kidnapped the president of the San Martin development corporation in 1988 for this purpose. In 1985, it offered an informal cease-fire to the newly inaugurated García administration on the condition that the new government make just settlements with unions and increase the minimum wage. It also demanded the suspension of debt payments and the expropriation of foreign companies. There have also been signals that at least some of its members would be willing to negotiate a peace settlement with the government if the right conditions prevailed. This "reformist approach" has led Sendero to criticize it for trying to patch the structures of exploitation so it can stay on its feet. More pointedly, Sendero cannot accept other political organizations, armed or passive, challenging its hegemony in priority zones. Differences have led to open confrontations and armed clashes. In the upper Huallaga, Junín, and the lower jungle foothills, Sendero and MRTA competed for control of territory, including open combats. In the upper Huallaga, Sendero has passed on information to the army on MRTA cadres, supporters, and supply dumps. In 1989, the two bands engaged in gun battles on the campus of San Marcos university.

However, by 1989, MRTA had suffered heavy losses in its feuding with Sendero, in fighting with the army and police forces, and in consistent intelligence work by the anti-terrorist police. Because it conformed to Latin American guerrilla practices, it was easy to anticipate its actions and movements. In January 1989, the army and police wiped out an entire column of 64 guerrillas. Police captured at least two members of its national war council, Victor Polay and Alberto Gálvez. These leaders and 46 other MRTA activists escaped from the Canto Grande maximum security prison in June 1990.

**Other Armed Groups**

With two armed groups already in the field, it is always a temptation for other radicalized groups, especially youth branches of mainstream left-wing parties, to join the fray. Pukallacta, Frente Patriótica de Liberación (FPL), and the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR-IV Etapa) have all dabbled in setting up guerrilla units. There are also many small cells that, although insignificant nationally, can be important at the grassroots level.

In the past, some groups within Izquierda Unida have prepared for armed struggle or have taken defensive measures in case they should become targets of Sendero, the armed forces, the police, or right-wing death squads. If a coup occurred, the most radical IU factions would probably go underground and start guerrilla activities. The youth wing of APRA, influenced by radical Marxist thinking and the party's own history, would probably follow suit. Military sources say that this potential for a wholesale civil war has been a dissuasive factor among malcontent officers tempted to overthrow the García administration.
Peruvian Security Force

Although the Peruvian army has a reputation for being one of the most progressive and socially heterogeneous in Latin America, it does not have a clear political vocation, aside from a fascist faction within the Navy. On the other hand, the experience of the past 6 years in active duty in the emergency zone is changing attitudes. The reform-minded officer corps of the Velasco regime is giving way to officers whose formative experience has been fighting Sendero "with their hands tied behind their backs," as some officers say.

The Peruvian armed forces was reluctant to get involved in fighting Sendero. It had just survived 12 years of authoritarian rule that had damaged the chain of command and the pool of officer talent. It had lost popular support and self-esteem. It was ill-prepared for an internal war, having concentrated over the previous decade on purchasing sophisticated weaponry to defend against a hypothetical two-front war against Chile and Ecuador. Although the army had successfully confronted a guerrilla insurgency in the mid-1960s, most of its counter-insurgency plans were stale, being based on the French school of tactics (Algeria and Indochina).

Since 1983, the military has played a leading role in the fight against Sendero and, later, MRTA. However, it has been difficult to discover what the military really think about the conflict. The army continues to believe that a maximum application of firepower will defend the insurgents, but the government does not allow this. A majority of the officer corps probably supports a southern cone strategy, with no questions asked.3

The military, as Brian Jenkins has noted, does not believe it has been "out-proselytized, out-mobilized, or out-fought," but rather thinks it has been "unreasonably constrained and unjustly criticized" for doing what is necessary to stem the tide of the insurgency. (McCormick 1990: 44, citing unpublished Rand Corp research)

Peru has a conscript-based military service, although recruits usually come from the lower classes. Middle- and upper-class youths easily get an exemption. This imposes several constraints on military tactics. Recruits from the Ayacucho emergency zone do not serve in battalions operating in the same region for fear of infiltration. Coastal and jungle recruits serve in the Sierra. This introduces ethnic, linguistic, and cultural distinctions in the relations between troops and the local populace. Urban soldiers look down on the Sierra Indians. They are ill-prepared for the hardships of operating in high-altitude combat zones, with poor supply lines and inefficient logistic support. However, troops in the Huallaga come from the zone itself and perform adequately.

In the training of the officer corps, there is a sharp distinction between officers at the rank of colonel and below and officers groomed to be generals. The standard instruction and education follow black and white principles — Christians versus Communists, United States versus the Soviet Union. For officers with superior

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3 For a detailed analysis of the thinking of military officers, mostly in retirement, see IDL (1989a). See also see the study by Mauceri (1989) on democracy and insurgency.
commands in their future, the armed forces offers intensive courses at the Centre for High Military Studies (Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM)). There the chosen few are given a political veneer and a more sophisticated vision of the world. This separation in professionalization processes explains why line officers do not have the capacity to discern political nuances among left-leaning groups and institutions.

If Peru's anti-guerrilla experience over the past 8 years accurately reflects the views, doctrine, capabilities, and constraints that shape current planning, the army has little appreciation for the dimensions of the problem it faces, little interest in or understanding of the principles of counterinsurgency, insufficient means to conduct a successful unconventional campaign, and no prospect of improving its material position in the foreseeable future. Its performance has suffered accordingly. (McCormick 1990: 33)

National Police Force

The 86,000-strong National Police Force has had to carry the brunt of counter-insurgency in non-emergency zones and also plays a subordinate role to the armed forces in emergency zones. It suffers from the rivalries among the three former police services: Guardia Civil, Guardia Republicana, and Policía de Investigación Peruana (PIP). The Garcia administration merged the three services into a national forces, but did not overcome grudges and administrative turf divisions inherent in the division.

Until the late 1980s, the police did not have specialized units for counter-insurgency operations. An infamous unit, known by its Quechua name, Sinchi, was nothing more than a group of recent graduates of the Mazamari training camp in the central Sierra jungle. Sendero's tactic of assassinating policemen, frequently when they were off-duty or after their service in emergency zones, has increased tension among rank-and-file policemen.

The street-corner cop is poorly paid, making less than $100 a month. He has the equivalent of a secondary education, plus a year's training. Until 1985, police received only 6 months' training.

State of Emergency

The 1979 Peruvian constitution allows the executive to declare a state of emergency for 60 days, renewable thereafter. It suspends four constitutional guarantees: the need for a search warrant to enter a private dwelling; the necessity of a warrant to make an arrest; freedom of movement within the national territory; and the right to hold a public meeting. Under a state of emergency, the executive may also hand over the safeguard of public order to the armed forces. Indeed, there may be a secret 1963 decree that automatically hands over authority to the military. If social unrest worsens, the government may also declare a state of siege. No government has invoked this second provision (Garcia Sayán 1987). However, once the government sets up a state of emergency, security forces interpret this authorization as a complete suspension of legal guarantees.
The government invoked a state of emergency for the first time in October 1981. Since 1983, it has become, for all intents, permanent in Ayacucho. Both the Belaunde and Garcia governments have declared the whole country under a state of emergency on several occasions. By the end of 1989, eight departments were under state of emergency (Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Apurímac, Junín, Cerro de Pasco, Huanuco, San Martin, and Ucayali). Also included are several provinces, like metropolitan Lima and Callao.

This measure has practical implications for GSOs. The army has interpreted its authority to restrict free movement and public meetings as a mandate to monitor GSOs in emergency areas (as well as human rights investigators and relief assistance by international organizations). In Ayacucho, two GSOs had their authorization to go into the countryside suspended, although both eventually regained it.

Since early 1989, army troops have occupied and patrolled areas that are not under state of emergency. For instance, in southern Cajamarca and Puno, commanders say that they have authority to seek and engage guerrilla units and even follow them into other military jurisdictions. This trend increased in the latter half of 1989 as the armed forces had to monitor November municipal elections. This status would continue through the April general election and the July hand-over of office.

The declaration of a state of emergency produces a subordination of civilian institutions to military authority. Although the judicial system and government supposedly continue functioning, the military commander becomes the ultimate decision-maker. Because civilian elites already fear for their property and lives, they seek security from the military. This forces a recomposition of the system of prestige and power, an additional polarization of haves and have-nots. From the choice of godfathers to potential husbands for daughters, the military take priority.4

Where there is more economic activity, counter-insurgency becomes a business contract with local interests. A commander provides protection in exchange for use of vehicles, provisions, and even cash payment. This practice is clear in Puno where police units provide protection for the remaining enterprises (Pisoconi and Santa Rosa in Melgar province, Sollacota in Azángaro and Aricoma in Carabaya) (IDL 1990: 50). In the central Sierra, the army and police have established relations with mining companies. During the 1989 national mining strike, military activity was aimed at breaking the strike rather than fighting off guerrillas.

Security forces, both police and the armed forces, are rotated regularly. These duty tours vary from 3 months to 1 year, which means that troops rarely have an in-depth knowledge of the zone. They view centres as foreign, even though they may have been there 20 years. Most centres and their staffs have become accustomed to this attitude; they expect periodic brushes with the law enforcement agencies as part of "getting to know each other."

4 The picture is even more complicated with the installation of regional governments in 1990. Several regional governments, like Libertadores-Wari (Ayacucho-Huancavelica-Andahuaylas-Ica) and Gran Chimu (La Libertad-San Martin), span both emergency and non-emergency zones.
The raw recruits want to make it through their 2-year term in the service and then get out. Most army troops come from coastal urban areas, adding a racial and ethnic component to their relations with the locals in the Sierra. Few officers speak Quechua. "For the officers, it's a world they don't understand and fear," says an Ayacucho GSO worker. "It is easier to lump everyone together as a suspected Senderista than start to make distinctions."

In periods of tension and conflict, the military officers and police are quick to accuse the GSOs of being troublemakers or even the legal arm and logistical apparatus of Sendero. In their eyes, GSO projects (and even bilateral or multilateral development programs) are voluntarily or involuntarily agents of communism. Their best option, the military say, would be to leave the zone and clear the way for the army to do its dirty work without embarrassing witnesses. The military cannot understand why foreigners (or university-educated outsiders) would want to work with backward Indians, unless they are communists and sympathizers with Sendero.

In a cross between feudal fiefdoms and caste solidarity, local commanders have leeway in carrying out counter-insurgency strategies. An active military officer says, "The rules for respecting local authorities and human rights are in the regulations for emergency zone operations. It depends on the commanding officer and his personality to enforce them." As long as they do not break internal rules, they can improvise, engaging in activities ranging from organizing sports events for local youth to dismantling all grassroots organizations that do not swear allegiance to the army. There has been only a scattering of reporting on this facet. Usually, human rights groups are able to determine which commanders are hardliners because complaints of abuse and disappearances in a specific zone start accumulating. Sometimes, a "good officer" will find his way into press reports because he organizes community action programs.

Most of the corruption is petty, like using petty cash for purchases that are overpriced or never made. (Large-scale military corruption comes from contraband and materiel purchase.) However, the military leaders fear the corrupting influence of the drug trade. The commanding officer of the upper Huallaga zone in 1984–85, General Carbajal, was drummed out of the service because of drug-related charges. In early 1990, three officers were court-martialled for drug trafficking and the regional commander of the Huallaga was relieved of his duties.

There is a structural abuse drilled into the soldiers and officers. They regard the "cholos" as second-class citizens or guerrilla sympathizers, if not outright combatants. Other types of abuse, like torture or extrajudicial executions, require special initiative which usually depends on the commanding officer.

Anyone who wants to get ahead in his career does not take risks. The risk-takers end up like "Comandante Camion," a marine officer who headed the bloodiest repression in Panama, but had no chance to become general or president. There are a few at the other end of the counter-insurgency spectrum, who distinguish themselves by breaking out of the hawkish, conformist mould imposed by military training. "In this kind of war, it is enough not to lose to win in one's military career," says a GSO staff member who has observed the military close up.
General Alberto Arciniega, the commander of the upper Huallaga theatre of operations in 1989, is an exception that confirms the rule. He succeeded in reversing Sendero's advances in the valley through an aggressive military offensive, an outspoken political stance, and an attempt to reach out to the local coca growers for support. He accomplished this reversal at the cost of human rights abuses in the zone, although less than might have been expected based on the scale of the operations. However, since the completion of his command at the end of 1989, he has been confined to a bureaucratic post in the Ministry of Defense.

Rodrigo Franco Democratic Command and Other Paramilitary Groups

The first action of the Rodrigo Franco Democratic Command (CRF) was the assassination of Manuel Febres, the defense lawyer for Senderista leader Osmán Morote, in July 1988. The name of the group was taken from a young Aprista leader and president of a state company, whom Sendero assassinated in August 1987. Over the next year, further assassinations, attacks, and threats were attributed to Rodrigo Franco Command. CRF offered a flag of convenience for disgruntled individuals and groups to hide behind. In Ayacucho, the army used it as a means of intimidating the local population (IDL 1989b).

However, there was already a record of paramilitary groups, closely linked to APRA. In Puno, GSOs, the Catholic Church, parliamentarians, and other organizations were subject to attacks and threats in 1986 and 1988. The national police force, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Attorney General's Office have shown little interest in resolving most of the crimes linked to the Rodrigo Franco Command. Military sources say that some CRF incidents reveal access to police intelligence.

A congressional inquiry led to a minority report claiming that Rodrigo Franco Command had direct links to the Ministry of the Interior, the National Police Force, and APRA. It also charged that the Rodrigo Franco Command was responsible for the assassination of IU deputy Eriberto Arroyo and perhaps APRA deputy Pablo Li in April 1989. The majority report shrugged off the evidence.

APRA members are pulled in two directions: MRTA and even Sendero in some areas attract its youth wing; the paramilitary style appeals to its strong-arm elements (buffalos and defense groups), who are strongly influenced by 40 years of anti-communism and goon tactics to keep control of popular organizations. A source close to the military says that 75 armed groups have been identified within APRA, attached to the party, government, or public entities to provide supplementary protection.

Paramilitary groups constitute a threat potentially more dangerous than Sendero for many GSOs. They operate in urban areas and target individuals and organizations that appear to have left-wing sympathies. These include human rights organizations, unions, regional defense fronts, and grassroots organizations. Their actions widen the breach in law enforcement by encouraging disgruntled military and police officers to bypass the insufficiencies of the justice system. Their targets serve to deliver messages to a broader public as well as to true subversives.
Criminal Activity and Narcotrafficking

In periods of social and political upheaval, criminal activity is bound to increase, out of the necessity to survive and through a breakdown of ethics and moral standards and of effective governance and law enforcement. In parts of the country, banditry and highway robbery have become common. Extortionist demand "war taxes" or other payments on the pretext of belonging to armed groups.

Drug trafficking poses a major threat to the country. Coca cultivation has been a traditional activity of Andean peasants for millennia. In colonization efforts in the 1960s and 1970s, the government opened up large areas of the Andean jungle foothills. By the mid-1970s, coca growing for illegal trafficking had gained a foothold and quickly expanded. By 1985, trafficking and its criminal repercussions took on epidemic proportions, augmented by the involvement of Colombian mafia. During its deepest on-the-ground involvement, the Colombian mafia accumulated an arsenal and armed forces far greater than those of either the government or insurgent forces. 5

Drug trafficking has concentrated in the upper Huallaga valley where GSOs have not been active. However, it is also prevalent in the tropical valleys of the Marañon, Apurimac, Urubamba, and Tambopata rivers, as well as Ene, Tambo, Perené, Pichis, and Palcazu rivers in the central Amazon. For that matter, the hardy coca plant is adaptable to all parts of the tropical eastern slopes of the Andes and will grow in other settings as well.

Both Sendero Luminoso and MRTA have developed working relations with cocaine growers and the intermediaries of the Colombian mafia. The coca-growing complex in the Huallaga valley reveals a facet of Sendero's practices. In rural areas, there is a conflict between growers and purchasers of their produce. The Colombian mafia imposes its prices through armed violence. In the Huallaga valley, neither the state nor a truly free market could intervene to moderate prices because the growing and merchandising of coca is illegal. Government and police authorities lost legitimacy because they were easily corrupted and conspired with the mafia. Abuses (theft and extortion) could not be appealed to the government because coca growers were engaged in an illegal activity.

Sendero, which already considers itself outside bourgeois law, stepped in to mediate this problem between growers and buyers by applying a superior violence. It charged taxes for this service. What we are seeing in the Huallaga is the installation of a new state in its most primitive form (De Rementería 1989: 372–374).

In 1982–83, Sendero tried to close down the Sunday fairs in Ayacucho, blocking access of the farmers to urban markets. This was one of the reasons why many campesinos lost their allegiance to Sendero. They needed the market. In the Huallaga,

Sendero found a more pragmatic, effective means of moving campesinos over to its side.

Both Sendero and MRTA have opened up new areas to coca cultivation, even imposing obligatory coca acreage on farmers and peasants who did not want to grow this crop. This development may be due to the guerrillas' recognition that they could only maintain financial independence by guaranteeing that local residents had sufficient income to pay "war taxes" and other contributions as well as a means of pushing the local populace outside the legal order.

The relation to coca growing and trafficking is perhaps one of the more menacing features of the Peruvian insurgency movement. It is hard to conceive of Sendero spreading to Bolivia, Ecuador, or Venezuela as a political phenomenon; the Sendero-cocaine partnership, however, is more likely to take root in other tropical Andean settings.
SECTION 3

TWO CASE STUDIES

We have chosen to describe in more detail the guerrilla attacks against the Allpachaka agricultural station in Ayacucho in 1982 and the IER Waqrani rural development program in Puno in 1989. There are intriguing parallels between the two cases: both symbolized regional demand for development; both had the backing of institutions (the University of Huamanga and the Sur-Andino Church, respectively); and both were attempts to produce change in the most impoverished, isolated regions of the country. The two cases differ, however, on the crucial issue of the means through which they aimed to attain their goals.

We also try to show that, although the aggression came from Sendero, there was another side to the conflict: the hostility of security forces and regional entrenched interests which preconditioned the attacks.

We have included detailed accounts of the antecedents, attacks, and aftermaths because reported information at the time was scarce and frequently incorrect. At times, Lima media may have intentionally distorted reports, or simply ignored them, for political purposes. The accounts frequently ended up incorporated into general evaluations, especially when analysts fail to filter the raw information.

We believe that those concerned about political violence should not see it as an abstract phenomenon. Death and destruction affect real communities, institutions, and individuals. The different ways of responding to the crisis are also telling of the methodology and institutional nature of the participants.

However, we should be careful of seeking overly sophisticated explanations for Sendero's or the military's aggression. Some of the fine points of this analysis may be mere coincidence or superficial features. The risk is that GSO staff, donor agencies, and others may use this analysis as a means of arguing that Sendero will never attack them. As stated elsewhere, Sendero needs little justification to strike at outsiders or power figures when it claims its preeminence in a zone.

Ayacucho, Allpachaka — Emptying the Countryside

The experimental station at Allpachaka was the first case in which Sendero took reprisals against a centre devoted to agricultural investigation and extension work. It was also part of the National University of San Cristobal of Huamanga, which was closely linked to the founding and evolution of Sendero Luminoso. Since then, Sendero has attacked other university research centres: the Chuquibambilla extension centre in Melgar province, Puno, and the La Raya stations (belonging to the universities of San Marcos and Altiplano-Puno), Secuani province (Cusco), the San Marcos tropical research facilities in Pucallpa (Ucayali) and the International Potato Centre's...
installations in Huancayo (Junín). Sendero has also attacked other research centres associated with universities in Lima.

A prominent Peruvian social scientist, who knew Guzmán and his respect of higher learning in the 1960s, asked why an insurgent group should try to destroy a pool of valuable information, part of universal knowledge that does not have political colours. Why should its actions also slaughter "capitalist cows," destroy seed banks, and burn down schools built over decades of work on the wind-swept plateau of Allpachaka and other remote zones?

The attack baffled many and led a foreign analyst to write, "Ironically, the University of Huamanga’s experimental farm has a good record for orienting its research towards the needs of the local peasantry and was by no means working solely to the benefit of medium-scale landlords, as happens with other universities in Peru" (Taylor 1983: 21). However, there were elements in the Allpachaka program and the broader context that allow us to understand the incident more adequately.

The National University of San Cristóbal of Huamanga set up the Allpachaka agricultural centre in 1965. More than 20 hacienda owners offered their estates to the university in hopes of avoiding being affected by the 1964 agrarian reform (Diaz Martinez 1985: 35). For decades, the Ayacucho area had been in decline, with continual migration and falling productivity. The experimental station was meant to revitalize this backward area through use of new technology and forms of application and extension work. Assistance and funding came from the Swiss Technical Cooperation, the World University Service, the Dutch government, the Organization of American States, and the Inter-American Institute of Andean Crops.

The 1588-ha experimental farm lies 72 km south of the city of Ayacucho, at an altitude of 3580–4200 m above sea level. Research included studies of soil, pastures and livestock, Andean crops (potatoes, mashua, oca, and olluco), and seed banks. The university had a second experimental farm in Huayapampa, a few kilometres outside the town. A third centre, proposed for the jungle foothills of the Apurimac river valley, never got past the planning phase (UNSCH 1977: 94–98). The idea was to give students, professors, and investigators practical experience and research opportunities in the three ecological zones of Ayacucho: the puna, the Quechua valley bottoms, and the jungle valley. Conceptually, this program complemented the university’s mandate to turn out "rural engineers" and other professionals who would have the necessary skills to aid in the transition of rural backwaters to modern, progressive societies.

The agricultural research and extension program was the brainchild of the rector, Efrain Morote Best, one of the individuals who shaped the university. He came to represent the cosmopolitan, educated provincial elite in the university and the community, linked with Lima’s intellectual networks. He found himself pitted against the other leading figure on campus and in town, Abimael Guzmán. He represented a more political line of thinking, strongly influenced by the Maoism in vogue in university circles at the time. This feud would determine public discussion and the alliances of power that revolved around the university and its outreach efforts for the next two decades. It also marked the political birthright of the Allpachaka project; it was the child of the anti-Guzmán block.
After Morote Best left the rectorship in 1968, the university administration fell into Guzmán’s control. Between 1970 and 1975, this rivalry, though veiled by other issues, came to a head. The dispute was mainly over the Guzmán clique’s practices in controlling university administration, but had other ramifications. While anti-Guzmán allies criticized hiring practices and the allotment of cafeteria and housing quotas according to party allegiance, the Senderista faction counterattacked by criticizing the Allpachaka program.

The Guzmán faction’s criticisms were: Allpachaka was not functioning as an educational centre because students visited the centre briefly and did not get involved in concrete activities; it was not making a serious effort to spread knowledge and research among the surrounding communities; the peasants did not accept the research and technical proposals in their farming practices. Antonio Díaz Martínez (1985: 37), an agronomist and leading spokesman for the faction, charged that Allpachaka was following the path of the Prussian Junker class toward capitalism and an enclave of imperialism in the Andes.

Díaz Martínez made a counterproposal for developing Allpachaka. It called for collective management of the workers’ holdings, including 10 ha of collectively farmed fields, unified communal herds, and a model village, emphasizing the ayni and minka Andean communal work systems (Díaz Martínez 1985: 205–208). Although the proposal manifested a concern for the well-being of the workers and surrounding communities, it did not go beyond paternalism and an idealized concept of the Ayacucho campesino community.

In response to some of the criticism, the University, under a new administration and without participation of the Guzmán faction, set up a Centro de Capacitación Campesina (CCC, peasant training centre) in 1975. The program marked a new tack for standard university practices and a reassessment of popular education and rural development programs in the region. From 1977 to 1982, with the assistance of two Dutch development advisors, the CCC worked with peasant communities in the Rio Pampas valley and the high pasture lands above it. Sendero cited the presence of the two Dutch advisors as additional proof of the capitalist and imperialist penetration hidden in the Allpachaka program.

**The Social Setting**

The Allpachaka experimental station had consequences that went beyond its mandate of agricultural research and extension. The university purchased the Allpachaka hacienda from the Capeletti family. With the land, the university also inherited 16 feudatarios (sharecroppers) and their families. They lived on the hacienda, working the land in exchange for small individual plots. Instead of expelling the serfs from the land, the university paid them as workers. Eventually, the former serfs joined

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6 See Gianotten and de Wit (1987) for a more detailed discussion of the team’s efforts to have an impact on the campesino economy. The work over 5 years had a lasting effect on other grassroots support organizations in Ayacucho and elsewhere.
the university union and received other privileges, like guaranteed employment and studies for their children in the university.

The university made other improvements. A bilingual school opened on the experimental farm, first for the primary grades and, later, incorporating secondary grades. It had four full-time teachers supplied by the university. The university also set up a medical post with a health promoter, nurse, and visiting doctor. These services were available to the surrounding communities. In comparison, the CCC staff surveyed 16 peasant communities in the Rio Pampas valley and found that 14 had primary schools, 2 had sanitary posts, 1 potable water, 5 road access. None of the communities had sewage disposal, electricity, or secondary schools (Gianotten and de Wit 1987: 216).

The workers maintained their right to cultivate their individual plots with the advantage of improved seeds, fertilizers, herbicides, and farm equipment supplied by the university. They also grazed their livestock on the station land. The peasant communities around Allpachaka were moving away from the traditional communal system of cultivation and rotation of the land. This process, called parcelization, means the breaking up of land into individual holdings and a stronger dependence on urban markets. The Allpachaka workers began buying land around the station.

These advantages soon began to differentiate the former serfs from the surrounding peasant communities. By 1970, a Sunday market functioned at Allpachaka. The workers were the merchants, buying the local produce and selling urban consumer goods to the peasants, thus serving as intermediaries between the countryside and the Huamanga market. By the late 1970s, the Allpachaka workers had incomes that averaged six to seven times more than those of peasants in the surrounding communities. They began buying up land outside the experimental farm. They sought and received positions of prestige in religious processions and other festivities, which play an important role in Andean culture. The young women of neighbouring communities aspired to marry one of the Allpachaka sons.

Finally, the university workers began to press the administration to help lobby for Allpachaka to achieve the status of district and have a police post opened there. The promotion of a hamlet or town to district has been a traditional means of "declaring independence" and strengthening direct ties to the provincial or department capital (Favre 1987: 26-27). There was strong resistance to the police presence in the Rio Pampas valley (Degregori 1986: 42); so there was a major change in attitude on the part of the Allpachaka workers to request a police post. We cannot attribute all these changes exclusively to the university’s program. Similar changes occurred in other areas of Huamanga province, but Allpachaka accelerated them.

Contrary to what Díaz Martínez criticized in the late 1960s, the former feudatarios were strongly favoured by the project. As employees-landowners-merchants, they gradually rose above the status of Ayacucho campesinos. There was actually little that the university could do to stop this process of differentiation once it started. The employees’ and workers’ union would have protested if the university had decided to discriminate against the Allpachaka workers.
Few of the benefits of the agricultural research found their way back to the surrounding area. Teachers and investigators found it hard to translate their studies into effective programs for the peasants. Allpachaka had a vertical structure and the surrounding communities were always the least benefited by its programs. At most, the university hired local campesinos as extra help (peones) when necessary.

The Centro de Capacitación Campesina (CCC) took a different approach and differences arose between it and the experimental station itself. For the first 3 years, the CCC operated a campesino school in Allpachaka where community leaders came for courses. Classes were examples of abstract learning in language that were over the heads of the peasants and removed from their real-life experiences. CCC staffers soon found that communities were not sending their leaders to the courses. Instead, the students were young people, easily spared from fieldwork, who did not have the communal standing to pass on their learning experience to the rest of the community.

The staff gradually placed more emphasis on anthropological and agrarian studies of communal systems, so the extension work could begin from the campesinos’ own level. After 1979, the centre actively sought direct contact with the communities and helped plan, finance, and carry out small rural development projects in Rio Pampas valley. After 1980, Allpachaka no longer served as the campesino school, but remained a supply depot. Eventually, the CCC program aimed to bring together the individual communities into a single peasant federation to address the social and economic problems of their region.

Sendero had always sharply criticized the centres and their international financial support in Ayacucho. Foreign investigators and development staff may have had good intentions, but their reports and articles were published abroad and formed a pool of intelligence against the revolution brewing in the Andean hinterland. Once guerrilla activities started, Sendero was also concerned that field trips and encounters with the campesinos would lead to intelligence leaks to security forces. The work carried out by the centres was "detouring the people from revolution and delaying its ignition," deceiving them into thinking that the work would contribute to their well-being. The head of the Allpachaka bilingual school was Sendero’s pointman in the zone and actively intervened to sabotage the CCC’s efforts to relaunch the centre’s extension work. Sendero was, however, never aware of the CCC proposal of bringing the communities together in an intra-communal organization, staff workers say. In fact, the CCC was not attacked by Sendero during this opening phase, mainly because there was nothing physical to hit at. All the small-scale infrastructure was absorbed into the campesino communities.

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7 In November 1988, I had a chance to participate in a CCC seminar for peasant leaders on veterinary care of their livestock in Huamanga. CCC staff and the anthropologist-director had an obvious rapport with the leaders, speaking in Quechua and building on a long-term relationship that had been preserved over a decade of violence. However, when an agronomist gave the closing speech, his condescending tone and academic approach upset the campesinos.
The Attacks

In May 1980, Sendero launched its armed insurrection, which gradually built up momentum. Through small, carefully planned actions, Sendero was sweeping the countryside clear of obstacles (Gorriti 1990).

On 3 August 1982, a Senderista column appeared at Allpachaka. It rounded up the neighbouring comuneros and forced them to loot and burn the centre (DESCO 85–86). In a conspicuous deviation from Andean respect for livestock, the attackers slaughtered four Brown Swiss breeding bulls and 18 dairy cows. However, when they started killing the animals, campesino women threw their arms around the cows and asked why they did not kill them too. The guerrillas distributed the remaining livestock among the peasants, who saw themselves as taking custody of them to return them to the university. However, when police arrived later and started searching the neighbouring communities, they arrested campesinos who had possession of livestock and took them to Lima. The University had to intercede to get them out of jail.

The guerrillas dynamited the installations, burning documents and research archives. They burned two tractors and destroyed seed banks, wiping out 2000 samples accumulated over 16 years of research. The attack also wiped out cheese- and wine-making facilities. Damages amounted to roughly $2.2 million (Taylor 1983: 21).

The news of the attack against Allpachaka created an uproar in Huamanga. The university community had believed that Sendero would never dare to attack it because the party had always defended the university as a forger of revolutionaries. The gossip in town was that "Sendero had really botched it this time." The university organized a caravan of buses, trucks, and other vehicles, loaded with students, professors, and workers to visit the farm. The university rector, agronomist Enrique Moya who had been crucial in starting the CCC program, proposed to reconstruct Allpachaka, clean up the damage, and put in back in operation. For the first time, Sendero broke its vowed silence and stopped the vehicles to explain why it had destroyed the centre. Three armed cadres stopped the buses on the way to Allpachaka and informed the Huamanga students that the university could continue with its work at Allpachaka, but it would have to "change its ways." They allowed them 3 months to produce results.

Within weeks of the incident, however, public opinion in Huamanga shifted from rejection to justification of the attack. Sendero and its sympathizers cited the social changes brought about by the program's existence, how the cheese and wine production ended up on the tables of the town's middle class and the absence of effective results. During the latter half of 1982, Sendero was also reaching its peak in popular support, which was marked by the massive turnout for the funeral of the guerrilla commander, Edith Lagos.

Meanwhile, Sendero was taking action in the southern Ayacucho provinces. Shortly after the attack, 2000 peasants from communities throughout the Rio Pampas valley came to Allpachaka. With 100 yoke of oxen, the campesinos ploughed and planted the fields communally. The armed conflict intensified with the intervention of the army a few months later. The communities never harvested the crops. Sendero brought 200 head of sheep liberated from neighbouring Huancasancos and distributed
them among the Rio Pampas communities. The high point was a feast in which the guerrillas slaughtered six bulls and distributed the meat to every man, woman, and child. "They announced that they had established the New State of Peru which would develop so campesinos would be self-sufficient," writes Billie Jean Isbell, an anthropologist who reconstructed the events from conversations with peasants several years later. They also distributed red wine brought from the coast (or more likely taken from Allpachaka's warehouses as the Huayapampa experimental station's vineyards used Allpachaka to age wine) (Isbell 1988: 10).

Although Senderistas condemned capitalist encroachment through the Allpachaka experimental station and the CCC efforts, it proved less capable of developing a viable alternative for the local communities. Isbell (1988: 11) pointed out that the cadres completely misinterpreted the Andean agrarian system, trying to force collective cultivation on the peasants in Chuschi.

(The) organizers of the insurgency had identified the appropriate conflicts and stereotypical enemies to target in order to engender peasant support. But they failed when they tried to impose an idealized view of the maitia system that had no basis in local reality. They were as ill-informed as Velasco's agrarian reform planners.

Ayacucho promotion workers also report that Sendero engaged in similar large-scale communal agricultural efforts in the northern part of Ayacucho, around Huanta.

On November 16, a Sendero column returned and destroyed what remained of the installations, including the bilingual school which they had spared in the first attack because of the pleading and weeping of women and children. This second time, the neighbouring communities were wary about getting involved and Sendero was distrustful of the communities. Complete destruction and slaughter was the command. To reinforce its presence, Sendero brought in campesinos from communities as far away as Sarhua and Quispillacta (2 or 3 days' walk).

This was part of Sendero's strategy to seal off the countryside from outside influence, to increase pressure on Huamanga and other urban holdouts, and to provoke a stronger reaction from the government in Lima.

**Aftermath**

One interpretation of the Allpachaka attack is that the university ran it as a "profit centre" for university finances and it had little direct, beneficial effect for the surrounding communities. The administrator of the unit was appointed by the accounting department, to whom he had to answer for all his decisions rather than to the agronomy program. The centre aided "pure research," but did not have much bearing on the academic program or the extension work among the communities. The campesinos did not benefit from the breeding program because few of them could afford to buy a Brown Swiss. Only in 1989 did the agriculture program set up research for improving breeding of the native cattle stock.

Other agronomists think that Sendero struck at Allpachaka simply because it represented a real alternative for regional development. It was, however, more a symbol.
of a kind of development that university professors and the Huamanga middle class wanted for the region, one that would be driven by technology, university expertise, and government funding. A collateral effect of the Allpachaka attack was that all the small landholders left the region. They were the main beneficiaries of the extension work, improving potato yields and cattle fattening.

The real reasons for the attack were two-fold. The strategic military value of Allpachaka made Sendero Luminoso want to clear the zone of outside influence. Sendero Luminoso had invested 10 years of ground work in the countryside. Its obsession with military methods made them unwilling to permit other players in the game. Sendero had also entered into a phase in which it wanted to escalate the conflict, drawing in the armed forces (Gorriti 1990: 278–283).

The attack also delivered a political message to the university in Huamanga for those who did not have the resolve or the conviction to set out on Sendero's revolution. The political option that centred on Moya as rector and encompassed Izquierda Unida, independents, and a technical-productive component found itself demoralized and blocked from developing a coherent response to the Senderista insurgency. In spite of winning the administrative skirmish for control of the university, Sendero claimed spheres of activity and discouraged the interference of others.

The Allpachaka incident is indicative of other factors. Development work, especially the more traditional approaches involving transfer of technology and investigation, opens up local divisions. Frequently, pure research seems more valuable to international interests than to local peasants. Research was more successful in establishing the university and its professors' reputation nationally and abroad than in yielding results for the campesino communities. At the same time, the cash flow resulting from research (hired labour, services, and other payments) had an impact on the local impoverished economy.

In 20 years, the university failed to establish a regional development program. Despite concerted efforts to adapt technology to local conditions (cattle breeding, pastures, and native crops), the university had serious problems in making these findings available to communities. Technical proposals were not matched to the needs of communities. Neither the CCC, the university, or the other centres of Ayacucho (much less the state) were able to propose a development strategy for the region.

Once under direct military command as of January 1983, the GSOs' reaction was to pull back to areas within the province of Huamanga. Most retreated to areas to which Sendero did not assign an operational priority. The emphasis shifted to technical programs and away from organizing and building leadership. Compared to other regions, like Cusco, Puno, or Piura, GSOs were recent arrivals in Ayacucho. Centres did not start programs until the late 1970s when Sendero had already laid the groundwork for insurrection. Although some government and university programs had brought innovations, they were limited in scope.

On the new, reduced scale, GSOs did not seem to have a serious problem in the countryside among their local partners. In fact, the pull-back corrected a dispersion of efforts in several centres, which had tried to cover immense territories. The problem
had been getting to the rural areas and maintaining an urban base of operations, which could be a target of sabotage or bombings. All the major centres received threats because they represented a left-wing option in municipal or regional government. The centres and individual staff members also take a role in the popular movement in Huamanga, especially the Federación Agraria Departamental de Ayacucho (FADA), affiliated to the Confederación Nacional Agraria.

One fatal consequence of the retreat was the abandoning of the organizing and promotional work in the Apurimac valley where there was the germ of a modern, export-oriented economy and new peasant organizations. Sendero's and, later, the military's priorities precluded any outside presence in the zone.

The one exception to the general retreat was the CCC. It maintained a presence on the northern slopes of the Pampas valley. It escaped reprisals because it had been overlooked by the university and because most staffers were local people. The other GSOs had foreign financing and superior pay scales while the CCC worked with university-level salaries. One of the drawbacks of the CCC's efforts was that its staff did not have a regional or national vision and were unaware of the worsening conditions.

The CCC accepted the "methodological challenge" of continuing its work in the Pampas basin. They were still trying to maintain a presence in the communities and decide when to hold courses and when and how to provide inputs and other resources to the communities. Yet the most striking conclusion from this centre's work is its capacity to mould itself to the potential of its local partners, accepting the methods and procedures that expose the communities to the least risk.

However, centres were slow to realize both the problems and the potential of Ayacucho campesino communities. A large part of the Ayacucho elite in the university and centres underestimated the capacity of campesino communities to resist the onslaught of violence. Not until after 1985 did most centres and investigators wake up to the resilience of campesino communities. Most centres did not realize there were new needs arising. The war was leading to a recomposition of the family productive unit because of the loss of male members, decapitalization, loss of inputs and tools, migration, and lack of communication with the interior.

Amazingly, the campesino communities were prepared to accept the risk of joining rural development programs. In 1986-88, during a window of opportunity for breaking the spiral of violence, peasants lined up to receive credits from the Agrarian Bank and drive off with their tractors. In mid-1989, campesinos appeared on the doorsteps of GSOs with assembly petitions to restart development contracts.

However, there can be a self-deluding component in centres' efforts to continue their work despite the odds against them. An example of this can be found in the report of a conference on development projects in Ayacucho that took place in October 1987 (PRATEC 1988). Admittedly a technical event dominated by a group of experts systematizing native Andean agricultural methods, there was only a minimum of discussion of how 8 years of violence had had an impact on the local partners, institutions, and work methods. The impression was that the violence was a battle between Sendero and the Lima government and had little to do with those who had not taken sides.
In 1988, ten Ayacucho centres set up a coordinating body, the Inter-Institutional Committee for Regional Development of Ayacucho (CIDRA) to try to keep from stepping on each others’ toes and to work with government institutions. This attempt to coordinate efforts and centralize information came surprisingly late in the process to alter the dynamics of violence.

When the national GSOs finally woke up to the fact that violence was going to be a constant ingredient in their fieldwork in 1989, a first reaction was to turn to Ayacucho as a case that could demonstrate how to continue with development under dire circumstances. They did not find an environment typical of the rest of the country. The 9 years of conflict in Ayacucho had closed down most broad social spaces where centres could exercise an influence and civilian reserves were depleted. Violence, assassinations, and threats had annulled municipal government and communal arenas.

The Ayacucho GSOs had several advantages in keeping a foot in the countryside. There had been a ready supply of agronomists, anthropologists, and other graduates of the University of Huamanga. The university was the founding stone of regional awareness. The staff members had close relations with the community, through mechanisms which are extremely important in the Sierra. These include kinship, compaternity, blood brothers.

During the period beginning in October 1989, through municipal and national election campaigns, Sendero began a phase of intense harassment of all possible nuclei of organization. The military reciprocated, especially after the general election and a massive block of the city’s middle and professional classes fled to Lima. Conditions in the countryside deteriorated, with vigilante groups pillaging neighbouring communities. Displaced peasants burdened the already overextended urban services. The GSOs finally had to withdraw from the countryside, using the opportunity to review and critique their fieldwork and programs. In September 1989, CEDEP staff workers were detained by a Senderista column and their vehicle was destroyed as a warning to stay out of the countryside during the municipal election period.

Despite these handicaps, 17 centres remained in Ayacucho in mid-1990 and gained a place alongside the university as pillars of the regional society. The centres had shown remarkable perseverance in the face of overwhelming odds. They remain a valuable resource in rebuilding a ravaged community, both as a pool of trained and experience staff and as a clearinghouse for contacts with rural communities. This investigation may criticize aspects of their operations and methods, but it cannot minimize their dedication and courage.

There were obvious structural and global problems in confronting the problems facing Ayacucho and rural development. The university had to defend itself from the distrust and aggression of the Lima government. Despite increasing attention to the plight of Ayacucho, there was no concerted effort on the part of the Lima government or other civilian institutions to reinforce local efforts. When half-hearted efforts to reverse the situation began to falter, the national forces tried to ignore the signs of failure. A national response to a regional problem is the opportunity to draw several steps back from the issues and examine them more dispassionately, to draw on external resources and perspectives to get a fresh grasp of the crucial factors.
Finally, the introduction of a political-military command in the Ayacucho emergency zone meant that the university and the community had to grapple with a counterpart that defied the traditional means of negotiation. The political-military command was a wild card in the intricate relations of a closed provincial society. Each year, the appointment of a commander by the government was looked upon like Russian roulette. For all purposes, the commander was a temporal prince in a realm under siege by barbarians. Each regent was supremely ignorant about how Huamanga society worked, much less the rural communities of Ayacucho.

**Puno, Instituto de Educación Rural Waqrani — Rising from the Ashes**

Since the early 1980s, Sendero and observers have eyed the department of Puno, on the southern plateau near Lake Titicaca, as the likely site of a "second Ayacucho." The region is rural, backward, and economically depressed. Cycles of drought and flooding over decades and centuries have prevented economic improvement. Exploitation on the basis of race, culture, and class was part of the land-owning system. Agrarian reform concentrated land in the hands of even fewer holders than under the hacienda system. Both mining and jungle colonization, two alternatives for regional development, failed to produce viable options. The potential for polarization was high (IDL 1989c).

In Puno, more than 100 development and assistance projects (Palao Borastain 1988), including bilateral and multilateral projects and those of state and nongovernment agencies have had an impact. This level of funding affected everyone from the upper classes down to the campesino community. Far more resources, however, were funnelled into the inefficient cooperatives than to land-poor peasants. Some of these programs stemmed from relief work, both state and private, due to natural disasters and affected relations between many programs and their recipients. In addition, increased awareness that subversive violence was spreading through the Andes and the consequences of the Latin American debt crisis increased the number of rural and urban development programs in the zone.

To understand the unique dynamics of Puno and its lessons in survival under duress, we must look at the role of the Catholic Church. The Sur-Andino Catholic Church has a regional focus, encompassing the dioceses of Juli (Aymara-speaking zone around Lake Titicaca), Puno, Ayaviri, and Secuani (Cusco). Originally, the dioceses of Cusco and Chuquibambilla (Abancay) belonged to the coordinating body, but they separated for practical and ecclesiastic reasons.8

Theology of Liberation and the group of clergy and lay people rallying around Father Gustavo Gutierrez strongly influenced the regional church. An openness to new theological, pastoral, and political approaches stemmed in part from the presence of

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8 This section on the Sur-Andino Church owes much to the doctoral thesis of Steven Judd (1987). Judd is a Maryknoll priest and director of the Instituto Pastoral Andino. The study is an inside view of regional developments and is based on rigorous academic methods.

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foreign clergy and Peruvian clergy trained abroad. The Sur-Andino Church became a laboratory for the social ministry of Peru’s progressive church.

The church’s endorsement of a preferential option for the poor led to a pro-campesino approach and had several effects on political and rural development in the region. It meant that one of the traditional pillars of the Peruvian status quo shifted its support to grassroots organizations, policies, and outlooks. Bishops and prelates, with all the trappings of authority, shifted the balance of power in the countryside. This strategy threw the Church, the campesino federation, and political allies into direct conflict with entrenched regional interests (the agrarian cooperatives, trading companies with interests in contraband and even drug trafficking, and power cliques) and national forces (the Lima government, the ruling party, and security forces).

However, this change and its implementation did not come by ecclesiastical edict. Over two decades, the Sur-Andino Church showed a capacity for criticism and analysis, both of its own performance and that of other social actors, with a strong emphasis on moral, ethical, and cultural aspects. These princes of the Church and their lay workers had more moral authority than any civilian government in the zone. They created an environment in which foreign and Peruvian participants, lay workers and clergy, political and non-political outlooks, pastoral and temporal approaches could interact. This "thinking room" included permanent institutions and periodic meetings. The approach also required short-, medium-, and long-term planning, with regular coordination and strategic planning. It has given the region a shared language, a code to communicate within itself. The Church’s method of working affected its pastoral mission and its social action programs, which were, for all purposes, indistinguishable from those of non-Church GSOs in the region. The approach also affected the latter because they learned from the Church’s experience and interaction.

Another outgrowth of this strategy was a willingness to incorporate a cultural dimension into reflection and praxis. The presence of three (or more) cultures — Aymara, Quechua, and Creole-Spanish — plus foreigners from North America and Europe, coexisting within the same region made participant groups examine their motives for biases and prejudices. The Sur-Andino Church also tried to incorporate peasants into the church structure as baptizers, catechists, and pastoral animators. The Church took this step to compensate for the shortage of clergy to perform the church rites, but it also stemmed from a stated objective to include the peasants as equal partners in dialogue. It had the secondary effect of developing local leaders. This becomes evident when examining the lists of collaborators with centres, peasant federation leaders, and elected authorities (municipal and regional).

The pastoral strategy gave the Sur-Andino Church vitality, commitment and resilience in adverse situations. During the 1983–86 string of natural disasters (drought and flooding), it critically examined relief work. By using food and other donations to set up communal stores and seed banks, it strengthened local organizations, rather than creating a dependence on handouts and charity. When Puno seemed to be a powder keg in 1986, its bishops and prelates intervened directly with President García to convince him that a restructuring of land distribution in Puno was a prerequisite for pacifying the area. A conference, called "Puno Wants Peace" in August 1986, focused national attention on the region when the threat of militarization of the region,
increasing paramilitary activity against the Church and centres and the land issue were close to pushing Puno over the brink.

We have described at length the Sur-Andino Church’s role because it differentiates Puno from Ayacucho, both in religious manifestation and in response to the political and social conditions of the region. The Ayacucho dioceses was conservative and traditionalist in its pastoral and liturgical practices, had few social action programs (pointedly in the charitable mode), and was distant from the peasant majority of the region. There were individual exceptions to the Ayacucho Church’s conduct. After 1988, a Jesuit group began a more sensitive ministry in the region.

Another issue that distinguished Ayacucho from Puno is land. Under the Agrarian Reform affecting nearly 2 million ha in Puno, 53 cooperatives received more than 90% of the land, while campesino communities got 2.5% and individual holders 7.5%. Even though they held most of the arable land, the cooperatives were inefficient and corrupt. By 1983, campesino federations were demanding a restructuring of the cooperatives to give land-hungry peasants another chance at productive endeavours (Rénique 1987, Lopes 1988).

In late 1985, the issue came to a head with the first land seizures occurred on November 4. The communities of Macari and Santa Rosa took 10,500 ha from the ERPS Kunaruna in the province of Melgar. During the next 4 years, other campesino communities and smallholders seized as much as 400,000 ha. The García administration pushed forward a plan for restructuring land held by the cooperatives. It claimed that it had handed over more than 800,000 ha to peasants, but the campesino federation countered that much of the land was given to the associative enterprises under another guise.

During the hottest period of seizures, 1986–89, only one person, a campesino, was killed in confrontations with police, army, or armed cooperative employees. Considering the scope of the movement and the stakes involved, this is an amazing accomplishment and an indication that Sendero failed to make inroads in the Puno peasant movement. The land issue will continue to be conflict-prone for years to come.

**Sendero’s Beachhead in the Sur-Andino**

Puno is far removed from Sendero’s traditional territory in the central Sierra. Due to its strategic value within Sendero’s Andean scheme, the party has maintained a presence in the zone since the mid-1970s. The Puno region is culturally distinct from the Andes on the other side of La Raya pass on the frontier with Cusco. Although Sendero was an intruder into local politics, Puno offered several advantages for it. It came as close as possible to conforming to Sendero’s analysis of a comprador-bureaucratic alliance in the state (PCP 1988: II, 4–5). The cooperative managers, Arequipa wool interests, and the regional state bureaucracy, especially the Agrarian Bank and the Ministry of Agriculture, reaped the benefits from the wool and livestock business while cooperative members and campesinos got the short end of the stick. The countryside is relatively empty, with a few urban centres and campesino communities scattered in disperse areas, usually on the worst land. It had strategic value due to its proximity to Bolivia, Cusco, and Arequipa.
In 1981, Sendero’s first actions included the attack on the IER Palermo, but the emphasis was on enacting crude justice against local powers and cattle thieves. It started working in the Puno university and the technological and teachers’ colleges.

By 1986, SL moved into the region in a big offensive, mobilizing two or three columns with up to 50 armed combatants and calling on another 200 activists as advance men, logistical support, and intelligence gatherers. The guerrilla column’s main field of operation was Azángaro province and, later, Melgar. Most (60%) associate enterprises were concentrated in those two provinces. It haunted the badlands of the province, living in abandoned mine shafts or shepherds’ huts. The columns frequently slipped into the Cusco highlands, Arequipa, or Bolivia (IPA 1990: 281).

In 1986, Sendero tried to preempt the land issue by beginning a series of "armed expropriations," forcing campesinos to accompany them in their raids and looting. During the period from February 1986 to April 1987, more than 100 people died in the battles and skirmishes, including police, SL activists, cooperative workers and staff, and campesinos. In Asangaro, Sendero managed to eliminate the associative enterprises even before government land redistribution took place. It blew up most rolling stock and stole many of the cattle, distributing them among the poor campesinos.

In other words, there were simultaneously three proposals for land restructuring in Puno: Sendero’s at the point of a gun, the Aprista government’s with the endorsement of the cooperatives, and the one backed by the Sur-Andino Church, the campesino federation, and Izquierda Unida.

Sendero’s aim was to provoke a militarization of the department, forcing the government to send in the armed forces, and a polarization of regional politics. This would cut out the middle ground where SL was numerically and conceptually at a disadvantage.

Although Sendero suffered several defeats in the region between 1987 and 1990, it recovered from these losses and kept the pressure on the Sur-Andino Church, the campesino federation, and the political parties, as well as the government and the cooperatives. This was a sign of the strategic importance of the region to Sendero’s plans.

**The IER Waqrani**

Founded in 1964 as part of the new social doctrine of the post-Vatican II church, the Instituto de Educación Rural Waqrani was a part of the prelature of Ayaviri’s pastoral plan. Its headquarters, located 11 km outside Ayaviri, include 962 ha of land, used for agricultural experimentation and demonstration. It had living quarters for staff and workers, administrative offices, classrooms, a library, and a dormitory for visiting campesinos. In the early days, there were workshops for carpentry, mechanics, and training programs. However, it concentrated its activities on young campesinos recruited from their communities, training them in skills that would allow them to migrate more easily.
From 1976 to 1979, Dominican brothers managed the IER; they specialized in agricultural work and closed the vocational workshops. They established a herd of Swiss Brown dairy cattle that still produce milk that is sold three times a week, all year round, in Ayaviri. However, the IER staff in the mid-1980s considered this activity a poor example for the peasants who would probably never be able to obtain sufficient capital or cover operating costs. The dairy required constant attention and was one of the reasons for keeping staff on the site.

In 1979, the IER Waqrani started to go out into the rural areas, always talking about land as the central problem in Puna agriculture. It concentrated its work on three communities, Macari, Santa Rosa, and Orurrillo, in the province of Melgar. It provided technical support for crops and livestock, better methods and advice on marketing, and collateral services. In addition, it helped analyze the political, economic, and social situation, providing information that was not available to peasants. Parallel to technical assistance, the teams prepared community leaders and strengthened local organizations. Its educational and training programs took place at its headquarters or in the communities' campesino schools. The team used different methods for axis communities and pilot communities. In the former (Macari) the traditional Andean communal organization was fully functional; the latter (Orurrillo) comprised mainly small landholders whose communal ties were weak or nonexistent. Santa Rosa fell between the two.

This methodology became known as the "Waqrani strategy" in the region. It put emphasis on teamwork: six technicians, four social workers, six full-time workers, and five part-time staff, plus the director, administrator, and secretary. The IER also maintained links with nine other research and development centres in Puna, participating in the drafting of a proposal for regional development.

However, in its work with local communities, it soon became clear that no improvement in farming or grazing methods could make these communities viable. The small size of their landholdings kept them from reaching reasonable levels of productivity and volume, and population growth would continue to prevent a rise in living standards. The IER team produced an analytical study that showed that, despite the communities' limitations, they still made better use of land and other resources than the associative enterprises, which monopolized the best land. The only way to improve their situation was through a redistribution of land in the province and the department (Vega, R. 1985. *La reestructuracion democratica de las empresas asociativas en Puno*, unpublished manuscript).

This analysis had enormous implications for the region because the associative enterprises were the most powerful entrenched interests in Puno. The land issue became part of the Sur-Andino Church's social ministry (see the pastoral document *La Tierra, Don de Dios - Derecho del Pueblo*, 30 March 1986). Indeed, the land issue would not have received as much political attention if the Church had not supported it. The IER team also brought the land issue to the attention of the united left (more precisely the Partido Unificado Mariateguista which is the only party with effective work in the Puno area). The land issue also put the IER staff into contact with peasant federations, other political forces, and centres. The Federación Unificada de Campesinos del Melgar (FUCAM) asked for technical assistance in drafting a proposal to redistribute land held
by associative enterprises. Later, the IER Waqrani team assumed an advisory function with the Federación Departamental de Campesinos del Peru. This was a highly visible function, staffers being present at most assemblies and events over the next 5 years.

By mid-1988, the IER began an experimental program in three districts with eight communities, each with an average of 100 families, in Melgar province. The idea was to increase the productivity of the empresas comunales without continued outside assistance. Other zonal, district, and provincial agrarian federations were to use these examples to fortify their own communal units. The team wanted to provide technology and management skills that would permit the empresas comunales to make productive use of the land that they had seized or received from the government. This effort was politically a challenge to Sendero's guerrilla tactics in the zone as Sendero had already staked its claim to campesino demands.

However, this mutual commitment to land redistribution carried its problems. There was an implicit tension among the sponsoring institution (the prelature), the IER staff, and the other organizations concerned, despite sharing criteria, methods, and goals. The prelature (and the Sur-Andino Church) was willing to be an instigator of social change, but it could not exceed its own mission as an ecclesiastical organization. The other components headed in a more political direction, sometimes radicalizing their demands for extemporaneous reasons. The Waqrani director, Ricardo Vega, served on the pastoral council, an elected position, so there was direct input from the prelature in designing this strategy.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the "Waqrani strategy" was its regional perspective and outreach. In many ways, it was the operative centre and flagship of the Sur-Andino strategy. It had the political wiles and campesino trust to lead the way.

This approach logically ran into opposition from the cooperatives, the ruling party, and security forces. During the heated period preceding and during the land seizure movement, police repeatedly stopped and searched Waqrani vehicles. The tires on IER staff vehicles were deflated when they were parked in town. Vega and other staffers were arrested for short periods of time. The Puno anti-terrorist police chief called him in for a blunt conversation about his activities. The Puno cooperative enterprises accused Waqrani, its staff, and PUM of being the legal arm of Sendero.

The Waqrani team had to take precautionary measures, both against security forces and cooperative workers and Sendero. These started with intelligence work to find out where guerrilla columns and anti-terrorist police units were active. By early 1989, the Waqrani staff had removed some non-essential equipment, archives, and other items from the experimental farm. The senior staff members no longer slept at the farm, but in town. In addition, local peasants or ronderos stood lookout around the experimental farm to alert the workers about strangers approaching.

**The Attack**

On 21 May at 7:00 pm, a truck pulled into the Waqrani experimental station. Some 20 guerrillas jumped out and overpowered the workers. The column leaders
asked for the three staff leaders by name, but they had already gone into the town. The guerrillas made quick work of the installation, destroying the teaching and administrative facilities and equipment like tractors, vehicles, and generator. However, it did not touch the stables, livestock, or living quarters of the workers. It was a blow at the brains and mobilizing forces of the Waqrani team.

The guerrillas had started its rampage on May 13 in Muñani in the eastern reaches of Azángaro province. On May 19, it assassinated the mayor of Azángaro, Marcelino Pachirri. He had emerged as a new kind of popular leader, playing a prominent role in the agrarian strikes in September 1988 and March 1989. He also extended municipal services to the rural population. The Waqrani team and the Church-campesino intelligence network thought that this was the objective of the column's activities and lowered its defenses. Sendero also staged a diversionary tactic by commandeering a truck and sending it through to Cusco, thus making it seem as if the column had made its escape out of the region.

After hitting IER Waqrani, the column struck at the Universidad Nacional del Altiplano's experimental station at San Juan de Chuquirambilla that same night. It blew up five tractors and other installations. It then went to Macari, the flagship community of the Waqrani program. It killed the lieutenant-governor and a justice of the peace. After rounding Lake Langui-Layo in Canas province (Cusco), it headed back. It hit the two high-altitude experimental stations at La Raya on May 25. The one run by San Marcos University's IVITA program suffered serious damage. The Universidad Nacional de Cusco farm got off more lightly. The SL column then swung through the eastern part of Melgar provinces and ended its sortie in Azángaro.

The guerrilla unit covered 700 km in 16 days, averaging an attack a day and killing seven people. A second unit kept up pressure in Azángaro during the period. "Sendero has shown a logistical support which we never suspected," said a veteran GSO director.

During this whole period, security forces did not make a single attempt to intercept the column. Eight truckloads of army troops arrived in Azángaro and committed abuses against the local population. Another unit took up position in Ayaviri.

Sendero's message at Waqrani was that the Church should not stick its nose into politics, development, and popular organization or lend itself to other forces, like PUM. Waqrani was attacked because of its educational activity and its intelligent approach to the changing conditions in Melgar province and Puno department.

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\(^9\) At the insistence of the IER Waqrani staff, the police post at Ayaviri did try to track the column, reaching Macari several hours after the guerrillas had left. The officer in charge promised the community that no reprisals would be taken against the community, as in the past. At 1:00 pm, the police unit caught up with the column, but since the guerrillas outmanned and outgunned them, they withdrew, recovering a truck and other stolen goods.
The Aftermath

The 25th anniversary of the IER Waqrani took place on 15 June 1989. Plans had originally included a major celebration, renewing the commitment of campesino communities, the prelature, the Sur-Andino Church, and regional groups. After the attack, there were serious doubts whether to hold an event at all. The guerrilla column was still in the zone. It was clear that Sendero's mobility could not be underestimated. The prelature and the IER staff decided to scale down the celebration to a 1-day affair so that visiting delegations would not have to travel at night.

The first rallying point was the IER Waqrani station itself where visitors could inspect the damages. A photography exhibit showed a dramatic before-and-after account of the attack and its role in forging a "way of the campesino community." The ceremony was brief. Despite the music and the reunion of Sur-Andino allies, the atmosphere was tense. As the visitors climbed onto their bicycles, motorbikes, cars, trucks, and buses to return to Ayaviri, the most threatening moment for a Senderista attack, the veil of fear lifted. The ride back, shrouded in plumes of road dust from dozens of vehicles, was festive. Back in Ayaviri, the mobilized visitors met with latecomers and townspeople to march to the main square. On the steps of the church, Monsignor Francisco d'Alteroche said mass, accompanied by his fellow bishops and clergy of the Sur-Andino. Most of the delegations headed home by 4:00 pm. The campesinos continued celebrating well into the night.

There is an obvious comparison with the university caravan after the Alpachaka attack and the sense of defeat in Ayacucho, but there are other points worth mentioning. The Waqrani attack generated a political response by the masses. It was not just a problem of methodology or appearances. This played an important role in defeating the fear that Sendero tried to create by destroying opposition. The attack generated a regional response that stretched from Cusco to Juli, with national components. From Lima came the Peruvian Episcopal Conference and its church's progressive wing, Izquierda Unida legislators, human rights advocates, representatives of the ANC, and journalists from print and electronic media. The anniversary celebration was a symbolic gesture that drew on the significance of the church and the popular movement in the region. The slogan launched for the event was "IER Waqrani will rise from the ashes."

However, the climatic celebration marked a watershed in the gruelling, tense period of 1985-90 for the Ayaviri prelature, its secular wing, and the other organizations that revolved around them. In the following days, the prelature told the IER staff that the program was to be discontinued. The church was fighting a multi-front battle, in Lima, in Puno, inside the church, and among other interests for and against the option chosen by the Sur-Andino Church. Pressure came from several directions. The Lima church, several religious orders committed to work in the Altiplano, and factions within the prelature were initially successful in forcing a retreat. On the other hand, the progressive wing of the Church tried to keep open the perspective of an active, fully implemented campaign in the prelature.

A primary criticism against the IER Waqrani strategy was the leadership team's close association with PUM. The confrontational tactics favoured by this party, like land seizures and agrarian strikes, seemed to go against the Church's interests. This
connection was exaggerated in the Lima media, especially by a nationally broadcast news program. Monseignor D'Alteroche felt that he was being pulled into PUM's game. However, as several priests pointed out, the Sur-Andino Church had first laid out its campesino option and sent out calls for allies. IU had been the only political force to respond.

A major concern for the prelature and the rest of the Sur-Andino Church was that, during the whole period of commotion, the local representatives of the Lima government and security forces seemed to have decided to remain inert before the Senderista threat. It looked as if the government was satisfied to let the Sur-Andino campesino-church block and the Sendero war machine fight over political control of the region and then move in to pick up the pieces. There was a sense of resignation in the forces squared off against Sendero, as if it was inevitable that the fight would degenerate into a shootout between the military and the guerrillas. The land seizures, police repression, Senderista harassment, and the deepening economic crisis bore down on the grassroots organizations, especially the peasants.

This uncertainty combined with the lack of a political horizon that would permit regional leaders to make rational decisions about the future. This atmosphere of pessimism and fatigue strongly affected the attitudes of the prelature. At one point, priests were talking about the need to prepare for a "Church of the Catacombs," harking back to the persecution of early Christians in Roman times. There was a strong inclination to "play safe," pulling back on risky initiatives to consolidate the achievements of the previous 3 years. The campesino communities needed time and resources to put their new land into production, strengthen their organizations, and take stock of options available in the future.

There was also an ethical question that haunted the church program sponsors. "I am not going to be responsible for the loss of seven lives," said Monseignor D'Alteroche. "Waqrani puts at risk the lives of the people with whom they work. We should not be multiplying the risks at this point." Keeping Waqrani in the field would provoke Sendero to strike against other institutions and the peasants themselves.

Monseignor D'Alteroche also mentioned that IER Waqrani was an expensive program to be maintained, with high salaries paid to technicians, many of them from outside Ayaviri, and the constant need for administrative support for everything from keeping the cows fed to keeping the staff alive. The prelature could spend this same money on other pastoral missions, in the jungle with the miners or in urban centres providing education for children or better care for the elderly. These criticisms of the Waqrani formula came to the forefront after the attack. Other pastoral agents felt as if they had been ignored while the attention was being given to the Waqrani team. The Monsignor said several times that Waqrani was not the flagship of the Ayaviri church, it was not its exclusive and most characteristic expression. "Why burn down the whole structure to preserve the barn?" he asked.

The Waqrani staff argued that scaling back or withdrawing the church activities in the area would mean huge losses. At a crucial juncture, the church was retreating. The campesinos needed to feel shelter and support. The relationship with the campesinos had been built up through face-to-face contact and years of work. When
there were reports from the "front-line" organizations that Sendero was demanding that the presidents of the communities, communal enterprises, and zonal federations resign, the Ayaviri prelature should not be sending signals that it was backing off.

The outlook for the coming 12 months was not good. Municipal, regional, general, and presidential run-off elections were to take place between November 1989 and June 1990, providing a situation in which Sendero would be actively harasssing its political adversaries. The prelature decided to continue with a scaled-back IER Waqrani program and dismissed the rest of the IER team. Despite this tactical retreat, Sendero kept up constant pressure on pastoral work. It even began searching for prospective recruits in the Church's own youth groups. Young lay leaders were snapped up and taken off to people's schools and given weekend briefings with cadres.

One of the most interesting reactions was from the campesinos themselves. The FUCAM issued an ultimatum: if the Church decided that it would not continue with the Waqrani efforts, the federation would demand that all property and assets, including land and vehicles, be handed over to the federation. The donor agencies had allocated the funds for the benefit of the campesinos, so they should be the final recipient if the program was not continued. The FCDP also demanded that the Church's commitment continue, although their leaders were aware that changes would have to be introduced to adjust to the new conditions. FUCAM offered to set aside land for Waqrani at its headquarters inside the town limits of Ayaviri. This move would sharply reduce the risk of Senderista harassment. Leaders offered to provide manual labour in the reconstruction of the experimental station.

The campesinos made imaginative adjustments to the situation. For instance, district municipal councils no longer met in the town halls. Council sessions took place in the fields at lunch time, where they blended with campesino routine. Rather than individualizing leadership, grassroots organizations, like communal organizations or district federation, assumed collective leadership. When Sendero ordered the campesinos in Melgar province to abandon their "communal enterprises" and distribute the livestock among their members in December, they followed the instructions. The campesinos, however, kept a parallel accounting in which communal herds and crops, supposedly distributed to individuals, remain as a "family cooperative." The district, provincial, and department federations created elaborate systems of intelligence and information exchange, vital for keeping leaders out of Sendero's reach. The peasants called these methods the "tactic of the vacuum" — Sendero could not kill or destroy what it could not find. There are other examples of these strategies all along the Sierra, an Andean expression of passive resistance.

The Instituto de Pastoral Andina organized a first Sur-Andino "Social Week" in Puno. The Instituto also published the papers and discussion promptly (IPA 1990).

A new coalition of forces may put forward a more ambitious program to support Puno campesino communities, federations, and other programs, drawing on staff and experience from Waqrani, pastoral efforts, and human rights activists. The dismissed Waqrani staff joined other centres, the FDCP, or their political parties. The core of the Waqrani team continued to make lightning trips into the countryside of Ayaviri, driving home the message that they had not abandoned peasant organizations.
A proposal for a regional program was to provide a service centre for the projects and programs scattered around the department. It would also set up a data base to centralize information for regional development and for fighting Sendero. One key issue was to avoid fragmenting the work of the centres and other groups, making them add up instead of remaining as separate, isolated units. The cornerstone in the new approach was to give a leadership role to campesinos, their local organizations, and the FDCP in an attempt to maintain, and in some cases rebuild, the "communal way."

Conclusions

Measured by the reduced Waqrani program at a crucial juncture, the Senderista attack cut an operative knot in the ties between the pastoral mission, campesino federations, and PUM's political strategy. However, there are indications that the Church and social and political organizations around the Sur-Andino strategy remade their pragmatic coalition under new terms. The depth in grassroots organizations and the flexibility of supporting institutions gave the Sur-Andino region the means to continue in the countryside. In addition, establishing a regional government, encompassing the departments of Puno, Moquegua, and Tacna, opened a new, although risky, arena for political work and consensus building.

The crucial question that has surrounded this case study is why, despite the factors leaning toward polarization, has Puno been able to resist the dynamics of violence while other regions have not? In other words, what has permitted rural development to be more than a mere slogan, but a motivating force in the region?

In 1988, an anthropologist said, "Rural development is a contention wall against Sendero." With the benefit of hindsight, it should be clear that the crucial element was not public or nongovernmental rural development, but how these programs fit into the regional context. The existence of strong, resilient grassroots organizations made the task easier for GSOs.

The regional context of Puno made it feasible to resist the demands to militarize the subversive conflict. It resorted to national and international resources to hold back an escalation of the conflict. The success of regional development efforts depends on reading the factors and using them to the advantage of development.

Due to the Sur-Andino Church's emphasis on culture, organization, and leadership development, the target of popular education was never lost. The political sphere was never distant from the debate, leading to the preeminence of the land issue in setting concrete objectives. This emphasis also found an immediate expression in political structures, like Izquierda Unida. GSOs used opportunities, like drought and flooding, to pursue both short- and medium-term objectives in creative ways. The struggle pointed toward political initiative, not just technical-productive proposals. The Waqrani strategy was not an enclave, but had a regional impact.

A risk of the Puno experience is drawing the wrong conclusions to apply on a national scale. For instance, PUM and several centres tried to apply the land restructuring issue in Junín without first making a thorough evaluation of the local conditions for sustaining the effort and the Senderista opposition. If the Waqrani team
and the Sur-Andino strategy sinned, it was in putting too much emphasis on the political side of the formula and not giving more value to the cultural resistance and long-term patience that campesino communities carried with them.
SECTION 4

THE AXIS OF WAR

Regional and Local Experiences

Grassroots support organizations are a new phenomenon in the Andean landscape and in Peru. The closest parallel is the equally recent presence of the state in a promotional role. Facing off against these suppliers of development services are hundreds and thousands of underprivileged and undereducated Peruvians demanding assistance in improving their plight.

The rural sociologist Telmo Rojas (1988) gives a useful summary of the social structure in rural settings drawn from working with microregional development agencies in southern Peru and Cajamarca. There are parallel social strata in the urban and rural sectors, each differentiated between dominant and subordinate groups. Peasants are on the bottom rung of this power structure. The power networks that connect the urban sector with the countryside run through the systems of landholdings, commerce, and the state apparatus. These networks are also tainted with rural-urban, racial, and ethnic discrimination. For the sake of simplification, we call this zone of conflict and tension the rural-urban interface.

The presence of a GSO causes a realignment of the local balance of power. GSO programs, projects, and ties with local partners do not fit neatly into the local structure. Their mandate and alliances lie outside the local context, with donor agencies, their headquarters offices, the national intelligentsia, and other institutions. Centres provide new contact points in the rural-urban interface. GSOs are suppliers of scarce services and goods in environments of chronic poverty and shortage. As intruders aligned with grassroots organizations, they menace the local power networks in and of themselves. Some centres have even stated explicitly that one of their program objectives is to break the stranglehold that local power groups hold over their zones.

Centres’ programs act on key pressure points, especially the market and state service, to improve the leverage of their local partners. For instance, marketing schemes bite into the profit margins of traders or eliminate them completely. Efforts to organize communal stores hurt local merchants. Programs to strengthen grassroots organizations and improve education standards increase pressure on the government and other groups to take peasant demands into account.

Even though GSOs come to the aid of the poor in general, the objectives of their programs are specific communities and groups, which are, therefore, favoured over other communities and groups. Therefore, opposition, resistance, or resentment may come not only from entrenched local interests, but also from communities or underprivileged groups that do not have access to their services.
Local interest groups regularly accuse GSOs of being "agents of communism." They can also invent Senderista attacks to make authorities crack down on unruly peasant groups. There is a predisposition in the provincial news media to report acts of violence as a result of Senderista action. Over the past decade, most centres have learned that there is an advantage in working more openly, explaining their objectives and methods to local authorities and security forces. This has partially reduced some of the inherent suspicion and conflict.

Campesino communities spend an enormous amount of time and resources negotiating with the government. If one added up all the expenses (trips to provincial or departmental capital, or even Lima, to petition authorities, fiestas and honours, slaughtering of livestock for fiestas, etc.), the community could easily finance most public works themselves. One calculation for the Cusco campesino community put the figure for time spent getting agrarian credits and other assistance from the state at 8000 person-days a year (Paz-Tarea de Todos, 7, 45-47).

Centres may aim to help communities maintain a dynamic equilibrium between their dealings with state and other organizations, their dependence and their struggle to get what they need. Perhaps, this is one of the reasons that a fast growing sideline for GSOs is human rights work. Their advice, lawyers, and other assistance improve grassroots organizations' bargaining position in the rural-urban interface. The presence of a trained professional alongside a peasant leader in dealing with state functionaries can change the terms of interaction.

This may also lead to a dependency on centres as intermediaries, just as peasants used to depend on their urban padrinos to intercede before judges and functionaries. "It would seem that centres organize the population to accept the project and participate more efficiently in its execution" (Gianotten and de Wit 1990: 249). Only by concentrating on organization and leadership development can centres expect to move beyond these paternalistic relationships.

Campesinos rarely discriminate between centres and state agencies. They make the same kinds of requests to both in an attempt to get something out of these new intermediaries. The tendency toward integral development projects, combining agricultural promotion, marketing schemes, organization, health and education services, and other aspects, shows that the centres are aware that their local partners have a wide range of needs, demands, and expectations. "We all wear the mask of public functionary," says an international development advisor.

Centres may distinguish themselves with a more horizontal, egalitarian treatment of campesinos and other "beneficiaries." They may reduce the paperwork and kowtowing to obtain benefits. Centres, however, are still firmly anchored within the rural-urban interface. They come with ready-made menus of programs, lines of action,

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10 Cusco centres concerned about the violence in their department searched Lima research centres' data bases for subversive incidents. They found that a third to half of the incidents were incorrectly reported. They were due to petty crime, disputes within the ruling party or undisciplined security forces, or had never happened at all. The inverse may be true in other areas. The sparse reporting from many remote rural areas means that subversive violence is underreported or does not get into the media.
and technology packages, as well as a hidden agenda. A grassroots leader once told Ton de Wit that the government, the parties, the centres, and Sendero were all the same thing: they want to impose their priorities on the grassroots organizations.

Sendero has positioned itself strategically at the intersection of fault lines in the bedrock of Peruvian society. It plays off the failed feedback between the centre and the periphery, the intricacies of local politics, and the experience and expectations of segments of the populace. Each setting has its own set of traditions, codes, and dynamics, which also interplay with national trends and factors.

Like a shark scenting blood, Shining Path is almost instinctively drawn to strife. "Shining Path has successfully inserted itself into existing conflicts," says Andean historian Nelson Manrique. In a society like Peru, fragmented ethnically, socially, and economically, these conflicts abound although they may appear to be personal vendettas or blood feuds. Disputes involving water rights or scarce grazing land can turn into one peasant community against another.

Sendero concentrates on a territorial turf to impose an "axis of war" on the local communities, the state, security forces, and other actors in the zone. Priority areas are those that have the most dynamic impact on local settings: education, land problems, the market, and the state. Although Sendero feeds and works off local disputes, its general framework and strategies involve a global evaluation of national and regional tendencies. This gives Sendero strategic and tactical advantages over their civilian adversaries and even the armed forces. This subversive strategy contrasts with the GSOs' work.

The impact of the programs is restricted; it works in an isolated world and the interpretation is rather localist... The critique and analysis are planted on a regional and national plain, but revisions of the proposals reveal a lacking of operative instruments to relate local actions with broader spheres (Gianotten and de Wit 1990: 244, 247).

One of the complaints of the centres once they woke up was that they could grasp the issues of violence and its repercussions, but it was impossible to bring their local partners (associates or beneficiaries) around to understanding them in the same way. The campesinos have been living with violence and SL for a decade now and have developed their own defenses and responses to the problem. For instance, some native communities in the Amazon prefer to confront insurgent groups alone because the presence of outsiders only complicates the situation. In extreme cases, we have the Ashaninkas of Junín department, who have practically declared a war against MRTA and Sendero in the zone, but also sweep up neighbouring native communities into the unrest.

"Each community has its different behaviour in the face of violence," says an Ayacucho centre director. "It acts to protect its members. Sometimes, it just vanishes when strangers approach."

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11 See Smith (1991) for a more detailed discussion of the local dynamics that allow Sendero to get a foothold in local communities.
During the 1970s and 1980s, centres paid a premium to those working with campesino communities, especially those in southern Peru that maintained their traditional structures. Because of the spiral of violence in the central and southern Andes and the increased awareness of the importance of rondas campesinas, there has been a marked increase in interest in working in the northern Andes. Today, there are about 40 centres in Cajamarca, compared to less than a dozen 2 years ago.

The rondas campesinas of Cajamarca and Piura are not a guarantee that Sendero will be turned back in the northern Sierra. Although they are one of the most impressive social groups to emerge in this century, they have their weaknesses. Rondas are a means of maintaining the viability of small property owners in rural areas. By organizing on a caserio basis and bringing rondas into broader organizations at a valley, district, or provincial level, they can combat cattle thievery and other threats more effectively without police protection. They have quickly evolved into a parallel justice system with communal government. Their broader mandate is to maintain communal equilibrium through consensual agreements within the ronda and with neighbouring rondas at district and provincial levels. However, the function of campesino justice, which takes place in the communal assemblies, also works to maintain internal equilibrium. Analysts have frequently cited the ronda as a buttress against Senderista encroachment, implying that its law enforcement functions combat guerrillas. My findings, however, point in another direction.

The ronda’s premium on internal cohesion keeps internal dissidents from referring to outside arbiters to achieve benefits. Sendero does not find the raw material and local breaches that allow inroads. However, in areas where the government or political parties interfere with rondas and take away their legitimacy as autonomous organizations (Cajabamba province in Cajamarca), then Sendero has a chance to exploit factional differences. This can be compared with the armed forces’ spotty performance with the use of "civil defense committees," modeled after those in Guatemala.

A case in point is the experience of a GSO in the Cajamarca area. It set up a program for distributing farm animals, seeds, and other goods among peasants to increase income options of peasant households. The centre left it up to each locality’s ronda to decide which family would receive each item. The rondas incorporated a non-technical criterion: how to maintain communal equilibrium.

A centre operating in the Ayacucho countryside found a similar situation. "We could probably build irrigation canals quicker and better if we had a cement mixer, but the machine is a symbol of power in Ayacucho," said the program director. A cement mixer is associated with government projects.

"Using fertilizers, herbicides, and insecticides, we could probably get potato yields of 18–20 tons per hectare, instead of the average of 2–2.5 tons in Ayacucho. But by using more modest technological levels, we get 8–10 tons." The campesinos are content with the higher yields and the program does not create a problem when the centre leaves and subsidized fertilizers are no longer available.

We may draw the conclusion that rural development programs must pay attention to the local dynamics of conflict and tension and cede more initiative to local
organizations in the allocation of resources. In addition, centres should find the means to allow broad-based organizations to intercede in the setting of goals and methods to avoid conflicts with communities that will not receive immediate benefits. For instance, if a district peasant federation is a co-sponsor of a marketing or production scheme for a specific project, it can explain to other communities that the project will eventually yield dividends for them, even though they are not participants. Marketing networks could be expanded or a pilot project in innovative farm techniques could be tested and made available.

"Sendero is the external auditor of centres' programs," says economist Javier Igüínez. "Only those with top quality will persist, and it doesn't matter if you carry a couple of pistols."

Several supervisors of development programs ask how much of the GSO funding actually gets down to the grassroots. As little as 20% of the funding goes to the local partners, say the most severe critiques. Although programs usually start out with modest budgets, the cost of maintaining a team in the field and making it functional increases as time goes on. This is covered up by the fact that program targets go up, but not as fast as costs.

This is a point that has been harshly criticized by Sendero for the past decade. It says that centres, their staffs, and others exploit the plight of the poor for their personal or institutional benefit. Centre staff rent the best housing in urban centres, ride in four-wheel-drive vehicles, and earn a salary (perhaps, pegged to the US dollar or indexed to inflation) above the average of the region. Working conditions and salaries may actually be better than those of most university graduates in Lima. They are certainly better than the local partners'. Under normal conditions, these disparities would be rationalized by the centre's rhetoric of serving grassroots organizations and the benefits from the programs. Under Peru's current conditions, centres look like enclaves of privilege.

On the hand, centre directors say that there is a distinction between programs in rural and urban areas. Rural programs tend to fit into the more austere methods required for working with peasant communities and organizations. Also centres with their operational roots in Lima or provincial capitals are naturally drawn toward research, investigation, and institutional consolidation.

In the most extreme manifestation of this elitist approach, some centre leaders go as far as to say, privately, that the centres are ends unto themselves; the donors should continue to support them because they are backing the national intelligentsia. The grassroots organizations are merely props for institution-building which is more important. This attitude contains a high degree of hubris and arrogance.

**Relations with Government and Political Parties**

When GSOs first appeared in rural areas in the 1960s and 1970s, the political landscape was clear: peasants, left-wing parties, and the GSOs on one side and the
government, ruling parties, and entrenched interests on the other. With the return to democracy, that situation has become more confusing. With the diversification of government through municipal and regional governments and parastate institutions, GSOs and grassroots organizations find that colleagues and associates have gained positions of administrative and political power.

Since the mid-1980s, there has also been an effort to make more efficient use of scarce resources by coordinating development work between GSOs and government or international agencies. This orientation was strong in the microregional approach in 1984–86. After the Fujimori shock package of August 1990, the government, donor agencies, and the Catholic Church called on the centres to assist in the social emergency program to provide relief aid to the underprivileged.

By cooperating too closely with the government, however, centres may come to be regarded as extensions of state services, or replacements for them. They may also lose their independence and capacity for criticism. The more connected they are to the state, the more exposed centres are to attack. Precisely, bilateral and multilateral programs have been high-risk targets for guerrillas because of their institutional contacts with the government and the high profile of large-scale projects.

In the regional and local setting, the gossip mill gives centres a reputation of using their resources for electoral purposes, instead of spending the last cent on helping campesinos. In comparison to the well-oiled campaigns of the major parties, this political use of resources may be insignificant. Typewriters and mimeographs may be used for election propaganda and communiques. Vehicles and gasoline may support election campaigns. Centre programs are used for party patronage: appointment of grassroots leaders to GSO staff positions to lock in their organizations, conditioning of participation on party allegiance, etc. The use of the prestige of directing a centre as a springboard to elected office is also cited. GSO directors can become local leading lights because they can become part of the local system, requiring frequent coordination meetings with prefects, subprefects, and other state functionaries. This kind of prestige can easily be translated into elected political positions.

In Peru, with hundreds of programs over the past three decades, there have been incidents of this nature. On the other hand, many of these charges are ungrounded and are part of the suspicion over the real motives for working in rural areas. It is only natural that GSO staff be drawn to political roles in the current situation. Working in rural Peru requires a high degree of motivation and dedication. The personal drive may come from religious or political conviction or from social awareness. Frequently, this political motivation can lead to seeking elected office.

A veteran GSO director says that the centres have three kinds of workers: the political virgins who do not want to accept the price of accepting a government job and compromising the work with campesinos; the political party activists who use the funding to support their outreach; and those accepting the explicit goals of the GSOs (campesinos, rural development, grassroots organization). "The yields of the third group outweigh the price of the first two," he adds.
Over the past decade, most centres have made a concerted effort to depoliticize themselves by freeing themselves of party influence, as stated. However, many have gone to the other extreme, turning into islands, concerned with the minutiae and means of development, but losing sight of the broader political issues and the need to forge political organizations (not necessarily party cells) to attain long-term goals.

Centres must also have clear guidelines about how and when staff may participate in politics. During the 1989–90 elections, several centre staff members ran for office, but they usually resigned or took leaves of absence from their centres.

**Program Financing Through Profit-Making Schemes**

A preoccupation of many GSOs and economists is the centres’ dependency on foreign financing. No project, except for a few tied to alpaca wool marketing, can get by on its own resources. Most are constantly begging resources. Removing international funding leaves two options, getting resources from local, regional, and national governments or self-financing through profit-making schemes.

The former means building up political alliances in the broadest sense of the word, to press for programs to continue. It means politicizing the projects so that broad sectors of the populace see their value. Some reform of municipal and regional governments would have to take place. It also poses the possibility that these programs could be seen as more state programs.

Self-sufficiency requiring a greater involvement in profit-making activities may also hold dangers. One of the themes of the past decade has been to help grassroots organizations insert themselves into the market more advantageously. Sendero has made clear that it will not tolerate capital accumulation in peasant communities. In Puno and Junín, it has opposed communal enterprises, an attempt to use peasant community resources and ways to increase economic viability. Another problem is that Peruvian economic policy has been so unstable that effective planning is impossible. Assisting peasants to embark on profit-making schemes can be a frustrating experience.

Attempting profit-making schemes means keeping a careful system of checks and balances, and complete openness must go hand in hand with organization building. Those responsible for management of funds must be fully accountable to local partners and prepared to spend long hours dispelling rumours about misappropriation.

**Meeting the New Challenges**

By late 1988, most GSOs in rural areas had put into effect a series of precautionary measures. Centres should concentrate their staffs, offices, and living quarters in province or department capitals. Staff should not stay overnight in the field or travel alone. Centres should give advance notice to local partners before going into the field for meetings, training sessions, or other events to make sure that there is no unusual activity in the area.
Most centres have also lowered their institutional profile. The GSOs must not parade their four-wheel-drive vehicles, their surplus of engineers and agronomists, and their well-financed projects. The GSOs are now thinking in terms of cultural and rescue/recovery programs of Andean technologies instead of selling technological packages imported from abroad. There is still a tendency to organize along paternalistic lines, but this method is also used for demands closer to the hearts of the campesinos.

Additional measures include prohibiting liquor on field trips and standing guard at night. All centres have ruled out the possibility of having police escorts (the government offered this option to several bilateral programs).

Meetings with local partners are more restricted. Promoters make sure they have detailed information about participants. The old idea of the more, the merrier has ended.

In addition, centres have also acquired new ways of orienting their policies. They call for the transfer of resources and programs to local partners and indirect management. This follows naturally from the reduced presence of the centres in the countryside. However, centre staff admit that efforts have been too brief and isolated to make a more systematic evaluation of progress in this direction.

Why does Sendero attack centres? They constitute platforms for development and organization. They are vulnerable, unarmed, and frequently unprepared for attacks. They may serve, in Sendero’s mind, as potential sources of intelligence for security forces. GSOs frequently occupy strategic zones through which Senderista columns pass or where they are setting up support bases. GSOs are normally not part of the local communities and more tolerated targets than residents. They are also are potential sources of booty for sharing among the local residents, through organized looting. GSO staff members frequently have political party affiliation and are, therefore, part of the system. Both GSOs and Sendero are competing for the same terrain — the fragile middle ground of institutions and organizations that have emerged over the past three decades or more. These organizations are possible rallying points for opposition to Sendero as well as catalysts for new means of bringing underprivileged groups into modern Peruvian society.

The centres have to differentiate between areas of risk and the types of programs and policies that they may carry out. Vicente Otta (1989: 29-32) makes three regional distinctions: emergency zones, zones of active violence, and rearguard zones.

**Emergency Zones**

Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Apurímac, Junín, Cerro de Pasco, and Huanuco are emergency zones. Belligerent forces set the pace and dynamics. The main objective should be to maintain the existing limited spaces and keep organizations from being demolished by fear and reprisals. Otta says that centres should increase technical-agrarian programs and broaden survival programs. Even what has been viewed as merely "asistencialismo" has value in keeping alive contacts and networks. Centres should increase contact with other institutions, like the church, universities, and
professional associations. Many of these regions need an independent presence, but centres should seriously think out their programs before entering them.

**Zones of Active Violence**

In these zones, which include Puno, Cusco, and Lima provinces (like Huacho, Paramonga, Cañete, Pisco, Chincha, and the Sierra of Lima), Centres should maintain a full presence taking advantage of Sendero's failure to maintain a permanent presence there. Centres should engage in an effort to differentiate ideologically and politically Sendero and other violence-prone groups from other options, says Otta. They should help other groups assume the clear position of rejecting Sendero.

**Rearguard Zones**

In Tumbes, Piura, Lambayeque, La Libertad, Tacna, Arequipa, Moquegua, Madre de Dios, Cajamarca, and Amazonas, Otta suggested that centres should contribute to broadening democratic spaces and encourage normal growth of civilian society. For instance, there has been an increase in the number of donor agencies and centres feeling out the possibility of working in Cajamarca under the mantle of ronda campesinas. This strategic shoring-up of the rearguard, however, will be in vain if centres repeat the same errors as elsewhere.

Beyond these broadly defined risk zones, there is still room for more distinction. The presence of belligerent forces can vary from province to province within a department, from district to district in a province. Some previously active areas may become quiet for extended periods, in effect, becoming staging areas or reserves where subversives may rest and recover their strength. The overriding factor is the importance of a district or province within the subversives' military strategy. Frequently, elements like concentration of population take a secondary role to other points such as geographic location as a link in communication. In the case of Sendero, its tactics seem to point to a strategy similar to the island hopping of the American armed forces in the Pacific theatre during World War II.

When a guerrilla group decides to upgrade its presence in a zone, it decides who is its principal enemy. MRTA rarely picks GSOs as enemies. Sendero may ignore them (as in Huamanga province, Ayacucho) or tum them into primary targets as in Puno or Junín.

A region can change overnight. During municipal and general elections, the number of guerrillas and security forces increases, increasing the potential for violence. Sendero has its own "revolutionary calendar" which punctuates cyclical campaigns with anniversaries. 12 It has also become almost a ritual for Sendero to launch a wave of

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12 March 2, the attack on the Ayacucho jail and the freeing of 200 inmates; April 19, the anniversary of the first graduating class from the military school; May 17, the first Senderista guerrilla action at Chuschi, Ayacucho; June 14, the birthday of José Carlos Mariátegui; June 18–19, the Lima prison uprising and massacre; September 3, the death of Edith Lagos; October 4, the day of the war prisoner; December 3, Abimael Guzmán's birthday and the founding of the People's Guerrilla Army. Because
attacks whenever a minister of the interior or defense tells the media that security forces have the guerrillas on the run. Guerrillas also take advantage of periods of government instability, like the post-economic package upheaval of September 1988. When guerrillas are inaugurating a new theatre of operations, they tend to be more ruthless. Security forces tend to be more aggressive when they are unveiling a "new counter-insurgency strategy." The period 1990–91 will be highly troubled because a new government will mean an all-out test of Peruvian resistance.

Some centres have been able to maintain programs in areas that are conflict-ridden. It has required a mental and methodological adjustment. It means taking a position that does not antagonize either side. There is an all-out war and the only way to intervene is to take arms against Sendero or the security forces because it is a question of who's the strongest. The experience of a rural development centre in the old emergency zone is illustrative of the narrow limits of action available for development work.

"If Sendero's rules do not go against your conscience, the regulations of the institution or the law, then, you can abide by them," says one centre director. Sendero has imposed rules on all outsiders working in the region.

1. No radio communication equipment.
2. No road improvements.
3. No support for political parties.
4. No projects specifically geared to selling in the market. Programs have to be aimed at self-consumption.
5. Programs should be aimed at the poorest campesinos.

The military rules require the following:

1. Reports on activities every 2 months. (Officers went to a site to measure how many metres of irrigation canals had actually been dug and fitted.)
2. Daily reports about the trips into the countryside from the base of operations. Usually, this requirement goes through a period of relaxation. Daily reports of "going to plant potatoes" get monotonous.
3. Reports on any treatment of bullet wounds and any encounters with guerrillas. Because the staff has never had to tend to a guerrilla, there has never been a report of this nature.

The same centre has internal rules for working in the emergency zone.

1. No one can be publicly active in a political party. Anyone in such a position should resign for his colleagues' sake.

Sendero is a clandestine organization that relies on unconventional means of communication, it uses fixed calendar dates to arrange timing. A regional or column commander must complete tasks in his battle plan before a specific date.
2. The centre complies with Sendero's armed strikes.
3. No foreign staff work in the project.
4. Outside visits are limited to 2 days.
5. No centre meeting has more than three people. Doors and windows are kept open at all times to avoid the appearance of secrecy.
6. People from the region are hired to carry out the project.
7. Financing comes from within the Catholic sphere. There may be exceptions to this rule, but the general thrust of the program allows the centre to explain and justify its work to local partners. The centre has turned down funding from the government and the opportunity to collaborate with government programs, i.e., agricultural credits and extension work.

In other areas, measures do not have to be so extreme. Indeed, the mandate is to take action to prevent situations from degenerating into the quagmire of the Ayacucho emergency zone.

However, it should be obvious that no matter what precautionary measures GSOs (or centres or other civilian institutions) take, Sendero or the security forces can brush them aside.
SECTION 5

CONCLUSIONS

This decade of growing violence has turned the country around on an "axis of war." To reverse the trend, institutions and individuals have to understand the new dynamics and urgencies. Trying to carry out rural development work with a business-as-usual attitude will end in frustration. This report tries to pull together a few conclusions that might assist Peruvians in this task.

1. Peru's 400 centres are no different from the rest of the country and the foreign counterparts playing a role in the country. The outburst of violence since 1980 has bewildered and shocked national elites. It has bled those unfortunate enough to be caught in the crossfire and has paralyzed institutions that should be leading the way out of the malaise.

2. Centres do not provide shock troops to be thrown into middle of the fray. Nor can they simply remain passive observers in the conflict. We should not overestimate their capacity to influence events and results.

3. Drawing on the Sur-Andino experience over the past two decades with elements from elsewhere in Peru, there are several key points that we should encourage in the shaping of a strategy for rural development in the face of political violence. Participants in rural development should aim to develop a regional approach, without losing sight of the national and international horizons. This regional approach should also allow interaction with individuals in all their varieties and nuances in Andean grassroots communities. It should lead toward the construction of superior levels of organization, helping them formulate their experiences and expectations and making them comprehensible to outside groups and institutions. Isolated grassroots organizations will not be able to resist the onslaught of violence.

Second, a logical outgrowth of a regional strategy is the need for coordination, communication, and pooling of information and experience. This also means being able to interlock projects and programs, so that there is feedback and less duplication of efforts. The coordination may be institutionalized or informal.

Third, retaining a capacity for moral, ethical, and intellectual criticism and self-criticism is imperative. This also implies the ability to give moral and political sanctions. This capacity guarantees the foresight, reaction, and flexibility to respond to new conditions. It also means a constant questioning of why the institutions and organizations are there, what they have to offer, and what they aim to achieve.

Fourth, a willingness to move and work in different terrains gives centres the chance to "take refuge" in other lines of activity when political violence restricts overt action. Centres and their local partners should work on practical and theoretical levels, tying in to technical, spiritual, political, and cultural facets. It means that centres and their local partners should learn by engaging in dialogue and constructive work with local, regional, and national governments, with political parties and interest groups. However, this effort should not
compromise their operational and institutional independence or commitment to giving an increasing voice and power to grassroots organizations.

Several experiences have shown that it is precisely in the "non-priority areas" that new lessons can be learned about popular practices of resistance. These collateral issues also give grassroots communities legitimacy to development programs because they address many of the most sensitive problems facing organizations.

A crucial pressure point is the relationship between grassroots organizations and support organizations, on one side, and government on the other. Should the social emergency program compromise GSOs' independence due to the need to make relief aid available to popular organizations? Should GSOs' enthusiasm for regional governments (frequently in the hands of Izquierda Unida) jeopardize future independence?

Fifth, organization should take priority over other more measurable targets. Proposals to use popular organizations as "cannon fodder" against subversives (civil defense committees) or other political adventures should be viewed with scepticism. The government can easily replace a fallen power pylon or a burned tractor. Grassroots organizations grow and mature over decades of sacrifice and effort, building up reserves of experience and leadership. This does not rule out the possibility that grassroots organizations choose to oppose the dynamics of violence. This means ceding a larger leadership role to grassroots organizations.

Not all these elements may be present in each zone or region, given the diversity and complexity of Peru. However, each has its peculiar features that can be linked together in a local strategy. Each has a key factor that can pull together organizations, as the land issue did in Puno or the rondas campesinas in Cajamarca.

4. Centres, coordinating groups, and national representatives should continue fighting against the temptation to militarize the country. This can only be accomplished by broadening the scope of activities that centres usually consider theirs. Coordination should not become a time-consuming, bureaucratic affair. Frequently, subregional coordination, if there are enough centres operating in an area, may be more helpful.

The painstaking work of coordination takes time, energy, and resources. Most institutions do not have the personnel or capacity to make this effort. Diverting staffers to coordinating tasks weakens programs. Regional research centres may be more appropriate for this task (see Padrón 1988: 62–65 for a more detailed discussion).

Donor agencies should provide funding to allow this activity. They should break out of their own institutional isolation and move toward pooling funding, resources, and regional approaches to maximize their use. In times of scarcity, these resources should be seen as seed money for high-risk ventures in social survival.

Although Gianotten and de Wit (1990: 249) are referring to rural development per se, their comments are pertinent to violence: "If the centre's actions are not linked with tasks of investigation, and vice versa, the centre becomes an assistentialist instance, despite the discourse... All innovation has a cost. The task of centres is diminishing the cost of innovations for the popular sector." In this case, the savings will be in lives and the viability of democratic institutions.
5. The search for conflict-free zones where GSOs can operate without violence is in vain. GSOs and other development agencies must start from the assumption that guerrillas or other components of the violence formula will also seek virgin territory. Shifting programs to areas where violence has not taken deep roots may be a simple excuse for continuing with the routines and repertoires of methodology and technological packets. GSOs may end up repeating the same mistakes that they have made over the previous two decades. A self-critical examination of programs and lines of action should lead to a realignment of GSOs' practices. They and other members of civilian society should try to build bulwarks against violence, starting with their own practices.

There is more potential for consensus at the regional level than on the national stage. This means setting up channels for dialogue and understanding, engaging local partners and outside groups in debate, and continual search for bearings in periods of crisis. Development work should be a prophylactic against the dynamics of violence.

6. GSOs that are not in the firing line should make a thorough evaluation of their programs and projects, their methods of working with local partners, and their goals. There is a dormant period of 2 to 5 years for Sendero to erupt into its virulent phase. Observers may not detect Sendero's presence because it is merely sounding out the territory, testing the ground for potential conflicts and recruits. It is all too easy to dismiss early signs (bombings, clandestine visits to schools) as rogue columns, copycat dissidents, or outside interference.

7. Programs that have high capital investment needs, high operating costs, and long maturity periods should be examined with care. Their cost and visible infrastructure make them power symbols and targets of political envy and sabotage.

Aseptically technical programs are going to be vulnerable because they have the most superficial roots scattered among communities and beneficiaries. They rarely have the political bearings to steer through troubled situations. From the example of the Allpachaka experimental station and its extension to other centres of abstract research, it should be clear that programs that cannot show practical and immediate relevance can come under attack, even in the more secure conditions of Lima. Established research facilities and living quarters for staff end up looking like enclaves of prosperity.

8. One key to confronting the challenge of political violence is promoting the local "beneficiaries" (passive recipients of programs and services) to full status as partners in rural development. This may mean readjusting the methods and goals of programs, blurring technical purity and goal-oriented approaches. It means devoting more effort and energy toward the slow, painful task of establishing lasting organizations and leadership.

"Projects with consolidated counterparts have more of a chance of continuing because the local communities can assume the leadership of the projects," says a development expert.

9. New priorities for aid and social organization emerge in situations of upheaval. The 10 years of expanding violence have set off a process of migration that will have as traumatic an effect as the mitimaes of the Incas, the reducciones of the Viceroy Francisco de Toledo, and the city-bound migration of 1960-80. This displacement of whole communities takes place in the adverse conditions of economic crisis, chronic underemployment, and political repression. In fact, it seems that this is a deliberate strategy employed by Sendero. It aims to heighten the
burden on the outmoded social structure and break down the makeshift safety net of the underprivileged.

The economic adjustment program of the Fujimori government is already stretching relief resources and GSOs to the maximum. The new shifts in population mean that new waves of needy will be demanding emergency services.

10. A fresh look should be taken at handouts and charity work, despite the serious criticism aimed at asistencialismo over the past three decades. Frequently, donations of medicine, food, and agricultural inputs or tools are one of the few means of maintaining contact with former participants in networks in emergency zones. Donations are the means of showing that someone still cares and of keeping whatever organizations exist in place. It maintains the personal commitment and trust that lie at the heart of effective development work. We have to find new, creative means to use these donations as levers for reversing the tide of violence, and not just preconditions for subservience.

An Ayacucho director says, "Direct assistance is messy. You've got to get your hands dirty, giving comfort and getting involved, making local people participate. We don't want to make professional beggars."

There are several unconventional kinds of groups that should be sought out in situations of political risk. These groups do not have all the paraphernalia of GSOs, but offer unique access to marginalized groups. They give high yield on allocated funds and involve local organizations. They are the kind of group that does not go knocking on the doors of donor agencies for funding. Both centres and donor agencies would be well-served by seeking them out. Donor agencies must actively seek them out through a profound knowledge of provincial networks.

11. There is a need for continuing study of political violence, its historical context, its social and political dynamics, and other facets. For instance, the military have blind spots, including poor use and pooling of intelligence. The issue of violence is too important to leave it in the military's hands.

There are several groups now studying it and coordinating their work: human rights groups and research centres like the Instituto de Defensa Legal, Democracia y Socialismo-Instituto de Política Popular, DESCO, Instituto Bartoleme de las Casas (Lima), and CEAPAZ. The ANC has set up a permanent commission on political violence and development. InterCentros has a task force.

The study of violence over the past decade has relied on a few specialists, tagged Senderologists and violentologists who have done the ground-breaking work. Journalists, anthropologists, and historians, combined with human rights advocates have followed the problem. Carlos Ivan Degregori (1990), Raúl González (1986), Nelson Manrique (1989), and Gustavo Gorriti (1990) have all made contributions. These investigators do so at personal risk because publishing their findings may provoke reprisals. The fact has also kept many individuals in provinces and shantytowns from contributing publicly because they could also be targets for reprisals and jeopardize their capacity to continue working.

The phase of individual studies has ended. The problem is too complex and intertwined
for individuals to have an effective impact. Just as counter-insurgency is too important to leave exclusively in the hands of the military, the issue of political violence is too vital to the country to leave in the hands of "Shining Pathologists and violentologists." These studies should be team efforts, coordinated to avoid duplication of efforts. It would also provide instances where front-line participants could add their experience without risk.

However, there is a danger of intellectualizing the problem, taking such a distant, cool perspective that it is hard to convert conclusions and recommendations into concrete action. This is where rural development centres and others can make a major contribution by drawing on their first-hand experience with grassroots organization to access peasant defense and resistance experiences through established partnerships of trust and to lower the discussion to a more pragmatic level.

There is a gaping hole in the response to what grassroots organizations are going through. Most proposals for peace, counter-insurgency policy, and other points tend to get lost in national issues and legal reform. They do not provide guidelines and explanations for those who are closest to the fighting.

12. GSOs and other development agencies will not advance toward achieving their goals unless there exists a medium-term horizon of stability and governance. The current situation of extreme economic upheaval and government instability imposes new priorities. GSO staffs have to grapple with the problem of matching funding with rising expenses. They have to adjust their programs to shifting realities. They have to deal with their own roles and institutional relations. The crisis throws the carefully laid survival strategies of grassroots organizations into the trash bin.

The key variables in this situation are the market and the Peruvian state. (Gianotten and de Wit 1990: 250) International assistance through governments, donor agencies, and multinational organizations can play a role in putting Peru on an even keel.

An important question is how Peru can respond to the macroeconomic demands of the crisis and still address the problems of Andean development. If a line of tension underlying the violence has been the rural–urban interface, then an attempt to force an urban–exterior logic on the entire country could have a detrimental effect on the Andes.

This macro policy issue also touches on other components in the violence equation, like the police, the armed forces, and the legal system. Only a medium-term effort to join civilian institutions and security forces in establishing mutually acceptable policies of pacification will provide a more viable framework for development work.

This does not mean that GSOs do not have a role at this juncture. In fact, there are many new challenges facing them in aiding their local partners.

13. It falls to donor agencies to keep these niches of civilian society viable. It may be a temptation to shut down shop for a while until the political and economic panorama clears up (fewer hassles in headquarters to justify expenditures on projects that are behind schedule and the moral qualms of placing staff members and local partners in risky situations). Unfortunately, when those donor agencies return to Peru, they may find that the enclaves (centres and grassroots organizations) are no longer viable.
However, this should not mean a perennial blank check for rural development centres or the prerequisite of accountability for projects and programs. Poorly conceived and executed projects should be sanctioned. There remains the problem of setting up clear, mutually acceptable, flexible criteria of efficiency and profitability for judging the performance and merits of development under these trying circumstances.

14. Peru's centres represent one of the independent spaces generated within Peruvian society in the past three decades. They have a degree of accountability to their donor agencies and grassroots associates. They have the opportunity to link theory and praxis in concrete situations. Their hands-on experience with grassroots organizations is an invaluable asset for the future.


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ACRONYMS

ACP, Acción Comunitaria del Peru
ANC, Asociación Nacional de Centros
AP, Acción Popular
APRA, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana
ARI, Alianza Revolucionario de Izquierda
CAEM, Centro de Altos Estudios Militares
CCC, Centro de Capacitación Campesina
CEDEP, Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Participación
CERABC, Centro de Estudios Rurales Andinos Bartolomé de las Casas
CICCA, Centro de Investigación y Capacitación Campesina
CICDA, Centro Internacional de Cooperación para el Desarrollo Agrícola
CICEP, Centro de Investigación Campesina y Educación Popular
CIDIAG, Centro de Información y Desarrollo Integral de Autogestión
CIDRA, Inter-Institutional Committee for Regional Development of Ayacucho
CIED, Centro de Investigación, Educación y Desarrollo
CIPCA, Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado
CRF, Rodrigo Franco Democratic Command
FADA, Federación Agraria Departamental de Ayacucho
FDN, Fundación para el Desarrollo Nacional
FMLN, Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional in El Salvador
FPL, Frente Patriótica de Liberación
FUCAM, Federación Unificada de Campesinos del Melgar
IBC, Instituto Bartolome de las Casas (Lima)
IDL, Instituto de Defensa Legal
IDMA, Instituto de Desarrollo del Medio Ambiente
IER, Instituto de Educación Rural
IERJMA, Instituto de Estudios Rurales José Maria Arguedas
IIADU, Instituto de Investigación y Apoyo al Desarrollo de Ucayalí
ILD, Instituto Libertad y Democracia
IPN, Instituto de Planificación Nacional
IU, Izquierda Unida
MIR, Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria
MRTA, Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru
PCP, Communist Party of Peru (Sendero Luminoso)
PIP, Policía de Investigación Peruana
PPC, Partido Popular Cristiano
PRATEC, Proyecto de Tecnologías Campesinas
PUM, Partido Unificado Mariateguista
SL, Sendero Luminoso (PCP)
UDP, Unidad Democrática Popular
UNSch, Universidad Nacional de San Cristobal de Huamanga
USAID, United States Agency for International Development