I. The research problem and focus:

In its August 2009 platform, Building Palestinian State Institutions, the government of Salam Fayyad has committed itself to continued modernization and professionalism of the Palestinian security sector based on the rule of law and oversight by the legislature and the judicial authorities. Since June 2007, the US, EU, and Canada, the major parties involved in the rebuilding of the PSF, have publicly committed themselves to SSR within the framework of rule of law and effective and democratic civilian oversight. Indeed, compared to the situation during the preceding nine years, the performance of the Palestinian security services has significantly improved.

But throughout the period of the project democratically-based security sector reform was lacking as it was being conducted without parliamentary oversight or effective and functioning judiciary; indeed it was conducted in a severely flawed rule of law environment. The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) was, and still remain, totally paralyzed and it remained unclear when a new parliament might be elected. Moreover, the constitutional division of powers and responsibilities in the security sector remained unclear. A clear institutional framework for managing the security forces was lacking. With a weak administrative capacity, the interior ministry, the main civilian body directly in charge of the security services, lacked the ability to devise adequate safeguards or exercise effective oversight. Above all of this, the single most important stakeholder, the Palestinian public, has been disregarded.

But in the context of the Arab Spring, public opinion could no longer be taken for granted. Failure to meet public expectations could fuel public anger and increase the demands for regime change. Therefore, our research focused on the evolving public perception and evaluation of, and expectations from, the security sector. The goal of the survey research has been to measure public perception of the security sector and to develop quantitative indicators that measure various aspects of SSR. Specifically, we sought to measure perception and develop indicators regarding the following areas:
(1) Public *assessment of the capacity* of the sector, not only in terms of ability to deliver security and enforcement of law and order, but also in terms of its capacity to deliver professional, not party- or factional-based services.

(2) Public perception of *service delivery*: Are people safer and more secure today? Who benefits most from the sector?

(3) Public *expectations* from the sector: what do people expect the various security services to deliver now and in the future? Will the services become more or less professional? Will they deliver more or less security to Palestinians? Will there be more or less repression? etc.

(4) *Evaluation of the performance* of the various elements of the security sector: what are the areas of success and areas of failure?

(5) Examination of *personal experiences* of people: here we examine exposure to crime, or being a victim. We then examine how people respond to crime. Do they complain to the police and if they do, how do they evaluate the performance of the police? If they do not complain, what are the reasons for that?

(6) Examination of the *justice system*: do people trust the courts? Do they use them? If yes, are they satisfied? If not, what are the reasons for that? How do people evaluate the ability of courts to enforce their decisions? Do security services help or hinder work of courts?

(7) Role of *outside actors*: what is the perception of the public regarding the role of outside actors like the EU, the various EU countries, the US, Canada, Jordan, and Egypt? If positive, what are the reasons for that, and if negative, why?

II. Project background and context:

Palestinian SSR gained momentum only in 2007. That momentum was generated by the Hamas’ violent take-over of the Gaza Strip. It allowed Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas to develop a game-plan that sought to restore conditions in the West Bank to the status quo ante before the eruption of the second intifada in September 2000. Essentially, this required him to disarm and disband Palestinian militias and assert his monopoly over coercive force on the one hand while reforming the security sector on the other. This however was not an easy job.

Background: After six years of the Palestinian second intifada, Palestinians were able to organize parliamentary elections. The immediate consequence of the 2006 elections, in which Hamas won a majority of the seats, had been further deterioration in internal conditions and the collapse of any hopes for immediate resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Once a Hamas government was in place, Israel stopped all revenue transfers to the PA. Fateh, now in the opposition, refused to join a coalition with Hamas before the latter agreed to come under the PLO umbrella and to accept all previous PLO agreements with Israel. Without international or Israeli engagement and with diplomatic isolation and financial sanctions, and with Fateh playing the role of the domestic
opposition, the Hamas government was unable to govern effectively or to deliver much of
the basic services the public came to expect from its government, most importantly the
enforcement of law and order.

Thus, while the Palestinian political system became more inclusive than ever, it also
became highly dysfunctional. Indeed, it also became highly divisive. Conditions on the
ground deteriorated almost immediately as Fateh did not take defeat easily. Fateh-Hamas
tensions were expressed in significant deterioration of law and order and an open
violence between the two groups leading to dozens of deaths particularly in the Gaza
Strip. In September 2006, with Fateh support, the public sector that has hardly been paid
since March went on strike. In the meanwhile, the Hamas government complained
bitterly of its inability to exercise any control over the security services. Hamas
demanded extensive reforms in and reorganization of the security services. When that did
not happen, the Hamas government established a new security service, the Executive
Force, which came under the direct control of the Hamas interior minister. Fateh and the
PA president declared the new force illegitimate. Tensions between the regular security
services, essentially under the control of the PA president, and the new force led to armed
clashes and deaths from the two sides.

Public complaint of anarchy and lawlessness and demand for national unity accelerated in
early 2007 with a Saudi initiative leading to the Mecca agreement of February 2007. The
agreement embodied a degree of moderation on the part of Hamas allowing Fateh to
agree to a power sharing arrangement, particularly in the security sector, and the
formation of a national unity government in March. The national unity government was
made up of the two largest political factions, Fateh and Hamas, as well as several smaller
ones. Since its establishment in 1994, this had been the first time that a broad nationalist-
Islamist coalition had come to rule the Palestinian Authority (PA).

With the US, Israel and most of the international community refusing to recognize and
engage the national unity government, Fateh was reluctant to implement the power-
sharing arrangement with Hamas in the security sector. Moreover, fragmentation within
Fateh and lack of accountability and civilian control over the security services further
complicated any genuine attempt to share power. In June 2007, encouraged by the state
of fragmentation and disrepair in the PA security sector, Hamas in Gaza organized a
violent coup against Abbas and Fateh and took full control of the Gaza Strip. PA security
forces in the Gaza Strip crumbled and surrendered their arms to Hamas. By ending
Abbas’s PA control over the Gaza Strip, the Hamas’s coup in June 2007 has further
diminished the ability of the Palestinians to unify their security services or begin a serious
process of SSR that would apply to both areas.

Context: As indicated above, the government of Salam Fayyad committed itself in 2009
to continued modernization and professionalization of the Palestinian security sector
based on the rule of law and oversight by the legislature and the judicial authorities. Yet,
the political context for this reform, extending up to the end of 2012, was daunting.
Palestinian SSR had to contend with the challenges posed by two serious problems:
Hamas’s use of force to solve its political problems leading to a split in the PA and the
lack of progress in the peace process in the aftermath of the formation of a right wing
government in Israel led by Benjamin Netanyahu. The rivalry between Fateh and Hamas
dominated and shaped the environment in which SSR took place. Indeed, that rivalry
focused on the question of who would control Palestinian security services. With Fateh dominating the various security services in the West Bank, it could curtail Hamas’s power in that area and weaken its ability to win the next elections or pose a threat to Israel. It goes without saying that in the Gaza Strip, Hamas sought to assert its own dominance using its own armed wing, al-Qassam Brigades, and the Executive Force to eliminate Fateh loyalists from active service.

To complicate matters further, Palestinian-Israeli negotiations which were stopped in early 2001 after the election of Sharon as Prime Minister did not resume until November 2007 in the context of the Annapolis peace process. By the end of that year, no agreement was reached. In early 2009, a right wing coalition was formed under the leadership of Netanyahu, head of the Likud Party, a man perceived by Palestinians to seek to consolidate Israeli occupation. In the absence of progress in the peace process, it was difficult to define the mission of the Palestinian security services in state-building terms. Indeed, Israel refused, on security grounds, to take any meaningful steps to end its daily incursions into areas controlled by Palestinian security forces, thus raising concerns in the public mind about the hidden agenda of the SSR. Furthermore, the rise of the right in Israel further complicated the process of SSR as Palestinians lost all faith in the ability of diplomacy to end Israeli occupation; demand for violence against Israeli occupation grew. Moreover, the failure of diplomacy to change daily life in the West Bank or to stop settlement activities and make progress in final status issues pushed Palestinians to pessimism about the future.

A further complication lied in the fact that President Abbas and the Fayyad government in the West Bank had to rely for training of Palestinian national forces on the US with training focusing in part on counterinsurgency missions targeting Hamas first and foremost with the underlying assumption of helping to strengthen Fateh. Palestinian public perception that for the US, Israel’s security takes precedence over security for Palestinians undermines confidence in the legitimacy of the security services trained and organized by the US.

For several years before the conduct of the security sector surveys, PSR has been tracking public perception of safety and security. By the time we started the current surveys, results indicated significant improvement with about 63% in December 2009 indicating that they feel safe and secure compared to only 25% four years ago. Nonetheless, other findings were not as encouraging. Among other things, PSR asked about the perception of the performance of the Palestinian security services and the willingness of people to report complaints to police if they became victims of crime. We sought to understand the motivation of those who did not report complaints, and the how those who did, evaluate the performance of the security services and police. The results encouraged further research focusing on those who have been victims of crime and those who come into direct contact with the security services.

The overall purpose of the project has been to promote a more accountable SSR and support decision-making in this area by providing empirical and evidence-based data and conclusions essential for the formulation of a government strategy that translates this policy goal into concrete steps to enhance reforms of the Palestinian security sector. We sought to promote citizen-focused security and policing through democratic civilian oversight of the security sector reform. Our point of departure has been that for security
sector reform to be meaningful, it must be debated and approved by democratically elected bodies and that the security institutions, the Palestinian Security Forces (PSF), undertaking and undergoing such reform, must be accountable to these elected civilian bodies. Such public accountability helps to provide legitimacy to the SSR and the whole security sector.

III. Research Findings:

The results of each survey are summarized into a single index: Palestinian Security Sector Index (PSSI). PSSI is made up of 15 main indicators. Each main indicator is calculated based on the scores of several sub-indicators. The score of each sub-indicator is calculated based on the results of a survey question. The total number of the sub-indicators is 171. The sample is representative of adult population of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. An additional sample represents those who have had an experience with the security services or justice system. The main score for the index in the first wave stood at .51, the second at .53, and the third at .51.

The following table shows the scores for the main indicators in the three waves of surveys.
Five particular findings are worth noting:

1. Findings clearly show a positive correlation (as the amount of one variable goes up, the level of another variable goes up as well) between the level of public satisfaction with and evaluation of the security sector with the level of political commitment and financial investment. Specifically, public perception of the security sector is significantly more positive in those geographic areas, such as Jenin and the whole northern area of the West Bank.

2. Public perception of the capacity and professionalism of the Palestinian Security services (PSS) is rated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave 1</th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th>Wave 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>WB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Public perception of the capacity and professionalism of the Palestinian Security services (PSS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Public evaluation of PSS performance</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Future expectations about the role and capacity of the various security services</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The direction of change in the role and performance of the security services</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Trust in the security establishment and its individual components</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Existence of corruption in the PSS and its role in fighting it</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Evaluation of external players including role in training</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Knowledge of the missions and tasks of various security services,</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Political dimension: relations with Israel as it related to PSS national mission, state building, and security coordination</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The political dimension PSS national internal state building mission</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Personal experience and the evaluation of the role of the security sector in enforcing law and protecting public freedoms</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Personal experience and the evaluation of the role of the security sector in fighting crime</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Perception of personal safety and security</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Public evaluation of the system of justice and the functioning of the courts</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Perceptions of prevailing levels of freedoms, accountability, and human rights</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bank, that have seen significant political commitment and financial investment on the part of the Palestinian Authority, Israel, and the donor community, than in all other areas in central and southern West Bank, where much less investment was committed. For obvious political reasons, e.g., settlements' geographic distribution, parties involved in the security sector are unwilling or unable to invest equally in all areas of the West Bank.

(2) A positive correlation was also found between public satisfaction with the security sector and public evaluation of the overall status of freedoms and liberties: in this regard, satisfaction with the security sector is significantly higher in the West Bank, under the Fayyad government, than in the Gaza Strip, under the Hamas government.

(3) A negative correlation (as the amount of one variable goes up, the level of another variable goes down) was found between "exposure" to the security sector and satisfaction with that sector. In other words, those who can be called "victims" tend to have a very high negative perception and evaluation of the security sector. It is worth noting that victimhood in our surveys applies to political and non-political cases.

(4) Not all security services receive the same rating from the public: civil police and National Security Forces (i.e., army) tend to have more positive evaluation than those in intelligence/preventive security.

(5) Finally, public evaluation of the sector's capabilities does not necessarily determine perception of the sector's performance. Indeed, in the Palestinian case, the public tends to give higher rating to performance and lower rating to capacity. This should be seen as a positive outcome as it indicates that the public does not view capacity as a threat; to the contrary, it might indicate that greater capacity would be welcomed.

IV. Project implementation and management:

Project Activities:

The project sought to achieve its objectives through a series of activities. These included a process of consultation, data collection, one baseline survey and two follow up surveys, data analysis, policy papers, and meetings and workshops to disseminate findings and discuss recommendations.

1) Consultation workshops and meetings: In the first six months of the project life, PSR had consulted with various Palestinian stakeholders-- the ministry of interior, the security services, the judiciary, members of parliament, human rights organizations, and various donors supporting the security sector. This process took the form of a dozen of workshops conducted mostly at PSR. Other workshops and meetings were organized at the request of PSR in the premises of the various stakeholders; most the security services and the Ministry of Interior. In formulating the survey instrument, PSR worked closely with all stakeholders, particularly the Strategic Planning Department at the Ministry of Interior. The feedback we received from those consultations and meetings were highly beneficial for the development and refinement of the survey instrument, the selection of the indicators, and the development of dissemination strategy.
2) **Data collection**: Using existing survey research findings, PSR collected existing data on public perception of various aspects of the security sector gathered during the past decade. The data, when existing, allowed us to formulate similar questions that allowed easy comparison between current and previous findings. Similarly, PSR collected data on on-going SSR programs and related activities underway in West Bank in order to help design specifically targeted questions and indicators in the various areas of the Palestinian security sector.

3) **Surveys and Indicators**: During the month of April 2011, PSR conducted its first baseline survey, which was the first of the series of three planned surveys. The data collected during the first baseline survey, enabled us to further develop the scoring system and the list of indicators. A first report providing an extensive list of indicators, scores, with various focus, i.e., West Bank-Gaza and victims-non victims was shared with various stakeholders. [A follow up survey was conducted during the month of September 2011 with funding from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.] Data collected during this survey enabled us to compare the scores, and to be able to measure and assess the change of those scores over the period of six months.

The base line and follow up surveys were conducted in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including East Jerusalem (WBGS) among a representative sample of adults, over the age of 18 years old. The interviews were conducted inside the home in face-to-face interviews. The numbers of population areas where the interviews were conducted were 120 with 10 interviews conducted in each area. All 16 districts in the WBGS were covered and the sampling of the various locations (urban, rural, and refugee camps) were always proportionate to size in Palestine. Our sample was gender sensitive and balanced (50% males vs. 50% females). Two target groups were represented in our sample: (1) a representative sample of the whole population in the Palestinian territories (1200 individuals) and (2) an additional representative sample of people who were victimized during a period of about one year before the conduct of each survey. For the additional sample, five interviews were conducted in each of the 120 population locations among a sub-sample of the population, those most exposed to interaction with the security sector, i.e., victims. Overall, the total number of the sample was 1200 and the additional number of interviews was 600, with a grand total of 1800.

PSR conducted its second and third IDRC funded survey in March-April and in September-October 2012. While our first two surveys were conducted during the "Arab Spring," our third survey in early 2012 was be able to measure changes that might have be generated by the Palestinian UN bid. This gave us the chance to assess the impact of this development on public perception of the political role the security sector, particularly in relation to Israel and the non-violent resistance movement.

For all surveys, raw data was transformed into scores for the various indicators. As indicated earlier, PSR indicators were developed in full consultation with the various stake holders with focus, naturally, of those indicators on those elements of SSR that can be best determined and measured in public opinion surveys. PSR scoring system had a list of fifteen indicators:

1. Public perception of the capacity and professionalism of the Palestinian Security services (PSS),
2. Public evaluation of PSS performance,
3. Future expectations about the role and capacity of the various security services,
4. The direction of change in the role and performance of the security services,
5. Trust in the security establishment and its individual components, and
6. Existence of corruption in the PSS and its role in fighting it
7. Evaluation of external players including role in training, personal experience including political dimensions,
8. Knowledge of the missions and tasks of various security services,
9. The political dimension: relations with Israel as it related to PSS national mission, state building, and security coordination,
10. The political dimension PSS national internal state building mission
11. Personal experience and the evaluation of the role of the security sector in enforcing law and protecting public freedoms
12. Personal experience and the evaluation of the role of the security sector in fighting crime
13. Perception of personal safety and security,
14. Public evaluation of the system of justice and the functioning of the courts,
15. Perceptions of prevailing levels of freedoms, accountability, and human rights

4) Policy papers: One short policy paper, along with a power point presentation and dozens of tables containing summaries of main findings, were drafted and circulated after the conduct of the baseline survey. A revised policy draft was circulated after the conduct of the first follow up survey. The same draft was further revised after the conduct of the third survey, See link below. Updated tables of findings per indicator and sub-indicators were also circulated, see links below. A fourth policy paper is currently in circulation and will be posted on PSR website soon. All papers contain a summary of methods, goals, findings, description of context and developments prior to the conduct of the surveys, and a list of recommendations.

It should be noted that due to the fact that all PSR’s reports and policy papers were revised after each survey, it made no sense to print copies of these reports. Instead, electronic copies were prepared and updated three times during the project life. Here is a list of all electronic files posted on PSR website:

[Arabic version of website:]

- مقياس قطاع الأمن ونظام العدالة 2010–2012
  - استعراض نتائج مقياس قطاع الأمن ونظام العدالة
    http://www.pepsr.org/arabic/domestic/policypapers/review.pdf
  - علامات مقياس قطاع الأمن ونظام العدالة حسب مناطق وموضوعات مختارة
  - علامات مؤشرات أسريق قطاع الأمن ونظام العدالة عند بعض قطاعات غزّة فوق طاع
The following table summarizes the various activities under the SSR project.

**Activity Timeline:**

The following table summarizes the various activities under the SSR project.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| October 2010 – March 2011  | • **PSR Consultation workshops**: brainstorming sessions aiming at exploring the various issues of Palestinian security sector reform agenda and issues of concern. All targeted stakeholders were invited.  
• **Stakeholders’ workshops and meetings**: various sessions, interviews, and meetings with interested groups and parties in their premises to explore their concerns and security sector challenges as they perceive them.  
• **Data collection**: Collection of information of previous data on public perception as it related to the proposed focus of the surveys. Similarly data was collected on the various aspects of on-going reforms and activities in the security sector. |
| April 2011- September 2011 | • **Conduct of the baseline survey**: a representative sample of 1800 households divided into 1200 individuals representing society and 600 representing victims.  
• **Development of a system of indicators and scores**: development of a detailed methodology for a scoring system  
• **Policy paper**: drafting and circulation of first draft of PSSI policy paper  
• **Meetings and brainstorming sessions**: findings were discussed with various stakeholders in more than a dozen meetings inside and outside PSR. |
### V. Project output and dissemination:

In addition to the surveys, two products were made public: (1) a policy paper in four various stages of developments, including various continuously updated power point presentation and (2) detailed tables and charts of findings showing the output from the various waves of surveys. A dissemination strategy was developed in close coordination with various stakeholders. The strategy envisaged workshops at PSR as well as the premises of the stakeholders. Various drafts of the policy paper were presented for discussion and a power point presentation allowed a detailed look at findings. All output and dissemination activities were carried out in four phases, with each focusing on the most recent findings while comparing current results to previous waves.

The dissemination strategy focused on reaching out to top policy makers in the government, particularly the Interior Ministry, the security services, the diplomatic community, think tanks and human rights organizations, etc. Early drafts of findings and policy papers were emailed to a list of stakeholders and updated versions were posted on PSR website. Input from all groups was incorporated into our updated questionnaire,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Summaries of findings: dozens of tables exploring main finding with various focus on areas and special groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 2011-March 2012</td>
<td><strong>Conduct of the first follow up survey:</strong> a representative sample of 1800 households divided into 1200 individuals representing society and 600 representing victims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Policy paper:</strong> revising a policy draft taking into account findings of the follow up survey; circulation of second draft of PSSI policy paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Meetings and brainstorming sessions:</strong> findings were discussed with various stakeholders in five meetings at PSR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Summaries of findings:</strong> dozens of revised tables exploring main finding of the two surveys with various focus on areas and special groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2012-September 2012</td>
<td><strong>Conduct of a second follow up survey:</strong> a representative sample of 1800 households divided into 1200 individuals representing society and 600 representing victims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Policy paper:</strong> revising a policy draft taking into account findings of the two follow up surveys; circulation of third draft of PSSI policy paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Meetings and brainstorming sessions:</strong> findings were discussed with various stakeholders in a dozen meetings at PSR and two major meetings at the premises of the Ministry of Interior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2012-December 2012</td>
<td><strong>Conduct of the third follow up survey:</strong> a representative sample of 1800 households divided into 1200 individuals representing society and 600 representing victims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Policy paper:</strong> revising a policy draft taking into account findings of the three follow up surveys; circulation of a third draft of PSSI policy paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Meetings and brainstorming sessions:</strong> findings were discussed with various stakeholders in two meetings at PSR. Other meetings are planned for the first quarter of 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Summaries of findings:</strong> dozens of revised tables exploring main finding of all three waves of surveys with various focus on areas and special groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Summaries of findings: dozens of revised tables exploring main finding of all four waves of surveys with various focus on areas and special groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
requests for detailed breakdown of findings were received from our various interlocutors. PSR made available whole sets of detailed findings to all those who requested them, most prominently the various security services.

When opportunities allowed, findings were also discussed in face to face meetings or shared with interested regional security and political leaders. Feedback from these meetings was normally shared with Palestinian stakeholders.

VI. Impact:

The project’s main goal of making Palestinian security sector reform more accountable guided PSR’s research and dissemination strategy. PSR sought to have an impact on policy debate, formulation, and planning. To achieve this goal, project findings were debated with senior official in the security sector and with other critical sectors and players. The feedback we have received throughout the period of the project was highly encouraging. Our interlocutors found the findings highly relevant to their own work. They were quick to make conclusions regarding their own plans and conduct. Indeed, we were told that our findings were widely discussed in their institutions. The fact that our findings were empirical and quantitative was highly appreciated by both policy makers and practitioners alike. They were quick to notice and appreciate areas of progress and success as well as areas of shortcomings and failures. Our recommendations were seen as relevant and practical. Overall, by providing empirical and evidence-based data and conclusions, we believe that our work has made policy makers and commanders of security services more sensitive to the findings and nuances our research has highlighted.

Needless to say, the project helped PSR improve its ability to engage Palestinian and non-Palestinian policy makers particularly in the security sector area. With dozens of meetings with various actors in the security sector, PSR enriched its capacity, through the training of its researchers, to conduct relevant research and ask policy oriented questions. Furthermore, the project contributed to enhancing PSR’s ability to develop quantitative political indicators, particularly in areas of the security sector not normally covered in PSR’s survey work. The project provided our researchers the ability to learn and teach others on how to transform data into quantitative indicators that are sensitive to change, useful to research, and relevant to policy making.

We believe that our research effectiveness was attained because (1) we obtained the cooperation of all stakeholders in the consultation process particularly in the design of the survey instruments and the debate over policy matters and options; (2) we developed survey instruments able to measure all the various indicators related to SSR under examination (3) we conducted surveys on the ground both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with only few rejections, about 10%; (4) we successfully translated raw data into easy to understand scores for the various aspects of SSR; (5) we managed to integrate findings in policy oriented reports; and finally, (6) we succeeded in communicating our findings to stakeholders in support of evidence-based policy making.
VII. Recommendations:

PSR’s recommends continuation of security sector survey research in the Palestinian areas. Indeed, we think it is feasible and desirable to apply the same methodology to similar work in the Arab World. Duplicating PSR work in several Arab countries would allow this work to take a regional dimension that would help improve our ability to understand the direction of SSR in the region by looking at it from the public perspective. A regional approach would also help us test and evaluate public reaction to "good practices" in the security sector in the whole region.

PSR success in engaging a wide variety of stakeholders encourage us to believe that a similar initiative can be conducted in other Arab countries, particularly those that have gone through a process of change resulting from the Arab Spring. Duplicating the work in other Arab countries would also provide an opportunity to build greater capacity in those countries to conduct policy relevant survey research. With the experience gained by PSR in this project, it would be feasible to conduct such capacity building. In this case, PSR researchers would train few researchers in each partner centers to conduct research.