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Aims and Scope

The *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* provides an interdisciplinary, bilingual forum for critical research and reflection upon development theory and the complex problems of development policy and practice. The *CJDS* publishes peer-reviewed articles and review essays, and the journal aims to keep readers informed with commentaries, practical notes and reviews of recently published books on development. The *CJDS* is international in its outlook and encourages contributions from scholars and practitioners across the world, while, as a Canadian journal, having a particular concern for Canada's role in international development policy making and practice.

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Submissions are invited in English or in French. We welcome theoretical papers, particularly if they offer thought-provoking interdisciplinary analysis; preference is given, however, to articles based on empirical research, case studies, or field work having significant implications for development planning and policy. We welcome contributions from all areas of development studies but require that papers are written in a way that is accessible to a multi-disciplinary audience. Use of disciplinary jargon is discouraged. Papers which use econometric evidence should do so sparingly and ensure that the results are explained. We also welcome short, incisive articles concerning current development practice, policies or teaching, or which open a dialogue on questions raised in earlier issues of the *CJDS*.

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The *CJDS* is edited at the School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University (English) and at the Department of Economics, Research group on economics and international development, University of Sherbrooke (French).

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La *Revue canadienne d'études du développement* est un périodique multidisciplinaire bilingue qui vise à l'avancement de la recherche et de la réflexion critique sur la théorie, les politiques et la pratique du développement. La *Revue* publie des articles et des essais critiques évalués par des pairs, ainsi que des commentaires, des notes de terrain et des comptes rendus de livres récemment parus. Elle s'inscrit dans une perspective internationale, sollicitant des contributions d'universitaires et de praticiens de partout dans le monde. En tant que périodique canadien, elle porte néanmoins un intérêt particulier au rôle joué par le Canada dans l'élaboration de politiques et de pratiques de développement international.

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
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Crop diversification, dietary diversity and agricultural income: empirical evidence from eight developing countries

Lorenzo Pellegrini and Luca Tasciotti*

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ABSTRACT This study sheds light on the dilemma between food crop specialisation and diversification. We use data from household surveys to estimate the effects of crop diversification on nutrition (dietary diversity) and on income (crops sold) of rural households from eight developing and transition economies. We find that the vast majority of households grow crops despite the modest contribution of agriculture to income. Most agricultural land is devoted to staple food production; high-value commodities such as fruits and vegetables are also produced, but in limited quantities. Both descriptive statistics and regression results show a positive correlation between the number of crops cultivated, household income from crops and the two indicators we use for dietary diversity, also after controlling for household characteristics.

RÉSUMÉ Cette étude examine le dilemme entre la spécialisation et la diversification des cultures vivrières. Elle a recours aux données d'enquêtes auprès des ménages pour estimer les effets de la diversification sur le régime alimentaire (variété alimentaire) et sur les revenus (récoltes vendues) dans huit pays en développement ou en transition. Nous avons trouvé que la majorité des ménages cultivent la terre en dépit de la modeste contribution de l'agriculture aux revenus. La plus grande partie des terres est utilisée pour la production des denrées de base. Des produits de haute valeur comme les fruits et les légumes sont également cultivés, mais en quantités limitées. Les statistiques descriptives et l'analyse de régression indiquent une corrélation positive entre la quantité des produits cultivés, les revenus du ménage et les deux indicateurs utilisés pour analyser la variété alimentaire.

Keywords: household survey data; crop diversification; nutrition; crop income; dietary diversity

Introduction

The diversification of agricultural activities for households living in developing and transition economies has a clear intuitive appeal: it is a form of risk management and allows households to overcome credit market failures and internal/external shocks, ultimately allowing them to smooth their consumption (Ellis 2000). In fact, the encompassing issue of income diversification has become prominent in development studies (Carney 1998).

Crop diversification can be used as a means to increase farm income, generate employment, alleviate poverty and conserve soil and water resources and is considered as an important strategy to overcome many of the emergencies faced by developing countries (Joshi et al. 2004). Low-income households in developing countries are the ones whose farms are

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characterised by the lack of crop diversification combined with production for self-consumption. Furthermore, due to very high transportation costs and to the remoteness of the villages they live in, some rural dwellers are forced to rely on their agricultural production or on the locally-produced crops to satisfy their nutritional needs. Currently, rural households' diet too often lacks basic micronutrients, with the potential consequence of increasing susceptibility to infection and diseases in the short run and major cognitive impairment in the long run (Eckhardt 2006). The majority of the studies focusing on the dilemma between specialisation and diversification in crop activities have been directed towards the theoretical analysis of the problem (Alderman and Paxson 1992; Reardon, Matlon, and Delgado 1998; Reardon 2000; Barrett, Reardon, and Webb 2001) without an empirical analysis quantifying the effects of one or the other strategy. Few empirical studies have estimated the impact crop diversification has on indicators of households' nutrition (Chand 1996; Johnson 1992; Pingali and Rosegrant 1995; Senaka Arachchi 1998; Webb and Von Braun 1994; Von Braun 1995; Ryan and Spencer 2001).

Our study measures the effects that crops diversification, here identified by the number of food crops produced by rural households, has on two indicators of households' dietary diversity and the amount of crop income.¹ The current study is the first employing representative national surveys from eight developing and transition economics to assess the magnitude of the effects of crop diversification on households' welfare. It takes into account two different but related perspectives. On one hand, we analyse the impact crop diversification has on crop income; on the other, we quantify the magnitude of the positive link between crop diversification and two indicators of dietary diversity. The analysis is based on household-level data from countries located in different areas of the globe. The robustness of the results presented is underscored by the fact that, despite the geographical, political and agricultural differences among the countries analysed, the results at the global level and at the individual country level go in the same direction.

Cross-country analyses like the one presented here are notoriously problematic. Variables in diverse surveys are typically measured and aggregated differently over time and space, which makes it difficult to discern consistent relationships and leads to fragile conclusions. In recent years, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations has compiled the Rural Income Generating Activities (RIGA) database, a selection of Living Standards Measurement Studies and similar multi-purpose household surveys that are nationally representative and present high degrees of comparability in codification and nomenclatures.² Cross-country studies based on the RIGA database have shown that patterns, regularities and common features constantly emerge, even when conducted in different agro-ecological, institutional and socioeconomic conditions (for example Davis et al. 2010; Winters et al. 2010; Pica-Ciamarra et al. 2011; Zezza et al. 2011; Zezza and Tasciotti 2010). The objective of this study is not to compare the results from the eight countries; rather, we wish to assess whether, even with all these cross-country and cross-household differences, a clear general pattern emerges, and whether this pattern is consistent in all the countries considered.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section deals with the importance of crop diversification from a nutritional point of view, the dilemma between specialisation and diversification, and the impact crop diversification is considered to have on nutrition. The following section, "Cross-country evidence", describes the data used for the analysis and provides a brief quantification of the correlation between crop diversification on one side and nutritional diversity and crop income on the other. In the section "Empirical model and results", the methodology used and the main results of the multivariate analysis are explained. Key findings and policy implications are discussed in the final section.

The role of crop diversification

The relevance of diversity to nutrition, health and cognitive development

Overall, in the last decades considerable progress in hunger reduction has been recorded. The proportion of the world's people living in developing countries who are still undernourished declined from about 25 per cent in 1970 to about 16 per cent in 2005. Nevertheless, that still means that some 800 million people in developing countries remain chronically underfed (FAO 2009). Furthermore, eradicating hunger is not enough to ensure good health, since the latter requires – amongst other things – a balanced and diverse diet. Increased production of cheap cereal foods, especially after the food price increase of the biennium 2007–2008 (Von Braun 2008), has coincided with a reduction of agricultural diversity, which has ultimately led to a decrease in dietary diversity. For example, the increased availability of staples followed by an increase in cereal and cereal-product intakes, which occurred in some developing countries, have been linked to a decrease in the intakes of iron and in turn a greater incidence of iron deficiency anaemia being observed in the sub-Saharan countries (Frison et al. 2006).

Although many institutions appear optimistic with respect to the hunger problem, malnutrition still represents a pressing challenge. In 2008 the Copenhagen Business School asked eight eminent economists to imagine that they had USD75 billion to spend on actions that would help the world. Almost everyone agreed to invest more in nutrition: vitamin supplements for children, zinc and iodine nutrients. Out of the total 40 nutrients people normally need, four are chronically lacking in developing countries (*Economist*, March 24, 2011). It is becoming increasingly recognised that a diet rich in energy (kilocalories) but lacking other essential components can lead to a number of diseases, such as heart problems, diabetes, cancer and obesity (Frison et al. 2006). These conditions are no longer associated only with affluence, as they are increasingly present among poorer people in developing countries.

Micronutrient deficiency caused by cereal-based diets may impair cognitive development and lower resistance to disease in children and adults (UNICEF/Micronutrient Initiative 2004). It increases the risk of morbidity and mortality of both mothers and infants during childbirth and, in addition, impairs the physical ability and economic productivity of adults. The costs of these deficiencies in terms of reduced quality of life are enormous, not to mention the economic costs for society (Shetty 2009).

A study of more than 40,000 women living in the USA showed that those who consumed a greater variety of foods had a lower risk of mortality (Kant et al. 2000). A study based on a sample of Italian households demonstrated the link between greater dietary diversity, high consumption of fruits and vegetables, and reduced incidence of stomach cancer (La Vecchia et al. 1997).

Analysis of Kenyan households' nutrition has demonstrated that diversity in the diet has clear beneficial effects on the physical and cognitive growth of children younger than three years of age (Onyango, Koski, and Tucker 1998). Another study, in Mali, showed a strong correlation between consumption of fruits and vegetables and both nutritional adequacy and consumption of specific nutrients such as vitamins A and C (Hatløy, Torheim, and Oshaug 1998). Along the same lines, a positive relationship between consumption from a variety of different food groups and nutrient adequacy was discovered in research on women in Tehran (Mirmira, Azadbakht, and Azizi 2006) and on women of reproductive age living in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique, Bangladesh and the Philippines (Arimond et al. 2010).

Why diversify agricultural activities

Sixty years have passed since Heady (1952) proposed the diversification concept in agricultural activities as a means of handling uncertainty. One of the most important objectives of

diversification in agricultural activity is to decrease the overall production risk by selecting a mix of crops which have a low or negative correlation in their productivity and are nutritionally important for the household's diet. Crop diversification strategies have been pursued worldwide as a way to improve household income in less-developed countries (Papademetriou and Dent 2001). The rationale for diversification strategies is based on the facts that: crop rotation has beneficial effects for the soil, guaranteeing environmental protection; it potentially reduces pests and diseases; and it increases food security by offering farmers access to sufficient, nutritious and diversified food in areas where markets are not available (Caviglia-Harris and Sills 2005; Kurosaki 2003; Matson, Naylor, and Ortiz-Monasterio 1998; Yao 1997). Furthermore, crop diversification has gained renewed interest due to the liberalisation of agricultural policies and the globalisation of agricultural markets. State interventions in the recent past have moderated domestic price fluctuations. Nowadays, as domestic prices follow international prices more closely, farmers are forced to cope with the implications of larger fluctuations in commodity prices (Weiss and Briglauer 2000).

Relying on food imports to satisfy domestic nutritional needs promotes food insecurity by subjecting developing countries to the fluctuations of the world market prices. Lastly, in remote areas, where physical access to markets is costly or markets are not available, households diversify their crop production patterns to satisfy their own consumption needs (Omamo 1998).

Despite the important role of diversification in agriculture, there are few studies that explicitly relate crop income with farm/crop diversification. Many of the available quantitative studies are confined to farms located in the USA and focus on the trade-off between diversification and farm size (Pope and Prescott 1980; Sun, Jinkins, and El-Osta 1995; Weiss and Briglauer 2000; White and Irwin 1972).

In the next section, we provide the first empirical analysis – based on a large dataset from developing and transition countries – examining the implications of crop diversification at crop income and dietary diversity level.

Cross-country evidence

We measure the crop diversification phenomenon using data from a cross-section of developing countries. This study is fundamentally different from any other study of crop diversification and its effects, for three reasons: we use nationally representative data; we use a comparable definition of agricultural activities; and the analysis takes a comparative international perspective. In what follows, only rural households have been considered. Our analysis is based on data from the Rural Income Generating Activities (RIGA) project, which had built a database from a pool of several Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS) and similarly constructed surveys, and which has been made available by the World Bank and other national and international institutions. Survey data from the following countries are used in the analysis (the year of the survey in parentheses): Albania (2005), Indonesia (2000), Malawi (2004), Nepal (2003), Nicaragua (2001), Pakistan (2001), Panama (2003) and Vietnam (1998). This list includes different geographic areas and countries in different stages of development.

Agriculture is practised by the great majority of rural households. This is not surprising at all, since it is well recognised that agricultural activities provide the basic livelihood for the majority of households living in developing areas.³ Almost all of the rural households in Malawi, Nepal, Vietnam and Albania are engaged in some sort of food crop production, without any remarkable difference among richer and poorer households. In all the countries in our study, the percentages of rural households engaged in agricultural activities are above the 50 per cent threshold, the only exception being households in Pakistan and richer rural Indonesian households.

Although the participation rate in agricultural activities is high overall, the percentage of total income coming from food crop activities does not follow the same pattern. It is lower than 30 per cent in six out of the eight countries, denoting that rural households do diversify their sources of income and that food crop productivity is not always very high. The participation rate does not show any particular pattern among rural households in different expenditure quintiles.

Crops mainly produced by rural dwellers are those for which the country, or the household, might have a comparative advantage, and there are a number of other crops which are systematically produced (Table 1). The data clearly show that farmers give priority to the production of those staple crops that are the foundation of the local diet. Nevertheless, other crops, not considered basic food for nutrition but definitely important for diversifying the diet, such as fruits and vegetables, appear to be present in the agricultural rotation as well. The degree of crop diversification varies from country to country, with Vietnam appearing on one extreme, highly specialised in rice production, and Albania at the other end of the spectrum, with a very high degree of diversification.

Notwithstanding variation across countries, in the majority of the countries rural households tend to rotate a limited number of crops. The most frequent combinations practised by households involve two, three, or a maximum of four agricultural products (Table 2).⁴ Very few households produce more than six different crops, for reasons most likely related to the limited size of the allotment as well as the intrinsic difficulty of producing many products (water requirements, necessity of sun exposition and type of soil, among others).

Dietary diversity, or dietary variety, is one of the outcome variables of this study. We define it as the number of different foods ("food count indicator" in the following text; it is a simple count of the different kinds of food consumed by the household) or food groups ("food group indicator" in the following text) consumed over a given reference period. Dietary diversity is often used as a food security proxy in nutrition surveys, and it generally has been found to be closely correlated to both caloric adequacy (the amount of kilocalories consumed) and anthropometric outcomes (Ruel 2006; Moursi et al. 2008; Tasciotti 2006). In developing countries, single food or food group counts have been the most popular measurement approaches for dietary diversity.

Summary statistics regarding the food count and the food group indicators are presented in Table 3. Since surveys in different countries collect data on different numbers of foods, the food count indicator across countries is not comparable. This indicator ranges between one and a positive number (the maximum number for each survey is available in the column for "Maximum Value" in Table 3). The food group indicator ranges between zero and 13 and is theoretically comparable across countries, being based on the methodology developed by the FANTA project of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and adopted by the nutrition division of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2007). Both indicators have been used recently by Zezza and Tasciotti (2010) in assessing the role urban agriculture plays in households' dietary diversity.

Looking at the food count indicator, it seems that, for all the countries considered here, there is a positive relationship between the number of crops produced and the number of foods consumed by rural households (Table 4). What is worth noting is that, within each of the three land classes⁵ into which we have divided the rural population, producing more crops is associated with an increase in the number of foods consumed by the household (*t*-tests run for each country for households in each land class prove that the food count indicators reported in Table 4 are statistically different in 75% of the cases). This result indicates that specialising in the production of one single crop and then trading the harvest does not increase the household food count indicator as much as crop diversification does. Within each land class, the number of foods consumed on average by rural households within each land class follows an inverted "U" shape, meaning that the food count indicator increases until a certain threshold and then drops. After the threshold, diet diversification does not benefit anymore from further agricultural diversification.

Table 1. Most cultivated crops, by share of land.

| Country ^a and year | | Crops and share of cultivated land (%) ^b for the top seven crops in each country | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|---------------|---|-------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| Malawi, 2004 | Crop | Maize | Beans | Groundnut | Potatoes | Cassava | Chick peas | Sorghum |
| | Share of land | 59 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 4 | 2 |
| Nepal, 2003 | Crop | Rice | Maize | Wheat | Vegetables | Lentils | Potatoes | Fresh fruit |
| | Share of land | 41 | 23 | 18 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 2 |
| Vietnam, 1998 | Crop | Rice | Maize | Vegetables | Cassava | Ground nut | Beans | Fresh fruit |
| | Share of land | 72 | 11 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Pakistan, 2001 | Crop | Wheat | Rice | Chick peas | Maize | Beans | Mangoes | Potatoes |
| | Share of land | 63 | 20 | 7 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Nicaragua, 2001 | Crop | Maize | Beans | Rice | Nuts | Oranges | Cassava | Cabbages |
| | Share of land | 46 | 34 | 10 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Indonesia, 2000 | Crop | Rice | Maize | Coconut | Cassava | Nuts | Beans | Fruit |
| | Share of land | 57 | 18 | 14 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
| Albania, 2005 | Crop | Wheat | Maize | Olives | Beans | Oats | Figs | Apples |
| | Share of land | 38 | 22 | 18 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 4 |
| Panama, 2003 | Crop | Rice | Maize | Melons | Banana | Beans | Oranges | Vegetables |
| | Share of land | 54 | 25 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 1 |

Note: ^aCountries are ordered by level of Purchasing Power Parity GDP per capita. ^bPercentages in the table refer to the share of cultivated land at the country level, and add up to 100 in each row.

Source: Data from the FAO website (<http://faostat.fao.org/site/291/default.aspx>).

Table 2. Share of rural households producing different numbers of crops.

| Country ^a and year | Number of crops produced and share of households (% of total national sample) producing each number | | | | | | | | Total |
|-------------------------------|---|----|----|----|----|----|---|----|-------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | ≥8 | |
| Malawi, 2004 | 11 | 21 | 23 | 20 | 13 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 100 |
| Nepal, 2003 | 3 | 25 | 8 | 18 | 8 | 10 | 3 | 25 | 100 |
| Vietnam, 1998 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 7 | 8 | 46 | 100 |
| Pakistan, 2001 | 22 | 61 | 15 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Nicaragua, 2001 | 6 | 19 | 20 | 17 | 11 | 9 | 7 | 11 | 100 |
| Indonesia, 2000 | 28 | 29 | 25 | 11 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 100 |
| Albania, 2005 | 11 | 31 | 15 | 14 | 8 | 9 | 3 | 9 | 100 |
| Panama, 2003 | 36 | 38 | 19 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 |

Note: ^aCountries are ordered by level of Purchasing Power Parity GDP per capita.

Source: RIGA database (<http://www.fao.org/economic/riga/riga-database/en/>).

Table 3. Average, minimum and maximum values for the food count and food group indicators.

| Country ^a and year | Food group indicator | | | Food count indicator | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|---------------|---------------|----------------------|---------------|---------------|
| | Average | Minimum value | Maximum value | Average | Minimum value | Maximum value |
| Malawi, 2004 | 8 | 1 | 13 | 15 | 1 | 51 |
| Nepal, 2003 | 12 | 2 | 13 | 22 | 10 | 37 |
| Vietnam, 1998 | 6 | 1 | 13 | 11 | 3 | 24 |
| Pakistan, 2001 | 10 | 1 | 13 | 19 | 4 | 42 |
| Nicaragua, 2001 | 9 | 1 | 13 | 18 | 1 | 59 |
| Indonesia, 2000 | 10 | 1 | 13 | 17 | 1 | 33 |
| Albania, 2005 | 10 | 1 | 13 | 34 | 1 | 69 |
| Panama, 2003 | 11 | 2 | 13 | 41 | 4 | 75 |

Note: ^aCountries are ordered by level of Purchasing Power Parity GDP per capita.

Source: RIGA database (<http://www.fao.org/economic/riga/riga-database/en/>).

Empirical model and results

As explained in the previous section, crop diversification can have several impacts on the dietary diversity indicators and agricultural income of rural households; in this section we explore these relationships. We begin by looking at the correlation between crop diversification and a series of indicators of dietary adequacy, and then move to crop diversification and agricultural income.

For the first two models, the distribution of the response variable, Y_i – where the suffix i indicates different rural households – conditional on a matrix of covariates, X_i , is assumed to be given by the Poisson distribution:

$$f(Y_i|X_i) = \frac{e^{-\mu_i} \mu_i^{Y_i}}{Y_i!}, Y_i = 0, 1, 2, \dots, \quad (1)$$

where we assume that the conditional mean parameter (Food Group Indicator for Model 1 and Food Count Indicator for Model 2) is given by:

$$\text{Model 1} \quad \mu_i = E[Y_i|X_i] = \exp\{a + b X_i\}$$

$$\text{Model 2} \quad \mu_i = E[Y_i|X_i] = \exp\{a + b X_i\}$$

Table 4. Food count indicators for rural households, by land class and by number of crops produced by the household.

| Country ^a and year | Land class ^b | Maximum number of food types available ^c | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | ≥8 |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|---|-----|-----|-----|----|----|----|-----|-----|-----|
| Malawi, 2004 | 0-1 | 53 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 18 | 16 | 16 |
| | 1-2 | | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 16 | 16 | 18 | 18 | 17 |
| | >2 | | n/a | 12 | 13 | 15 | 16 | 18 | 18 | 20 | 19 |
| Nepal, 2003 | 0-1 | 35 | 19 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 22 | 21 | 22 | 18 |
| | 1-2 | | 18 | 21 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 24 | 22 | 22 | 24 |
| | >2 | | 20 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 21 | 26 |
| Vietnam, 1998 | 0-1 | 20 | n/a | 10 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 12 |
| | 1-2 | | n/a | n/a | 11 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 12 |
| | >2 | | n/a | n/a | n/a | 12 | 10 | 13 | 19 | 14 | 12 |
| Pakistan, 2001 | 0-1 | 83 | 17 | 19 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 18 | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| | 1-2 | | 18 | 20 | 20 | 21 | 24 | 23 | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| | >2 | | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 25 | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Nicaragua, 2001 | 0-1 | 61 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 19 | 19 | 17 | 21 | 22 |
| | 1-2 | | 14 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 19 |
| | >2 | | 18 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 22 | 21 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| Indonesia, 2000 | 0-1 | 37 | 15 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 21 |
| | 1-2 | | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 17 | 19 | 18 | 18 | 22 |
| | >2 | | 18 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 18 | 19 | 18 | 20 | 18 |
| Albania, 2005 | 0-1 | 74 | 23 | 29 | 28 | 32 | 36 | 37 | 42 | 31 | 40 |
| | 1-2 | | 21 | 29 | 34 | 37 | 39 | 38 | 35 | 39 | 40 |
| | >2 | | 30 | 45 | 42 | 37 | 40 | 47 | 45 | 41 | 39 |
| Panama, 2003 | 0-1 | 82 | 41 | 43 | 42 | 46 | 45 | 42 | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| | 1-2 | | 42 | 41 | 39 | 38 | 45 | 59 | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| | >2 | | 36 | 36 | 38 | 37 | 42 | 52 | n/a | n/a | n/a |

Note: ^aCountries are ordered by level of Purchasing Power Parity GDP per capita. ^bLand class "0-1" indicates the area of owned land is up to one hectare; class "1-2" is households owning between one and two hectares of land; and class ">2" indicates holdings larger than two hectares. ^cThe number in this column represents the total number of foods recorded in the survey.

Source: RIGA database (<http://www.fao.org/economic/riga/riga-database/en/>).

The resulting models take the following forms:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Model 1 } E(\text{Food group indicator}_i | \text{diversification}_i, \text{diversification}_i^2, X_i) \\ = \exp(a_0 + a_1 \text{diversification}_i + a_2 \text{diversification}_i^2 + a_3 X_i) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Model 2 } E(\text{Food count indicator}_i | \text{diversification}_i, \text{diversification}_i^2, X_i) \\ = \exp(a_0 + a_1 \text{diversification}_i + a_2 \text{diversification}_i^2 + a_3 X_i). \end{aligned}$$

Model 3 will be estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method:

$$\text{Model 3 } \text{Log}(\text{Total crop income}_i) = a_0 + a_1 \text{diversification}_i + a_2 \text{diversification}_i^2 + a_3 X_i.^6$$

In the three specifications, the dependent variable is represented by a food group indicator (Model 1) (see Appendix Table A1 for the classification), a simple food count indicator (Model 2), as previously described and the total food crop income variable (Model 3).⁷ The variable "diversification" represents the number of crops the rural household produces yearly in its allotment; the square term allows us to measure whether its influence on the dependent variable has a positive or negative curvature. "X" is a vector of household demographic and socio-economic control variables. The regressions also include a set of geographic dummy variables, square terms for the age and education variables and an independently, identically distributed

error term, ε . We include a set of independent variables in order to identify the sign and magnitude of the link between crop diversification and the dependent variables without those aggregates polluting the final results; that is, we avoid an omitted variable bias (see Zezza and Tasciotti 2010).

The three models are run separately for each country using only rural households ("country-specific regressions" in what follows). Model 1 and Model 2, being count data models, have been estimated using a Poisson regression technique,⁸ while Model 3 has been estimated using OLS. Furthermore, Models 1 and 3 are run for the pooled sample of rural households living in the eight countries ("pooled sample regression" in what follows).⁹ Model 2 has not been run for the pooled sample as it would not have any meaning: the dependent variable, in fact, is not comparable across countries, since it assumes different values depending on how the survey has been designed. In total there are nine regressions for Model 1 and Model 3 (eight country-specific regressions plus one for the pooled sample regression) and eight regressions for Model 2 (eight country-specific regressions). Table 5 shows the results for the pooled regressions.

Overall, after introducing the set of X controls specified above, we find evidence that rural households producing different crops do have greater dietary diversity (Table 5, second column). The ratio of the result is intuitive: those households diversifying their agricultural production increase the chance of consuming foods which before were excluded from the family diet. The reasons for the exclusions range from affordability (food other than staples might be unaffordable) to the absence of markets in the village in which the households reside. Furthermore, the fact that some villages are located in remote parts of the country makes supply by ground transport very difficult. The results of the other variables are the expected ones: level of education and the age of the head of the household (proxies for its wisdom), share of female members in the family, per-capita expenditure and size of land holding increase the probability of consuming items from different food groups. The variable "household size" has a positive impact on the dependent variable, meaning that a larger family could theoretically work a larger piece of land. Having larger ruminants and owning a tractor increase the chance of having a more diversified diet; other livestock ownership also has a positive effect.

The results of the coefficients of the pooled regression for Model 3 are as expected as well. Following our preliminary descriptive findings, crop diversification has a positive and significant impact on total crop income. The marginal effect is now even greater, as an extra crop has the potential to increase crop income by 16 per cent. The channels through which this extra income could be generated are multiple. For example, the rural household can now sell the "new" product, and, being a "non-staple item", the selling price is higher. Total agricultural yields might increase as well, as continuous cereal production systems, including systems with two or three crops per plot, may become progressively susceptible to diseases and pests due to insufficient diversity in the crop rotation and could depauperate the land (Tilman et al. 2002).

Looking at the country-specific regressions (Table 6), the household's diet receives a significant beneficial impact from crop diversification in all the countries when nutrition is measured using the food groups indicator, and in seven out of eight countries when nutrition is measured using the food count indicator. The marginal effect of an additional crop on the food count indicator is not large, maximum values being 27 per cent in Malawi and 22 per cent in Nicaragua (marginal effects means that if the average number of food groups for Malawi is 14.78 – see Table 5 – an increase of 27% brings it to 18.77 on average). The marginal effect on the food group indicator is slightly lower, with the maximum increases observed in Indonesia and Nicaragua (8% in both the countries). The increase in the number of food groups consumed by the household is smaller if compared to the increase in the simple food counts when crop diversification is practised. This is due to the fact that the former variable, food groups, has a limited range (between 0 and 13), and the variability of this variable itself is not very large either.

Table 5. Regression results for the pooled model indicated by Model 1 and Model 3.

| Independent variables | Model 1 | | Model 3 | |
|--|---|------|--|-------|
| | Coefficients, dependent variable: Food group indicator ^a | | Coefficients, dependent variable: Log (crop income) ^b | |
| Crop diversification ^c | 0.010*** | | 0.152*** | |
| Crop diversification squared | -0.001*** | | -0.005*** | |
| Household size | 0.005*** | | 0.006*** | |
| Education head of the household | 0.010*** | | 0.011*** | |
| Education head of the household squared | -0.001*** | | -0.000 | |
| Age of the head of the household | 0.003*** | | 0.018*** | |
| Age of the head of the household squared | -0.000*** | | -0.000*** | |
| Share of women in working age | 0.026*** | | -0.140*** | |
| Per capita expenditure ^b | 0.000*** | | - | |
| Size of land owned (in hectares) | 0.001 | | 0.008*** | |
| Large ruminants ownership | 0.012*** | | 0.081 | |
| Other livestock ownership | 0.012*** | | 0.002 | |
| Tractor ownership | 0.001* | | 0.001*** | |
| Dummy Albania | -0.007 | | 0.527*** | |
| Dummy Indonesia | -0.083*** | | 5.334*** | |
| Dummy Malawi | -0.059*** | | -2.563*** | |
| Dummy Nepal | 0.158*** | | -4.555*** | |
| Dummy Pakistan | -0.156*** | | -6.761*** | |
| Dummy Panama | -0.032*** | | -3.207*** | |
| Dummy Vietnam | 0.031*** | | -11.239*** | |
| Constant | 2.184*** | | 15.686*** | |
| Number of households | 33,119 | | 23,641 | |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.24 ^d | | 0.22 | |
| Test for over-dispersion | 1.00 | | n/a | |
| Test for heteroskedasticity (Breusch-Pagan test) | n/a | | 0.07* | |
| Test for multicollinearity | n/a | | 7.34 | |
| Test for omitted variables | n/a | | 0.48 | |
| Observed value predicted value | 9.90 | 9.84 | 14.70 | 14.87 |

Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. ^a“Food group indicator” refers to the number of food groups consumed by the households, varying from 1 to 13. ^b“Crop income” and “Per capita expenditure” from the eight countries, originally measured in local currency unit, has been inflated and converted to 2010 US dollars. ^c“Crop diversification” refers to the number of crops produced by the rural households. ^dThe number indicates the pseudo R², as for the Poisson regression the “Adjusted R-squared” is not available.

Source: RIGA database (<http://www.fao.org/economic/riga/riga-database/en/>).

Agricultural diversity seems to have a higher impact on the agricultural incomes, measured in local currency units. The marginal effect of producing an additional crop potentially increases average farm income by, for example, 25 per cent in Panama, 22 per cent in Malawi, 13 in Vietnam and 90 per cent in Pakistan. Regressions run for the poorest quintile of rural households and for households endowed with less land lead to very similar results, highlighting that even the poorer households, in terms of income and land endowment, might benefit from crop diversification.

All the regression results, whether from the pooled sample or the country-specific regressions, provide a robust confirmation of a positive link between crop diversification and the two measures of dietary diversity and crop income. The magnitude of the marginal effects, rather small in the case

Table 6. Regression results^a for Models 1, 2 and 3.

| Dependent variable | Countries ^b and year | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| | <i>Malawi, 2004</i> | <i>Nepal, 2003</i> | <i>Vietnam, 1998</i> | <i>Pakistan, 2001</i> |
| Food group^c | | | | |
| Coefficient | 0.009*** | 0.001*** | 0.002*** | 0.002*** |
| Standard error | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.31 | 0.11 | 0.15 | 0.10 |
| Number of observations | 7122 | 2,300 | 3873 | 9,843 |
| Test for over-dispersion | 0.92 | 0.37 | 1.00 | 0.96 |
| Food count^d | | | | |
| Coefficient | 0.020*** | 0.001*** | 0.010*** | 0.007*** |
| Standard error | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.15 | 0.14 |
| Number of observations | 7,122 | 2,300 | 3,873 | 9,843 |
| Test for over-dispersion | 0.52 | 0.31 | 0.06** | 0.41 |
| Crop income | | | | |
| Coefficient | 0.058*** | 0.027*** | 0.044*** | 0.478*** |
| Standard error | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.019 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.17 | 0.12 | 0.21 | 0.34 |
| Number of observations | 6,799 | 2,122 | 3,740 | 3,517 |
| Test for heteroskedasticity (Breusch-Pagan test) | 0.17 | 0.79 | 0.52 | 0.06* |
| Test for multi-collinearity | 8.55 | 8.67 | 9.40 | 8.47 |
| Test for omitted variables | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.21 | 0.07 |
| | <i>Nicaragua, 2001</i> | <i>Indonesia, 2001</i> | <i>Albania, 2005</i> | <i>Panama, 2003</i> |
| Food group | | | | |
| Coefficient | 0.010*** | 0.008*** | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Standard error | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.13 | 0.11 | 0.13 | 0.09 |
| Number of observations | 1,827 | 5,307 | 1,473 | 1,374 |
| Test for over-dispersion | 0.41 | 1.00 | 0.36 | 1.00 |
| Food count | | | | |
| Coefficient | 0.015*** | 0.013*** | 0.025*** | -0.010*** |
| Standard error | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.007 | 0.000 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.10 | 0.04 | 0.20 | 0.12 |
| Number of observations | 1,827 | 5,307 | 1,473 | 1,374 |
| Test for over-dispersion | 0.10* | 0.09* | 0.70 | 0.87 |
| Crop income | | | | |
| Coefficient | 0.263*** | 0.070*** | 0.031*** | 0.147*** |
| Standard error | 0.017 | 0.016 | 0.015 | 0.027 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.28 | 0.07 | 0.24 | 0.07 |
| Number of observations | 1,368 | 2,762 | 1,303 | 1,309 |
| Test for heteroskedasticity (Breusch-Pagan test) | 0.41 | 0.37 | 0.71 | 0.12 |
| Test for multi-collinearity | 7.55 | 5.43 | 4.78 | 7.92 |
| Test for omitted variables | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.10 | 0.23 |

Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. ^aThe coefficient and the standard error values expressed are those associated to the variable measuring crop diversification. ^bCountries are ordered by level of Purchasing Power Parity GDP per capita. ^c"Food group" refers to the number of food groups consumed by the households, varying from 1 to 13. ^d"Food count" refers to the number of foods consumed by the household, with an upper limit that differs from country to country. "Crop diversification" refers to the number of crops produced by the rural households. For reason of comparability among countries, the coefficients of the Poisson and OLS regressions have been standardised.

Source: RIGA database (<http://www.fao.org/economic/riga/riga-database/en/>).

of the food group indicators but larger for crop incomes and the food count indicators, varies quite extensively, suggesting that crop diversification has a different impact depending on the country.

The most powerful results come from the food crop income analysis. In all eight countries we find a positive and rather strong statistically significant association between food crop income and the number of crops produced.¹⁰

It is worth stressing that an increase in the food consumption, whether measured by the food group or by the food count indicator, might lead to negative effects if it is concentrated in households that already consume a high amount of calories. Although obesity has been considered to be a pathology affecting only households in the urban and the rich parts of the world, there is increasing evidence of this in rural areas of developing countries as well (Zezza and Tasciotti 2010).

Conclusions

This study estimates the effects of food crop diversification through the analysis of a large dataset of household surveys from eight developing and transition countries. It addresses two specific research questions concerning the existence of the link between the number of food crops produced by rural households, on the one hand, and two measures of dietary diversity and crop income, on the other. Smallholder producers often strive to maintain subsistence food production, although, as noted above, food crops could yield higher returns. Diversifying crop production can be viewed as an insurance policy for farm households. The higher the transaction and food transportation costs, and the closer the households are to food subsistence level, the stronger the households' preference should be for diversifying the crop mix.

From a theoretical point of view, the diversification strategy can be seen as a second-best solution, since the benefits of market integration and economic specialisation are foregone. Practically, however, the production of own food supplies can be seen as the best strategy, given the risky economic environment, the missing insurance market, the fluctuations in food prices and unpredictable climate changes.

Our descriptive analysis points out that agriculture is practised by the vast majority of rural households, with lower percentages only in rural Pakistan. In terms of income generation, though, agriculture's role appears to be more limited, with the exception of Malawi and Vietnam, where the portion of income coming from crop activities is close to 50 per cent. The highest share of agricultural land is devoted to produce staple foods, namely maize, rice and wheat, depending on the country. However, high-value commodities such as fruits and vegetables are still produced.

Our data highlight that the link between the number of crops produced and the dietary diversity indicators is positive and follows an "inverted U" shape. Regression analysis confirms this finding: the variable measuring the crop diversification is positive and significant, while its square term is also significant but has a negative sign. In the great majority of the countries analysed, regression results show a positive correlation between the number of crops produced and the two dietary diversity indicators, even after controlling for variables related to household economic welfare and to other household characteristics. In addition, we find evidence that in all countries the number of crops produced is positively and statistically significantly related to crop income. The policy lesson to draw is that crop diversification has a double role: it has a non-negligible impact on households' diets and, other things being equal, it increases agricultural revenues. Furthermore, all the results, although different in magnitude from country to country, are in the same direction. Although the eight countries we studied are different from each other in geography, government policies and agricultural intensity and specialisation, the regression results and summary statistics together allow us to identify a consistent pattern for all the countries we took into account.

In light of the fact that poverty is mostly concentrated in rural areas and that rural poor are the most vulnerable to economic shocks, the findings also have major policy implications. Having direct access to a wider variety of food through direct production is definitely beneficial to rural households, which cannot always rely on trade and markets.

At the same time, it is important to stress that, while the impact of crop diversification on agricultural income is positive and rather large – on average above 15 per cent – the marginal effects that an additional crop has on the two measures of dietary diversity can be quite small, although they remain positive (in the range of 5%). The magnitude of the effect should be taken into account when assessing the potential contribution of more diversified crop production on food security.

Even though the results leave no doubt about the positivity of the relationship, it is important to keep in mind that this study refers to country averages. Case studies within each country might catch peculiarities for which this relation no longer holds.

Biographical notes

Lorenzo Pellegrini is an associate professor at the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University, The Netherlands. His research is on the economics of environment and development, including the role of institutions (especially corruption) in setting and implementing environmental policies, the local socio-economic effects of extractive industries and energy use.

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Notes

1. We acknowledge the fact that the Simpson or the Herfindahl indicators would also have been useful measures of crop diversification. Unfortunately, the construction of those indicators is not feasible, as the majority of the surveys we use do not provide us with an appropriate set of variables (that is, the indicator for land area devoted to particular crops, or the data on agricultural yields, have not been collected consistently across all surveys).
2. The RIGA data and their full documentation are available at <http://www.fao.org/economic/riga/riga-database/en/>. The RIGA project analysed data from 19 countries located on four continents. However, not all countries included in RIGA yielded the data necessary to run the analysis as we did in this paper. In other words, data availability has limited the set of countries in this study to eight.
3. By agricultural activities we mean activities related to the harvesting of food crops. In what follows, cash crops (coffee, mustard, or sugar cane, for example) have been excluded from the analysis.
4. In the analysis that follows, we take into account all the land used by the households: as home gardens, agricultural land, rented or owned land and land used without any specific proprietary right.
5. Rural households have been divided into three groups according to the land they own. Land class "0–1" indicates the area of owned land is up to one hectare; class "1–2" is households owning between one and two hectares of land; and the class ">2" indicates holdings larger than two hectares.
6. While to a certain extent all cross-sectional analysis of this type is subject to the endogeneity problem, we find that the evidence presented in our paper is quite robust across specifications and countries. Furthermore, the literature (Johnson 1992; von Braun 1995; Senaka Arachchi 1998; Barghouti et al. 2004) suggests that crop diversification has an impact on the two indicators of dietary diversity and on crop income, and not the other way around.
7. Regarding the crop income calculation, two total crop income variables have been created. The first one includes estimates of own crop consumption based on the agricultural production module of the household questionnaire, and the second includes estimates of own crop consumption based on the food expenditure section of the questionnaire. For the regression analysis, both the variables have been used, with no remarkable differences in the results.

8. The choice of the Poisson model over the negative binomial is determined by the fact that the two dependent variables, food count and food group indicator, are not over-dispersed, as the test states. A significant p ($p < 0.05$) test statistic from the over-dispersion test indicates that the Poisson model is appropriate. Only for Indonesia, Nicaragua and Vietnam is the test of over-dispersion run on the food count indicator significant, but never at the 1 per cent level.
9. The pooled regression has been possible given the fact that data on different countries are absolutely comparable. The only two variables that have needed further manipulation are "Crop Income" and "Per Capita Expenditure", both measured in the local currency unit of the year of the survey. To make this variable comparable across the eight countries, all the values for "Crop Income" and "Per Capita Expenditure" have been transformed into 2010 USD.
10. Table 6 introduces average and predicted values for the food count indicator (Model 1), food count indicator (Model 2) and the logarithm of crop income (Model 3).

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Appendix A

Table A1. List of food groups and content of each group.

| Food group | Content of the group |
|---------------|------------------------------------|
| Food group 1 | Cereals and grain products |
| Food group 2 | Starchy, roots, tubers and legumes |
| Food group 3 | Nuts, seeds and legumes |
| Food group 4 | Vegetables |
| Food group 5 | Fruits |
| Food group 6 | Sugar, syrup and sweets |
| Food group 7 | Meat and poultry |
| Food group 8 | Fish and shellfish |
| Food group 9 | Milk and milk products |
| Food group 10 | Oil and fats |
| Food group 11 | Beverages |
| Food group 12 | Eggs |
| Food group 13 | Miscellaneous |

Source: FAO (2007).

Table A2. Food consumption recording technique and recall period.

| Country and year | Food consumption record technique | Recall period ^a |
|------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Malawi, 2004 | One enumerator's visit | 7 days |
| Nepal, 2003 | One enumerator's visit | 31 days |
| Vietnam, 1998 | One enumerator's visit | 365 days |
| Pakistan, 2001 | One enumerator's visit | 14 days |
| Nicaragua, 2001 | One enumerator's visit | 15 days |
| Indonesia, 2000 | One enumerator's visit | 7 days |
| Albania, 2005 | 1-day diary compiled by the household | 14 day |
| Panama, 2003 | One enumerator's visit | 15 days |

Note: ^aLiving Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS) and country representative surveys used different techniques for collecting data; hence the recall periods are different from country to country.

Source: The information is available in the various household questionnaires available at <http://iresearch.worldbank.org/lms/lmsurveyFinder.htm>.

Table A3. Average and predicted values for the food group indicator (Model 1), for the food count indicator (Model 2), and for the logarithm of crop income (Model 3) estimations.

| Country ^b and year | Food group indicator ^a | | Food count indicator ^a | | Logarithm of crop income | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|-----------------|
| | Average value | Predicted value | Average value | Predicted value | Average value | Predicted value |
| Malawi, 2004 | 8.11 | 8.09 | 14.78 | 14.70 | 9.72 | 9.72 |
| Nepal, 2003 | 12.28 | 12.24 | 21.65 | 21.82 | 8.80 | 8.79 |
| Vietnam, 1998 | 6.15 | 6.16 | 11.28 | 11.25 | 8.11 | 8.11 |
| Pakistan, 2001 | 9.93 | 9.94 | 19.14 | 19.19 | 9.98 | 9.43 |
| Nicaragua, 2001 | 8.83 | 8.83 | 17.64 | 17.63 | 7.56 | 7.32 |
| Indonesia, 2000 | 9.90 | 9.90 | 17.24 | 17.24 | 13.35 | 13.25 |
| Albania, 2005 | 10.67 | 10.67 | 34.31 | 34.22 | 13.16 | 13.12 |
| Panama, 2003 | 10.73 | 10.72 | 40.98 | 40.72 | 5.66 | 5.65 |

Note: ^aValues on the food group indicator and food count indicator are slightly different from values presented in Table 3, as now decimals to the one-hundredth level have been included. ^bCountries are ordered by level of Purchasing Power Parity GDP per capita.

Source: RIGA database (<http://www.fao.org/economic/riga/riga-database/en/>).

Policies in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: dominance or diversity?

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ABSTRACT Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) were introduced in 1999 by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund as a requirement for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) to gain access to debt relief and concessional loans. They signalled a new focus by including a participatory framework of “nationally driven” policies. Employing 81 PRSPs for 58 countries, published during 2000–2008, this paper develops a unique scorecard to evaluate the alignment of policies in PRSPs with three dominant development paradigms. It finds that the New York Consensus, which was forged around the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), is driving the content of PRSPs, while the Washington Consensus and Post-Washington Consensus have become secondary influences. This could be the first step in breaking down the hegemony of perceived ideas in the development policy landscape.

RÉSUMÉ Les documents de stratégie pour la réduction de la pauvreté (DSRP) ont été introduits en 1999 par la Banque mondiale et le Fonds monétaire international comme exigence à l'égard des Pays pauvres très endettés (PPTÉ) en contrepartie d'un allègement de leur dette et de prêts à des conditions avantageuses. En mettant l'accent sur un cadre participatif pour la définition de politiques pilotées par le pays lui-même, ces documents annonçaient un changement d'approche. Cet article analyse 81 DSRP de 58 pays publiés entre 2000 et 2008 à l'aide d'une fiche de notation conçue pour évaluer l'alignement des politiques ainsi définies sur trois grands paradigmes de développement. Les résultats montrent que le consensus de New York, qui s'est forgé autour des les Objectifs du développement pour le millénaire, constitue la force principale qui guide le contenu des DSRP tandis que l'influence du consensus de Washington et post-Washington est devenue secondaire. Cela pourrait marquer une première étape dans l'effondrement de l'hégémonie des idées reçues dans le paysage des politiques de développement.

Keywords: PRSPs; MDGs; Washington Consensus; Post-Washington Consensus; New York Consensus

Introduction

The Millennium Declaration, signed by all United Nation member states in September 2000, incorporated the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These goals represent a virtually universal commitment to the reduction of poverty in its many forms by the year 2015 (see Appendix Table A1 for the full list of MDGs). Progress towards the United Nations' MDG targets has been uneven. While some countries are on track to achieve some of the goals, the latest United Nations MDG Report indicates that over one billion people are still living in income poverty, nearly a quarter of children in the developing world are underweight, large gender gaps in employment

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prevail, the goal of achieving universal primary education is unlikely to be achieved and over 2.6 billion people still lack access to improved sanitation (United Nations 2011).

Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) represent an outcome of the World Bank's 1998 Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and provide a road map as to how the MDGs are to be achieved. Importantly, countries should devise and write their own plans for reducing poverty. PRSPs are, therefore, country-driven and should involve broad-based participation by civil society and the private sector. Given the different initial starting points as well as the social, economic and cultural differences, great diversity in the macroeconomic policies embedded in PRSPs should be expected if they truly reflect national and local ownership. However, PRSPs are often criticised for a lack of policy space. International Financing Institutions (IFIs) and the donor community are often accused of imposing an agenda or withholding funding until policies deemed as acceptable are adopted by developing countries (Dijkstra 2005; Lazarus 2008).

A number of studies find that the policies most commonly adopted in PRSPs are those of the Washington Consensus, most notably privatisation, liberalisation and fiscal discipline. While these studies also note a rise in second generation reforms and a greater focus on poverty reduction in PRSPs, they provide no conclusive evidence of a paradigm shift away from the Washington Consensus (Stewart and Wang 2003; Gottschalk 2005; Fukuda-Parr 2010; Sumner 2010). This paper contributes to this literature by undertaking a systematic review of the development policies of 81 PRSPs for 58 countries during the period 2000–2008. This represents the most comprehensive analysis of PRSPs to date. The paper extends existing analyses by examining the strength of PRSP policy alignment to three development paradigms: the Washington Consensus, the Post-Washington Consensus and the New York Consensus. While these distinct paradigms have different emphases and focus on different policies, it is recognised that they do not represent mutually exclusive development agendas. To some degree they are complementary, since their policies overlap. The methodology of the paper is to apply a unique scorecard system to each PRSP to measure the extent of adoption of specific policies. An index derived from the scorecard evaluates the degree of alignment to the three development paradigms. Finally, the paper examines the country characteristics, which explain the variation in paradigm alignment index scores.

Results indicate that PRSP policies are most closely aligned to the New York Consensus. While this might reflect a requirement for PRSPs to operationalise the MDGs in a national strategy, the contention that Washington Consensus policies dominate policy space in PRSPs is no longer the case, giving rise to a new contemporary agenda. While there is a large degree of cross-country variation in the paradigm alignment index scores, countries with higher levels of GDP per capita are more likely to adopt Washington Consensus and Post-Washington Consensus policies. The same is true for countries located in Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and Europe (relative to countries in the Middle East and Africa). While region and income levels are less influential in explaining the variation in New York Consensus alignment, PRSPs devised after 2004 are more likely to be aligned to this paradigm.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a background to the PRSP process and an overview of the existing literature. The three development paradigms are presented in the following section, followed by a discussion of the paper's methodology. The section following that presents and discusses the results and the final section concludes the article.

Background and previous literature

The introduction of PRSPs in September 2000 promised a new focus on poverty reduction, with national ownership driving the process. Countries participating in the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative were required to draft and implement a PRSP in order to be eligible for access to concessional loans and debt relief. Following the Monterrey Consensus in

2002, PRSPs now form the framework by which international donors and developing country governments' coordinate their actions to reduce poverty.

The process first requires an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP). This document must contain the following as a minimum: a statement of commitment to poverty reduction; an outline of the nature of the poverty problem and of existing government strategies aligned to tackle it; a timeline and process for preparing a PRSP; and a three-year policy matrix and macro-economic framework (World Bank 2002).

If a PRSP is approved and funded, developing country governments are required to follow up with an annual progress report. A PRSP covers a three- or four-year period and second (and third) generation PRSPs follow their completion. Each stage is overseen by the World Bank and IMF in the form of Joint Staff Advisory Notes, which provide direction into priority areas and which directly link funding to strategies and priorities.

This paper reviews 81 PRSPs (58 first generation PRSPs and 23 second generation PRSPs) from 2000–2008. It accounts for the most comprehensive analysis of PRSP documents to date.

If, as the World Bank suggests, PRSPs are country-owned, driven and devised in consultation with the private sector and civil society, there should be a diversity of macro-economic policies adopted to reflect the different priorities of key stakeholders across developing countries. Five studies have examined the issue with a consensus that policies vary little by country. The policies within PRSPs are found to be remarkably similar to those of the Washington Consensus and the World Bank's previous policy of structural adjustment lending policies. These studies, however, also acknowledge the changing development landscape that is embracing a new agenda towards second generation reforms with an emphasis on poverty reduction.

Stewart and Wang (2003) analysed the policy contents of 30 PRSPs. A focus of their paper is whether country "ownership" has increased as a result of the PRSP process. In addition, the following policy areas are also evaluated: economic management, public sector governance and management, financial sector, private sector development and social sector. The study finds little evidence of civil society participation in PRSPs. Their paper highlights an adherence to a common structural adjustment reform package and a one-size-fits-all development approach. However, it also acknowledges progress on the contemporary international agenda for poverty reduction and second generation reforms in governance and public sector management. Stewart and Wang (2003) concluded that the similarity of the macroeconomic programmes of the 30 countries evaluated suggests that PRSPs are more of a "window dressing" than a representation of true national ownership and civil society participation. The reforms associated with the three contemporary development paradigms are partially examined within the study, without explicitly identifying any dominance. Overall, findings reflect a symbiotic rise of the other development paradigms, but note the familiarity of structural adjustment policies within the PRSPs.

Gottschalk (2005) investigated the macroeconomic content of the PRSPs of 15 countries. Monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies, as well as the feasibility of proposed growth targets as a basis for poverty reduction, were evaluated. Findings revealed that monetary policy tended to have narrow inflationary bands, it was too focused on price stability and there was limited capacity for countercyclical fiscal policy. Given that these policies limit developing countries' capacity to respond to shocks and macroeconomic volatility, Gottschalk was critical of the ability of PRSPs to directly deliver economic growth and poverty reduction. Although Gottschalk's paper is not directly explicit in defining Washington Consensus content, it does imply a lack of creativity and diversity in policies.

Sumner's (2006) analysis of PRSP policy content challenged the contention that the Washington Consensus is dead and has been replaced by other consensuses.¹ The study examined 10 Washington Consensus policies of 50 PRSPs by examining whether or not the policy was mentioned or if an "unorthodox" policy or review of policy was in the PRSP (Sumner 2006).

The study found that strict monetary and fiscal policy and privatisation are common fixtures in almost all PRSPs. Other standard Washington Consensus policies such as foreign investment, trade and capital account liberalisation were often missing. This was evident particularly in HIPC countries from Africa. Of the 450 policies Sumner examined in the PRSPs, only 11 policies were found to be “unorthodox”. Overall, the study found that a shift to a contemporary development paradigm was far from complete, but a full alignment to the Washington Consensus was no longer the norm. The method of noting this transition, by Sumner’s own admission, is somewhat crude and fails to identify policies from alternate paradigms.

Finally, Fukuda-Parr (2010) examines 22 second generation PRSPs and their alignment to the eight MDGs. Commitment to the MDGs is evaluated by: assessing whether goals are outlined as a priority; whether there is an action plan to achieve the goal; and, finally, whether there are quantitative outcomes included in the PRSP with which progress can be judged. Fukuda Parr (2010) established links between the MDGs and the PRSP documents in terms of goal setting. The study finds that PRSPs demonstrate a commitment to social investments in education, health and water. However, empowerment and vulnerability are areas deemed to receive the least amount of attention in the PRSP documents, particularly with regard to gender violence and women’s political representation.

Development paradigms

John Williamson introduced the term Washington Consensus in 1989 to describe a set of policy reforms implemented in Latin America as “the common core of wisdom embraced by all serious economists” (Williamson 1993, 1334). The macroeconomic policies of the Washington Consensus reflected a commonality of thinking shared by the IMF, the World Bank and the US Treasury. In broad terms, it recommends “governments achieve macroeconomic stability by controlling inflation and fiscal deficits; open their economies to the rest of the world to trade and capital account liberalisation; and liberalise domestic and factor product markets through privatisations and deregulation” (Gore 2000, 789). During the 1980s and 1990s, Washington Consensus policies were strongly pursued by the IFIs in their engagement with developing country governments, particularly through the IMF’s stabilisation programs and the World Bank’s structural adjustment loans. However, Williamson’s original policies did include areas such as progressive taxes and institutional reforms, which did not necessarily comply with what many perceived as the original intent of the Consensus.

During the 1990s, strong dissatisfaction arose with the Washington Consensus. There was little evidence that its policies actually spurred development in the countries that adopted them. Moreover, some countries, particularly those located in Asia, experienced prolonged high rates of economic growth without adopting the standard prescriptions. This led to a reduced focus on free markets and to an emphasis on good governance and strong institutions with social safety nets to protect the vulnerable. Specific policies include anti-corruption strategies, public administration reform, direct subsidies and social funds. Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz was a pioneer of the approach, arguing that countries can only reap the benefits of globalisation and free markets if appropriate institutions are already in place (Stiglitz 1998). The framework for development became known as the Post-Washington Consensus. However, it is sometimes argued that it offers only supplementary reforms to the Washington Consensus and, as such, does not offer much of an alternative path to development (Fine 2001). This study also acknowledges that the Post-Washington Consensus plays a complementary role to the Washington Consensus and that the two are not necessarily competing paradigms.

More recently, development policy discourse has evolved away from a focus on macroeconomic stability and economic growth towards an international agenda that places poverty

reduction at the core of development. The most recent discourse, the New York Consensus, has the achievement of the United Nations' MDGs at its centre. The approach calls for donors to increase aid in a "big push" development framework, with Sachs (2005) providing much of the background and justification to the approach. The New York Consensus outlines direct plans of how to achieve the MDGs. PRSPs have taken greater importance in outlining a country's policies to achieve progress towards the MDGs. Under the New York Consensus, social protection is important and public resources are funnelled into the social services for the poor rather than directly allocated towards the productive sectors (Williamson and Canagarajah 2003; Maxwell 2005). The New York Consensus provides an overarching approach to development, encompassing trade openness, good governance and prioritising government expenditure towards social services (Sumner 2006).

As discussed above, the existing literature provides some, although limited, evidence that policies within PRSPs are moving away from those of the Washington Consensus. Importantly, there is currently no clear consensus as to which contemporary paradigm is dominating current policy space. This paper revisits the issue by providing a comprehensive evaluation of PRSPs to examine their strength of policy alignment to different development paradigms.

Data and methodology

This paper evaluates 81 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers for 58 countries during the period 2000–2008. The sample includes 58 first generation and 33 second generation PRSPs. All PRSPs are publicly available online from the World Bank (2012).

The first stage of the analysis involves devising a scorecard which assesses the degree of policy adoption. Each PRSP receives a score from zero to three for each policy. There are 72 policies (19 Washington Consensus policies, 17 Post-Washington Consensus policies and 22 New York Consensus policies). Higher scores reflect a greater degree of policy adoption and therefore alignment to the paradigm. The scorecard system is provided in Table 1.

The scorecard method is a quantitative evaluation of PRSP policy content, previously used by Bojo and Reddy (2002), Eggen and Bezemer (2007) and Sapkota (2011). Although the method involves subjective judgments, it is considered sufficiently reliable to provide transparent judgments to evaluate policies that determine paradigm alignment in the PRSP, by condensing information in a practical way that allows for clear interpretation.

In the second stage, all individual PRSP policy scores are summed and rescaled to create an overall paradigm alignment index value. Index values fall between zero and one to make interpretation easier. The index is calculated by taking each country's PRSP score and dividing this by the maximum score as follows:

$$PRSP \text{ alignment index} = \frac{\sum Policy \text{ Score } ij}{Policy \text{ Score } Max_j}, \quad (1)$$

where i is the policy and j is the country.

Table 1. Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) scorecard system.

| Score | Criteria |
|-------|---------------------------------------|
| 0 | No mention of the policy |
| 1 | Policy is mentioned |
| 2 | Policy is elaborated upon |
| 3 | Policy is extensively elaborated upon |

A full list of the countries and their paradigm alignment scores is provided in Appendix Table A2.

In a further stage of the analysis, the paper examines the country characteristics that explain the variation in the paradigm alignment index scores. Specifically, it uses cross-tabulations to examine whether high and low paradigm alignment index scores are associated with particular country characteristics. It is postulated that the following factors might explain PRSP alignment to certain development paradigms: geographic region, income levels, the level of aid and the level of governance.

Geographic region is included to capture the potential role of culture and the possibility of countries adopting policies that are similar to their neighbours. Income levels (real GDP per capita) are included, since richer countries might be less inclined to adopt New York Consensus policies if their poverty rates are lower than in other developing countries. The level of aid (ratio of Official Development Assistance to GDP) is examined to determine whether international donors are influential in the adoption of policies of a particular development paradigm. The level of governance is included to examine whether countries with (perceived) weaker governance tend to favour the policies of a particular paradigm (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton 1999). Finally, this paper also examines whether more recent PRSPs are more likely to adopt New York Consensus policies, given the importance of the MDGs in the development discourse in recent years.

The policy sets for the three development paradigms draw on the frameworks outlined above. Each is discussed in turn.

Washington Consensus policies

Washington Consensus policies are drawn from the 10 original macroeconomic policies outlined by Williamson (1990, 1993, 2000) and are provided in Table 2. Even though Williamson outlined 10 original reforms, this paper disaggregates several policies to identify the 19 policies that are

Table 2. Washington Consensus policies.

| Policies | Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) scorecard variable |
|---|--|
| Fiscal discipline | 1. Limiting budgetary expenditure, mention of prudent policy ^a |
| Reorientation of public expenditures | 2. Increased spending on capital expenditure, infrastructure ^b |
| | 3. Increased expenditure on basic social services ^b |
| Tax reform | 4. Relocation of public expenditure to pro-poor programs |
| | 5. Increased revenue rather than reduced expenditure through tax reform ^b |
| | 6. Broad-based consumption tax ^a |
| Financial liberalisation/interest rates | 7. Market determined interest rates ^a |
| | 8. Capital account convertibility ^c |
| | 9. Prudent monetary policy towards price stability ^c |
| Unified and competitive exchange rate | 10. Exchange rate floating ^a |
| | 11. Elimination of exchange rate controls ^b |
| Trade liberalisation | 12. Elimination of quotas/import licensing ^b |
| | 13. Reduced tariffs ^b |
| | 14. Reduced customs regulations ^b |
| Openness to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) | 15. Investment deregulation ^a |
| | 16. Legislation to allow inflows of foreign investment ^b |
| Privatisation | 17. Privatisation of government owned industries ^a |
| Deregulation | 18. Reduction in the controls on the establishment of new firms and on new investment ^a |
| | 19. Elimination of price controls ^c |
| Secure property rights | 20. Legislation of property rights ^a |

Note: ^aWilliamson's (1998) original tenet. ^bDisaggregated (sub)policy of original tenet. ^cNot included in Williamson's (1998) original tenet, but included with Washington institution's version of consensus (Marangos 2009).

widely regarded as being synonymous with the Washington Consensus and were typically included in the conditionality programs of the IFIs during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, this paper includes capital account and price liberalisation, which were not part of Williamson's original tenet but later formed part of the IFI's conditionality packages (Marangos 2009). Within this paradigm, economic growth is primarily led by market integration (Balassa 1984; Edwards 1998). Further, sustained economic growth is believed to result in large-scale poverty reduction and increased benefits to material welfare (Krueger 2004).

Post-Washington Consensus policies

Rodrik (2006) and Stiglitz (1998) were strong advocates for a move away from standard Washington Consensus policies to a Post-Washington Consensus. The Post-Washington Consensus policies are presented in Table 3 and draw upon the 10 policies outlined by Rodrik (2006). As with the Washington Consensus, several policies are disaggregated. As noted by Stiglitz (1998), these policies can be considered as complementary additions to the Washington Consensus agenda. The Post-Washington Consensus policy set includes reducing corruption, increasing social safety nets and targeted poverty reduction programs, which are not specific macroeconomic reforms (Mosley 2001). In essence, the Post-Washington Consensus does not replace the Washington Consensus, but is designed to humanise and sequence its policies.

New York Consensus policies

This paper follows Sumner (2006) and Fukuda-Parr (2010) in devising a New York Consensus policy set. Sumner attributes the New York Consensus to Maxwell (2005) and the Millennium Development Project of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2005). Fukuda-Parr (2010) investigated 10 priority areas within PRSPs linked to specific MDG targets and

Table 3. Post-Washington Consensus policies.

| Policies | Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) scorecard variable |
|--|---|
| Corporate governance | 1. Bankruptcy law ^b |
| Anti-corruption | 2. Effective competition law ^b |
| | 3. National anti-corruption strategies ^b |
| Flexible labour markets | 4. Public administration reform ^b |
| | 5. Judicial reform ^b |
| | 6. Labour market reform legislation ^b |
| World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements | 7. Flexible labour market ^b |
| | 8. Commitment to the WTO principles outlined ^a |
| Financial codes and standards | 9. Prudential requirement ratios stipulated and enforced ^a |
| Prudent capital account opening | 10. Capital account prudence ^a |
| Non-intermediate exchange rate | 11. Target zones for exchange rate ^b |
| | 12. Crawling bands ^b |
| Independent central banks, inflation targeting | 13. Independence of the central bank ^a |
| | 14. Set inflation rate target ranging 3–5% ^b |
| Social safety nets | 15. Limited food subsidies to compensate for income loss, cash transfers ^b |
| | 16. Social funds; introduction of pensions and other entitlements; social protection ^b |
| Targeted poverty reduction | 17. Rank poverty programs in relative importance with economic and redistribution criteria ^a |

Note: ^aRodrik (2006) original tenet. ^bDisaggregated (sub)policies.

indicators. Additional priority areas not specifically linked to the MDGs but an explicit directive of the Millennium Declaration (2000) are included: democracy, good governance, human rights and the social integration of vulnerable groups.

This paper builds on Fukuda-Parr (2010) and UNDP (2005) by including policies designed to achieve the eight MDGs and two additional goals aligned with the UN Development Agenda. The policies associated with the MDGs are taken from Millennium Project's directive, which outlines policy interventions required to operationalise the global goals (UNDP 2005). The first additional policy is rural development, which relates to MDG1 (eradicating extreme poverty and hunger). The second policy is infrastructure development, which is an overarching directive, but is also specifically aligned to MDG1 and MDG7 (ensuring environmental sustainability). New York Consensus policies and the MDGs to which they align are provided in Table 4.

Table 4. New York Consensus policies.

| Policies | Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) scorecard variable | MDG alignment |
|-------------------------------------|---|-------------------------|
| Infrastructure capacity | 1. Increased spending on capital expenditure in areas of transport, energy, water supply, sanitation and telecommunications ^b | MDG 1, 7 |
| Rural development | 2. Agricultural productivity: soil health; water management; farm diversification; and pest control ^a | MDG 1 |
| | 3. Linking farmers to markets: storage; market places and agro processing ^a | MDG 1 |
| | 4. Evidence of irrigation techniques and water resource management; pumps; drip irrigation; wells ^a | |
| Education | 5. Primary school enrolment: elimination of school fees; provision of school materials; cash transfers to parents ^a | MDG 2, MDG 3 |
| | 6. Gender participation addressed in schools ^a | |
| Health | 7. Child mortality policies; neonatal immunisations; preventative approaches to childhood illness (for example malaria beds) ^a | MDG 4 MDG 5 MDG 6 |
| | 8. Maternal health policies; emergency obstetric care; skilled birth attendance and antenatal care ^a | |
| | 9. Prevention and control programs for HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases ^a | |
| Governance: rule of law, corruption | 10. National anti-corruption surveys ^b | MDG 8 |
| | 11. Public expenditure tracking and review ^b | MDG 8 |
| | 12. Government accountability programs: civil liberties; political rights; voice and accountability ^b | MDG 8 |
| | 13. Human rights policies ^b | |
| Employment | 14. Public works programs ^a | MDG 1 |
| | 15. Employment in decent work programs ^a | |
| Water and sanitation | 16. Provide, operate and maintain water infrastructure ^a | MDG 7 |
| | 17. Construction and operation sanitation facilities ^a | |
| Gender equality and empowerment | 18. Women's political representation ^a | MDG 3 |
| | 19. Reform to legislation for women's entitlement to land ^a | |
| Environment | 20. Natural resource protection programs; market mechanisms, regulation and enforcement and biodiversity programs ^a | MDG 7 |
| | 21. Urban planning and investment to improve the lives of slum-dwellers ^a | |
| Science and technology | 22. Programs to support research and development through higher education; improved access to communication technologies ^a | MDG 8 |

Note: ^aUNDP (2005). ^bOther Millennium Declaration Policies.




Figure 1. Paradigm alignment index scores.

Note: NYC: New York Consensus; WC: Washington Consensus; PWC: Post-Washington Consensus.

Results and interpretation

Aggregate (average) index scores for paradigm alignment are provided in Figure 1. They reveal a degree of policy diversity not documented in other studies. The highest average paradigm index score is for the New York Consensus (0.644), followed by the Washington Consensus (0.638) and the Post-Washington Consensus (0.510). These results, to some extent, challenge the findings of existing studies that the Washington Consensus is the dominant paradigm (Stewart and Wang 2003; Sumner 2006). This paper demonstrates that the New York Consensus has emerged as a more dominant prescription in the development process than the other two development paradigms. Findings also dispute the legitimacy of the Post-Washington Consensus as an emerging contemporary development paradigm. Each paradigm alignment index is discussed in turn before the country characteristics that explain the variation in alignment index scores are examined. Differences in index alignment to the paradigms across first and second generation PRSPs are also examined.

Washington Consensus paradigm alignment

The Washington Consensus policy paradigm dominated the macroeconomic policy landscape of most developing nations during the 1980s and 1990s. The results from the paradigm indices reveal marginally weaker alignment to the Washington Consensus than to the New York Consensus. Figure 2 presents the distribution of average PRSP adoption scores by specific Washington Consensus policies. The policies are ordered by strongest alignment (on the left) to weakest alignment (on the right). The four most commonly adopted Washington Consensus policies are: limiting budget expenditures, increased expenditures on social services, increased capital expenditure and broad-based consumption tax implementation. The least adopted policies are exchange rate controls and capital account opening. However, it should be noted that these policies are unlikely to be included in PRSPs if they were previously implemented. The legislation of property rights is often mentioned in PRSPs, being absent in only 25 per cent of these documents. Yet, only 6 per cent of PRSPs had actually implemented legislation to protect property rights. Trade reforms, in the form of reduced tariff and customs deregulations, do not feature as prominently as suggested by previous studies.




Figure 2. Washington Consensus policy adoption in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).

Post-Washington Consensus paradigm alignment

The adoption by PRSPs of specific Post-Washington Consensus policies is provided in Figure 3. There is greatest adoption of public administration reform, national anti-corruption strategies and reform of the judiciary. Each of these policies represents a move towards strong institutions and regulatory controls synonymous with the Post-Washington Consensus. Exchange rate and labour market reforms are policies with the lowest degree of adoption. These policies are potentially more likely to be associated with more developed economies.²




Figure 3. Post-Washington Consensus policy adoption in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).




Figure 4. New York Consensus policy adoption in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).

New York Consensus paradigm alignment

PRSPs are found to be more aligned with the New York Consensus than to the other development paradigms. The requirement of MDGs to be translated into national PRSPs has seen the New York Consensus transitioning as the dominant development paradigm. As depicted in Figure 4, PRSPs commonly adopt the following New York Consensus policies: increased expenditure on capital infrastructure, safe drinking water and support for HIV prevention programs. Women's representation in parliament, legislation for women's entitlement to land and biological diversity were not as well represented in the PRSP documents. Gender and the environment are often cross-cutting issues, which are not yet fully embraced by developing nations. These results are broadly consistent with Fukuda-Parr (2010).³

Factors explaining the variation in paradigm alignment index scores

This paper provides the first examination of the country characteristics that explain the variation in PRSP paradigm alignment scores. Cross-tabulations are used to examine whether there are statistically significant relationships between high and low index scores and possible drivers influencing paradigm adoption. As discussed above, these drivers include region, income levels, level of governance, dependence on foreign aid and the period in which the PRSP was published.

Table 5 presents results from cross-tabulations of paradigm alignment index scores with the region a country is located. High index scores are defined as those above the mean. Low index scores are defined as those below the mean. Region follows the World Bank's regional classification. The table indicates that countries located in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa tend to have a lower alignment to Washington Consensus policies than countries in other regions of the world. While the Pearson chi-squared statistic indicates that regional differences are significant, these findings should be assessed with recognition of small samples of PRSPs across the different regions.

Results are remarkably similar when examining the alignment to Post-Washington Consensus policies across regions. The notable difference is that countries in Latin America tend to be less

Table 5. Cross-tabulation of paradigm alignment index scores with region.

| | Sub-Saharan (n=44) | Europe & Central Asia (n=13) | Latin America & Caribbean (n=7) | South Asia (n=7) | East Asia and Pacific (n=8) | Middle and North Africa (n=9) |
|--|-----------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Washington Consensus alignment index score (%) | | | | | | |
| Low WC score <0.659* | 68.18 | 30.77 | 28.57 | 28.57 | 25.00 | 100.0 |
| High WC score >0.659* | 31.82 | 69.23 | 71.43 | 71.43 | 75.00 | 0.000 |
| Chi-squared (P-value) | 14.2211 (0.014) | | | | | |
| Post-Washington Consensus alignment index score (%) | | | | | | |
| Low PWC score >0.510* | 65.91 | 7.69 | 57.14 | 33.33 | 25.00 | 100.00 |
| High PWC score <0.510* | 34.09 | 92.31 | 42.86 | 66.67 | 75.00 | 0.000 |
| Chi-squared (P-value) | 19.1814 (0.002) | | | | | |
| New York Consensus alignment index score (%) | | | | | | |
| Low NYC score <0.643* | 40.91 | 46.15 | 71.43 | 66.67 | 37.50 | 50.00 |
| High NYC score >0.643* | 59.09 | 53.85 | 28.57 | 42.86 | 62.50 | 50.00 |
| Chi-squared (P-value) | 2.8766 (0.719) | | | | | |

Note: *Average values of paradigm alignment index scores.

aligned to the Post-Washington Consensus than they are to the Washington Consensus. This could be explained by the Latin American and Caribbean countries in the sample being classified as HIPCs and possibly being subject to a high degree of conditionality (Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guyana, Dominica and Haiti). The finding of significant differences in alignment to Washington Consensus and Post-Washington Consensus policies across regions suggest a greater degree of policy space than found by previous studies. Interestingly, countries in Europe and central Asia tend to be more aligned to the Post-Washington Consensus than the Washington Consensus.

With respect to the New York Consensus, Table 5 indicates that the PRSPs of sub-Saharan African countries are most closely aligned with this paradigm and countries from Latin America and the Caribbean are the least aligned. However, the chi-squared test suggests that the difference in New York Consensus index scores across regions is not statistically significant.

Cross-tabulations of paradigm alignment index scores and income levels are provided in Table 6. Countries are defined as low income countries if their GDP per capita falls below USD1,500 (Dollar Purchasing Power Parity 2005) and as middle and high income countries if it falls above this threshold. The table indicates that countries with higher incomes tend to have PRSPs that are more closely aligned to Washington Consensus and Post-Washington Consensus policies. This finding does not hold for the New York Consensus paradigm alignment index scores.

Cross-tabulations found remarkably little evidence that PRSP policy content is influenced by either indicators of governance and aid dependence (see Appendix Tables A3 and A4).⁴ This latter finding is reassuring, as it indicates that recipients of higher aid are not necessarily influenced by donors in their PRSP formulations.⁵

Table 7 presents results from cross-tabulations of paradigm alignment index scores with time. The entire sample period for the PRSPs evaluated in this study runs from 2000–2008. The table

Table 6. Cross-tabulation of paradigm alignment index scores with income.

| | Low income (GDP per capita <USD1,500) | High income (GDP per capita <USD1,500) | Number |
|--|--|---|--------|
| Washington Consensus alignment index score (%) | | | |
| Low WC score <0.659* | 73.81 | 29.73 | 42 |
| High WC score >0.659* | 29.55 | 70.27 | 39 |
| Total | 100.00 | 100.00 | 81 |
| Pearson chi2(1) | 13.3519 | | |
| (P-value) | 0.000 | | |
| Post-Washington Consensus alignment index score (%) | | | |
| Low PWC score <0.5101* | 61.36 | 35.14 | 40 |
| High PWC score >0.5101* | 38.64 | 64.86 | 41 |
| Total | 100.00 | 100.00 | 81 |
| Pearson chi (2) | 5.5315 | | |
| (P-value) | 0.019 | | |
| New York Consensus Alignment Index Score (%) | | | |
| Low NYC score <0.643* | 38.64 | 54.05 | 37 |
| High NYC score >0.643* | 61.36 | 45.95 | 44 |
| Total | 100.00 | 100.00 | 81 |
| Pearson chi2(1) | 1.9254 | | |
| (P-value) | 0.165 | | |

Note: *Average values of paradigm alignment index scores.

indicates that PRSPs published after 2004 are more closely aligned to the New York Consensus than those published in the period 2000–2004. The chi-squared statistics indicate that these time periods are not important for any changes in Washington Consensus and Post-Washington Consensus alignment, demonstrating the dominance of the New York Consensus in the recent development discourse.

Table 7. Cross-tabulation of paradigm alignment index scores and time period.

| | Before 2004 | After 2004 | Number |
|--|-------------|------------|--------|
| Washington Consensus alignment index score (%) | | | |
| High WC score >0.659* | 48.89 | 55.56 | 42 |
| Low WC score <0.659* | 51.11 | 44.44 | 39 |
| Total | 100.00 | 100.00 | 81 |
| Pearson chi2(1) | 0.3560 | | |
| (P-value) | (0.551) | | |
| Post-Washington Consensus alignment index score (%) | | | |
| High PWC score >0.5101* | 48.89 | 50.00 | 40 |
| Low PWC score <0.5101* | 51.11 | 50.00 | 41 |
| Total | 100.00 | 100.00 | 81 |
| Pearson chi2(1) | 0.0099 | | |
| (P-value) | 0.921 | | |
| New York Consensus alignment index score (%) | | | |
| Low NYC score <0.643* | 64.44 | 22.22 | 37 |
| High NYC score >0.643* | 35.56 | 77.78 | 44 |
| Total | 100.00 | 100.00 | 81 |
| Pearson chi2(1) | 14.3690 | | |
| Probability(P-value) | 0.000 | | |

Note: *Average values of paradigm alignment index scores.

The finding of policy diversity within PRSPs across countries is encouraging and represents a departure from the findings of other studies. It suggests at least some degree of ownership within the PRSP process. While this is true at a national level, it does not necessarily suggest that there is extensive consultation and participation with civil society and the private sector.

Second generation changes in PRSPs

A second generation PRSP represents an opportunity for recipient nations to respond to earlier criticisms of the first generation and develop not only poverty reduction strategies but national development strategies. Research by Driscoll and Evans (2005) found second generation PRSPs demonstrated a greater emphasis on poverty reduction, highlighted by increases in pro-poor expenditure, increased donor alignment and improved poverty linking to budget outcomes.

Figure 5 indicates that alignment to the Washington Consensus paradigm across PRSP generations did not vary significantly for many countries. Of the countries undertaking a second generation PRSP, 11 of the 23 were found to have a lower Washington Consensus alignment score relative to their first PRSP. Moldova's alignment to this paradigm drops sharply, which may be explained by the large reduction in the size of its PRSP (84 pages in 2008 versus 211 pages in 2004). Alignment to the Washington Consensus paradigm increased in the second generation PRSP of 12 countries.

As demonstrated in Figure 6, alignment to the Post-Washington Consensus also fell in the second generation PRSPs for about half the countries in the sub-sample. However, Figure 7 indicates that alignment to the New York Consensus increased in all second generation PRSPs, with the exception of Moldova, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe. Overall, this confirms a significant change in policy adoption, reflecting a strong commitment to the international MDG agenda.




Figure 5. First and second generation index scores for Washington Consensus.

Note: WCI: first generation Washington Consensus; WC2: second generation Washington Consensus.




Figure 6. First and second generation index scores for Post-Washington Consensus. Note: PWC1: first generation Post-Washington Consensus; PWC2: second generation Post-Washington Consensus.




Figure 7. First and second generation index scores for New York Consensus. Note: NYC1: first generation New York Consensus; NYC2 second generation New York Consensus.

Conclusion

This paper has undertaken the most comprehensive review of the development policy content of PRSPs to date. A scorecard is devised to measure a country's adoption of specific policies. The

scorecard is used to calculate an index which measures the alignment of a PRSP to three established development paradigms. It contributes to the existing literature by evaluating a greater number of PRSPs and examining the country characteristics that explain the variation in paradigm alignment index scores.

Even though Washington Consensus policies are still very prevalent in PRSPs, the development landscape has broadened to include greater diversity. Fukuda-Parr (2010) and Stewart and Wang (2003) found evidence of a commitment to the social sectors within the PRSPs. Gottschalk (2005) and Sumner (2006) found less variation in macroeconomic policies, but still noted a variation from previous generations of structural adjustment programs, although they did not examine policies outside the Washington Consensus framework. This paper builds on the existing literature by analysing the alignment of PRSPs to the three contemporary development paradigms in greater depth and breadth than has been previously undertaken. It notes the emerging dominance of the New York Consensus in the PRSPs, confirming that these policies are driving the content of developing country strategies. Clearly the Millennium Declaration has been successful at shifting policies in the PRSP process towards the achievement of the MDGs. This could be the first step in the breaking down of the perceived hegemony of ideas, which will hopefully strengthen in the post-2015 MDG era. However, questions arise as to whether this represents greater ownership on behalf of developing countries or whether there has been a change in donor behaviour and a move to push New York Consensus policies into the agenda of their development partners.

The paper identifies key regional differences in PRSP paradigm alignment. While countries in Asia, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean have a greater alignment to Washington Consensus and Post-Washington Consensus policies, countries located in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa are more likely to align their policies with the New York Consensus. Policies of lower income countries are, in general, more likely to be aligned to New York Consensus policies than to the other development paradigms. Those countries undertaking a second generation PRSP demonstrated higher paradigm alignment scores to the New York Consensus, further reinforcing the emphasis on poverty reduction policies in more recent development strategies.

The paradigm index alignment scores serve as valuable preliminary analysis to inform future research. Future research needs to examine whether strong PRSP alignment to the development paradigms actually translates into tangible improvements in poverty reduction. Designing a high quality PRSP that outlines a clear path to reducing poverty is one thing, enacting the policies to experience the gains is another.

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Biographical notes

Meg Elkins is an Associate Lecturer in the School of Economics, Finance and Marketing at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology. Her research interests include policy evaluation in developing economies, in particular reviewing Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Millennium Development Goals. Further areas of interest are social protection and poverty and wellbeing. She has recently published in the *Journal of International Development* (2014).

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Notes

1. James Wolfensohn, the President of the World Bank, stated in May 2004 that the Washington Consensus was now dead and replaced by several consensuses. Maxwell (2005) identified which consensuses were appearing in place of the Washington Consensus.
2. Serbia-Montenegro's 2004 PRSP was most aligned to the Washington Consensus and Post-Washington Consensus paradigms. High GDP per capita, long life expectancy and virtual achievement of the MDGs are strong features of this country. It was not eligible for debt reduction under the HIPC initiative and undertook a PRSP without the requirement to do so. The high alignment score illustrates a desire to create a fully functioning market economy. The strong uptake of Washington Consensus and Post-Washington Consensus policies is driven by Serbia-Montenegro's objective to integrate into the European Union. The government is developing its national strategy, emphasising both economic growth and poverty reduction in equal measure.
3. Rwanda's 2008 PRSP has the greatest alignment to the New York Consensus paradigm. PRSP policies were targeted towards agriculture in the form of irrigation projects, agro-processing plants and land planning projects. Government spending was clearly directed towards achieving MDG targets for education, health, employment, safe drinking water, and sanitation infrastructure. Governance indicators, anti-corruption plans and public expenditure review strategies were also evident to increase the likelihood of achieving these targets. Despite Rwanda being classified as a low income nation with a GDP per capita of USD490, there is evidence of significant progress towards the MDG targets. School enrolment rates, access to water in rural areas and infant mortality rates have surpassed other sub-Saharan African nation's trends (World Bank 2011). The Democratic Republic of Congo's PRSP for 2007 was least aligned with the New York Consensus, although its index score was influenced by weak institutional capacity and experiencing conflict.
4. The governance index is calculated as the sum of Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton's (1999) six governance indicators: voice and accountability, political stability, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, control of corruption and the rule of law.
5. Examining differences between bilateral and multilateral aid remains an area for further work.

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Appendix

Table A1. Millennium Development Goals.

| | |
|--------|--|
| Goal 1 | Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger |
| Goal 2 | Achieve universal primary school entertainment |
| Goal 3 | Promote gender equality and empower women |
| Goal 4 | Reduce child mortality |
| Goal 5 | Improve maternal health |
| Goal 6 | Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases |
| Goal 7 | Ensure environmental sustainability |
| Goal 8 | Global partnerships for development |

Source: <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>

Table A2. Index scores and regions for Washington Consensus (WC), Post-Washington Consensus (PWC), and New York Consensus (NYC).

| Country | Region | Year | WC | PWC | NYC |
|--------------------|----------------------------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| Afghanistan | Middle East & North Africa | 2008 | 0.705 | 0.559 | 0.857 |
| Albania | Europe & Central Asia | 2008 | 0.909 | 0.676 | 0.768 |
| Armenia | Europe & Central Asia | 2003 | 0.932 | 0.765 | 0.589 |
| Armenia | Europe & Central Asia | 2008 | 0.773 | 0.706 | 0.75 |
| Azerbaijan | Europe & Central Asia | 2003 | 0.568 | 0.529 | 0.625 |
| Bangladesh | South Asia | 2005 | 0.864 | 0.706 | 0.768 |
| Benin | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2002 | 0.568 | 0.324 | 0.357 |
| Benin | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2008 | 0.409 | 0.324 | 0.929 |
| Bhutan | South Asia | 2004 | 0.273 | 0.118 | 0.25 |
| Bolivia | Latin America & Caribbean | 2001 | 0.75 | 0.559 | 0.625 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | Europe & Central Asia | 2004 | 0.523 | 1 | 0.607 |
| Burkina Faso | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2000 | 0.386 | 0.529 | 0.411 |
| Burkina Faso | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2004 | 0.659 | 0.529 | 0.964 |
| Burundi | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2006 | 0.773 | 0.441 | 0.643 |
| Cambodia | East Asia & Pacific | 2002 | 0.773 | 0.529 | 0.661 |
| Cambodia | East Asia & Pacific | 2005 | 0.5 | 0.471 | 0.75 |
| Cape Verde | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2004 | 0.75 | 0.588 | 0.464 |
| Cape Verde | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2008 | 0.795 | 0.706 | 0.786 |
| Chad | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2003 | 0.295 | 0.147 | 0.393 |
| Congo DR | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2007 | 0.523 | 0.235 | 0.304 |
| Djibouti | Middle East & North Africa | 2004 | 0.545 | 0.471 | 0.804 |
| Dominica | Latin America & Caribbean | 2006 | 0.5 | 0.441 | 0.357 |
| Ethiopia | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2002 | 0.932 | 0.588 | 0.661 |
| Gambia | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2002 | 0.523 | 0.324 | 0.411 |
| Gambia | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2007 | 0.682 | 0.588 | 0.821 |
| Georgia | Europe & Central Asia | 2003 | 0.841 | 0.559 | 0.286 |
| Ghana | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2003 | 0.841 | 0.559 | 0.804 |
| Ghana | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2005 | 0.727 | 0.412 | 0.982 |
| Guinea | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2002 | 0.545 | 0.353 | 0.643 |
| Guinea | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2007 | 0.409 | 0.412 | 0.661 |
| Guyana | Latin America & Caribbean | 2002 | 0.841 | 0.471 | 0.589 |
| Haiti | Latin America & Caribbean | 2008 | 0.477 | 0.324 | 0.821 |
| Honduras | Latin America & Caribbean | 2001 | 0.75 | 0.765 | 0.571 |
| Kenya | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2004 | 0.795 | 0.765 | 0.607 |
| Kyrgyz Republic | Europe & Central Asia | 2002 | 0.705 | 0.882 | 0.643 |

(Continued)

Table A2. Continued.

| Country | Region | Year | WC | PWC | NYC |
|---------------------|----------------------------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| Lao | East Asia & Pacific | 2004 | 0.795 | 0.353 | 0.518 |
| Lao | East Asia & Pacific | 2008 | 0.705 | 0.706 | 0.857 |
| Lesotho | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2005 | 0.545 | 0.294 | 0.625 |
| Liberia | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2008 | 0.659 | 0.382 | 0.679 |
| Madagascar | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2003 | 0.545 | 0.382 | 0.375 |
| Madagascar | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2007 | 0.432 | 0.353 | 0.661 |
| Malawi | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2002 | 0.523 | 0.5 | 0.768 |
| Malawi | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2006 | 0.705 | 0.412 | 0.929 |
| Maldives | South Asia | 2008 | 0.477 | 0.529 | 0.571 |
| Mauritania | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2000 | 0.75 | 0.294 | 0.5 |
| Mauritania | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2006 | 0.773 | 0.5 | 0.554 |
| Moldova | Europe & Central Asia | 2004 | 1 | 0.941 | 0.768 |
| Moldova | Europe & Central Asia | 2008 | 0.432 | 0.382 | 0.679 |
| Mongolia | East Asia & Pacific | 2003 | 0.682 | 0.676 | 0.5 |
| Mozambique | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2001 | 0.477 | 0.382 | 0.643 |
| Mozambique | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2006 | 0.591 | 0.382 | 0.554 |
| Nepal | South Asia | 2003 | 0.773 | 0.706 | 0.482 |
| Nicaragua | Latin America & Caribbean | 2001 | 0.705 | 0.353 | 0.5 |
| Nicaragua | Latin America & Caribbean | 2005 | 0.75 | 0.882 | 0.732 |
| Niger | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2008 | 0.341 | 0.529 | 0.786 |
| Nigeria | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2005 | 0.545 | 0.353 | 0.643 |
| Pakistan | South Asia | 2003 | 0.727 | 0.441 | 0.446 |
| Rwanda | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2002 | 0.659 | 0.294 | 0.607 |
| Rwanda | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2008 | 0.341 | 0.618 | 1 |
| Sao Tome & Principe | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2002 | 0.341 | 0.294 | 0.518 |
| Sao Tome & Principe | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2005 | 0.25 | 0.206 | 0.464 |
| Senegal | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2002 | 0.432 | 0.294 | 0.732 |
| Senegal | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2007 | 0.568 | 0.559 | 0.839 |
| Serbia Montenegro | Europe & Central Asia | 2004 | 1 | 1 | 0.75 |
| Sierra Leone | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2005 | 0.659 | 0.412 | 0.429 |
| Sri Lanka | South Asia | 2002 | 0.955 | 0.794 | 0.839 |
| Tajikistan | Europe & Central Asia | 2002 | 0.659 | 0.559 | 0.446 |
| Tanzania | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2000 | 0.273 | 0.176 | 0.393 |
| Tanzania | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2005 | 0.614 | 0.559 | 0.714 |
| Timor Leste | East Asia & Pacific | 2002 | 0.523 | 0.559 | 0.893 |
| Uganda | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2000 | 0.386 | 0.147 | 0.375 |
| Uganda | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2005 | 0.773 | 0.529 | 0.75 |
| Uzbekistan | Europe & Central Asia | 2008 | 0.818 | 0.647 | 0.786 |
| Vietnam | East Asia & Pacific | 2003 | 0.932 | 0.676 | 0.5 |
| Vietnam | East Asia & Pacific | 2006 | 0.773 | 0.618 | 0.643 |
| Yemen | Middle East & North Africa | 2002 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.571 |
| Zambia | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2002 | 0.568 | 0.353 | 0.875 |
| Zambia | Sub-Saharan Africa | 2006 | 0.773 | 0.706 | 0.982 |

Source: World Bank Documents as of July 2009.

Table A3. Cross-tabulation of paradigm alignment index scores with overseas development assistance (ODA).

| | Low ODA <13.58% of GDP ^a | High ODA >13.58% of GDP ^a | Total PRSPs ^b |
|----------------------------------|--|---|--------------------------|
| Washington Consensus | | | |
| Low WC score <0.659* | 52.86 | 48.72 | 37 |
| High WC score >0.659* | 47.14 | 51.28 | 44 |
| Total | 100.00 | 100.00 | 81 |
| Pearson chi2(1) | 0.2799 | | |
| (P-value) | 0.597 | | |
| Post-Washington Consensus | | | |
| Low PWC score <0.5101* | 52.38 | 46.25 | 37 |
| High PWC score >0.5101* | 47.62 | 53.85 | 41 |
| Total | 100.00 | 100.00 | 81 |
| Pearson chi (2) | 0.3137 | | |
| (P-value) | 0.575 | | |
| New York Consensus | | | |
| Low NYC score <0.643* | 31.48 | 51.28 | 37 |
| High NYC score >0.643* | 59.52 | 48.72 | 44 |
| Total | 100.00 | 100.00 | 81 |
| Pearson chi2(1) | 0.9516 | | |
| (P-value) | 0.329 | | |

Note: ^aMean score of ODA as a percentage of GDP. ^bPoverty Reduction Strategy Papers.

Table A4. Cross-tabulation of paradigm alignment index scores with aggregate World Bank Governance Indicators.

| | Low summed governance <-3.1339 ^a | High summed governance >-3.1339 ^a | Total PRSPs ^b |
|----------------------------------|--|--|--------------------------|
| Washington Consensus | | | |
| Low WC score <0.659* | 53.66 | 50.00 | 37 |
| High WC score >0.659* | 46.34 | 50.00 | 44 |
| Total | 100.00 | 100.00 | 81 |
| Pearson chi2(1) | 0.1085 | | |
| (Probability) | 0.742 | | |
| Post-Washington Consensus | | | |
| Low PWC score <0.5101* | 48.78 | 50.00 | 37 |
| High PWC score >0.5101* | 51.22 | 50.00 | 41 |
| Total | 100.00 | 100.00 | 81 |
| Pearson chi (2) | 0.0120 | | |
| (Probability) | 0.913 | | |
| New York Consensus | | | |
| Low NYC score <0.643* | 53.64 | 37.50 | 37 |
| High NYC score >0.643* | 46.34 | 62.50 | 44 |
| Total | 100.00 | 100.00 | 81 |
| Pearson chi2(1) | 2.1305 | | |
| (Probability) | 0.144 | | |

Note: ^aMean score of the summed World Bank Governance Indicators. ^bPoverty Reduction Strategy Papers.

Caractéristiques et succès des projets de développement international : Que peuvent nous apprendre les gestionnaires d'ONG?

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RÉSUMÉ Cet article présente les points de vue de gestionnaires d'ONG sur les particularités de ces organisations et les dimensions liées au succès des projets de développement international. La réalisation d'une enquête inédite auprès des gestionnaires de projets de développement international au sein d'ONG par le biais d'entrevues semi-structurées et par une analyse documentaire permet de faire ressortir une vision pragmatique et éclairante des conditions de fonctionnement des ONG, plus particulièrement des éléments relatifs à la définition des besoins, aux conditions de travail, à la reddition de compte, à la pérennité des changements, aux pratiques de gestion et à l'implication des parties prenantes. Cette recherche met en évidence certaines dimensions particulièrement significatives pour les gestionnaires de projets qui travaillent sur le terrain et soulèvent de défis sur les façons de faire pouvant contribuer à alimenter la réflexion dans la pratique de la gestion de projet de même que quelques pistes de recherche futures.

ABSTRACT This article presents the perspectives of NGO managers on the particularities of NGO organisations and the conditions related to the success of international development projects. The content analysis of a survey carried out with project managers of international development projects highlights their pragmatic and informative vision of the management conditions of NGOs concerning, in particular, needs assessment, working conditions, accountability, the sustainability of change, management practices and stakeholder participation. This research underlines certain dimensions that are particularly significant for project managers, contributes to enriching our understanding of project management and opens avenues for future research.

Mots clé : évaluation de projets; facteurs de succès des projets; développement international; habiletés gestionnaires projets; ONG internationales

Introduction

Une portion importante de l'aide internationale passe par les organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) avec la réalisation de nombreux projets dans une proportion dépassant les 20 pour cent de l'ensemble de l'aide allouée (Beaudet, Schaffer, et Haslam 2008; OCDE 2011). Orientées sur le développement économique, social ou l'humanitaire, ces ONG œuvrent pour la majorité dans des conditions difficiles. Élément important de la société civile et de la vie démocratique, le travail des ONG auprès de la population des pays en développement est traditionnellement perçu comme étant légitime et nécessaire face aux interventions du gouvernement et du secteur privé (Beaudet, Schaffer, et Haslam 2008). À la fois les mouvements de droite les ont saluées pour

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leur efficacité, de par leur statut non gouvernemental, et ceux de gauche pour la transformation sociale qu'elles engendrent (Lewis 2007; Lewis et Kanji 2009; Zimet 2006).

Dans la foulée des nombreuses réflexions menant à une meilleure efficacité de l'aide internationale (Objectifs du millénaire, Déclaration de Paris, Programme d'Accra, etc.), les ONG font dorénavant face à plusieurs défis. Faisant appel à une professionnalisation grandissante de leur personnel, formé historiquement de volontaires et de religieux (Lewis et Kanji 2009; Mawdsley, Townsend, et Porter 2005; Ronalds 2010; Ryfman 2009), les ONG doivent réaliser des projets dans un environnement de plus en plus complexe. Cela se caractérise notamment par la présence de problèmes liés à des enjeux de pauvreté et d'inégalité, une reddition de compte vis-à-vis leurs bailleurs de fonds axée sur un cadre hautement normatif (Ika, Diallo, et Thuillier 2012), des conditions locales précaires et en constante mutation (Khang et Moe 2008) et la présence de multiples parties prenantes et d'un réseau d'acteurs aux besoins et capacités variables (Abbott, Brown, et Wilson 2007). Le mode de gestion des projets par les ONG revêt ainsi un caractère spécifique car il repose généralement sur une approche managériale avec un fonctionnement décentralisé et participatif, une faible formalisation, peu de niveaux hiérarchiques et un mode de travail en réseau (Ronald 2010; Ryfman 2009).

Face à cette complexité et malgré l'importance que ces organisations jouent dans le développement international, les ONG de développement international font paradoxalement peu l'objet de recherche empirique (Ika 2012) permettant d'alimenter en profondeur, par des données qualitatives, la réflexion des praticiens sur la nature des projets qu'ils réalisent et les facteurs permettant leur réussite.

En effet, en parcourant la littérature sur les caractéristiques des projets de développement international et les principaux facteurs de succès des projets, on constate d'une part que les études réalisées se traduisent généralement par des articles scientifiques (Hermano et al. 2013; Ika 2007, 2012; Ika, Diallo, et Thuillier 2012; Khang et Moe 2008) ou des guides (PMD Pro 1 2010) qui recensent les principaux critères et facteurs de succès, leur répartition selon les différentes étapes du cycles de vie et les enjeux liés à leur mise en œuvre par les acteurs du développement, notamment les bailleurs de fonds. D'autre part, les recherches réalisées sur le sujet utilisent majoritairement des méthodes de recherche quantitatives par l'entremise de sondages pour la validation des données présentées (Diallo et Thuillier 2004; Khang et Moe 2008); ou encore des études de cas de pays (Brière et Proulx 2013; Holcombe et al. 2004; Muriithi et Crawford 2003; Okorley et Nkrumah 2012). Ces études mettent principalement de l'avant des enjeux spécifiques liés à la participation des acteurs, à l'adaptation au contexte local et à la durabilité des projets, mais ne permettent pas en revanche une généralisation des données. Enfin, dans l'ensemble, on constate que les études traitant spécifiquement des projets au sein d'ONG sont rares (Holcombe et al. 2004; Khang et Moe 2008; Okorley et Nkrumah 2012; PMD Pro 1 2010).

Ainsi, malgré la pertinence de ces études, leur nature montre aussi la nécessité de réaliser d'autres recherches permettant de découvrir par des analyses qualitatives les préoccupations, les perceptions et les défis au quotidien des gestionnaires de projet d'ONG face à la réussite de leur projet. À notre connaissance, les quelques recherches réalisées dans cette perspective (Abbott, Brown, et Wilson 2007; Crawford et al. 1999) ouvrent la voie à d'autres études pour lesquelles les caractéristiques et les dimensions liées au succès restent encore à explorer auprès de ces gestionnaires puisque ces études n'abordaient pas spécifiquement ces dimensions et les données recueillies étaient issues essentiellement d'une analyse de données secondaires.

La présente recherche a visé à documenter, à travers le discours des gestionnaires, l'ensemble des aspects liés aux caractéristiques et facteurs de succès des projets de développement international menés par les ONG. Elle vise plus spécifiquement à répondre aux questions suivantes : parmi les caractéristiques, critères et facteurs de succès des projets de développement international présentés dans la littérature, lesquels sont particulièrement significatifs pour les gestionnaires de

projets au sein d'ONG? Et de quelle façon le discours de ces gestionnaires sur le terrain peut-il contribuer à alimenter la réflexion théorique et pratique sur le succès des projets de développement international? L'aspect unique de cette recherche repose sur la réalisation d'une enquête inédite auprès de 28 gestionnaires de projets au sein d'ONG ayant en moyenne plus de 10 années d'expérience et ayant œuvré dans plusieurs secteurs et régions du monde.

Revue de littérature

Caractéristiques spécifiques aux projets de développement international

Différentes études recensent les principales caractéristiques spécifiques aux projets de développement international (Harmano et al. 2013; Ika 2012; PMD Pro 1 2010). Ces études soutiennent que les gestionnaires de projets en développement international partagent beaucoup de défis avec les gestionnaires de projets d'autres secteurs (unicité, cycle de vie, etc.), mais ont toutefois certaines caractéristiques spécifiques (Ika 2012; PMD Pro 1 2010). Ils doivent obtenir des résultats favorisant le changement social et comportemental, conduisant à des améliorations du bien-être des populations ciblées au sein du projet. Ils visent à résoudre des problèmes complexes de pauvreté, d'inégalité et d'injustice, ils sont gérés et mis en œuvre dans un éventail de contextes difficiles, par un ensemble complexe de relations avec les intervenants et, enfin, ils visent un transfert de connaissances et un renforcement de capacités.

Apprendre à aider les collectivités locales à devenir des agents efficaces de développement est donc un élément important au sein de ces projets, caractérisés par un manque de capacités locales pour le développement communautaire participatif, des bas salaires, un moral parfois défaillant et l'absence de budgets adéquats de fonctionnement. Ces projets sont également financés par des prêts/subventions d'organismes de financement ou d'agences d'exécution, lesquels ont un impact sur la détermination des objectifs (Khang et Moe 2008). Les projets de développement international se situent donc dans des environnements complexes caractérisés par une gestion par résultats et une reddition de comptes pour les donateurs, les organisations qui implantent les projets, les communautés bénéficiaires et les autres intervenants clés.

Cette reddition de compte est un aspect qui caractérise particulièrement le travail des ONG. Ebrahim (2003) traite du nouveau rôle des ONG comme partenaires de l'aide, de l'usage de leurs réseaux et des tensions créées par leurs bailleurs, qu'il considère en partie causées par leur reddition de compte. Les ONG doivent donc rendre des comptes à partir d'une approche de gestion par résultats qui a pour effet de formaliser beaucoup leurs critères d'évaluation (Ika, Diallo, et Thuillier 2010). Ces organisations fonctionnent dans un cadre normatif formel très développé (Baccarini 1999), avec une autonomie relative quant à leurs interventions, leurs délais et les résultats finaux qu'elles présenteront à leurs bailleurs de fonds (Ika 2007). Cette situation tend à créer des inégalités de pouvoir quand un organisme extérieur, international ou national, fournit des ressources financières ou intellectuelles à une communauté (Holcombe et al. 2004).

En même temps, la nature même des projets internationaux fait que les responsables sont souvent laissés à eux-mêmes, doivent prendre des initiatives et s'ajuster à un contexte changeant qui ne peut pas être prévu à distance (Khang et Moe 2008). On voit là la contradiction entre le contrôle des cadres logiques d'intervention (Giovalucchi et Olivier de Sardan 2009) et la nécessité de s'adapter, tout comme la gestion par résultats peut avoir des conséquences contraires à ce qui est souhaité quand les résultats fixés nuisent à l'atteinte des buts généraux de l'intervention (Brière et Proulx 2013; Lim et Zain 1999). L'utilisation du cadre logique comme outil de planification est critiquée par certaines études (Crawford et Bryce 2003; Landoni et Corti 2011) soutenant qu'il est inefficace pour gérer correctement les projets de développement international,

principalement dans le suivi et l'évaluation du projet, dans la gestion des équipes et dans la gestion d'un réseau complexe d'acteurs (Hermano et al. 2013). Selon Mawdsley, Townsend, et Porter (2005), le recours excessif à la documentation et aux indicateurs et la dévaluation des pratiques de travail et des relations professionnelles affectent la réalisation des projets dans ce secteur. Trop d'accent et de temps seraient mis par les agences d'aide à la reddition de compte et à l'évaluation de la performance d'un projet au détriment du processus de prise de décision organisationnelle, du contexte sociopolitique et de la culture locale (Ika 2012). Des études (Crawford et Bryce 2003; Ika et Lytvynov 2011) proposent dans ce contexte une version actualisée du cadre logique afin d'y inclure la gestion des risques ainsi que des critères et facteurs de réussite.

Les dimensions liées au succès des projets de développement international

Compte tenu de la spécificité des projets de développement international, de nombreuses études ont également recensé les différentes dimensions liées au succès des projets. Parmi les critères de succès (Ika 2007), plusieurs études accordent une importance à la pertinence du projet, à l'atteinte des résultats et à l'impact. Lier le succès d'un projet à l'évaluation de l'impact est difficile car le succès du processus de gestion ne garantit pas celui de l'impact (Diallo et Thuillier 2004).

La conception, la gestion et le mode d'implantation des projets dans la communauté sont des facteurs de succès importants (Ika 2012; Youker 1999). Une planification mal définie, peu réaliste et non actualisée, un manque de rétroaction, de faibles mécanismes de contrôle, une analyse de facteurs de risque déficiente, une gestion bureaucratique du bailleur de fonds et le manque d'interactions entre les bailleurs et l'organisme local représentent des facteurs d'échec. Le modèle développé par Khang et Moe (2008) pour les projets de développement international qui identifie les différents critères de succès selon les phases du cycle de vie du projet montre que le succès des premières phases a des impacts importants sur celles qui suivent.

La durabilité du projet est également un critère de succès qui est très souvent lié aux facteurs relatifs au partenariat, à l'implication des parties prenantes et au renforcement des capacités locales (Diallo et Thuillier 2004; Hermano et al. 2013; Ika 2007; Jepsen et Eskerod 2009; Khang et Moe 2008; Lim et Zain 1999; Okorley et Nkrumah 2012; Youker 1999). Le point de vue des parties prenantes est davantage lié au succès du projet dans sa dimension macro alors que le gestionnaire de projet regarde le succès du projet davantage d'un point de vue micro, donc plus opérationnel. Ainsi, les parties prenantes peuvent avoir des attentes plus difficiles à satisfaire, mais définies dans le cadre logique alors que, pour le gestionnaire de projet, il est généralement suffisant de respecter les trois conditions de base : spécifications techniques, temps et coûts (Diallo et Thuillier 2004). Muriithi et Crawford (2003) estiment l'échec des projets dû au manque de capacité interne et à la difficulté pour les bénéficiaires du projet de gérer la rapidité des changements insufflés par les projets, dont les principes ne sont pas toujours en adéquation avec la culture et les traditions locales. Les projets seraient ainsi confrontés à des problèmes structurels et contractuels occasionnés notamment par la corruption, le manque de soutien politique, les coûts récurrents, l'absence de capacité et trop d'accent sur des résultats visibles (Ika 2012).

Selon différentes études (Brière et Proulx 2013; Ika 2007, 2012; Ramaprasad et Prakash 2003), plusieurs projets de développement international résulteront en échecs compte tenu de ce qu'ils appellent une vue « top down » du bailleur de fonds qui souvent exclut le savoir local pour la réalisation d'un projet. Les bailleurs de fonds ont souvent cherché à reproduire un modèle extérieur (« prêt-à-porter ») qui ne prend pas suffisamment en compte la diversité du milieu (Ika 2012; Madaule 2005). Dans ce type de projet, les facteurs de succès sont ainsi fortement tributaires de l'environnement spécifique et de la diversité culturelle des différents acteurs, en particulier le style de leadership et les processus de communication interculturelle, qui ont tous deux un impact considérable sur l'ensemble du cycle de vie du projet (Anantatmula et Thomas

2010; Matveev et Milter 2004; Muriithi et Crawford 2003; Ochieng et Price 2010). Abbott, Brown, et Wilson (2007) montre que les questionnaires de développement international sont soumis à un processus continu où ils doivent donner du sens parce qu'ils sont continuellement en mode solution de problèmes et doivent adapter leurs outils pour chercher l'implication de multiples parties prenantes avec qui ils doivent coopérer.

Dans ce contexte, l'appropriation du changement par la communauté et une relation avec les bailleurs tenant compte de l'évolution et d'une compréhension plus nuancée des résultats finaux atteints localement s'avèrent des éléments importants à considérer (Holcombe et al. 2004). Selon cette étude, la nécessité de montrer des résultats peut être le défi le plus difficile auquel sont confrontés les responsables des projets dans les ONG et cette responsabilité doit être partagée ou même déléguée à des partenaires et des communautés. Le temps devient encore une fois un élément essentiel dans ces types de projets pour l'établissement de relations de partenariat, l'apprentissage par l'expérience et l'adaptation des programmes. Le temps requis sur le terrain n'est pas le même que celui du calendrier des bailleurs de fonds et la pression sur les résultats peut compromettre l'intention du projet en matière de renforcement des capacités.

Une approche collaborative, une organisation adéquate du projet et la présence d'un gestionnaire compétent et d'une équipe performante sont également des facteurs de succès. Les compétences du gestionnaire de projet et des membres de l'équipe sont très importantes pour Khang et Moe (2008) pour assurer le succès du projet. Diallo et Thuillier (2004) soutiennent que la qualité des relations interpersonnelles et la communication entre les acteurs clés sont des facteurs de succès, indépendamment de la connaissance spécifique et des compétences requises pour le projet. Pour eux, les projets de développement international sont des systèmes dynamiques dans lesquels les perceptions deviennent « la réalité » et ils ne peuvent pas être effectués efficacement sans que le directeur du projet et son équipe établissent une relation de confiance avec les parties prenantes clés.

Méthodologie

Considérant la nature des écrits sur le sujet et la problématique de départ, nous avons privilégié une étude exploratoire de type descriptif. À partir d'une approche inspirée de la phénoménologie, une enquête inédite a été réalisée auprès des gestionnaires de projets de développement international au sein d'ONG par le biais d'entrevues semi-structurées et par une analyse documentaire. L'entrevue en profondeur a été privilégiée compte tenu du caractère exploratoire de la collecte de données auprès des gestionnaires de projets et d'une préoccupation pour la description de leurs expériences individuelles. Comme l'entrevue permet de recueillir les faits et les perceptions (Bordeleau 1987), cette enquête a permis de réunir à la fois des informations précises et de faire émerger de nouvelles données sur les caractéristiques et les dimensions du succès des projets. Comme le nombre de participants dans ce type d'étude peut représenter une variation de quelques sujets à une trentaine (Fortin 1996), un total de 28 gestionnaires ont été rencontrés jusqu'à un niveau de saturation des données, c'est-à-dire au moment où les informations recueillies n'apportaient pas suffisamment d'informations nouvelles justifiant l'augmentation du corpus empirique. Les entrevues se sont appuyées sur un guide semi-dirigé.

Les témoins clés choisis devaient occuper ou avoir occupé depuis plus de trois ans une fonction de gestion pour une ONG. Vingt des 28 témoins avaient été ou étaient encore gestionnaire de projet, gestionnaire de programme ou directeur de projet, les autres occupaient ou avaient occupé des fonctions de gestion dans des ONG, dans des territoires couvrant presque tous les continents. Les domaines d'intervention des ONG étaient variés (aide humanitaire, coopératives, santé, éducation, l'aide à l'enfance, droits humains, entrepreneurship, etc.). Parmi les ONG rencontrées, deux provenaient du domaine humanitaire, 12 des domaines sociopolitique et socioéconomique,

deux du domaine coopératif et trois du domaine de l'entrepreneuriat. La très grande majorité des gestionnaires de projets rencontrés œuvraient dans des ONG ayant un bureau au Québec.

Les diplômes des répondants variaient entre le baccalauréat (6), la maîtrise (17), le DESS (2) et le doctorat (3). Il y avait 11 femmes et 17 hommes. Les entrevues ont duré en moyenne une heure et ont été enregistrées et traitées à l'aide du logiciel QDA miner. Nous avons établi une liste de codes à partir des questions de recherche sur les caractéristiques des projets (13 variables) et les dimensions liées au succès (7 variables) puis ajustée en fonction du discours des participants afin de détecter les données émergentes des entrevues. Pour les fins de ce premier article, nous nous sommes donnés comme limites de présenter les perspectives des gestionnaires globalement plutôt que par secteur d'intervention, type de projets ou spécificité de chaque ONG. Comme autre limite, nous pourrions ajouter que les résultats concernant les particularités et les dimensions du succès ne sont pas liés aux types de projets. Nous avons aussi choisi de faire ressortir les éléments jugés les plus significatifs du discours des gestionnaires quand apparaissait une majorité des points de vue exprimés et de consensus entre les gestionnaires. Le traitement des données s'est ainsi inspiré de la théorie ancrée puisque des regroupements de données ont été réalisés afin de dégager un modèle des relations entre variables pouvant se comparer à ceux identifiés par d'autres études.

Résultats

Deux parties de la recherche sont présentées dans cette section : d'abord les particularités des projets internationaux des ONG, puis les facteurs de succès incluant les habiletés nécessaires pour agir selon le discours des gestionnaires de projet.

Particularités des projets

Complexité dans la définition des besoins

Une première particularité des projets réside dans le fait qu'ils requièrent la participation des populations de bénéficiaires compte tenu de l'importance de bien identifier leurs besoins. Les projets sont conçus en partenariat avec les organisations locales et en tenant compte des modèles des bailleurs de fonds. Ces besoins sont toutefois généralement complexes à cerner. Cela est dû au fait que les critères d'évaluation et de fonctionnement ne sont pas les mêmes pour les intervenants du Nord et pour les locaux, ce qui risque toujours de provoquer des problèmes de compréhension. La logique de rationalité, caractéristique des bailleurs de fonds selon les répondants, risque toujours de se heurter à des visions du monde peu compatibles. Comme le montre ce témoignage, les bailleurs exercent une influence importante à cette étape du projet :

Avec des bailleurs de fonds, c'est plus difficile parce que, souvent, [ils] vont influencer les objectifs, ils vont analyser notre évaluation des besoins, ils vont peut-être intervenir à ce niveau-là. On sait que les besoins sont X, mais le bailleur de fonds est juste prêt à financer Y; il faut qu'on fasse des compromis.

La définition d'un problème à partir de critères du Nord (bailleur de fonds et consultants) peut s'avérer un problème dans la mesure où ils sont parfois incompatibles avec ceux des populations ciblées :

Comment demander à notre consultant d'évaluer [...] le bonheur de la communauté en fonction du nombre de latrines qu'on aura construites? On risque toujours d'entendre « nous ça fait trois mille ans qu'on n'a pas de latrines puis ça se passe bien ».

De plus, les intérêts économiques en jeu opposent parfois les populations et les entreprises, ce qui met l'ONG dans une position délicate. Si une entreprise minière a besoin d'eau, qui doit-on appuyer, la mine ou la population? Ce n'est pas simple de l'avis des personnes rencontrées.

Parfois, ce sont les intérêts mêmes d'autres ONG qui peuvent poser problème, en particulier dans le secteur humanitaire quand il faut aller chercher des fonds auprès du public, qui se montre généreux surtout lorsqu'il y a une crise.

Cette complexité dans la définition des besoins fait ressortir une dimension spécifique liée à la communication. Selon plusieurs répondants, les bénéficiaires croient que si tout ne va pas bien, l'argent sera coupé. De plus, la communication formelle passe par des documents pensés par le bailleur de fonds, mais incompréhensibles pour les populations locales. Il est normal que ces gens n'arrivent pas à distinguer objectifs, résultats, mission, buts, ce qui force à tout réécrire pour que cela devienne compréhensible.

Le formulaire, si je l'envoie comme ça, les partenaires ne comprendront juste rien du tout. [...] C'est du chinois : « des extrants », « des résultats ». « J'envoie des formulaires qui sont différents des formulaires des bailleurs de fonds, évidemment, là avec des questions beaucoup plus larges, différentes aussi; ça va être plus facile à comprendre ».

La définition des besoins peut ainsi comprendre des écarts de compréhension et de perception. Selon les critères des bailleurs, les résultats doivent être conformes au plan initial, mais sur place, les adaptations nécessaires peuvent faire en sorte que l'on dévie du plan initial. D'une part, le bailleur de fonds pourrait ne pas vouloir payer pour un projet qui aurait obtenu de bons résultats et dont les partenaires seraient satisfaits, s'il avait dévié du plan initial; d'autre part, les partenaires pourraient être mécontents d'un plan rigide qui ne correspondrait pas à leurs besoins. Enfin, parfois l'objet même de l'intervention pose problème si les populations locales n'en ont pas la même définition. Par exemple, « une campagne de sensibilisation qui parle du viol sans l'avoir bien sensibilisé et défini dans la communauté, ne donnerait aucun résultat ».

Conditions de travail difficiles

Parmi les responsables que nous avons interrogés, certains se retrouvent parfois devant des enjeux multiples et complexes qui interagissent avec leurs conditions de vie généralement difficiles. Ils ont à la fois des responsabilités très étendues au plan financier et au plan de la sécurité. C'est une conséquence de se retrouver seul pour tout faire :

Quand je suis arrivée, j'avais pas de ressources humaines, pas de finances, j'étais en plus la gestionnaire des projets, qui faisait le recrutement, les [annonces], qui gérait l'argent, [qui était] à mon nom personnel. S'il manquait un sou, c'est moi qui étais responsable.

Les résultats montrent ainsi une caractéristique fondamentale de ce type de projet, soit que les gestionnaires fonctionnent avec des ressources extrêmement limitées et dans un contexte qui n'a aucune commune mesure avec ce que l'on trouve par exemple au Canada. La gestion de ce type de projets exige des capacités d'organisation et d'adaptation à des situations imprévues qui sont hors du commun, tant au plan personnel que pour les projets : « Les volontaires canadiens, c'est pas des employés, c'est des bénévoles, c'est des gens qui donnent une grosse partie de leur temps et même de leurs ressources, dans certains cas ».

Le contexte sécuritaire est également un enjeu de plusieurs projets d'action humanitaire, mais cela fait rarement partie des conditions de travail reconnues : « Nous n'avons aucune politique de sécurité. Dans les zones de guerre, pas de matériel pour ça, pas de budget ... ». Comme l'indiquent les résultats, les conditions de fonctionnement sont liées au fait de devoir se débrouiller seul dans des conditions complexes. Sur le terrain, la situation peut être très préoccupante, les coopérants devant parfois faire face à des conflits armés, de jeunes femmes pouvant se retrouver seules dans des contextes difficiles, etc.

L'autonomie est déterminante, parce que les supérieurs hiérarchiques sont loin et parce que le gestionnaire n'a pas accès à du soutien dans un contexte de décisions difficiles, d'incertitude et d'ambiguïté sur le sens à donner au mandat et à la réception des gens. Les gestionnaires œuvrent dans un contexte d'obligation de résultat et de nécessité d'agir dans le doute.

[Dans les] pays en développement, on a tendance à retranscrire selon ce que nous on pense que sont les besoins de nos partenaires [...] il y a des grandes chances que l'écart entre ce qu'on a écrit et ce qui va se passer soit énorme.

Reddition de comptes et contrôle des bailleurs de fonds

Les résultats montrent également que les projets se caractérisent par un contrôle étroit de la part des bailleurs de fonds et par une volonté de justification de toutes les dépenses, faites parfois en contradiction avec leurs objectifs. Cela oblige les gestionnaires de projets à faire à l'occasion des acrobaties techniques pour vraiment arriver à leurs buts : « La particularité, c'est que je pense qu'on est très scruté, très suivi par les bailleurs de fonds et, à certains moments, ils s'impliquent eux-mêmes dans la gestion (l'ACDI) ».

Dans ce contexte, paradoxalement, l'autonomie des ONG est limitée, malgré leur expertise collective. Elles se débrouillent seules dans des conditions d'isolement, certes, mais elles ont des comptes à rendre à leur bailleur. Certains qualifient cette reddition de compte de « médiatisée », c'est-à-dire axée sur l'information potentielle au grand public, ce qui n'a pas toujours des effets positifs. La visibilité du pays donateur et les communications dominent au détriment des enjeux humanitaires, surtout si les intérêts du bailleur et de la population ne convergent pas. La reddition de comptes pose ainsi un double problème car les ONG doivent faire rapport à la fois aux bailleurs et à la population bénéficiaire, alors que leurs besoins et leur compréhension ne sont pas toujours compatibles. « Une des caractéristiques fondamentales c'est que le payeur n'est pas celui qui reçoit les services. [...] Et ça nous met dans des positions quelquefois difficiles où le client payeur peut être content mais le client bénéficiaire n'est pas content ». Aussi, le gestionnaire peut faire face à des contraintes bureaucratiques qui sont impossibles à appliquer sur place :

Le bailleur de fonds veut trois soumissions avant qu'on achète. Là t'es dans un petit village, puis y en a juste un qui fait telle affaire, l'autre il t'en fera pas s'il sait que tu vas pas aller acheter, il perdra pas son temps. Alors t'es obligé d'en faire deux qui n'existent pas.

Les normes bureaucratiques des bailleurs sont complexes et changent, ce qui exige un effort dont la pertinence n'est pas toujours bien perçue par les intervenants des ONG ni par leurs commettants locaux, les concepts n'étant pas faciles à comprendre et surtout à transmettre. « Par exemple, l'ACDI fonctionne avec un modèle "Performance management framework" et il y a deux ans c'était un "Logical framework and analysis" qui sont des outils avec lesquels j'ai personnellement beaucoup de difficulté, de comprendre l'importance ». La pertinence des interventions à long terme peut apparaître secondaire dans ces modèles bureaucratiques : « on essaie de leur faire faire en trois ans ce que nous on a pris dix ans à faire ». Les pratiques locales, souvent, ne sont pas compatibles avec la recherche de résultats dans des délais précis.

Un contact étroit et participatif avec les populations

Un élément déterminant des projets d'ONG internationales est de maintenir un contact étroit avec les populations locales. Selon la majorité des témoignages recueillis, il est généralement impossible de se cantonner dans un projet technique sans impliquer directement les gens sur place :

Il a fallu faire beaucoup de travail d'animation communautaire. [...] Il y a des gens (ethnie X), qui ont du pouvoir énorme dans certains territoires du pays, ils contrôlent tout. Si cette personne-là dit : tu ne rentres pas ici, tu ne peux pas entrer.

Au-delà du principe, la participation des populations aux définitions des projets peut toujours poser des difficultés de compréhension, ce qui oblige les responsables à se mettre à leur place, à évaluer leur degré d'acceptation et leur vision de leur rôle. Parfois, les partenaires ne disent pas les choses comme on les comprend, pour des raisons culturelles, ou la réalisation d'un changement exige beaucoup de temps.

L'autre que tu viens « aider » [...] d'abord, tu lui apportes plus de travail et lui il faisait ses petites affaires et puis toi tu arrives avec ton bon projet, il n'a pas été nécessairement partie prenante au projet.

Enfin, une caractéristique fondamentale des projets dans cette perspective tient aux éléments de culture nationale qui divergent et qui influencent les projets. Ainsi, une succursale bancaire décorée avec des squelettes, ça choque les consultants mais pas les nationaux; ces deux groupes ne perçoivent pas le travail et les délais de la même manière; et le vocabulaire du bailleur de fonds est inaccessible aux nationaux.

Le succès des projets

Durabilité des changements

Selon les répondants, le succès des projets repose sur la durabilité des changements, telle que mesurée notamment par des critères d'intégration des comportements désirés qui perdurent après le départ des coopérants : « les gens nous demandaient du savon. Ça veut dire que les activités de promotion de l'hygiène ont fonctionné ». Les répondants ont même exprimé un certain étonnement parce que la durabilité ne semblait pas acquise au départ et qu'elle s'avère par la suite quand on retourne sur place. Les résultats de l'analyse montrent que les facteurs de succès ne mesurent que des éléments apparents, alors que les obstacles ne sont pas où l'on pense; du moins se situent-ils en dehors du modèle rationnel mis de l'avant.

Au niveau de l'aide humanitaire [...] si t'as une latrine pour vingt personnes, ce qui est « top notch », c'est aussi un critère de succès. Mais après ça, [...] peut-être les gens ne l'utiliseront pas. Donc, il faut la consultation pour être sûr que les gens vont les utiliser.

Bonnes pratiques de gestion

De nombreux facteurs de succès ont également trait aux bonnes pratiques de gestion qui se traduisent par l'atteinte des objectifs et l'efficacité du projet. Ce sont les facteurs qui sont le plus proches des volontés des bailleurs de fonds, des facteurs de résultats liés au cadre logique ou au contrat. C'est là la perspective la plus rationnelle sur le succès des projets. « Souvent, ce qui va dicter le succès d'un projet, malheureusement, c'est le bailleur de fonds. S'il est content, tout le monde est content et le projet a marché ». Ces facteurs sont souvent quantitatifs, quoique la satisfaction des bénéficiaires soit un élément clé. « Dans un des projets, j'avais des objectifs sur le nombre de clients à intégrer dans la coopérative, sur le volume de prêts, sur le volume d'épargne, sur le nombre d'entreprises qui avaient été créées ».

Les intervenants, peu importe la formation initiale, se retrouvent donc face à l'obligation de connaître des outils de gestion même s'ils n'y étaient pas préparés au départ. Ils n'ont pas le choix d'apprendre l'administration ou la comptabilité, de savoir gérer un budget et de gérer des employés locaux ou expatriés. Ils apprennent donc sur le tas. Ils doivent maîtriser le cadre logique de l'ACDI, tout comme le cadre de rendement pour l'humanitaire, parce que non

seulement l'Agence l'exige, mais parce que beaucoup d'ONG les reprennent à leur compte. Ils doivent aussi avoir une bonne dose de réalisme et de savoir vivre pour s'adapter à un environnement imprévisible, comme l'illustre ce témoignage.

Ils arrivent d'universités [...] puis ils disent : « la première semaine on fait ça; la deuxième semaine, on fait ça; après ça on fait ça », je dis : « Oui, c'est beau, mais tu rêves en couleur parce que, pour faire ça, il faut que le camion soit là; tu l'appelles. Là-bas, il vient quand il vient, hein! La route est fermée, y a un barrage militaire, le pont est parti!

De plus, les responsables d'ONG font parfois face à des dilemmes éthiques difficiles.

Un jour, j'arrive sur le terrain puis y a une petite fille enceinte qui arrive en disant : « Bien moi c'est ton coopérant qui m'a mis enceinte ». Je fais quoi avec ça? Ça dépasse la gestion axée sur les résultats.

Enfin, dans un monde restreint où les conditions de travail sont difficiles, les ressources sont limitées et les règles sont parfois ambiguës; il faut faire des choix qui ne sont pas compréhensibles pour les partenaires.

Je peux pas prendre l'argent d'un projet pour l'utiliser à autre chose que ce pour quoi on s'était mis d'accord. Je peux pas dire : je vais te faire entrer à tel endroit parce qu'on est des amis.

Croissance économique et sociale

Parmi les facteurs de succès, des répondants ont aussi mentionné la croissance économique et sociale, soit de pouvoir mesurer un enrichissement des bénéficiaires ou un changement social. Ces facteurs font davantage référence aux impacts des projets qu'à des objectifs spécifiques. « C'est pas de construire une école, l'important [c'est] combien de jeunes ont une formation ». Au-delà de la réalisation du projet, c'est « l'amélioration du niveau de vie, c'est l'amélioration des conditions socioéconomiques, de manière générale ».

Parties prenantes impliquées

Enfin, le succès se mesure par l'implication des parties prenantes, qui apparaît en filigrane dans plusieurs autres facteurs de succès. Un projet ne peut pas exister sans une symbiose entre les responsables du projet et les communautés d'accueil. « Un projet de développement réussi, c'est un projet basé sur les communautés, participatif, intégré, en accord avec un plan stratégique [...] sinon, il s'inscrit dans le vide ». Il est essentiel pour le succès des projets d'impliquer les populations, d'avoir un comité de gestion issu de la communauté, avec des frais adaptés pour l'utilisation des ressources, même si ce ne sont que quelques sous par mois, pour réparer les bris et sensibiliser la communauté à l'entretien.

Dans ce contexte, le leadership est perçu comme une compétence essentielle pour les gestionnaires. On ne parle pas ici de leadership traditionnel, où le chef se met en avant. On pense plutôt à toutes les interventions indirectes qui visent à insuffler de l'énergie aux autres en les valorisant plutôt qu'en les dominant, en favorisant l'initiative locale et la participation plutôt que l'exercice direct du pouvoir.

Si tu veux vraiment faire un renforcement de capacités, c'est pas toi qui dois prendre les devants, c'est tes partenaires. Il faut apprendre à écouter puis à faire des interventions précises [...] mais pas dominer la parole dans les instances.

Ce témoignage illustre bien ce type de leadership :

Quand je commence l'année, j'envoie une note à tous mes partenaires, mes contacts, mes consultants, mais c'est une lettre [...] d'inspiration, [...] En juin-juillet, je fais des visites chez des partenaires puis elle est encore sur le babillard.

Dans un contexte de valorisation des compétences locales et de participation des intervenants locaux, la valorisation du savoir local est une habileté déterminante. Il est essentiel de reconnaître les techniques et le savoir-faire qui marquent une société, sous peine de voir les méthodes refusées parce qu'inutiles, incompréhensibles ou peu appropriées. Il y a là une reconnaissance intrinsèque de la valeur des autres, même si la culture de domination ne la reconnaissait pas beaucoup.

Dans le temps, les vieux, ils avaient un système : [...] ils faisaient des coches sur les murs pour savoir quelle était la quantité des stocks de maïs qu'ils avaient, la quantité d'huile, etc. Donc on est parti de ça pour faire comprendre aux femmes la nécessité de noter l'évolution de leurs affaires.

La participation des parties prenantes fait appel à la capacité de comprendre les particularités de leur culture et de leur milieu.

Je ne suis pas [...] spécialiste dans les études de marché. [...] j'ai dû apprendre ce que ça voulait dire et le traduire de façon pédagogique pour que les femmes illettrées soient capables de le voir.

À l'opposé de la spécialisation, l'adaptabilité est la capacité de développer professionnellement des habiletés multiples.

Dans les programmes de reconstruction, je suis pas un ingénieur, ni un contracteur, ni un spécialiste en environnement, [...] pas un spécialiste en gestion, en économie sociale, mais tout ça, je le touche dans à peu près tous nos projets.

L'adaptabilité est une compétence qui s'acquiert à travers les expériences, les difficultés, l'obligation de se débrouiller face aux difficultés. Les façons de s'exprimer et les méthodes doivent souvent être remises en question :

Souvent on demande aux populations, [...] de nous faire les forces, les faiblesses de leur communauté, mais ils ne fonctionnent pas en ces termes [...] alors il faut changer nos mots puis il faut mettre des images peut-être là-dessus.

La coopération avec les populations locales ou l'introduction du changement en milieu interculturel font en sorte que les habiletés liées aux relations humaines prennent une importance particulière. Le fait d'être centré sur les résultats et en même temps d'être un joueur d'équipe sont abondamment cités : difficile équilibre, en particulier quand la dimension affective du travail et la dimension interculturelle prennent de l'importance :

Nous, on a un système de valeurs qui est basé sur le travail, sur la performance, sur la réussite. En Afrique, c'est un autre système de valeurs qui est basé sur la famille, qui est basé sur le clan, qui est basé sur la hiérarchie.

Cela implique également de « réseauter » dans son milieu. « Avoir un bon réseau de contacts parce que dans ces communautés-là, c'est primordial ».

Le Tableau 1 propose un sommaire des particularités et facteurs de succès des projets de développement international menés par les ONG tels qu'identifiés jusqu'ici.

Tableau 1. Particularités et facteurs de succès des projets de développement international menés par les ONG.

| | |
|--|---|
| <i>Particularités des projets</i> | |
| Complexité dans la définition des besoins | Dualité des logiques et pratiques entre bailleurs de fonds et organisations bénéficiaires Besoins difficiles à cerner Intérêt économique vs priorités de développement Difficultés de communications |
| Conditions de travail difficiles | Ressources humaines et budgétaires limitées Menace à la sécurité Autonomie |
| Reddition de compte et contrôle des bailleurs de fonds | Limites à l'autonomie des organisations Incompatibilité entre les différentes réalités Normes bureaucratiques complexes et changeantes Compatibilité avec les interventions à long terme |
| Contact étroit et participatif avec les populations | Animation communautaire et adaptation Dimension interculturelle significative |
| <i>Succès des projets</i> | |
| Pérennité des changements | Intégration des comportements |
| Bonnes pratiques de gestion | Atteinte des résultats formels Éthique Compétences techniques et humanistes |
| Croissance économique et sociale | Atteinte des impacts du projet |
| Parties prenantes impliquées | Exercice d'un leadership mobilisateur Valorisation du savoir local Adaptation au terrain Relations humaines et réseau |

Discussion et conclusion

Cet article présente les points de vue de spécialistes des ONG internationales sur les particularités des organisations et sur les facteurs de succès des projets. Il cherchait, dans un premier temps, à savoir quelles caractéristiques ou facteurs de succès étaient particulièrement significatifs pour les gestionnaires de projets au sein d'ONG, parmi tous ceux qui sont présentés dans la littérature. Dans un deuxième temps, cette recherche cherchait à voir de quelle façon le discours de ces gestionnaires sur le terrain peut contribuer à alimenter la réflexion théorique et pratique sur le succès des projets de développement international.

Les résultats sont conformes à la majorité des études réalisées à ce sujet (Abbott, Brown, et Wilson 2007; Baccarini 1999; Ebrahim 2003; Giovalucchi et Olivier de Sardan 2009; Hermano et al. 2013; Holcombe et al. 2004; Ika 2007, 2012; Khang et Moe 2008; PMD Pro 1 2010); ces organisations ont des caractéristiques particulières qui les démarquent et leurs spécificités affectent les dimensions liées au succès de ce type de projet. Cette recherche fait ressortir les dimensions qui semblent particulièrement significatives pour les gestionnaires de projets qui travaillent sur le terrain : nous les avons regroupées en trois points qui constituent autant de défis sur les façons de faire qui peuvent alimenter la réflexion sur la pratique de la gestion de projet et ouvrir quelques pistes de recherche futures.

Une analyse des besoins défaillante qui affecte directement la durabilité des projets

Selon les perceptions recueillies, l'analyse des besoins dès la conception du projet a un impact important durant toute la durée du projet, et en particulier pour la durabilité des changements désirés. Comme Ika (2012) et PMD Pro 1 (2010) l'ont montré, les gestionnaires considèrent

que les projets doivent favoriser le changement social et comportemental et viser à résoudre les problèmes complexes de pauvreté et d'inégalité. Ils vont plus loin encore en nous faisant sentir la difficulté d'obtenir un impact, faute d'avoir bien cerné les besoins des populations bénéficiaires. Les résultats démontrent une participation insuffisante, voire quasi absente, des intervenants locaux, de même qu'une incompatibilité entre les logiques de ces intervenants et celles des bailleurs de fonds. Il semble donc que les intérêts divergents amèneraient une mauvaise définition du problème à résoudre.

Cette recherche fait clairement ressortir que le travail des ONG se fait toujours à la jonction du monde des bailleurs de fonds, avec ses règles, son vocabulaire, ses intérêts économiques, ses méthodes directement empruntées aux principes du management moderne, et celui des populations locales, qui sont plus près de leurs besoins, dont la vie se déroule à un autre rythme, de façon moins linéaire. Entre ces deux mondes, comme l'écrivait Abbott, Brown, et Wilson (2007), le concept de besoin n'apparaît pas de façon évidente. Il existe un écart significatif entre les besoins définis à partir de normes des bailleurs de fonds associées à des critères plutôt quantitatifs liés aux résultats et aux impacts et ceux qui sont définis par les ONG dans le cadre d'une relation étroite et longue avec une population, selon des critères constamment réévalués en fonction de perspectives culturelles, de nécessités sociales et de communication imparfaite.

Pour les gestionnaires rencontrés, la durabilité des changements se mesure notamment par la satisfaction des besoins locaux et par les critères d'intégration des comportements désirés qui vont au-delà des exigences des contrats avec les bailleurs de fonds et qui se heurtent à des obstacles allant au-delà du modèle rationnel. Ce constat renforce ceux de Okorley et Nkrumah (2012) puisqu'il indique que les impacts se situent au plan des changements de comportements et des savoirs locaux plutôt qu'à celui de l'atteinte des résultats plus quantifiables et parfois imposés par les bailleurs de fonds. La recherche indique que, parce que les parties prenantes peuvent avoir des attentes difficiles à satisfaire et que les gestionnaires de projet souhaitent aller au-delà des trois conditions de base des projets (techniques, temps et coûts), la nécessité de montrer des résultats est peut-être le défi le plus difficile auquel sont confrontés les responsables des ONG. Ce point soulève des questions importantes pour l'avenir : comment mieux définir les besoins des populations locales? Comment placer les parties prenantes au cœur du processus et avec quels outils? Comment rendre plus compatibles les besoins des communautés et les perceptions et intérêts des bailleurs de fonds pour assurer la durabilité des changements?

Des gestionnaires peu outillés qui doivent s'adapter dans des conditions difficiles en exerçant un leadership non traditionnel

Cette complexité dans la définition des besoins trouve écho dans l'environnement complexe des communications entre tous les acteurs du projet où le gestionnaire de projet doit naviguer. Plusieurs études (Anantatmula et Thomas 2010; Diallo et Thuillier 2005; Matveev et Milter 2004; Muriithi et Crawford 2003; Ochieng et Price 2010) ont montré que la communication et une relation de confiance avec les parties prenantes clés sont des facteurs de succès importants lors de la conception et l'implantation des projets, mais la présente recherche va plus loin en montrant tout le travail que doivent faire les gestionnaires de projet pour rendre compréhensible l'ensemble des documents et exigences liés à la gestion de projet telle que pratiquée par les bailleurs de fonds, dans un contexte caractérisé par un manque d'interaction entre les bailleurs de fonds et l'organisme local, la faiblesse des mécanismes permettant de détecter rapidement les problèmes et une analyse de facteurs de risque déficiente.

L'approche prévue doit être adaptée selon les différents contextes. Le discours des gestionnaires nous apprend que cette adaptation leur revient en grande partie. Ils doivent être centrés sur les résultats et en même temps travailler en équipe, puis trouver un équilibre entre le

travail, sa dimension affective et sa dimension interculturelle; le tout dans des conditions de travail difficiles. Souvent, ils acceptent de vivre dans des conditions matérielles minimales, leurs budgets de fonctionnement sont calculés de façon très serrée, leur sécurité est parfois menacée et ils doivent prendre des initiatives et survivre dans l'isolement. Est-ce nécessaire? On peut en déduire que leur motivation est intrinsèque, parce qu'ils en font profession et qu'ils croient être utiles à la société.

Dans ce contexte, les gestionnaires doivent constamment faire preuve d'imagination et de débrouillardise, tout en voyant leur autonomie restreinte par des contraintes bureaucratiques imaginées à des milliers de kilomètres d'eux et exprimées dans un vocabulaire qui ne cesse de changer. Ils sont continuellement en mode solution de problèmes et ils doivent adapter leurs outils de gestion pour assurer l'implication de multiples parties prenantes avec lesquelles ils doivent coopérer. Ces dirigeants sont d'abord des humanistes qui doivent apprendre à devenir des gestionnaires sachant écouter, valoriser les ressources et le savoir local et respecter leurs règles éthiques.

Le pouvoir d'influence à long terme au sein des projets réside donc dans la capacité d'exercer un leadership fort et non traditionnel, qui sait reconnaître et utiliser le savoir local, un leadership aux antipodes de celui attendu des perspectives traditionnelles d'imposition technologique ayant mené à tant de cul-de-sac dans les projets de développement (Ika 2012; Madaule 2005). Ce leadership pose plusieurs défis pour l'amélioration des pratiques et pour la recherche : Comment améliorer les processus de communication entre les acteurs locaux et les bailleurs de fonds? Comment mieux appuyer les gestionnaires dans leur travail sur le terrain? Comment mieux former les gestionnaires pour les appuyer dans leur rôle?

Une reddition de comptes qui se fait sans le partenaire local

La recherche montre que la reddition de comptes exigée par les bailleurs de fonds et l'obligation de faire face à un environnement imprévisible ne sont pas toujours compatibles avec les intentions initiales d'un projet, un résultat conforme à ceux rapportés par plusieurs auteurs (Giovalucchi et Olivier de Sardan 2009; Ika 2007, 2012; Ika, Diallo, et Thuillier 2010; Ika et Lytvynov 2011). Les normes bureaucratiques et la gestion axée sur les résultats ne sont pas toujours compatibles avec la réalité alors que les gestionnaires doivent les respecter et agir de façon autonome. Ils doivent aussi composer avec des contrats à terme qui ne correspondent pas aux conceptions locales du temps, ni à une perspective à plus long terme qu'ils perçoivent comme essentielle.

Ces deux perspectives sont difficilement conciliables alors que le succès des projets de développement en est tributaire. Pour que des projets où il y a un tel écart de perspective entre bailleurs et ONG réussissent, il est nécessaire de trouver la bonne façon de faire pour répondre aux besoins et au contexte, mais aussi à la relation entre les deux types d'acteurs et les différentes parties prenantes locales (Anantamula et Thomas 2010; Matveev et Milter 2004; Muriithi et Crawford 2003; Ochieng et Price 2010; PMD Pro 1 2010).

La présente recherche apporte une contribution au débat en mettant l'accent sur l'implication des parties prenantes locales comme facteur de succès. Les résultats montrent une absence quasi totale des parties prenantes locales dans le processus de reddition de compte. Selon le discours entendu, tout semble se passer entre gestionnaires et bailleurs de fonds, les intervenants locaux étant réduits à un rôle de spectateurs malgré les tentatives faites pour les impliquer dans des comités de gestion. L'incompréhension des concepts de reddition de compte et de gestion axée sur les résultats, qui s'oppose à l'implication des parties prenantes et, par ricochet, au succès des projets, montre bien la nécessité d'apporter des révisions au cadre logique (Crawford et Bryce 2003; Ika et Lytvynov 2011) et de voir à son harmonisation entre les bailleurs (Landoni et Corti 2011), ou même de le mettre au rancart (Giovalucchi et Olivier de Sardan 2009).

La non participation des intervenants locaux à la reddition de compte interpelle la recherche. Comment faire pour y impliquer les parties prenantes locales? Quels seraient les processus à privilégier? Comment appliquer sur le terrain de nouveaux outils et comment évaluer leurs apports?

En somme, cette recherche réalisée auprès des gestionnaires de projets au sein d'ONG jette un éclairage sur les caractéristiques et dimensions des projets de développement international qui contribuent à leur succès telles que vécues sur le terrain par des praticiens. Ces observations montrent les limites des modèles normatifs proposés par les agences de développement international. Leur révision ne signifie pas de laisser les responsables de projets faire n'importe quoi. Elle demande plutôt de développer des guides qui tiennent compte des particularités des populations et de la nécessité de les intégrer. À cette fin, la recherche fournit des pistes de réflexion pour amener les praticiens à mieux comprendre leurs conditions de succès et les chercheurs à explorer de nouveaux terrains de recherche.

Notices biographiques

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Les pratiques clés des ONG canadiennes dans le renforcement des capacités de leurs partenaires du Sud

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RÉSUMÉ La recherche d'une meilleure efficacité de l'aide conjuguée à l'approche de la coopération basée sur le savoir a amené les ONG canadiennes à œuvrer dans le cadre de partenariats axés sur le renforcement des capacités de leurs partenaires. L'article concourt à la compréhension des mécanismes et conditions par lesquels les pratiques de gestion des connaissances qui sont déployées dans ces partenariats contribuent au développement des capacités des partenaires. S'appuyant sur une recherche terrain, il identifie trois configurations de pratiques porteuses qui ont amené les partenaires à modifier ou à créer des routines organisationnelles à partir de connaissances nouvelles.

ABSTRACT The search for more efficient aid, together with a knowledge-based cooperation approach, has led Canadian NGOs to work in a partnership model aimed at their partners' capacity building. This article focuses on understanding the mechanisms and conditions by which the knowledge management practices deployed within these partnerships foster the development of the partners' capacities. Based on field research, it identifies three supporting sets of practices that have allowed the partners to create or change their organisational routines on the basis of new knowledge.

Mots clé : partenariat Nord-Sud; développement des capacités; apprentissage organisationnel; gestion des connaissances; ONG

Introduction

L'aide canadienne au développement mobilise des ressources importantes. Ainsi, de 2002 à 2009, l'aide publique au développement nette du Canada a doublé, passant de 2 à 4 milliards de dollars USD.¹ Par ailleurs, tout en haussant le niveau de son aide, le Canada, comme l'ensemble des pays donateurs, s'interrogeait sur les moyens d'améliorer l'efficacité et la portée réelle de cette aide. Ainsi, en 2002, l'Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI) adoptait un nouvel énoncé de politique axé sur la recherche d'une plus grande efficacité de l'aide où elle retenait le cadre d'action défini par le Comité d'aide au développement (CAD) de l'Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques (OCDE) en 1996, lequel privilégiait l'établissement de partenariats véritables visant le renforcement de l'appropriation et des capacités locales. L'ACDI mettait de plus l'accent sur le renforcement des capacités comme moyen d'enclencher un développement durable, reflétant ainsi sa conviction que les échecs des programmes d'aide antérieurs pouvaient être attribués au fait qu'ils n'avaient pas réussi à développer suffisamment les

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capacités nécessaires au maintien des investissements une fois que les pays donateurs avaient retiré leur appui (ACDI 2002).

Dans le même ordre d'idées, en 2005, le CAD concluait que le développement des capacités conçu comme un processus technique de transfert de ressources et de connaissances du Nord vers le Sud et opérationnalisé par des projets à court terme de formation ou d'envoi d'avisers techniques ne produisait pas les résultats durables escomptés et que sans des capacités locales suffisantes, le développement ne pouvait réussir. Le développement des capacités était ainsi considéré comme un des enjeux les plus critiques, à la fois pour les pays donateurs et pour les pays en développement (OCDE 2005; Smith 2005). Ce développement devait être conçu comme un processus endogène de changement (OCDE 2005) se mesurant à l'apprentissage (Lavigne et Saxby 2001). Dès lors, l'approche d'aide au développement devait être recentrée autour de partenariats visant à faciliter l'apprentissage de manière à soutenir les populations visées dans la prise en charge de leur développement. Par après, *La Déclaration de Paris sur l'efficacité de l'aide* (2005) consacrait l'appropriation, l'alignement et l'harmonisation comme principes d'intervention. On a déploré toutefois la relative absence de la société civile dans toute cette réflexion et bien que des progrès aient été réalisés, les organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) estiment que « le processus [...] demeure trop axé sur les relations intergouvernementales et ne favorise pas suffisamment le rôle des ONG dans la coopération au développement » (Perroulaz, Fiorini, et Carbonnier 2010, 155). Afin de pouvoir jouer pleinement ce rôle, les ONG ont tout intérêt à pouvoir démontrer l'efficacité de leur action sur le terrain et pour cela, à développer une compréhension fine des mécanismes à l'origine de cette efficacité.

Cet article se veut une contribution à cette compréhension. À partir des résultats d'une recherche terrain ayant analysé le développement des capacités de trois partenaires ouest-africains d'Oxfam-Québec sur une période de près de 10 ans, il éclaire la manière dont les pratiques de gestion des connaissances des ONG canadiennes contribuent au développement des capacités de leurs partenaires du Sud.

L'évolution de l'action des ONG sur le terrain

Les ONG d'aide au développement ne sont pas restées en marge de la réflexion sur l'efficacité de l'aide. Ainsi, depuis plusieurs années, leurs interventions dans les pays en développement se déroulent dans le cadre de partenariats axés sur le renforcement des capacités des organisations partenaires locales. Au niveau canadien, notamment, le programme de coopération volontaire de l'ACDI prévoit que les organismes de coopération volontaire fassent « appel aux compétences de bénévoles qualifiés pour développer les capacités des partenaires des pays en développement et pour répondre aux besoins locaux de façon durable ».²

Les partenariats axés sur le renforcement des capacités sont des lieux où la connaissance locale est valorisée et utilisée dans le design et l'implantation des programmes (Smith 2005). Ils s'inscrivent dans le nouveau paradigme de la coopération basée sur le savoir qui prône le partage d'information, le réseautage et la communication comme moyens d'amener l'*empowerment* et le développement des communautés et des sociétés (O'Brien 2005). Ainsi, les interventions des ONG et tout spécialement celles des ONG canadiennes de coopération volontaire ont pour but l'apprentissage des organisations partenaires. Elles visent à ce que celles-ci apprennent « par design » (Hamel 1991), à l'occasion de tentatives délibérées d'acquérir de nouvelles ressources ou de les reconfigurer, et non seulement « par défaut » dans le cours normal de leurs activités. Le défi consiste donc à développer des partenariats au sein desquels les pratiques de gestion des connaissances déployées vont fournir aux organisations partenaires des occasions délibérées d'apprendre et de renforcer leurs capacités.

Ce défi soulève de nombreux questionnements dont certains sont à l'origine de la recherche présentée dans cet article. Cette étude s'est intéressée aux pratiques ou configurations de pratiques de gestion des connaissances des ONG d'aide au développement qui, dans le cadre d'un partenariat ou d'un réseau, s'avèrent particulièrement porteuses pour soutenir l'apprentissage et le développement des capacités organisationnelles de leurs partenaires. Elle s'est aussi préoccupée de l'influence que les caractéristiques spécifiques des organisations en cause et les relations qu'elles établissent entre elles peuvent avoir sur les effets de ces pratiques.


La littérature offre peu de réponses à de tels questionnements, notamment parce que les études portant sur le lien entre la gestion des connaissances au sein des partenariats et réseaux et le développement des capacités des membres sont rarissimes. L'originalité de la recherche présentée ici est d'avoir pu mettre au jour, à travers l'analyse longitudinale du développement des capacités de trois partenaires d'une importante ONG canadienne d'aide au développement, Oxfam-Québec, les pratiques de gestion des connaissances qui ont contribué à ce développement. Outre l'identification des configurations de pratiques qui sont présentées dans cet article, la recherche a aussi éclairé l'influence des intentions stratégiques des organisations et de leur confiance mutuelle sur le développement des capacités du partenaire. Bien que ces derniers résultats ne puissent être traités en profondeur dans le cadre du présent article, ils pourront être évoqués au besoin.

Présentation de l'étude : le cadre conceptuel

En l'absence d'un modèle existant, l'étude des liens entre les pratiques de gestion des connaissances d'Oxfam-Québec et le développement des capacités de ses partenaires ont nécessité l'élaboration d'un modèle exploratoire qui a permis d'orienter la recherche. Ce modèle, présenté succinctement dans les lignes qui suivent, articule les relations pouvant être établies au niveau théorique entre les principaux concepts mis en cause dans la problématique, soit la gestion des connaissances, l'apprentissage organisationnel, les capacités organisationnelles et les partenariats et réseaux.

La gestion des connaissances, l'apprentissage organisationnel et le développement des capacités

Nous traiterons d'abord des relations pouvant être établies au niveau organisationnel entre la gestion des connaissances, l'apprentissage organisationnel et le développement des capacités. Le Graphique 1 illustre schématiquement ces relations.



Graphique 1. Gestion des connaissances, apprentissage organisationnel et développement des capacités organisationnelles.

Dans le cadre de la recherche, la gestion des connaissances réfère aux processus de connaissances, soit la création et le transfert, et aux activités, telles que la captation, le partage, la dissémination et le soutien à l'utilisation des connaissances, qui facilitent ces processus dans l'organisation. C'est « l'apprentissage géré » (Easterby-Smith et Lyles 2005).

Pour sa part, le concept d'apprentissage organisationnel renvoie à l'acquisition de connaissances par l'organisation (Maier, Prange, et von Rosenstiel 2001); l'apprentissage correspondant au processus d'acquisition et la connaissance organisationnelle, au produit de ce processus. Dès lors, étant donné le large consensus à l'effet que la connaissance est d'abord créée au niveau individuel (Crossan, Lane, et White 1999), la difficulté réside dans l'articulation du passage du niveau individuel au niveau organisationnel autant en ce qui concerne le processus d'apprentissage qu'en ce qui concerne son produit. En ce qui a trait au processus, Crossan, Lane, et White (1999) décrivent l'apprentissage organisationnel comme un ensemble de quatre sous-processus liant entre eux les niveaux individuel, de groupe et organisationnel. Ainsi, les processus d'intuition, d'interprétation et d'intégration surviennent aux niveaux des individus et des groupes alors qu'au niveau organisationnel, le processus d'institutionnalisation répercute et enchâsse le contenu des apprentissages individuels ou de groupe dans les attributs de l'organisation, c'est-à-dire ses procédures, ses systèmes, ses structures et sa stratégie (Crossan, Lane, et White 1999). On peut ainsi considérer que les connaissances organisationnelles correspondent aux connaissances qui ont été institutionnalisées dans les attributs de l'organisation. Par ailleurs, la perspective sociale sur la connaissance amène à inclure aussi dans les connaissances organisationnelles les connaissances collectives explicites et surtout tacites enchâssées dans les routines organisationnelles (Nelson et Winter 1982; Tsoukas 2000) et qui sont transmises aux membres par les diverses communautés de pratique composant l'organisation (Wenger 2000).

Enfin, en ce qui concerne les capacités organisationnelles, il faut souligner que les définitions proposées par la littérature sur le développement nous sont apparues plutôt ambiguës. Ainsi, les capacités réfèrent soit à l'*habileté* à accomplir les tâches appropriées de manière efficace, efficiente et durable (Grindle et Hilderbrand 1995), soit à l'*aptitude* des organisations à gérer leurs affaires (OCDE 2005), soit encore au *potentiel* d'une organisation d'être performante, à « son *aptitude* à exploiter avec succès ses compétences et ses ressources pour atteindre ses buts et répondre aux attentes des intervenants » (ISNAR, CRDI, et ACP-EU 2004). Ces définitions soulèvent certaines difficultés d'opérationnalisation, les capacités y étant définies par un quasi-synonyme : habileté, potentiel ou aptitude, de sorte que la capacité doit se présuumer à partir des résultats. La littérature en management offre une définition plus « observable » qui a été retenue pour la recherche. Ainsi, les capacités organisationnelles correspondent à des *collections de routines* (Helfat et Peteraf 2003; Winter 2003) qui, avec certains intrants ou *ressources* spécifiques, permettent d'exécuter, d'intégrer et de coordonner les tâches requises par la production d'outputs répondant à des critères préétablis (Renard, St-Amand, et Ben Dhaou 2007).

Gestion des connaissances et apprentissage organisationnel

La présentation des concepts permet d'entrevoir les relations pouvant théoriquement être établies entre eux. Tout d'abord, la littérature associe nettement la gestion des connaissances à la stimulation de l'apprentissage organisationnel (Dalkir 2005). Celui-ci découle des processus de transfert et de création de connaissances qui sont à l'œuvre dans l'organisation et permettent la réutilisation et le renouvellement des connaissances organisationnelles. La gestion des connaissances soutient ces processus en déployant dans l'organisation un cycle d'activités visant à faciliter le fonctionnement des processus de connaissances en rendant les connaissances disponibles et en soutenant leur utilisation.

Apprentissage organisationnel et capacité organisationnelle

Le second lien est tout aussi documenté, l'apprentissage organisationnel étant considéré à l'origine des capacités organisationnelles (Teece, Pisano, et Shuen 1997; Winter 2003). Quatre mécanismes d'apprentissage organisationnel sont associés au développement des capacités. Le premier, la répétition, souvent désigné comme l'accumulation d'expérience, est un mécanisme plutôt passif produisant un apprentissage incrémental basé sur la sélection et la rétention des expériences passées (Zollo et Winter 2002). Les trois autres mécanismes impliquent la recherche délibérée de moyens d'accomplir les tâches mieux et plus vite (Teece, Pisano, et Shuen 1997); ils ont pour but explicite de faire évoluer les routines organisationnelles (Zollo et Winter 2002). Ces mécanismes sont (a) l'expérimentation/exploration (Helfat et Peteraf 2003); (b) l'articulation des connaissances qui correspond à un apprentissage collectif et survient lorsque les individus expriment leurs opinions et croyances et confrontent constructivement leurs interprétations. La connaissance individuelle est alors articulée à travers la discussion collective et des compréhensions partagées améliorées résultent en ajustements à l'ensemble existant de routines ou en la reconnaissance accrue d'un besoin de changement plus fondamental (Zollo et Winter 2002); et (c) la codification qui produit un artéfact (document/produit) reflétant la compréhension partagée (Zollo et Winter 2002).

La capacité d'absorption : un facteur clé dans l'apprentissage au sein des partenariats et réseaux

Compte tenu du but des partenariats de développement et du lien établi entre apprentissage organisationnel et développement des capacités, la compréhension des facteurs qui influencent l'apprentissage organisationnel au sein des partenariats ou des réseaux revêt une importance toute particulière.

Dans le cadre de notre étude, le concept de partenariat prend une définition très précise. Il correspond à une entente formelle à long terme, à durée indéterminée, établie entre une ONG canadienne et un partenaire local. Ce partenariat a comme but précis le renforcement des capacités du partenaire local en vue de l'atteinte de résultats de développement dans les sphères d'activités privilégiées par les deux organisations. Pour sa part, le réseau organisationnel correspond à un regroupement de trois organisations et plus entretenant entre elles des liens multilatéraux à long terme.

Précisons tout d'abord que les études qui ont porté sur l'apprentissage interorganisationnel permettent de distinguer deux types d'apprentissage possibles. Le premier concerne la manière dont une organisation apprend d'une autre organisation et met en cause le processus de transfert des connaissances. Le second a plutôt trait à la façon dont deux organisations s'allient pour développer des connaissances nouvelles (Child 2001) et met en cause le processus de création de connaissances. Il est possible de dégager des études les principaux facteurs qui affectent ces types d'apprentissage au niveau organisationnel dont notamment la capacité d'absorption des organisations (Child 2001; Hamel 1991; Lane, Salk, et Lyles 2001), leur intention de collaborer (Child 2001; Hamel 1991) et la confiance qui prévaut entre elles (Lane 2001).

Nous nous intéressons particulièrement dans le cadre de cet article à la capacité d'absorption en raison de l'éclairage particulier que le concept apporte sur les configurations de pratiques qui, dans le cadre de partenariats, contribuent au développement des capacités. La capacité d'absorption a d'abord été définie par Cohen et Levinthal (1990) comme l'habileté organisationnelle à reconnaître la valeur d'une information nouvelle, à l'assimiler et à l'appliquer. Zahra et George (2002) ont bâti sur cette contribution pour définir la capacité d'absorption comme un ensemble de routines et de processus par lesquels l'organisation acquiert, assimile, transforme et exploite la connaissance externe.

La capacité d'absorption englobe ainsi quatre dimensions ou capacités : (1) la capacité d'acquisition, qui permet à l'organisation d'identifier et d'acquérir la connaissance externe; (2) la capacité d'assimilation qui lui permet d'analyser, de traiter, d'interpréter et de comprendre l'information obtenue; (3) la capacité de transformation, qui procure une première intégration de la connaissance externe par l'organisation. Elle consiste à développer et raffiner des routines facilitant la combinaison de la connaissance existante et de la connaissance nouvellement acquise et assimilée. Cette capacité résulte du processus de *bissociation* par lequel deux ensembles d'informations sont combinés dans un schéma nouveau; (4) la capacité d'exploitation, qui est basée sur des routines permettant à l'organisation de raffiner, d'étendre et de mobiliser les compétences existantes pour en créer de nouvelles en incorporant la connaissance acquise et transformée dans ses opérations. Le résultat de cette capacité est la création continue de nouveaux biens ou services, systèmes, processus, etc.


Ainsi, la présence de routines permettant à une organisation d'acquérir et d'assimiler des connaissances externes puis de les transformer et de les exploiter en les intégrant dans ses routines, ses systèmes, ses procédures, etc., ou en d'autres termes, sa capacité d'absorption, apparaît comme un facteur déterminant dans les apprentissages organisationnels que cette organisation sera en mesure de faire au sein d'un partenariat ou d'un réseau.

Cette dernière relation complète les liens conceptuels au cœur du modèle exploratoire de la recherche. Le Graphique 2 illustre très schématiquement ces relations.

Présentation de la recherche : le cadre opératoire

Afin de mieux comprendre les éventuelles contributions des pratiques de gestion des connaissances d'une ONG canadienne sur le développement des capacités de ses partenaires, nous avons privilégié une recherche longitudinale portant sur le processus afin de permettre l'observation de la séquence des changements survenus dans le temps (Grenier et Josserand 2003) au niveau des ressources et des routines organisationnelles des partenaires.

La recherche a consisté en une étude de cas multi-sites auprès de trois partenaires d'Oxfam-Québec œuvrant respectivement au Bénin, au Burkina Faso et au Niger. Chacun des cas a porté sur le processus de développement des capacités de l'organisation locale à compter de l'établissement de son partenariat avec Oxfam-Québec et a pris en compte le contexte interne de



Graphique 2. Relations entre les concepts mobilisés par le cadre conceptuel.

l'organisation de même que son contexte externe que ce soit au niveau du partenariat, de sa participation à un réseau national mis sur pied par Oxfam-Québec ou de son environnement social, économique, politique et concurrentiel. Les données ont été recueillies au moyen d'entrevues semi-structurées, d'un important corpus documentaire et de visites terrain.

Chaque cas a fait l'objet d'une narration détaillée validée par des informateurs clés. L'analyse a recouru à la stratégie de la décomposition temporelle du processus (Langley 1999) qui a mené à découper le processus de développement des capacités de chaque partenaire en périodes successives. Par la suite, chacune des neuf périodes identifiées a fait l'objet d'une analyse contexte/contenu/processus des changements, selon l'approche proposée par Pettigrew (1987, 1990). Enfin, une analyse inter-sites ou comparative a permis de comparer et contraster les périodes ainsi que les sites entre eux.

Le terrain : Oxfam-Québec et trois partenaires

Oxfam-Québec est une ONG canadienne qui œuvre dans le domaine de l'aide au développement depuis 1973. Celle-ci se donne pour mission, par ses interventions, de renforcer ses partenaires dans la conception et la mise en œuvre de solutions durables à la pauvreté et à l'injustice. Le principal moyen lui permettant d'atteindre cet objectif est son programme de coopération volontaire (PCV), au sein duquel elle mobilise en moyenne chaque année plus de 130 personnes. Les profils des coopérateurs sont choisis en fonction des besoins des partenaires et la durée de leur mandat est habituellement de deux ans.

Les partenariats établis par Oxfam-Québec dans le cadre du PCV sont pensés à moyen et long termes afin de permettre la pérennisation des activités du partenaire. Ils impliquent un appui technique au renforcement des capacités et, à l'occasion, un appui financier plutôt modeste, afin de permettre la réalisation de certaines activités dites « levier » par le partenaire. L'appui technique au développement des capacités recourt à diverses pratiques de gestion des connaissances : formation et suivi, coaching ou aide-conseil, diagnostic et évaluation périodiques, etc. Trois types de capacités sont visés par les interventions, soit les capacités de gestion, d'intervention et de plaidoyer. Les capacités de gestion sont tournées vers l'organisation elle-même et se rapportent à des éléments tels que la gouvernance, la planification stratégique et la gestion des projets. Les capacités d'intervention sont en lien avec la mission de l'ONG locale et concernent sa prestation de services aux populations visées par son domaine d'intervention. Enfin, les capacités de plaidoyer se rapportent à la défense des intérêts des populations cibles auprès des décideurs des organismes internationaux, nationaux, régionaux ou locaux.

Les trois organisations participantes sont des ONG dûment constituées dans leur pays respectif qui œuvrent dans le domaine de l'égalité entre les sexes et des violences basées sur le genre (VBG). Ce sont des organisations de petite taille, le total des membres actifs (bénévoles) et des membres du personnel se situant autour d'une trentaine de personnes. À l'époque de la collecte des données, en 2010, les trois organisations étaient des partenaires d'Oxfam-Québec depuis huit ou neuf ans.

Les partenaires ayant participé à la recherche sont :

- (1) Au Niger, SOS Femmes et enfants victimes de violences familiales (SOS FEVVF). Ce partenaire se consacre à la lutte contre les violences familiales par des interventions de sensibilisation des populations et des intervenants, un plaidoyer auprès des autorités civiles et coutumières et la prise en charge de femmes et d'enfants victimes de violence.
- (2) Au Burkina Faso, la Marche mondiale des femmes – Action nationale du Burkina Faso. Ce partenaire s'implique dans la défense et la promotion des droits des femmes et dans la

lutte contre les violences et la pauvreté qui les affligent au moyen d'activités de sensibilisation et de plaidoyer.

- (3) Au Bénin, l'Association Vinavo et Environnement (Assovie). Ce partenaire se consacre à la lutte contre les violences faites aux enfants, tout particulièrement aux filles. Il mène des interventions en éducation de base et en appui à la scolarisation des enfants ainsi qu'en sensibilisation des communautés et des autorités locales.

Les résultats

L'analyse du processus de développement des capacités de chacun des partenaires s'est appuyée sur l'historique de ses réalisations ainsi que sur les points de vue des acteurs quant aux capacités développées au fil des ans et aux interventions et facteurs ayant influencé positivement ou négativement ce développement.

Les configurations de pratiques porteuses

La mise en parallèle de l'apparition ou de la modification des routines et des ressources organisationnelles du partenaire avec l'ensemble des pratiques de gestion des connaissances déployées par Oxfam-Québec a permis d'identifier trois configurations de pratiques qui ont particulièrement contribué au développement des capacités des partenaires parce que chacune à leur manière, elles ont déclenché et accompagné des apprentissages organisationnels.

Ces configurations porteuses ont été identifiées en fonction de leur capacité à soutenir les partenaires dans la définition et la mise en place de routines nouvelles ou améliorées qui, selon les acteurs et tout particulièrement les membres des organisations partenaires, permettaient à ces derniers d'accomplir leurs tâches de manière à atteindre régulièrement les résultats visés, qu'il s'agisse d'interventions de sensibilisation, d'actions de plaidoyer, de rapportage narratif ou budgétaire, etc. Ce qui n'exclut pas que ces routines aient évolué dans le temps en fonction de l'évaluation des résultats atteints et de l'évolution des résultats visés.

Comme l'illustre le Tableau 1, ces configurations varient en fonction de deux dimensions. La première est la source des connaissances ayant fait l'objet d'un apprentissage organisationnel, ces sources étant soit externes, c'est-à-dire que les premiers détenteurs sont à l'extérieur de l'organisation partenaire, principalement chez Oxfam-Québec, soit internes, auquel cas les premiers détenteurs sont des membres individuels de l'organisation partenaire. La seconde dimension met en jeu le type de processus de connaissances à l'œuvre dans l'apprentissage, soit le transfert, lorsque les connaissances étaient déjà existantes dans l'environnement, soit la création, lorsque ces connaissances ont dû être développées.

Les sections suivantes décrivent les trois configurations identifiées. Toutefois, afin d'en faciliter la compréhension, la présentation de chaque configuration est d'abord illustrée par un exemple type tiré du processus de développement des capacités de l'un ou l'autre des partenaires d'Oxfam-Québec.

Tableau 1. Typologie des configurations.


| Sources | Processus | |
|----------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | Transfert Connaissances existantes | Création Connaissances « à créer » |
| Externes | Configuration A | Configuration B |
| Internes | | Configuration C |

La configuration A : modifier les routines organisationnelles à partir de connaissances externes existantes

La première configuration, appelée configuration A, se rapporte plus précisément au transfert de connaissances d'Oxfam-Québec vers le partenaire ce qui, du point de vue de ce dernier, correspond au processus d'absorption de connaissances externes. Une version très élaborée de cette configuration a été observée lors de la mise en œuvre d'un programme de renforcement des capacités par Oxfam-Québec au Niger de 2002 à 2005 et auquel a participé SOS FEVVF.

Le programme s'est adressé à cinq jeunes ONG de Niamey œuvrant dans le domaine des VBG. Il visait notamment à renforcer l'ensemble des capacités des organisations participantes de manière à assurer leur pérennité. Le contenu du programme a été conçu à partir d'un modèle d'ONG nigérienne établi par Oxfam-Québec et d'une évaluation des besoins de renforcement menée conjointement avec chacun des partenaires. Un plan d'intervention annuel comportant des éléments spécifiques à chaque partenaire et des éléments communs à l'ensemble des structures a par la suite été élaboré et mis à jour annuellement pendant toute la durée du programme. Ces plans ont comporté un important volet de formation touchant l'ensemble des capacités que l'on cherchait à développer ainsi que la réalisation d'interventions sur le terrain à l'intention des populations cibles de l'ONG locale. Peu importe le thème sur lequel on voulait intervenir : gestion de projet, vie associative, approche participative, etc., les pratiques de gestion des connaissances déployées ont été caractérisées par une forte régularité. Elles composaient une sorte de spirale dans laquelle on évoluait d'année en année et d'un élément à l'autre en fonction des résultats obtenus dans l'action et des nouveaux besoins perçus par les partenaires et Oxfam-Québec. Le Graphique 3 illustre cette spirale.

Au départ, un diagnostic annuel permettait l'élaboration d'un plan d'intervention. À la suite de l'identification des domaines à renforcer, la première activité a le plus souvent consisté en une formation permettant la diffusion de connaissances, principalement théoriques, sur le thème à



Graphique 3. Structure du Programme triennal de renforcement des capacités d'Oxfam-Québec au Niger.


traiter. Un exercice de suivi était ensuite mené par Oxfam-Québec avec chaque organisation afin d'approfondir les contenus et d'élargir le nombre de membres qui y étaient familiers, de vérifier le niveau d'intégration des contenus traités dans les modes de fonctionnement organisationnel et d'élaborer conjointement un plan d'action pour accroître ce niveau. Ce plan d'action pouvait comporter des mesures à prendre par les membres du Bureau exécutif, du personnel ou d'autres membres impliqués dans les activités concernées. La mise en œuvre du plan d'action était assurée par le partenaire alors que les coopérants d'Oxfam-Québec apportaient un soutien à toutes les personnes et groupes impliqués. La réalisation d'interventions sur le terrain permettait ensuite d'expérimenter et d'approfondir l'intégration des contenus dans l'action. Enfin, la dernière étape consistait en une évaluation périodique appuyant la formulation de recommandations pour la poursuite du programme.

La durée du programme a permis une évaluation itérative des progrès accomplis et un travail approfondi afin de solutionner les problèmes rencontrés; ces retours cycliques et systématiques sur l'action et ses résultats permettaient un apprentissage réflexif par les membres de l'organisation. Par exemple, la vie associative a fait l'objet de suivis sur trois ans pour s'assurer d'une bonne implantation et de l'intégration aux niveaux individuel et collectif des modes de fonctionnement prévus dans les statuts de l'ONG.

Comme le démontre l'exemple type ci-dessus, la configuration A comporte un accent marqué sur le transfert de connaissances. Elle réunit des pratiques visant à faciliter l'absorption de connaissances externes par le partenaire. Ces pratiques interviennent à chacune des phases du processus d'absorption afin de s'assurer que le processus est complété et que les nouvelles façons de faire sont institutionnalisées dans les procédures et routines organisationnelles. Ainsi, la diffusion de formation et la réalisation d'un suivi permettant un retour sur les notions traitées et leur présentation à un plus grand groupe de membres de l'organisation ont facilité l'acquisition et l'assimilation des connaissances externes par l'organisation partenaire. La transformation des nouvelles connaissances a été soutenue par l'accompagnement offert lors de l'évaluation des pratiques organisationnelles et de l'élaboration d'un plan d'action. Enfin, la phase d'exploitation des connaissances transformées a été soutenue par l'appui-conseil aux personnes et aux groupes impliqués dans la réalisation du plan d'action et l'accompagnement de l'ensemble de l'organisation dans la réalisation de ses interventions sur le terrain. On remarque que l'ensemble des phases de cette configuration permet qu'un véritable processus de traduction (Blumentritt et Johnston 1999) ou de transformation des connaissances (Gherardi et Nicolini 2000) intervienne au sein de l'organisation partenaire, la transmission de connaissances requérant qu'elles soient traduites en informations puis retraduites en connaissances afin que l'information prenne du sens dans le contexte de l'utilisateur (Blumentritt et Johnston 1999). Ainsi, l'absorption de connaissances externes suppose qu'elles soient en quelque sorte recréées par l'organisation.

La configuration A est illustrée au Graphique 4.

Bien que cette configuration ait présenté plusieurs variantes, elle a toujours comporté l'introduction de connaissances externes à l'occasion d'une activité où les partenaires ont pu questionner, échanger et ainsi procéder à une première assimilation des contenus abordés. Par la suite, l'appui-conseil offert par Oxfam-Québec a permis aux membres de l'organisation de poursuivre l'assimilation des connaissances en approfondissant leur compréhension des informations obtenues et d'amorcer la transformation des connaissances acquises en les confrontant aux modes actuels de fonctionnement puis en les combinant aux connaissances existantes afin d'en identifier les utilisations possibles, compte tenu du contexte de l'organisation. Dans certains cas, ces utilisations ont été documentées dans des manuels, des formulaires, des procédures, etc. qui ont par la suite facilité leur reproduction dans l'organisation. Enfin, lors des retours sur l'action favorisant un apprentissage réflexif, l'accompagnement a soutenu la modification des méthodes de travail et des modes de fonctionnement individuels et collectifs et le développement de nouvelles routines



Graphique 4. Configuration A. Modifier les routines organisationnelles à partir de connaissances externes existantes.

organisationnelles intégrant les connaissances transformées dans l'organisation, permettant ainsi l'exploitation des connaissances externes. De plus, les évaluations périodiques ont constitué des boucles de rétroaction permettant à Oxfam-Québec et au partenaire de *monitorer* leurs activités de manière à asseoir encore plus solidement le type de routines que l'on cherchait à implanter.

La configuration A a été reliée au développement des capacités de coordination, de gestion de projet, de gestion budgétaire, d'intervention, etc. des partenaires. Par ailleurs, l'analyse a révélé que le succès de cette configuration dépend de la présence de trois conditions importantes. Premièrement, les thèmes abordés doivent correspondre à un besoin de renforcement clairement ressenti par le partenaire et lié à ses objectifs stratégiques de développement. Deuxièmement, le suivi exercé par Oxfam-Québec doit être constant et offrir au partenaire le type et le niveau d'expertise requis pour le soutenir tout au long de la mise en œuvre des changements visés. Troisièmement, la quantité et la qualité des efforts consacrés par le partenaire à l'intégration des connaissances externes dans ses modes de fonctionnement se sont aussi avérées déterminantes pour le développement de ses capacités organisationnelles. Ces conditions rejoignent les constats de Kramer et Cole (2003) concernant l'impact de l'ampleur du besoin sur l'implication de l'organisation utilisatrice dans le transfert et le succès de celui-ci. Elles rejoignent également ceux de Cummings et Teng (2003) sur l'importance d'un niveau élevé d'interaction entre les parties au transfert et d'une itération permettant un approfondissement des connaissances à acquérir dans la réussite de l'exercice. Dans l'ensemble, la configuration A décrit le transfert comme un processus interactif et itératif, une activité réciproque et mutuelle qui engage les deux organisations à toutes les étapes du processus, du développement de l'intervention à l'application des connaissances.

La configuration B : modifier les routines organisationnelles à partir de connaissances externes créées

La seconde configuration porteuse réunit également des pratiques accompagnant l'absorption de connaissances externes. Cependant, alors que dans la configuration A les efforts se concentraient

sur la transformation et l'exploitation de ces connaissances, dans la configuration B, ils portent principalement sur leur acquisition et leur assimilation. Ainsi, dans la configuration A, le savoir est déjà disponible alors que dans la configuration B, le traitement permettant de passer des données aux informations puis au savoir doit être fait. La version la plus élaborée de cette configuration a été observée lors de la réalisation d'enquêtes sur le terrain par Assovie, le partenaire béninois d'Oxfam-Québec.


La population cible d'Assovie est composée d'enfants des campagnes, dont plus de 90 pour cent sont des filles, confiés à des tuteurs/tutrices dans les villes où ils sont exploités comme main-d'œuvre dans les marchés ou domestiques dans les familles. L'ONG a développé une approche originale lui permettant de dispenser l'éducation de base aux enfants sur les lieux mêmes des marchés, avec l'assentiment des tuteurs/tutrices. Cependant, le phénomène étant plus ou moins tabou, les données sur le nombre, la situation et les besoins de ces enfants et de ces ménages étaient quasi inexistantes. Afin d'obtenir ces informations nécessaires à une meilleure planification de son offre de services, Assovie a mené des enquêtes porte-à-porte dans les quartiers avoisinant les marchés où elle intervenait ou désirait intervenir. Le rôle d'Oxfam-Québec a alors consisté à appuyer son partenaire dans (a) l'identification des informations à colliger et la formation du personnel chargé d'obtenir les données sur le terrain, (b) le traitement et l'interprétation des informations obtenues, (c) l'analyse des implications des résultats et (d) la modification des services ou approches. Ainsi, l'accompagnement d'Oxfam-Québec a été offert au cours des quatre phases du processus d'absorption. Toutefois, étant donné l'importance des phases d'acquisition et d'assimilation, la configuration présente une composante création de connaissances plus importante.

La réalisation d'études sur les clientèles cibles peut dans cette configuration être associée aux phases d'acquisition et d'assimilation de connaissances externes. Le développement des capacités a cependant nécessité que, tout comme dans la configuration A, ces connaissances soient transformées et exploitées par le partenaire. Cette configuration a été reliée au développement de la capacité de planification en développant des routines liées à l'obtention et à l'analyse de données sur les clientèles. Elle a aussi été liée au développement des capacités de plaidoyer, les informations obtenues représentant des ressources informationnelles à partir desquelles les positions défendues par le partenaire auprès des communautés et des autorités ont pu être articulées. La configuration B est illustrée au Graphique 5.

La configuration C : créer de nouvelles routines organisationnelles à partir des connaissances internes

La troisième configuration identifiée est tournée vers l'apprentissage interne et capitalise sur les connaissances déjà acquises par accumulation d'expérience par l'organisation partenaire et ses membres. L'exemple le plus explicite de cette configuration a pu être observé chez SOS FEVVF, le partenaire nigérien, lors de la réalisation d'un projet visant l'élaboration d'un module de sensibilisation sur les violences politiques.

Dans ce cas, Oxfam-Québec a apporté un appui technique et financier au projet soumis par son partenaire, permettant à ce dernier de se doter d'un module de sensibilisation sur les violences politiques et d'un module de formation d'animateurs qui ont été validés et rodés sur le terrain. Le projet a comporté la conception d'un téléthéâtre, la validation du contenu auprès d'un groupe d'experts, la formation de plusieurs animateurs sur l'utilisation du téléthéâtre, et enfin, la tenue de sessions de sensibilisation qui ont permis de roder l'intervention. Au terme du projet, l'ONG nigérienne disposait d'un module d'intervention « prêt à être routinisé », ce que l'obtention de deux financements subséquents lui ont permis de faire.




Graphique 5. Configuration B. Modifier les routines organisationnelles à partir de connaissances créées.

Dans le développement de cette capacité d'intervention, le partenaire a bâti sur les connaissances internes. En effet, SOS FEVVF était déjà intervenue sur la problématique de la participation des femmes à la prise de décision et avait développé une solide expérience de la formation de formateurs dans le domaine de la lutte aux violences domestiques. Enfin, elle avait intégré depuis longtemps dans ses routines la tenue de *post mortem* sur ses interventions terrain. Ainsi, la conception du téléthéâtre a nécessité l'articulation des connaissances des membres de l'équipe de projet et leur codification dans une forme dramatique, les compétences en formation de formateurs ont été sollicitées pour le développement et la diffusion du module de formation des animateurs et le rodage du module a bénéficié de la longue habitude des *post mortem*.

Dans la réalisation de ce projet, l'apport de connaissances d'Oxfam-Québec a été marginal, l'aide conseil étant davantage axée sur la gestion du projet. Ainsi, l'appui offert a consisté à accompagner le partenaire dans l'articulation et la codification de ses connaissances sur l'existence d'une opportunité de développement dont il pouvait profiter étant donné ses compétences et ses ressources, à soutenir l'articulation des connaissances individuelles en connaissances communes qui ont été codifiées dans les nouvelles ressources de connaissances que représentaient le téléthéâtre et le module de formation des animateurs, et enfin, à favoriser la mise au point de façons de faire permettant l'exploitation de ces nouvelles ressources dans de nouvelles routines organisationnelles. L'appui d'Oxfam-Québec a ainsi permis au partenaire de développer de nouveaux services et d'accroître ses capacités d'intervention. La configuration C est illustrée au Graphique 6.

Cette configuration combine en fait deux types de pratique, soit (a) une pratique de gestion du partenariat par laquelle Oxfam-Québec alloue des ressources financières à une activité levier et (b) une pratique de gestion des connaissances, l'appui-conseil, par laquelle Oxfam-Québec facilite l'opération de mécanismes d'apprentissage au sein de l'organisation partenaire. Elle supporte la création de connaissances entre pairs où le processus de groupe permet d'extraire la



Graphique 6. Configuration C. Créer de nouvelles routines organisationnelles à partir des connaissances internes.

connaissance individuelle d'expérience et, grâce à l'interaction en équipe, de mieux comprendre cette connaissance et de pouvoir l'adapter au contexte, menant ainsi à la création de connaissances communes (Roth 2003) et éventuellement, à la création de nouvelles routines organisationnelles.

L'apprentissage de routines collectives: une clé dans la pérennisation des capacités organisationnelles

La comparaison des trois configurations fait ressortir que les pratiques de gestion des connaissances d'Oxfam-Québec permettent l'apprentissage organisationnel des partenaires en favorisant deux types de « mouvement » de la connaissance à l'intérieur de l'organisation. Le premier est le passage de la connaissance externe à la connaissance interne, présent dans les configurations A et B. Le second est le passage de la connaissance individuelle à la connaissance organisationnelle, commun aux trois configurations.

Comme on l'a vu, le mouvement de la connaissance externe vers la connaissance interne est saisi par le processus d'absorption. Ce processus, cependant, ne rend pas compte du passage de l'individuel au collectif qui est mieux expliqué par les mécanismes d'apprentissage organisationnel d'articulation, de codification et d'expérimentation. En effet, c'est lorsque les interprétations individuelles des problèmes et des situations sont confrontées collectivement pour permettre le développement de compréhensions partagées et d'actions concertées, lorsque des procédures, guides, etc., reflétant ces compréhensions partagées et pouvant être utilisés comme référence par les membres de l'organisation sont produits, ou encore lorsqu'un groupe expérimente et rode une nouvelle façon de faire que peut se produire le mouvement vers la connaissance collective.

Ainsi, dans la configuration A, le double mouvement de l'externe vers l'interne et de l'individuel vers le collectif a été facilité du fait que l'appui-conseil a été exercé auprès de l'ensemble

| | Phase du processus d'absorption | Pratique de gestion des connaissances | Mécanisme d'apprentissage organisationnel | Niveau d'apprentissage | |
|--------------|---------------------------------|---|---|------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Externe ↓ | Acquisition | Formation, atelier | Exploration | Individuel | Individuel ↓ Organisationnel |
| | Assimilation | Formation, atelier Appui-conseil | Exploration | Individuel Groupe | |
| Interne | Transformation | Appui-conseil à l'identification des utilisations possibles | Articulation Codification | Individuel Groupe | |
| | Exploitation | Appui-conseil aux utilisations identifiées | Expérimentation Articulation Codification | Organisationnel | |

Graphique 7. Facilitation des mouvements de connaissances dans la configuration A.

des personnes concernées par la mise en place des changements et ce, autant pour articuler les utilisations possibles des connaissances externes dans le contexte de l'organisation partenaire que pour roder leur exploitation dans l'action. La contribution de l'appui-conseil à cet égard a consisté d'abord à mettre en place divers lieux de discussion, que ce soit sur une base statutaire ou *ad hoc* comme des comités de gestion; comités de suivi; équipes de projet; rencontres d'unité; groupes de travail ou autre, lorsque de tels lieux étaient inexistantes. Elle a consisté ensuite à soutenir les groupes impliqués dans l'apprentissage de savoir-faire de communication permettant la confrontation constructive et l'intégration des points de vue individuels. Elle a aussi comporté des retours réguliers sur l'action sur une base individuelle et collective afin de permettre la mise au point progressive de façons de faire ou de routines individuelles et collectives mieux coordonnées et plus performantes. Enfin, dans certains cas, elle a comporté d'accompagner le partenaire dans la codification des connaissances développées. Par la suite, la transmission des routines collectives aux nouveaux membres de l'organisation et la disponibilité d'outils ont permis de pérenniser les nouvelles façons de faire ou capacités organisationnelles.

Le Graphique 7 reprend l'ensemble des correspondances impliquées dans la configuration A.

Dans la configuration B, les mouvements à faciliter demeurent les mêmes. Toutefois, en raison de l'accent sur l'acquisition et l'assimilation, l'ensemble de la démarche apparaît comme un exercice collectif.

Enfin, dans la configuration C, seul le passage de la connaissance individuelle à la connaissance organisationnelle est impliqué. Essentiellement, ce mouvement repose sur les mécanismes d'articulation et de codification déjà présentés.

Les conditions d'utilisation des configurations

Les configurations étant tirées de l'analyse de trois processus de développement des capacités fort différents, les contextes d'utilisation de celles-ci ont été fort variés. L'examen de ces contextes permet toutefois de présenter quelques constats et de soulever certains questionnements entourant leurs conditions d'utilisation.

Ainsi, les données montrent que la configuration A s'est révélée particulièrement appropriée pour soutenir le renforcement de capacités reposant en grande partie sur des connaissances

techniques, comme la gestion budgétaire par exemple. Cependant, le niveau de difficulté est apparu plus élevé dans le cas de capacités requérant un degré important d'ajustement mutuel ou pouvant remettre en cause la répartition du pouvoir et la circulation de l'information entre les membres de l'organisation comme la capacité de coordination, par exemple. Bien qu'un accompagnement individuel soutenu et des évaluations de groupe périodiques aient permis des réajustements progressifs et soutenu des changements personnels, notamment dans le style de leadership, il serait intéressant de mieux comprendre l'incidence de facteurs tels que la volonté personnelle de changement, la crédibilité des intervenants et la confiance qui s'établit entre les représentants des organisations sur un accompagnement réussi.

De plus, sur ce point, les données suggèrent que lors d'interventions visant à soutenir le partenaire dans la correction de situations insatisfaisantes se rapportant aux modes de communication ou à la répartition du pouvoir au sein de l'organisation, une lacune importante a consisté à ce que les coopérants d'Oxfam-Québec concentrent leur appui auprès d'une ou deux personnes, souvent un dirigeant et/ou un gestionnaire, et se reposent ensuite sur ces personnes pour diffuser ces connaissances dans l'organisation et soutenir les autres membres dans leur utilisation, ce qu'elles n'ont pas réussi à faire. Considérant que les phases de transformation et d'exploitation ont semblé présenter un niveau de difficulté particulièrement élevé pour le partenaire puisqu'on remettait en cause des routines reposant sur des modèles profondément ancrés tant au niveau personnel que collectif, il faudrait développer une meilleure compréhension des mécanismes et facteurs en cause dans les changements où la composante culturelle est importante comme dans ceux qui touchent l'exercice du leadership et du membership. Même si l'exemple de SOS FEVVF, qui a mis plus de trois ans avant d'adopter des modes de fonctionnement permettant une vie associative jugée satisfaisante par l'ensemble de ses membres, indique que les constats sur la nécessité d'assurer au partenaire un appui suffisant en durée et en intensité lors de la phase d'exploitation prennent ici toute leur importance, il n'en demeure pas moins qu'une meilleure compréhension des facteurs en cause pourrait éclairer davantage les pratiques d'accompagnement.

En ce qui concerne la configuration B, les données suggèrent qu'elle requiert que le partenaire ait développé un lien de confiance suffisamment fort avec son milieu d'intervention pour que ces enquêtes lui permettent d'obtenir des données fiables. Des recherches subséquentes pourraient aider à vérifier le caractère incontournable de cette exigence.

Pour sa part, la configuration C n'a été observée que dans le développement de capacités d'intervention associées à l'élaboration, la mise au point et l'utilisation d'un nouvel outil d'intervention. Il semble que plusieurs conditions aient été réunies pour que la configuration porte fruit. Premièrement, les interventions développées correspondaient à un type d'activité pour lequel du financement était accessible au partenaire, ce qui suppose que ce dernier ait déjà établi des contacts avec les bailleurs et possède la crédibilité nécessaire pour obtenir les mandats qui lui permettent d'installer de nouvelles routines et ressources organisationnelles. Dès lors, elle apparaît ne pouvoir s'appliquer qu'à des partenaires déjà bien établis. Par ailleurs, la configuration ne semble avoir laissé de traces durables dans l'organisation que dans les cas où l'intervention développée s'inscrivait dans la stratégie globale d'intervention du partenaire. Dans le cas où une activité n'est développée que pour répondre aux préoccupations ponctuelles d'un bailleur et assurer la survie de l'organisation, le partenaire est à risque de disperser ses énergies en diluant son expertise ou en intervenant dans des territoires trop vastes, et ainsi, de fragiliser la crédibilité de son message et l'efficacité de ses interventions à moyen et long termes. Enfin, parce qu'elle est aussi basée sur une pratique de gestion du partenariat, la configuration C demande qu'Oxfam-Québec ait jugé que le partenaire possédait les connaissances nécessaires pour profiter d'une réelle opportunité de développement, ce qui suppose un partenariat bien établi et une bonne connaissance du milieu.

Les conditions favorisant le développement des capacités

On remarque que dans les trois configurations, le partenaire reconnaît explicitement le besoin de développer ou renforcer ses capacités. Dans tous les cas, cette reconnaissance s'est avérée en lien avec les intentions stratégiques du partenaire, que celles-ci aient été dictées par les besoins qu'il cherchait à combler chez ses populations cibles ou par les exigences des bailleurs. Par ailleurs, certaines interventions d'Oxfam-Québec n'ont pas obtenus les résultats escomptés. Dans ces cas, outre les lacunes et exigences liées aux configurations de pratiques déjà mentionnées, la concordance entre les intentions stratégiques du partenaire et d'Oxfam-Québec de même que la qualité de leur relation de confiance apparaissent avoir joué un rôle important.

Les contextes interne et externe du partenaire ont également affecté le développement de ses capacités. Bien qu'il ne soit pas possible d'associer directement le succès d'une configuration à la présence de certaines conditions au niveau des contextes internes ou externes des partenaires, l'analyse comparative a permis l'identification de conditions qui, lorsqu'elles étaient présentes, ont facilité le développement des capacités. Ainsi, au niveau du contexte interne, un degré élevé d'engagement des membres, la stabilité des ressources humaines et l'absence de conflits constituent des conditions favorables. Au niveau du contexte du partenariat, les conditions identifiées sont le positionnement avantageux d'Oxfam-Québec dans le réseau des bailleurs ainsi que la présence au sein des intervenants d'Oxfam-Québec de traducteurs culturels, c'est-à-dire de coopérants connaissant suffisamment bien les deux cultures en cause pour pouvoir expliquer les différences culturelles aux uns et aux autres et ainsi maintenir possible le partage de connaissances entre les groupes. Enfin, les partenaires ont bénéficié de l'adoption de politiques nationales favorables à leurs activités et de l'absence de crise économique ou politique.

Conclusion

Les préoccupations entourant l'amélioration de l'efficacité de l'aide au développement et la montée de l'approche de la coopération basée sur le savoir ont amené les ONG canadiennes d'aide au développement à privilégier l'établissement de véritables partenariats Nord-Sud axés sur le renforcement et la pérennisation des capacités locales. Afin de pouvoir influencer davantage la réflexion sur l'efficacité de l'aide, ces dernières ont avantage à développer une compréhension fine des pratiques et des mécanismes à l'origine du développement des capacités de leurs partenaires.

La recherche présentée dans cet article contribue à cette compréhension en identifiant trois configurations de pratiques de gestion des connaissances qui ont effectivement contribué à renforcer les capacités d'ONG ouest-africaines impliquées dans un partenariat avec Oxfam-Québec en soutenant la modification de leurs routines organisationnelles à partir de connaissances externes existantes ou créées ou à partir de connaissances internes.

La première configuration est axée sur le transfert de connaissances explicites et de façons de faire entre Oxfam-Québec et son partenaire. Ce type de transfert, considéré au cœur des partenariats axés sur le renforcement des capacités, a par ailleurs été l'objet de critiques; Roberts, Jones, et Fröhling (2005), entre autres, questionnent le managérialisme imposé aux ONG du Sud par leurs partenaires du Nord. Il n'entraîne pas dans les objectifs de la recherche de porter un jugement sur l'à-propos des façons de faire ayant fait l'objet d'apprentissages. À ce sujet, nous ne pouvons que mentionner que l'analyse indique que les façons de faire qui ont été maintenues dans le temps par les partenaires l'ont été parce que ceux-ci considéraient que ces façons de faire leur permettaient des gains importants au regard de leurs intentions stratégiques. À titre d'exemple, les membres des organisations partenaires ont mentionné que l'acquisition de compétences liées à l'approche de la gestion axée sur les résultats leur avait permis de rencontrer les

exigences des bailleurs et de se qualifier pour des financements plus facilement que les ONG concurrentes; ils ont aussi souligné qu'elle leur avait permis d'améliorer la cohérence de leurs actions.

Il apparaît ainsi que le renforcement des capacités ne peut être conçu comme l'application d'une séquence de pratiques de gestion des connaissances dont les effets seraient indépendants des intentions stratégiques des partenaires du Sud. En fait, les résultats empiriques nous ont amenées à modifier le modèle de départ pour tenir compte (a) de l'influence des intentions stratégiques du partenaire sur les efforts consacrés aux apprentissages externes, (b) de l'influence des intentions stratégiques de l'ONG canadienne sur ses pratiques de gestion des connaissances, (c) de l'interaction entre les intentions stratégiques des deux partenaires (ONG canadienne et locale) et enfin, (d) de l'influence de la relation de confiance sur les intentions stratégiques de chacun. Le modèle empirique de développement des capacités dans un contexte de partenariat et de réseau qui en est résulté devrait faire l'objet d'une publication à venir.

Par ailleurs, en éclairant le lien entre la gestion des connaissances au sein des partenariats et réseaux et le développement des capacités des membres, la recherche dégage des éléments permettant de baliser les interventions des ONG canadiennes. Ainsi, elle montre l'importance que les pratiques de gestion des connaissances viennent soutenir chacune des phases du processus d'absorption des connaissances externes par le partenaire. Elle indique aussi que les capacités peuvent être renforcées en soutenant les processus d'apprentissage interne. Enfin, elle fournit une définition plus « observable » de l'effet recherché en mettant de l'avant le caractère essentiellement collectif des apprentissages devant survenir chez le partenaire pour modifier ses capacités organisationnelles.

Enfin, l'étude dégage aussi certaines pistes de recherche. On a déjà mentionné l'intérêt de préciser les conditions d'utilisation associées à chaque configuration ainsi que les facteurs à prendre en compte dans l'accompagnement de changements intentionnels dans la culture organisationnelle. De plus, parce qu'elles doivent conduire à des apprentissages collectifs, les trois configurations décrites reposent sur l'existence chez le partenaire de mécanismes ou lieux de discussion permettant l'articulation des connaissances individuelles. Les résultats suggèrent ainsi que dans leurs interventions, les ONG canadiennes pourraient favoriser l'apprentissage de leurs partenaires en appuyant dès que possible le développement de leur capacité de coordination, laquelle repose largement sur la présence de tels lieux et l'acquisition de savoir-faire collectifs de communication. Cette conclusion pourrait être examinée par des recherches futures.

Nous espérons que ces contributions apporteront aux praticiens un éclairage nouveau à partir duquel considérer les pratiques déployées sur le terrain et soutenir la pertinence de leur intervention.

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Notices biographiques

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Notes

1. Les données présentées sont extraites de la base de données en ligne de l'OCDE disponible à : <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?lang=fr&SubSessionId=e4b879c4-ee0d-408f-a4f9-2b54e0c1bb84>.
2. Tiré de <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/fra/FRA-325122215-M7Y> (date de modification : 2012-03-06).

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Access to justice and corporate accountability: a legal case study of HudBay in Guatemala

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ABSTRACT This case study looks at the avenues open for addressing serious allegations of murder, rape and assault brought by indigenous Guatemalans against a Canadian mining company, HudBay Minerals. While first-generation legal and development policy reforms have facilitated foreign mining in Guatemala, second-generation reforms have failed to address effectively conflicts arising from the development projects. The judicial mechanisms available in Guatemala are difficult to access and suffer from problems of corruption and intimidation. Relevant corporate social responsibility policies and mechanisms lack the necessary enforcement powers. Canadian courts have been reluctant to permit lawsuits against Canadian parent companies; however, in *Choc v. HudBay* and *Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation*, Ontario judges have allowed cases to proceed on the merits of the case, providing an important, if limited, avenue toward corporate accountability.

RÉSUMÉ Cette étude de cas examine les stratégies qui s'offrent pour traiter les allégations de meurtre, de viol et d'agression formulées par des autochtones guatémaltèques contre une compagnie minière canadienne, la HudBay Minerals. Alors que les réformes légales et institutionnelles de « première génération » ont facilité l'extraction minière par des compagnies étrangères, les réformes de « deuxième génération », qui s'intéressent aux droits sociaux et aux droits de la personne, n'offrent pas encore de mécanismes fiables pour résoudre les conflits résultant des actions des entreprises. En effet, les règles qui définissent la responsabilité sociale des entreprises et les jugements des mécanismes internationaux qui interviennent lors de plaintes ne sont pas contraignants pour les états. Or, il est très difficile d'accéder aux mécanismes judiciaires du Guatemala, sans compter qu'ils sont affligés par des problèmes de corruption et d'intimidation. En outre, les cours canadiennes ont jusqu'ici été réticentes à autoriser des actions légales contre les compagnies mères canadiennes. Cependant, dans *Choc v. HudBay* et *Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation*, la Cour supérieure ontarienne a permis ces cas à procéder, s'il pourraient s'avérer une voie intéressante pour bien établir la responsabilité sociale des entreprises.

Keywords: mining; Latin America; Chevron; HudBay; corporate social responsibility

Introduction

In this paper, we will examine the history of one particularly troubled nickel mine in Guatemala, located near the town of El Estor in the region of Izabal. The mine was born into violence, as indigenous people living on the site were removed to make room for the mine and the town in the 1960s and 1970s. Numerous murders, assaults, and other human rights violations have

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occurred as a result of the conflict between local indigenous people who have lived in the area since the late nineteenth century and the successive Canadian corporate entities INCO, Skye Resources, and HudBay Minerals, as well as their Guatemalan subsidiaries.

We will study the practical dimensions of this case in the context of “second-generation” reforms in the law and development field that have introduced social and human rights issues as a component of the rule of law. While first-generation reforms focused on judicial and institutional reforms to encourage an appropriate climate for commercial relations, second-generation reforms introduced a number of voluntary, soft law mechanisms to address social, environmental, and human rights aspects of development (Trubek 2006). However, they have been criticised for being more show than substance (Eslava 2008). Legal scholar Kerry Rittich suggests the need for specific case studies to determine how these social aspects are faring on the ground (Rittich 2006). We are not engaged in evaluating whether corporate social responsibility mechanisms or judicial reforms in Guatemala have improved the conduct of individual corporations, or judges, as the case may be; rather, we are making a more specific point, that the current mechanisms do not provide meaningful access to justice for those who are most in need of the protection of the law.¹

Taking up Rittich’s suggestion, we describe a dispute, centred around allegations of murder and rape, between indigenous people in the El Estor region of Guatemala and the Canadian mining company HudBay Minerals. We first look at the history and context of the dispute, including a decades-long struggle over land and resources. We believe that an understanding of the history of the conflict reveals the contextual factors driving the actions of specific individuals. We take the approach that second-generation reforms must take into account history and context in a way that recognises the interests and rights of indigenous communities.

We then review three avenues for addressing that dispute: seeking resolution in the Guatemalan judicial system, relying on voluntary corporate social responsibility mechanisms, and suing in Canada. We argue that both the Guatemalan courts and corporate social responsibility mechanisms present serious limitations with respect to resolving claims of human rights abuses by Canadian mining companies. We are concerned that, while Canadian companies are permitted to profit from extractive activities in foreign jurisdictions, the Canadian court system has typically not stepped in to fill this gap with respect to the effects of those activities, finding either that the cases should be heard in foreign jurisdictions or that Canadian mining companies do not owe a duty of care to people in foreign countries directly affected by Canadian mining.

Decisions rendered in 2013 by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and in 2014 by the Ontario Court of Appeal may be an indication that Canadian courts are prepared to narrow this accountability gap. In the first decision, the judge ruled that three lawsuits filed by indigenous people of El Estor against HudBay may proceed to trial, as it is not “plain and obvious” that HudBay is not liable to the plaintiffs in negligence. In the second decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal provided that the Ontario courts had the jurisdiction to decide whether an Ecuadorian judgment could be enforced in Ontario. Regardless of whether these plaintiffs succeed in proving their case in either proceeding, the openness of the court to decide on the issues based on their merits provides an important precedent for those attempting to seek a remedy against Canadian mining corporations’ alleged wrongs committed abroad.

We wish to point out two limitations to our methodology. First, we are only studying the interests of the individuals who are plaintiffs in the lawsuit. While there are different views about mining and the events in the region within the indigenous communities, we do not purport to generalise about interests in the indigenous community as a whole. We feel that this is a valid approach, as we are studying the availability of legal remedies to complainants, not the dynamics of community relations. Second, we are limited by the evidence that we have available, from court documents, newspaper reports and our own personal knowledge of Guatemala. Consequently, while we present divergent versions of events, we do not attempt to draw conclusions about

which version is correct or whether we have all the information; rather, we show that there are serious issues raised that need to be resolved in a process that can make determinations of fact and, if appropriate, provide redress.

The establishment of INCO in Guatemala²

The Canadian mining company INCO³ first became involved in the Izabal region of Guatemala in 1960 through Exmibal, a subsidiary established with the US-based Hanna Mining Company (McFarlane 1989). The history of INCO in Guatemala shows that Canadian mining interests were promoted by the Canadian government, and yet that the Canadian government did not take the initiative to address corporate accountability for the violence associated with these mining operations.

INCO planned to build an open pit nickel mine near the town of El Estor, located north of Lake Izabal in the area of Izabal in eastern Guatemala. However, there were two immediate obstacles to the realisation of INCO's objective. First, open pit mining was prohibited under Guatemalan law. Second, in 1960, civil war began in Guatemala and the area around El Estor became the base of operations for guerrilla rebels (McFarlane 1989).

INCO was able to surmount these difficulties through negotiations with Guatemala's military government. INCO hired an engineer to rewrite the mining code, and this revised version was accepted by Guatemala's Congress (McFarlane 1989). The resulting mining code of April 1965 specifically allowed for "open sky mining" (Driever 1985, 34). The company also received a 40-year lease to mine an area of 385 km² near El Estor as well as "generous tax concessions". Finally, the military government provided INCO with the understanding that it would guarantee "stability" in the region (McFarlane 1989, 127).

Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio⁴ was responsible for clearing the indigenous people out of the INCO region in Zacapa-Lake Izabal in the late 1960s and 1970s (McFarlane 1989; Bradbury 1985). The indigenous people of Izabal were largely Mayan Q'eqchi', who had migrated to the area from the highlands of Verapaz in the late nineteenth century (Grandia 2006). During this "reign of terror", the number of people killed is estimated to be between 3,000 and 6,000 (McFarlane 1989, 127). At the same time, Canada showed ongoing support for the El Estor project, as the Canadian ambassador to Guatemala, S. F. Rae, went on a well-publicised tour of the mine site in 1968 (McFarlane 1989).

There was strong opposition to the Exmibal project from indigenous people and other concerned Guatemalans. A group of professors from the School of Economic Sciences at the University of San Carlos, Guatemala City, took up the cause and established a commission in 1969 (McFarlane 1989). The commission concluded that the Guatemalan government had not negotiated sufficient benefits from the project and that Exmibal would simply strip Guatemala of its riches (Driever 1985, 36). Public protests against the mine followed. Carlos Arana, who had become President of Guatemala, responded by suspending the constitutional right to assembly and arresting large numbers of people. The army occupied the university in an attempt to silence the opposition from the nation's intellectual community. State death squads assassinated two law professors and members of the commission, Julio Camey Herrera and Adolfo Mijangos López. One other member of the commission was wounded in an assassination attempt and another was forced to flee the country due to death threats (Ball, Kobrak, and Spierer 1999; Bradbury 1985). The UN Commission on Historical Clarification (the Truth Commission) later found that these crimes were committed by state authorities in retaliation for opposition to the government's policies (Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification 1999).

In February 1971, an exploitation agreement was signed between INCO and the Guatemalan government. Major construction began on the El Estor mine in 1974 (Driever 1985), aided by a

CAD20 million loan from the Canadian Export Development Corporation (*Toronto Star*, April 15, 1979). The UN Commission documented violence associated with the mine during this period. In 1978, two people in El Estor were shot and wounded by men riding in an Exmibal truck (Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 679). The next month, employees of Exmibal were involved in the execution of four people in the municipality of Panzós, near El Estor (Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 105). In 1981, police officers riding in an Exmibal truck killed community leader Pablo Bac Caal (Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification 1999, 674).

In 1982, the market value of nickel was declining while the cost of oil was rising. As a result, INCO shut down the El Estor mine. While the mine lay dormant, violence in Guatemala continued. The most serious human rights violations were perpetrated under the dictator Rios Montt. There were 192 massacres in 1982 alone.⁵ Despite condemning these human rights violations in Guatemala in 1983, the Canadian government participated in negotiations to sell military planes to the Guatemalan air force. The Guatemalan military had been known to use their planes to shoot at indigenous villages (Lemco 1986).

In 1996, the Guatemalan government signed a peace accord with the guerrillas, ending the 36-year civil war. According to a 1998 report by Monsignor Juan Gerardi, which evaluated evidence and testimony of 600 people collected from across Guatemala over three years, 150,000 people were murdered, 50,000 disappeared and 1 million were displaced during the civil war (Gerardi 1998). In a 1999 report, *Guatemala: Memories of Silence*, the UN Commission found that the state, in some capacity, was responsible for 93 per cent of the human rights violations that occurred during the war and that the state had “committed acts of genocide against groups of the Maya people” (United Nations 2002, 2).

The Fenix project

In 2004, a Canadian company called Skye Resources purchased the mine at El Estor. At that time, the mine came to be known as “Fenix” and was to be operated by Skye’s Guatemalan subsidiary, Compañía Guatemalteca de Níquel (CGN). As INCO’s original mining concession from the 1960s was set to expire, the Guatemalan government granted a licence for mining exploration at El Estor on 13 December 2004 (International Labour Organization 2007, 40). According to a committee of the International Labour Organization (ILO), despite the fact that indigenous people had not yet formalised their rights of ownership and possession with respect to the land in question, the Guatemalan government had an obligation under ILO Convention No. 169 to consult with the affected indigenous people prior to granting the licence, which it had failed to do (International Labour Organization 2007, paragraphs 48–51).

The Mayan Q’eqchi’ farmers in the Izabal region gradually began to occupy or reoccupy lands in El Estor that had been cleared of indigenous people for the mine in the 1960s and 1970s. New settlements were formed on these lands, including the community of Barrio Revolución, and other communities, such as La Unión, were reoccupied (Paley 2007).

Skye Resources referred to the reoccupation of the El Estor region as “land invasions” (Skye Resources 2007). Because of Skye Resources’ belief that it had the exclusive right to occupy the area, court orders were obtained to remove the “squatters”.⁶ On 8 and 9 January 2007, hundreds of armed police officers and members of the military conducted forced evictions of five communities in the El Estor region, including Barrio Unión, La Pista, Barrio Revolución, Barrio La Paz and Lote Ocho (Paley 2007; *Caal v. HudBay* 2011). During the evictions, people’s homes were destroyed and some were burned (Paley 2007).

According to Skye Resources, “a peaceful atmosphere” was maintained during the evictions (Skye Resources 2007). President and CEO Ian Austin admitted that homes were burned, but

claimed that the burning of homes was not caused by company people (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2011). He stated that the company remained committed to “continue [its] discussions on matters of concern with the local communities in the El Estor region” (Skye Resources 2007).

According to allegations in court documents, another set of evictions occurred on 17 January 2007. During these evictions, 11 Mayan women of Lote Ocho were allegedly gang raped by police, military and Fenix security personnel. The women say that they were trapped by security personnel as they were attempting to leave their homes, and then raped by groups of men, including members of the Fenix security team, who were wearing uniforms bearing the initials CGN. Two of the women were pregnant at the time of the alleged rapes, and subsequently miscarried their unborn children (*Caal v. HudBay* 2011). CGN denies that these rapes occurred; according to the company, police reports show that no “illegal occupiers” were even present at the evictions on the date of the alleged rapes (HudBay Minerals, n.d.).

The Fenix mine changed ownership again in 2008, when HudBay Minerals purchased Skye Resources, changing the name to HMI Nickel (HudBay Minerals 2008a, 2008b). HudBay announced that it did not plan to begin construction at the Fenix site until market conditions became more favourable (HudBay Minerals 2008b). During this time, some of the Mayan Q’eqchi’ people returned once again to the disputed land.

In 2009, nickel was rising in price, and the company began considering spending the CAD1 billion necessary to open the mine (Grainger 2009).⁷ On 27 September 2009, there were protests against mining activities in several communities located near the Fenix mine, including the communities of La Unión and Las Nubes. In the violence that day seven people were shot, resulting in the death of community leader and school teacher Adolfo Ich Chamón, and serious injury to another community member, German Chub Choc. Five security guards were also injured.

The events that led up to the violence are in dispute. According to one version of events, the governor of Izabal, along with 50 CGN security guards, entered the community of Las Nubes to discuss resettlement of the community (Behrens 2009). These discussions lasted for a few hours, but did not lead to an agreement. In response to CGN’s presence, community members organised protests to assert their right to remain on the land. Adolfo Ich’s family claims that protests were sparked by the “intrusion of Fenix security personnel into Mayan Q’eqchi’ communities” and “fears of renewed forced and violent evictions” (*Choc v. HudBay* 2010, paragraph 51). Residents of La Unión joined those of Las Nubes in a march toward the town of El Estor to denounce “illegal evictions” and to gather support for their cause (Rodriguez 2009). At around three in the afternoon, security guards reportedly opened fire on community members, wounding eight people (Behrens 2009). According to the Ich family’s statement of claim, Adolfo Ich was in his home in La Unión when he heard gunshots being fired. He left his home to see what was going on and if he could help restore the calm (*Choc v. HudBay* 2010). As he was a respected community leader, he was apparently recognised by security personnel. The claim states that he was unarmed when he was surrounded by a dozen armed CGN security guards who beat him, dragged him away and severed his arm with a machete. The head of CGN security, Mynor Padilla, is alleged to have shot him in the head. Padilla is a former high-ranking officer in the Guatemalan military.

An alternative version of events is provided by HudBay. According to the company, authorities were attempting to “peacefully resolv[e] illegal occupations through dialogue” when “organised protestors” attacked departing government vehicles (HudBay Minerals 2009). HudBay claims that the protestors stole automatic firearms and other weapons from the police station and attacked a community hospital that had been sponsored by CGN. HudBay acknowledges that a protestor died that day; however, it claims that “CGN personnel were not involved with his death” (HudBay Minerals, n.d.). HudBay suggested that Adolfo Ich died as a result of a “confrontation among the protestors” (HudBay Minerals 2009). The company expressed its

commitment to working with residents to arrive at a “fair and equitable solution to the land claims and resettlement”. Regardless of which version of events is believed, the incident highlights the ongoing tensions occurring in the area as a result of unsettled land claims.

The three cases from El Estor

Members of the Mayan Q’eqchi’ communities around the Fenix mine are bringing three related lawsuits in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice against the Canadian mining company HudBay Minerals. The first lawsuit was commenced on 24 September 2010 by the widow of Adolfo Ich Chamán, who was killed during the protests around El Estor in September 2009. As discussed above, the claim alleges that Adolfo Ich was “hacked and shot to death by private security forces employed by [CGN] near his home in El Estor, Guatemala” (*Choc v. HudBay* 2010, paragraph 1).

The claim made by Adolfo Ich’s widow is that HudBay, both in Canada and Guatemala, was negligent in deploying security forces into the community of La Unión and in authorising the use of excessive force in response to the peaceful opposition, despite the corporation’s knowledge that the security personnel were unlicensed, using illegal weapons and had in the past used unreasonable violence against local Mayan populations. Furthermore, the allegation is that HudBay continued to employ under-trained and inadequately supervised security personnel and, regardless of public commitments to the contrary, failed to implement or enforce adequate standards of conduct and oversight, which would have prevented the murder of Adolfo Ich.

On the same day that Adolfo Ich was shot, German Chub was shot, allegedly by the same mine company security personnel (*Chub v. HudBay* 2011). The then 21-year-old single father has been left a paraplegic by the shooting and has lost the use of his right lung. He had not been involved in any protests on that day but was watching a football game at a community football field and was shot without provocation. On 26 October 2011, Chub commenced a lawsuit against HudBay Minerals and CGN, similarly alleging that the violence against him was caused by negligent authorisation of the deployment of heavily armed security personnel into Mayan Q’eqchi’ communities on 27 September 2009.

The final lawsuit against the corporation relates to the forcible evictions of the community of Lote Ocho that took place in January 2007, as discussed above. Eleven women – Luisa Caal Chun, Margarita Caal Caal, Rosa Elbira Coc Ich, Olivia Asig Xol, Amalia Cac Tiul, Lucia Caal Chun, Carmelina Caal Ical, Irma Yolanda Choc Cac, Elvira Choc Chub, Elena Choc Quib and Irma Yolanda Choc Quib – have commenced an action against HudBay Minerals and HMI Nickel for the alleged gang rapes by uniformed mining company security personnel, police, and military during the forceful expulsion of Mayan Q’eqchi’ families (*Caal v. HudBay* 2011).

The claim alleges that the security forces who committed the rapes were under the control and direction of Canadian mining company Skye Resources, which sought the forced eviction in order to clear the land of the indigenous communities for its Fenix mining project. The claim asserts that HudBay’s 2008 purchase of and merger with Skye Resources (renamed HMI Nickel) makes HudBay responsible for the past legal wrongs and liabilities of Skye Resources. The lawsuit alleges that the harm suffered by the plaintiffs was caused by the negligence of Skye Resources in failing to direct and supervise its security personnel, knowing that they lacked the licence required under Guatemalan law, and authorising the forced evictions without taking reasonable steps to control violence against the community, although it made public representations to the contrary.

In September 2011, HudBay sold the Fenix mine and all of its Guatemalan assets to Solway Investment Group, a private company with a head office in Cyprus (*HudBay Minerals* 2011).

While HudBay had purchased the mine for CAD446 million, it was sold for only CAD76 million (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2011). The lawsuits against HudBay are proceeding despite the sale (Klippensteins, n.d.).

On 22 July 2013, Justice Carole J. Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice rejected three preliminary motions filed by HudBay and allowed the three cases to proceed to trial. We will come back to the discussion of this case below, in the section “The courts in Canada”.

The context for judicial decision making in Guatemala

The plaintiffs in the three El Estor cases have decided to pursue their claims against HudBay in Canadian courts rather than in Guatemala. There is good reason for Canadian courts to hear cases like these on their merits, given the context for judicial decision making in Guatemala. This section will outline the state of impunity in Guatemala, as expressed by international bodies, and will then provide an example of a case that made its way through the Guatemalan courts, to illustrate the difficulties faced by plaintiffs who wish to receive a fair trial in a claim against the interests of foreign mining companies.

According to a 2009 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Leandro Despouy, the Guatemalan justice system is afflicted by a general climate of impunity for violent crimes and human rights abuses:

the prevalence of impunity in Guatemala has a number of causes, the main ones being a variety of structural factors and the violence to which justice professionals are subjected [...]. The existing system is open to external interference and is highly politicised, and this has a negative impact on the independence of the judiciary. (United Nations 2009a, 1)

Similarly, the 2012 Human Rights Report on Guatemala prepared by the US Department of State asserts that the Guatemalan judicial system has failed to “ensure full and timely investigations and fair trials” and to “protect judicial sector officials, witnesses, and civil society representatives from intimidation” (US Department of State 2012, 1). It notes that judges, prosecutors, plaintiffs and witnesses “continued to report threats, intimidation, and surveillance” (US Department of State 2012, 7).

This situation has improved to some degree since the establishment of the UN-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG); however, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions cautions that “neither Guatemala nor the international community should fall into the trap of seeing CICIG as ‘the’ solution to Guatemala’s failing criminal justice system” (United Nations 2009b, 12) and the US Department of State report observes that “impunity continue[d] to be widespread” despite the efforts of the CICIG (US Department of State 2012, 1).⁸

As an illustration, we describe a case from Guatemala’s Constitutional Court in which the claimants were required to pursue an excessive number of judicial proceedings in order to obtain a remedy for a relatively simple problem involving formal title to communal property. The community of Agua Caliente Lote Nueve located near the Fenix project in El Estor complained that CGN was illegally exploring on its land and said that mining personnel moved boundary stones and made exploration holes, which affected the community’s water (Constitutional Court 2011).⁹ The community asked Fontierras¹⁰ to confirm that the community of Lote Nueve had title to its land. There was a problem with this request, and the resolution to this problem reveals much about the judicial system and its potential influences.

Under a land reform statute, communities were able to purchase land to hold under communal title. The community in this case began paying for the land in 1985 and was awarded provisional

title, conditional on completing the scheduled payments. They made the final payment on 18 July 2002. In 2004 the mine was being transferred from INCO to Skye Resources. On 2 July 2004, Fontierras informed the community that the registry book had been damaged in 1998 and that the pages of the registry that contained their title were missing. Fontierras told the community that they would have to go to court to obtain an order to replace the pages.

The same year, the community went to the Ninth Judge of the Civil Trial Court.¹¹ Their case was rejected because the judge held that the community had begun the wrong process for the remedy that they were seeking. The community then went to the Tenth Judge of the Civil Trial Court, but were rejected because the document certifying the legal status of the representative was illegible. The community returned to the Tenth Judge, who then found that there was no certification that the land claimed was the land that was referred to in the missing pages. In 2007, the community again appealed to Fontierras for assistance. They were rebuffed a second time, and told that they needed to obtain a judicial order. When the community returned to court, this time the Sixth Judge of the Civil Trial Court, their case was dismissed because the community had failed to provide proof that the missing pages referred to the land that they were claiming. The community returned to Fontierras to ask them to replace the pages, and they were told a third time that a court order was necessary. Finally, the community began a constitutional proceeding, arguing that their constitutional rights had been violated through the refusal of Fontierras to confirm their title.

The constitutional application was heard at the first level by the Court of Appeals on 15 February 2010. This was a year after HudBay started considering reactivating the mine and had been trying remove indigenous occupants from lands needed for the mine. The judge found that the community already had title confirmed on 17 February 2004 and that Fontierras had replaced the missing pages, pursuant to an order from the Fifth Judge of the Civil Trial Court on 20 December 2004. Consequently, there was no basis for the proceeding. The judge ordered costs against the community and fined the lawyer 1,000 quetzales (approximately CAD143) for bringing the proceeding. The history of Lote Nueve, as recounted by the judge of the Court of Appeals, is completely different from the story we have recounted above, in which Lote Nueve did not have the missing pages replaced and were being shunted back and forth between the courts and Fontierras. This is because the judge of the Court of Appeals based his decision on the documents from another community, Agua Caliente Sexan Lote Once.

The community of Lote Nueve appealed this decision, and was able to present its case to the Constitutional Court in 2010. Lawyers for Fontierras and for CGN intervened to ask the Constitutional Court to uphold a decision that was clearly based on mistaken documents. Fortunately for the community, the Constitutional Court found in their favour, and confirmed that the Court of Appeals had relied on mistaken documents. The Constitutional Court reviewed documents that confirmed that the provisional title had been awarded in 1985 and documents that confirmed that the final payment had been made in 2002. The judges of the Constitutional Court came to the conclusion that the only step remaining was the administrative act of confirming title. The Court then ordered that the missing pages be replaced, confirming community title to the land.

It was unnecessary, then, for land title to be thrown into limbo for seven years when the evidence that fulfilled the conditions for title was readily available. It is interesting that the missing pages were noticed at around the same time as exploration was taking place on the land in question and as the mine was being sold by INCO to Skye Resources. Without more facts, we do not know whether CGN played an active role in the circumstances surrounding Lote Nueve's title, but we do know that HudBay had an interest in the outcome of the hearing at the Constitutional Court, as lawyers for CGN intervened and argued that the community of Lote Nueve should not have their title confirmed. As of May 2013, two years after the Constitutional Court decision, the missing pages in the registry have not been replaced.

We do not argue that it is impossible to obtain a fair trial for a claim against the interests of a mining company within the Guatemalan justice system. Nevertheless, the barriers faced by plaintiffs who wish to sue mining companies in Guatemala are significant, and they are compounded by the difficulty in retaining a lawyer for cases such as these. The Lote Nueve case, for example, was supported by Leo Crippa, a lawyer for the Washington-based Indian Law Resource Centre.

A further problem exists in respect to the availability of remedies. A decision of a court in Guatemala against CGN alone will not reach the conduct of executives in Canada, or the assets of the Canadian parent. Even if a Guatemalan court were to make an order against the parent company, HudBay Minerals, enforcement would have to be transferred to a court in Canada, where further litigation could take place, challenging the original decision in Guatemala. This would further lengthen an already arduous process and render it prohibitively expensive.

Corporate social responsibility

If claimants such as those from El Estor are unable to obtain a fair trial in the Guatemalan courts, it might be suggested that corporate social responsibility (CSR) mechanisms adopted by mining companies can provide appropriate redress. We argue in this section that the voluntary nature of CSR and the lack of enforcement mechanisms make it an inadequate forum for resolving cases in which there are allegations of serious human rights abuses and significant factual discrepancies between the positions of the claimants and those of the company.

In recent years there has been an increasing interest in, and adoption of, CSR policies by the mining industry (Dashwood 2012; Sagebien and Lindsay 2011). The establishment of the United Nations' "Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights" framework ("Ruggie Principles") has provided further impetus to develop standards of behaviour that address a company's impact on the environment and local communities (United Nations 2011).

HudBay heavily promotes its commitment to CSR. Its website shows that it has internal policies on human rights, the environment, and business ethics. It has also adopted a number of external instruments, including the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, n.d.), the Global Reporting Initiative (Global Reporting Initiative, n.d.), and the "Toward Sustainable Mining" framework of the Mining Association of Canada (Mining Association of Canada 2011). Each year, HudBay publishes an attractive 50-page Corporate Social Responsibility Report, setting out its accomplishments (HudBay Minerals 2012).

We do not propose to describe and analyse each of these CSR policies, nor do we wish to suggest that HudBay is being disingenuous in adopting these standards. Rather, we wish to show that the policies will not serve as an adequate mechanism for addressing the issues raised by the Guatemalan plaintiffs.

The 2012 Corporate Social Responsibility Report lists four "avenues available to people who wish to register concern about HudBay's activities" (HudBay Minerals 2012, 13). The first two avenues provide phone numbers and a website to the Board or a Committee of the Board to register a concern. In the case of the Guatemalan plaintiffs, this avenue would not have been fruitful for serious criminal charges, as HudBay released a press release saying that its own investigations had shown that "a protestor died" but that company personnel were not involved; and that rapes did not take place (HudBay Minerals, n.d.). HudBay maintains this position despite the arrest of their head of security, Mynor Padilla, in 2012 for the murder of Adolfo Ich Chamán (Prensa Libre 2012). Given that HudBay had already publicly declared its own findings of fact, the plaintiffs would not expect to have a fair hearing from HudBay.

The third avenue of redress suggested by HudBay is the federal government's Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor. In 2009, Canada's federal government released a policy called "Building the Canadian Advantage: A CSR Strategy for the International Extractive Sector", which established the Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor. The CSR Counsellor does not have any significant powers. She can only act when there has been a complaint; a process can be instituted only with the agreement of the corporation; she cannot offer determinations as to whether harm has occurred; she cannot investigate the complaints; and she cannot issue binding recommendations to the corporations (Department of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). The limitations of the process are clearly illustrated in a complaint about labour practices that was lodged against a Canadian mining company, Excellon Resources Inc., in Mexico. The CSR Counsellor found that the Mexican workers were "eager to engage in a good faith dialogue", but Excellon unilaterally withdrew from the process after six months. This brought the process to an abrupt end (CSR Counsellor 2011). In fact, in all three of the cases in which the CSR Counsellor was ready to begin mediation, the process ended when the mining company decided to withdraw from the process. For the Guatemalan plaintiffs, the most that the CSR Counsellor could do would be to try to convene a meeting, but she would be powerless to require HudBay to participate. Even if HudBay agreed to participate, she would not be able to investigate what happened or provide compensation if there was wrongdoing.

The final mechanism suggested by HudBay is the National Contact Point of the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD). The OECD has developed Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which state that corporations should "respect the internationally recognised human rights of those affected by their activities" (OECD 2011, 19). In order to implement the Guidelines, the OECD Council created a system of National Contact Points (NCPs) in 2000; these are typically government officials in each of the member states. The role of the NCP is to facilitate inquiries and discussions between corporations and affected communities on all matters covered by the Guidelines. The NCP has some capacity to investigate complaints directly by seeking information from parties to the dispute and can attempt to mediate between the parties to come to a resolution. Neither the resolution nor the statement is binding on the corporation or enforceable by state governments. The NCP does have fact-finding powers, but these are not commonly used. The NCP does not have the power to award compensation. If there is no resolution, the NCP can review the evidence, consult experts, make a determination and issue a statement on the case (OECD 2011).

None of these mechanisms suggested by HudBay provide an effective method for investigating whether the allegations are true, for ascertaining responsibility, or for awarding penalties or redress. For this reason, we turn in the next section to the Canadian courts as the remaining potential avenue to fairly resolve the dispute between the plaintiffs from El Estor and HudBay.

The courts in Canada

Having a case decided in a Canadian court has the advantage of producing an enforceable decision. A judgment against the parent company, HudBay, could result in payments to the plaintiffs and could shed light on the conduct of the executives.

Judges in Canada have had several opportunities to address concerns about the activities of mining companies with operations abroad. They have articulated three principles that create barriers to bringing a case in Canada: lack of jurisdiction, *forum non conveniens* and lack of duty of care.¹²

We will discuss each of these principles in the context of a case against a transnational mining company and then explain how these principles play out in the lawsuits from El Estor.

Jurisdiction

On 8 November 2010, the Canadian Association Against Impunity brought a class action against Anvil Mining Ltd. in Quebec for the corporation's actions relating to a massacre in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Mining Watch 2010). Anvil Mining was headquartered in Perth, Australia, but opened a small office in Montreal in 2005. Its primary activity was the exploration of a mine located 55 kilometres from Kilwa in the DRC (*Association Canadienne Contre L'impunité (ACCI) c Anvil Mining Ltd.* 2011).

On 13 October 2004, a small group of approximately 10 armed individuals from neighbouring Zambia, claiming to act on behalf of the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Katanga, entered Kilwa. The government of the DRC ordered army officers to remove the men and to regain control of Kilwa. A UN mission in the DRC subsequently documented the army's human rights violations against the people of Kilwa perpetrated during the counterattack (Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2005). According to the mission's report, 73 civilians were killed and a large percentage of the population was displaced as they fled the counter-attack. Twenty-eight people were reported to have been summarily executed based on suspicions that they supported the insurgents.

The mission's report stated that Anvil provided support to the military during the events by providing its planes to transport troops to Kilwa and providing trucks, drivers, fuel and food rations to the army. It also stated that the managing director of Anvil Mining admitted in an interview with an Australian television station that the corporation provided logistics to the army.

The Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed the action on the basis that the Court had no jurisdiction. It found that at the time of the massacre there was no Anvil activity or office in Quebec and that, in any event, the dispute was not substantially connected to Anvil's work in Quebec. The Court did not apply the forum of necessity exception, which permits the Court to assume jurisdiction where there is a sufficient connection to the jurisdiction and proceedings could not possibly or reasonably be instituted outside Quebec (Civil Code of Quebec, article 3136). The Court found that the claim against Anvil could be heard in Australia, the corporate headquarters, and that victims could bring their case before the courts in the DRC, although attempts to try the cases in those jurisdictions before had been unsuccessful.

Anvil's overall revenue for the DRC rose from USD29 million in 2004 to almost USD69 million in 2005 (Anvil 2005).

Although in *ACCI c. Anvil Mining Ltd* the courts declined to exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate a tort that had been committed outside of Canada, in *Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation* Ontario courts considered the related issue of whether they should exercise jurisdiction to enforce a judgment that had been obtained outside Canada (*Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation* 2013).

The underlying dispute was between 47 plaintiffs – representing approximately 30,000 residents of Sucumbios province in Ecuador – and Chevron, an American corporation incorporated in Delaware. The plaintiffs alleged that Texaco, which subsequently merged with Chevron, severely polluted the Lago Agrio region of Ecuador during its activities between 1972 and 1990. The plaintiffs brought an action before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in 1993, which was eventually dismissed. As a condition of dismissal, Texaco committed to submit to the jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian court when a claim was brought in that jurisdiction.

On 11 February 2011, the trial court in Ecuador found that Chevron was liable for approximately USD18 billion. In 2013, the highest appellate court in Ecuador, the Court of Cassation, reduced the damages on appeal to USD9.51 billion.

Nevertheless, the plaintiffs have not been able to enforce the judgment. Chevron continues to contend that the trial judgment was obtained by fraud and corruption by the plaintiffs' counsel.

In 2011, a New York District Court granted Chevron a global anti-enforcement injunction, barring the enforcement of the judgment. This injunction was overturned on appeal (*Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation* 2013, C.A., paragraphs 5–13).

In 2012, the plaintiffs brought an action in Ontario, seeking recognition and enforcement of the judgment against the assets of Chevron and its Canadian subsidiary, Chevron Canada Limited (*Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation* 2013, Ont. Sup. Ct., paragraph 3). The defendants, Chevron and Chevron Canada, did not file statements of defence but instead challenged the jurisdiction of the court to enforce the judgment. In other words, Chevron argued that the Ecuadorians should be barred from the Ontario justice system. The Ontario Court of Appeal was clearly irritated by the position taken by Chevron. Mr Justice MacPherson pointed out the shifting positions taken by Chevron in various court proceedings:

For 20 years, Chevron has contested the legal proceedings of every court involved in this litigation – in the United States, Ecuador and Canada [...]. In these circumstances, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs should have an opportunity to attempt to enforce the Ecuadorian judgment in a court where Chevron will have to respond on the merits. (*Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation* 2013, C.A., paragraphs 69 and 70)

The Court of Appeal found that Ontario courts could hear the case and hear arguments from both sides about whether or not the Ecuadorian judgment could be enforced in Canada.

Chevron has since sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada (Supreme Court of Canada 2014) and has continued fighting the case in the USA. In March 2014, a US District Court Judge found that the plaintiffs' counsel had engaged in fraud and corruption in order to obtain the Ecuadorian judgment. Although the US decision does not bar the enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment in Canada, or in Brazil and Argentina (where the plaintiffs have also sought enforcement), it may cause the Ontario courts "to take a second look at the enforceability of the Ecuador judgment" if there was fraud (Krauss 2014). However, the finding of fraud could only be made if Chevron agrees to bring itself under the jurisdiction of the Ontario court to argue on the merits that the judgment should not be enforced against it. Thus Chevron appears to be in a difficult position. If it continues to argue that Ontario courts do not have jurisdiction to hear the case by the Ecuadorians, then it will not be able to argue in a Canadian court that the Ecuadorian judgment was fraudulent. If Chevron wishes to argue that the Ecuadorian judgment was fraudulent in a Canadian court, it will have to agree that the Ecuadorians also have the right to have their case heard in Canada.

Forum non conveniens

As noted above, even when a court accepts jurisdiction, the defendant company can assert that there is a more appropriate forum for the claim can be heard. In 1998, a class action was brought in Quebec against Canadian mining corporation Cambior Inc. by a group of 23,000 victims represented by a public interest group, Recherches Internationales Québec. The claim alleged that a failed tailings dam leaked 2.3 billion litres of liquid containing cyanide and heavy metals into the Esequibo River in Guyana on 19 August 1995. Justice Maughan, who was hearing the case, described the leak as one of the worst environmental disasters in gold mining history (*Recherches Internationales Québec v. Cambior Inc* 1998).

The action was dismissed without being heard on the merits. The Quebec Superior Court ruled that it had jurisdiction but applied the legal doctrine of *forum non conveniens* codified in Quebec's civil code. The Court based its decision on the fact that Guyana was the location of the spill, the location of many of the witnesses and victims, the location in which the damage was suffered and

that Guyanese law would apply to the incident. Furthermore, the Court noted that its decision not to hear the case did not deny the victims justice, since “Guyana’s judicial system would provide the victims with a fair and impartial hearing”. It rejected the claim that “the administration of justice is in such a state of disarray that it would constitute an injustice to the victims to have their case litigated in Guyana” (*Recherches Internationales Québec v. Cambior Inc.* 1998, paragraph 12). The victims did pursue their claim in Guyana’s courts, but due to failure to file an affidavit, in 2006 the action was struck by the High Court of the Supreme Court of Judicature of Guyana and the plaintiffs were ordered to pay the company’s legal costs (CNN Money 2006). Cambior continued to operate profitably until 2005, when the mine was exhausted (Ramraj, n.d.; Cambior 2004).

Duty of care

A component of establishing that a mining company is responsible for human rights abuses is the existence of a legal obligation to take reasonable care in the conduct of mining operations that could foreseeably harm the interests of the claimants. In Canada and in many other common law jurisdictions, duty of care is established when the court determines that: the harm suffered is “reasonably foreseeable” as a result of the defendant’s conduct; and there is a relationship of “proximity” between the defendant and the claimant, such that the defendant should be required to contemplate the claimant’s legitimate interests when acting (*Donoghue v. Stevenson* 1932).

In the context of transnational corporations, there are several obstacles to finding such a relationship. Owing to legal requirements of the country in which the mining is taking place or in order to avoid financial liability, a subsidiary of the parent corporation is often incorporated in the country of operations to conduct the extraction or production of the mineral resource. The subsidiary is in charge of day-to-day operations on the ground, which often include hiring and training employees, conducting exploration and maintaining the mine. Where third parties, such as private security companies hired by subsidiary corporations, commit violence, it may be difficult to impute their wrongdoing to the parent corporation. The difficulty in establishing duty of care was evidenced by the suit commenced in 2008 against two of the directors of Copper Mesa, a Canadian mining company in Ecuador, as well as the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX). The claimants, Ecuadorian *campesinos* from areas adjacent to Junin, where Copper Mesa attempted to carry out exploration activities, opposed the proposed mine (Klippensteins 2009, paragraphs 13–15). Prior to Copper Mesa being listed on the TSX, the mayor of the county informed the TSX of the opposition to the mine in the community and the likelihood of violence.

On 2 December 2006, a large group of armed security forces confronted members of the Junin community and sprayed pepper spray directly into the eyes of one of the claimants. The security forces then shot into the crowd, injuring another of the claimants. A representative of the community met with the Copper Mesa directors on 27 April 2007 to advise them of the confrontation and risk of violence. However, the violence continued. One of the plaintiffs was alleged to have received death threats in June 2007 and one month later was allegedly attacked by a mob led by affiliates of the corporation, who assaulted him with sticks and rocks before the police intervened (Klippensteins 2009).¹³

The Ontario Court of Appeal found insufficient evidence to hold the Copper Mesa directors personally liable, upholding the determination of the lower court that the directors did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs as there was no direct connection between acts or omissions of the directors and the harm caused to the plaintiffs. The Court held that the circumstances in which directors could be held personally liable for negligence for the acts of the corporation were limited and were not met in this case. The Court found that the defendants had only recently

become directors when the representative of the community advised them of the potential violence, and it was not claimed that the directors directly operated the Copper Mesa entities or authorised the violence, nor was it specified how the policies and practices of the corporation led to violence. The Court was not sympathetic to the argument that the directors had been informed and that silence from the directors in the face of the violence amounted to tacit approval of the violence against the plaintiffs (*Piedra v. Copper Mesa Mining Corporation* 2011).

In the HudBay case, the company did not contest the fact that Ontario courts had jurisdiction to hear the case. However, HudBay initially argued that the case should be heard in Guatemala based on *forum non conveniens*. They abruptly dropped this ground of objection shortly before a hearing on the matter (Klippensteins, n.d.). In the end, HudBay relied on the third ground: the lack of duty of care. In other words, even if the allegations of murder and rape by their security forces were true, HudBay would not be responsible because the parent did not have a duty of care to community members in Guatemala. Therefore, HudBay argued, there would be no purpose in having a trial.

The Ontario Superior Court rejected this argument, finding that it was not “plain and obvious” that the actions would not succeed. In doing so, the Court has acknowledged that parent companies may owe a duty of care to individuals in foreign countries to prevent harm caused by “security personnel at its foreign operations when there is direct control by the Canadian parent corporation” (*Choc v. HudBay* 2013, paragraph 73). The Court found that the plaintiffs have alleged facts which, if proven at trial, could establish the elements of foreseeability and proximity necessary to establish a duty of care. The Court stated that acts such as “requesting a forced eviction of a community using hundreds of security personnel” and “authorising the use of force in response to peaceful opposition from the local community” would make it reasonably foreseeable to HudBay/Skye that violence would result, including “raping the plaintiffs” and “killing Adolfo Ich and seriously injuring German Chub” (*Choc v. HudBay* 2013, paragraphs 63–64). The Court found that HudBay’s public commitment to maintaining a relationship with local communities is a factor in finding that a relationship of proximity may be established at trial.

Because this decision is the result of a preliminary proceeding only, the existence of a duty of care will have to be established at trial. However, it is important to note that HudBay has decided not to appeal this preliminary decision and the case will proceed to be tried on its merits.

Access to justice

A resolution of conflict between mining corporations and communities does not automatically require a judicial determination in the Canadian courts. In fact, some aspects of the El Estor cases make judicial resolution impractical. For example, threats of violence to potential plaintiffs and witnesses can prevent evidence from being brought forward, regardless of whether a case is heard in Canada or in the jurisdiction in which the alleged incidents occurred. There is also a significant difficulty when the plaintiffs have limited access to funds to retain counsel. Additionally, the present cases against HudBay will not resolve underlying political issues such as the decades-long dispute over land rights. Nevertheless, due to significant shortcomings of other dispute resolution mechanisms, a Canadian judicial determination on the merits may be the only practical way, at the present time, to resolve issues raised in the El Estor cases. The court system in Guatemala would likely not be reliable, as the judicial system in Guatemala appears “open to external interference and is highly politicised” (United Nations 2009a, 2), and the outcome of a judicial process could be influenced by mining interests. The Lote Nueve case, plagued by troubling administrative delays, indicates the significant barriers faced by mine-affected plaintiffs. In any event, a decision against a Guatemalan subsidiary may not effect the necessary change in the parent company’s practices, or be sufficient to impose the rule of law on Canadian executives.

CSR mechanisms are not adequate for resolving serious allegations of human rights abuses against Canadian mining companies. Mechanisms coordinated by the mining company are ineffective when the company disputes the basic facts alleged by the complainants. Mechanisms coordinated by a third party, such as the Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor or the National Contact Points of the OECD, are voluntary and not enforceable. Given the limitations of alternative mechanisms for resolving these disputes, there is a lack of adequate accountability measures with respect to Canadian mining companies with operations in other jurisdictions. We find it contradictory that profits can travel freely from Guatemala to Canada, while the Canadian beneficiaries are not held responsible for how that money is raised or for activities undertaken to produce the profits. Canadian courts do have the ability to fill the void. As demonstrated by the cases of Anvil Mining, Cambior, and Copper Mesa, legal obstacles such as jurisdiction, *forum non conveniens* and duty of care can prevent cases like these from being tried on their merits in Canada. However, *Choc v. HudBay* may represent an important change in course, at least with respect to duty of care.

As discussed above, the Ontario Superior Court has now acknowledged that parent companies may owe a duty of care to individuals in foreign countries to prevent harm caused by “security personnel at its foreign operations when there is direct control by the Canadian parent corporation” (*Choc v. HudBay* 2013, paragraph 73). If the trial court confirms this finding, individuals alleging injury caused by Canadian mining operations will have access to an enforceable mechanism of accountability. While the legal barriers mentioned above and other barriers such as the cost of litigation and availability of evidence will still exist, we may be at the beginning of a shift in judicial thinking on the relationship between Canadian transnational corporations and the individuals at the location of operations. Until such time as Guatemala’s judiciary is strengthened and is able to act, the Canadian courts may be the most viable forum.¹⁴

In a globalised world, encouraging ethical behaviour cannot be left to a single jurisdiction or a single institution. We hope that the time has come for Canadian courts to begin to participate in creating the mechanisms necessary to close the gap in corporate accountability.

A spokesperson for Chevron, referring to the Ecuadorian case, stated that “We’re going to fight this until hell freezes over. And then we’ll fight it out on the ice”, to which the Ontario Court of Appeal replied:

Chevron’s wish is granted. After all these years, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs deserve to have the recognition and enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment heard on the merits in an appropriate jurisdiction. At this juncture, Ontario is that jurisdiction. (*Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation* 2013, C.A., paragraphs 74 and 75)

In the words of retired Supreme Court of Canada judge Ian Binnie, “[a]pplying our law to situations outside of our territory is contrary to our custom; but there are acts that are so repugnant that they must force us to rethink our law” (Boisvert 2012).¹⁵

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Notes

1. See also North and Young (2013) and Keenan (2013).
2. This section is based in part on Imai, Mehranvar, and Sander (2007), section II.
3. At the time it was called International Nickel Company. It officially changed its name to INCO in 1976 (see McFarlane 1989).
4. Carlos Arana Osorio was elected as president in 1970, in what was referred to by McFarlane as a “fraudulent election”. Upon his election, Arana stated that he would, if necessary, “turn the country into a cemetery in order to pacify it” (McFarlane 1989, 130).
5. For example, Oliverio Castañeda de León, a member of the University Student Association, was machine-gunned to death in broad daylight in front of hundreds of witnesses, including police. The police did not attempt to chase or arrest the shooters (Gerardi 1998).
6. Note that the first evictions in November took place without a court order, which is required by Guatemalan law (Paley 2007).
7. HudBay Minerals has indicated that the Canadian dollar is the company’s functional currency. See Audited annual financial statements – English, HudBay Minerals, dated 19 February 2014. All references to dollar amounts in relation to HudBay Minerals, unless otherwise specified, refer to Canadian dollars.
8. The recent conviction at first instance of Ríos Montt, Guatemala’s former military leader, in Guatemalan Courts for genocide and crimes against humanity during the civil war represents an important step in Guatemala’s fight against impunity (UN News Center 2013a). However, the verdict was annulled by the Constitutional Court a few days later (UN News Center 2013b).
9. For photos of Lote 9 see University of Northern British Columbia (2008).
10. Fontierras or “Fondo de Tierras” is a state entity responsible for keeping a registry of land titles.
11. The courts of first instance, or trial courts, are referred to this way, so that the Ninth Judge of the Civil Trial Court refers to a judge at the Civil Trial level.
12. For a description of litigation in Canada and the Interamerican system, see North and Young (2013).
13. Much of the conflict in and around Junin between farmers, the security forces, and the mining community has been filmed by Malcolm Rogge in his documentary film, *Under Rich Earth* (see the website at http://underrichearth.ryecinema.com/?page_id=114).
14. There is significant support for legislation in Canada that would provide accountability for the activities of extractive industries in other countries, but attempts at a legislative solution have not been successful. For a full discussion, see Kamphuis (2012).
15. Author’s translation. Original: “Appliquer notre droit à des situations à l’extérieur de notre territoire est contraire à nos conceptions; mais il y a des actes tellement répugnants qu’ils doivent nous forcer à revoir nos conceptions du droit. Au XVIIIe siècle, la piraterie posait une telle menace qu’on pouvait juger les pirates sans égard au lieu de leurs crimes”.

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Utilising drama to promote gender equity and social justice in The Gambia: outcomes from a peer health and a community policing project

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ABSTRACT Gambian society adheres to a “culture of silence” that leaves a number of social justice-related concerns, disproportionately impacting women and girls, unaddressed. This article focuses on the utilisation of drama troupes to shine light on a variety of taboo-laden social justice concerns in peer health and community-based policing initiatives. A culturally sensitive, relevant approach underscored successful outcomes in peer health, but initial gains in the policing project were lost because the government considered the topics subversive. The potential and limitations of using grassroots level dramatic presentations to effect attitudinal and behavioural change to advance social justice in sub-Saharan Africa are discussed.

RÉSUMÉ La « culture du silence » à laquelle adhère la société gambienne a pour conséquence une négligence des problèmes de justice sociale qui affectent tout particulièrement les femmes et les filles. Cet article s'intéresse à l'intervention de troupes de théâtre pour faire de la sensibilisation à divers problèmes tabous de justice sociale, dans le cadre d'initiatives d'éducation sanitaire par les pairs et de police communautaire. L'approche, culturellement sensible, a obtenu des résultats positifs en matière de santé par les pairs, mais le succès initial du projet de police communautaire s'est buté à l'objection du gouvernement qui jugeait les sujets traités subversifs. L'article développe le potentiel et les limites du théâtre communautaire pour induire des changements d'attitudes et de comportements et faire progresser la justice sociale en Afrique subsaharienne.

Keywords: community-based policing; gender equity; social justice; drama; health promotion

Introduction

Much of sub-Saharan Africa is characterised by a “culture of silence” regarding certain taboo topics, including gender violence (LeClerc 2000), family dynamics and anything involving sex and reproductive health (Wight et al. 2006). Beyond what can be said are prohibitions about who can say it; rigid observance of social hierarchies leaves women with less voice than men and with young people the expectation to hold their tongues in the presence of elders (Perrott 2009; Wight et al. 2006). These “no go” areas and the silencing of certain segments of society constitute a major impediment to curbing domestic violence (Amoakohene 2004; Kedir and Admasachew 2010), identifying child sexual abuse (Bijnsdorp and Montgomery 2003) and preventing HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections (STIs) (Duffy 2004; LeClerc 2000; Van der Heijden and Swartz 2010). Furthermore, this culture of silence, along with objections to perceived Western ethnocentrism, render it difficult to shed light on certain “traditional practices”,

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such as the taking of child brides (Amber 2008), wife inheritance (Amoakohene 2004) and female genital mutilation (FGM) (Morison et al. 2001; Wakabi 2007).

As in the West, restricting sex-related discourse does little to restrict youth from risky sexual activity; more likely, it exacerbates problems insofar as it allows for myth and misinformation to grow. Also, as in the West, African youth face a plethora of conflicting messages about sex, some quite permissive and others very restrictive (Wight et al. 2006). One South African high school girl aptly captures this conundrum in noting that “sex is not something we talk about, it’s something we do” (Francis, 2010, 228–236).

In a related but different vein, most regimes across Africa have little tolerance for criticism directed at the government or its agencies (see, for example, Houngnikpo 2006). What is considered minor criticism and fair commentary in “real” democracies can easily be construed as sedition, leading to imprisonment or worse in many African nations. The practice of singing the praises of the ruling party is normative, regardless of one’s true affiliations, and offering negative commentary about the government is widely understood to be out of bounds. After certain gains in the 1990s, the last decade has seen freedom of expression diminish on much of the continent across and below the Sahel (Callamard 2010). Therefore, political discourse, much like sex talk or discussion of family-related matters, is also characterised by a culture of silence.

The Gambia, a small West African nation, is no exception. Here, a culture of silence exists in relation to family and reproduction-related matters (Bijnsdorp and Montgomery 2003; Walraven et al. 2001), especially for young people (Miles et al. 2001; Paine et al. 2002). The Gambia’s President, Yahya Jammeh, “The Despot from Kanilai” (Kandeh 2004, 179), has also ensured that a culture of silence exists with regard to political expression. His seizure of power in a 1994 coup was accompanied by predictable promises of democracy and transparency following a transitional period of military rule (Ceasay 2006). Instead, he has become increasingly authoritarian and intolerant of dissent across the opening years of this millennium (Saine 2008, 2009). According to Freedom House (2013), The Gambia is now a nation that is “not free” (having been “partly free” in the early 2000s), is seen as repressive even by African standards, and has experienced the third most precipitous decline in political freedoms and civil liberties in the world between 2008 and 2012.

Purpose

This article focuses on how drama troupe presentations were used in The Gambia to challenge both of these “cultures of silence” in separate development initiatives sponsored by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The first, Peer Health Education in The Gambia, which ran from 2001 to 2004, contracted the author as official project evaluator for CIDA (see Devanney 2007; Perrott 2004; Perrott and Corr 2002). The program was managed by the Nova Scotia Gambia Association (NSGA), a longstanding educationally-focused NGO. Community-based policing in The Gambia ran from 2004 to 2010, until being terminated about six months earlier than scheduled due to a lack of support from the senior management of the Gambia Police Force (GPF) (Perrott 2009, 2012, 2013). This community-based policing (CBP) project was managed by Mount Saint Vincent University, of Halifax, Nova Scotia, with consulting support from NSGA. The author was project director.

In addition to the scholarly sources cited, the author draws upon anecdotal evidence from his experience with both of these projects across nearly a decade, bearing first-hand witness to the culture of silence reported here. For example, that male teachers often have exploitative sexual relations with female students was widely understood to be the case in The Gambia, but simply not openly discussed (see Gallant and Maticka-Tyndale 2004, on the South African

situation). Furthermore, the author became acquainted with the growing authoritarianism of the Jammeh government and the widespread self-censorship of even the most minor of criticisms.

Drama as interloper of culture of silence

Community street theatre (and dramatic variants) is frequently used across the developing world, including in South America (Boal 2006), south Asia (McGill and Joseph 1996; Valente and Bharath 1999), southern Africa (Francis 2010; Kim et al. 2001; Mwansa 1990), East Africa (Quigleya et al. 2004) and West Africa (Bosompra 2007), as a means of promoting social justice and reducing health risks. The professional drama troupes engaged in both projects discussed here were comprised of recent Gambian high school graduates, most of whom had commenced their training under the tutelage of the NSGA while still in public school. The audiences to whom the skits are directed appear not to allow the drama troupe members to speak on their own behalf, which would be clearly offensive and out of bounds, but they are rather actors fulfilling the dictates of the role to which they have been assigned. As such, the troupes were accepted and proved persuasive to same-age peers, school teachers, adults in various public forums and even to village elders.

The audiences, it seemed, took in the new knowledge being made available and were able to process the social dilemmas being presented in a non-defensive way. After observing many hours of presentations, the author surmised that, although audience members were seeing the dramatisation of problems with which they were already aware, they were being challenged in terms never before encountered. It was also clear that much of the basic health knowledge being presented was novel information for the adult audience members (perhaps not as well informed as their school-aged children).

NSGA's program, using drama troupe presentations as a central pillar of communication, has been widely recognised, has been embraced by UNESCO, and has been exported to Sierra Leone and Malawi (Devanney 2007). Because of its demonstrated efficacy, the author's familiarity, and the established relationship with NSGA, it was decided that the model would be used to present dramas within the CBP project and that NSGA would be contracted to deliver this component. As was the case in taking on sensitive topics involving sexual health, the drama troupes could introduce taboo topics related to the behaviour of the police (and by extension, of the state) from the perspective of a detached intermediary entity. The hope was that the community and the police officers on hand could then enter into discussions that were stimulated without any adversarial, defense-provoking assertions having been made. One of NSGA's professional troupes was reassigned to the policing project and received training on the issues germane to policing in The Gambia.

Drama in action

Peer health education program

Each of the upper basic/basic cycle (Grades 7, 8 and 9) and senior secondary (Grades 10, 11 and 12) schools in which the program was introduced developed their own in-school drama troupes under the tutelage of one of NSGA's professional troupes. The professional troupes performed in a variety of venues: public schools nationwide, marketplaces (for example, Farafenni, Wassau, and Sare Bojo), on the street in urban Banjul and Serrekunda, at military barracks and at the Banjul ferry terminal. For a time, drama troupe activities and the larger peer health program were also promoted in a Sierra Leonean refugee camp near Basse Santa Su. The professional drama troupes in both projects typically worked full days while on the road, training others, working as one component of a larger project team and sometimes working as the sole agent of program delivery.

A day in the rural north bank villages of Albreda, Juffureh, and Mbanta (in the Niuni region) is relatively representative of professional drama troupe activities. The first stop was Albreda Upper Basic School, to assist with monitoring and coaching the school's in-house troupe. In the evening, the regional peer health coordinator and professional troupe headed to Mbanta, a remote Wolof village. Given cultural mores, and especially the sensitive nature of what was to be presented, it was necessary to brief and acquire the permission of the Alkalo (the hereditary village chief) in consultation with the village elders. The writer and regional coordinator were welcomed into the Alkalo's home, where they were soon joined by a group of elders, as well as a group of influential village women.

After the coordinator provided an overview of what he proposed should happen that evening, an animated debate took place amongst the elders. The sticking point, it turned out, was that condom use would be coming up during the presentation. The concern was that this would contravene Islamic teachings and encourage youth to engage in premarital sex. Throughout the debate, the Alkalo sat quietly until he had heard enough. He then pointed out that the troupe was not encouraging premarital sex; rather, the focus would be on abstinence as the preferred option. He then went on to decry the slipping morals of Gambian youth, but concluded that a history of ordering youth to abstain from sex had done little to curb it. He noted that it was unfortunate that youth needed to learn to protect themselves from a killer disease by using condoms, but that this was preferable to them dying from the disease. He decided that the drama troupe presentations should proceed, and with this proclamation the debate ended.

A key to effectiveness was that the dramas presented were not static, but modified to time, locale and context. Indeed, the drama troupes often practised developing strategies on an impromptu basis and taught the school-based groups under their tutelage to do the same. At the same time, certain scenarios or themes tended to play out time after time. For example, one skit designed to challenge the stigmatisation of those infected with HIV and to redirect attributions of blame featured a polygamous household in which the husband, a truck driver, availed himself of the services of prostitutes while on the road. The skit outlined how he had contracted HIV and then transmitted the infection to his youngest wife; the other wives, in turn, defaulted to blaming and shunning her for bringing trouble to the family. Other topics frequently presented included, for example, wife inheritance, resisting the "sugar daddies" who prey on teenage girls and ways in which girls can effectively say no to their boyfriends' "but if you loved me" pleas for sex.

Community-based policing

Other than for a change in specific topics, the approach for drama troupe presentations in the CBP program was the same as used for the peer health program. Topics for dramatisation included bullying, police corruption, spousal battering, citizen rights under the law, drug abuse in the schools, drug trafficking and problematic police-citizen interactions. Delivery was country-wide from Banjul to Basse, including to the Police Intervention Unit (PIU) from Fatoto, the last village at the eastern end of the river. (The PIU is the paramilitary wing of the GPF, which, in conjunction with Gambian soldiers, was heavily implicated in the shooting and killing of 13 students on 10 April 2000; see Jawara 2009.) Presentations were also delivered at the Banjul ferry terminal, at police open houses, and in the public schools.

A session that occurred before an assembly of the entire student body at Muslim High School is representative of the afternoon-long, fully integrated outreach sessions. Attending this session was Superintendent Aziz Bojang (GPF project lead) and several lower ranking officers, several members of Youth Crime Watch of The Gambia (a local youth group with whom we partnered) and the CBP-dedicated professional drama troupe. After initial greetings, the president of Youth

Crime Watch introduced the rationale for his organisation and lobbied to start up a chapter at Muslim High. He also worked to generate ideas for police–student collaborations. After this, the drama troupe went into action and played out a scenario in which a driver bribed a police officer at a traffic stop.

That a skit like this would be acted out in front of a high ranking member of the GPF surprised and initially stunned the audience, but it was not long before tentative questions and comments were directed to Supt. Bojang. The audience was surprised again when Supt. Bojang acknowledged that bribe taking was a significant and widespread problem about which all present, police officers and students, were aware. Once the students determined that the police commander was going to be honest and non-defensive about the problem, the assembly broke into animated discussion about past incidents of police corruption that had caused offense.

Drama as subversion

Drama has often been used to effect social change, the most fully articulated model being Augusto Boal's Theater of the Oppressed (see Boal 2006). To the extent the projects discussed here were designed to empower and effect social change, the use of drama could be considered a subversive act. However, although the Canadian partners were aware that the depictions could easily strike as culturally offensive, they did not conceive of project-related activities being subversive in any way. Quite the opposite was true insofar as they were attempting to enhance the nature of civil society in The Gambia, in part by strengthening the nation's educational and criminal justice institutions. They could not have anticipated just how contradictory to one of the President's initiatives (in the case of peer health) or just how subversive government authorities would consider drama troupe activities (in the case of the policing project) to be.

The biggest threat to drama troupe activity did not come from concerns about the appropriateness of the materials on cultural or religious grounds, but rather from the President's unpredictable and eccentric antics. In 2007, President Jammeh announced that he had developed his own herbal remedy to cure HIV/AIDS and enlisted government machinery, including his Secretary of State for Health, a physician, to proclaim the veracity of such claims (BBC News 2007a). His assertions obviously contravened the AIDS prevention messages promoted by various government organisations (GOs) and non-government organisations (NGOs) to that point (and made mockery of the millions of dollars spent doing so). When the United Nations' envoy to The Gambia questioned whether the government, in the absence of scientific evidence, should make claims of a cure, she found herself summarily expelled from the country (BBC News 2007b). The peer health drama troupes, having successfully traversed various cultural and religious sensitivities for years with the government's blessing, now faced the challenge of going into public interactions knowing that the President's "cure" stood in direct opposition to the educational information they were presenting during their skits.

The subversive threat of the drama troupe presentations ran much closer to the surface in the CBP project, at least insofar as GPF managers were concerned. Initially, Supt. Bojang was nervous about what the troupe might present in public as part of a GPF initiative and any negative repercussions for which he surely would have been held responsible. His concern was somewhat assuaged by assurances from the author that the troupe was not representing the GPF and that he need not feel responsible for what was presented (an argument that he, not surprisingly, found only moderately reassuring in this increasingly authoritarian state). He was ultimately won over by the way the general public and some moderately well-placed public officials received the outreach sessions. It appeared that his acknowledgement of real faults in the behaviour of the police in conjunction with the two or three skits, on often controversial topics, was enhancing the esteem by which the GPF was being held in the eyes of the public.

It is worth recalling, at this juncture, that President Jammeh's rule relies heavily on a steady diet of propaganda focused on his inherent goodness and the legitimacy of his security forces. The daily newspaper controlled by the main government sings his praises on a daily basis and even mild critical commentary by independent papers invites harassment or worse from the security forces (Chaudhry 2009). The GPF itself, obsessed with pomp and circumstance, has always assumed a superficial official position emphasising the importance of maintaining order and adhering to the rule of law (Perrott 2009). In reality, the police ranks are largely inept, poorly disciplined, rife with corruption, driven by nepotism and beholden to the whims of the President. The public is, of course, aware of the reality.

In this context, that the drama troupe would openly present a scenario in which a police officer "shakes down" a motorist for a bribe came as a breath of fresh air. Additionally, the scenarios were carefully constructed so as not to point fingers in any single direction (thereby avoiding progress-hindering defensiveness) and to promote the partnership-focused solutions central to the tenets of CBP. With the traffic stop situation, the problem did not lie solely in the hands of the officer in soliciting the bribe but also with the motorist in being so willing to pay it. The openness and transparency with which skits were presented (and subsequently discussed) seemed to convey that the police force and the government were really committed to reform and to making CBP work.

The warmth with which the public received the outreach sessions was undoubtedly aided by the unbridled enthusiasm of those on the outreach team, including the drama troupe and Supt. Bojang. For the first two years of the initiative, a significant component of which were the community outreach sessions, the project went ahead with greater than expected successes. The Canadian and Gambian team members, including Supt. Bojang and many of his subordinates, had come to believe in the power of the project not only to reform the GPF but also to have a broader positive impact across all sectors of Gambian society. In retrospect, with the subsequent decay and demise of the initiative known, this enthusiasm might seem naïve. If so, it was a naïvety shared by Westerners who had considerable experience in The Gambia, many Gambians and Supt. Bojang, who himself had over 20 years of experience on the police force, beginning at the rank of constable.

At around mid-project, Supt. Bojang's superiors began to marginalise him, and as he became increasingly alienated from project activities so too was the professional drama troupe. Although there were a variety of reasons why senior managers worked to derail the project (while continuing to pledge support), the most central, as argued elsewhere (Perrott 2012, 2013), is that the project was achieving too much success in promoting democratic policing. Despite claims to the contrary, the project, and especially the drama troupe, were considered subversive. Senior GPF commanders began to hobble the troupe's activities with numerous conditions for, and restrictions on, performances.

Ultimately, Supt. Bojang was deployed to the Sudan and control of the drama troupe fell to a number of GPF commanders parachuted in to manage the project despite having little previous exposure to the project or to CBP more generally. Community outreach sessions quickly morphed into political rallies in which senior police officers and politically-selected attendees met to sing the praises of the President under the guise of advancing CBP. To return to the previous example, a skit about a police officer taking a bribe from a motorist had become out of bounds. Why? Because corruption was against the official policy of the GPF and the Gambian Government and, therefore, did not exist.

When the troupe did perform it was under the direction of these rather ignorant and politically-motivated officers, who often failed to show up for prearranged sessions. And, although the drama troupe did not represent the GPF, these officers saw fit to prohibit the actors from making any presentations whatsoever that were not being supervised and censored. What had been seen as

a genuine attempt by the GPF to mend fences and enhance police–community relations had reverted to a politically-guided and cynical public relations exercise.

As time passed, it became clear that the police “no-shows” and last-minute cancellations of sessions represented a covert effort to block progress, though other political considerations meant that the GPF’s official position remained one of providing support. (Police management, answering to Secretary of State Ousman Sonko, now showed similar patterns of obstruction in other project components, including in their relationship with Gambia College, where a collaborative certificate program was being developed; Perrott 2012, 2013.) After providing for many concessions and allowing many opportunities to get back on track, the reality that GPF senior management and the Secretary of State for the Interior were working to derail the initiative became irrefutable and the project was terminated.

Under which conditions can drama troupe activities work?

Sustainable change is always the goal of development initiatives, but notoriously difficult to measure. In the case of these two projects it can be concluded, at least in general terms, that one was a success and the other a failure. It seems that sustainable change did not occur in the CBP project given that it was terminated; even the short-term gains in police–community relations were likely lost when the GPF failed to follow through on its promises. By way of comparison, drama troupe activity in the peer health program did contribute to lasting positive change (Perrott 2004; Perrott and Corr 2004) and the program continues to be delivered, albeit in modified form, today (see www.novascotiagambia.ca). What worked in the peer health program seemed also to work in the CBP project; this is discussed directly below. What did not work in the CBP project would not have worked in the peer health program either, and this is discussed in the concluding section of this article.

First, in the peer health program it was important to choose just which “battles” would be taken on by the drama troupes in order to preserve the most gains across the widest set of domains possible. Female genital mutilation was a notable example of a health issue mostly left alone. It is a sensitive topic across Gambian society, and President Jammeh himself has sent contradictory messages about his position on the practice, once warning that he was not responsible for ensuring the safety of anyone who chose to criticise the practice (Dougan-Beaca and Suma 2011). Consequently, although certain health-related concerns about FGM were raised in some of the more traditional workshop settings, FGM as a cultural practice was not dealt with by the drama troupes for fear that it would cause offense and derail the gains being made in other areas.

This example relates more broadly to the necessity of being as respectful as possible of Gambian culture. Judgmental, “preachy”, ethnocentric messages, perceived as being imposed by Westerners, would surely have been poorly received and counterproductive. That there was a basic need to demonstrate respect for Gambian culture and protocols was a basic premise of all activity; an example of this principal in action was the visit to the compound of Mbanta’s Alkalo outlined earlier. Similar introductions and protocol were observed with school administrators and teachers and, where appropriate, local Imams.

Most importantly, the peer health program was very much a Gambian, as opposed to Canadian, administered program; this was especially the case at the level of community/school outreach and drama troupe activity. As the project evolved, Western consultants moved increasingly to the administrative periphery of the project, encouraging Gambian ownership in the delivery, and reception, of project content. This meant that project activities were carried out in indigenous languages, that Gambians interacting with Gambians could catch cultural nuances that Westerners would miss and that the face of the project was Gambian.

Building civil society without government involvement?

So, just what differentiated the success of the drama troupes in the peer health program from the failure of the troupe working on the CBP project? Simply stated, it was the greater degree of government involvement in the CBP program that led to the troupe's demise. There are two basic problems when bringing any sort of development initiative to the Gambian Government. First, the Gambian civil service, although always troubled by nepotism and corruption (Hughes and Perfect 2006), once functioned relatively well by regional standards but has grown increasingly incompetent during Jammeh's tenure. Furthermore, Jammeh's infamous "electric broom" policy (*Freedom Newspaper*, October 14, 2007), in which appointees can find themselves in positions of power one day and sacked or even imprisoned the next, has led to gossip, fear, and paranoia such that even competent civil servants need to expend more energy protecting themselves than running the country. This is why it is likely that the manner in which the CBP project was blocked did not come to the President's attention; rather, senior GPF managers probably spent an inordinate amount of time trying to judge what the President might want, or, conversely, what might offend him. They could, of course, be completely wrong in these judgments.

The second problem is that the sorts of initiatives favoured by Western donors typically include elements of democratic or human rights reform and almost always require efforts to promote gender equity. Gambian politicians and senior civil servants have become adept at engaging in "democratic talk", but little of this translates into a "democratic walk". Indeed, and as discussed elsewhere (Perrott 2013), movements towards democracy are antithetical to a regime that is growing increasingly dictatorial. Although the entire thrust of the CBP initiative was contrary to the political direction in which The Gambia is heading, the drama troupe's activities would have been considered particularly subversive because of how transparently controversial and sensitive topics were broached and because of the very public fora in which the troupe conducted its activities.

The author had many informal discussions over a dozen years with those who work for successful NGOs or who are involved in profitable areas of the private sector in The Gambia. Although there are varying reasons for success, there is one common condition that must be maintained before anything useful can be accomplished on a sustainable basis: *one must stay under the government's radar*. Of course, if the government's ire is aroused at the outset, any initiative will be sunk in short order. As such, it is imperative that one obtain the requisite permits, licenses or Memoranda of Understanding before beginning. However, there is little benefit in currying particular favour, as the initiative will then be more salient in the consciousness of government actors and more likely to draw negative attention as favour is lost (it almost always is). The best strategy is to follow the rules but to otherwise remain as invisible as possible.

The peer health professional drama troupes, and their school-based protégées, were able to act in a relatively invisible way. Outside of yearly national drama competitions, to which the Minister of Education is invited, most day-to-day troupe activity is conducted without the attention of senior civil servants and politicians. Although the peer health program has enjoyed capacity-building success and served to enhance the education institution as a whole, it does so through the efforts of bright, committed young Gambians, largely independent of the institution's functionaries.

The CBP drama troupe could not prosper precisely because it could not stay under the radar of senior police managers and an obstructive secretary of state. This had little to do with how the troupe members acquitted themselves or even in how they were utilised within the project. Rather, it was the very nature of the project, requiring ongoing contact with incompetent and politically-driven officials, which ensured that the drama troupe's message would be considered subversive and unacceptable. Of course, this was also true of the other project components, but it was the drama troupe that had the most public face.

Western donor nations must either change priorities or become more selective and strategic in how they approach development initiatives in countries like The Gambia, in which democracy is headed in the wrong direction. Anything even remotely suggestive of being at odds with a regime's sole mission to stay in power will be doomed to failure if real project progress comes to the attention of those in power (or, worse, the initiative may be coopted to turn democratic tenets "upside down"; Perrott 2013). Any initiative focused on democratic or social justice-related change must do so with the intent of changing the system from outside the system. With this basic, but difficult to achieve, requirement in mind, drama troupe activities may prove to be especially subversive and especially effective!

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Biographical note

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Economic growth without transformation: the case of Uganda

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ABSTRACT This paper argues that Uganda's economic development has been characterised by structural change in production without structural change in employment. This poses dangers to continued growth. Although labour is increasingly abundant, low productivity in agriculture, it is argued, makes labour expensive. This is due to policy failure – lack of investment in agriculture – and ultimately to the evolution of patron–client politics in Uganda. Rapid agricultural growth is required in order to permit labour-intensive growth in manufacturing.

RÉSUMÉ Cet article soutient que le développement économique de l'Ouganda est caractérisé par un changement structurel dans la production, sans changement structurel dans l'emploi, ce qui menace la poursuite de la croissance économique. Même si la main d'œuvre est de plus en plus abondante, la faible productivité en agriculture contribue à augmenter les coûts de main-d'œuvre. Cela est dû à l'échec des politiques, soit le manque d'investissement en agriculture, et, en dernier ressort, à l'évolution de la politique ougandaise des relations patron–client. La croissance rapide du secteur agricole est un préalable nécessaire au développement d'un secteur manufacturier à forte intensité de main d'œuvre.

Keywords: agricultural productivity; structural change; dualistic model; Uganda; patron–client politics

For decades sub-Saharan Africa has suffered political unrest and economic stagnation. This was not always the case: in the 1950s and 1960s many newly independent African nations experienced relatively rapid growth in GDP and GDP per capita. Beginning in the 1990s, much of Africa has witnessed a turnaround, both politically and economically, with political stability returning to many nations and rapid economic growth beginning again.

Uganda is an example of a sub-Saharan African nation that has experienced an economic renaissance. In fact, Uganda has experienced more than two decades of relatively rapid economic growth. From 1990 to 2001 this growth averaged 6.9 per cent per annum, while from 2001 to 2011 the growth rate rose to 7.8 per cent per annum, although in 2010 and 2011 these growth rates dipped to 5.9 per cent and 6.7 per cent, respectively. The share of agricultural production in total output declined from 52.2 per cent in 1991 to 23.4 per cent in 2011. Uganda became increasingly involved in trade, with the share of exports in GDP rising from 7.5 per cent in 1991 to 23.79 per cent in 2011 (World Bank 2013). As a result, poverty in Uganda (as measured by the proportion of the population below the national poverty line) declined from 56 per cent in 1991 to 25 per cent in 2010 (Ssewanyana, Matovu, and Twimukye 2011).

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This indeed represents dramatic progress for Uganda, especially after the dismal conditions that existed in the 1970s and 1980s. There are, however, some anomalies in the economic experience of Uganda. The most striking anomaly involves the process of structural change. Generally, rapid economic growth is accompanied by a decline in the share of agricultural production and an increase in the share of manufacturing in GDP. As pointed out in the previous paragraph, agriculture's share in production has indeed declined relative to manufacturing. With respect to manufacturing, the share only rose from 5.7 per cent in 1990 to 8.7 per cent in 1999, and has remained stagnant since. This is not a dramatic change over the share of manufacturing in 1960, 8.5 per cent (Kjaer and Katusiimeh 2012). As agriculture has declined, it is the service sector that has increased its relative size in terms of production.

Structural change in employment also generally accompanies rapid economic growth, with the employment share in agriculture declining but that of manufacturing increasing. The astonishing fact is that "73% of the population is estimated still to be working in low productivity agriculture" (Kjaer and Katusiimeh 2012). Moreover, this proportion has increased since 2002/2003, when it was approximately 63 per cent (Mukwaya et al. 2012). With such a large portion employed in agriculture compared to a declining proportion of GDP produced by agriculture, the implication is that productivity in the agricultural sector is very low. This is borne out by the predominance of small farms utilising low levels of fertiliser and limited use of high yielding seed varieties. Given these characteristics, it should not be surprising that population growth in Uganda remains quite high, at 3.2 per cent per annum. Thus if growth in GDP averages 7 per cent, a large proportion of this is offset by an increasingly large population (World Bank 2013).

The peculiarities of structural change in Uganda are accompanied by the fact that gross domestic savings remains low, at 13.8 per cent of GDP (World Bank 2013). In addition, manufacturing does not make up a large share of exports, primary products still dominate. Foreign aid is very important for the Ugandan economy, constituting approximately 12 per cent of GDP (Kjaer and Katusiimeh 2012). Finally, the distribution of income seems to be worsening through time. The Gini coefficient for 1992/1993 was 0.365 and this rose to 0.426 by 2009/2010. Thus in Uganda it would seem that there is economic growth without transformation. What accounts for this type of economic development? This paper uses a simple dual economy perspective to address the question of the large share of employment in agriculture. It will be argued that even though the population is growing rapidly, labour in Uganda is not cheap. What accounts for the expensive cost of labour? It will be argued that the low productivity of agriculture makes labour expensive. The low productivity in agriculture is due to policy failure and a lack of investment in agriculture. The latter, in turn, is the result of the evolution of patron-client politics in Uganda.

The paper unfolds as follows. The first section will briefly review political and economic developments in Uganda post-independence. The next will develop the dualistic theoretical perspective utilised throughout the paper. In the third section, the role of patron-client politics is examined. The summary and conclusion address the sustainability of growth in Uganda and the threat inequality presents to the government's legitimacy.

Uganda's experience

After independence Uganda embarked upon a state-centred, import substitution strategy of economic development. Tariffs and quotas were used to protect domestic production activities. The government required 60 per cent public ownership in almost all private sector ventures. Marketing boards were formed to control the marketing of export crops and export taxes were utilised to add to government revenue. The currency was overvalued and exchange rate rationing occurred. In

1970 many foreign firms were nationalised. These policies brought rapid economic decline and political instability (Matthews, Claquin, and Opolot 2009).

In 1971 Idi Amin took power and expelled 50,000 Asian people and confiscated their assets. The government heavily taxed exports through direct taxes, the activities of marketing boards, and currency overvaluation. This led to increased political instability and economic decline. By the end of the decade income per capita had declined by 40 per cent.

Idi Amin was overthrown and a period of further political instability occurred. In 1986 Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power. Initially, the new government sought to continue a policy of import substitution and revalued the currency. The budget remained in deficit, due to the inability to collect tax revenue. Inflation rose to over 200 per cent between 1985 and 1987 (Matthews, Claquin, and Opolot 2009).

In 1987 the NRM was forced to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for aid. In return, the new government was required to engage in a number of reforms. Some of these reforms were aimed at reducing government expenditures as well as enhancing the government's ability to collect tax revenue. The latter involved the creation of the Uganda Revenue Authority as a semi-autonomous institution mandated to collect revenue and administer the tax system. Currency devaluation and the unification of exchange rate markets were aimed at eliminating the anti-export bias that had developed in previous political administrations. Export taxes were removed to further enhance primary product exports (coffee and tea). Tariff reform was also pursued, such that, by the late 1990s, Uganda's average tariff fell to less than 10 per cent. Quantitative restrictions were also slowly dismantled. Privatisation was aimed at reducing state control over the economy (Jaimovich and Kamuganga 2010).

In addition, there were reforms of a more political nature. The public sector was cut from 320,000 employees to 160,000 during the early 1990s. There was an emphasis on decentralising political power. Resources and functions were shifted to the district level and local elections were held for sub-county and district councils. In addition, the size of the army was dramatically reduced. Eventually, multi-party elections were held at the national level (Kjaer and Katusiimeh 2012). These reforms were undertaken within a historical context of patron–client politics, which had dominated much of Ugandan post-independence politics. This type of politics is personalistic and hierarchical in nature. The political elite, using their control over the state (and the economy), seek to reward their political supporters and punish their foes. Thus a ruling coalition can be constructed and maintained.

The key characteristic of patron–client political systems is the creation of a situation in which discrimination in the provision of benefits can be practised. For example, tariffs are used to protect those firms that provide political support for the ruling elite. Exchange rate regulations are used to direct scarce foreign exchange to political supporters. Marketing boards are often used to extract resources from the agricultural sector or to direct food to those who provide political support.

The typical package of import substitution policies utilised by many states thus provides the mechanism through which the ruling elite (patrons) exercise authority over their clients. The reforms carried out as a result of consultation between the political elite and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund eliminated many of these mechanisms for allocating benefits and would thus seem to have undermined the patron–client political system in Uganda.

Large amounts of foreign aid were made available by donors to the new leaders of Uganda from the early 1990s to the present time. In 1990, USD500 million was provided, and by 2009 this had grown to USD1.8 billion. International donors provided USD600 million annually in general budget support throughout the first decade of the 2000s. Aid at one point constituted 55 per cent of the government's budget, dropping to 26 per cent in 2011/2012 (Kjaer and Katusiimeh 2012). A portion of this aid was meant to provide a revenue source for the state as it eliminated trade taxes, marketing boards, and other undesirable sources of revenue.

The hope was that the state would then have the time to develop new revenue sources. In addition, the foreign aid would potentially generate political legitimacy for the state through poverty reducing projects, thus permitting a shift away from patron–client politics to politics based upon institutions and laws and the political competition inherent in multi-party elections. Thus improvement in the quality of the state’s decision making would provide a firm foundation for politically sustainable economic growth in the future.

The economic effects of reforms to the import substitution policies were very positive, as outlined at the beginning of this paper. Growth rates rose, poverty rates fell and export diversification occurred. Import substitution policies had implicitly acted as a significant tax on agriculture, especially export-oriented agriculture. The reforms dramatically reduced this implicit taxation and the result was that agricultural growth rates rose (agricultural GDP growth rates rose to 3.4% by the early 2000s; Matthews, Claquin, and Opolot 2009). However, as pointed out in the introduction, some anomalies remain: the bulk of the population remains in rural areas, engaged in agricultural production; population growth rates remain high (in excess of 3%); manufacturing as a share of GDP and exports remains stagnant; and inequality has increased. In addition, the political reforms discussed above have, according to some authors, been undermined. The next section of the paper will attempt to explain these anomalies utilising a dualistic development model. The role of patron–client politics will be analysed in this context.

Dualistic models

W. Arthur Lewis’ (1954) model of economic development is probably the best known dualistic model. In a closed economy setting, he assumed that a developing country’s economy could be divided into traditional and modern sectors. Although the traditional sector was often identified with agriculture and the modern sector with manufacturing, Lewis actually argued that the distinction between the two sectors was based on decision making behaviour.

The modern sector uses capital and labour, pays a wage equal to the marginal product of labour, and maximises profits. The owners of capital provide savings. The traditional sector uses labour and land, pays a traditional wage (usually assumed to be equal to the average product of labour), and engages in no savings. Profit maximisation is not the goal of production in this sector; instead survival of the family is critical. Finally, it is presumed that surplus labour exists in the traditional sector; the marginal product of labour is zero. Thus labour can be transferred from this sector without any reduction in the traditional sector’s output.

The wage in the modern sector (equal to the marginal product there) is equal to the wage in the traditional sector (equal to the average product of labour). This labour productivity is directly enhanced through education (Ciccone and Pappaioannou 2005). Thus the key to development is the transfer of labour from the traditional sector (where its marginal product is zero) to the modern sector (where its marginal product is positive). This occurs through savings in the modern sector. Thus growth in this model is driven by structural change. It should be pointed out that this structural change is also promoted through human capital accumulation, which aids the assimilation of new technology (Turcotte and Rennison 2004).

If one assumes that the traditional sector is agriculture and produces food, then some fundamental difficulties arise in the growth and development process. Initially, economic growth is driven by capital accumulation in the modern sector, which draws out surplus labour from the traditional sector. But food production does not decline, since surplus labour exists in the latter. Thus the opportunity cost of modern sector expansion is zero. However, once surplus labour is exhausted, continued growth of the modern sector comes at the opportunity cost of less food production. This implies that wages must rise in the modern sector, which in turn

implies less profit, resulting in less savings and capital accumulation. Eventually, this will slow economic growth and this may prevent the modernisation (commercialisation) of the economy.

This analysis, however, neglects an adaptive reaction that is likely to occur as the modern sector grows. The rising wages in the modern sector will lead firms in that sector to switch to more capital intensive activities, thus slowing the growth of employment in the modern sector. The implication then is that growth in output will generate less growth in employment. Thus structural change in production (an increased share of GDP production occurring in the modern sector) can occur without (or with very slow) structural change in employment (the proportion of those employed in the modern sector grows slowly or not at all).

Many economists have criticised Lewis' model for its assumptions concerning decision making in the traditional sector and the concept of surplus labour. However, one can drop these aspects and still have a dualistic model in which growth can occur with structural change in production, but without structural change in employment. Assume that farmers in the traditional sector seek to maximise profits in a manner similar to that of producers in the modern sector. Eswaran and Kotwal (2004) have developed dualistic models in which it is presumed that preferences are non-homothetic in nature. More simply, as long as a family's income is below a specific level, all income is spent on food. However, once income rises above that level the proportion of income spent on food declines continuously. One can also think of this as a subsistence requirement for consumption, and the specific income at which the switch takes place can vary from family to family.

In this context, at very low levels of income all families must engage in agricultural production. As productivity rises in agriculture, income per person will begin to rise and some families will begin to spend an increasing portion of their income on modern sector goods. The modern sector will begin to grow and draw labour out of the traditional sector. The rate at which labour can be drawn out of this sector will then be dependent upon the rate of growth of agricultural productivity. Thus structural change occurs through supply and demand factors. For the demand for non-agricultural modern goods to grow, incomes among rural producers must rise above the family subsistence level. For labour to be able to exit the agricultural sector by migrating to the modern sector, it must be possible for the agricultural sector to be able to feed this labour.

Thus the growth process will be shaped by the interaction of two forces: savings and capital accumulation in the modern sector, and agricultural productivity growth in the traditional sector. If savings and investment in the modern sector occur at a faster rate than productivity growth in agriculture, then wages in the manufacturing sector will rise, growth will become more capital intensive, and structural change in terms of employment will lag.

An alternative perspective on this process arises if one divides the modern sector into two parts: manufacturing and services. Assume that productivity in the manufacturing and service sectors is equal and exceeds that of the agricultural sector, but the service sector uses no labour (an extreme assumption, but it makes the functioning of the model clearer). In this context, if agricultural productivity growth is slow, then savings and capital accumulation and growth in the modern sector will cause the cost of labour in this sector to rise. Although this will cause production in manufacturing to become more capital intensive, it will also cause resources to shift out of manufacturing and into services. In this situation, a segment of the economy becomes increasingly important for growth and that segment (the service sector) is independent of the agricultural constraint (service sector). Thus growth occurs, and structural change in production occurs, but not in terms of employment.

This analysis assumes that the service sector uses no labour. A less stringent assumption would be that it is less labour intensive and more capital intensive than manufacturing. To justify this assumption, one must make a distinction between modern and traditional services.

The former is thought to be more capital intensive, while the latter more labour intensive. Evidence on the factor intensity of modern sector services is quite limited. However, the experience of India indicates that much modern sector growth there since the 1990s has been driven by capital intensive service industries (Kochar et al. 2006). If one includes human capital within the concept of capital intensive, then it is particularly apparent that modern service industries have been much more capital intensive than manufacturing (Ramaswamy and Agrawal 2012).

The model developed above, with its variations, is a closed model. One might ask whether this is an appropriate assumption. Opening the model to trade implies that slow agricultural productivity growth would no longer have the structural implications discussed above, as imported food could substitute for domestic production. However, it would seem that, indeed, few developing countries rely upon trade to meet their food needs. In most developing countries the proportion of labour employed in agriculture exceeds the proportion of output produced in agriculture, implying low agricultural productivity. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reported that in 2000, 68.6 per cent of the arable land in 159 developing countries was devoted to food staples (grains, pulses, roots, tubers). Of this production, almost all was devoted to domestic consumption. As an example, only a few countries are net exporters of grain, and of them only one, Argentina, exported more than a quarter of its grain production. A similar story can be told with respect to the production of roots and tubers. FAO data show that most poor countries meet their food needs for these goods through domestic production. Thus in developing countries most of the resources in agriculture are used to produce food, the resources required to do this are large (especially the labour resources required) and "it is reasonable to view most economies as closed from the perspective of trade in food" (Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson 2007).

The above observations are particularly appropriate for Uganda. The government estimates that, in large parts of the country, 85–90 per cent of households are dependent on subsistence agriculture. Ten crops account for over 90 per cent of the plots under cultivation, and, with the exception of coffee, all are food crops produced for home consumption. The principle food crops are not traded much in international markets. Thus Uganda too seems closed with respect to food production (Gollin and Rogerson 2010).

Much of the lack of trade in food products is the result of the poor state of infrastructure in Uganda. For example, it is estimated that less than 1 per cent of rural households had access to grid-supplied electricity in 2000. A majority of the towns and market centres also lack such access. In addition, transportation infrastructure, in particular roads, is sorely lacking. Data suggest that approximately 78 per cent of the population lives two or more hours from a market centre and 25 per cent live more than five hours away. In 2003 Uganda reported a paved road network of 16,300 km for a land area of 200,000 km²; Gollin and Rogerson (2010, 13) remark that this is "not much greater than the paved density found in Britain in 350 AD". This lack of transportation infrastructure has led to a high dispersion of prices across geographic space. This dramatically reduces specialisation and division of labour in agriculture. Thus the non-tradability of food is largely the result of poor infrastructure.

The cornerstone of the above analysis is that labour in many less-developed countries is not cheap, and this creates a constraint (in a closed model) that leads to growth in output without growth in alternative sources of employment. The work of Gelb, Meyer, and Ramachandran (2013) provides empirical support for this proposition. They focus on comparing labour costs in 12 sub-Saharan African countries with those in 13 comparators drawn from four regions. The data are taken from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys of 10,502 manufactory firms. The data cover formal sector firms classified with ISIC codes 15–37, 45, 50–52, 55, 60–64, and 72.¹ The main questions that they focus on are: Africa may be poor, but is its labour cheap? Is it cheap relative to its comparators?

The results are indeed quite interesting. They imply that labour costs in sub-Saharan Africa are substantially higher than comparator countries, with this wage premium approaching 50 per cent. One of the countries included in the study was Uganda. It turns out that the study estimates that the Ugandan labour cost difference was less than the average of 50 per cent, but it was still substantial. Thus, although Uganda is a poor country, labour is not cheap.

Gelb, Meyer and Ramachandran (2013) hypothesise that the higher labour costs may be the result of price or cost of living differences. Utilising data from 188 countries, they found that, "relative to low income comparators like Bangladesh, Vietnam, and also India, African countries are considerably more costly" (2013, 16). Excluding South Africa as a middle income country, the average purchasing power parity (PPP) for African countries is about 20 per cent higher than for Bangladesh, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam (Gelb, Meyer, and Ramachandran 2013). Once again, although Uganda fell below this average, it is still substantially above that for other low income comparator countries in other regions.

Gelb, Meyer and Ramachandran (2013) speculate that sub-Saharan price or cost differences with low income comparator nations reflect large differences in food production, which it has been argued is non-tradeable in nature. Thus labour costs in Africa are high because food productivity is relatively low. This perspective is supported by the work of Shively and Hao (2012). They note that, despite significant success in growth in poverty reduction, "many communities in Uganda struggle with chronic malnutrition, especially among children" (2012, 3). The stunting of growth in children under five is seen in nearly 40 per cent of the country's population at large, and in some areas exceeds 50 per cent.

Joughin and Kjaer (2010) also provide evidence of continued problems in agriculture, particularly in food production. Between 1992 and 2005, the country's average calorie intake per person per day improved from 1,494 to 1,971, but this is well below the figure of 2,300 recommended by the World Health Organisation. While the percentage of food insecure families in Uganda has declined, the absolute number increased from 12 million in 1992 to 17.7 million in 2007. A comparison of food yields for 13 food crops from 1999 to 2005 indicates improvement for only four crops, while the rest declined (including rice, maize, beans and sorghum). Annual agricultural growth from 1991 to 2001 was a respectable 3.5 per cent, but from 2001 to 2011 this fell to 1.7 per cent (Joughin and Kjaer 2010).

Another set of factors also increases the cost of labour to potential employers in the manufacturing sector. Even work in labour intensive manufacturing requires human capital skills involving the ability to read, write and calculate. A labour force may be physically abundant, but not economically cheap if that labour lacks the necessary human capital. Enrollment in primary education in Uganda rose steadily from the late 1990s to the late 2000s. However, the quality of public education has remained very poor, with low numeracy and literacy rates in primary education. "This challenge of quality in primary education is best illustrated by the fact that, despite the number of children in primary education nearly doubling, the number of pupils passing their primary leaving exams (PLE) has only increased marginally" (Hedger et al. 2010). In addition, education expenditures as a per cent of the government budget have declined. The difficulties with expanding agricultural production (particularly food), combined with poor education and infrastructure, have posed significant barriers to the development of a competitive manufacturing sector. Thus, growth of this sector, especially labour intensive manufactured goods for export, has been slow and quite limited.

In addition to the above, corruption has played an important role in the intersectoral allocation of resources. The high returns to rent seeking and corruption have resulted in a significant allocation of resources to these sorts of activities relative to more productive, entrepreneurial activities (see Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991; Acemoglu and Verdier 1998). Lower levels of human capital seem to increase the resources devoted to rent seeking and corruption (Svensson

2005). Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) have found that corruption seems to disproportionately harm small and medium-sized enterprises. It seems that large enterprises find it much easier to protect themselves from corrupt officials. Svensson (2000), in a study of 176 Ugandan firms in 1997, found that the median firm (by size) paid bribes equivalent to 28 per cent of its investment in machinery and equipment. Those involved in exporting have a higher probability of facing corrupt bureaucrats and having to pay bribes.

The above result is important for a number of reasons. First, small and medium firms tend to be more labour intensive in nature. In fact, in Uganda they make up 50 per cent of total employment and 96 per cent of all business establishments (Svensson 2000). Second, as a result of corruption many of these small and medium-sized firms withdraw from the formal sector and become part of the informal sector. There they can, to some extent, evade government rules, etc. However, they have less access to the inputs that are available to firms in the formal sector, in particular credit. This has, indeed, made it difficult to expand labour intensive manufacturing, especially for export.

Thus there are a variety of factors involved in the lack of structural change in terms of employment. Slow agricultural growth, within the context of food being basically non-tradable in nature, has meant that labour is not economically cheap, though physically abundant. This situation made it difficult for labour intensive manufacturing and exports to be competitive. This is made even more difficult by the lack of transportation infrastructure and, especially, the poor quality of educational institutions. Finally, corruption has also hobbled the development of small and medium-sized labour intensive manufacturing firms. Although all these factors are important, the remainder of this paper focuses on agriculture and the lack of agricultural growth (in particular food production) in making labour economically expensive.

The effect of patronage politics

Although the government has often placed agriculture at the top of the policy agenda, the sector has never received a significant share of the public budget. More importantly, the share of the budget going to agriculture has been declining, from 8 per cent in 2001/2002 to 3.1 per cent in 2009/2010 (Joughin and Kjaer 2010).

The utilisation of modern agricultural technology in Uganda also seems low. Data from 2005/2006 indicate that only 7.3 per cent of farmers in Uganda were visited by an extension agent during the previous 12 months. There was also bias in the activities of extension agents in that richer farmers were more likely to be visited than poorer ones. This is important because there is empirical evidence suggesting that connections between extension agents and farmers tend to increase productivity significantly (Mukwaya et al. 2012).

In addition, data from Uganda for 2005–2006 indicate that less than 10 per cent of the areas farmed in Uganda utilised any kind of modern inputs such as improved seed, organic or inorganic fertilisers or pesticides. Although modern input usage varies from region to region, in all regions usage is quite low. This is generally because modern inputs, in particular chemical fertilisers, are quite expensive in Uganda. In addition, it is likely that the lack of human capital has also constrained the use of modern inputs (Nkonya, Schroeder, and Norman 1997). Few farm households utilised outside labour in the production process. It is estimated that only 9.4 per cent of agricultural labour hours are carried out by non-family workers. Thus family labour is the main input in the production process on Ugandan farms (Mukwaya et al. 2012).

The problems facing the modernisation of Ugandan agriculture are reflected in the experience with NERICA (New Rice for Africa) rice varieties. These varieties were developed by the Africa Rice Centre.² They are characterised by good weed competitiveness and resilience to major African biotic and abiotic stresses, while also providing much higher yields. Another advantage

of these seeds is that they can be self-produced by farmers. However, panel data show that, in Uganda, between 2004 and 2006 more than 50 per cent of the initial adopters of these rice varieties abandoned use of the seeds. The main reason for this was the relative profitability to the farmer of growing the new rice variety. The relative profitability of the seeds was strongly linked to rainfall patterns. The greater the variability of rainfall, the less profitable the seeds were (Kijima, Otsuka, and Sserunkuuma 2011).

The implication of the above is that the new seeds were often targeted for application on farms with rainfall patterns that made them inappropriate. Thus farm extension activities would seem to be necessary to better target the application of new seed varieties (Kijima, Otsuka, and Sserunkuuma 2011). But it also implies that new seed varieties are not adapted to varying local circumstances. Another likely problem is the unavailability of cheap chemical fertilisers.

This relates to a significant general problem faced by agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa. Agricultural research is quite location specific. However, agricultural research, no matter where it is undertaken, has spillover effects on other regions of the world. These effects are even stronger if they are supplemented by local research seeking to tailor foreign technologies to local circumstances. The problem is that the extent of such technology spillover is much less for sub-Saharan Africa than for other agro-climatic regions of the world. Specifically, the African continent is characterised by significant heterogeneity in agro-climatic characteristics (temperature variations, soil variety), which dramatically reduce the diffusion of profitable and productive agricultural technologies. This is further aggravated by the lack of national and regional research capacity in Africa (Johnson and Evenson 2000). These same problems plague agricultural development in Uganda.

The argument made so far is that slow agricultural growth has slowed structural transformation in terms of employment in Uganda. Despite the rhetoric of the government, which puts agriculture high on the list of investment priorities, such investment has generally failed to materialise. Why has this been the case? Up until the late 1980s and early 1990s, politics in Uganda was patron-client in nature. As mentioned earlier, the political elite used the powers of the state to set policies that rewarded political allies and supporters and punished political foes. Among other things, marketing boards were used to raise revenue for the state and to allocate food supplies to supporters. Exchange rates were controlled so as to allocate foreign exchange to supporters. The key characteristic of these policies was their selectivity. That is, these policies were aimed at differentiating among recipients. Thus the production of general purpose public goods was avoided. Such goods, once provided, are available to all individuals regardless of their politics. Agricultural research is a good example of such a policy. Once profitable new technologies are developed and released, practically anyone can make use of the technology. Investment in agricultural technology may thus be economically sensible in terms of high returns to society, but politically it is not very attractive. Of course, investment in agricultural growth will likely generate enough of an increase in output so as to allow for the compensation of losers and still generate a surplus. However, compensating losers may also be politically unattractive (since this is likely to increase their relative political power). Also, the political elite are likely to heavily discount returns occurring in the future. Thus, even though the number of rural people whose lives are strongly affected by agricultural productivity may be large and predominate in a society, investment in agriculture is likely to be short-changed. Indeed, this seems to be the story of Ugandan politics until the late 1980s.

However, as pointed out in an earlier section of this paper, the economic reforms had, it was thought, effects both economic and political in nature. They allowed for a reallocation of resources from less productive to more productive areas. In particular, many of the import substitution policies in force prior to the reforms acted as a tax on the agricultural sector and provided a net subsidy to the non-agricultural sector. This observation is supported by the empirical work of

Matthews, Claquin, and Opolot (2009). Using data on agricultural production, prices and policies for the years 1961 and 2004 they find that the burden of taxation on agriculture increased dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the economic liberalisation that occurred in the early 1990s significantly reduced discrimination against the agricultural sector and thus a reallocation of resources did occur.

In turn, these reforms were also thought to have undermined the base for patron–client politics. Marketing boards were eliminated, exchange rates reformed, taxes on agricultural exports eliminated and tariffs reduced. In addition, a number of external aid providers promoted a series of political reforms. These included dramatic reductions in the size of the army as well as the state bureaucracy. The development of multi-party democracy was promoted. The latter efforts have been somewhat successful, with elections occurring in 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011. Those in 2006 and 2011 occurred within the context of a multi-party system (Kjaer and Katusiimeh 2012).

There is indeed some empirical evidence that the spread of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa has brought about policies more conducive to agricultural growth. For example, Bates et al. (forthcoming) find that electoral competition in Africa leads to an increase in agricultural factor productivity of approximately 1 per cent. Electoral competition allows for the formalisation of effective power for members of the agricultural sector, who generally make up the largest proportion of the population of nations in this region.

In Uganda, however, the patron–client political structure seems to have survived the reform process. This is apparent from several different perspectives. As pointed out above, reforms initially resulted in a dramatic decline in state employees, but this has been reversed since the 1990s. In addition, while in 1992 the number of ministries was cut from 39 to 21, since then it has again risen to 72. In the 2000s public administration expenditures ranged from 20 to 28 per cent of the government budget. “A recent research project conducting a survey of civil servants in Uganda found that 76 percent thought that civil servants owed their appointments and promotions to considerations other than those of merit, and all of them felt that a fusion between politics and the public service had taken place” (Kjaer and Katusiimeh 2012, 18).

In addition, it appears that the size of the army has not actually shrunk. Military expenditures have risen as a share of GDP, although it is difficult to get an accurate measure of this since the defence budget is classified. In addition, in the early 2000s it became known that the army had as many as 24,000 soldiers on payroll that did not really exist (ghost soldiers). This allowed officers to draw substantially larger salaries. Attempts to report these activities were sharply punished by the government (Kjaer and Katusiimeh 2012).

Another mechanism for distributing benefits to political supporters in Uganda has been the expansion of the number of local government districts. In 1991 there were 31 of these districts and by 2011 there were over 100. On the surface, this would seem to represent a decentralisation of power. However, the evidence does not support this contention. Green (2010) examines four possible reasons for the rapid expansion of districts: improvement of service delivery, ethno-linguistic conflict management, the inability of the central government to resist local demands for new districts, and patronage politics.

Using data from the Human Poverty Index and the Human Development Index at the district level, Green (2010) finds that such measures are not correlated with new district creation. Also, new districts did not perform any better on these measures than older districts. Data on the ethnic makeup of the districts indicate that perhaps a quarter of the new districts could be explained as attempts to deal with problems of ethnicity. However, in many of the new districts, ethnic conflicts have actually been exacerbated. There is also little evidence of political demand from below for the creation of such districts, since the government proved resilient to other regional political movements. There is, however, strong evidence that President Museveni “has used the creation

of new districts to create a raft of new jobs, each one a patronage opportunity" (Green 2010, 13). A whole new set of technical and administrative staff has to be hired, new district chairpersons and counselors must be found, and this also had a significant impact on non-governmental jobs (Green 2010). The actual power wielded by these new districts has, however, been circumscribed as their number has increased.

The persistence of patron–client politics, albeit in new forms after the economic and political reforms of the 1990s, is the likely reason why agriculture has received diminished support from government policy. The economic reforms certainly reduced the implicit tax burden on agriculture and this in turn led to initial growth in agricultural productivity, but this growth has slowed due to limitations on the supply side (limited technical change).

The experience of Uganda contrasts sharply with that of much of east Asia, in particular China, Taiwan, and Japan. In all three of these nations, rapid agricultural growth either preceded or coincided with rapid expansion in labour intensive manufacturing. Here, abundant labour was indeed cheap labour. Investments were made in irrigation, commercial fertilisers and national agricultural research systems. All of them had accumulated a backlog of agricultural technology that could be used to expand productivity rapidly. In Japan the backlog of technology was the result of continuous innovation during the Tokugawa period, combined with feudal restrictions on the diffusion of technology. The end of the feudalistic Tokugawa period allowed agriculture to grow rapidly. In China the technological backlog stemmed from continuous innovations, the application of which had been limited by the elimination of markets and the use of socialist mechanisms for allocating resources. With the end of socialism, agricultural productivity rapidly increased. Finally, in Taiwan, colonisation by Japan resulted in infrastructure investments that allowed newly independent Taiwan to utilise already existing agricultural technologies rapidly; these having been adapted to Taiwanese conditions with the help of a national research system.

The difficulties faced by Uganda in developing and applying agricultural technology are significant. Many technologies developed in south and east Asia are not easily applied in the diverse agro-climactic environment of sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, limited investment in agriculture and agricultural research in Uganda also poses a problem for development of new agricultural technologies. This seems to be a direct result of the patron–client political system that still dominates Uganda.

What policy implications follow from the analysis presented above? Labour intensive growth in Uganda awaits rapid productivity growth in agriculture. Thus foreign aid agencies should concentrate their resources on the national (Ugandan) research and extension system as well as the further development of regional African agricultural research systems. Such a system can create technologies that would rapidly increase agricultural productivity. Such technologies could be politically appealing for a number of reasons. First, broadly based growth in agricultural productivity could provide political legitimacy for the ruling elite since the bulk of the rural population would likely benefit. Second, increasing inequality is a significant threat to the future viability of the regime in Uganda. Rapid productivity growth in agriculture provides a mechanism for attenuating this inequality.

Investment in public infrastructure must also play an important role, especially investment in transportation infrastructure. Expanded transportation infrastructure will reduce geographic price differentials and increase specialisation and division of labour within the rural sector, thus enhancing productivity. This, combined with the provision of electricity, will make labour that is physically abundant economically cheap.

Finally, efforts to reduce corruption will likely allow firms in the informal sector to move into the formal sector, thus getting access to modern sector services such as credit. Since these firms are generally more labour intensive, this too would spur structural transformation in terms of unemployment.

Summary and conclusion

After enduring an extended period of import substitution industrialisation within the context of a patron–client political system, economic reform occurred in Uganda in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These reforms reduced the implicit tax on agriculture and the implicit subsidy to the non-agricultural sector. The result has been a dramatic rise in the rate of growth of GDP and a dramatic reduction in poverty in both rural and urban areas. This dramatic success was accompanied by a significant inflow of foreign aid from a number of different sources.

This success has been accompanied by several anomalies. The proportion of the population employed in agriculture has actually increased. Population growth rates have remained high, reducing per capita GDP growth. Inequality in the distribution of income has also increased. Much of the growth has occurred in the services sector, with manufacturing lagging. Finally, patron–client politics seem to persist in Uganda.

One might argue that these anomalies are nothing to worry about given the rapid growth and dramatic reduction in poverty that has occurred. There is, however, cause for concern. The rising inequality threatens the legitimacy of the state. Continued growth in inequality may lead to a large proportion of the population viewing the state as illegitimate, making effective governance very difficult. The lack of growth in labour intensive manufacturing raises concerns about whether growth will generate enough employment opportunities, since rapid population growth implies future rapid growth in the labour force. Also, one must wonder if rapid growth is sustainable in the future without rapid growth in manufacturing. Finally, potentially significant quantities of oil have been recently discovered in Uganda. This presents great opportunities for future growth but also great dangers. Large inflows of natural resource-based revenues within the context of patron–client politics is likely to lead not only to Dutch disease, but also significant amounts of corruption. For these reasons, an understanding of why structural change in production has occurred without structural change in employment is important.

This paper has argued that, while unskilled labour is relatively abundant, it is not cheap because food is relatively expensive, due to the slow growth of agricultural productivity. This has caused production in both manufacturing and services to be more capital intensive, especially in terms of human capital. In addition, it has led to a shift in employment from manufacturing to modern services (from a relatively labour intensive sector to a relatively capital intensive sector). Thus growth has generated little employment growth, while leading to an expansion in modern services. This effect is exacerbated by several other factors. The lack of transportation and power infrastructure further increases costs for manufacturing firms, thus reducing their growth in terms of both production and employment. These problems are made worse by the widespread prevalence of corruption. Finally, the lack of employment growth has meant that traditional services connected with transport and retail activities have also expanded in the rural areas in which production techniques are much more labour intensive (Joshi, Prichard, and Heady 2012).

In order for labour intensive manufacturing to grow rapidly, there must be significant growth in agricultural productivity. This has not occurred in Uganda because of a lack of investment by the state, which is in turn the result of an upsurge in patron–client politics after the initial economic reforms. The policy implication is that external aid providers should concentrate resources on the development of a regional and national agricultural research and extension system in combination with continent-based regional research systems. The provision of a set of technologies that can rapidly increase agricultural productivity could generate legitimacy for the political elite that in the long run is more sustainable than a system of patron–client politics. In addition, improvements in infrastructure can enhance manufacturing growth and structural change in terms of employment.

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Biographical note

Richard Grabowski is a professor of economics at Southern Illinois University. His work has been published in a number of journals, including *World Development*, *Journal of Development Studies*, *Review of Development Economics*, *Journal of Asian Economics*, and *Oxford Development Studies*.

Notes

1. International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) is the international reference system for the classification of production activities. The World Bank's Enterprise Survey can be found at www.enterprisesurveys.org
2. Created in 1971, AfricaRice is a pan-African rice research organisation and one of the 15 international agricultural research centres that comprise CGIAR (Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research). AfricaRice's membership today includes 25 countries covering the West, central, East and North African regions. See <http://www.africarice.org>

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BOOK REVIEWS / COMPTES RENDUS DE LIVRES

Hungry for change: farmers, food justice and the agrarian question, by A. Haroon Akram-Lodhi, Halifax, NS, Fernwood Publishing, 2013, 200 pp., ISBN 978-1-55266-546-6 (paperback)

Hungry for Change: Farmers, Food Justice and the Agrarian Question is a short and sharp book about the global food system and its profound and widespread transformation of the ways in which food is produced, distributed and consumed.

The book has nine chapters. It starts with introducing the process of agricultural commercialisation, in which money is needed for both producing and buying food. Chapter 2 explains the process of rural capitalist development, reviewing the classical literature of agrarian differentiation and primitive accumulation. Chapter 3 continues by describing how capitalism incorporates Third World peasants into profit making, while alienating them from the benefit of their own labour. Chapters 4 and 5 then turn to discuss land reform and capitalism's induced technological path dependencies through the application of the Green Revolution and biotechnologies. Chapters 6 and 7 expose how large-scale industrial farms and food processing and distributing corporations, notably US-based ones, use that country's hegemonic position in the global food system to dispossess small-scale peasants around the world, forcing them into export-oriented agriculture. Chapter 8 compares and assesses two contrasting visions for the future of food and farming. On the one hand, the World Bank typifies those that advocate for a deepening of capitalism, while Via Campesina (an international peasant movement) campaigns for food sovereignty on the other. Finally, Chapter 9 proposes an alternative food system, in which food should be considered as public good, unifying different movements under a common objective of food justice.

Throughout the book, Akram-Lodhi convincingly demonstrates how market imperatives under the capitalist food system incorporate farmers into the profit-making cycle. The drive to efficiency, as a condition of accumulation, or simply of survival, leads to wealth concentration and dispossession, in which only large-scale mechanised farmers can take advantage of the market and state policies. In turn, it dispossesses small peasants from their land and drives demand for landless workers, forcing them either toward urban migration or to join a growing but weakening rural labour class at the mercy of large industrial farms. While his focus on this process of class differentiation builds on a tradition of agrarian political economy, Akram-Lodhi also uncovers other and broader mechanisms of the global food system. The author convincingly discusses how differentiation occurs not only within the farming sector but also between farmers and other capitalists, with upward and downward linkages along the food commodity chains. These horizontal and vertical processes of differentiation allow a few seed and agrochemical companies, farming conglomerates and distributors to concentrate power, while subsuming farmers into a cycle of dependence and impoverishment, and alienating consumers into addictions to highly caloric, fatty foods of low nutritional value. These result in a number of contradictions, the most notorious of which are persisting world hunger and creeping malnutrition crises, while food production continues to increase.

While the above arguments are not new, the way Akram-Lodhi put them together makes for compelling reading. First, the breadth and scope of coverage, from the processes of primitive accumulation and capitalist development to current issues of technological changes and food sovereignty offers a coherent and complete introduction for students of agrarian political

economy. Second, the systematic presentation of different perspectives through the life stories of individuals shows how they are interwoven into the fabric of capitalism and how interconnected the food system is. The language is also simple and straightforward, starting with the captivating and insightful stories of both ordinary peasants and influential figures, and supported by powerful statistics and analyses. This makes Akram-Lodhi's message not only relevant to researchers and activists already versed in the topic, but also accessible to a wider public. I believe this is one of the rare books on agrarian issues and the food system that is not only scientifically well documented, but is also successful in its reach beyond an inner circle of specialists to convince a greater audience and, ultimately, have a wider impact.

But this quality of synthesis and brevity may also inevitably be one of the book's weaknesses. First, while explaining how the globalised food system has transformed food, making it cheap and addictive at the expense of nutrition, Akram-Lodhi does not discuss the more complex entanglement of interests beyond those of conglomerates, which have translated into a broad food safety crisis, mounting in both developed and developing countries. Second, while the author provides a convincing critique of the World Bank's model of capitalist farming, his assessment of Via Campesina's food sovereignty, notably its neopopulist influence, needs further elaboration if it is to benefit the broader audience, as the rest of the book successfully does. Lastly, and more fundamentally, Akram-Lodhi acknowledges the ecological impact of the global food system, but should have more clearly articulated those contradictions to the widening metabolic rift resulting from industrial, globalised and capitalist agriculture. This would have allowed the book to account for the dependency of capitalist food production on ecosystems, and hence its inherent vulnerability in the current context of environmental change. The author could then have better inserted his valuable analysis into a bigger picture of systemic risks: that socio-ecological stressors (notably biodiversity loss and climate change) could bring this productive but precarious food system to a halt, and prevent a reversion to alternative cultivars and coping strategies, threatening the food security of hundreds of millions more.

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Long-term solutions for a short-term world: Canada and research development, edited by Ronald N. Harpelle and Bruce Muirhead, Waterloo, ON, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2011, xvi + 228 pp., ISBN 978-1-55458-223-5 (paperback)

This edited volume is a collection of 10 essays on theory and practice of development research, written by applied researchers and development practitioners who received funding from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). The essays were presented in the conference "Canada and Research for Development: Past, Present and Future", held in September 2008 at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) in Waterloo, Ontario. This volume complements the findings of *IDRC: 40 Years of Ideas, Innovation, and Impact* (2010), a history project by the same two authors, commissioned by the IDRC.

The 10 essays that are presented as stand-alone chapters focus on issues as diverse as the political economy of international development, gender, water, public health and information and communication technologies (ICTs). In Chapter 1, Ronald Harpelle, the lead editor of this volume, argues in a critical analysis that defense, diplomacy and development have historically

emerged as the three pillars of Canadian foreign policy. Then follows co-editor Bruce Muirhead's summary of the history of IDRC in Chapter 2, which is based on the history writing project reported in the 2010 volume.

In Chapter 3, Deepak Gyawali, an international authority in water resource management, uses examples from Nepal to illustrate how IDRC's work is distinct from the work of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), now merged into the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and renamed the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development (DFATD). He argues that IDRC focuses on development research, while CIDA spends its substantial budget on high profile development consultancy; the latter is expected to gain in political profile after the recent merger. Critics further argue that Canadian conservative government is not an exception in merging aid agencies into foreign affairs, giving a newfound political height to foreign aid. This has happened in New Zealand and Australia, where there is also conservative government (*The Guardian*, September 18, 2013; *Ottawa Citizen*, June 19, 2013). They anticipate that this change can further deter these countries from the United Nations aid target (0.7% of gross national income). Canada has come nowhere close to her European counterparts – Norway, Sweden, Luxembourg, Denmark and the Netherlands in particular – in meeting the aid target first recommended by the Pearson Commission (chaired by Canadian Prime Minister Lester Bowles Pearson) and later adopted by the United Nations.

The editors note that IDRC, despite being a Canadian Crown corporation, is less known among Canadians than it is among developing country researchers. Important decisions are made by the internationally appointed Board of Governors. This can imply that there is a growing dissatisfaction over IDRC's 40 years of creativity, development innovation and impact (not just economic but also social and environmental impact) in some quarters of Canadian political caucus. The rest of the book's chapters showcase IDRC's work in engaging developing country scientists to develop alternative models of science, technology, innovation, entrepreneurship and development.

In Chapter 4, Zoubida Charrouf and Dominique Guillaume bring a rare case study of the engagement of Amazigh people, native to the argan forest on the Souss plain of Morocco, in conservation and utilisation of argan trees. Of specific interest to proponents of alternative models of development would be women's collective action to improve artisanal methods of argan oil extraction. As this chapter addresses aboriginal rights to forest biodiversity without a discussion on rights-based approaches to its conservation and use, we can critique that the focus is more on native people's rights to development than the introduction of rights-based approaches in innovation, entrepreneurship and development processes (see Uvin 2007).

Chapter 6, by Oumar Cissé, offers a case study of how the daily waste management challenges of urbanites in Dakar, Senegal, were successfully brought to national policy discussions. Similarly, Palmira Ventosilla in Chapter 8 writes about how action research on the biological control of malaria made such technologies locally accessible and adaptable. Her case shows how school children and community partners were successfully engaged to design experiments using locally available materials and test the biological control of malaria using coconuts inoculated with naturally occurring bacterium.¹ In Chapter 7, Clotilde Fonseca investigates successful ways to deliver education to remote regions of Costa Rica through the use of ICTs. This work facilitated the education of individuals who would otherwise be left behind. Chapter 9 by Heloise Emdon is a similar investigation of the power of ICTs in innovation, entrepreneurship and development.

Chapter 5, by Rita Giacaman, Yoke Rabaia, and Viet Nguyen-Gillham, illustrates the challenges of doing development research in conflict-ridden areas of the Middle East, particularly the Gaza Strip. The study is of life under military occupation in general and trauma among Palestinian youth in particular. Although it is understandable that proponents of alternative

development often favour the Palestinian point of view, this chapter would have benefitted from more balanced analysis. The last chapter, by Diego Piñeiro, provides a rigorous analysis of the author's own struggle to pursue an academic career under the military dictatorship in Uruguay.

In conclusion, we wish to highlight two important flaws of this edited volume. First, it is argued that Canadians' lack of familiarity with the IDRC indicates a need to promote IDRC's mandates among Canadian tax payers. However, this is an overgeneralisation and not likely true among Canadians of all values and faiths. Further research in this area should focus on what the phenomenon has to do with conservatism and socialist ideals of international development. Second, the editors properly acknowledge Canada's attraction for immigrants from all around the world, but given the recent influx of immigrants from developing countries, this volume should have discussed the role of highly qualified diaspora in development (for example, Brinkerhoff 2008). None of the book's chapters are authored by scholars from diaspora communities – although this might be unintentional – and some of the chapters attempt to paint diaspora as a lost generation.

Notes

1. *Bacillus thuringiensis Subsp. Israelensis*, serotype H-14 (Bti).

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The golden fleece: manipulation and independence in humanitarian action, edited by Antonio Donini, Sterling, VA, Kumarian Press, 2012, xviii + 318 pp., ISBN 978-1-56549-487-9 (paperback)

Antonio Donini's book, *The Golden Fleece*, uses the Greek myth as a metaphor for the political economy of humanitarian aid. Donini contends that the myth is an appropriate symbolic representation of how humanitarian aid is often used to further a variety of political interests. The edited volume combines on-the-ground experience with thorough scholarship: all of the contributors are experienced aid workers or academics (or both) associated with the Feinstein International Centre at Tufts University. Collectively, their contribution catalogues the convergence of "political/security concerns" beginning with the refugee flows from Palestine in 1947 and later conflicts in Biafra and Indo-China in the 1960s, to contemporary examples in which humanitarian aid is part of a liberal peace or "world ordering framework", in cases such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Darfur (244).

A popular version of the Golden Fleece myth rests on the notion that Jason and the Argonauts were beset with a series of Herculean tasks in the hope of attaining a prize that did not exist. Like Jason and the Argonauts, humanitarians face formidable challenges in a variety of rebellious contexts, and they, too, according to Donini's hypothesis, are in search of a prize that does not exist:

Although humanitarian thinking and practice have evolved significantly over the past 150 years, there never was a 'golden age' when core humanitarian values took precedence over political or other considerations. (3)

While other scholars, notably Michael Barnett, have established the history of humanitarianism in great detail, Donini's eloquent use of Greek mythology provides a unique frame for his work. Donini and Ian Smilie quickly acknowledge that neutrality, impartiality, and independence have been challenged since the beginning of the humanitarian enterprise. Larry Minear highlights the importance of "institutional memory" by outlining the varied impacts of different political eras (Cold-War, post-Cold War, Global War on Terror) on the delivery of humanitarian aid. The significance of "institutional memory" emphasises the aim of the book: to provide "useful markers for analysts and policymakers as well as for humanitarians themselves" (4). In short, authors in this volume identify a variety of cases in which different state and non-state actors have manipulated humanitarian aid, yet they ultimately believe that it "deserves to be protected and nurtured despite its obvious limitations and imperfections" (12).

In the second part of the book, "Never Ending Crisis: Taking a Long View", the authors examine a variety of challenging humanitarian contexts including Afghanistan, Darfur, Somalia, Palestine, Pakistan and Haiti. What makes these chapters significant is their collective focus on the manner in which humanitarian aid was or was not instrumentalised by different actors in particular contexts. For example, in Chapter 6, Mark Bradbury and Robert Maletta argue that the 2011 famine in Somalia was avoidable and that cutting aid with the aim of weakening al-Shabaab "certainly compromised the ability of humanitarian actors to respond and mitigate it" (130). This contrasts with Chapter 8, in which Marion Pechayre observes that in the aftermath of the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, cooperation between security forces and humanitarian agencies brought about what was considered one of the "best ever implemented" humanitarian responses (54). These differing outcomes highlight the importance of context and demonstrate the historically negative outcomes for both aid recipients and those who seek to manipulate humanitarian action for political, security, and material ends.

The third part of the book, "Thematic Chapters", centres on types of humanitarian aid. Chapters in this section avoid a detailed analysis of human security and the responsibility to protect (R2P). However, emphasis on the manipulation of food aid and the difficulties that surround the protection needs of aid recipients as well as workers, which feature prominently in this section, certainly evoke the ongoing theoretical and conceptual debates that engulf contemporary scholarship on the politics of aid, of which human security and R2P are central. The section does not engage more nuanced and theoretically driven debates; this allows Donini's contributors to retain an arguably more practical concentration on specific humanitarian circumstances, with the goal of drawing out concrete lessons that can be of value to practitioners. The approach serves the book well and reflects the background of the authors' decades of experience as humanitarian workers.

The conclusion is made up of a single chapter bluntly titled "So What?" In this final chapter, Antonio Donini and Peter Walker provide a meta-analysis of the preceding chapters, identify obstacles to change and forecast what the instrumentalisation of humanitarian aid could look like in the future. After they pay homage to contemporary scholarship on humanitarian aid and openly acknowledge a disconnect between the "lofty universalist and principled goals of

humanitarianism and the messy reality on the ground” (248), the authors explore a diverse set of areas that deserve attention. Chief among these are the inclusion of “perspectives other than the dominant Western universalist discourse” (248) and the diversification of funding (260). While these ideas are underdeveloped in the book, they offer an invitation for academics and aid practitioners alike to explore them in the future.

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