Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence

By Robert Muggah

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Preface

In 2007, the world became a predominantly urban society. Across the world, an estimated three quarters of economic production takes place in cities. Urbanization brings with it possibilities of improved access to jobs, goods and services for poor people in developing countries and beyond as globalization trends connect cities world-wide.

However, urbanization has also brought new challenges in terms of conflict, violence and urban governance – and citizen security in particular. The World Bank’s landmark 2011 World Development Report highlighted the significance of violence as a development problem. Its work noted how violence is changing, becoming less structured around notions of civil war and conflict, and more focused around criminal violence, terrorism and civil unrest. The impacts of violence on human development are significant and varied. As Stergios Skaperdas has documented, they include direct costs such as death and injury, destruction to public infrastructure, personal property and assets, as well as indirect costs like psychological trauma, population displacement, the disruption of social services, reduced economic growth, brain drain and increased spending on law enforcement.

What is clear is that violence has emerged as one of the central development challenges of our time. Virtually all fragile states have experienced repeated episodes of violence, and the large majority of the world’s poorest people live in states affected by violence – over 1.5 billion people. As the 2011 World Development Report has underscored, the close relationship between violence and poverty is reflected in this stark fact: no low-income fragile or conflict-affected state has yet to achieve a single Millennium Development Goal.

Today’s cities are centres of multi-layered violence. Criminal and organized violence, associated with the drug trade in some countries have become entwined with national politics. Gangs and militias have come to substitute for public authority, offering some protection to communities, but often at great cost. Social violence, including violence within the household, is also a significant problem, particularly for vulnerable youth and women living in these environments.

In response to these challenges, Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) have launched Safe and Inclusive Cities. This collaborative research initiative is aimed at generating an evidence base on the connections between urban violence, inequalities and poverty and on identifying the most effective strategies for addressing these challenges. The present study marks the first step in this endeavour, and has served to inform the design and scope of the Safe and Inclusive Cities research initiative.
Towards this end, the study set out to achieve four objectives:

1. Document what is known about the connections between violence, inequalities and poverty in urban centres and assess the strength of the knowledge base. Particular focus was given to assessing evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia;

2. Describe the state of theory on violence, urbanization and poverty reduction, and assess the extent to which they interact, and whether emerging evidence actually informs theoretical debates and assumptions guiding work in these fields;

3. Identify key evidence gaps that require further investigation; and

4. Map out key actors (researchers and research organizations) that are producing knowledge on these issues.

The outcome is a study that promotes an integrated and comprehensive approach to tackling the challenges posed by rapid urbanization, escalating violence, and increased poverty and inequalities.

This study represents a starting point for further investigation and action, and has helped to shape a research agenda that IDRC and DFID are committed to advancing so that together, and with other stakeholders, solutions to the central development challenges of today can tomorrow be realized.

I would like to thank Robert Muggah for undertaking this challenging endeavour. I am also grateful to Markus Gottsbacher, Navsharan Singh, Ramata Thioune, Njeri Karuru, Véronique McKinnon and Charlotte Heath for their constructive input and feedback, as well as to the numerous experts who provided valuable input through key informant interviews.

John de Boer  
Program Leader  
Governance, Security and Justice  
International Development Research Centre  
Ottawa, Canada
Dr. Robert Muggah is a Professor at the Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, the Research Director of the Igarape Institute, and a Principal of the SecDev Group - a Canadian company with a mission to engage issues of insecurity and development. He is also a Research Associate at the Center for Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) (Switzerland) and a senior advisor to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations (UN). Between 2000 and 2010 he was the Research Director of the Small Arms Survey and lectured at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland.

For almost two decades Dr. Muggah has lead or conducted applied research on themes of security promotion, governance and development. He has worked with multilateral and bilateral agencies in over twenty countries including in Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, Nepal, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Sri Lanka, Togo, Uganda, Sudan, and Timor-Leste. He currently oversees several projects on urban violence, stabilization and humanitarian action. Specifically, he coordinates the "Humanitarian Action in Situations Other than War," "States of Fragility" and "Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence" projects which feature research in Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and the South Pacific.

Executive Summary

Introducing the urban dilemma

The world recently entered an unprecedented period of urbanization. Just 600 urban centers now generate roughly 60 per cent of global GDP. Most urban growth, however, is occurring not in wealthy settings but rather in the expanding cities and slums of developing countries. Many of the fastest growing metropolises are also witnessing a sharp escalation in the incidence and severity of various forms of urban violence, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa, though other urban centers in South and Central Asia are increasingly affected. Concerns registered by security and aid experts alike are the ways in which the urban poor are directly and indirectly implicated in such violence, and the wider consequences of violence in cities for national and regional stability and development more generally.

There is a comparatively wide-ranging engagement with issues of urbanization, urban poverty and urban violence by social scientists. Indeed, much has been written on the scale and distribution of urban growth as well as the character of urban impoverishment and inequality. There also appears to be considerable scholarship on the real and perceived costs and consequences of urban violence across an array of low- and medium-income settings. But much of the research and debate continues to be segmented and compartmentalized within certain disciplines and geographic settings. There are also major silences in relation to the interaction between urban poverty and urban violence and, in particular, the effectiveness of interventions designed to mitigate and reduce insecurity in medium- and lower-income cities.

Notwithstanding these gaps, policy makers across the security and development domains are starting to engage more proactively with the “urban dilemma”. The dilemma is exemplified by the paradoxical effects of urbanization in the twenty first century: as a force for unparalleled development on the one hand, and as a risk for insecurity amongst the urban poor on the other. While the research base on this urban dilemma has only recently started being built, development specialists have long been confounded by the double-edged character of urbanization. Moreover, increasing numbers of military and law enforcement specialists are seized by the implications of dilemma, convinced as they are that “fragile” cities and their urban peripheries constitute likely sites for the future wars of the current century.

The growing preoccupation with the urban dilemma amongst diplomats, development and defense sectors is not, however, matched with commensurate investment in research. The 2011 World Development Report usefully pointed out how multilateral and bilateral agencies are drilling down on the two-way relationships between poverty and insecurity. But the Report had little to say about these associations at the metropolitan or city level: the socio-spatial dimension was missing altogether. A recurring challenge is the poor state of the underlying data which frustrates empirical measurement and testing. Agencies such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations and the World Bank continue to privilege
national over municipal statistical datasets. The paucity of reliable subnational data and analysis limits theory-building and inhibits the design, implementation and monitoring of effective interventions.

Researching the urban dilemma

This paper issues a preliminary overview of the state of research on the urban dilemma. It was commissioned by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) with the intention of supporting an action-oriented research agenda in 2012 and beyond. It is based principally on a desk review of publicly available on-line and peer-reviewed literature in multiple languages. The paper is also informed by consultations with scholars and practitioners spanning diverse fields. Undertaken over a two month period (December 2011 to January 2012) the paper assembles competing and complimentary theories, evidence and practical examples on the complex relationships between urbanization, poverty and violence.

While preoccupying a wide range of disciplines and sectors, the research agenda on urbanization, urban poverty and urban violence can be grouped loosely into three camps consisting of “macro-level”, “micro-level” and “security-oriented” researchers. Each draws from an array of disciplinary perspectives and speaks to different epistemological, thematic and geographic concerns. The methodological approaches advanced by these three clusters vary from data-driven inter- and intra-city assessments to panel surveys and ethnographic studies of the lived experiences of the urban poor. Yet while many different scholars have taken up particular aspects of the debate their engagement with the specific relationships between urbanization, urban poverty and urban violence tends to be sporadic and inchoate.

The paper detects considerable heterogeneity in the theoretical underpinnings and terminology used to research the urban dilemma. Though central to hypothesis building and testing, conceptual parameters ascribed to basic concepts such as “cities” and “slums”, the “urban poor” and “urban violence” are diverse, ambiguous and vigorously contested. Several theories have emerged since the early twentieth century to explain variations in urban disorder and violence within and between cities and neighborhoods, with most rooted in the Western European and North American experience. The explanatory power of these constructs and their assumptions are being tested by contemporary trends, notably the rise of massive and globally interconnected cities and their slums in lower- and medium-income settings across Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and Asia. Likewise, the often simultaneous, overlapping and blurred character of urban violence is also forcing a rethinking of engagement strategies.

Reviewing impacts, risks and protective factors

There is a comparatively high level of agreement on the impacts and consequences of urban violence, whether in situations of armed conflict, post-conflict settings or chronic criminality. There is also overwhelming support for the idea that the urban poor suffer most from urban violence (in relation to other urban or rural population groups) even if the causal mechanisms connecting the two remain comparatively poorly understood and under-theorized. Scholars also agree that the effects of urban violence span generations and are reproduced across both time and space, though more research is recommended to assess the long-term effects on constraining individual, family and community exposure and relations. In spite of these areas of consensus, however, there is still continued debate over the ways in which different forms of urban violence interact.
Many researchers of the urban dilemma typically distinguish between “direct” forms of harm resulting in physical and psychological injury and more “indirect” manifestations affecting livelihoods and social relations. Building on these and other frameworks, the paper introduces a fivefold typology of impacts that radiate out from fatalities and non-fatal injuries which represent the tip of the iceberg, to urban displacement, deterioration of socio-economic welfare, the restructuring of social capital and cohesion and the transforming of systems of urban governance. A review across a number of literatures indicates how urban violence generates “cascading” and cumulative effects and in turn constrains the upward and outward socio-spatial and socio-economic mobility of the poor. Most experts consulted as part of this paper concede that the state of knowledge on impacts is substantial and growing.

By way of contrast, there is a lively debate concerning the specific risks and protective factors that are most influential in shaping the onset, duration and character of urban poverty and urban violence. While it is widely conceded that the more pernicious effects of urban violence appear to be concentrated in marginal settlements and amongst low-income families, there is considerable disagreement over why this is the case. The paper considers a number of widely discussed risk factors that shape urban violence in particular, notably urbanization, city density, poverty, inequality, the abundance of young unemployed males and associated youth bulges, conflict-related legacies, and governance failures. Many of these risk factors are believed by media pundits, policy makers and practitioners to be ineluctably connected to the onset and severity of urban violence even if they are not always supported by evidence.

Indeed, countries exhibiting rapid urban population growth are statistically more likely to experience violent conflict. Likewise, social and income inequalities, in particular, are highly correlated with differential rates of violence across and within cities, as compared to per capita income which does not have a clear effect. Legacies of armed conflict, political authoritarianism and repressive policing are also all routinely associated with the onset and persistence of urban violence. By way of contrast, there is less convincing evidence of the influence of urban density, poverty or of youth bulges in shaping urban violence. Indeed, there is some evidence that mid-sized cities – not large ones – tend to feature a higher susceptibility to violence. While densely populated and vertical cities appear to generate a range of negative consequences for the urban poor, violence is not necessarily always one of them.

Studies reviewed in this paper indicate that it is the aggregation of risk – i.e. the cumulative effects of multiple risks – that results in the greater likelihood and intensity of urban violence. Social disorganization theory, for example, predicts that many of the abovementioned risks are themselves aggravated by the socio-spatial characteristics of cities themselves, such as their heterogeneity, inability to absorb surplus low-skill labor, uneven provision of services and jarring inequalities. Cities also appear to play a role in influencing and shaping the gendered patterns of insecurity: the physical and social spaces of cities reflect the unequal gender relations of a society. The paper also shows that the “ecological model”, in particular, allows for assessing these multiple risks at different levels of analysis from the individual to the community levels.

What is less well studied, however, are the ways in which these risk factors are mutually reinforcing or not. There also appears to be relatively limited examination of how these risks impact on local forms of coping and
adaptation – what is referred to here as “urban resilience”. There is nevertheless a widely held assumption that the urban resilience and resistance of marginalized poor population groups can be strengthened or enhanced through purposive changes in the built and social environment. Such transformations, it is argued, can be induced by targeted urban renewal and regeneration, more inclusive and responsive urban governance, and sustained exposure to positive role models and modes of living. The signal role of local organizations and grassroots actors as well as informal mediation and grievance mechanisms in addressing urban violence is an area that merits greater attention.

The paper reveals grey areas in the social science and practitioner literatures where more research is urgently needed. While the evidence base is slowly growing, there is still a dearth of applied research on the urban dilemma across most low-income settings in developing countries. Instead, scholarly assessments tend to be stove-piped within particular disciplines and sustained funding for longitudinal investigation is limited. While there is moderate engagement with the issues of urbanization, urban poverty and urban violence in Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, there is less information available on these issues from Southeastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, Southeast Asia or the South Pacific – even though populations there are growing rapidly. In some ways, this uneven treatment reflects the relative gravity accorded to the urban dilemma by policy makers and researchers in the Americas and to a lesser extent Africa and Asia. More investigation is undoubtedly required to determine if the apparent research deficits in other parts of the world are a function of selection biases in the preparation of this report.

**Investing in evaluation**

The paper considers a wide menu of policy and programming responses developed over time to convincingly engage with the urban dilemma. Strategies range from “hard” (coercive) to “soft” (voluntary) in orientation, however the most effective interventions appear to envision qualified repression and socio-economic support as complementary rather than competing objectives. The paper reviews a small sample of the more prominent types of interventions introduced to resolve the urban dilemma including pacification and community policing, targeted investments in at-risk population groups, support for social cohesion, urban renewal and gentrification, slum upgrading and investments in urban governance. It finds that certain forms of pacification and slum upgrading interventions in particular have yielded positive gains and that more narrowly constructed law and order actions and employment schemes produce less certain outcomes.

Even so, the evidence base for what works and what does not is extremely thin. Many interventions, while laden with theoretical assumptions about the relationships between urbanization, urban poverty and urban violence, have yet to be tested. With the exception of public health interventions subjected to controlled study, there are few evaluations of what works and what does not. The paucity of time-series data and local analysis capacities in many low-income settings has also limited the ability of policy makers and practitioners to distinguish “successful” outcomes from those that are not. The unintended consequences of interventions to mitigate urban violence are seldom adequately interrogated. Led by institutions such as UN-Habitat, urban planners, development specialists and social workers are only now beginning to discriminate good practice from bad.
The generation of solid research on the urban dilemma is not an “academic” issue. Solid data and analysis is vital to countering the prevailing bias in many cities that urban security is necessarily a function of the urban poor. Elites often ascribe urban disorder to “gangs”, unemployed “youth”, and “overcrowded” slums while side-stepping political, social and economic failures in relation to governance, planning and inclusive citizenship. Indeed, research on the political economy of the urban dilemma is sorely lacking. Even so, assessments of evaluated practice reveal that a combination of visionary political leadership, proactive community involvement, and routine evidence-collection are critical preconditions for resolving the urban dilemma. Harnessing local capacities, identifying political “moments of opportunity” and ensuring adequate and predictable financing are also seen as critical. Virtually all experts agree that when states overprescribe violence or lose the ability to manage and monopolize it, the potential for violence will likely escalate.
Introduction

The world’s population is rapidly urbanizing. The signs are inescapable. In the early 1800s, roughly three percent of the world’s population lived in cities. Today the proportion is well over half, and in the next fifty years will increase to two thirds. In 2011 there were 480 cities with populations exceeding one million as compared to just 80 in 1950. More than three billion people currently reside in urban centers and this figure is expected to rise to five billion by 2050. Perhaps most striking is the fact that virtually all population growth in the coming decades will occur in low- and middle-income settings. Global population growth is overwhelmingly concentrated in marginal urban and surrounding periphery contexts, especially slums.¹

Particularly in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, but also in North America and across South and Central Asia, certain cities and their neighborhoods are convulsed by, and in some cases exporting, endemic violence. It is widely believed that rapid urbanization, the marginalization and exclusion of specific groups, and the inability or unwillingness of federal and municipal-level governments to absorb them is contributing to a rise in organized forms of urban violence. Metropolitan authorities in upper, middle and lower-income cities routinely attribute urban insecurity to the urban poor, and in particular to the failure of their integration. Deftly side-stepping the systemic exclusion and deprivation that are endemic in slums, urban elites regularly resort to military and policing responses to what are visible failures of governance and socio-economic inclusion.

The preoccupation with urbanization, urban violence and urban poverty is not new. Cities have been a locus of violent revolution and popular unrest, as well as sites of pacification and social control.² Impoverished urban residents – whether residing inside or outside the city gates – have always been targeted as the sources of lawlessness and disorder. During the middle ages, for example, municipal authorities tried to “civilize” and tame street violence with draconian punishments and neighborhood renewal schemes. In the present era, city and town planners and civic leaders address urban violence and poverty in surprisingly common ways. It is less the methods or “social technologies” of control than the sheer scale and intensity of urban misery that has changed.³

¹ See UN (2010, 2008) and UNFPA (2007).
² See, for example, Huntington (1969) and Vautravers (2010). Kalyvas (2004) is more wary, however, of what he and others have described as an “urban bias” in the study of civil war that extends back centuries. Correspondence with Kalyvas, January 2012.
³ A widely cited, even if dystopian, account of the “coming anarchy” implicating the urban poor is Kaplan (1994). As he notes in his breathless introduction, “[T]he cities of West Africa at night are some of the unsafest places in the world. Streets are unlit; the police often lack gasoline for their vehicles; armed burglars, carjackers, and muggers proliferate”.


Notwithstanding centuries of experience managing urban violence at the center and periphery, the record of city authorities is a mixed one. This is partly due to the extraordinary heterogeneity and diversity of cities themselves. On the one side, some cities are evolving into complex global networks of accumulation, innovation and transformation, offering an exit from poverty to tens if not hundreds of millions of people. They serve as de facto enclaves of protection from “without” and sites of pacification from “within”. On the other side are a growing number of sprawling cities and intermediate towns in Latin America, the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa that exhibit advanced forms of fragility, with the poorest residents especially vulnerable. Whether rich or poor, however, it is worth recalling that virtually all metropolitan centers feature “no-go zones” and “hot spots” that challenge the legitimacy of governments and the formal institutions of governance.

This paper contends that development policy makers, practitioners and researchers confront a dilemma in low- and medium-income urban settings affected by chronic violence. As noted above, cities can be a site of safety, resilience and opportunity. An estimated three quarters of global economic production occurs within them. They often have characteristics – predictable service delivery, economic productivity and dense networks of reciprocity – that can accelerate pro-poor growth. Yet at the same time, cities are also frequently home to extreme forms of insecurity, inequality, and squalid poverty. In extreme scenarios, organized urban violence threatens political, economic and social stability. Entire neighborhoods may succumb to non-state armed groups and hybrid governance arrangements that compete with, or supplant, local governments. There are fears that in some cases fragile and failing cities can “tip” from zones of criminality to outright warfare and trigger national and even international intervention.

A small number of multilateral and bilateral development agencies are preoccupied with the dilemma and are re-appraising the relationships between violence and poverty in cities. Although approaching the topic from distinct ideological and institutional perspectives, they often pose common questions. How is urban violence – whether in war, post-war or criminalized settings – affecting relief and development? What are the key risk factors or stresses – whether rapid urbanization, densely populated slums, poverty or inequality – that shape urban violence? What strategies exist to prevent and reduce urban violence and is there any evidence of success? Do such interventions reinforce or undermine the legitimacy and capabilities of governments and how can the security of citizens be ensured and their voices heard? And then there is the counterfactual – why are some cities less predisposed to violence than others? As this paper will show, the answers to these questions are seldom straightforward.

This concept paper sets out a preliminary research agenda to understand and mitigate the effects of urban violence on the poor. Divided into seven parts, the opening section briefly reviews the methodology employed in this review. The next section considers some of the ways in which social scientists have conceived urbanization, urban violence and urban poverty and the relationships between them. The third section reviews the state of the debate on key concepts and theories. Section four introduces a framework to consider the

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5 See Muggah with Savage (2012) and the Humanitarian Action in Situations Other than War (HASOW) project at www.hasow.org.
7 This was the topic of UN-Habitat (2008), for example.
differentiated impacts of urban violence on poorer and more marginal populations. Section five focuses on known risks and drivers of urban violence onset and duration. The sixth section considers various forms of resilience and resistance employed by urban residents – and in particularly the poor – to urban violence. The final section issues a typology of interventions to mitigate, contain and reduce urban violence, many of which draw on insights from the theoretical contributions cited in earlier parts of the concept note. The paper also features a series of annexes, including some key research questions, examples of how theoretical approaches have informed practice, a list of interviews, relevant websites, and an extensive list of references to help guide future research into the urban dilemma.
There is a lively international debate on the “positive” role and influence of cities in global development.\textsuperscript{8} Indeed, a relatively small number of urban areas are recognized as economic giants. Today, just 600 cities account for 60 per cent of global GDP. And the membership of this group is changing. Whereas more than half of these cities are currently located in North America and Western Europe, over the next twenty years there will be a much higher representation from South and East Asia and Latin America.\textsuperscript{9} While urbanization trends are shifting “eastwards”, there are also a wide range of mid-size or intermediate cities (in some cases on route to becoming mega cities) from across the “south” which are making sizeable contributions to global growth. Amidst the breathless treatment of massive urban expansion, the “dark side” or urbanization is less often discussed by leaders of capital or politics. While there is a considerable, if scattered, literature on the contradictions generated by run-away urbanization, urban poverty and urban violence, it is seldom assembled together or examined as a whole.\textsuperscript{10} Nevertheless, a small number of research and donor organizations have started to invest in better understanding various aspects of urbanization, urban poverty and urban violence.\textsuperscript{11} Indeed, this particular paper is an expression of this growing engagement. It was prepared precisely to support a far-reaching call for research proposals to be issued by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) with funding from the UK Department for International Development (DfID) in 2012. The paper is intended to provide a general overview of the diverse literatures engaged with the three aforementioned themes and, it is hoped, inform future research priorities. More specifically, it distils theoretical insights, empirical findings and emerging trends on what is referred to hereafter as the “urban dilemma.” It is also informed by historical and contemporary research findings and the views and experiences of selected experts. Taken together, the paper represents a preliminary exploratory study.

The paper is organized according to terms of reference (ToR) elaborated by IDRC and DfID and is shaped by an extensive consultation and peer-review process.\textsuperscript{12} The original ToR featured several overlapping research priorities, each with a range of accompanying sub-questions.\textsuperscript{13} Following discussions with IDRC and DfID, the

\textsuperscript{8} See, for example, Webster and Burke (2012), DFID (2010), Roy (2009), Van de Pluijmm and Melissen (2007), and the New Scientist (2006) among others.


\textsuperscript{10} See, for example, World Bank (2010), Davis (2007), Davis (2006a, 2006b), Moser (2006) and Winton (2004), among others.

\textsuperscript{11} Notable among them are DFID (since 2000), the Brookings Institution (since 2004), the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the World Bank.

\textsuperscript{12} The ToR was six pages long and refined on several occasions in late November and early December 2011. A first draft of the paper was submitted on 30 December 2011. Six pages of comments from IDRC and DfID were received on 13 January 2012. A final version of the paper was submitted on 30 January 2011 and additional comments and revisions were requested on 6 February 2012. The paper was vetted by two independent experts in early February 2012.

\textsuperscript{13} Specifically, these were: 1) What are the most important drivers of urban violence and the policy implications for poverty reduction?; 2) What are the most effective interventions to tackle the problems of urban violence and urban poverty?; 3) What conditions facilitate
ToR were subsequently refined by the author into the present iteration of the paper and accompanying annexes. It should be highlighted that one motivating factor that precipitated interest in the urban dilemma were the findings of the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report. To this end, the paper was expected to generate a set of research questions in relation to conflict, crime and violence. Since the 2011 World Development Report has comparatively little to say on issues of urban poverty or urban violence per se, this paper can be seen as the starting point of such a dialogue.

Following agreement on its overall structure, the author proposed a mixed methods approach to preparing the paper. Time and resource constraints ensured that a desk review approach was pursued. To this end, the author drew from existing published and grey material as well as extensive personal and internet-based consultation with policy makers, practitioners and scholars. The author also reached out to young academics to accumulate unpublished yet cutting-edge research across a number of networks. IDRC and DfID were particularly interested in ensuring a degree of substantive input from “southern” experts, particularly key informants from low- and middle-income settings affected by fragility and instability. Moreover, it was anticipated that outreach would be pursued in English, French, Portuguese and Spanish. The author elaborated an interview schedule (see Annex 3) and a shortlist of research institutions (see Annex 4) that reflected nodes of expertise in Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia in particular. These are also areas that are acutely affected by the urban dilemma, though the absence of research from other regions reveals certain (recognized) limitations in the methodology.

A host of keywords and terms were introduced in various search engines and online scholarly networks to identify past and current published and secondary material related to the urban dilemma. The online review considered search terms such as “urban violence”, “urban security”, “urban war”, “urban crime”, “urban poverty”, “urban inequality”, “urban resilience”, “urbanization”, “urban density”, “urban governance”, “urban pacification”, “urban stabilization”, and many others (in multiple languages). Widely recognized engines such as JSTOR, PLOS, Mendeley, SSRN and others were consulted. Likewise, specialist peer-review, online journals and a wider range of practitioner-oriented and unpublished material were examined, including French, Portuguese and Spanish articles, with a small number of editors consulted to review the state of literature in their fields. Owing to the request for such a far-reaching assessment, the paper invariably suffers from selection biases—historical, linguistic, geographic and disciplinary.

the development of effective policies and promote security of the poor in urban centers affected by conflict and crime?; and 4) How do different state and non-state responses to urban violence and conflict impact the legitimacy and accountability of public authorities and what are their policy implications?

14 A separate set of principles and a proposed structural outline were provided by the author in early December 2011, following a request from IDRC and DfID.
15 See http://www.jstor.org/.
16 See http://www.plos.org/.
17 See www.mendeley.com/.
The author also generated a short-list of specialists working on aspects of the urban dilemma for direct consultation. A selection of quantitative and qualitative researchers was consulted on the basis of their expertise in urbanization, urban poverty or urban violence – or some combination across these themes. It rapidly emerged that there are comparatively few scholars with expertise across all three areas – indeed, many made it very clear in the course of interviews that they were not specialists in other areas even if expressing curiosity and interest. A semi-structure interview schedule was prepared and set of six questions were asked of each respondent.\(^\text{21}\) Occasionally interviews were held in person (wherever the author happened to be in the months of December 2012 and January 2012, whether Brazil, Canada, Switzerland or the US). More commonly interviews were held by Skype or through email correspondence. A preliminary list of interviewees is included in Annex 3 but it should be noted that a wider range of scholars and practitioners were consulted on aspects of the urban dilemma over the course of seminars and other work.

It is worth noting that preliminary drafts of the paper were also tested in a variety of fora and with specialists in urban violence. For example, some key findings from the paper were presented at a workshop organized by the Humanitarian Action in Situations Other than War (HASOW) project in December 2011 in Rio de Janeiro. There, experts from Colombia, Haiti and Mexico were assembled to review “tipping points” from situations of chronic violence to armed conflict.\(^\text{22}\) Likewise, an early version of the paper was summarized at a seminar on “New and Old Wars” held by Tufts University in January 2012.\(^\text{23}\) Moreover, the author tested out some of the basic concepts and theories in a short paper entitled Urban Violence and Humanitarian Action: Engaging the Fragile City to generate debate and feedback on core concepts. The paper was circulated in the Journal of Humanitarian Assistance\(^\text{24}\) to a wide constituency ranging from humanitarian field workers, scholars and researchers, government officials and residents of countries affected by crises and disasters, and donor agency officials.

As signaled above, there are inevitably a number of trade-offs when preparing a wide-ranging literature review. Specifically, the *timing* of the paper generated two challenges. First, the paper was undertaken over a *two month* period in late 2011 and early 2012.\(^\text{25}\) Surveying a massive literature spanning virtually the entirety of the social sciences (and dipping into the natural sciences) and distilling “key theories”, “areas of convergence and divergence”, “practical examples” and “research gaps” presents a host of obstacles. Indeed, this required reviewing disparate literatures, consulting with diverse specialists, identifying and divining linkages, and rendering them to external scrutiny. Second, the paper was undertaken during the months of December and January, precisely the time when most policy makers, practitioners and scholars were offline and less amenable to constructive communication and dialogue. The timing of the paper, then, inevitably affected response rates and the exhaustiveness of the analysis that follows.

\(^{21}\) The questions were: 1) How would you typologize urban violence?; 2) What are the key factors in your opinion that shape the onset, duration and lethality of urban violence, especially in low income settings?; 3) Are the urban poor more or less affected by urban violence?; 4) What strategies work in preventing and/or reducing urban violence?; 5) Any key research gaps in relation to urbanization, urban violence and urban poverty that you feel need answering in (setting x)?; and 6) Finally, have you come across any exceptional southern-based researchers working on issues of urban violence and urban poverty?

\(^{22}\) The proceedings of the HASOW workshop are available online at www.hasow.org and on request from the author.

\(^{23}\) The author presented preliminary findings to assembled experts from North America and the United Kingdom and integrated comments. The author submitted a blog summarizing key findings to the World Peace Foundation in January 2012.

\(^{24}\) See http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/1524.

\(^{25}\) The full paper was prepared by the author over a two month period between early December 2011 and early February 2012.
The “city” constitutes a novel and challenging referent for international policy makers and scholars. Preoccupied as they are with managing affairs between states, diplomats and their advisors have paid less attention to the “urban” setting even though its real and potential influence on global governance and diplomacy is considerable.\textsuperscript{26} Although urbanization trends shaping fragile cities and their peripheries are increasingly correlated with “new” and transformative forms of organized violence, global security and development responses have been slower to engage. As noted by Stanley (2003), the “urban scale, as a site for the resolution of international social conflicts, ethno-national conflicts, and inter-state war” is problematic. Nevertheless, the city is forcing its way onto international security and development agendas. The apparent fragility and failure of some urban centers over the past two decades in particular has sharpened the focus of military and development specialists on cities as critical areas of engagement.

Notwithstanding growing appreciation and even apprehension of “fragile cities”\textsuperscript{27}, development specialists have yet to fully grasp the relationships between urbanization, urban violence and urban poverty. Instead, cities are often cast dichotomously as angels or demons – alternately serving as \textit{engines} of employment and economic growth or as \textit{drains} on agricultural productivity and rural livelihoods. Since the 1970s, for example, some experts have singled out a donor bias favoring urban (as opposed to rural) poverty reduction strategies.\textsuperscript{28} Other specialists contend that the opposite has occurred and that national poverty reduction strategies routinely neglect cities and urban poverty.\textsuperscript{29} Missing from this debate, however, has been any serious treatment of urban safety and security. Although UN-Habitat initiated a modest work stream on safer

\textsuperscript{26} Some international relations scholars have recently started to examine the city in relation to global governance, however. See Amen et al (2011) and Van der Pluym and Melissen (2007). See also the recent headlines from CNN – “Could Big Cities Lead the Fight Against Climate Change?” – as an example of this new optimism (Maguire 2011).

\textsuperscript{27} See Hills (2009, 2004).

\textsuperscript{28} See Lipton (1977, 1984, 2005).

\textsuperscript{29} See Jones and Corbridge (2009) and Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2004).
cities during the mid-1990s, only comparatively recently have entities such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the World Bank started wading into the discussion. Notwithstanding the OECD Secretary General Angel Gurria’s claim that “everything is happening in the cities”30, the organization continues to be biased towards the connections between states, poverty and fragility.31

With some notable exceptions32, the research communities concerned with the urban dilemma have also come late to the table. This is partly because the issue is dispersed across academic disciplines, even if instances of collaboration occur. Many scholars have taken up particular aspects of the debate, among them anthropologists, architects, behavioral analysts, criminologists, demographers, geographers, political scientists, sociologists and urban planners, to name a few. But the engagement with the relationships between urbanization, urban poverty and urban violence has been sporadic and inchoate. An example of its limited treatment in mainstream development discourse emerges from the 2011 World Development Report which devotes but a single paragraph to urban violence. Notwithstanding the Report’s convincing review of the pernicious effects of organized violence on development and economic growth, it nevertheless considers urban violence only in relation to “national” state institutions and in contexts of civil war.33 Although scholars are increasingly giving these issues more attention, there are also indications that the dilemma is assuming ever greater saliency in policy circles.34

Much of the past and ongoing research on urbanization, urban violence and urban poverty is compartmentalized and segmented amongst discrete epistemic communities. Although there are examples of productive cross-fertilization across disciplines and amongst groups of scholars, such collaboration and cooperation is more often the exception than the rule. The desk review and interviews undertaken in preparation of this paper revealed instances of nascent partnerships that span disciplines – and some of these have expanded into productive policy- and research-oriented networks (see Annexes 3 and 4). To be sure, a small number of social science researchers are beginning to collate and appraise quantitative and qualitative patterns and trends in urbanization, urban poverty, and urban violence in low- and medium-income settings.35 Others are consciously drawing on mixed methods approaches to understand the dynamics of urban “resilience” – the capacity of formal and informal institutions to cope and adapt – in situations of chronic and acute violence.36 There is also a gradual accumulation of case studies on the historical and political economy of specific cities and their informal nodes of authority and their varied experiences of urban violence.37

32 See also the Cities and Fragile States project of LSE at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/Research/cafs.aspx and the Manchester “urban tipping point” project at http://www.urbantippingpoint.org/about/news/newsitemthree.htm.
33 For a critique of the 2011 WDR, consult Jones and Rodgers (2011).
34 Interviews and correspondence with Gary Milante (World Bank), Alys Willmann (World Bank), Tobias Nussbaum (CIDA), Elkin Vasquez (UN-Habitat), and Rachel Locke (USAID) between November 2011 and February 2012.
35 See Marc et al (2010).
36 See, for example, the work of the urban resilience in situations of chronic violence project (www.urbanresilience.org) and the recent outputs of the associated MIT/USAID project on the same theme. See also Bosher (2008).
37 See, for example, Esser (2004), Jota (2011), Ismail (2009), Renders and Terlindien (2010), Vetters (2007), and many others.
Social scientists preoccupied with particular aspects of urbanization, urban violence and urban poverty can be broadly divided into two camps: macro- and micro-level analysts. Macro-level researchers tend to be focused on generating and scrutinizing datasets, tracking general trends and predicting and anticipating the consequences of urbanization or population density on armed conflict or criminal violence onset, duration and severity. While the bulk of research tends to be undertaken in upper-income settings, some macro-level researchers also interrogate the underlying structural drivers of urban violence in lower- and middle-income settings. Regardless of their geographic focus, virtually all of them draw on quantitative methods. By way of contrast, micro-level researchers are preoccupied with interpreting the many dimensions of urban violence in relation to the lived experiences of urban dwellers. They often review historical and cultural trajectories of urban violence and interrogate the experiences, perceptions, attitudes and inter-generational, spatial and underlying structural conditions shaping urban violence in single cases. Discussed in more detail below, micro-researchers often resort to more qualitative and inductive methodologies.

Although there are some exceptions, macro-level researchers include amongst their ranks criminologists, demographers, epidemiologists, economists, political scientists and other quantitative social scientists that for the most part draw on large administrative or event-based databases and cross-sectional surveys to identify trends and correlations across time and space. They tend to manipulate statistical datasets featuring information on populations, urbanization, population density, cities, conflict deaths, and homicidal violence. Some of these researchers are also involved in designing and implementing cross-national and national or city-level surveys to assess victimization trends, including in and between cities affected by or emerging from armed conflict. In cooperation with architects, urban planners and geographers, some have also started applying similar approaches, geo- coding administrative and survey-based data to assess spatial trends.

Meanwhile, micro-level researchers include historians, urban geographers, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists and others who draw more intensively from field-based assessments to infer relationships and patterns within single case studies. These researchers typically develop and assess the findings from small

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38 There has been a recent growth in repositories of administrative statistics on city populations and characteristics that are being supported and circulated by international institutions and networks.
41 See esa.un.org/unpd/wup/index.htm.
42 See wu2.unhabitat.org/programmes/guo/guo_databases.asp.
43 See, for example, http://www.citypopulation.de/cities.html.
44 See, for example, http://www.citymayors.com/statistics/.
45 See, for example, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/.
48 See http://www.microconflict.eu/.
49 See, for example, www.urbanresilience.org and the MIT/USAID assessments in eight cities which use, in many cases, survey-based techniques.
50 See, for example, http://spacesyntax.com and www.acleddata.org.
51 See Bollens (2007) who provides a thoughtful review of comparative research on “contested” cities.
surveys of a cohort or cross-section of urban dwellers.\textsuperscript{52} In some cases such approaches have been extended to displaced populations living in “protracted” refugee circumstances.\textsuperscript{53} In other cases, they may undertake participatory forms of research with a representative sample of city residents.\textsuperscript{54} There are also micro-researchers who have undertaken long-term ethnographic studies of the lived experiences of perpetrators or victims of urban violence, or alternately, examined the social morphology of cities and neighborhood over time.\textsuperscript{55} Other recently deployed techniques include the use of diaries to review the distinct gendered experiences of urban violence among male and female residents.\textsuperscript{56}

Alongside macro- and micro-level research is a more activist and critical literature that engages with urban \textit{security}, urban spaces and urban governance. Its proponents are alarmed by the progressive securitization of cities and their populations in upper- and lower-income settings alike. They challenge reified discourses accompanying the so-called “global war on terror” and the progressive expansion of technologies of surveillance and urban control. Comprised primarily of urban planners, geographers and sociologists, these researchers are critiquing the ascendance of quasi-military solutions deployed by some governments to what they describe as essentially challenges of urban welfare and social integration.\textsuperscript{57} Led by Neil Smith (1996), they have initiated a critique of neoliberal “revanchist cities” wherein local authorities and elites reconceive local resistance as “urban disorder” and introduce zero-tolerance policing as a response.\textsuperscript{58} Moreover, they draw attention to the often violent erasure of slums and informal settlements under the guise of development and efforts by public authorities to “take back” the city.

Even a cursory review of these literatures reveals that there are many opportunities for supplementary analytical and field-based research on the linkages between urbanization, urban violence and urban poverty. As the following sections show, many of the basic assumptions underpinning both policy and academic assessments are shaky and untested. Research could fill knowledge gaps in relation to theory, while also directly informing policy and programming. For example, more investment in applied field research, and in particular household survey data collection, could facilitate better intra-city, inter-household and intra-household disaggregation.\textsuperscript{59} Likewise, incident-monitoring and passive surveillance could also help to better understand the temporal and spatial dynamics of urban violence. An innovative example of such approaches

\textsuperscript{52} An excellent example of a longitudinal panel survey is the work of Janice Perlman and Tim Campbell and the “R-Rio Study” which examined the life histories of 750 households in three low-income communities in Rio de Janeiro between 1968-1969, 1999 and 2001. Nearly 40 per cent of the original sample was re-interviewed in 1999, with an additional cohort added in 2001. Another example is the recent work of Rodgers and O’Neill on so-called “infrastructural violence” which explores the relationships between state-led infrastructure development and various forms and modes of violence on the poor. See Perlman (2005).

\textsuperscript{53} See, for example, http://sites.tufts.edu/feinstein/2012/developing-a-profiling-methodology-for-displaced-people-in-urban-areas.

\textsuperscript{54} See, for example, Moser (2006, 2005, 2004), Moser and Holland (1997), Muggah and Banerjee (2002), Muggah and Moser-Puangsawan (2003), and Muggah and Lebrun (2005).

\textsuperscript{55} See, for example, Goldstein (2004) and Rodgers (2009).

\textsuperscript{56} See, for example, the work of Paula Meth in South Africa. In particular, she has undertaken research in 2002 on women and domestic violence using diaries with women living in poor housing environments. She expanded this to men in 2006, in combination with a mixed methods approach. Her projects have focused on the male experience of violence while challenging the problematic assumptions of men as exclusive perpetrators. See http://www.shef.ac.uk/trp/staff/paula_meth/research.

\textsuperscript{57} See, for example, Graham (2009, 2005) and Koongings and Kruijft (2007).

\textsuperscript{58} See Slater (2008) for a review of “revanchist” cities.

\textsuperscript{59} A number of experts consulted in the preparation of this report highlighted the importance of generating more robust household survey data in selected cities. Better time-series datasets could allow for comparisons and ultimately, evaluation of interventions.
includes the Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset (ACLED). ACLED plots the incidence of violence in relation to distances (in kilometers) from the capital city to demonstrate how political forms of violence are geographically concentrated (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1: Spatial distribution of “violence” events in selected African countries**

![Figure 1: Spatial distribution of “violence” events in selected African countries](image)

Source: Raleigh (2011)^60

The paucity of reliable time-series data on urban violence and the urban poor not only limits theory-building, but it also inhibits the design, implementation and monitoring of interventions to reign in urban violence. Especially in low-income settings experiencing armed conflict or emerging from war, there is an absence of even the most rudimentary information on who the poor are, their numbers, and where they are living. Even where there exists a will and capacity to promote urban safety – whether through proximity policing, targeted youth programs, slum upgrading, or infrastructure renewal – rendering an assessment of their costs and benefits or value for money is frustrated by the absence of deep contextual and longitudinal data. Investment in local and national data collection capacities, as well as strengthening the ability of local authorities to manipulate and analyze it, is crucial.

Innovative mapping tools related to Geographic Information Systems (GIS), Geographic Positioning Systems (GPS), and poverty mapping are increasingly important, if still nascent and under-exploited. More positively, new information and social media technologies are heralding what has been termed the “politics of witnessing” and being used to report on sexual violence in Cairo^61, exposure to insecurity in Port-au-Prince^62, and election violence in Nairobi. A growing number of researchers are starting to rely on crowd sourcing^64

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^60 Courtesy of Clonadh Raleigh – unpublished material from ACLED.
^62 See http://blog.palantir.com/2010/04/05/haiti-effective-recovery-through-analysis/.
and other social networking tools to gather data, though their biases in relation to trends in urban (or other forms of) violence have yet to be tested. A critical need for the research community, then, is to find ways of ensuring that such data is regularly and reliably collected, managed and shared across disciplines.

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65 Interview with Heather Blanchard, Director of Crisis Commons, December 2011. See http://crisiscommons.org/.
Section 2
Concepts and Theories

The unprecedented pace of urbanization of the global population and its implications for security and development are raising concerns from the local to the international levels. In a world comprised of nation states, it is worth recalling that more than half the population today resides in cities. The latest projections indicate that this proportion will rise to almost three quarters by 2050, or 5 billion people. While rapid population growth on its own generates opportunities and stresses in any socio-economic context, it is important to signal that the majority of future growth will be concentrated in southern cities and their sprawling slums, townships and shanty-towns. Owing to the ways urbanization, urban violence, and urban poverty are presumed to interact, the security and development establishments in industrializing countries are starting to obsess about the city and the implications for national and international peace and security.66

Paradoxically, the focus on the “fragile city” is occurring during an unprecedented decline in armed conflicts worldwide. Research groups such as the Center for Systemic Peace67, the Correlates of War68 and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program69 are reporting secular declines in major forms of inter- and intra-state conflict since the 1990s. Others are detecting a concomitant expansion in other forms of organized violence associated with networked armed groups.70 Alert to these shifts and mindful of recent ventures in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, certain militaries are re-evaluating the ways in which tomorrow’s wars will be waged. Some defense analysts are convinced that “future wars” will be fought not on open battle fields but rather in streets and alleys. Development experts too are wary of the how poverty and inequality is increasingly urbanized. Both security and development experts share concerns that many cities are increasingly unable to absorb fast rising

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66 Examples of these existential anxieties can be found in recent publications of UN-Habitat, for example.
67 See http://www.systemicpeace.org/.
68 See http://www.correlatesofwar.org/.
69 See http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/.
70 See, for example, Krause et al (2011) and Hewitt et al (2012). Note that Hewitt et al (2012: 25) suggest that the number of active conflicts in the world has remained comparatively stable since 1990 – with dramatic decreases from 28 to 20 between 1990 and 2004, but a slow increase since then.
populations and that particular geographic spaces – namely slums – are becoming densely populated pockets of inequity and deprivation. The international commitment to reducing poverty in slums and other types of informal settlements, including as part of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), are as clear an index as any of their concern.71

Yet in spite of growing awareness of the urban dilemma, there are surprisingly few theoretical or analytical efforts to bring its separate threads together. Research has increased rapidly over the past decade, though outputs are only gradually filtering out from academia to wider audiences.72 Some of these writings are being described as the “new economic geography” and draw explicitly from multiple disciplines, including most prominently from political economy and urban planning. Owing in part to the slow penetration of research on urbanization, urban poverty and urban violence, however, there are fears that more positivist neo-Malthusian assumptions are hardening. A common narrative amongst politicians is that the rapid growth of cities is resulting in a chaotic and unsustainable outlay of slums. It is argued that in such settings ethnic tensions, overcrowding and competition for scarce resources combined with weak or predatory security forces necessarily gives rise to complex forms of political, economic and social violence.73 Recent media reporting on “violence-plagued” Karachi or “Nairobbery”, for example, strongly reproduce such perceptions.74

Macro- and micro-level social scientists and practitioners consulted as part of the preparation of this paper repeatedly cautioned against these and other stylized arguments (see Annex 3). They contend, correctly, that all-encompassing and universalizing prescriptions can do more harm than good. They insist on evidence-based approaches to addressing urban violence that account instead for the heterogeneity of urban experiences rather than misleading all-encompassing narratives. While in some settings urban insecurity and distinct patterns of impoverishment are highly visible, there is nothing certain or inevitable about violence in urban settings.75 Fast-growing megacities such as Beijing and Calcutta, while numbering in the tens of millions and densely populated, are amongst the world’s safest. Likewise, massive cities such as Bogota or Sao Paulo have also experienced unprecedented declines in organized violence, although the gains in some of these cities have not necessarily been sustained.

Even so, it is important to stress that there is still conceptual and terminological disagreement amongst macro- and micro-level researchers. Such divisions can have significant implications for the direction of research, the communication of policy and the design, implementation and monitoring of programs. For macro-researchers, generating valid correlations requires tight categories and well-defined variables. Micro-researchers are often required to balance multiple definitions and interpretations and often purposefully interrogate the various meanings ascribed to concepts by different subjects. Owing to the many disciplines involved in researching the

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71 See also the international coalition – Slum Dwellers International – for more on how international advocacy is shaping the debate. Available at http://www.sdinet.org/.

72 Two recent efforts to summarize the literature – Agostini et al (2009) and World Bank (2010) – seek to push the debate on the relationships between urban violence and development. Both are case study based and include only comparatively few specific references to the urban poor per se. Likewise, UN-Habitat has undertaken a range of assessments on urban settlements and slums over the past decade (2011a and b, 2007). See also Baker (2008) for a review of urban poverty.

73 See, for example, Koonings and Kruji (1999) and Gleaser and Sacerdote (1996).


urban dilemma, it is hardly surprising that competing definitions and understandings of what may appear to be common phenomenon emerge. A key criterion of future IDRC and DFID-commissioned research, then, should be to critically revisit the conceptual architecture of the debate and identify ways to allow researchers to communicate across their respective boundaries. The following section sets out a preliminary roadmap and set of terminologies for starting down this road.

i. Defining the “urban”

While there is no unequivocal definition of what comprises “urbanity” there are nonetheless some basic characteristics that are agreed. At its most basic, an urban setting is defined in relation to, or as forming a core characteristic of, a city or town. Furthermore, urban areas include demarcated geographic zones of dense human habitation and a degree of physical separation from rural areas. While intrinsic features of urban settings, demographers and urban planners generally concede that size and density alone are insufficient criteria of urbanity.\(^\text{76}\) Notwithstanding these features — administrative demarcation, dense populations, separation from rural areas — definitions of what comprises urban vary significantly from country to country and city to city. Indeed, most states apply a core set of variables in their definition which often includes a demographic threshold and an index of urban functions which are typically linked to the absence of agricultural land and rural employment. Depending on all of these criteria, then, countries can be described as either majority urban or rural.

In spite of their ubiquity, there is also surprisingly limited agreement on what constitutes cities or towns. An early working definition of a city – by definition an urban area – is as “an inhabited central place differentiated from a town or village by its greater size and the range of activities practiced within its boundaries.”\(^\text{77}\) This definition is analogous to that of urban areas described above with its focus on population density and a corresponding index of activities. Collectively, these activities involve the exercise of power over the surrounding countryside. Cities, then, can be associated with relatively large forms of urban human settlement within which a range of activities are performed enabling the city to become centers of power in relation to outlying areas and smaller settlements. Cities of antiquity shared common features with cities today including

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\(^{76}\) For example, Rome under Emperor Augustus in the first century BC was easily the largest pre-modern city outside of China and numbered just 300,000 inhabitants.

\(^{77}\) Wirth (1938: 8) also issued one of the more classic definitions of cities as “relatively large, dense, and permanent settlements of socially heterogeneous populations.”
physical and symbolic boundaries with roads and walls serving practically to defend the city but also to divide it from the surrounding countryside.\textsuperscript{78}

A number of social scientists refined the definitional contours of urban spaces and cities throughout the twentieth century. Amongst the more prominent, Max Weber traced the evolution of Western European cities in his 1921 volume, \textit{The City}. Geographers and sociologists elaborated on his work examining the interaction of contemporary residents with the social and physical built environment of rapidly industrializing cities.\textsuperscript{79} A particular concern amongst these early scholars – and one addressed comprehensively by the so-called Chicago School – was the ways in which the built-up city – and in particular its rapid growth – negatively affected pre-existing individual bonds within communities. They discovered that social ties established through living in close proximity could be “disorganized” by new associational forms of interaction that favored transient market transactions over deeper kinship ties. These new relations were temporary, transitory and instrumental. Building on the findings of nineteenth century sociologist Emile Durkheim, proponents of the Chicago School noted how the progressive “fraying” of communal ties resulted in anomie and eventually violence.\textsuperscript{80}

Scholarship on cities and the implications of urbanization has evolved in parallel with their spectacular growth over the past century. It has also expanded outside of North America and Western Europe to Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa and areas of South, Southeast and East Asia.\textsuperscript{81} What much of this contemporary research shows is that while some facets of social control in urban settings remain the same, there are in fact quite remarkable contrasts in scale and function between modern cities of the twenty-first century and those of even one hundred years ago.\textsuperscript{82} Today, more people live in cities than at any time in history with the most populous conurbations numbering more than 30 million inhabitants.\textsuperscript{83} According to UN-Habitat, one in three urban residents around the world is living below the poverty line and at least 90 per cent of slum dwellers reside in the developing world. Geographically, South Asia features the largest share of urban poor in absolute terms, followed by East Asia, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. China and India alone are home to more than one third of the world’s slums. Meanwhile, in Sub-Saharan Africa, urbanization has become virtually synonymous with slum growth; almost three quarters of the region’s urban population lives currently live in slum conditions, compared to just above half in South Asia.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{78} The central areas were typically occupied by a religious edifice, a palace, government and commercial buildings and public squares. The commercial and political centers were often enclosed within a second inner wall. The ruling class tended to be concentrated near the center and the less privileged lived towards the perimeter or outside the walls, moving inside in the event of an attack. Distinct ethnic and demographic groups were allocated to separate neighborhoods, with comparatively weak transport and communications structures. See Muchembled (2012).

\textsuperscript{79} See Tonnies (1887), Simmel (1903), Park (1952), Mumford (1961), and Wirth (1938).


\textsuperscript{81} There in fact appears to be a range of “nodes” of researchers focused on questions of urbanization and insecurity in Sao Paulo, Cape Town, and Mumbai. See, for example, the excellent work of Caldeira (2000), Myers (2011) and Boano, C. et al (2011) which spans all three regions.

\textsuperscript{82} See, for example, Roy (2009).

\textsuperscript{83} See, for example, Webster and Burke (2012).

\textsuperscript{84} According to UNFPA (2007): “The slum population of sub-Saharan Africa almost doubled in 15 years, reaching nearly 200 million in 2005”.

Far from the dystopian wastelands of social decay anticipated by the Chicago School, many of these rapidly growing cities are in fact highly dynamic. This is due in part to their ability to adapt to rapid changes and reproduce opportunities for cumulative inflows of enterprising migrants and diaspora populations. Owing in part to their transnational networks and growing economies, many twentieth and early twenty-first century cities boomed in the face of what many assumed to be adversity. The latent resilience of certain cities was in fact anticipated by national and metropolitan planners from the 1960s onwards. Some consciously drew on “central place theory”, envisioning cities as growth poles for both national and metropolitan development.\(^85\) The growth of an array of massive urban centers such as Beijing, Buenos Aires, Cairo, Dhaka, Jakarta, Lagos or Manila gradually came to challenge binary characterizations of “urban” or “rural” populations and fixed territorial notions of “cityness”.

As Giddens (2011) has observed, cities in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and across Asia are today sites of massive movements of human capital and remittance flows. The global and local integration of cities are generating what Ellis and Harris (2004) describe as “city regions” that link urban centers with rural areas in novel and complex ways. What are emerging in some cases are “supra-metropolitan” regions of networks, facilitating enhanced migration and challenge old conceptions of static city identities. According to some geographers, cities of the global South are inexorably assuming an ever more prominent role in urban theory to the extent that they do not constitute an anomalous category but rather a fundamental dimension of the global city cannon.\(^86\)

Over the past decades, a sprawling lexicon has emerged to describe the various scales of urbanity. At the top of the pyramid are “conurbations”\(^87\) – polycentric clusters of cities and towns forming a continuous network or networks – which number in the tens of millions. Below them are so-called urban “agglomerations,”\(^88\) consisting of a series of metropolitan areas, themselves constituted of central cities and their suburbs. In parts of North America and Western Europe, there is also talk of “suburbanized agglomerations,”\(^89\) “subnormal agglomerations,” as well as “in-between” cities\(^90\) where new modes of living, work and travel are occurring away from traditional urban centers. Alongside these urban forms are “hyper cites,” “mega cities,” the “megalopolis,” the “metroplex” and “global cities,” which are all invoked to signal an intensely concentrated area of population and activity through which politics, media, finance and production flow.\(^91\) While there are no precise definitions, there is agreement that these latter cities can number between ten and twenty million to qualify. In some countries, these various urban manifestations co-exist. In India, for example, the urban

\(^85\) See, for example, Lasuen (1969) and Darwent (1969).
\(^86\) See, for example, Mabogunje (1990), Fox (2011) and Myers (2011).
\(^87\) The term was coined by Geddes (1915). Contemporary examples include the stretch of land running from Hong Kong, up the mainland along the Pearl Delta and including Macao (50 million people), National Capital Region of New Delhi (21 million people), the Taiheizo Belt in Japan (35 million people), the Johannesburg-Ekurhuleni-Tshwane band (14.6 million people), the Greater Buenos Aires area (13 million people), and the Greater London Area (8.2 million people).
\(^88\) The peak of urban life is described as a “megapolis”. This term was actually coined in ancient Greece in describing a city state that was planned to be the envy of all civilizations.
\(^89\) See Vicino et al (2007).
\(^90\) See Sieverts (2003).
\(^91\) A mega-city, for example, is one that includes in excess of 10 million people. Some definitions also accord a minimum population density (say 2,000 persons per square kilometer). A megacity can consist of one or two converging metropolitan areas. There are an estimated 23 megacities in 2012. See http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-images/Observer/Pix/pictures/2012/01/21/urban2.jpg for a snapshot of megacities. See New Scientist (2006) and Castells (1996).
population is set to top 590 million by 2030. It is expected that there will be 6 megacities with more than 10 million, 13 cities with more than 4 million, and 68 with more than a million residents. Most of these urban forms are artifacts of the late twentieth and twenty-first century, and all of them present a new scale and novel set of challenges in relation to the appraisal of urban poverty and violence.

At the bottom of the urban pyramid are informal settlements, which, when reaching a certain size and scale, can be described “slums.” While also lacking a formal definition, slums are characterized by UN-Habitat as a group of individuals living under the same roof in an urban area with at least one of four key deprivations. The etiology of the word appears to be traced to nineteenth century London to imply “low, unfrequent [sic] parts of town.” More contemporary synonyms for slums range from “squatter housing” and “ghettos” to “low-income communities” and “barrios” though such categories hardly capture the extraordinary diversity, agency and resourcefulness of their residents. Though often described as foreboding zones of informality, exclusion and insecurity, slums also frequently exhibit exceedingly complex and wide-ranging institutions to maintain authority, order and productivity.

The complexity of slums is frequently glossed over by journalists and policy makers. A case in point is Dharavi in Mumbai, home to an ethnically and religiously diverse population of one million and featuring remarkable entrepreneurial activity. Dharavi is home to thousands of profitable micro-businesses with estimated annual turn-overs of more than half a billion dollars. Slum residents feature a bewildering range of collaborative networks that span caste and identity lines, display impressive associative capital to address basic needs ranging from waste disposal and childcare, and are able to organize and resist discriminatory policies. While slums suffer from severe forms of poverty and marginalization, they also frequently give rise to powerful forms of political resistance and voice. For example, the Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM) is a slum dwellers movement emerging from Durban in 2005 and campaigns to improve the living conditions of the urban poor.

ii. Defining urban violence

The history of cities is intertwined with the search for protection from, and the containment of, violence. There is ample evidence that the progressive expansion of urban centers and their peripheries has occurred in parallel with the evolution of (social) technologies to deploy, and regulate, violence. There is a shared lineage between urbanization and security – from the progressive fortification of cities through aggressive and defensive architecture and the use of siege tactics and enclaves to the rapid expansion of surveillance

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92 See, for example, McKinsey Global Institute (2011).
93 In some countries a minimum size of a settlement has been defined to qualify as a slum. For example, in India at least 300 people or 60 households living in a settlement cluster is required for an area to be classified as a slum. Other countries lack such definitions.
94 These include lack of access to improved water supply, lack of access to improved sanitation, overcrowding (more than three persons per room), and dwellings made of non-durable materials. Access to tenure is regarded as a fifth potential criteria, but lack of data has resulted in it not being systematically included. See UN-Habitat (2002).
95 The quote has been attributed to Egan (1821).
96 See UNFPA (2007).
98 This is a point made emphatically by Slum Dwellers International at http://www.sdinet.org/.
99 See, for example, http://www.abahlali.org/.
100 This is a contention of the historian Charles Tilly (1985, 1996) in his wide-ranging review of the expansion and consolidation of states as “protection rackets” across Western Europe.
technologies and the regulation of mobility. Many of these same tenets are present in contemporary cities, including mechanisms to subdue violence within the urban core and its outlying areas. More recent efforts to manage and contain intensive forms of organized violence – whether through peacekeeping or counterinsurgency – have drawn from these past city-based experiences.  

Yet the definitions and characterizations of urban violence are contested. A bewildering range of typologies and parameters exist to describe its characteristics, few of which are agreed by experts consulted during the preparation of this paper. Even so, many scholars:

- Distinguish between “direct” forms of urban violence which result in physical and psychological harm including intentional fatalities, assault and sexual violence, and “indirect” manifestations that negatively affect other aspects of livelihoods, social relations and wellbeing;  
- Portray the intensity of urban violence as a continuum ranging from “acute”, “endemic”, and “chronic” to “everyday”, “common” and “petty”;  
- Describe the spatial features of violence (including urban violence) as concentric circles radiating outwards from “self-directed” to “relational”, “communal” and “structural” iterations;  
- Differentiate the intentionality of urban violence according to the motivations of the perpetrators ranging from “political and “economic” to “social”, “cultural”, “ethnic”, “caste-based” or all manner of interests; and  
- Assess the context in which such violence occurs from “war” and “armed conflict”, to “elections”, “crime” and “terrorism”.

Unless carefully explained, these semantic and conceptual tensions can have implications for how policy communities “speak” across boundaries and formulate intervention strategies.

Establishing clear parameters for violence – including urban violence – is especially frustrating due to the dynamic and evolving character of the phenomenon. The categorical distinctions highlighted above give the misleading impression that different forms and incidents of violence fit into neat and tidy categories. And yet the origins of gang violence in San Salvador, the spread of ethnic violence in Karachi, the persistence of vigilante justice in postwar Monrovia, the triggering of post-election violence in Abidjan, and cartel violence in

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101 See Bollens (1998) and Ekici et al (2009) for a review of urban peacekeeping and what are described as “terrorism resistant communities”. See also Coaffee (2009).  
102 This point is made in Muggah and Wenmann (2011) as well as by Moser (2004) who notes how definitions of “violence overlap with those of conflict and crime, reflected in terms such as “violent crime”, “criminal conflict”, “conflictual violence”, and “violent conflict”.  
103 See Krause et al (2011) for a summary of the debate.  
104 Interviews with experts by the author in December 2011 and January 2012 revealed a wide range of categories, including those listed here. For example, Paula Meth distinguishes between “civil”, “sate” and domestic” forms of violence and notes how the intersections between them are often useful for demonstrating their overlapping features.
Guatemala all defy simple constructs such as “armed conflict” or “criminality”. In many places, what might be construed as “conflict”-related violence is in fact directly connected with organized criminal activity, including politicized violence targeting government officials and related attempts to influence and modify government policies through coercion and corruption. In these contexts, labels such as “conflict deaths,” “homicide” and “extra-judicial killings” can be misguided.

Some progress has been made in administratively codifying certain distinct forms of (urban) violence. For the past few hundred years here was a concerted effort to criminalize the most egregious forms of violence even while its socially structuring aspects were glossed over. In legal terms, violence – including urban violence – came to include a series of “crimes” against persons such as premeditated and un-meditated homicide, assault and rape. Likewise, violence included intentional deaths and injuries arising as a consequence of war, including urban warfare. For decades, macro-researchers have attempted to compare the dynamics of death and injury between cities and the reasons why some cities exhibit higher rates of violence than others using data classified according to the above-mentioned categories. Micro-researchers have also explored variations in criminal violence within cities, though tend to resort less on administrative definitions.

Some scholars have ascribed measurable parameters to urban violence so as to better apprehend its long-term effects and feedback loops. As noted above, direct forms of urban violence encompass physical and psychological harm against persons – from homicide to other forms victimization – that occurs in cities. Researchers have noted that both direct and more subtle indirect forms of urban violence can trigger cycles of violence. Moreover, urban residents can also experience real and perceived exclusion and a restructuring of social relations as anticipated by proponents the Chicago School. Bourdieu (1998) has shown how “structural” forms of urban violence arising from the degradation of urban economies and austerity measures can contribute to a “break down” in social life and relations leading to new forms of violence. Colin Marx has underlined the ways in which urban violence is often symbolically apparent in the discourses constructed by governments in relation to protests, riots, disturbances, emergency declarations and insurgencies. Extending the symbolic to the physical, O’Neill and Rodgers (2012) recently introduced the concept of “infrastructural violence” in order to draw attention to the political economy shaping the social and geographic dimensions of urban violence and the implications for “spatially just cities.”

Other researchers have more recently advanced multi-dimensional frameworks to describe and appraise the consequences of urban violence and implications for development policy. For example, Pearce and McGee

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105 Credit to Mary Kaldor, interview in January 2012.
106 The excesses of violence have been both fiercely denounced and declared illegitimate by divine means or otherwise and also elevated to a positive place in society, to validate the actions of those defending the civilized, women and children against infidels or enemies of the prince and state (“just” war).
107 The classification is not the same in all countries or all periods. Indeed property crimes are now classified as violent where physical contact occurs.
108 See, for example, Porterfield (1949).
109 See, for example, Sampson et al (1997). Much of the initial findings by micro-researchers explained variation by drawing heavily on theories of social organization, constructs forged in the early twentieth century by the aforementioned Chicago School.
110 The World Bank (2010) subdivides direct violence into four categories that mirror the ecological model: (i) self-inflicted violence, (ii) domestic violence, (iii) common violence, and (iv) organized or collective violence.
111 Interview with Colin Mark, December 2011.
(2011: 11) describe (urban) violence as a function of the intensity, location and timing of specific acts. In their view, “chronic” violence occurs in areas where the violent death rate is at least twice the average of the country income category, where this rate is sustained for at least five years or more, and when acts of violence occur across several “socialization spaces”, including the household, neighborhood, and schools allowing for its further “reproduction”. Other scholars reject arbitrary a priori thresholds associated with the incidence or duration of urban violence.\(^{112}\) Moser (2004) and her colleagues instead elaborate a “roadmap” to assess discrete types of urban violence including their political, institutional, economic and social dimensions. Her seminal research has revealed how various forms of urban violence overlap and require comprehensive strategies of prevention and containment. Most researchers acknowledge that such frameworks are ultimately static devices which establish artificial divisions that are difficult to align with realities on the ground.

Amidst the efforts to categorize and map urban violence are a small group of social scientists who have detected an “urban turn” in military doctrine and practice. Indeed, cities – and in particularly their poorer areas – are being progressively securitized.\(^{113}\) In what is dubbed the “new military urbanism”, cities as wide-ranging as Ciudad Juarez, Guatemala, Nairobi and Rio de Janeiro are being problematized as future zones of conflict.\(^{114}\) These cities are being approached with a combination of military, policing, relief and developmental interventions, often in controversial fashion. Indeed, cities have returned to the center of debates on emerging frontiers of warfare and counter-insurgency.\(^{115}\) Cities and their residents are being re-imagined as battle spaces with western military doctrine increasingly seized by the micro-geographies, architectures and cultures of urban settings.\(^{116}\) Scholars such as Beall (2007) and Muchembled (2012) also note how modern concerns are rooted in past preoccupations and that cities have long been sites of intense violence, whether from within (terrorism) or without (peasant insurgencies). And while certain cities experiencing rapid population growth are experiencing violence, it is also the case that violence is often an expression of resistance by urban residents to these new forms of urban militarism.

Certain cities and their peripheries are becoming problematized by security and development actors alike, as strategic sites whose density, vulnerability and volatility require new paradigms of engagement. Entities ranging from NATO to the OECD have started to explore the implications of urbanization, including warfare in capital cities.\(^{117}\) Yet the pursuit of geo-strategic and military interventions in cities and its merging with “civil”

\(^{112}\) It is worth noting that virtually all of the conflict measurement datasets rely on simple thresholds of “battle deaths” to measure the threshold at which a particular form of violence can be said to be “armed conflict”. In the 1970s the threshold was set at 1,000 battle deaths per annum. By the 2000s, the threshold had dropped to between 25 and 100. All conflict researchers agree that these approaches are inadequate, but also recognize the limitations of other metrics.

\(^{113}\) See Muggah with Savage (2012a) for a review of these debates.

\(^{114}\) See Graham (2010, 2009, 2004) for a wider discussion of the ideologies of ‘battlespace’ within contemporary military doctrine - whether it is the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA), ‘asymmetric warfare’, the ideas of ‘effects-based operations’ and ‘fourth generation warfare’, or, the Pentagon’s new obsession with the ‘Long war’ – which essentially amounts to the rendering of all terrain as a persistently militarized zone without limits of time and space. See also Postec (2004) and Misselwitz and Rieniets (2003).

\(^{115}\) See Kemp (2009), Tisseron (2007) and Tomes (2004).

\(^{116}\) In its report to Congress entitled ‘Conduct of the Persian Gulf War’, the United States Department of Defense stated that ‘to engage in military operations in urban terrain’ is ‘a form of fighting that is costly to attacker, defender, innocent civilians, and civilian objects’. Indeed, the majority of civilian deaths that occurred in the 2001 US military operations in Afghanistan appear to have been recorded in areas of high population density.

and “metropolitan” matters is intentionally blurring once separate boundaries. It is also encouraging some military and development specialists to look to the past for modern day challenges. In response to what some analysts describe as “post-modern medievalism”, military tacticians are hastily revisiting the earlier proxy wars of colonialism to learn lessons that might help inform tactics in contemporary urban theatres. Even “mega” slums are said to constitute a new frontier of potential violence as they are alleged to serve as “natural havens for a variety of hostile non-state actors” that may pose “security threats on a scale hitherto not encountered.”

Urban geographers and municipal planners are developing a colorful lexicon to describe the role of cities and war. Novel expressions range from “urban battlespace” to “military urbanism”. Moreover, the localized geographies of cities, the heterogeneous forms of violence between and within neighborhoods, and the systems linking them together are increasingly dominating discussions of security, war and geopolitics. This new terminology has unsettling implications for the securitization of the city. As Blackmore (2005) observes, the use of concepts such as battlespace connotes a boundless and unending process of militarization: “nothing lies outside [the battlespace] temporally or geographically. Battlespace has no front and no back and no start or end.” These terms are also shaping how military strategists are rethinking interventions. Vautravers (2010) has noted how owing to “… the complexity of the urban environment, fighting in cities calls for adaptations in military doctrine, structures, training, and equipment.”

There is also a growing awareness of “fragile” and “failed” cities – at least in military circles – in much the same way that security and development sectors have raised concerns about “failed states.” Such cities experience a failure of localized social contracts binding governments and citizens and a declining ability to regulate and monopolize legitimate violence across their territories. The potential instability generated by such settings is said to give rise also to urban terrorism. While empirically untested, there are also creeping worries that megacities and urbanizing corridors – including their governance systems and security apparatus – are unable to cope. In the words of one commentator: “boom cities pay for failed states, post-modern dispersed cities pay for failed states, and failed cities turn into killing grounds and reservoirs for humanity’s surplus and discards (guess where we will fight).” In this way, “future military expeditions will increasingly defend our [US] foreign investments … rather than defending [the home nation] against foreign invasions. And we will fight to subdue anarchy and violent ‘isms’ because disorder is bad for business. All of this activity will focus on cities” (Peters 1999: 92).

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118 See Bishop and Clancey (2003).
119 See Graham (2010).
121 As cited in Graham. (2010).
122 Norton (2003) proposes a taxonomy consisting of twelve measurements to assess whether cities are healthy (green), are faltering (yellow) or are going feral (red).
iii. Defining the urban poor

Development specialists have long been preoccupied with the multidimensional and spatial dimensions of poverty – including its causes, characteristics and consequences for urban and rural populations. The determination of what constitutes “urban poverty” varies from universal metrics of income and wellbeing to more relative and perception-based scales. A common definition includes those living below the poverty line in a given urban area which is set at purchasing parity prices of $1 or $2 per day. Other analysts have expanded the definition to include a range of deprivations – from limited access to formal sector employment opportunities and income to inadequate and insecure housing, few social protection mechanisms, limited access to basic services and unhealthy, even violent, environments.

It is increasingly agreed that far from being a static condition, urban poverty is dynamic and also a function of vulnerability and exposure to a set of risks. Such characterizations have been reinforced by large-scale assessments such as the “Voices of the Poor” initiative undertaken by the World Bank in more than 60 countries during the late 1990s. Likewise, the work of scholars such as Satterthwaite (2002) on urban poverty in cities of Argentina, Colombia, Guatemala, India, Nicaragua, Pakistan and South Africa also highlight the diverse and interactive deprivations confronting the urban poor. It is precisely owing to their (partial) integration into market economies, precarious socio-economic condition, susceptibility to extreme forms of segregation, relative instability of social networks, and exposure to organized forms of violence that the urban poor are distinguishable from other “urban” and “rural” population groups. As a demographic group, it is a “myth that [all] urban populations are healthier, more literate or more prosperous than people living in the countryside.” Indeed, the UN-Habitat (2007) has demonstrated how the urban poor die earlier, confront more chronic and acute forms of hunger and disease, achieve less education and have access to

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124 See Downs (1970) for an attempt to define the urban poor.
125 See Baker and Schuler (2004).
126 More than 60,000 poor women and men were consulted through participatory methods to discern the dynamics of poverty from their perspective. The findings were featured in the World Bank’s 2000 World Development Report. See, for example, http://web.worldbank.org/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/0,,contentMDK:20612393~menuPK:336998~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:336992~isCURL:Y,00.html for more information.
127 Specifically, Satterthwaite (2002), drawing from Baulch (1996) has featured a hierarchy showing the different aspects of urban poverty including inadequate income, unstable and risky asset bases, inadequate shelter, weak provision of public infrastructure and basic services, limited safety nets, inadequate protection of poor groups’ rights in the law and voicelessness and powerlessness. Notably missing from his eightfold pyramid is exposure to violence and insecurity.
128 See, for example, Fay (2005).
fewer stable employment opportunities than other urban dwellers and rural populations. What is more, young adults living in slums are more likely to have children, be married or head a household than their counterparts living in non-slum areas.

From the 1950s to at least the 1970s the development enterprise was disproportionately preoccupied with rural areas which were assumed to be rife with poverty and destitution. Metrics were elaborated to track poverty trends—whether based on income, consumption or expenditure—and emphasized how rural poverty appeared to be more entrenched than urban poverty. This assumption was deeply rooted since many development experts believed that cities afforded better access to services, infrastructure and opportunities than villages or otherwise rural areas. And while pockets of urban squalor and inequity were acknowledged, a dominant focus of the development agenda was on eradicating poverty in the countryside. Since the 1980s and 1990s, however, there is evidence that poverty is increasing more rapidly in urban areas than in rural ones. Statisticians have become increasingly aware of how aggregated national statistics conceal deep inequalities and nodes of extreme poverty in cities.

Notwithstanding the traditional focus of development agencies on mitigating rural poverty, some social scientists were adamant that an urban bias shaped development trajectories in favor of cities in the developing world. The reasons for this were attributed to the concentration of wealth, power and capacity in cities which reinforced urban accumulation. As Bates (1988) wryly observes, most governments are not necessarily inclined to promote social welfare or particular ideologies, but rather “… enact policies to accommodate the demands of organized private interests”. And in most societies, influential “private interests” tend to consist of urban elites, urban poor and a sample of wealthy land-holders and farmers. Debates on whether development should be urban- or rural-focused are equally influenced by evidence supporting alternately positive and negative relationships between urbanization and development. Indeed, concern that cities have evolved at the expense of the rural periphery have persisted for decades.

There is also a literature that considers the “urbanization” of poverty and its measurement. It emerged in response to the spectacular growth of the urban poor as a discrete population category of donor concern. In terms of scale, an estimated one third of all urban residents are considered poor or a quarter of the world’s total poor population. As noted above, the question of who counts as “urban poor” is of course conditioned on the parameters one applies and often centers on anthropomorphic or economic criteria. For example, current definitions of the urban poor focus on social indicators related to life expectancy, infant mortality,

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130 In Ethiopia, for example, UN-Habitat reports that “child malnutrition in slums and rural areas is 47 per cent and 49 per cent respectively, as compared with 27 per cent in non-slum urban areas. In Brazil and Cote d’Ivoire, child malnutrition is three to four times higher in slums than in non-slum areas. In most Sub-Saharan African countries, HIV prevalence is higher in urban areas than in rural areas; in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia HIV prevalence among urban populations is almost twice that of rural populations. In all countries, women and slum dwellers are disproportionately affected, reflecting a general trend in the region.” See UN-Habitat (2007).

131 See, for example, Baker (2008).

132 For example, the World Bank (2000) found that urbanization and GDP per capita are closely and positively correlated. Meanwhile, Henderson (2002) has presented data showing that medium sized countries with high urban primacy experienced progressive losses in annual growth implying an ‘optimal’ level of urban concentration.

133 See Jacobs (1969).


135 See Masika et al (1997) for a review of the gendered aspects of urban poverty.
nutrition, the proportion of household expenditure spent on food, school enrolment rates, literacy, access to key services, involvement in informal sector activities, geographic location, local interpretations and other categories. Other definitions tend to use hard and fast economic parameters.\(^{136}\) Drawing on the latter approach, the World Bank estimates that roughly 750 million people living in urban areas fall below the poverty line of $2 dollar per day and 290 million when applying the $1 dollar a day threshold.\(^{137}\) As for their distribution, the majority of the urban poor reside not necessarily in megacities but rather in large and mid-sized cities in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa where the incidence of poverty is also comparatively high.\(^{138}\) According to the World Bank, Latin America and the Caribbean have the greatest proportion of the urban poor relative to the total poor owing in part to high rates of urbanization.

As with classifications of cities and urban violence outlined above, the categorization of urban poor is not without controversy. There are many disagreements in mainstream development discourse concerning the measurements and metrics used – whether multi-dimensional or monetary.\(^{139}\) Nor is there consensus over where to set poverty lines and how to account for the higher cost of living that persists in urban areas into national estimates.\(^{140}\) Some analysts contend that “proximity” variables such as those determining the distance of individuals from specific services, can lead to overly positive interpretations (selection bias). And while facing complex and diverse forms of risk and resilience, social scientists concede that the urban poor – particularly those in informal settlements and slums – confront a host of common deprivations that shape their interaction and fulfillment of potential. These include, among other things, under- and unemployment, poor infrastructure and services, inadequate and insecure living conditions, enhanced exposure to hazards and health risks, socio-spatial constraints to mobility, and inequality linked to exclusion.

So while there is still some way to go to arrive at a common definition of urban poverty, there is nonetheless consensus that the number and proportion of urban poor are increasing, as is their share in overall poverty. A growing chorus of analysts claims that the locus of poverty is changing – from rural to urban areas.\(^{141}\) Specifically, Satterthwaite (2002) has found that in a growing number of countries the proportion of poorer people living in urban areas is greater than in rural areas. For example, in Indonesia, more than half of the country’s 20 million poor (of a total of 40 million) live in cities, though if poverty thresholds were adjusted this would spiral up to 50 million (of a total of 80 million). As noted by Ravallion (2002), “more spatially concentrated and visible forms of poverty [in cities] ... [will] generate new pressures on government to respond ... in ways that may or may not be coincident with good policies for overall poverty reduction”. There

\(^{137}\) For example, Ravillion et al (2007) in an assessment of 90 low- and middle-income countries between 1993 and 2002 found that on average, the urban poverty lines are about 30 per cent higher than the rural lines.
\(^{138}\) Using the USD2 dollar a day threshold roughly 40 per cent of the urban poor reside in Sub-Saharan Africa and 22 per cent in South Asia. Using the USD1 dollar a day marker almost half of the urban poor reside in South Asia and another third in Sub-Saharan Africa. See Baker (2008).
\(^{139}\) Money-metric methods are widely used because they are objective, can be used as the basis for a range of socio-economic variables, and it is possible to adjust for differences between households, and intra-household inequalities. See Baharaoglu and Kessides (2002).
\(^{140}\) See, for example, Satterthwaite (2002).
\(^{141}\) See Jones and Corbridge (2009) who note there is evidence from Angola, Bangladesh, Chad, Guatemala, Haiti and Niger that over half of the population is considered urban poor.
is also overwhelming support for the idea that the urban poor bear the brunt of urban violence even if the causal mechanisms connecting the two remain poorly understood and under-theorized.
Section 3
Measuring the Impacts

There are divergent perspectives about the influence of cities on public safety and security, social life, economic productivity and local governance. For some, cities are the dominant civilizing factor and hubs of innovation. The concentration of people, capital and resources has afforded exceptional opportunities for political, social, cultural and economic advancement. Yet for others, cities and their informal settlements are chaotic infernos in which disorganized and aggressive groups co-exist with legitimate authorities and where for many, criminal violence and poverty are dominant forms of living. This section considers some rudimentary evidence on urban violence in lower- and middle-income cities and its implications for poorer segments of society. It assesses how lives, livelihoods and lived spaces are affected and sets out a crude framework for distinguishing between different manifestations of impacts (see Figure 2). While not exhaustive, this section considers lethal and non-lethal violence, forced displacement, social capital and cohesion, socio-economic livelihoods and productivity, and issues related to governance, power disparities, voice and representation.

The direct and indirect effects of urban violence are experienced acutely by the urban poor. This is because urban insecurity tends to be spatially concentrated in poorer neighborhoods and slums – and in some cases intentionally so. Direct forms of urban violence – homicides, robbery, and assault – are also experienced by middle and upper-income groups and wealthier groups also tend to report a disproportionately heightened sense of insecurity and corresponding adjustment in their behavior and mobility. A recurring obstacle to measuring the effects of such violence on the urban poor is the fundamentally diffuse characteristics of the phenomenon. Violence itself often exhibits multiple, simultaneous, and shifting characteristics and motivations. The association and interaction between different types of violence – say police repression and

Section 3 Highlights

Section 3 examines the varied direct and indirect impacts of urban violence, particularly in relation to the urban poor. It finds considerable literature which confirms a negative two-way relationship. While not exhaustive, it focuses on issues of fatal and non-fatal victimization, displacement, the erosion of social capital and cohesion, declines in socio-economic wellbeing and implications for governance. While extensive, there are still a number of silences in the literature on impacts. For example, there is comparatively little known about how different types of violence interact. Moreover, the “resilience” of households and communities to urban violence are also less well examined. More research is also needed on the long-term effects of urban violence on constraining individual, family, household and community exposure and interaction.

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143 See Davis (2007).
intimidation or extortion by organized criminals in slums – are thus frequently blurred and difficult to parse apart. As such, neighborhood gangs and vigilante groups may mobilize for the purposes of self-defense or predation, but, alternately, can put themselves at the service of politicians and business people as has been the case from Lagos\textsuperscript{145} and Port-of-Spain to Dili and Jakarta.\textsuperscript{146} Similarly, sexual and gender-based violence can be used simultaneously as a political tool by elite interests and armed groups, or to exert social power within urban households.\textsuperscript{147} In some cities, overlapping forms of violence appear to be mutually reinforcing in complex ways – leading in some cases to a form of “urbicide”, or destruction of the city.\textsuperscript{148}

Figure 2: Framing the impacts of urban violence

While many of the direct physical manifestations of urban violence are documented, its indirect consequences are often more intangible and difficult to track. Urban violence is most clearly expressed by the annual tally of conflict deaths, homicides, assaults, robberies and sexual violence. Yet it is underneath the surface that the medium- to long-term effects of urban violence are extensive. It is also detected in transformed livelihoods, voluntary and involuntary migration patterns to, from and within affected neighborhoods, and the reconfiguration of social and market organization and the legitimacy of municipal institutions. Urban violence transforms the administrative, symbolic and material landscapes of inner cities and suburban neighborhoods. Pervasive fear, for example, can lead to the physical separation of “insecure” zones from surrounding areas by urban planners and the police, resulting in new transport corridors and roads, surveillance, walls and gates.\textsuperscript{149}

The restricted access of residents living in high-crime neighborhoods to social and economic opportunities on the “outside” can in turn reinforce their sense of exclusion and segregation as predicted by social disorganization and stress theorists. These sentiments can give rise not only to social and psychological

\textsuperscript{145} See Ismail (2009).
\textsuperscript{146} Jutersonke et al (2009). See also Muggah (2010).
\textsuperscript{147} See Krause et al (2011).
\textsuperscript{148} The term urbicide emerged in the 1960s as way of describing how complex forms of structural and proximate violence (including massive urban restructuring) can result in the destruction of particular areas of cities. There is considerable debate on the concept. See Coward (2009) and Campbell et al (2007).
stigmatization, fear and evasion – as has been amply researched in cities such as Cape Town and Rio de Janeiro, for example – but also to more frustration and ultimately renewed violence.\textsuperscript{150} In the long-term, reduced contact amongst neighbors of the same city reinforces perceptions of insecurity among wealthier residents who may alter their habits to isolate themselves further still. In these and other ways, urban violence creates a vicious cycle in which relationships among urban residents are transformed along with the ways in which they relate to their built environment.

i. **Death and victimization in the city**

Arguably the most visible and widely reported manifestations of urban violence are its fatal consequences. Such violence can occur within the home amongst intimate partners or family members, on the street with unknown assailants, and as a result of encounters with public police and paramilitaries or armed groups. Urban settings tend to register comparatively high rates of such violence, partly owing to the more sophisticated reporting systems in cities.\textsuperscript{151} Public authorities and scholars alike have long observed how city homicide rates in particular tend to be higher than the national average, as Figure 3 amply demonstrates in the case of a selection of violent cities. And while the vast majority of research on homicidal violence is undertaken in US and Western European cities, analysts have also emerged to study the phenomenon in Latin America, the Caribbean and more recently Sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{152} With the exception of assessments fielded by the UNODC, there appears to be a deficit of research on lethal urban violence in Southeast Europe, and East, South and Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{153}

**Figure 3: Comparing selected national and city homicide rates (per 100,000)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most populous city</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>City homicide rate</th>
<th>National homicide rate</th>
<th>Multiple</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caracas</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>122 (2009)</td>
<td>46 (2009)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>116.6 (2010)</td>
<td>41.4 (2010)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<td>Belize</td>
<td>106.4 (2010)</td>
<td>41.7 (2010)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basseterre</td>
<td>St. Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>97.6 (2009)</td>
<td>38.2 (2010)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Salvador</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>94.6 (2010)</td>
<td>66 (2010)</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegucipalpa</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>72.6 (2009)</td>
<td>82.1 (2010)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maseru</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>61.9 (2009)</td>
<td>33.6 (2009)</td>
<td>1.84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>59.9 (2007)</td>
<td>33.68 (2007)</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port of Spain</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>60.7 (2008)</td>
<td>35.2 (2009)</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>34.6 (2010)</td>
<td>21.6 (2010)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Selected data from UNODC (online)

\textsuperscript{150} See, for example, Fernandes (2009, 2008, 2005), Lemanski (2004) and Murer (2010).

\textsuperscript{151} See Hagedorn (2004).

\textsuperscript{152} See UNODC (2011) and ECLAC (2008).

\textsuperscript{153} Interviews with experts in South Asia and Southeast Asia confirm this view, December 2011 (see Annex 1). Some new research by the Small Arms Survey India Armed Violence Assessment and the Nepal Armed Violence Assessment, however, is seeking to fill this gap. See http://www.india-ava.org/.
A review of the literature confirms how lethal violence tends to be clustered in cities and in particular areas of cities. Homicidal violence, in particular, appears to be concentrated in lower income areas, and amongst lower-income families.\textsuperscript{154} Across time and space, lower income urban areas tend to experience higher rates of violence and victimization and within these areas, poor, marginal and vulnerable social groups are more at risk than others.\textsuperscript{155} A number of specific case studies in large cities in Brazil confirm the socio-spatial concentration of urban violence amongst lower income groups. For example, Briceno-Leon and Zubillaga (2002) observe how homicide rates were several times higher in “low-income” areas of Rio de Janeiro (177 per 100,000) than in “middle class” (59 per 100,000) and “tourist” areas (39 per 100,000). What is more, these patterns also hold constant over time. Multi-generational household surveys in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo reveal how successive generations of low-income residents in favelas have disproportionate numbers of family members killed in “wars” involving armed groups.\textsuperscript{156}

It is also worth noting that even within low-income urban settings, certain population groups are impacted more, or differently, by urban violence than others. Specifically, there are clear gender dimensions to the experiences of violence (Moser 2004, Winton 2004). At the global level, male homicide rates are roughly double female rates for all age groups.\textsuperscript{157} At the national level, the ratio tends to be even more extreme. For example, in Bogota, Cali and Medellin, there are 12 reported male homicides for every single reported female homicide.\textsuperscript{158} Likewise, in San Salvador, young men were at least 10 times more likely to be murdered than young women.\textsuperscript{159} In one review of more than 8,500 homicide incidents in Puerto Rico (2001-2010) Zavala et al (forthcoming) found that the risk of homicide death in males is 13 times greater than among females. The highest rates are observed among males 20-24 years of age (198.4 homicides per 100,000).\textsuperscript{160} And in all three settings, whether Colombia, El Salvador or Puerto Rico, as well as in the slums of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, it is the highly urbanized and poorer areas of municipalities which present the highest risks of homicide.

Although men are more likely to kill or be killed in urban and rural settings alike, the rates of non-fatal victimization by violence are more equal by gender. For example, overall, men are only slightly more likely than females to be victimized by violence in urban settings.\textsuperscript{161} While males tend to experience higher rates of physical assault and violent robbery, women tend to suffer from dramatically higher rates of sexual violence, including rape. In South Africa, for example, studies of a selection of cities have determined that women are consistently more likely to suffer violence than men.\textsuperscript{162} Women are also especially susceptible to domestic violence, with an estimated 1 in 3 women worldwide experiencing domestic violence over the course of her

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{154} And while the relationship is believed to hold true in the case of “conflict-related” lethal violence, there is a major silence in the literature on this issue. See Raleigh et al (2010).
\textsuperscript{155} See Winton (2004).
\textsuperscript{156} See Campbell (2008).
\textsuperscript{157} See Krause et al (2011) and WHO (2002).
\textsuperscript{158} See the work of the Conflict Analysis Resource Center at www.cerac.org.co.
\textsuperscript{159} See Cruz and Beltrán (2000).
\textsuperscript{160} Firearms are used in at least 80 per cent of homicides in Puerto Rico in any given year. The average lifetime risk of homicide death for males is 1 in 34. Young adult males with access to firearms are at greatest risk of homicide in Puerto Rico.
\textsuperscript{161} See World Bank (2010).
\textsuperscript{162} See Vogelman and Lewis (1993) and Abrahams (2004).
\end{footnotesize}
The extent to which women in urban settings experience an increased or decreased vulnerability to domestic violence, however, is under-researched and requires more investigation.

Of course, the costs and consequences of urban violence extend far beyond violent death and non-fatal injury. There are also dramatic and long-lasting psychological and behavioral implications associated with exposure to violence in urban settings. New insights from neurology, biology and the behavioral sciences confirm the ways in which direct forms of violence result in physiological changes in both perpetrators and victims. There is considerable literature on the cognitive, behavioral, and psychological impacts of witnessing or being subjected to violence. McIlwaine and Moser (2006) also stress the ways in which urban residents manage “complex layerings” of violence, and in particular fear and insecurity, that is eventually “routinized” and “normalized.” Common forms of everyday victimization noted by Moser (2004) include “robbery and theft, violent assault and burglary, crimes associated with alcohol and drug misuse, gang violence and prostitution, and commonplace intra-family abuse”. Likewise, participatory mapping in urban settings, including slums in South, South East, and Pacific island cities also highlights the legacies of violent victimization. Such research has shown how the constructions of violence by urban residents are often heavily contingent on local time- and place-specific perceptions and values.

ii. Displacement to and from the city

Across urban settings real and perceived violence influences the decision of individuals and households to stay in their homes or to relocate elsewhere. Much has been made in US and Western European cities of the “white flight” and migration of the middle class to the suburbs in the latter half of the twentieth century. Whether in upper- or lower-income settings, it is affluent households – and in particular those with pre-school and school-aged children – that are inclined to leave first with the poorer often staying behind. This exodus of human capital frequently results in neighborhoods being deprived of their most educated and productive populations and a decline in the quality and quantity of services. While believed to be substantial, the full costs and consequences of violence-associated out-migration have yet to be tabulated in many cities. Even so, there are indications that such flight concentrates poverty in areas vacated by the middle class. The corresponding decline in market networks and social contact can in turn contribute to downward spirals in property values and deter investments, further deepening poverty traps.

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165 Cairns (1994) and Tremblay et al (2009) focus on the effects of political violence on the development of aggressive behavior and cognitive impairment. Psychological distress, depression, and anxiety in different populations are also addressed in urban violence cases by Mari et al (2008) and for homicide survivors specifically by Miller (2009).
166 See Koonings and Krujit (1999) and Glassner (1999) for example.
167 See, for example, Muggah and Moser-Puangsuwan (2003) and Muggah and Lebrun (2005).
168 See, for example, Frey (1995).
169 There are, however, examples of efforts to measure the costs of out-migration at the regional and national levels. See, for example, Massey and Aysa (2005) for the case of Latin America.
There are other pronounced forms of population movement associated with armed conflicts and organized criminal violence in cities from Afghanistan and Iraq to Brazil and Mexico. As in centuries past, before, during and after intense bouts of armed conflict refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) often temporarily or permanently relocate to cities for sanctuary. A considerable number – often the poorer and more vulnerable – relocate and resettle in temporary “camps”, some of which become protracted and acquire city-like characteristics. Today, approximately half of the world’s estimated 10.5 million refugees and at least four million IDPs are thought to live in urban areas, having been displaced involuntarily. Many transit through or settle in densely populated settlements, including capital cities and their slums, where they purposefully blend in with the general population. For example, Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, purportedly hosts some 1.7 million internally displaced people and refugees, though few statistics are considered reliable. Meanwhile, Abidjan and Bogota have absorbed hundreds of thousands of people – mostly poorer and smallholder residents – during years of armed conflict, swelling already under-serviced slums.

While there is virtually no accurate data on urban displacement, there are some emerging case studies that offer glimmers into the extent of the phenomenon. The Afghanistan experience is especially poignant owing to the confluence of voluntary and involuntary migration and the dramatic implications of urban displacement on a predominantly rural society. For example, in 2001 there were reportedly 1.2 million IDPs and over 5 million refugees living abroad in Iran and Pakistan, owing to previous conflicts and the 2001 US-led intervention. Most returned spontaneously to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, though increasingly old and new displaced populations settled in urban and semi-urban areas blending in with the mass of urban poor. In the past decade the capital, Kabul, doubled in size from 1.78 million (1999) to more than 2.9 million (2009). Other cities in Kandahar, Herat, and Khost followed similar patterns. Today there are purportedly over 415,000 displaced persons in the country, of which more than half are living in identifiable urban and semi-urban locations, with the remainder living in rural areas and camp-like settlements.

In addition to violence, there are a host of more subtle factors shaping individual and household decisions to flee or migrate to or from urban areas. Specific groups are frequently compelled to relocate from rural areas owing to armed conflict and organized violence. Though difficult to generalize, males typically move to avoid (forced) recruitment and earn a livelihood, while women and girls are seeking to ensure their and their families’ security and wellbeing. Once arrived to an urban settlement, groups may opt to migrate within

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171 See IDMC (2008).
175 See Martin and Sluga (2011) and de Geoffroy (2009).
176 Research by Albuja and Ceballos (2010) shows that 93 per cent of the 270,000 displaced people that year in Colombia had moved to urban areas. More than 98 per cent of the displaced population of Bogota lives below the poverty line while 82.6 per cent are officially classified as living in extreme poverty, rates that contrast sharply with the non-IDP population. The income of IDPs in Bogota is on average 27 per cent lower than the income of the poor resident population.
177 See http://sites.tufts.edu/feinstein/tag/internal-displacement-to-urban-areas for a review of trends and patterns in Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire and Sudan.
179 See World Bank and UNHCR (2011) and Schutte and Bueaer (2007).
180 See Morris (2011) for a review of literature on refugee and IDP movements to urban areas.
cities to escape various forms of insecurity and instability, including identity-based intimidation and political or identity-related threats. Still more may decide to move back out of cities to peri-urban and rural areas due to chronic violence or lack of opportunity. The sudden and rapid movement of refugees and internally displaced people into low- and middle-income cities can generate a host of negative shocks. When arriving in large numbers, new arrivals can generate stresses on already dilapidated water and sanitation services, exacerbate conflicts over tenure and access to land, and generate competition for resources with host populations.

Most international humanitarian and development aid agencies are only gradually starting to engage with such challenges, having traditionally concentrated their activities in rural emergencies and disasters. According to Crisp and Refstie (2011), the relationship between displacement and urbanization is one that urban planners, demographers and development specialists are only beginning to grapple with, even though mass population movements have already generated profound transformations in urban centers around the world. And while the impacts of major population movements are receiving some attention, with few exceptions, there are no long-term or comparative empirical assessments of how people displaced to urban areas manage their lives or the extent to which they influence policy making and practice. While difficult to generalize, a number of very basic observations are nevertheless emerging. For example, it appears that certain cities can in some cases absorb large numbers of people unnoticed, which in turn results in low registration and enumeration, and shapes local understandings of the scale of displacement. Moreover, the urban displaced frequently live alongside slum dwellers, further reducing their susceptibility to being counted. Predictably, then, assistance provided to urban refugees, IDPs and returnees in urban centers tends to be ad hoc and unevenly sustained.

iii. Social capital and cohesion in the city

The indirect effects of violence permeate into the social fabric of families and entire societies. Indeed, urban violence can negatively affect interpersonal trust and mutual expectations that are so critical for sustaining predictable and rule-based transactions. It can also erode the willingness of disparate urban populations to bridge divides, build networks of self-help and reciprocity, or to form associations devoted to positive social change. Endemic urban violence has been shown to gradually transform relationships in ways that erode effective collective action – essential for enabling predictable exchanges within the political, market or other social domains. As Marc et al (World Bank 2010: 2) and others have observed, the ensuing “climate of fear” and mistrust generated by persistent urban violence can also engender new forms of brutality, which then are justified within communities as defense or protection. Capturing and documenting these complex and perverse relations is difficult for macro-level researchers, though has been the subject of micro-research for generations.

181 There is an emerging literature from the forced migration community on the multiple manifestations of urban displacement and the motivations for why populations are compelled to (or voluntarily) move. See FMR (2010).
182 See Muggah with Savage (2012). UNHCR began addressing the issue of urban displacement in the mid-1990s through a rash of policy notes. The International Displacement Monitoring Center also began focusing on urban displacement in the past five years. But most agencies are still oriented towards rural displacement and camp management. See Zetter and Deikun (2010).
183 See, for example, the work of Jacobsen (2011), Morris (2011) and some recent studies issued by Forced Migration Review and the Overseas Development Institute cited elsewhere in this report.
184 See, for example, Cuesta et al (2007).
There is a growing evidence base on the detrimental impacts of urban violence on social capital and cohesion. Overlapping forms of urban violence restricts mobility, deters foreign and domestic investment, stigmatizes neighborhoods, erodes associational ties, and constrains access to formal (and informal) employment and other educational opportunities.\textsuperscript{185} Urban residents trapped in urban “hot spots” may themselves opt to decrease or avoid investing in their (or their families) physical or human capital. They may also delay setting up small shops or stalls, and curb their own social exchange and solidarity with neighbors for fear of being exposed to victimization. The ensuing climate of insecurity can also significantly weaken formal governance institutions – from elected positions and committees to more local forms of association such as chambers of commerce – which may themselves be subjected to intimidation. Likewise, informal institutions of authority – from faith-based groups to advocacy and activist organizations – may also find themselves targeted, further diminishing the strength of community bonds.

Certain socio-spatial characteristics of poor neighborhoods ensure that their residents are vulnerable to becoming involved in, or a victim of, urban violence. Since the majority of the urban poor are located on marginal land – often lacking basic public services ranging from public lighting to police protection – they tend to be more exposed to predatory activity of organized and petty criminals. And as most of the urban poor are also engaged in informal sector income generation,\textsuperscript{186} they are also frequently exposed to grim working conditions, lack of insurance and greater susceptibility to economic fluctuations and rising food prices.\textsuperscript{187} Underemployment and unemployment are often more acute in these areas as compared to rural regions or wealthier areas of cities.\textsuperscript{188} As such, not only are the urban poor more vulnerable to direct and indirect forms of violence, they are potentially more susceptible to recruitment into the ranks of guerrillas and gangs and may themselves assume higher risk opportunities.

Urban armed groups, and in particular gangs and local mafia, seldom emerge spontaneously. Rather, they are frequently forged in conditions of social and economic marginalization and are themselves formed and nurtured by political and criminal elite.\textsuperscript{189} Owing to the weak penetration of basic services and their disproportionately high costs in slums,\textsuperscript{190} the impulse to rely on informal providers is unsurprising. Indeed, the urban poor are inclined to resist the external imposition of user fees and related costs for services, even violently. As such, gangs tend not only to manage to consolidate their “political” and “social” authority and functions in slums, but also to consolidate their “economic” hold as well.\textsuperscript{191} In the end, the urban poor confront a complex tradeoff between residential location, travel distance and travel modes. The result is a triple burden. First, they are compelled to live in gang-held areas and under their authority owing to an inability to find meaningful alternatives. Second, their decision to stay often leads to prolonged exclusion from essential services as well as “neighborhood effects” with consequences for individual behavior and peer

\textsuperscript{185} See, for example, Morenoff et al (2001), McIlwaine and Moser (2001), and Vial et al (2010).
\textsuperscript{186} Estimates suggest that between 30 and 70 per cent of the GDP amongst lower- and middle-income economies are constituted by informal sector activities. See World Bank (2010).
\textsuperscript{187} See Hossain and Green (2011) which focused on food price spikes in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya, and Zambia.
\textsuperscript{188} See ILO (2004).
\textsuperscript{189} See Small Arms Survey (2010) and Muggah with Savage (2012).
\textsuperscript{190} There is ample evidence that the urban poor tend to pay, on average, higher prices for utilities than the non-poor. Moreover, the poor tend to pay a higher proportion of their overall income on utilities. See Karuki and Schwartz (2003).
\textsuperscript{191} See, for example, Rodgers (2006) who discusses the political and social roles of gangs in urban Nicaragua.
groups. Third, these outcomes are intensified since the policy response of public authorities to urban insecurity often includes still more social containment and control.

The emergence of gated communities is one of the more tangible manifestations of segregation and associated socio-spatial stigmatization. While the particular characteristics of such communities vary from city to city, they tend to share a number of common features. At a minimum, such settlements house middle- and upper-income families. Spatially, they tend to feature physical fences or other obstructions, mechanical, electronic and human security systems, private internal gathering areas and privatized water, waste disposal, lighting and other services. The primary rationale for such communities is enhanced safety, though there is only limited evidence of even the short-term benefits in this regard. Yet the rise of such enclave communities has contributed to the fragmentation of cities and the diminished use and availability of public spaces alongside increased socio-economic stratification and segmentation. They have also yielded an assortment of unintended consequences on populations including an increasing perception of increasing crime amongst the middle classes and a resort to neighbourhood enclaving. The growth of gated communities betrays declining confidence of citizens in the ability of the state to guarantee their security. It also signals the erosion of the social contract.

iv. Socio-economic welfare in the city

There are many ways in which overlapping forms of violence – including urban variations – contribute to and exacerbate poverty. The debate on the relationships between organized violence and poverty is particularly well developed in the conflict studies literature and extends across several decades even for those who “escape” upwards (owing to rising income) or outwards (due to migration). There is also considerable research available from criminology and behavioral sciences. For example, micro-researchers have documented the ways in which domestic and intimate partner violence imperishes women and girls, as well as their children. Moreover, they have demonstrated how interpersonal and collective violence also generates a disproportionate effect on the assets of the poor as compared to the assets of other groups. Perhaps even more important, urban violence also appears to exacerbate urban inequality and vice versa. Discussed at length in the next section, inequality is one of the most important variables explaining differential rates of violence between cities and countries. As Stewart (2008) has shown, it appears that violence, poverty and inequality are linked in a vicious cycle: inequality spawns violence, which in turn worsens poverty and increases inequality even more.

Urban violence has long-term and potentially inter-generational implications for the poor. In slums and shantytowns affected by persistent violence across Brazil, South Africa, and the United States, one encounters long-term stigmas of the residents and a stubborn persistence of poverty, even for those who “escape” either

192 Interview with Paula Meth, January 2012.
194 See, for example, Fernandes (2009, 2008 and 2005).
197 See IADB (2003) and Moser and Holland (1997).
upwards (socio-economically) or outwards due to migration.\textsuperscript{198} This confluence of stigmatization, violence and poverty generates prolonged impacts on local coping and adaptation strategies – including geographic and socio-economic mobility.\textsuperscript{199} Poverty experts have shown the ways in which productive networks of exchange between and within neighborhoods are critical for poverty reduction. And yet these systems are compromised and distorted in violence plagued communities. In some cases, what has been described as “enclave mentalities” can take hold of poor households and their neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{200} What may have once been rich and diverse sources of information and knowledge can rapidly contract inwards and be confined to a small and immediate circle of friends and relatives.\textsuperscript{201} Poorer households can bunker down, sometimes for generations, as a protective measure further eroding their access to precarious entitlements. More research into the long-term effects of urban violence on constraining individual, family, household and community exposure and interaction is required.

There is a vast literature on the ways in which urban violence can impact child and adolescent learning and undermine their future earning and productive potential and wellbeing.\textsuperscript{202} Much of this focuses on how it disproportionately affects children and adolescents who are exposed to abusive families and peer-groups, and the attendant enduring impacts. Abused children in violent family settings are more at risk of becoming offenders, while also suffering from reduced educational performance in later years.\textsuperscript{203} Street children, one of the most poignant examples of the failure of social safety networks, are also exposed to heightened risks of both violence perpetration and victimization.\textsuperscript{204} Not only are they more exposed to illicit drug consumption, but they can also experience above-average rates of teenage pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases – all vectors more readily transmitted in urban environments. Although changing, public opinion has been exceedingly negative towards street children, with such groups often described as a menace or worse. Violent campaigns designed to ‘cleanse’ the streets have been reported from Rio de Janeiro to Mumbai.\textsuperscript{205}

Urban violence slows economic growth and impedes social development. The most obvious cost generated by violence is the value of resources used to attempt to control it or treat its consequences: public and private expenditures on police, security systems and judicial services. Urban insecurity also curbs macro and micro-economic productivity in several ways. In many crime-affected cities, employees are reluctant to work after dark when the streets are considered insecure. Employers and investors are less inclined to invest in cities where their assets are likely to be destroyed or stolen. All of these deterrents can negatively influence the foreign and domestic revenues and ultimately the livelihood sources of the poorest quintile groups. The effects of extreme drug- and crime-related violence on labor migration in major economic corridors of northern Mexico (Ciudad Juarez) and Central America (Guatemala, Managua, San Salvador and Tegucigalpa) are recent examples. Both individual improvements in standard of living – such as acquiring appliances or investing in education – and entrepreneurial investments in buildings and services are hindered by the

\textsuperscript{198} See Campbell (2008).
\textsuperscript{199} These reflections emerged during consultations undertaken with specialists as part of the preparation of this paper. See Annex 2.
\textsuperscript{200} See Stone (1993).
\textsuperscript{201} Granovetter (1973) describes this as the “weak ties” thesis which can further entrench poverty in poor neighbourhoods.
\textsuperscript{202} The political and psychological impacts of violence, including on children and youths, are reviewed by Dubow et al (2009).
\textsuperscript{203} See, for example, UNICEF (2010).
\textsuperscript{204} See Dowdney (2003).
\textsuperscript{205} See de Benitez (2007).
likelihood of crime and violence. And since the poor tend to have less access to collateral or other safeguards, their livelihoods are often most under threat.

v. Erosion of urban governance in the city

Cities are at the axis where formal government occurs and where states and citizens mediate the social contract. Global, national and local governance challenges are also most immediate and visible on the city frontlines.\textsuperscript{206} Regardless of whether they want to or not, municipal leaders and activists are often impelled to address the direct and indirect effects of urban violence well before national governments, much less international or regional entities. But as this paper shows, the symptoms of urban insecurity are not just a result of a failure of metropolitan or even federal law and order or even socio-economic inequality, but also the degradation or collapse of the equilibrium of expectations between public authorities and citizens.\textsuperscript{207} The physical and psychological separation arising from urban violence can lead to “divided cities” and socio-symbolical segregation that undermines the social and economic structures and formal and informal organizations that constitute a city’s modes of governance.\textsuperscript{208} The progressive deterioration of relations between authorities and citizens and the ways in which people are excluded from participation and planning – what Lemanski (2004) terms a new form of “apartheid” – can unravel the social contract.

A consequence of urban violence on systems of governance is the radicalization of policies of containment and control amongst public, private and non-governmental actors. On the one hand, government authorities may refocus on repression rather than prevention, thus exacerbating exclusion and minimizing citizen engagement.\textsuperscript{209} As Moser and Rodgers (2005) have found, “the policing of urban order is increasingly concerned with the management of space rather than the disciplining of offenders” resulting in the formulation of policies that in seeking to promote safety for the minority can deny local voices and citizen engagement. Both public and private actors are resorting to increasingly securitized forms of regulating what has been called the formal and “night-time economies” in cities. Either in response to muscular state-led interventions or in spite of them, civil society groups themselves can resort to more aggressive and violent means of ensuring neighborhood safety, including vigilantism, lynching and other extra-judicial forms.\textsuperscript{210}

\textsuperscript{206} See McArtney (2000, 1996).
\textsuperscript{207} See Amen et al (2011).
\textsuperscript{208} For an excellent treatment of this in the case of Johannesburg, consult Beall et al (2002).
\textsuperscript{209} For a fascinating account of the reversion of El Salvadorian politicians to hard-line “mano dura” policies, see Sanz and Martinez (2012).
\textsuperscript{210} See Jutersonke et al (2007).
Section 4
Risks and Drivers

Whilst many cities experience chronic urban violence, not all cities are equally violent. In fact there is considerable diversity of experiences across time and space. And yet the varied historical and geographic experience is often overlooked in the rush to report on urban violence in the global South. While some cities are confronting spectacular levels of urban violence – particularly those affected by open warfare between state forces and armed groups or pitched battles between competing cartels – there is not necessarily anything inevitable about violence in cities. Indeed, cities are not necessarily always more violent than rural areas. Nor are bigger, more crowded cities more violent than smaller ones. And while the rate of population growth in cities appears to be connected to violence, it is by no means direct or axiomatic. It is therefore incumbent on both policy makers and researchers to tread carefully into the debate on urban violence and the elaboration of prescriptions for its prevention and reduction.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that an array of cities in particular regions appear to be consistently more exposed to greater and lesser levels of direct and indirect violence over the past decades. It is also the case that experiences of chronic urban violence are to some extent intensified expressions of political, social and economic problems facing societies as a whole. In upper-income settings, certain cities are key sites for highly networked forms of civic protest and public demonstration. They may have also experienced sudden outbreaks of urban violence, often triggered by resistance, but are connected to more fundamental contradictions of the state-building process. The “invisible” fault-lines within cities – whether owing to unequal urbanization, income inequality, local grievances, failures of cultural integration, or under- and unemployment – can undergo massive tremors, sometimes violently in the form of riots, social unrest and war. Particularly in cities with weak institutions and legacies of unrest, “disorganized” expressions of instability can rapidly transform into more organized political protest, contestation and state reprisal.

Section 4 Highlights

Section 4 appraises the risks and drivers of urban violence. It reflects on a number of assumed stressors, including urbanization, urban density, poverty and inequality, youth bulges and unemployment, and wider governance failures. It finds considerable empirical support for urbanization and inequality, but less conclusive evidence for other variables.

The chapter underlines the ways in which cities themselves aggregate risks. It is the cumulative effects of risks, coupled with the spatial-social characteristics of cities themselves, which result in a greater likelihood for chronic urban violence. It notes that there is more research required to understand how risks interact.

211 For a simple non-representative experiment, type “dangerous cities” in Google. The tendency regardless of region or country is to focus on the “most dangerous”, the “most violent”, and the “most insecure”.

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As noted in earlier sections, a number of theoretical frameworks have been mobilized to explain the risk factors that give rise to violence – urban or otherwise. One that is particularly well known is the so-called “ecological model” first invoked by Bronfenbrenner (1977) and applied in the public health domain. Rather than proposing a monolithic causal pathway, the ecological model distinguishes between distinct “risk factors” shaping violence onset and duration at the structural, institutional, interpersonal, and individual levels. It allows for disaggregation of specific risks to be independently examined, as well as their relationships to be assessed so as to craft appropriate mitigation and reduction strategies. Complementary theoretical approaches to assessing the “causes” of urban violence also emphasize its “structural causes” including inequality, poverty and societal influences such as patriarchy and gender norms that sanction or tolerate deadly force as a means of resolving social tensions. What these and other approaches tend to share is a focus on underlying risks as well as a treatment of both identity and agency.

To this end, endemic urban violence can be at least partly explained as a function of the simultaneous aggregation of “risk” factors and a decline in “protective” factors. The rapid accumulation of risks overwhelms local coping systems and reshapes identities, agency and social relations. It is the cumulative effects of overlapping risks, rather than single drivers alone, that matters. Risks can be structural - deeply embedded in urban settings and societies – or more proximate – ranging from the availability of guns, alcohol and drug trafficking. And what may at first appear to be “random” acts of violence due to binge drinking by young men or outbreaks of ethnic violence in crowded markets can be traced to a host of underlying political, social and economic factors shaping male and identity group aggression and their individual or collective sense of grievance and injustice. It is the interaction of these many risk factors that give rise to and potentially escalate urban violence.

The following section considers a number of recurrent risks commonly associated in the literature with urban violence, notably urbanization, urban density, poverty and inequality, and youth bulges.

i. Urbanization and population growth

As has been noted elsewhere in this report, the scale of urbanization is increasing at a dramatic pace in the twenty-first century. The experience of rapid urbanization is not entirely without precedent. Indeed, nineteenth and twentieth century cities experienced processes of massive industrialization and ultimately urbanization, including the movement of populations from rural areas into towns and cities across Western

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213 Variations of the ecological model focus alternately on the interpersonal, collective, national and global levels. See Turpin and Kurtz (1997).
215 See McIlwaine and Moser (2006).
216 It is worth stressing the considerable influence of drug trafficking and transit on the scale and distribution of urban (and rural) violence in Latin America and the Caribbean. This topic has received a high level of attention in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and increasingly Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago. See http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/Facultad/eventos_y_noticias/eventos/2011/Otros/1st_AL_CAPONE_meeting as one example of efforts to begin better understanding the impacts of drug markets on violence in South America.
Europe and later North America. The impacts of urbanization on new and old migrants were complex, and generated a host of impoverishment effects while also generating new opportunities. What distinguishes contemporary urbanization from historical trends is how urbanization is transpiring on a genuinely global scale involving most, if not all, developing countries. In 1950, just 30 per cent of the world’s population were considered urban dwellers but by 2050 this is expected to grow to over 70 per cent (see Figures 4a and 4b). What is new is how most of this growth is concentrated in less developed regions, with growth concentrated especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

It is the pace of urbanization, together with its sheer scale, that is likely to stress national and urban institutions in many developing countries to their breaking point. With few exceptions, the speed of urbanization is proceeding at a rate that exceeds the ability of city authorities and residents to respond. To put this in perspective, it took New York approximately 150 years to grow to 8 million people, while Mexico and Sao Paulo generated the same interval of population growth in less than 15 years. At the time of Pakistan’s independence in 1947, Karachi had a population of less than 500,000. By 2011, the metropolitan region included more than 18 million and generated almost three quarters of the entire country’s GDP.

In the meantime, the number of cities with at least 1 million has increased more than fifteen-fold between 1950 and the present. Dhaka, Kinshasa, and Lagos today are each approximately forty times larger than they were in 1950. Taken together, cities have absorbed nearly two-thirds of the global population explosion since 1950, and according to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), are currently adding a million infants and migrants each week.

### Figure 4a: Urban population growth (thousands): 1950-2050

![Urban population growth graph](http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/index.htm)


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217 In 1800, for example, less than 10 per cent of the US population lived in communities with populations of more than 2,500 people. Today, more than 75 per cent of the population does so. Some analysts contend that structural adjustment programs (SAPs) supported by the World Bank and IMF during the 1970s and 1980s also hastened urbanization across Sub-Saharan Africa. Credit to IDRC – Nairobi for these comments, January 2012.

218 See Richardson and Bae (2005).
The causes of this unprecedented urban explosion are wide ranging. High fertility rates, the reclassification of rural land, and net migration (from rural areas) are often singled out. Some analysts believe that urban growth will be especially intensive in settings also affected by acute climate change, itself regularly associated with conflicts over resource scarcity in population dense areas. There are also expectations amongst some demographers that the speed of urbanization will eventually begin to stabilize and even decrease. While birth rates in many lower-income settings are likely to remain high, they are also projected to drop in the future as countries go through demographic transitions. This may in fact trigger a decline in the rate of urbanization. Other specialists have underlined critical opportunities for cities to “absorb” some new migrants, particularly where cities are able to integrate effectively into international markets, promote sustainable investment, and create economic links – in short, become what Sasken (1991) coined as “global cities”.

Figure 4b: Percentage of populations living in urban areas: 1950-2050


There is a comparatively long debate on the consequences of urbanization, both positive and negative. According to a number of studies by the World Bank, urbanization has played an important poverty reduction function by offering new opportunities for migrants and second-round impacts on those staying in rural areas. Yet the pace in urban poverty reduction has been more gradual than the reductions in overall poverty reduction. These trends have been most pronounced in East Asia and Eastern Europe, though less so in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. Indeed, future projections also anticipate increases in urban poverty in most of these regions. And according to UNFPA, failure to anticipate and prepare for rapid urbanization – including a failure to recognize the needs and rights of the urban poor – will most likely further exacerbate poverty and environmental degradation. Even so, it is worth recalling that different regions experience different forms of urbanization. For example, in contrast to parts of the Americas or Asia, urban

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220 See, for example, Linn (1982) and more recently, UNFPA (2007).
221 According to Ravallion et al (2007) the total decline in the poverty rate for lower and medium-income countries between 1993 and 2002 was 8.7 per cent, with 4.8 per cent attributed to actions in rural areas and 2.3 per cent in urban areas and another 1.6 per cent owing to the population shift effect.
222 See Martine and McGranahan (2010).
areas across most of Sub-Saharan Africa are growing without commensurate industrialization resulting in complex patterns of migration and settlement in “hollow” cities devoid of commensurate services and labor opportunities.\textsuperscript{223}

Another prolonged controversy is related to the connection between urbanization and direct forms of violence, including homicide. Policy makers have regularly blamed rising homicide on urbanization, though the basis for this claim is more contested than most assume. For example, Archer and Gartner (1977) tested this hypothesis by examining city size as a measure of urbanization, focusing primarily on upper-income settings, though also including some examples from Latin America and the Caribbean. Based on cross-national comparisons, they found that larger cities generally featured higher homicide rates than smaller ones. Hence, they concluded that urbanization is directly related to homicide. They noted, however, that absolute city size alone was not the only issue. They also signaled that the relationship between city size and homicide must be understood relative to the national homicide rates: the larger cities within a nation generally feature higher homicide rates, but this is not so across nations. This is why cities of comparable size in different countries can feature markedly different homicide rates.\textsuperscript{224}

Today, from Mexico to Mumbai, spiraling urban growth – what has been called “turbo-urbanism” – is routinely connected by politicians and researchers with escalating rates of crime, delinquency and urban violence.\textsuperscript{225} Many academics have pointed out that it is the \textit{rapid pace} of urban growth and not the urbanization process \textit{per se} that contributes to violence onset and corollary stresses on development. For example, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (2011) and the World Bank (2010) connected rapid urbanization with higher levels of homicidal violence in a comparatively large panel. Working on behalf of the World Bank, Marc et al (2010) observed how: “the annual rate of a city population growth correlates positively with homicide rates ... and this correlation is statistically significant ... especially ... in city agglomerates such as Asuncion, Kathmandu, Nairobi, and Quito”.\textsuperscript{226} This rapid pace of urbanization also appears to be correlated with various forms of armed conflict. According to Population Action International, countries with rapid rates of urban population growth – greater than four per cent per year – were roughly twice as likely to experience civil conflict during the 1990s.\textsuperscript{227}

And yet, even the relationships between rapid urban growth and violence are not clear cut. It is patently obvious that many rapidly growing cities have witnessed a dramatic escalation of violence in urban areas, particularly in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. There is the risk, however, of confusing causation with correlation since there are also instances of rapid urbanization with comparatively less impact on aggregate levels of crime and violence. Indeed, in a review of 55 African and Asian cities, macro-researchers Buhaug and

\textsuperscript{223} See Myers (2011) and Fox (2011).
\textsuperscript{224} For the last three decades the preoccupation with population growth and violence has become a subject of considerable interest. Another contribution emerged from Gizeweski and Homer-Dixon (1995) who observed the tensions generated by rapid urban growth. They found that alongside urbanization, specific risk factors such as episodic economic shocks and the erosion of protective factors such as state capacity and rural options for absorption could make a situation even more vulnerable.
\textsuperscript{225} See Rodgers (2010).
\textsuperscript{226} Marc et al (in World Bank 2010: 18) also note some exceptions such as Duabi, Aleppo, Mumbai and Dhaka which show low homicide rates in spite of rapid population growth.
\textsuperscript{227} See, for example, http://www.populationaction.org/Press/In_the_News/2011/111611ethd.php for a review of the debate.
Urdal (2010) and Urdal (2011) find no strong empirical support for the notion that high and increasing urban population pressure leads to a higher risk of frequency of social disorder expressed as violent deaths. Rather, social disorder is attributed primarily to a lack of consistent political institutions, economic shocks and ongoing (or past) civil conflict. It seems that urbanization is one of a number of possible factors driving violence. Indeed, many of the largest and fastest urbanizing human settlements in the world today, such as Tokyo in Japan or Chongqing in China, have very low crime rates. What is more, historical research on long-term violent crime trends in Europe implies that there might even be a negative relationship between violence and urbanization, insofar as homicide rates declined markedly with the industrialization-spurred growth of cities from the eighteenth century onwards (Eisner 2003).

ii. Urban population density

Alongside urbanization, urban density is often singled out as a determining factor shaping a city’s vulnerability to various forms of urban violence. As noted above, violence has long been associated with urban density, size and heterogeneity. The idea that population density is linked to a prevalence of urban violence is deeply rooted and extends back to Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim in the nineteenth century. In his path-breaking article, Wirth (1938: 23) described urban life itself as one characterized by “personal disorganization, mental breakdown, suicide, delinquency, crime, corruption, and disorder.” He anticipated a certain degree of social (dis)organization and collective (in)action in relation to city’s population density, size and heterogeneity. Forming what later became known as social disorganization theory (described above), he was adamant that large and heavily populated cities witnessed the segmentation of human relations, the pre-eminence of secondary over primary social contact, and a downgrading of interpersonal relationships. The implications were obvious: in worst case scenarios, dense cities were more predisposed to social disorder and organized violence.

But while dense and vertical cities generate a host of contradictory outcomes, violence is not always one of them. Indeed, studies testing variability of violent crime and violent injury using population density as a predictor yield decidedly mixed results. Gaviria and Pagés (2002) have observed how households in a selection of Latin American cities with over one million inhabitants were at 70 per cent higher risk of experiencing violence than households residing in cities with between 50,000 and 100,000. Similar findings have been reported in the US where it is mid-sized cities – and not large ones – that tend to feature higher rates of victimization. Likewise, even in societies that feature comparatively high rural populations, violence is often concentrated in cities as the case of Guatemala amply shows. A paradigmatic example is Nepal.

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228 These findings mirror in many ways the risk factors shaping civil war onset produced by researchers such as Paul Collier and others.
230 According to Wirth, urban density reproduced increased competition and the resulting inequalities further accentuated latent social antagonisms. What is more, heterogeneity led to more social stratification, heightened individual mobility, and increased social fluidity.
231 See, for example, Hasan (2010) for a review of these debates in the case of Karachi, Pakistan.
232 Likewise, it seems that those Latin American cities featuring the highest homicide rates such as Ciudad Juarez or San Pedro Sula also seem to have low to medium population densities. What is more, the three capital cities with the highest urban densities – Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires and Santiago de Chile – also feature comparatively low homicide rates. Interview with Jorge Surr, January 2012.
234 See Matute and Garcia (2007).
where one third of the country’s homicides occurred in the capital city where just three per cent of the population resides.\textsuperscript{235}

More recently, established organizations such as UN-Habitat (2007: 70) have observed how “the prevalence of overcrowding in inadequate dwellings has ... been linked to increases in negative social behaviors, such as domestic violence and child abuse, and to negative outcomes of education and child development.” Research has also suggested that overcrowding may lead to the eviction of some tenants, since congestion increases the likelihood of property damage and may violate rental agreements, and hence more potential for violence. There also appears to be a connection between densely packed squatter settlements where residents do not know one another, weak leadership structures and violence.\textsuperscript{236} UNODC (2011: 70) has detected that population density is a factor influencing homicide and crime. Homicide and density are strongly correlated in the Americas, including in the US where densely populated states report higher homicide rates than those that are more sparsely populated. But UNODC also notes that “[W]hilst population density shows a general correlation with homicide rates, other factors may nonetheless result in unexpectedly high homicide rates in certain less densely populated areas.”\textsuperscript{237}

Densely populated cities are not necessarily always more violent than rural areas. In a large number of countries, cities exhibit lower homicide rates than the national average.\textsuperscript{238} Victimization rates can vary tremendously across cities within countries, and in some cases sexual violence is registered at much higher levels in rural areas as compared to urban ones. City size and density does not always correlate with excess rates of violence. As Rodgers (2010) observes, “while large numbers, density, and heterogeneity can plausibly be considered universal features of cities, it is much less obvious that they necessarily lead to urban violence.” Nor are more crowded cities always more violent; cities like Santo Domingo, Guatemala City and Kathmandu, have very high murder rates in relation to their population, but other very large cities such as Dhaka, Mumbai and Cairo have homicide rates below the national average.\textsuperscript{239}

There are conflicting assessments of the positive association between densely packed slums and various forms of urban violence. Overcrowding – widely understood to imply a high level of homelessness – is said to contribute to strains on household and communal relations, anomie and dislocation, and ultimately insecurity. But even on this elementary point, agencies such as UN-Habitat (2007: 32) are careful about making too hasty a causal claim. It noted how while it is “… too early to associate crime and violence levels with the number of shelter deprivations in slum communities, many researchers are beginning to make a link between inequality and violence in the region’s larger cities.” Indeed, a growing number of studies – including by the present author – report complex forms of safety and resilience in highly populated slums.\textsuperscript{240}

\textsuperscript{235} See World Bank (2010).
\textsuperscript{236} Interview with Paula Meth, January 2012.
\textsuperscript{237} These factors may include strategic interventions of state repression, organized criminal groups operating at borders, or others.
\textsuperscript{238} See data on homicide supplied by UNODC (2011) and World Bank (2010).
\textsuperscript{239} See UNODC (2011).
iii. Urban poverty and inequality

As cities have expanded in population size and geographic scale, so has the total spread of urban poverty and inequality.\textsuperscript{241} It was the concern with the extent of urban poverty and the vast differences between neighborhoods in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that triggered the expansion of social enquiry into urban life, including, unsurprisingly, in cities such as Chicago (which in turn gave rise to the Chicago School). Early sociologists found that the relationships between inequality, exclusion and criminal and inter-personal violence appeared to be more intense in settings characterized by the unequal distribution of resources. Not only was criminal violence more pronounced in cities but intra-urban disparities in violence were correlated with neighborhood income levels: higher income areas suffered from property-related violent crime and more severe forms of violence (chronic or otherwise) concentrated in lower income settings. Many of these same observations are recorded in studies of inequality and criminal violence in the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{242}

Nevertheless, a debate persists concerning the extent to which urban violence – and in particular criminality – are correlated with poverty or inequality.\textsuperscript{243} While poverty has long been considered a key determinant of urban violence, this relationship has been challenged as too simplistic and even dangerous.\textsuperscript{244} Indeed, statistical modeling has shown the ways in which inequality – and in particular income inequality – offers more explanatory power than poverty. Income inequality and the unequal distribution of economic opportunities across groups are believed to promote criminal violence as compared to per capita income which does not appear to have a clear effect.\textsuperscript{245} This applies at the national level when controlling for the distribution of education, ethnic and economic polarization, social capital and poverty.\textsuperscript{246} Some scholars theorize that a similar finding may emerge when examining horizontal inequality and violence, though there is no study that has subjected this hypothesis to robust testing in urban settings.

In urban contexts, Winton (2004) has emphasized how inequality comprises an important form of “structural” violence which in turn triggers more reactionary forms of violence. Inequality and deprivation is not limited exclusively to income, but also lack of access to basic social services, lack of state protection, exposure to systematic corruption, and inefficiencies that most acutely affect the poor.\textsuperscript{247} Winton (2004: 166) has found that “... in situations of widespread and severe inequality, the urban poor are undervalued and marginalized, and their daily living conditions heighten the potential for the emergence of conflict, crime or violence”. Adopting a different tact, scholars such as Giddens (2011) have proposed that increased levels of urban violence are also closely tied to processes of globalization and structural adjustment as well as political

\textsuperscript{242} See Morenoff et al (2001).
\textsuperscript{243} See Moser (2004) and Neumayer (2005).
\textsuperscript{244} Virtually every interviewee consulted in the preparation of this paper rejected a direct causal link between poverty and urban violence. See Annex 1.
\textsuperscript{245} Crime rates and inequality are positively correlated within countries and, particularly, between countries. This correlation reflects causation from inequality to crime rates, even after controlling for other crime determinants. See Fajnzylber et al (2002). A more recent assessment has shown how violent crime also has a negative and significant effect on wellbeing and health – both key measurements of poverty. See Graham and Chaparro (2011).
\textsuperscript{246} See Fajnzylber et al (2002).
\textsuperscript{247} See also Vanderschueren (1996).
democratization. In his view, as the daily living conditions of the urban poor become more precarious (particularly relative to the wealthy), the potential for conflict, crime or violence escalates.

Other prominent examples of structural forms of urban violence (manifested as inequality) are common across South Asia. With some exceptions, South Asian cities and slums are not characterized by large-scale urban violence or criminal gangs that threaten citizens in Latin America and the Caribbean. Rather, certain urban centers and informal settlements in Karachi or Mumbai experience episodic and sporadic outbursts of violence that are often characterized as ethno-religious and targeted against specific identity groups.248 Rather than being cast as a contest between greed or grievance, such violence is widely assumed to emerge as a function of progressive marginalization and the weakened position of labor. It is often the transplanted and displaced working poor who are pushed to the periphery through complex policies of urbanization and modernization that are implicated in violent unrest.249 As experiences in South and Southeast Asia show, there appear to be strong connections between underlying conditions of poverty and inequality that shape and condition the particular forms of urban violence – even if the relationships are neither necessary nor sufficient.250

iv. Urban youth and unemployment

Young, poorly educated and unemployed males are regularly singled out by politicians as the scourge of urban existence and are linked to all manner of delinquency and public disorder. And while a slew of problems are attributed to them, the particular pathways shaping their resort to violence are less seldom interrogated. There is, however, some scientific research undertaken in upper- and middle-income settings on the ways in which young boys and adolescents are conditioned into violent behavior, including in cities.251 Much of this was stimulated by concerns with the characteristics of violence – and primarily interracial or black-on-black – in inner-cities of the US.252 A more recent strain of research has been mobilized by a preoccupation with youth membership in gangs,253 as well the interest amongst military and development actors seeking ways to address the complex challenges presented by armed groups, whether disarmed and demobilized soldiers or former gang members.

Micro-researchers, particularly psychologists and behavioral analysts, have detected a range of connections between the exposure of young boys to domestic violence and later perpetration of violence as adolescents and adults. The iterative cycle of violence between victimization and perpetration appears to span generations. It appears that male children who witness abuse – in war and non-war settings – can also present an increased tendency to commit violence as adolescents or adults, whether in homes or as part of larger organized groups such as armed groups or gangs.254 By way of comparison, female children who witness or are exposed to violence in the home may also be more predisposed to entering into abusive relationships. Empirical studies in a selection of countries have confirmed how women were twice as likely to report abuse

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249 Credit to IDRC – South Asia for comments, January 2012.
250 See Jalil and Iqbal (2008) and Breman (2003).
253 See Hagedorn (2005) and Small Arms Survey (2010).
by intimate partners if their own mothers had been abused. What is more, sexual violence is also often used as a form of coercion and intimidation as well as symbolic demarcation between rival groups in contexts of gang violence and open warfare.

In the meantime, macro-researchers focused more intensively on the relationships between the so-called “demographic youth bulge” and organized violence, in particular armed conflict. Beginning in the 1990s, there are a series of authors concerned with the presumed relationship between populations exhibiting a large proportion of young adults and civil war. Their argument was that as populations move from high to low fertility and mortality rates, a large proportion of the youth population (the youth bulge) will lack employment opportunities and instead resort to social and economic advancement through extra-legal means. In other words, the opportunity costs of joining an armed movement are lowered. While the youth bulge theory is intensely contested, there is some evidence that youth bulges – together with other factors – explain certain forms of organized violence. Indeed, the concentration of youth bulges in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East and the South Pacific – including Afghanistan, Nigeria and Pakistan – suggest more research may be required.

Whether drawing on micro- or macro- research findings, the stereotype of young, increasingly violent males in big cities is frequently advanced by media commentators to justify causal claims between urban slums and violence. There is little doubt that one of the most obvious expressions of urban violence is the marauding street gang. And while gangs have featured as a social phenomenon around the world for generations, their recent regional growth and transnational influence is without precedent. As a result, some policy makers are linking gangs with the spectacular rise in urban violence in some countries of Latin America and the Caribbean as well as Sub-Saharan Africa. What were once small-scale street, corner or vigilante groups are often described as having “graduated” into large-scale global criminal gangs. And yet a closer inspection of sensationalist claims reveals how gangs are also profoundly misunderstood.

There is in fact no unified definition of a gang. A frequently cited description of gangs notes how they constitute “an interstitial group originally formed spontaneously and then integrated through conflict… The result of this collective behavior is the development of tradition, unreflective internal structure, esprit de corps, solidarity, morale, group awareness, and attachment to a local territory.” Reliable information about most gangs is scarce, and official record-keeping is problematic due to under-reporting, deficient data collection and political interference. Basic consensus on the size and scale of gang membership is similarly lacking. Even so, there is consensus that youth gangs are very much urban manifestations, in large part

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255 See Osofsky (1999).
257 Between 1970 and 1999, for example, 80 per cent of the reported civil conflicts occurred in countries where 60 per cent of the population was under 30. See Goldstone (1991) and Fuller (1995).
258 Interview with Cincotta, December 2011.
260 See Jutersonke et al (2009) and Muggah (2012b) for a critical review of the gang literature.
261 See Muggah (2012b) and Gastrow (2011).
262 An example of sensationalist reporting is the website www.mostdangerouscities.com.
because a critical demographic mass of youths is essential for them to emerge. Evidence suggests that up to 15 per cent of youths within gang-affected communities can end up joining – although most studies indicate that on average the figure is somewhere around 3 to 5 per cent.²⁶⁵

The profile of the typical “violence offender” has not changed for the past several hundred years in spite of considerable changes in the rates and distribution of violence globally. Males aged 20–29 are overwhelmingly present in committing murder and other forms of victimization.²⁶⁶ For example, in the mid-1990s, the national homicide rate was roughly 10 per 100,000 as compared to over 1,500 per 100,000 amongst gang members in Boston. In the major cities of Colombia or El Salvador, young males are today 100 times more likely to be violently killed and ten times more likely in Canada or the UK.²⁶⁷ Women and girls, however, are a minority. The wealthiest and most privileged tend to be under-represented while the poorer and lower educated are more prominent.²⁶⁸ And these patterns are repeated in upper-, middle-, and lower-income settings alike. What seems to be the case is one of young, poor and uneducated young members who see gangs as a source of power, prestige and profit. As some gang members are inclined to say: “better to live a short-time and comfortably than for a long time and miserably.”²⁶⁹

Whether a function of gangs or not, homicide and violent assault have retained one sociological characteristic that remains virtually unchanged since the thirteenth century. They are overwhelming the act of adolescents whose victims are frequently their peers. Historically, murders have typically revolved around issues of rights, precedence and honor. Intriguingly, the extraordinary reduction in violence across Western Europe since the seventeenth century is linked to a concomitant reduction in fighting and duels among young men, particularly those emerging from the upper classes and then later the poor.²⁷⁰ In some cases certain groups of young men refused to accept the pacification and disarmament in spite of insistent efforts of ruling authorities and church leaders. However, thanks to a concerted campaign of constraining adolescent violence, Western European homicide rates declined more than 100 times in the past four centuries from over 100 per 100,000 to less than 1 per 100,000 today.²⁷¹

Though public and civic authorities have played a role in shaping violence reduction, cities themselves can play a role in influencing and shaping the gendered patterns of insecurity. A number of feminist critiques have reported how the physical and social spaces of cities reflect the unequal gender relations in a given society.²⁷² Cities highlight the ways in which power and space interact – particularly what gets built, where, how and for whom. Beall (1997) for example, notes how “… cities are literally concrete manifestations of ideas on how

²⁶⁶ Emile Durkheim put the prime age of male murderers in Western Europe at between 25–30 in 1897. Indeed, murderers (and victims) appear to have been getting younger since the nineteenth century according to data from the US and Western Europe. While young murderers who constitute a minority are giving prominence in the media, it is also shaping a perception of the juvenilization of criminal violence.
²⁶⁷ See Small Arms Survey (2010).
²⁶⁸ See Muchembled (2012: 9) and Chesnais (2003, 1982). Interestingly, Chesnais (2003) notes how violence perpetration is distinguished not just by a socio-economic divide, but also a cultural difference. Moreover, behaviors appear to have been rapidly adapted through education, moral persuasion and pressure on young men from upper classes (through bans on duals, for example).
²⁶⁹ Interview with Jorge Srur, January 2012.
²⁷⁰ See Muchembled (2012).
²⁷¹ Ibid.
²⁷² See Beall (1997).
society was, is, and how it should be”. Gender separation was literally “built in” to early nineteenth and twentieth century cities wherein public spaces were dominated by males who were mobile and free to move. Women and girls, by contrast, were expected not to be seen in public spaces and often stigmatized if they were viewed publicly. Suburbanization during the latter half of the twentieth century contributed to more spatial differentiation, including shaping the patterns of labor and mobility to and from urban centers. Public transportation tended to be shaped by the needs of male workforces with comparatively less attention to the specific needs or requirements of women, including with regards to safety and security.

v. Failures in urban governance

A major factor shaping urban violence is the inability of state institutions to regulate and ultimately manage the legitimate use of force. In some cities, systems of law and order, ranging from the police, judiciary, penal systems and other forms of legal enforcement, are dysfunctional and considered illegitimate by the citizens who they are intended to serve. In many cases, formal security entities are simply unable to deter organized violence and may indeed be considered amongst the worst offenders by civil society. There is also evidence that capacity gaps in providing basic and accountable security services is a key determinant shaping urban violence. For example, Soares and Naritomi (2010) have observed the influence of low incarceration rates, among other factors, in shaping “cultures of impunity”.273 Legacies of armed conflict, political authoritarianism and repressive policing are also tightly correlated with the onset and persistence of urban violence. This is because the state and its institutions – including at the metropolitan level - play a fundamental role in constructing both the normative and operational responses to violence and citizens’ experience of it.274

The normalization of violence, then, is systematized through symbols, laws, actors, values and attitudes (sanctioned and codified by the state) that may permit – may even condone – the use of violence to resolve tensions and grievances. An extreme manifestation of these normative codes is the apartheid system in South Africa, where violence became “... normative rather than deviant” and was “... visible across the entire political spectrum.”275 In Colombia, Gaviria (2000) has found how routine contact between young people and criminals can also alter social morals and increase the overall tolerance for a resort to violence: knowledge transferred from career criminals to local crooks is attributed to escalations in crime. When states either over-prescribe violence or lose the ability to manage and monopolize it, the potential for violence often increases. Indeed, states and cities that have failed to reform their security sectors before or after conflicts are often exposed to complex forms of violence. In these and other instances, states lose the institutional means to resolve grievances peacefully, and violence becomes the preserve of a multitude of actors in pursuit of varied and often overlapping interests.

In areas where governance failures are persistent, political violence can form both an overt and covert form of coercion and control. In many cases, elected officials collude with supposedly non-partisan public institutions,

273 Indeed, there is considerable evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, of how offenders involved in urban violence display a high level of recidivism. They are often involved in drug trafficking and suffer some forms of addiction and also feature a low level of education and employment. Interview with Jorge Srur, January 2012.
274 See Koonings and Krujit (1999).
275 See World Bank (2010).
including the security services and community structures as residents’ associations and local service providers. In some cases, the emerging hybrid arrangements may result in coercive forms of mobilization and rent extraction. These forms of violence can give rise to a spiral of revenge and retribution, wherein fierce inter-group struggles can emerge owing to competition between patrons and parties. A recurrent outcome of these tensions is the fight to fill institutional power vacuums. Indeed, where states are weak and lack the ability to exert control over the city, different groups may emerge including so-called “violence entrepreneurs.” Many of them thrive in cities due to access to a ready pool of recruits, but also owing to the complicity of public institutions and powerful patronage networks as has been witnessed from Caribbean cities such as Port-of-Spain and Kingston to cities in Cambodia, Indonesia and Timor-Leste.

277 See Winton (2004).
278 See Townsend (2009), Leslie (2010), and Muggah (2010).
Section 5
Resilience and Resistance

Comparatively little is known about the extent to which fragile cities are able to cope, adapt and rebound from massive shocks or chronic forms of violence. What is often noted instead is the rapid deterioration of state capacities to undertake basic functions – whether deliver services, collect taxes, or manage its territory. But the manner in which formal and informal institutions in supposedly chronically violent cities such as Rio de Janeiro, Port-au-Prince, Beirut, Kingston or Johannesburg are capable of reproducing alternative service functions is also under-examined as are the livelihood strategies adopted by many of the residents within them. And while urban violence and its effects are of mounting concern to elites, elected officials and service providers alike, the underlying modalities and political economies of “real” service provision are often profoundly neglected.

Yet urban violence is both a result of, and a catalyst for, transformations in state and metropolitan governance and, more prosaically, spatial organization. In many cities, for example, certain slum neighborhoods and shantytowns have assumed the character of forbidden gang and crime zones beyond the control of public security forces. As signaled above, the accumulation of risk factors is believed to exacerbate these trends, although many remain contested and poorly analyzed. Of course, in certain cities, slums are often less dangerous than widely presumed. Port-au-Prince’s notorious Cité Soleil, Bel Air and Martissant neighborhoods are cases in point, with most until recently registering amongst the lowest rates of homicide in the Caribbean region as a whole. Insecurity in such areas is of course relative, with some zones within these slums being considered more dangerous to residents (and outsiders) than others.

When it comes to urban violence, however, the relationship between evidence and action is paradoxical. Irrespective of the evidence of rapidly declining direct violence rates, many middle- and upper-class residents may feel compelled to build (higher) walls and elaborate (more sophisticated) security systems to shield...
themselves, giving rise to a Manichean landscape of “safe” gated communities and “violent” slums. According to Gotz and Simone (2009), in some informal settings defined by volatility and unpredictability and control over confined spaces, tensions over unclaimed spaces can lead to the staging of exaggerated and often violent claims of belonging. However, city disorder need not imply that urban spaces are unable to cope with such challenges and ultimately transform.

On the contrary, the “resilience” of cities is a crucial feature that is often overlooked, and one from which important lessons can be drawn. The concept of resilience can be defined as an ongoing process of adaptation/coping of territorially bounded units including the city’s formal as well as informal social, political, and economic institutions and its members and affiliates to exogenous and endogenous stress. Indeed, proponents of the public health approach note how “protective factors” – characteristics of an individual and his/her environment that strengthen the capacity to confront stresses without recourse to violence – play a role in facilitating healing and decreasing the propensity of violence behavior. There is, for example, considerable evidence that a feeling of social connection is an important protective factor against violent behavior.

While still a comparatively nascent area of study, there is a growing body of work examining the critical place of protective factors in enhancing resilience and resistance to urban violence. Drawing largely on the ecological model noted above, protective factors tend to be aggregated at multiple levels. Moreover, it is often the accumulation of such factors that are said to enhance the safety and security of urban residents. Examinations include “social connections” in the family at an early age – including the reduction of child exposure to violence but also their exposure to positive family role models. Other social connections that are considered protective include peer groups as well as proactive community associations and schools and their authorities. Sociologists have also highlighted the role of community networks and productive employment opportunities as “protective.”

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282 Credit to Colin Marx for pointing out this argument. Interview, December 2012.
283 See Muggah and Jutersonke (2012). See also URCV (www.urbanresilience.org) for a review of literature on how formal and informal institutions in cities adapt and cope with situations of chronic and acute violence.
284 The URCV project’s approach to assessing resilience builds on the notions of (i) metabolic flows that sustain urban functions; (ii) governance networks and adaptive capacities of societies to meet urban challenges; and (iii) the social dynamics of citizens in relation (and response) to changes in their built environment. Ibid.
286 See World Bank (2010).
Section 6
What Works and Why

As this report has shown, urban violence is unevenly distributed between and within cities. Indeed, urban violence tends to be highly concentrated in certain areas, described commonly as “hot spots” and “no-go” or “red” zones. These areas also tend to be superimposed over neighborhoods experiencing sharp economic inequalities, exclusion and poverty. It is inadmissible to prescribe universal or generic recommendations to prevent and reduce urban violence that apply across all settings. What may work in one area may not work in another. And while some “social technologies” are potentially transferable, the scarcity of longitudinal data and disagreement over how to measure “improvements” has limited comparable evidence-based analysis of interventions across lower- and middle-income settings.  

Indeed, most experts consulted in the course of preparing this assessment conceded that the evidence base of what works or not is very thin indeed.

It is still important to reinforce that a number of theories and concepts signaled in this paper have had a profound effect on the orientation and structure of approaches to urban violence prevention and reduction. Chief amongst them is social disorganization theory which, as explained above, stresses the ways in which economic disadvantage, ethnic heterogeneity and residential instability contribute to community disorganization and ultimately violence. Other related approaches, notably “broken window” theory, underlines the ways in which urban disorder and decay by shaping and influencing norms can influence patterns of anti-social behavior and criminal violence. These and other theories have been subjected to considerable testing and analysis in upper-income settings such as Boston, Chicago, New York and across Western Europe. What is more, major urban centers such as Mexico, Bogota, and Sao Paolo have also

Section 6 Highlights

Section 6 offers an overview of different strategies introduced to enhance urban safety and security. It draws on historical examples as well as contemporary experiences to demonstrate parallels over time and space. Key interventions include pacification and proximity policing, schemes focused on at-risk youth, urban renewal and slum upgrading and urban governance.

The section highlights the dearth of reliable evaluations and assessments of urban safety and security activities. Even so, it notes that programs combining "hard" and "soft" strategies, that promote local leadership and community involvement, and that are routinely measured over time are more likely to be effective.


288 Visible signals such as broken windows, rubbish in the street, graffiti, abandoned tenements and lack of street lighting all create an environment promoting criminal deviancy. See, for example, Keizer et al (2008).

borrowed heavily from these theories while also introducing novel adaptations and variations aligned with local circumstances.

But even in the US, the evidence base linking neighborhood disorder with crime and urban violence is still comparatively weak. Some researchers have dismissed the connection altogether.\textsuperscript{290} Still other theories that focus on the structural and material “strains” imposed on disadvantaged groups on meeting their own needs are rooted in nineteenth century Emile Durkheim’s concepts of anomie.\textsuperscript{291} When stress accumulates, the resulting frustrations can lead to outbreaks of violence, though even these theories do not adequately explain why some individuals given challenging conditions – and not all – resort to violence.\textsuperscript{292} Rather than simply the would-be perpetrators or the built environment, it appears that a range of factors are critical for influencing the extent of urban violence and opportunities for its containment. These include the motivation of prospective “offenders”, suitable “targets” of opportunity and absent or ineffective “guardians”. Thus, even if offenders are well distributed across a given city, urban violence appears to be concentrated geographically since some communities offer a sufficient number of targets, or too few guardians.

**Figure 5: Targeting urban violence prevention and reduction interventions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harder</th>
<th>Informal</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacification and community policing</td>
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<td>Slum upgrading for urban safety</td>
<td>Urban governance for security</td>
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<td>Urban renewal for security</td>
<td>Promoting social capital and cohesion</td>
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<td>Enhancing protection and reducing risks facing youth</td>
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<td>Softer</td>
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Drawing in some cases on the aforementioned theoretical approaches, there are a wide range of formal and informal initiatives underway that are designed to contain, prevent, and reduce urban violence, particularly amongst low- and middle-income neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{293} These can be loosely divided into “hard” (coercive) and “soft” (voluntary) interventions in low-income settlements. These range from pacification and youth targeted

\textsuperscript{290} See Sampson and Raudenbush (2004).
\textsuperscript{291} See Emmet (2003) for examples of this in South Africa.
\textsuperscript{292} See World Bank (2010).
\textsuperscript{293} See Willman (2010).
initiatives across the Americas and Caribbean to urban renewal and environmental design activities in Sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia. Interventions may also be undertaken by “formal” public institutions or “informal” civil society actors – though many often feature innovative partnerships and collaborations across these two poles. The following section reviews a number of “strategies” deployed across various sectors that appear to have yielded effective results in relation to improvements in urban safety and security and development dividends, particularly in low-income areas. For the purposes of focus and clarity, these interventions are set out on a simplified axis to show how these interventions combine the elements described above (see Figure 5). 294 Only a small sample of the many possible urban violence prevention and reduction interventions is singled out here for illustrative purposes.

i. Pacification and community policing

Urban violence is not a new phenomenon nor are measures intended to contain and reduce it. The preoccupation with pacifying and policing cities is as old as cities themselves. 295 The maintenance of law and order has always been considered a priority in order to maintain the wealth and privilege afforded by cities while ensuring the security of private interests. The focus on “cleaning up” cities through physical and social interventions was as common in the middle ages as it is today. Indeed, many early efforts in Western Europe were spectacularly successful. From the mid-seventeenth century onwards, cities achieved astonishing reductions in violence in ways that did not resort to public displays of torture. Cities instead enacted prohibitions on fighting, monitored and organized at-risk groups, and adopted systems of systematic legislative and financial punishments rather than physical punitive measures. 296

City authorities then as now have developed complex measures to police and manage urban centers. In the past, cities were “... relatively protected islands in a sea of great brutality." 297 Through a combination of repression but also controls on migration, policing of drinking establishments and constraints on managing weapons, extreme forms of lethal violence, vendettas and premeditated murders diminished. 298 Cities deliberately developed responses to potential violence by addressing relative levels of “threat” in the population. For example, records from medieval Western European city ordinances show a recurring preoccupation with extensive surveillance measures adopted to manage new migrants. 299 Over the next

294 See OECD (2009) and Muggah and Wenmann (2011) for a review of “direct” and “indirect” interventions designed to prevent and reduce armed violence.
296 Indeed, the marked decline in violence appear to be linked to both the pacification of public space, but also the abandonment by young men of good families murderous confrontations: these were turned to duels until they were, eventually, criminalized.
298 Indeed, homicides fell sharply in Western Europe in the first half of the seventeenth century, whereas as the number of death penalties for this crime greatly increased. See Norbert (1939) and D’Cruze et al (2006).
299 Then as now, urban stability comes at a cost. It can often result in the exclusion of those without stable employment or permanent residence. In the middle ages as today, many of those wishing to settle in cities and towns, particularly itinerant young men driven out of the countryside owing to demographic pressures, came to the city. Yet only a small minority was permitted to penetrate the local networks in cities. Outside the gates, they instead mingled with throngs of locals banished for having broken the law. Towns refused to accept those not sharing in their presumed values, much less were considered dangerous. The outside “suburbs” immediately outside the gates were not entirely lawless. They served as refuges for those unable to assimilate and a “safety valve” closely monitored by the authorities, including the growth of makeshift tenements and the lively informal economies. It was in contrast to the “civilizing process” underway inside the city walls. See Muchembled (2012).
Urban pacification and policing interventions combine the re-assertion of state authority with efforts to reinstall services in neglected areas. They include both qualified police repression and socio-economic programs. A key tenet of such activities is ensuring that citizens are included in the process of prioritizing and reinforcing security promotion. The more progressive of these interventions draw heavily from social disorganization theory and seek to bring together otherwise disconnected parts of the city through a combination of deterrents and incentives. Drawing explicitly from experiences in North America and Western Europe, a growing number of lower- and middle-income states and cities have promoted pacification and community policing approaches to urban security promotion. They tend to combine intelligence-led and problem-oriented policing (including incentives for good performance) with a wider engagement with social networks, school-based systems, and early treatment of addictions. Several prominent contemporary examples of these interventions include the Pacification Police Units (UPP) in Rio de Janeiro, the law enforcement and military efforts of the Mexican authorities in Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana, the consolidation efforts of the authorities in poorer neighborhoods of Medellin, and the muscular interventions undertaken by the Jamaican authorities into West Kingston.

The outcomes of these and related efforts have yet to be subjected to rigorous evaluation, though anecdotal evidence indicates some positive results and an array of unintended consequences. On the one hand, they are credited with generating sharp reductions in urban violence – both real and perceived – and opening up opportunities for more integration of formal and informal areas of the city. They are lauded with beginning a process of reconstituting the social contract, though most observers are sanguine about whether pacification and community policing alone are sufficient to rebuild state legitimacy. On the other hand, there are still many lingering questions about their effectiveness and their impoverishment effects on residents who are “liberated.” Indeed, there are outstanding concerns about the timing and extent of force that should be applied, the direction and flow of community intelligence and ownership, the extent to which security dividends last, the challenges of rebuilding trust between policing institutions and the poorer segments of the population who may have been previously targeted, how to manage wider issues of new and emerging forms of criminality, socio-economic livelihoods, and tenure security in newly “cleared” areas.

ii. Enhancing protection and reducing risks facing youth

A wide spectrum of interventions have been fielded to simultaneously promote “protective factors” and reduce “risk factors” facing would be victims and perpetrators. Many of these have honed in on family

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300 See Kennedy (2011).
301 See Muggah and Mulli (2012) and Rodgers (2011).
302 See Rau and Prosser (2010).
303 For a review of these interventions consult Felbab-Brown (2011).
304 See Muggah and Mulli (2012) for a review of the intended and unintended outcomes of pacification in Rio de Janeiro, for example.
305 Ibid.
306 Op cit.
planning, parent-child relations, youth identity and belonging, youth education, after-school and recreational opportunities, and community resilience.  

Such interventions are relatively common in upper-income urban settings and routinely scaled-up in municipal public health, educational and welfare schemes. However, such activities tend to be less prominent in poorer contexts where interventions are typically more sporadic and project-oriented. An organizing principle of many protection enhancing efforts is to provide necessary skills and coping strategies for at risk groups to make the most of the opportunities offered by cities while helping them cope with the negative externalities. From a theoretical perspective, then, these approaches tend to draw from the public health concern with “accumulations” of risk while also building on emerging concepts of resilience.

A major priority of such interventions is the provision of appropriate skills and wage-earning opportunities for young males living in neglected urban settings. This is because young unemployed males are perceived to be “at risk” of being perpetrating and suffering from an act of organized violence. Indeed, since the medieval era, municipal authorities were involved in reducing the incidence of violence and rape which were often regarded as “normal” activities amongst young and otherwise un-attached males. In order to alter this behavior, a range of associations sought to supervise and organize boys and young men into neighborhood groups, religious fraternities, shooting societies and other associations. These represented quite deliberate attempts to temper “violent masculinities” and to promote socialization processes that mingled married and unmarried as well as the wealthy and poor. Well-advertised festivals and recreational alternatives were designed to create opportunities to channel the energies of young people in much the same way as music and sporting events for today’s at-risk youth.

Many contemporary interventions draw from these historical antecedents. For example, the introduction of vocational training and employment schemes targeting youth in post-conflict and crime-affected settings are a repetition of an earlier theme. There is in fact a prevalent assumption amongst policy makers that urban violence is in some ways a failure of youth integration into labor markets and persistent unemployment. Although statistical evidence is of poor quality, it appears that unemployment for urban youth exceeds that of other groups by orders of magnitude in many low- and middle-income settings. Long term youth unemployment is also associated with ill health, involvement in crime and delinquency. For decades, governments and agencies have sought to invest in stimulating income opportunities for the poor through cash transfer schemes, job training, microenterprise development and the provision of childcare.

Some of these programs – in particular childcare centers and micro-lending – have enormous potential for scaling up in poor urban areas based on numerous successful examples. Yet targeted youth employment

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307 See UNDP (2010a) and WHO (2002).
308 In Western European urban centers, for example, authorities invested in “youth abbeys” intended to control smaller gangs involved in organized violence.
310 See O’Higgins (2002) and interview with Jorge Surr, January 2012.
schemes are not necessarily the panacea that is often attributed to them. The relationships between youth and, in particular, youth unemployment and violence are still not well understood. There appear to be few, if any, conclusive evaluations of youth employment schemes and crime and violence reduction. Indeed it is not just the existence of employment, but its type and quality which may shape its protective outcome. Interventions that enhance social and life skills are as important as those that provide technical skills training.

Another major area of intervention relates to gang violence prevention and reduction schemes. Most of these efforts appear to be concentrated in North America and increasingly in Central and South America, though other examples exist. Many of these emphasize peer-to-peer and mentorship programs that seek to use former gang members as “positive multipliers.” But the most successful of these interventions in terms of reducing violence and recidivism, such as those undertaken in Boston or Bogota, feature a host of characteristics. First, effective gang violence reduction efforts advance multi-faceted and comprehensive strategies that envision enforcement and more protection and risk-reduction oriented activities as complementary. Second, the critical place of community involvement in creating, validating, and implementing strategies is regularly underlined: where cities endorse such approaches, they are signaling a new social norm. A third important factor is the central role of mayoral leadership – both political and moral – and the development of processes that begin with shaping a vision, move toward setting concrete goals and are followed-up with practical strategies. Finally, the fundamental role of reliable monitoring and evaluation capacities and regular communication are seen as key.

iii. Promoting social capital and urban cohesion

The promotion of social capital and cohesion as a means of preventing and reducing urban violence is not new. It has been systematically advanced as a policy in towns across Western Europe for the past five hundred years. For centuries efforts have been made by public authorities to galvanize adults into dense networks of sociability so as to prevent “undesirable”, dangerous and violent strangers from encroaching in towns or affecting municipal stability. An active investment in social capital and cohesion was intended to generate opportunities for economic exchange through markets, fairs and festivals and reverse latent xenophobia among urban residents. For example, in medieval Western Europe, confederations emerged amongst towns which purposefully extended social linkages. These inter-city linkages served to boost local economies,

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312 Cross city evaluations of labor market programs in OECD countries, for example, show insignificant treatment effects for training. Moreover, a paper by Cramer (2010) highlights the wide range of intervening variables shaping the relationships between unemployment and violence and the weak theoretical and empirical state of the debate.


315 See, for example, TLAVA (2010), for the experience of gangs in Timor-Leste.

316 See NCCD (2010).

consolidate social belonging, and create a greater commitment to local investments and in the arts.\textsuperscript{318} Towns effectively sought to defuse crisis in advance, including by requiring self-control on the part of individuals.

The promotion of social capital and cohesion as a means of fostering the conditions for security has deep theoretical moorings in upper-income settings. For example, social capital formation is regarded as a critical factor shaping collective action and fostering collective efficacy – critical for addressing issues of social disorganization and disarticulation. The networks, norms and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit are regarded as critical factors in binding community relations as anticipated by proponents of the Chicago School discussed in earlier sections.\textsuperscript{319} Likewise, the concept of cohesion – the constellation of local social forces linking people together – is also considered by analysts as a means of promoting security and resilience to shocks and stresses. The tightening of social bonds, it is argued, can empower community actors to make more informed demands on public authorities and divine local forms of protection and self-defense.\textsuperscript{320} Both of these concepts – social capital and cohesion – combine the concepts of trust and solidarity with shared expectations for action.\textsuperscript{321} The relationships between social capital and cohesion with manifestations of urban security have been tested in some cities, including Chicago. Indeed, they have been shown to prevent certain forms of urban violence and victimization by mediating the impacts of structural disadvantages.

Yet it is also the case that social capital and cohesion do not always translate into collective action to prevent or reduce violence. On the one hand, bonding social capital can contribute to safety and security if the leader of a group can impose a value system condemning the use of violence. Bridging capital too can reinforce the resistance of communities to violent actors. Yet strong social ties can also hinder collective action. This is because they can generate dense – even impenetrable – networks that ultimately isolate some members at the expense of others. They can also reproduce forms of collective action that are counterproductive, described by McIlwaine and Moser (2004) as “pervasive” social capital. When social capital is deployed perversely, norms may emerge that sanction and condone violence. Collective efficacy can exhibit a “dark side” wherein communities bond together to undertake actions that may be discriminatory against minority groups, including surveillance, ethnic profiling and vigilante activities. Such outcomes have been observed in communities overrun with drug trafficking networks, drug dons, and gangs. The new emerging norms condone a drug culture that glorifies power, machismo and easy money. Such networks and norms can become institutionalized, and in some cases oppose the values and claims of the state and public authorities.\textsuperscript{322}

There has been renewed interest in the concepts of social capital and cohesion in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries as a means of preventing urban violence. Episodic social unrest in wealthy cities such as London and Paris and protracted experiences of social unrest in poorer cities including Karachi and Kano have been attributed to an absence of adequate interconnectivity and direct engagement of communities in defining their own security and safety priorities. For example, in the wake of London riots in both 2001 and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See Muchembled (2012).
\item See Putnam (1993). See also Coleman (1990 and 1988) for a review of social capital.
\item See an example of this approach toward urban poverty reduction in Sri Lanka at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/drivers_urb_change/urb_society/pdf_liveli_vulnera/Sevanatha_Poverty_Profile1.pdf.
\item See Sampson and Raudenbush (2004).
\item Dowdney (2003) describes this in the case of Rio de Janeiro as a “narcocracy”.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
2011, follow-up reports undertaken by so-called “community cohesion review teams” singled out the central place of deep ethnic and identity-based polarization.\textsuperscript{323} Reports in both instances called for more community cohesion based on contact between and respect for cultures and shared principles associated with citizenship. A series of commissions recommended the launching of national debates focused on youth with a view of revitalizing the concepts of citizenship, education, housing, regeneration and employment (Giddens 2011). Also, major organizations such as the UNDP and World Bank have started redirecting some of their investment portfolios and development programming toward promoting social capital and cohesion over the past decade, including in societies emerging from armed conflict or at risk of experiencing outbreaks of violence.\textsuperscript{324}

iv. Urban renewal for security

Historically, approaches adopted by municipal authorities to address urban poverty tended to adopt intensive social engineering. In many instances, low-income areas and in some cases the poor themselves were treated as a “blight” to be replaced with enhanced physical and social infrastructure and a new middle class. Interventions frequently sought to reclaim city spaces by forcing out poorer residents, enable the inflow of desirable citizens and “renewed” economic productivity. A determined opposition to aggressive processes of “statebuilding in miniature” emerged in the 1960s and 1970s which challenged their wide-ranging negative consequences.\textsuperscript{325} A scaled-down approach gradually emerged that aimed to enhance local engagement and recognize the possibilities for working with existing urban institutions and modes of organization.\textsuperscript{326} Some analysts began to recognize the impressive (if hidden) resources available in poorer communities and the possibilities of identifying means and modes of enhancing their potential through more limited urban renewal interventions.\textsuperscript{327} Indeed, since the 1980s and 1990s a number of governments in South Asia have identified innovative ways of working with private sector actors to harness the unrealized potential of informal settlement land – including investing in renewal and expanding market access.\textsuperscript{328}

More recently, urban renewal interventions have emerged as a possible means to redress urban violence in poorer and low-income inner cities and outlying areas. These interventions have started from the premise that informal settlements offer critical resources that can be built on, fostered and expanded. Some have developed market-based approaches to expanding the “value” of informal land.\textsuperscript{329} Over the past generation, a range of national and metropolitan schemes have been pursued to revive decaying urban areas, including low interest loans and grants to rehabilitate houses, tax incentives to draw in business, social housing schemes, new deal regeneration funding packages, and environmental design efforts to bring disparate populations closer together.\textsuperscript{330} Some of these have been facilitated by a high degree of political alignment but also the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{323} See http://www.cohesioninstitute.org.uk/Resources/AboutCommunityCohesion for a review of the concepts of community cohesion in the UK, including an overview of the outcomes of these reviews.
\item \textsuperscript{324} See UNDP (2010a) and World Bank (2012). Correspondence with Gary Milante in December 2012 and UNDP BCPR representatives, January 2012.
\item \textsuperscript{325} See Kaplan (1963).
\item \textsuperscript{326} See Jacobs (1969).
\item \textsuperscript{327} See de Soto (2001) who signaled the possible role of granting land tenure to the poor as a means of accelerating development potential.
\item \textsuperscript{328} See Mukhija (2001).
\item \textsuperscript{329} See, for example, de Soto (2001).
\item \textsuperscript{330} See, for example, Schlomo (1968), Ray (1977), Newman (1972).
\end{itemize}
anticipation of major global events such as the Olympics, the World Cup or a Global Trade Fair. At the same time, lessons from some settings, particularly in developed countries, suggest that an over-reliance on the private sector and free market approaches may generate unsatisfactory returns and that the intractability of challenges in low-income areas may result in schemes being prematurely abandoned or replaced when results do not emerge rapidly enough.\(^{331}\) Other lessons are that the focus should not be narrowly on “physical” aspects of regeneration such as public housing, but also on social and economic renewal efforts.

Indeed, the privatization of gentrification – itself an amalgam of corporate and state power – has led to “urban regeneration” or “urban renewal” as central agendas in the developed and developing world. But retaking the city for the upper and middle classes involves more than privatizing real estate. It is a vehicle for transforming new landscape complexes that integrate housing, retail, culture, employment – in short, social and economic relations. The process of gentrification weaves together international capital markets with estate agents, merchants and governments.\(^{332}\) These strategies are in essence a capital accumulation plan for urban economies with the goal of fostering linkages between the providers of social housing, private investors and those responsible for policing, as well as between local regeneration agencies, authorities and national governments. Indeed, the pacification program launched by the state and city of Rio de Janeiro in 2009 has gentrification as one of its core objectives in “re-connecting” the slums in the hills with the middle class living on the asphalt.\(^{333}\)

There is a growing tendency toward coordinating urban regeneration across national boundaries. There is increasingly a focus on balanced approaches to bring people back to cities, though some suggest this amounts to the colonization of brown areas by the middle and upper classes (Smith 2002). To a politician, planner or economist, “social balance” in Rio de Janeiro or Mumbai implies bringing "back" the middle class - a self-interested appeal. There is a need to interrogate the symptomatic silence. The use of pseudo-scientific language of "regeneration" potentially denies social and deeply political origins of neglect and the politics of winners and losers. And while the "re-conquest" of the city is held out to be socially neutral, it potentially sugarcoats gentrification. It is worth noting, however, that there is comparatively little discussion on issues of urban regeneration and gentrification outside of non-conflict settings.

v. **Slum upgrading and urban safety**

With an estimated one billion people living in slums and as many as 1.4 billion by 2020,\(^{334}\) a concerted focus on “upgrading” is one of the hallmarks of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century urban planning.\(^{335}\) Slum upgrade programs became increasingly common since the 1970s as a counter to more traditional

\(^{331}\) Giddens (2011) notes that “apart from the odd showpiece project, providing incentives and expecting private enterprise to do the job is ineffective .... So many oppressive circumstances come together in the inner city that reversing processes of decay once they have got under way is ... exceedingly difficult’. See also Satterthwaite (2002).

\(^{332}\) See Smith (2002).

\(^{333}\) See Muggah and Mulli (2012) for a review of the pacification program.

\(^{334}\) The growth of slums in the last 15 years has been unprecedented. In 1990, there were nearly 715 million slum dwellers in the world. See UN-Habitat (2011a) and Fox (2008).

\(^{335}\) In Africa, UN-Habitat estimates that nearly three quarters of urban residents in Africa reside in slums.
strategies, such as razing slums and resettling populations.\textsuperscript{336} Moreover, UN-Habitat (2007) alleges that some countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Thailand and Tunisia managed to reduce slum growth over the past two decades through improvements in service delivery, better housing and employment policies. Indeed, the seventh United Nations Millennium Goal calls for the improvement of the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020 and a host of guidelines have emerged to set out principles for “positive” slum upgrading.\textsuperscript{337} Country-driven programs have been developed with support from agencies such as the World Bank with a view of improving services, promoting growth and encouraging more equitable distribution.\textsuperscript{338} In countries with stronger analytical base on issues of urbanization and urban poverty, there tended to be more detailed attention to issues of pro-poor slum development.

The promotion of slum upgrading is based on an assumption that poverty alleviation interventions in informal settlements can stimulate transformations in urban safety and ultimately real and perceived security. It is worth noting, however, that the outcomes of slum upgrading are still highly contested with some observers detecting varying socio-economic dividends for the urban poor.\textsuperscript{339} Some analysts have found that the while evidence of “improvements” is limited\textsuperscript{340}, the impacts of slum upgrading reveal some incremental gains with regards to service delivery, including security promotion. Assessments of the so-called “new generation” of slum development efforts in Latin America\textsuperscript{341} have also detected improved quality of life and violence reduction.\textsuperscript{342} The World Bank’s Water and Sanitation Program (2009a) also undertook a series of robust evaluations and detected credible gains in relation to improvements in livelihood opportunities in the small- and medium-enterprise sectors, improvements in health and environmental conditions, better access to paths and roads, reduction in crime following the installation of street lighting and the provision of recreational centers and youth training.

Some of the more negative experiences with upgrading programs are attributed to weak government institutions, challenges in acquiring the land on which communities were to be upgrading which led to major delays, overvalued pricing, and poor quality of physical works. In some communities, there have been major problems with maintenance and cost recovery.\textsuperscript{343} There are also concerns that unless underlying structures of

\textsuperscript{336} See Buckley and Kalarickal (2006) who reviewed 278 World Bank financed projects seeking to improve shelter conditions over the past thirty years in more than 90 countries.

\textsuperscript{337} A so-called “multi practice approach” has emerged to shape slum upgrading. Launched by UNDP, and supported by a host of scholars and practitioners, this approach emphasizes a full spectrum awareness of poverty, a multi-sector approach, the critical place of design in shaping social and physical integration, the importance of scale, the role of public-private partnerships, the influence of state reform and the importance of inclusion.

\textsuperscript{338} These are often developed in the context of Poverty Reduction Strategies, or national development plans. There is a lively critique about the extent to which these plans reflect local priorities or are adopted by local authorities. See Vanderschueren et al (1996).

\textsuperscript{339} While the renovation of neighborhoods generally increases their value, it seldom improves the living standards of its low-income residents who are often forced to move out. Even in cases where public good are formed (improved schools and police), the resulting increase in taxes and rents force migration to more affordable neighborhoods, often into areas of greater social exclusion. See Muggah and Mulli (2012).

\textsuperscript{340} Indeed, meaningful appraisals are hampered by the absence of longitudinal baseline data regarding the situation prior to most upgrading efforts. In some cases, proxy data selected on the basis of availability has not proven sufficiently granular or representative to measure changes over time. For example, the Medellin Integrated Urban Project was monitored according to homicide rates and HDI ranking – but these measures were insufficient to capture more subtle changes in safety and security, particularly in marginal areas where data collection capacities were weakest. See Werlin (1999) for a range of critical insights.

\textsuperscript{341} See Riley et al (2001).

\textsuperscript{342} See Samper (2011).

\textsuperscript{343} Interview with Maninder Gill, December 2011.
power and control are addressed, issues of land tenure or the control of neighborhoods by predatory gangs (often in collusion with state authorities), urban renewal schemes are purely cosmetic. Still others have emphasized the importance of not just investing in “safer” cities, but also more “just” and “humane cities” – places that are not just unthreatening but also “full of life.” This echoes, in many ways, Lefebvre’s (1996) call for the “right to the city” that might combine the practical needs of everyday life with substantive rather than abstract conceptions of modern citizenship.

Many of these and other early slum upgrade efforts were noticeably quiet on issues of safety and security. In the past, slums were often viewed by urban elite as dangerous no-go areas and so-called under-governed spaces where non-authorized groups and informal economies held sway. Precisely for these reasons, they were often ignored or worse. More recently, there has been a change in how governments engage with slums when it comes to violence prevention and reduction, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean (Riley et al 2001). Previously addressed through repression and containment strategies, some observers have detected a shift in approach from the 1990s onwards as local authorities became preoccupied with the criminal and potential environmental catastrophes arising from policies of repression and neglect.344

There are a slew of reasons for the limited engagement of urban planners and upgrading efforts more generally with questions of urban safety. In some cases, issues of urban crime were considered to be the purview of national or state-level policing actors and thus too sensitive for local municipal engagement. The fear of “politicizing” already volatile community-based processes frequently discouraged more proactive partnerships across sectors. As a result, safety and security priorities tended to tip-toe around, or at best, pursued in parallel as side projects with a narrow focus on local “community safety audits”, “crime prevention through environmental design”345, or the more widely known “safer-city” methodology which sought to strengthen local capacities through partnerships, participatory consultative frameworks, and other measures.346 Even so, what all of these efforts have in common is their effort to close the gap between formal and informal settlements and reduce the “social distance” between communities while marginalizing more repressive and illicit structures and institutions.

While focused predominantly on poverty reduction, a host of interventions seeking to improve living conditions in slums over the past two decades have sought to indirectly engage with questions of urban safety. The Local Partnership for Urban Poverty Alleviation Project in Dhaka, the Kenya Slum Upgrading Program in Nairobi, the Douala Infrastructure Program, or the Integrated Community Development project in Port Moresby were all efforts launched by national and metropolitan governments to upgrade essential infrastructure, promote open public spaces, formalize land title and tenure and improve housing. Many were complemented with targeted interventions to promote income generation through job training and micro-finance schemes and support for local enterprise. In some cases, they also invested in health care systems, parks and leisure centers and other education opportunities for at-risk groups. As such, these programs are

344 See, for example, UN-Habitat (2011a and 2011b).
345 A variation of this is the so-called crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) model which encourages a range of modifications to the built environment – from lighting, visibility, barriers, cameras and other factors – to shape the vulnerability of residents to violent criminality. See IADB (2003).
346 Interview with UN-Habitat, January 2012.
lauded for enhancing the conditions for local resilience and promoting protective factors without focusing explicitly on the manifestations of urban violence. At the same time, a number of urban upgrade and slum renewal schemes have also aimed to improve livelihoods while also directly influencing safety and security. Prominent examples include the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading Program (VPPU) administered by the Cape Metropolitan Council in South Africa, the Medellin Urban Integrated Project (IUP), the Morar Carioca Project in Rio de Janeiro, Consejo Nacional de la Vivienda (CONAVI) in Caracas, an urban regeneration project in Ciudad Juarez (Todos Somos Juarez) and the Favela Bairro project in Rio de Janeiro. Many of these interventions emphasize a combination of investment, service delivery, physical infrastructure investment and training. Inspired by theories associated with social connectivity, they also seek to deliberately bring together the formal and informal areas of cities and promote more exchange between them. It is anticipated that this multi-track approach successfully builds up the local stock of capital while also bridging divides.

One prominent example is the Medellin-based IUP scheme which is credited with major reductions in violence between 2003 and 2007. Household surveys of community residents, however, have shown that these interventions served to open up social and physical forms of communication and exchange between informal and formal areas. These networks allowed for information exchange, rapid responses to violence when it occurred, and helped identify solutions such as mediation. Another “successful” case is the Favela Bairro project which particularly sought to transform some 148 so-called “informal” settlements (favelas) into “formal neighborhoods (bairro) from 1994 to 2000. The largest urban upgrade project ever launched in Latin America, the intervention promotes basic urban services, the physical reconfiguration of favelas, income generation and training program, and legalization of land tenure.

Paradoxically, while some of these interventions have successfully reduced violence, they have not necessarily generated a similarly positive impact in relation to urban poverty. Indeed, recent surveys of the VPPU, IUP and Favela Bairro programs have noted that while some quality of life and safety indices have improved, the social and economic integration of these settlements in the city have been less impressive. In the case of the VPPU, upgrading from slums to more formal housing and improved collaboration with local police has impacted positively on violence but poverty rates have remained stubbornly high. Moreover, in the case of the Favela Bairro, while violence rates seem to have decreased, international agency involvement has itself unintentionally disempowered some communities by reinforcing top-down development practices.

347 Interview with Juma Asiago and Elkin Vasquez, December 2011 and January 2012.
348 The VPPU appears to be generating some important impacts on homicide violence rates. It focuses on regenerating public spaces, improving visibility of areas to enhance local surveillance, improving leadership and others activities.
349 See Samper (2011) and Lepik (2010).
350 The reigning political party of Medellin claimed that decreases in homicides coincided with dramatic increases in investment in urban upgrading in selected slums.
351 Recent research drawing from architects, urban planners, policy makers and community members have also mapped out security perceptions amongst a selection of favelas that participated in Favela Bairro over a decade long period.
352 Interview with Paula Meth, January 2012.
vi. Urban governance for security

Alongside the push for urban renewal and support for slums has been a growing chorus to transform modes of urban governance in order to stimulate social cohesion and economic development. Internationally, this has been led by international agencies such as UN-Habitat but also locally, in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. In calling for “good”, “good enough” or even “best fit” approaches, proponents of urban governance draw attention to the often rent-seeking, patronage-led and elitist relations that systematically undermine modes and modalities of equitable urban governance. They also challenge the overly technocratic aspirations of urban planners who call for large-scale social engineering in urban slums rather than grappling with politics and economics as they are. In Africa, for example, the concept of governance as an expanded arena for civil society cannot be disconnected from issues of legitimacy of traditional power structures that predominate in cities. The concept of “citizen security”, for example, emerged in Latin America and the Caribbean as a way of framing a more holistic approach to promoting safety and enabling wider social and economic development.

The fact is that governments are central to planning and implementing interventions designed to address violence in the city. At the root of many failed strategies is not always a lack of political will, but according to the director of the urban governance program for UN-Habitat, a lack of ability amongst municipal governments who do not have the requisite personnel, skills and capital to address rapid urbanization. Urban governance – and in particular urban security sector governance – is thus a critical, if under-appreciated, feature of effective urban violence prevention and reduction. Many initiatives to promote urban safety lack effective systems of urban governance. There are, according to UN-Habitat, few normative frameworks setting out rules and responsibilities between overlapping layers of government. Clear role definition could allow for improved communication, fewer transaction costs, and complementary action plans to improve more effective and efficient use of public resources. The risk of reducing urban safety to an “add-on” or to the police may result in failed opportunities to develop more appropriate entry-points.

The devolution and decentralization of certain core governance functions from national and regional governments to municipalities is a hallmark of urban governance. When accompanied with adequate and transparent resource transfers and municipal resource generation, urban governance is believed to promote more capable, accountable, effective and responsive public sectors that serve the interests of the poor. As important as urban governance may be, it is exceedingly difficult if not impossible to “create” from the

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354 See, for example, Abiodum (1997), Olukoju (2003) and Rakodi (2002).
355 See the LSE Cities and Fragile States project (http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/Research/cafs.aspx).
356 See the LSE Cities project at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/LSECities/home.aspx.
357 See, for example, Gandy (2006).
358 See, for example, the Citizen Security program of the IADB at http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/citizen-security/citizen-security,1200.html.
359 Interview with Elkin Vasquez, December 2011.
360 UN-Habitat launched the Global Campaign on Urban Governance in 1999. A declared intention of the campaign was to eradicate poverty through improved urban governance. The campaign builds on the Urban Management Program (UMP) established in 1986 and currently involved in supporting a network of 40 partner institutions and over 140 cities in 58 countries. Interview with Juma Asiago, January 2012.
outside. And while the decentralization of core functions to local governments may have generated important safety dividends in cities with strong institutions such as Bogota, Medellin or Rio de Janeiro, commensurate efforts have yielded uncertain outcomes settings featuring weak structures and capacities as is the case in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans or parts of Central and South Asia. For example, efforts to delegate aspects of security management to mayors and municipal authorities in Afghanistan’s 153 municipalities have been challenging owing to the way local authorities are more responsive to the center and suffer major capacity gaps.

A corollary emphasis of proponents of urban governance relates to reinforcing the capabilities and participation of non-state civic actors. Indeed, a key tenet of urban governance is promoting the “interaction” of local residents and associations with public institutions, including mayors and line services. This is not just a matter of rights and citizenship, but also practically connected to ensuring the survival of interventions and local buy-in to action plans. As noted earlier, residents – and in particular poorer residents – may be reluctant to pay for new user fees or taxation if they are not clearly explained the concomitant returns. Indeed, interventions from urban renewal to policing can and do frequently generate new violent outbursts due to poorly articulated strategies, badly managed interventions and unfulfilled expectations. The critical role of local organizations and grassroots actors as well as mediation and grievance mechanisms is an area that needs more attention from external donors. Indeed, UNDP and other partners have devoted considerable resources to supporting “national peace architectures” and “visioning processes” to precisely this end, including in capital cities across Sub-Saharan Africa.

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361 See, for example, Vetters (2007).
363 See, for example, Muggah and Sisk (2012).
Concluding Reflections

The world is rapidly urbanizing and the share of urban dwellers residing in impoverished corners of cities is expanding. The shifts in urban growth and concentrations of urban poverty are especially pronounced in cities across Latin America and the Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan Africa, but also in South and Central Asia. Across these regions and others, a considerable number of large and middle-sized cities are confronting chronic and acute forms of urban violence. A widely dispersed range of policy makers and scholars are becoming aware of the dilemmas posed by urbanization, urban poverty and urban violence. They are required to reach across disciplines and there is some evidence of cross-fertilization to better apprehend the implications of these patterns. There is as a result a modest but growing awareness of the direct and indirect impacts of urban violence ranging from victimization to eroded livelihoods, to the rise of gated communities, new forms of segregation and the restructuring of urban landscapes.

The fact is that globalization – and in particular the rapid diffusion of new technologies, communications and financial relationships – is affording opportunities for cities and local governments to play a revitalized political and social role from the international to the local levels. Cities are in some instances more nimble than nation states which are increasingly finding it difficult to manage and navigate global dilemmas. Large-scale environmental risks and volatile markets operate far outside the control of solitary countries and states are also often too overwhelmed to adequately address the diversity of needs found within dynamic and pluralistic urban areas. As noted by Giddens (2011) and others, city governments may be more “agile forms for managing the global.”

Some emerging research priorities

- More applied field research and household survey data collection based on valid and defensible standards
- A study of innovative information and social media technologies and their potential contribution
- Research on the interaction of different direct and indirect impacts of urban violence
- More research into the long-term effects on individual, family, household and community exposure
- Testing specific risk factors such as urbanization and unemployment against violence onset, duration and severity
- Assessments of how fragile cities and their institutions cope, adapt and rebound from massive shocks and chronic forms of violence
- Develop a more robust evidence base of what works and what does not and the unintended consequences of efforts to promote urban safety

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facilities that form the social base for economic productivity and by ensuring socio-cultural integration and fostering dense networks of reciprocity while also allowing space for participatory forms of political representation and urban management.

Yet at the same time, globalization has also been singled out as a process which is exacerbating and intensifying urban violence. Indeed, Davis and de Duren (2010) observe how cities are at the interface of global processes and are themselves increasingly engaged in licit and illicit transnational flows that “operate at scales and through activities outside the reach of national institutions.” Moreover, associated rapid geo-political and economic realignments above and below national governments are presenting new challenges to the “political order and institutions of the modern state.” This has, they argue, decreased the ability of states and national institutions to regulate violence much less monopolize it. Coupled with the scaling-down of identity categories, Davis and de Duren fear that “cities are ever more likely to stand at the front lines of battle and conflict.” Around the world, they claim, metropolitan populations are being “thrust into violence, while in these embattled cities the commitment to civil rights and democratic deliberation are frequently cast aside in the quest for security.”

Oddly, the central place of cities is only very slowly being recognized by governments and agencies involved in promoting security and development beyond their borders. International financial institutions such as the IADB and World Bank have made some modest inroads into supporting urban violence prevention and reduction. Internationally, the UN-Habitat’s Safer Cities Program, the International Center for the Prevention of Crime and Violence, and the European Forum for Urban Safety are examples of agencies and networks seeking to promote a more targeted engagement. Several international alliances have also been formed to build a more solid knowledge base on the subject ranging from mayors’ associations in North America, across Latin America and Western Europe as well as the WHO violence prevention alliance, the OECD-supported International Network on Conflict and Fragility and the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development. A very preliminary list of these networks is included in Annex 4 of this report.

Most importantly, cities themselves are starting to identify ways of collaborating across and within state borders. Since at least the 1970s, if not well before, cities have launched formal collaborative initiatives to generate investment, identify new forms of employment and share strategies on urban safety promotion (see, for example, Annex 2). At least 50 of Europe’s largest cities have been involved in such arrangements since 1989 and Asian cities more recently. Many of these networks have developed medium- and long-term strategic plans to promote renewal and regeneration plans with local government authorities, civic groups and private agents. More than 600 mayors have also joined a campaign against illegal weapons in the US, influencing federal and state-level policy. Some cities not only offer capacity, but also the real potential for scalability in ways that more dispersed population settlements simply cannot. Cities are thus an obvious entry point for developing pro-poor and anti-violence campaigns. The question, of course, is how can outsiders support these efforts, if at all?

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Cities are political, social and economic entities in their own right and their authorities often have a vested interest in proactive governance. The potential role of mayors in stimulating effective policies is widely acknowledged, with leadership being a key ingredient for promoting urban agendas and raising their profile.\textsuperscript{367} Cities are increasingly coming to complement states in the construction of political, social and economic identities that are considered most legitimate by citizens.\textsuperscript{368} This does not necessarily imply a return to the paramount place of “city states” of old, but rather the emergence of new forms of political power and representation – what might even be described as a “dual sovereignty” – in relation to regions and nation states. Cities – and increasingly cities in developing settings – are themselves nodes of international production networks that are increasingly de-territorialized from state moorings and highly influential. Moreover, cities such as Cape Town, Lagos, Moscow, Mumbai, Sao Paolo, and Shanghai challenge more traditional urban centers not just in size and density, but as leading incubators of a global economy.\textsuperscript{369}

Traditional distinctions between “northern” and “southern” or “developed” and “developing” cities may be increasingly unhelpful from both a policy and a research perspective. This is especially the case because extreme forms of urban poverty and violence persist in highly developed cities while enclaves of ultra-modern production and affluence are dispersed across poorer cities and their sprawling slums. And yet rapidly growing metropolitan areas, large and intermediate cities from Africa to Asia and Latin America are growing at an unprecedented pace. Unlike cities of old, the link between “new cities” and wider investment in public works and social reproduction is less pressing. There is in fact a tendency toward more authoritarian (or revanchist) policies in many of these cities as authorities and urban elite seek to safeguard the means and modes of international production as well as their own security. These authoritarian tendencies are justified to make cities safer for gentrification, segregation and, ultimately, a larger tax take. Resistance and locally occurring resilience are often casualties of efforts to make streets “safer.”

Although in absolute terms more people may face poverty and insecurity in large and mega-cities, it is in fact medium- and small-sized cities in the developing world which are even more at risk. This is because they are generally less well-resourced in terms of professional capacity, governance and finance. Their vulnerability is also greater because of more limited investment in infrastructure and urban services such as water supply, solid waste management systems and health services.\textsuperscript{370} In addition, there is less experience of working with humanitarian and development actors and other international agencies. It is not in anyone’s interest to be complacent about the looming challenges ahead. There is insufficient data to accurately map, assess and predict the distribution of urban ‘hot spots’ (regions, cities and areas within cities) at risk of major urban crises. Policy makers, practitioners and researchers must equip themselves with the analytical tools and skills to prepare for and mitigate these challenges lest the urban dilemma turn to disaster.

\textsuperscript{367} In the US, city mayors have become powerful political and economic agents. More than 600 city mayors have abandoned reliance on federal attempts to pass gun control legislation and filed lawsuits against gun manufacturers, while strict “quality of life policies aimed at homeless populations are credited with making some positive changes. See http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/.

\textsuperscript{368} See Taylor (1999, 1995).


\textsuperscript{370} See Water and Sanitation Program (2009b).
Annex 1
Evidence Gaps and Emerging Questions

Effective urban violence prevention and reduction requires routine and reliable data generation and analysis

While evaluations are few and far between, there appears to be consensus amongst practitioners and academics that solid evidence and analytics are crucial for effective urban violence prevention and reduction. The ways in which data are collected are wide-ranging, but the importance of such information for informing priority setting, shaping the design of interventions, managing expectations amongst stakeholders, communicating results and making course-corrections is widely agreed. In some cases, autonomous entities such as universities and research institutes are responsible for overseeing data harvesting while in others, inter-sector monitoring systems and observatories consisting of governments, private sector actors and civic organizations play a more prominent role.\(^{371}\)

A major area for investment of research is in the generation of reliable, valid and representative time-series and geo-referenced data on urban violence in low-income settings of Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America and the Caribbean, Central and South Asia. Such data could be generated from existing bodies or through consortiums designed for this purpose. Moreover, data should be supported with standards and protocols of good practice, including those produced by international entities such as UNODC and WHO. Moreover, there is a critical need to invest in both public administrative and non-governmental data collection capacities in under-serviced areas of Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa and South and Central Asia in particular. Such research could also be supplemented with insights into the relationships of particular clusters of “risks” and the resilience effects of “protective” factors.

The long-term effects of urban violence prevention and reduction efforts require greater empirical study

There is some anecdotal evidence that effective interventions to prevent and reduce violence amongst the urban poor combine both hard control and soft prevention tactics. Where subjected to controlled study, it is also apparent that short-term measures ranging from the enforcing by-laws on firearms and alcohol, targeted policing interventions, and certain forms of urban renewal can generate sharp reductions in organized violence. But it is also the case that the effects are often limited over time. Much less is known about medium- to long-term interventions that de-concentrate poverty, promote more income and horizontal equality, or sanction norms condemning urban violence. The cost-benefits and value for money of these measures are seldom interrogated.

\(^{371}\) Regional and local crime and violence observatories have also emerged in dozens of countries, many of which draw on mixed data streams ranging from vital registration, hospital and mortuary records, police and penal statistics, court registries, media and archival reviews, and household surveys. See Krause et al (2011) for a review of observatories.
Much greater attention should be devoted to assessing the real and perceived outcomes and impacts of urban violence prevention and reduction efforts in middle- and lower-income settings. There is still not enough known about how, for example, slum upgrading interventions affect patterns of violence over time or local coping and adaptation strategies. Researchers should be encouraged to work with policy makers and practitioners to “test” interventions from the outset, including through randomization and experimental design measures. Research needs also to feature an historical approach that captures longer-term changes as well as qualitative methods to demonstrate wider perceptions amongst intended beneficiaries and stakeholders.

The political economy of urban violence and the ways in which public and private authorities are implicated requires attention

This paper has shown how urban violence is often a function of a convergence of risk factors and a failing of protective factors. Moreover, urban violence can also change over time as a result of value-based codes sanctioning violence, transitioning into forms of revenge and vengeance, reproduced in the political arena as protest and then reemerging later as a form of criminality. In almost all cases, public institutions shape its direction, incentivize or deter its reproduction, and play a role in its expansion, containment and termination. In certain fragile cities, political elite may in fact be driving urban violence either to secure new rents, distract attention from persistent challenges, or otherwise.

There is comparatively little engagement with the political economy of violence in the city. While the cases of Cape Town, El Salvador, Karachi, Sao Paulo and a small number of other mega cities are receiving some critical attention, there is an absence of serious treatment of these issues in surrounding countries. In some cases, such silences are understandable given the ethical and security-related risks of such investigations for researchers. There is some treatment of how structural forms of violence – particularly development interventions targeting the poor – generate in certain cases violent resistance. There is also some treatment in the gangs literature on the collusion between formal nodes of authority and ostensibly illegal armed groups. But a focused research agenda on the wider factors shaping such collusion, its character and outcomes is urgently needed.

The place of communities in shaping urban violence prevention and reduction outcomes is less well understood

Urban violence affects city neighborhoods and their communities in myriad ways. Yet community residents – particularly in poorer areas – are often neglected by municipal authorities in the identification and design of intervention priorities and strategies. In some cases, this neglect can fuel resentment and resistance. This paper has noted how the creation of mechanisms and platforms for “communication” and “cooperation” are a central pillar of any “full community” response. As is widely recognized by development practitioners, the participation and ultimately ownership of interventions by communities is central to ensuring their longevity, much less effectiveness. It is only through their active participation can trust be rebuilt, social networks re-

372 Notable exceptions include the work of Bowden (2011), Rodgers (2010), and Arias (2004).
activated, and collective action achieved. Community engagement is not just an add-on, but an essential feature of the social contract and legitimate governance in most urban settings affected by chronic violence.

International and national development agencies often struggle to find effective ways to identify, support and empower communities. Often they rely on intermediaries – whether public institutions or local non-governmental entities. But the legitimacy of these intermediate actors, the modalities of community engagement, and the political and social dynamics of cooperation are seldom parsed apart. Moreover, the ways in which intermediaries are themselves influencing or affected by urban violence are also under-examined. Finally, the implications of overzealous external engagement is also known to negatively influence community participation in complex ways, including by reducing local leverage in response to newly empowered nodes of authority. There is a need for more research on local strategies of cooperation, cooptation and resistance in relation to urban violence, particularly amongst the poor.

**A future over-the-horizon agenda on urbanization, urban poverty and urban violence is critical**

There is little doubt that the issues of urbanization, urban poverty and urban violence are preoccupying military and development establishments and affected governments. There is also evidence that the urban dilemma may well intensify in some parts of the world, including in cities where hyper-urbanization is occurring and comparatively limited research is being undertaken. Researchers are becoming increasingly aware of the challenges. The emergence of new methodological approaches – from geo-spatial tools to social media and new information technologies – promises to expand the repertoire of lenses available, hopefully to positive effect. But as specialists grapple with today’s challenges, there is a risk that they miss out on tomorrow’s catastrophes.

While not addressed at length in this paper, both climate change and new forms of health-related pandemics are both real risks confronting cities. The apparent increase in extreme weather events and other natural hazards risks driving up (rural-urban) population displacement and new patterns of inter-urban migration. Urban disasters and related violence are already starting to dominate the agendas of humanitarian agencies, possibly serving as a canary in the mine. In the meantime, over-crowding, poor-living conditions, and reduced access to clean water and sanitation in mega slums may generate unprecedented health emergencies including outbreaks of communicable diseases. Related risks include food insecurity (high prices, food shortages, lack of safety nets), already demonstrated as a threat. These and other “stress bundles” deserve more attention in the years to come.

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373 See Muggah with Savage (2012).
## Annex 2

### Moving From Theory to Practice: A Review of Selected Examples

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<tr>
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<th>Assumptions</th>
<th>Applications</th>
<th>Actions*</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Social disorganization</td>
<td>A sociological theory that economic disadvantage, ethnic heterogeneity and residential instability contribute to community disorganization and ultimately violence</td>
<td>Urban renewal and regeneration Urban gentrification Safer-cities Slum upgrading</td>
<td>Urban Partnerships for Poverty Reduction (Dhaka)375 Kenya Slum Upgrading Program (Nairobi)376 Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading Program (Cape Town)377 Medellin Urban Integrated Project378 Consejo Nacional de la Vivienda (Buenos Aires)379 Favela Bairro (Rio de Janeiro)380</td>
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<tr>
<td>Broken window</td>
<td>A criminological theory that posits that the norm signaling and symbolic effects of urban disorder can contribute to more crime and associated violence</td>
<td>Pacification Community and problem-oriented policing Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED)</td>
<td>Zero tolerance (New York 1993)381 Safe Streets Program (various US cities)382 Operation Ceasefire (Boston Pacification Police Units (UPP) (Rio de Janeiro 2008-2014)</td>
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<td>A public health approach that considers the interactions between individual, relationship, community and societal risk factors that seek to</td>
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<td>Early Head Start (US 1990s)383 Alcohol regulation and rationing (Australia, US and Bogota)384 Mayors Against Illegal Guns (600 US cities)385</td>
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375 See http://www.fukuoka.unhabitat.org/projects/bangladesh/detail02_en.html
376 See http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=668&catid=206&typeid=13
377 See http://www.vpuu.org/
378 See http://www.holcimfoundation.org/T820/A08lAgo.htm
379 See http://www.cnvivienda.org.ar/
380 See http://www.iadb.org/en/annual-meeting/2011/annual-meeting-article,2836.html?amarticleid=9164
381 See http://cad.sagepub.com/content/45/2/171.abstract
382 See http://www.safest.org/
385 See http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/
| **Social capital and social cohesion** | A behavioral and institutional economic perspective that assumes that interpersonal trust formation and binding capital are critical determinants for reducing victimization | Participatory citizen planning and exchanges with public sector  
Public spaces for co-existence  
Local-level justice provision  
Leadership training, education and support  
Micro-enterprise development | Social capital for violence prevention (Metropolitan Area of San Salvador)  
DESEPAZ (Cali 1992-1994)  
HOPE VI and HOPE SF (US 2000s)  
UNDP community security and social cohesion projects (more than 13 countries) |
| **Youth empowerment and employment** | A sociological and psychological approach that supports targeted interventions for at-risk (and principally male) youth to prevent them from resorting to predatory or anti-social behavior | Parent and family support and home visits  
Social and conflict resolution skills  
Mentoring and peer-to-peer networks  
School and after-school interventions  
Training and apprenticeships for former gang members and child soldiers | Kenya Youth Empowerment and Employment Initiative (Nairobi)  
Youth empowerment and employment project (Honiara)  
Youth employment and empowerment (Freetown and Monrovia)  
Youth empowerment programs in Nigeria  
Safer Cities International Youth-led Urban Development Platform (DARUA) |

*It should be noted that most urban violence prevention efforts tend to integrate a range of “approaches” consciously or unconsciously borrowing from theoretical approaches noted above. Moreover, the selected cases included here are for illustrative purposes only. They have not all been subjected to rigorous evaluations.*

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136 See [http://www.mdgfund.org/program/buildingsocialcapitalreduceviolencenewtransitionelsalvador](http://www.mdgfund.org/program/buildingsocialcapitalreduceviolencenewtransitionelsalvador)
140 See [www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/12/47942093.pdf](www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/12/47942093.pdf)
141 See [http://kenyayouth.org/](http://kenyayouth.org/)
Annex 3

List of Key Informants

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<th>Urbanization and violence</th>
<th>Urban data and networks</th>
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<td>Markus Kostner*</td>
<td>Paula Miraglia**</td>
<td>Suri D. Ajay*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charlotte Lemanski*</td>
<td>Gareth Jones*</td>
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<td>Elijah Agevi*</td>
<td>Carole Rakodi*</td>
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<td>Elkin Vasquez*</td>
<td>Juma Assiago**</td>
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<td>Colin McFarlane*</td>
<td>Desmond Arias*</td>
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*Contacted
**Communication
Annex 4

Selected Networks and Internet Resources

INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL ALLIANCES

Alianza de Ciudades por la Seguridad Ciudadana
The Alliance consists of over 40 cities across Latin American and the Caribbean to initiate dialogue and share experiences in innovative violence prevention and reduction activities.

Cities Alliance
Formed in 1999, the Cities Alliance focuses on poverty reduction in lower-income settings through a catalytic fund. To date, it has supported more than 220 projects.
Site: http://www.citiesalliance.org

European Forum for Urban Safety
The European Forum for Urban Safety is an international entity established in 1987 in Barcelona. It gathers more than 300 local authorities to identify crime prevention policies and options for improved safety.
Site: http://cctvcharter.eu/index.php?id=31559&L=rbuxduzg

Mayors Against Illegal Guns
The US-based MAIG coalition was initiated in 2006 and has grown from 15 to 600 mayors dedicated to developing strategies to reduce gun violence in their cities.
Source: http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/

Mega-Cities Project
Established in 1987 and involving 21 cities, the Mega-Cities Project is a transnational non-profit network of leaders and innovative groups involved in identifying solutions.
Site: http://www.mega-cities.net/ (Boston)

UN-Habitat Safer Cities
The SaferCities program was launched in the mid-1990s and includes more than 300 projects in 20 countries across Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America.
Site: http://www.unhabitats.org/categories.asp?catid=375 (International)
Urban Age
The Urban Age research network was launched in 2005 to begin examining the spatial and social dynamics of rapidly urbanizing cities and focuses on holds regular conferences.
Site: http://urban-age.net/

Violence Prevention Alliance
Launched in 2004, the VPA is a network of more than 50 WHO member states, international agencies, and civil society organizations dedicated to preventing violence. Many advocate evidence-based approaches that target risk factors.
Site: http://www.who.int/violenceprevention/en/

Women in Cities
The Women in Cities network was formed in 2002 is designed to create opportunities for exchange and collaboration between organizations involved in gender equality and safety of women in cities.
Site: www.womenincities.org

INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL RESEARCH

African Center for Cities
Based out of the University of Cape Town, the ACC is a multidisciplinary center devoted to reversing urban inequality, environmental degradation and social conflict in Africa’s cities.
Site: http://africancentreforcities.net/ (Cape Town)

Bartlett
The University College of London’s Bartlett is a leading multidisciplinary faculty devoted to examining the “built environment”, including with the use of advanced spatial methods, and includes more than 300 staff.
Site: http://www.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/research

Centro de Estudios en Seguridad Ciudadana
Based out of the University of Chile, the CESC has initiated a number of initiatives to assess the relationships between urbanization and citizen security across Latin America.
Site: http://www.cesc.uchile.cl/noticia_resultado_bp.html

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
The premier center devoted to violence prevention in the US, the CDC features a wide range of publications and resources for researchers and practitioners.
Site: http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/overview/VP_publications.htm
CEUR - CONICET
Based in Argentina with support from the Red Mujer y Habitat America Latina, UN Women and Spanish Development Cooperation, this initiative is designed to examine urban violence and the role of gender.

Conflict in Cities
The Conflict in Cities project focuses on a small selection of “divided cities” in Europe and the Middle East to examine how they are shaped by, and absorb, resist and transform territorial conflicts.
Site: http://www.conflictincities.org / (Cambridge)

Human Security and Cities
This project is a partnership initiated in 2008 between the Liu Institute and Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and is intended to review topical themes.
Source: http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/?p2=/modules/liu/researches/research.jsp&id=74

Informal Settlements Research
The ISR is small-scale field-based research effort to examine the relationships between urban regeneration schemes and urban violence in Ciudad Juarez, Medellin, and Rio de Janeiro.

Institut National d’Amenagement et D’Urbanisme
The National Institute of Urban and Territorial Planning (INAU) is a Moroccan based established in the 1980s to promote innovation in urban planning across the Magreb and other countries of North Africa.
Site: http://www.inau.ac.ma

LSE Cities Program
The LSE Cities Program is one of a small number of institutes dedicated to research on contemporary urban society and in particular the physical and social structure of cities.
Site: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/LSECities/citiesProgramme/home.aspx

Prevention Institute
Established in 2007, the PI City Network collaborates with cities in the US that are committed to urban violence prevention and reduction.

Shrinking Cities International Research Network
The SCIRN is a consortium of scholars founded in 2004 under the guidance of the Institute of Urban Research and Regional Development at the Berkely. It includes 30 members from 14 countries, primarily in upper-income settings.
Site: http://www.shrinkingcities.org/
South African City Development Strategy
The South African Cities Network (SACN) was established to promote the exchange of information, best practices and urban development across cities of South Africa
Site: http://www.sacities.net/

Urban India Reforms Facility
Housed in the Tat Institute of Social Sciences and affiliated with the School of Habitat Studies, the UIRF is focused on identifying and addressing the challenges of India’s urbanization process.
Site: http://tiss-uirf.org/

Urban Institute
The Urban Institute was established in 1968 in the US to examine challenges confronting American cities and seeks to develop evidence-based solutions to municipal challenges.
Site: http://www.urban.org/

Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence
This project was launched in 2009 as a collaborative initiative between the Graduate Institute and MIT to examine the dimensions of coping and adaptation in violent cities.
Site: http://www.urbanresilience.org

Urban Tipping Points
The project was launched in 2010 out of the University of Manchester to examine four cities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to study why these cities did “not” experience high rates of violence.
Site: http://www.urbantippingpoint.org/

DATA AND INFORMATION

City Mayors
City Mayors is a repository of statistics on city size, wealth, populations, density and other information.
Site: http://www.citymayors.com/statistics/

City Population
The website City Population offers a range of datasets on large agglomerations (over 1 million), maps and statistics and other information.
Site: http://www.citypopulation.de/cities.html

Inter-American Development Bank
The IADB has a large-scale program devoted to urban development, neighborhood upgrading and investments in safe and sustainable cities across Latin America and the Caribbean.
Site: http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/cities/cities,1175.html
World Bank Social Cohesion and Violence Prevention Unit
The World Bank has also invested extensively in research on the character and dynamics of urban violence as well as strategies to prevent and reduce it in the context of wider development investments.

World Development Report Input Papers
The World Bank commissioned several dozen “input” papers for the preparation of the 2011 World Development Report including on themes of violence and development.

World Urbanization Prospects
The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs publishes a range of statistical estimates on urban and rural population, urban growth rates, urban agglomerations and other issues associated with cities.
Site: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/index.htm
Annex 5

Bibliography


http://www.microconflict.eu/publications/RWP6 PJ.pdf


http://stathis.research.yale.edu/files/New.pdf


http://www.wola.org/publications/tackling_urban_violence_in_latin_america_reversing_exclusion_through_smart_policing_and


