Social Change and Internal Migration

A review of research findings from Africa, Asia, and Latin America
IDRC


- IDRC pub CRDI. Review of research pertaining to internal migration and social change in the developing country/s of Africa, Asia, and Latin America — (1) examines the limitations of current research; (2) includes information on the determinants and consequences of migration; characteristics and motivation/s of migrant/s; development policy issues, and related research implications. Bibliography.

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Social Change and Internal Migration

A Review of Research Findings from Africa, Asia, and Latin America

A report of the Migration Review Task Force of the International Development Research Centre

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Preface

The movement of peoples in developing countries has been intensively studied, and in recent years the results of these studies have been thoroughly reviewed. One needs good justification for preparing yet another review, but we feel that ours is distinctive in a number of ways. It focuses heavily on development policy issues and related research implications with respect to migration and population distribution. It reviews these issues separately for Africa, Asia, and Latin America. While the bibliography is by no means comprehensive, it is extensive and may be particularly useful to scholars and planners seeking original sources. Finally, the regional reviews are structured in parallel so that it is possible for investigators interested primarily in one region to determine what is known on the topics that concern them for the other regions. The three regional reviews are introduced by a short overview that attempts to give a broader picture of what is known, what is not known, and which research issues are most closely related to current development policy concerns in each of the three regions.

The three regional reviews were written with the assistance of the following people, whose efforts we are pleased to acknowledge: Abou Nabé, Manuel Jimenez, and Marco-Antonio Gramegna. In addition we would like to thank Harry Cummings for his input to the conceptual framework underlying the regional reviews, and Pam Butcher for her help in preparing the manuscripts.

We present these reviews in the hope that they will assist our colleagues carrying out research in developing nations. We also hope that they will assist in the evolution of new policy-relevant research initiatives. The conclusions we present are limited due to the rapidly evolving nature of migration research. We hope that our colleagues will bring us abreast of any current developments not noted in this review.

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Overview

Internal migration in developing nations has been a favourite topic of research in recent years. The related literature is voluminous and difficult to summarize. In this regard things have changed markedly from the situation ten years ago when Breese (1966), in reviewing available findings, was forced to conclude that "very little is known about factors which impel residents of rural areas and villages to make their way into the large cities" (p. 79) or about rural-urban "migration patterns" (p. 83) in general. We now know a good deal about both the social and economic factors that lead to rural-urban migration and about migration patterns, as the studies referred to in this report will indicate.

The present review addresses the following two problems:

(1) The abundance of findings on social change and migration in developing nations is not uniform across subtopics. Much of the research documents the volume, origin, destination, and characteristics (age, sex, education, etc.) of rural-urban migrants. Less attention has been given to migration within the rural sectors, to the consequences of migration for sending and receiving communities, and to the impact of government development policies on population distribution. Migration has often been studied as an isolated phenomenon rather than as one variable among many interacting in the process of economic development. We need to identify policy-related research issues that have not been adequately investigated.

(2) The volume of the migration research literature has in itself created something of a problem. Investigators are frequently unaware of conceptual and methodological advances being made by their colleagues working in other regions of the world. There is currently a need for review, integration, and interpretation of research findings from all regions to improve our identification of research issues, concepts, and methods for future studies.

The present review addresses itself to both of these problems and attempts to fill some gaps left by other reviews on the subject. This introductory part of the report is a brief overview of the strengths and weaknesses evident in

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1 In recent years there has been a proliferation of reviews of the literature on internal migration. A number of them have reviewed the literature about specific regions. The following regional reviews were consulted for this project: Africa (Byerlee and Eicher, 1970; Gugler, 1969, 1974; and Hance, 1970); for Asia (Eames, 1969; Laquian, 1972; and McGee, 1971); and for Latin America (Butterworth, 1971; De Oliveria and Stern, 1972; Gilbert, 1974; and Cardona and Simmons, 1974). Other reviews covering literature from many parts of the world that may be noted are Breese, 1966; Brigg, 1971; Shaw, 1975; and Todaro, 1976. This last review places a heavy emphasis on Africa. Other reviews consulted are concerned primarily with internal migration in developed countries. The one by Suval (1972) deals with the selectivity of migration within the United States. The review by Ritchey (1976) is fundamentally concerned with the internal migration literature in developed nations.
existing research. The conclusions reported in this section are based on the longer, detailed reviews of the migration literature for Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The reviews for the three major areas cover both literature produced within each region as well as that produced by outside analysts.

**Why Has Migration Been a Favourite Research Topic?**

The proliferation of research on migration and the biases and shortcomings in much of the research appear to stem from similar causes. Two factors in particular seem to have encouraged the large number of exploratory, descriptive studies of the characteristics of rural-urban migrants.

**Public Visibility**

Population movements are highly visible in developing countries in part because of their magnitude and in part because of their impact on political sensitivities in urban areas. Two-thirds or more of the adults in many of the large, expanding cities of the developing world are in-migrants, and their high fertility (due in part to their young age structure) means that the cities are growing very rapidly through the combined effects of continued in-movement and natural growth. Davis (1962) suggests that if the current rates of growth continue to apply, Calcutta will have a population of 35 million by the year 2000.

Urban problems emerging from this movement and growth have been particularly visible to politicians and planners. These problems include: the cost of extending services to the ever growing suburbs, the overloading of transportation facilities, water shortages, circles of slum housing around the outer periphery of the city, and general administrative confusion among overlapping political authorities within the urban area. The fact that a high proportion of the “problem” population in slum areas may be migrants with little education and of poor rural background has reinforced stereotypes that all migrants are of poor, farm background. In the ensuing public debate about whether this stereotype is correct (as we shall see below it is not), and what should be done about population movements and rapid urban growth, there has been a strong demand for information about the migrants: their skills, their age, sex and marital status characteristics, their motives for moving, and their employment and housing circumstances. Often this demand for information has been in the context of pressure to establish legislation intended to redirect existing population movements.

**Research Convenience**

In contrast with many other features of social and economic change, migration and urbanization are relatively easily measured and can often be assessed from existing sources (census data) or from surveys of readily identifiable and accessible migrant populations (for example, the residents of urban low income or squatter housing). This research convenience is especially helpful in developing nations where information on labour force change, reorganization of production, land tenure, and other features of social and economic structure are limited and relatively difficult to obtain. One can count migrants and calculate the percent of the population living in cities as tangible evidence that technological and socioeconomic change are taking place, even when the details of these other changes are only partially known. One can also survey migrants to learn indirectly about social-economic circumstances and
difficulties in their place of origin that forced them to move; the advantages that have accrued to them in their new residence that keep them from moving back; their housing, employment, and political activities; and general sense of well-being, as well as their age, sex, and education characteristics that may determine the impact of their move on their place of origin and on their destination. Thus, one can learn about social, economic, and political changes taking place in the nation as a whole by studying “key” migratory streams. Not surprisingly, geographers, anthropologists, sociologists, economists, political scientists, and many others, have all been interested in analyzing some aspect of migration related to their own specialty. This has contributed to the volume of research on migration, as well as to the conceptual diversity of the studies undertaken.

Some Strengths and Weaknesses in Existing Research

In spite of the interest of researchers from such a wide range of disciplines in internal migration, a uniform and comprehensive coverage of the more important issues pertaining to its determinants and consequences has not been achieved. Studies describing the demographic and social characteristics of migrants and studies that analyze the leading causes of out-migration from rural areas abound in the literature. At the same time there is a notorious scarcity of studies that evaluate the consequences of migration in places of origin and destination. The reasons why empirical knowledge on internal migration has developed so unevenly are various. In the first place, migration studies have reflected narrow disciplinary concerns, and investigators have sometimes forgotten to ask the broader questions that cut across or escape conventional disciplinary boundaries. Demographers, for example, have traditionally been interested in migration selectivity, hence their focus on migrant characteristics; anthropologists and sociologists have been concerned with the adaptation of migrants to new urban settings, and have stressed kinship ties, informal communication networks, and the search for work and housing; geographers have been heavily concerned with the spatial aspects of population redistribution, thus their focus on the size and directions of migrant streams and on the effects of distance on migration. Economists have been more concerned with explaining the determinants of migration. Other questions, such as the impact of out-migration on the social-economic organization of rural communities and the implication of overall change in residential patterns for health, social services, and economic development have been relatively ignored.

Limitations in the sources of data upon which migration studies have relied are also responsible for some of the shortcomings in the literature. Population censuses and sample surveys of migrants are the two most frequently used sources of data on migration studies. Both sources have advantages and disadvantages. As Simmons (1976) and Todaro (1976) point out, shortcomings of censal data have impeded the testing of complex theoretical models. In addition, narrowly focused survey research designs have led to the neglect of some important aspects of internal migration.

In our review we have noted a number of specific weaknesses in current migration research. For example, consider the following points:

(1) The results of research on the determinants of migration are often based on static observations such that the findings are hard to interpret from the
point of view of policy implementation. For example, schooling opportunities in rural areas may initially reduce rural-urban migration since the desire for education is an important reason for leaving rural areas. However, over the long run the increase in education in the rural area will tend to increase out-migration. In static analyses, where the cumulative effect of differences in education over a long period of time are noted, only the tendency for education to increase out-migration will be evident.

(2) Existing models of the determinants of migration generally explore back only to the level of the most proximate causes of migration. They do not go back further to determine basic structural causes, such as changes in investment patterns, land tenure patterns, foreign and domestic markets, and so on. Yet it is the more basic factors which will presumably have to be altered in any policy to direct migration. In this regard not enough attention has been given to the elements of investment, sectoral change, and productivity which are most amenable to government influence. Many developing economies have limited control at the national level, due to heavy reliance on single sector exports and on foreign capital, and it may be difficult for them to do much about migration without a radical restructuring of their economies. Other nations, which are more diversified and in which government policy has more freedom to influence economic growth by sector, may be unaware of the extent to which variables under their own control tend to "snowball" capital into the larger cities. For example, Gilbert (1973) has shown that the government of Colombia is planning to encourage growth of industry and commerce in secondary cities through the use of tax incentives, etc., while at the same time continuing its pattern of heavy investment into infrastructure, services, government, and military bases in the major cities of the nation.

(3) Due partly to both the use of static models and the focus on proximate causes, insufficient attention has been given to the impact of major programs designed to influence migration. Program evaluation when properly done involves at least trend analysis (changes from the baseline trend) and may also involve certain "control groups" (regions not influenced by the program) such that fairly detailed inferences may be drawn about the irrelative effects of program inputs.

"Among the many examples of what has been tried to limit the growth of large urban cities are regional development (Greece, Finland), decentralization of government activities (The Netherlands), relocation of the capital (Brazil, Tanzania), support of new towns (Japan, Britain), dampening of wage differentials between urban and rural areas (Zambia), reorientation of education towards agricultural interests (Indonesia, Tanzania), subsidies for industrial location (France, Sweden, and Togo), rural land reclamation (Kenya), and even a "citizenship tax" on living in the city (Seoul) in South Korea."

(Freedman and Berelson 1974, p. 38)

The effects of such policies have not generally been well evaluated to determine the extent to which policy inputs worked in relation to other important social and economic forces determining migration. The general conclusion nevertheless is that "internal migration to the cities is difficult to affect" (Freedman and Berelson 1974, p. 38) by the means that have so far been tried. However, for a truly international perspective on this, more attention should be given to comparative international studies, which also include information
from programs in centrally planned economies, such as Cuba and the Soviet Union, or the effects of national land reforms such as the ones partially instituted under Frei and later Allende in Chile in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

(4) Research on the consequences of migration has tended to focus heavily on the individual migrant. Studies here tend to confirm the fact that migrants are generally pleased with their move, have higher incomes than previously, and would not consider moving back to where they came from. Studies often further show that, in comparison with people in the place of origin, migrants are actually better off or that over time they may have experienced considerable upward occupational mobility and improved their position in society in a way that would have been impossible in their home area. The inference is generally drawn from these findings that by bringing people into areas with greater marginal productivity, higher wages, and occupation opportunities, migration is promoting economic development. While this may be true, the fact is that migration is in part a highly interdependent system and has consequences of its own. Thus, skilled people who leave rural areas taking their capital with them may contribute significantly to the decline and stagnation of the rural area itself. Therefore, the relatively poor situation of nonmigrants in rural areas may be in some degree a result of the fact that a high proportion of people with schooling and capital have left. Out-migration of younger people and of the more aspiring and energetic may take considerable pressure off rural institutions, such that they change more slowly, and productivity remains low. These are not hypotheses to be ignored in more urbanized nations of the developing world, such as those in Latin America, where food production per capita is low and falling, despite the fact that productive potential in terms of land and climate is great.

(5) Studies on the consequences of migration have ignored rural areas of out-migration. Out-migration may have "positive" benefits in terms of helping to reduce pressure on the land. Out-migration of young people who in turn send large remittances back to their families may be an institutionalized feature of rural economies in some regions, and may contribute to the maintenance of rural communities that would otherwise not be viable. On the other hand, direct remittances from rural to urban areas may also be substantial, related for example to the out-migration of young adults who have been trained and/or schooled at the expense of the rural communities. While somewhat more attention has been given to the importance of "return" migration to rural areas, the influence of such migrants' land use patterns, technological innovation, and community leadership needs to be further examined.

(6) Existing methodologies have also failed to disentangle the complex interdependence between the causes and consequences in the migratory process. Variables that are consequences of migration at one point in time may become causes of migration in a subsequent point. For example, the out-migration of skilled people as a consequence of limited opportunity further decreases opportunities for those who remain and becomes a cause of increased out-migration. Static approaches to the study of migration cannot freely assess these temporal interactions effectively. Existing models tend to interpret the educational and income differences between regions as causes of migration only, when in fact they are also consequences of migration that has
previously taken place. To understand consequences, then, we need greater attention given to a longitudinal study, retrospective and prospective. Whenever the opportunity emerges, we must also take advantage to study government programs designed to influence migration. Such programs provide a unique opportunity because at the moment they begin, the new "cause" of migration is clearly identifiable and the consequences that emerge from it may also be more clearly discerned.

On the positive side, the focus on the characteristics of rural-urban migrants and on the determinants of migration has led to a thorough understanding of these aspects of population redistribution. Not only have earlier misconceptions and simplifications given way to more realistic interpretations, but better conceptual models have been proposed. As the detailed reviews by region indicate, the evidence is overwhelming that the basic motivation for migration is economic — the search for employment and security. The characteristics of migrants reflect this. Those who move are typically the young adults who are searching for an entry point into the employment market, and the better educated whose relative opportunities, no matter how poor, are better in the city. The relative poverty, high levels of unemployment, and the slum housing, which many migrants face in the city, may make rural-urban migration appear to be more of a puzzle than it really is. Despite weaknesses and biases in previous studies, we are at a point in research where a great deal is known, and some general priorities for future research can be established.

Some Major Issues for Future Research

What has been accomplished and what remains to be achieved on migration research can be placed in a better perspective by considering how far migration has contributed to rural-urban population shifts in different areas of the developing world. Since to a large extent such population shifts are intimately associated with the process of modernization, it follows that different stages in the evolution of urbanization may result in stage-specific developmental concerns that may dictate distinct research priorities.

Following the urbanization typology proposed by Beier et al. (1976) the developing areas of the world can be divided into four types:

Type 1

This category includes most countries of Latin America where urbanization "is well underway. The population is already more than half urban, incomes are relatively high, and there is little population pressure on arable land and natural resources" (Beier, 1976:5).

Type 2

The semi-industrialized nations of East Asia and the countries of North Africa have fared relatively well in promoting economic development. They may be as urbanized as Type 1 countries by the year 2000 but their future economic well-being depends largely on their ability to reduce high population growth rates within the next decades.

Type 3

The majority of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa constitute Type 3. These countries are and will still be predominantly rural by the year 2000. They
are not yet experiencing heavy rural population pressure, although some subareas are clearly "overpopulated" in terms of available land and technology. A large proportion of future population growth in this region is likely to be absorbed by rural areas.

**Type 4**

These countries confront the most dreadful prospects for the coming years. This category is formed by the largest and poorest Asian countries: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and perhaps the People's Republic of China. These countries should still be predominantly rural by the end of the century, but "urban populations are also large and could swell massively even if only a small percentage of rural population is pushed out by accelerating pressures on land." (Beier, 1976:5-6). It would appear that only through regionally balanced economic development, the establishment of new cities, reduced rates of population growth, and tightly controlled rural-urban migration (of the kind vigorously pursued in China) can one avert potentially overwhelming problems in urban areas of these countries. The already large cities of these countries will in any case become larger, but growth of these cities on the scale of the recent past will be difficult if not impossible to deal with.

The above typology suggests that research priorities in one region of the developing world do not necessarily correspond with research priorities in other regions. For example, in Latin America where the path of urbanization is running its course and where the highest imaginable levels of urbanization will be reached within one or at most two decades, it does not appear to be of the highest priority to further investigate the main structural causes that lead to out-migration from rural areas. These factors, at least in their basic outlines, seem to be well understood. Rather, interest should be directed to a series of policy-relevant concerns, including how to resolve seasonal labour shortages in rural areas and how to encourage rural population shifts from densely settled traditional areas of agriculture, where soil erosion and low productivity predominate, to new lands. Similarly, more research should be done on the advantages of, and mechanisms for, diversifying urban growth to various regional cities as a way of distributing the social and economic benefits of development.

In areas of Type 3 and 4, the highest priority efforts should be made to reach a better understanding of the rural development programs that simultaneously increase production and absorb increased inputs of labour. Studies along these lines may prove useful in instituting policies likely to stem the rural out-flow. But even in these countries future studies should not pursue traditional avenues of research. There is no apparent need to verify once again that wealth differentials result in population redistribution. However, there would seem to be an urgent need to explore how wealth differentials interact with other forces such as urban unemployment rates in inducing or slowing down rural out-migration. Todaro (1976) in a recent discussion has suggested plausible new lines of inquiry along these lines. Other potential relationships worth exploring are how cultural factors affect out-migration rates and whether or not the relationships between migration and culture are affected as value systems change and economic modernization occurs.

Taking the above points all together suggests that the time may have come for a shift in emphasis within the field of research on migration and population
distribution in developing countries. We certainly do not know all there is to know about the determinants of migration nor about the characteristics of migrants, but we do know a great deal. We know much less about the overall interaction between population distribution and economic growth. Given the dilemmas facing governments and planners in developing countries, it is clear that we need to know more about the interplay between population growth, population distribution, and economic development.

Perhaps the time has come to place less emphasis on studies of the origin of migrants, the stages or processes by which they arrive at their destinations, and on their adaptation once they arrive. More studies to assess the impact of social and economic development policies that may lead to population redistribution, and population distribution policies that can enhance development, are badly needed and should be encouraged. Such studies will be more difficult to undertake because the opportunities for this kind of research are more limited, the social processes involved require a longitudinal perspective, and the conceptual frameworks and methodologies for assessing cause and effect among such variables are as yet only poorly developed.
Africa
Introduction

Modern Africa is a culturally, linguistically, and economically varied mosaic of nations, where country-to-country differences are very marked. The systematic analysis of any aspect of social behaviour, including migration patterns, in the African continent is a difficult endeavour. This review covers a selection of the literature available in English and French and focuses mainly on current issues, although a brief review of historical movements is included in the introduction. The review is concerned primarily with systematic migration patterns, and largely ignores the sporadic and unpredictable population movements that have resulted from political or ethnic upheavals, such as the exodus of expatriates and European settlers on a large scale from Algeria, Angola, Morocco, and many other countries, and selectively of Asians from Uganda and other nations, and the large movements of refugees across international boundaries as a result of ethnic conflict, as in the Congo during the 1960s and during the Nigerian civil war. Although the bibliography is by no means exhaustive it should be useful to scholars wishing to review specific issues in greater detail than is done here. The review examines evidence on the determinants of migration, the characteristics of the migrants, some of the consequences of migration, and what policies have been enacted with an impact on internal migration.

Considerable migratory movements have been recorded in Africa for centuries. Literary accounts of population movements in precolonial Africa can be found in chronicles of Arab and European travellers, discoverers, and adventurers (Hance, 1970). Many of these movements were associated with trade, land colonization, drought, epidemic diseases, and ethnic conflict. Descriptions of the slave trade, wherein millions of Africans were shipped across oceans are numerous (Curtin, 1969). Some of these population movements have in the past had a significant influence on the ethnic population distribution on the African continent.

During the period of European colonization, the character and extent of migration patterns were significantly altered. The colonial powers instituted compulsory measures to move needed African labour to areas where it was required (Hance, 1970:134). Governments and private interests also organized recruitment schemes (Deniel, 1968). But more important for the future evolution of migration patterns was the colonial socioeconomic system, which led to large voluntary movements of people into mining towns, centres of plantation agriculture, and urban commercial and administrative centres. New monetary and commercial systems, central administrative structures, modern transportation networks and communication systems as well as educational institutions were established. “Aggregatively the enumerated factors led to the restructuring of traditional societies and completely changed the scale of social and economic values.” (Addo, 1974:6). With the establishment of links with European markets for agricultural commodities and mineral exports,
export-oriented economies were established throughout Africa. The results were the creation of regional social and economic imbalances that promoted internal migration.

Many important population movements in Africa in recent years reflect the socioeconomic and cultural changes associated with political independence. The attainment of political independence brought with it rising expectations of material well-being that combined with socioeconomic transformations and demographic forces, led to a faster pace of population redistribution. Of these the most important has been the accelerated migration from rural areas to urban centres in general, and to large cities in particular. To a large extent these developments have occurred as a response to large regional socioeconomic differentials inherited from the colonial past and reinforced by current developmental policies. In the following pages, we will examine how contemporary researchers have attempted to account for some of the determinants and consequences of migration in modern Africa.
Part I

Determinants of Migration

In assessing the determinants of internal migration in Africa a distinction will be made between broad socioeconomic structural factors and the specific mechanisms (wage and unemployment differentials, etc.) through which the structural factors operate. We believe that this is a useful analytic distinction, since it serves to heighten our awareness of the role that general development policies and socioeconomic considerations play as the underlying determinants of shifts in population distribution.

Structural Factors

General Development Strategy

In many countries of Africa the development strategies instituted by colonial powers have had a large influence on existing patterns of internal migration. In West Africa, mines and cash crops were developed along the coastal regions. Ancillary facilities, such as communication systems (roads, railways, etc.) were established to serve these enterprises. The natural consequence was the development of deep regional disparities in socioeconomic development. After independence, most African governments followed the path established by the colonial administrations, and similar development strategies continued to be pursued. As a result, the earlier established regional inequalities between the coastal lands and the hinterland have become more marked. A typical pattern in many countries is the development of large and booming coastal cities — where the export-oriented economy is concentrated — that act as magnets to attract the migrants from the more traditional agricultural zones, where subsistence agriculture prevails. Some writers attribute the establishment and perpetuation of the regional inadequacies directly to the impact of foreign capital on the economies of the developing countries of Africa (Amin, 1974; Rochefort, 1973). Notable examples of this are the expansion of groundnut cultivation in Senegal at the expense of the development of intensive irrigated agriculture. Amin (1974) claims that the former type of agriculture was favoured by foreign investors although intensive agriculture would have been more beneficial to Senegal. Another example was the migration during colonial days from Upper Volta to the Ivory Coast and Ghana caused by the imperial powers. Upper Volta was a manpower pool for the coastal region and as such its economy reflected this externally oriented development strategy.

Agricultural Productivity

The low productivity of the African peasant is widely attributed to the use of rudimentary technology. Low outputs characterize not only production for local markets, but also for the export markets (Engmann, 1972:131). In tropical Africa, for instance, the average yield for maize has been found to be
between 600 and 1000 kilograms per hectare as compared to a United States average of about 5000 kg/ha (FAO, 1973:50). Similar lower average yields are found in other crops such as millet, sorghum, and rice. However, yields are much higher when modern agricultural techniques are used.

The underdevelopment of African agriculture breeds widespread poverty as the great majority of people are farmers. Food supplies are inadequate, seasonal shortages common, and nutritional problems widespread. Poor agricultural techniques also contribute to the deterioration and erosion of the soils and therefore hurt the prospects for improvements in long-term production.

**The Role of Population Growth**

A significant percentage of out-migrants from rural areas seem to come from densely populated areas. Forde and Harvey (1969:27) pointed out that most migrants to Freetown, Sierra Leone, surveyed in the 1963 population census came from chiefdoms with an above average population density. Hance, in his review of motivations and causes for migration, has found numerous examples of migration that are “in considerable measure related to pressure on the land,” which in turn may be partly related to high population densities (Hance, 1970:173-174). Ominde has noted that in certain areas of out-migration in Kenya “the available land cannot maintain an adequate standard of living or even support improved living conditions” (1968c:185). He concludes that either because of poor agricultural lands or excessive land fragmentation and the resulting inability of available resources to support the growing population, out-migration results. Another well-known example is that of the valley of the Senegal River. This area has experienced high out-migration rates during the last thirty years. It is believed that these migratory movements have been the result of survival needs rather than of a desire for monetary income, as the region is plagued by serious economic subsistence problems. High rates of population growth during the previous 50 years have been blamed for aggravating these problems (Lerricollais, 1975).

High densities are not always synonymous with out-migration. Boserup (1965), for instance, postulates that the adoption of new labour-intensive methods of cultivation might help alleviate the pressures of population growth on available resources. She argues that an increase in population density through population growth will hasten the adoption of more intensive methods of farming. If this were the case, high population densities may in themselves have a positive impact on the introduction of new agricultural techniques, and in some cases an increase in population density may lower the outflow of migrants. High densities have been observed in some mountainous areas where high returns per acre are reached through crop rotation, mixed farming, use of manure, and erosion control. However, with intensification, productivity per worker tends to be low in these areas, although productivity per unit of land increases. Van de Walle (1972) has shown that Boserup’s theory may be valid until a point is reached when higher population densities cease to contribute to further labour intensification. In the case of the island of Ukara in Lake Victoria, higher production per unit of land was obtained years ago through an intensive system of cultivation. High population densities initially favoured these more intensive systems of cultivation. Eventually, however, as population growth continued, critical densities were reached on the island.
earlier in this century, and out-migration resulted. Note, however, that the case of Ukara island is a very special one as its history of agricultural intensification occurred with a fairly constant level of technology and within a very self-contained land unit.

Also, the interrelations between high population densities and cultural or ethnic factors must be considered. For example, in his study of the relations between population and resources in the Sine-Saloum (Senegal), where there are signs of population pressure, Gubry (1972) found that the Wolof migrate more easily than the Serer, although the latter were experiencing a higher population density and a lower standard of living. The author explained the different rates of out-migration by the attachment of the Serer to their land (a quasi-religious attachment) and by the fact that the Wolof accept the effects of population pressures less easily.

In many regions of Africa where fertilization and the fight against erosion are not yet underway, higher population densities seem to contribute to the pressures on the land and hence to soil deterioration and erosion (Hance, 1970; Allan, 1965). At the same time, it appears that primitive or inappropriate technology is the major cause of the declining land quality, for even in regions of low population density there are often signs of misuse and overutilization of the land (Gourou, 1970:70). This is especially true in areas where soil conditions are initially poor, where agricultural practices (such as “slash and burn” clearing of the land) are excessively destructive, where rainfall is light, and where the forest cover has been stripped away for firewood.

It may be tentatively concluded that higher population densities sometimes encourage agricultural innovation and improved farming techniques, but not always. Under poor soil, climatic, and technological conditions, even low population density can contribute to the destruction of agricultural potential. Under such conditions population growth may be considered a “cause” of agricultural problems and out-migration, given, it should be remembered, current agricultural techniques. Farming innovations can well result in increases in the carrying capacity of the land.

**Intervening Mechanisms**

**Income Differentials**

Many studies of rural-urban migration in Africa have emphasized economic factors as being the most important motives leading to migration. Various theoretical approaches have been used to investigate the impact of economic differentials as determining factors in migration. Some of these are the Schultz and Sjaastad hypothesis, which focuses heavily on the benefits and costs of migration (see, for example, Sjaastad, 1962); the Kuznets’ interpretation (1964), which emphasizes the selective character of migration and its role in economic development; and the theoretical perspective that highlights “push” and “pull” factors, such as outmoded land tenure systems, wide dispersion of income, and the “bright lights” of the city, dating back to Ravenstein (1885 and 1889).

Of peculiar relevance to the African context is the hypothesis postulated by Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) that incorporates many of the elements of the Schultz-Sjaastad theory and is consistent with the
conceptualizations of Kuznets and Ravenstein. Todaro and Harris have hypothesized that the decision to migrate to an urban area, for example, reflects the urban-rural income differential and the urban unemployment rate, with the former effect being discounted by the latter. Thus, the likelihood of migration is reduced when the possibilities of obtaining an urban job (as reflected in the prevailing urban unemployment rate) is low enough to discourage workers still in the rural sector from moving.

Presented below is a review of some of the studies that have assessed the effects of income differentials on migration. It must be noted that in many studies the estimated income differentials between rural and urban areas tend to exaggerate the actual levels, since monetary income is a very small component of total income in many rural areas of Africa. As a result, in urban areas many services and goods have to be purchased that in rural areas can be obtained through more traditional exchange practices. Boserup (1970) claims that the failure of national accounting systems to take into account the nonmonetary contributions of the subsistence sector of the population tends to exaggerate the actual income differentials. Ghanaian immigrants to urban areas make this point very clear when they note that in town life “everything must be paid for” (Caldwell, 1969:97), even the housing, which in rural areas one can either build or acquire very inexpensively from relatives or friends.

The above reservation aside, certain conclusions can be made regarding the influence of income differentials on internal migration. Income differentials and their apparent increase between the towns and villages are a decisive factor in the growing exodus to the cities. Under ideal circumstances, policies intended to reduce the gaps in income levels between rural and urban areas may be implemented. However, there are few indications that such policies are presently favoured by African governments. To the contrary, to date all wages and income policies are intended for the benefit of the salary- and wage-earning group, generally found in urban areas, to the neglect of the nonwage-earning group of the population. These considerations underscore the key points emphasized in Todaro’s hypothesis and suggest that the wage differential between the modern urban sector and the traditional rural sectors provide strong incentives for rural-urban migration in Africa.

Many attempts have been made in Africa to assess the impact of income differentials on migration. Some of the studies have relied on the use of regression analysis. Rempel (1970), for example, attempted to test Todaro’s model with data from Kenya. In Rempel’s regression, the pulling effect of income differentials (as estimated by comparing the differences between the expected real income streams anticipated at origin and destination) as a determining factor on internal migration did not prove conclusive. The results indicated that a barrier to migration was distance and the costs of moving. The majority of migrants (84%) listed lack of jobs and land as the primary reason for leaving their rural homes. There was some evidence that clan contacts in destination areas attracted migrants.

A more recent test of the Todaro model by Godfrey (1973) with Ghanaian data produced some results that tend to disprove Todaro’s hypothesis. Godfrey found that during part of the Nkrumah years in Ghana (1960-65), the rural-urban income differentials were reduced and the difficulties in obtaining a modern sector job increased. Yet rural-urban migration did not seem to have
been reduced. In this case neither a reduction in wage differentials nor higher urban unemployment rates were sufficient to lessen the rate of rural-urban drift.

Greenwood's (1969) regression study with data from Egypt suggests that income differences play an important role in internal migration in that country. The results of the study showed that a one percent increase in wages in the region where a migrant originates, assuming all other things remain equal, retards migration by 1.406%, while relative increases in destination wage rates, also holding other variables constant, encourages a 0.651% increase in migration. Since the direction of net migration is away from low wage regions toward high wage regions, the eventual result should be a reduction in regional wage differentials. The study concludes that income differentials have indeed declined substantially in Egypt between 1952 and 1960.

Mabongunje's (1970, as cited in Byerlee, 1972:7) findings for Nigeria in 1953 contradict the predicted relationship between income differentials and migration. His findings suggest a negative effect of income differentials on migration and a positive effect on education. Mabogunje has postulated that the obtained negative relationship between income and migration occurs because of attempts to colonize the relatively poor, sparsely settled interior of the country.

Other regression studies that may be cited are those by Sabot in Tanzania and Leir in Sierra Leone (both studies noted in Byerlee, 1972:7 and 9). Both studies produced inconclusive results although the Tanzanian study suggested that education had positive effects on migration and that, in general, rural-urban differences in per capita income had a significant and positive effect on migration.

As noted above, distances between areas of origin and destination appear to be closely associated with income differentials and the propensity to migrate. Distance as a factor influencing migration has been discussed by many authors. A number of studies show that there is an inverse relationship between the probability of migrating and the distance between origin and destination. For instance, Greenwood (1969) found that in Egypt a 10% increase in home wages deters migration as much as a 13.3% increase in distance. Beals et al. (1967:484) in determining the rationality of interterritorial migration in Ghana, did a regression analysis that showed that a 16% increase in distance between origin and destination deters migration as much as a 10% increase in incomes at origin.

As Beals et al. (1967:481) notes, factors other than transportation costs between origin and destination are operative in the negative effect that distance has on migration. Differences in food and dietary habits, social practices, and other variables are surely related to distance and may independently serve to inhibit migration. The exclusion of these variables in analysis may tend to falsely exaggerate the estimated importance of transportation costs as a deterrent to migration. The concept of distance as conventionally used serves as a proxy for unmeasured variables (such as cultural and language differences), and assesses primarily only the factor of moving costs. As the evidence above suggests, few definitive conclusions can be derived when reviewing the studies in Africa that have attempted to assess the effects of
income differentials on internal migration. Some of the causes of contradictory results include the poor quality of the data on which many of these studies are based. For one thing, most of these studies rely on secondary data, not ideally suited for detailed analysis, and secondly, the available data tend to be used at a highly aggregative level. Aggregating the data into large political units (usually provinces or states within a country) obstructs the analysis of many relationships, as the procedure tends to combine heterogeneous population subgroups to which generalizations do not apply. As a result the standards of prediction are poor. Matters are further confounded because there is insufficient data on economic indicators and also because noneconomic variables are ignored in building a predictive model. In addition, attention is not generally given to nonmonetary income components that have the effect of reducing measurable income inequalities. Finally, it must be remembered that these studies generally fail to take into account overall development strategies and other factors, while concentrating primarily on the most immediate antecedents of the decision to migrate. This often makes it difficult to interpret the research results within the framework of broader development policy alternatives.

Noneconomic Determinants of Migration

Education

The effects of education as a determinant of internal migration can be viewed from two perspectives. The first one is whether different levels of educational attainment are associated with different rates of migration. The second is whether a desire to acquire higher levels of education leads to migration from rural to urban areas where educational facilities tend to be located. In many cases, both dimensions may interact.

The desire to acquire education for one's own self and for one's children appears to be a strong motive for rural-urban migration. Caldwell's (1969:87-119) findings in Ghana showed that both the rural and urban people sampled mentioned furthering one's education as one of the main motives for moving to the cities. Roussel (1970:240) reports on a 1968 village survey in the Ivory Coast where 33% of males and 20% of females between 15 and 29 years of age born in villages had left the land for the cities. Those who had completed primary school were more likely to leave than those who had not. Sixty-one percent of the males and 75% of the females with primary school certificates left their villages to continue their education in some big town. Forty-two percent of males and 55% of females with some schooling, but without their primary school certificates left for further education. Of the illiterate group, only 8% of males and 11% of females left their homes to continue schooling in the big towns.

There appears to be a consensus among investigators that higher levels of education in rural areas, where skilled employment opportunities are fewer, act as a spur to migration. For instance, Caldwell (1969:113) found that 19% of the rural-born migrants interviewed in urban areas of Ghana stated that they had gone to the big town "because they were educated." However, other studies have come up with contradictory evidence. Beals et al. (1967:485) did not find any support for the simple hypothesis that dissatisfaction with life in the rural areas of Ghana increased with education. Another case, which does
not fit the generally observed pattern, is Greenwood's (1969:289) finding that levels of education in the areas of origin and out-migration are inversely related in Egypt. This suggests that higher levels of education act as deterrents to migration in that country. Greenwood's results should be interpreted cautiously, however, since they are based on the analysis of average levels of education at places of origin rather than on the educational attainments of individual migrants. High levels of aggregate schooling in a region often indicate a confluence of favourable development circumstances, which tend to attract even more well-educated migrants.

Perception of Rural and Urban Life

How the prospective migrants perceive living conditions in destination areas may have a decisive impact on migration. Generally migrants have a positive image of the town, although they tend to be aware of some of its disadvantages. Migrants are not only attracted to towns because of potential economic gains, but also by the favourable attitudes they have regarding city living. Deniel (1968) has noted that the attractions of the Ivory Coast for young Voltaics were reinforced by oral and written accounts of conditions there. Returning migrants were more inclined to speak about their success and their gains than about the problems and obstacles they had to face.

The influence of appealing pictures in the printed and other media is obvious, and it may begin at school with suggestive messages in textbooks describing some of the advantages of city living (Deniel, 1968). It has been noted that books used in primary schools often give a pleasant impression of the African towns. On the other hand, life in the rural areas is depicted as more difficult: work is hard, there are no roads, no stores, etc. Such images may tend to exaggerate some aspects of reality and underemphasize others, so that the potential migrant bases his decision to move on a somewhat distorted overall picture.

The Presence of Friends and Relatives in Urban Areas

Many migrants are influenced by the immediate security (and knowledge of labour markets) afforded by the presence of contacts such as friends and relatives in urban areas and by the belief that these contacts can help the migrants move fairly easily into jobs after arrival. Caldwell (1968:367) showed that there is a very strong statistical association among both males and females in Ghana between the presence of some rural household members in the town and the likelihood of other members visiting the town. The probability of becoming a rural-urban migrant appears to increase directly in response to the number of members of the household already in town. The size of the source village and the economic condition of the household also appear to have a direct influence on migration.

Other Factors

Many other influences have been identified as likely determinants of migration from rural to urban areas as well as to migrations from rural to rural areas. Some researchers, such as Caldwell (1969:90) and Deniel (1968:80) have found that migration may be stimulated by an expected rise in social prestige. Cultural opportunities and the availability of "more things to do" in towns are also reasons cited by migrants for their decision to move.
Certain more immediate factors are known to be responsible for large population redistribution movements in Africa. A well-known example was the drought in the Sahelian zone of Africa during the early 1970s that led to the temporary displacement of thousands of people. Disease infestation such as river blindness and trypanosomiasis has led to population withdrawal in some parts of West Africa. Examples of such resettlements occurred in Nigeria, Zaire, and the islands and low-lying shores of Lake Victoria in Uganda and Kenya (Hance, 1973:170).
Part II

Migrant Characteristics

The personal characteristics of the migrants are important from two points of view. First, they aid researchers in understanding the determinants of migration. Second, the personal characteristics of the migrants will have a direct impact on both the sending and receiving communities.

The literature on the characteristics of African migrants is relatively extensive; however, more is known about the characteristics of migrants than about nonmigrants, and more is known about the characteristics of rural-urban migrants than about those of rural-rural and "return" migrants who have left the towns to go back to their villages. Generally, rural-urban migration is a selective process. Migrants tend to have demographic, social, and economic characteristics that distinguish them from the nonmigrants. In Africa, migrants are predominantly young adult males with somewhat higher educational attainments than their peers. They are more likely to come from wealthier homes and from regions of higher population density. Some of the principal characteristics of migrants within Africa are reviewed below.

Age

The propensity for rural residents to migrate to urban areas is selective of age. The typical migrant in Africa is a young adult. In Ghana, for example, Caldwell noted a concentration of migrants in the 15-19 age-group (1969:59). Rempel (1970:21) noted a preponderance of migrants in the 20-25 year age category in his sample of urban Kenya, while Callaway (1967, cited in Byerlee 1972:4) found that three-quarters of the migrants in Ibadan, Nigeria, were school leavers between 15 and 25 years of age.

The greater tendency for young people to migrate as compared with the rest of the population can be explained by certain factors. Most of the migrating young adults have neither established their own families yet nor made occupational commitments. In some African regions conflicts between generations also lead to the out-migration of the young. The young who resent the authority of chiefs and traditional elders may believe that the city will provide a place of "freedom." "Make I go Freetown — Make I go Free" was a reply given to Banton (1957:57) by young migrants when they were asked why they migrated to Freetown, the capital city of Sierra Leone. Migration may also be promoted among the young because of the lack of money to pay their annual poll tax, or as a rite of passage — an initiation into adulthood. Some young males also migrate to earn enough money for their bride prices through wage employment in the city, as well as for the prestige accorded them for their experience in the big town.

Sex

Several studies of migrant characteristics have noted higher proportions of adult males in relation to females in migratory currents in Africa. Caldwell
(1968:368; 1969:58) makes this point in his studies on Ghana where in 1960 Accra had over 20% more males than females who were born elsewhere in Ghana. Forde and Harvey (1969:20) noted that the 1963 population census for Sierra Leone showed that a sizeable proportion of the total population of Freetown was constituted of adult male migrants.

Male predominance in the migratory streams is not universal. Cultural factors can and do have a significant influence on the sex composition of migratory groups. For example, Podlewski (1975:559) notes that in the Cameroons “female mobility is everywhere more important than male mobility.” He attributes this pattern of sex differentials in migration to the fact that most clans practice exogamy in order to avoid consanguineous marriages. Since “the members of a same clan are usually united in the same villages, and as the wife usually goes to live in the husband’s clan, a great volume of female migration is recorded.”

More recently, there have been some indications that the female shares in rural-urban migration are on the increase (Caldwell, 1968:369). This occurrence, it has been suggested, has resulted from changes in the traditional roles of women that have taken place in Africa. As the attitudes toward women’s roles have changed so have the rules that formerly precluded female migration to towns. However, the significance of either sex in the migratory streams appears to be heavily influenced by cultural, economic, and ethnic variables. Roussel (1970:240), for instance, found in his study of some villages in the Ivory Coast that contrary to findings in other parts of Africa, more females than males migrated from the rural to the urban areas. This was particularly true among the better educated. Among illiterate villagers, 8% of the males and 11% of the females had left the land, and of the literate villagers 42% of the males and 55% of the females had out-migrated. These results may reflect the prominent role of women in urban marketing and the retail trade in the Ivory Coast. Other factors are likely to be involved as Ghanaian women are also very active in marketing, but more males than females migrate from rural to urban centres in Ghana. One of these factors, as Boserup (1970) has suggested, is the role of women in agricultural production. In certain ethnic groups in Africa women are the main agriculturalists and this factor alone may preclude their migration (while encouraging the out-migration of males). Conversely, women in other ethnic groups who participate to a lesser extent in agricultural tasks may not be as constrained in moving to the towns and cities.

Skill Levels Among Migrants to Urban Areas

The greater tendency for better educated rural youths to migrate to urban areas, both to continue their schooling and to find employment related to their skills has been widely observed. Some typical studies that have observed a positive relationship between migration and education are Caldwell (1968:370; 1969:69) for Ghana; Rempel (1970:26-27) for Kenya; and Sabot (1972, as cited in Byerlee, 1972:9) for Tanzania.

Closely related to the educational dimension is that of occupation. The African literature on migration does not clearly establish whether rural occupational differentials play a role in selecting out-migrants. It may be surmised that some selectivity based on occupational skills may be operating, as the evidence from educational levels suggest. In any case, and for most of
Africa within the rural areas, it appears that occupational differentials are relatively unimportant because of the predominance of agriculture and farming.

**Kinship and Ethnicity**

The ethnic and kinship characteristics of migrants have been analyzed in studies by Banton (1957) and Little (1969), among others. Of relevance to this review, however, is evidence that rural-urban migrants are attracted to areas where they find friends, relatives, and members of their own ethnic groups. This pattern is reinforced by the existence of voluntary ethnic associations in the cities. In certain cities there are distinctive quarters set aside for ethnic groups such as the Hausa quarters in the predominantly Yoruba areas in the east of Nigeria. Frequently, kinship ties lead to the migratory process that has been described as chain migration. The importance of this mechanism in rural-urban migration is exemplified by the fact that, as the migration process is initiated by a household, a succession of migrants either related to the original migrating household or connected through ethnic or residential links, follows.

**Place of Origin**

Migrants to large cities may arrive directly from their places of birth or may reach their final destination after a series of moves. Since most of the African population is rural it would appear that most migrants to large urban centres arrive in a single move. However, it is not easy to reach a definite conclusion since the evidence for Africa on this dimension of internal migration is meagre. Caldwell (1969:46-47) found that the great majority of migrants to suburban areas of large Ghanaian towns arrived from rural areas. Yet close to 25% of the native-born migrants (born in Ghana) claimed to have come from cities with over 10,000 inhabitants. Caldwell indicates that this result should be interpreted cautiously since interviewers found a tendency on the part of the migrants to exaggerate the size of the localities from which they came. Caldwell (1969:46) concluded that “…the tendency to migrate to the country’s largest towns rises with the size of the centre of origin. It is greater from a medium-sized town than from a large village, and in turn greater from a large village than a small one.” This conclusion and the fact that the majority of the migrants arrived from rural places suggest that many migrants do not arrive in a single move, but rather in sequential stages.

**Stage Migration**

In Africa, as in other developing regions of the world, many migrants reach their final destination only after a sequence of moves. Distance, expectations, and exposure to urban conditions, just to cite a few factors, influence the migratory behaviour of individual migrants. Forde and Harvey (1969:20) noted in Sierra Leone that initially people move for a short distance from the local area to the local town or regional capital. The local inhabitants speak of this short distance migration as moving from “my home village” to “my home town.” If conditions are not suitable there, the migrant may decide to move to the capital city. However, the migrant may choose instead to move to a bigger town, and as a result the arrival in the capital city of Freetown may take place after two or more stages.
Cyclical Migration

Associated with the concept of stage migration is that of cyclical migration. For example, a final move to a destination may be preceded by temporary moves to that same place. The ebbs and flows of agricultural work may lead some individuals to go to cities during those times of the year when agricultural labour demands are low. Cyclical migrations also occur from one rural area to another, depending on the time of the year and the agricultural demands for labour.

The most definitive patterns of seasonal migrations are established in West Africa. They follow a north-south axis, since the fertile forest belt is located east of longitude 13°W. The more important north-south movements include: Mossi migrants into southern Ivory Coast and southern Ghana (Skinner, 1965); Hausa migrations into southwestern Nigeria and southwestern Ghana (Prothero, 1968); migrant labour from northeastern Ghana to Ashanti cocoa belts (Fortes, 1971); and migration from southern Mali into southern Ivory Coast. Important east-west movements include Ibo migration into southwestern Nigeria (Udo, 1974); the "navetanes" (strange farmers) who migrate seasonally from Mali and Guinea into Senegal and the Gambia; and Urhobo migrations into the Yoruba cocoa belt (Udo, 1974).

The migrants find work in areas as diverse as the coffee and cocoa regions of the Ivory Coast, Ghana, and western Nigeria; in the iron ore and diamond mines of Sierra Leone and Liberia; and at ports and major towns like Dakar, Abidjan, Accra, Kumasi, Lagos, Ibadan, and Freetown. There is no detailed information on the different forms of transport and times taken in various journeys, but these are relevant factors in the timing of migrations, which in West Africa are annual events. Migrants leave home to seek work between late September and November, when work on the harvest has been finished, and return the following April or May to cultivate their farms at the onset of the wet season. Distinct seasonal changes in climate permit migration to be well integrated into the annual cycle of activity.

Labour migration in central and southern Africa is atypical as it involves workers on much longer absences from home, generally for between one and two years. However, there are some seasonal movements such as the migrant labour from the mainland to the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba for the clove harvest (Hance, 1970:152-153). The patterns of movements are less well defined than they are in West Africa. In general, migrants from poor areas seek work in those that are comparatively well developed. These include areas of cotton cultivation in Buganda, the Kenyan highlands, the sisal estates of Tanzania, the copperbelt of Katanga in Zaire, Zambia, and the Witwatersrand in South Africa as the main foci of attraction.

In South Africa the migrants normally work for a period and then return to their region of origin in the Batustans (reserves). In this case there is no permanent shift of population. When one man has completed his period he returns home, and his place is taken by another migrant, and the migrations continue. At their homes in the villages, the migrants are engaged in primitive agriculture or pastoral pursuits of the traditional economy. In the cities they are part of the economy with its wage labour, modern factories, and trains. Within their lifetime migrants may alternate between the traditional rural
context and membership in an industrial proletariat. Houghton (1960:179-181) examined about 193 employment histories and sketched the life of a hypothetical typical migrant in South Africa who spent more than 60% of his working life from age 16-47 in employment away from home (interrupted by annual or biennial visits home). In these 31 years, he had 34 different jobs, remaining an average of 47 weeks on each job.

Other migratory movements, which also may be labelled as cyclical, are those of the nomads who practice transhumance searching for pasture and water with their animals. In some countries of Africa the importance of these types of migration is considerable. Dankovssov et al. (1975:684) estimate that in Niger nearly 600,000 Tuaregs and Fulani are constantly on the move throughout the year as they travel between the semidesert regions and areas of arable land. These nomadic people amount to over 20% of the total population of Niger.

**Return Migration**

Return migration is important in Africa and is explained to a large extent by the social and cultural traditions and the land tenure systems of the African people, as well as by economic institutions that evolved during colonial times. The cyclical migration movements observed for African labour in South Africa are just one example of some of these migration patterns. The cultural factors, however, in most of Africa play a decisive role. Caldwell (1969:185) puts it as follows: “to most West Africans the ancestral village remains home.” Most migrants return home and even while in the city they maintain a link by visits and participation in ancestral worship. The land tenure system in most of Africa is such that land is communally owned in trust whereby returning migrants can claim rights of use. The lack of social and old age security compels some migrants to maintain a rural link in case they ever need or desire to return to their place of birth. Caldwell (1969:188-189) and Ominde (1968a) note that after the age of 45, the number of returning migrants exceeds the number of migrants leaving the village.
Part III

Consequences of Migration

It is difficult to make an assessment of the consequences of internal migration in African countries. Only during recent years have analytically oriented studies appeared in the literature. To a great extent, the study of internal migration in Africa has been hindered by considerable data limitations, if not by their complete unavailability. It is also true that research methodologies required for assessing the impact of population movements on social and economic structures in sending and receiving areas, as well as for assessing its impact on the total socioeconomic system, are not well developed. This limitation applies to Africa as well as to the rest of the world. Moreover, whatever analytical techniques have been devised have only been partially adapted and applied to the study of the consequences of internal migration in African settings.

In general, most studies that have touched upon the consequences of migration in Africa have emphasized the consequences on receiving areas (see, for example: Banton, 1957; Gugler, 1968; Gutkind, 1969; Kuper, 1965; and Little, 1969). The social and economic implications of migration in rural areas of origin have received less attention. This state of affairs reflects not only a general urban bias in studies of internal migration, but also methodological problems. One instance that illustrates these methodological drawbacks are the difficulties inherent in attempting to measure family income in rural areas where most agricultural production and consumption is within the household or local community. The domestic income component bypasses the money market, making its proper measurement relatively uncertain.

Studies assessing the impact of internal migration on the total socioeconomic system are sorely lacking. Practically without exception all that we have are commonsense speculations based on fragmentary results obtained in local studies or on theoretically derived relationships. The same is true of most of the work on consequences on areas of origin and destination. The following sections survey some of these limited empirical findings and theoretical speculations emphasizing those that have a bearing on social and economic development.

Consequences in Rural Places of Origin

Since rural-urban migration is selective of certain characteristics it affects the composition of the population in both sending and receiving areas. Out-migration areas lose a disproportionate percentage of the younger and better educated population. As a result, the proportion of the total population economically dependent increases as the relative share of productive workers is reduced. The consequences of the out-migration of the young and educated population on rural productivity and social progress are unknown. Studies seeking to evaluate the magnitude of actual losses of population and their
impact on the rural economies are scarce, but some tentative findings and speculations suggest that out-migration may have both beneficial and detrimental effects on rural areas.

**Agricultural Labour Force and Productivity**

A frequently made claim is that the loss of able-bodied men from the rural areas results in a reduction of the total agricultural product (or agricultural productivity) and in a general deterioration of the local agricultural system (Skinner, 1965; and ILO, 1969, as cited in Vaidyanathan, 1974, pp. 26-27). In these studies, the authors have noted a decline in agricultural productivity in rural areas experiencing heavy out-migration. Although the empirical association between falling agricultural productivity (or even total production) and out-migration in these and other studies seems clear enough, no cause and effect relationship appears warranted. Other factors besides out-migration may be placing strains on agricultural production — soil erosion, population growth and density, environmental changes, etc. — and hence may be responsible for both lower agricultural productivity and out-migration. In this regard, out-migration may be principally a consequence of decreasing opportunity in agriculture.

The few studies that have sought to examine the problem of out-migration and agricultural production suggest that the negative consequences of out-migration on agricultural production are not very drastic. It seems that the rural families and communities adapt to minimize any detrimental results. Watson's (1958, as cited in Gugler, 1968:480) study of the Mambwe in Zambia noted that men in one kinship group had worked out a system whereby work was shared by the nonmigrating men while others were away. In many cases female workers took the place of the absent men from the farms and the community handled the planting and harvesting. Another case of an adjustment mechanism used by rural communities to compensate for out-migration has been documented by Kane and Lericollais (1975: 186). They observed that in Sominké villages in Senegal experiencing high out-migration (between 30 and 40% of the male working population had left), the remaining population hired outside workers to help with the agricultural production. Nevertheless, the input of the seasonal salaried workers was insufficient to make up for the loss due to out-migration and the resulting decrease in cultivated land surface.

Other studies, at a more speculative level, have postulated that under certain conditions out-migration may result in increased productivity. Harvey (1972:171) in assessing the effects of internal migration in Sierra Leone states that:

"... in the area of out-migration, pressure on land resources is reduced, and the marginal productivity of labor may even increase. If the marginal product of the out-migrants from this region is lower than the average for the area, per capita income might increase among the remaining labor force."

**Urban-Rural Remittances**

Urban-rural remittances is an important topic in migration studies that has not been thoroughly examined. There are gaps in our knowledge, which do
not allow us to make a fair estimate of the volume of cash involved in these transfers, or of their economic importance. This weakness is due in large part to a lack of statistical information although some attempts have been made to quantify the flow.

Caldwell (1969:142-143) has estimated that in Ghana remittances in 1963 may have amounted to as much as £16 million or 3% of the national income and a considerably larger fraction of that within the cash economy. Since the largest percentage of these remittances go to rural Ghana it is fair to say that this wealth transfer from urban to rural areas should play a key role in the process of economic change in the country.

A more recent study by Johnson and Whitelaw (1974) studied the extent of urban-rural income transfers in Kenya. They found that 89% of the male migrants in Nairobi having an income sent money regularly to their homes out of the city. The average amount remitted was 85 shillings per month or close to 21% of the respondents' urban salaries.

It could be assumed from the findings of these studies that remittances are making a substantial contribution to the rural economy, but this assumption may be unwarranted; we do not know enough about the magnitude of rural-urban transfer of cash and goods in most countries. Even less is known about how the remittances are used by the rural communities. The importance of this topic and its past neglect may make it a prime candidate for future research.

**International Remittances**

At the level of international migration, Boeder (1973:42) suggests that if the nearly 300 000 Malawians abroad (1966 census) were all repatriated within a year, the country's economy and political stability would be severely strained. Between 1959 and 1964 remittance payments alone flowing into Malawi from South Africa, Rhodesia, and Zambia were generally in excess of £1.5 million per year. Net capital inflow to Malawi from migration was higher, as migrants also returned with savings and goods purchased abroad, and made other investments in their home country. Between 1965 and 1967, the average annual net capital inflow to Malawi from South Africa, Rhodesia, and Zambia was £2.4 million. Migrant income was the third most important source of foreign earnings, behind tea and tobacco. These figures do not include money and goods brought home by individual migrants.

Perhaps without the remittances and other earnings of migrants from Upper Volta now living in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta would be much worse off than it is today (Hance, 1970:197). Hance (1970:160-161) also mentions that receipts to migrant workers from Lesotho, South Africa, and elsewhere in the form of voluntary deferred pay, remittances, and money and goods brought home that year amounted to $6.1 million. However, recent immigration and political policies adopted by several African countries suggest that immigration remittances per se cannot be relied on as a permanent solution to economic problems of sending areas.

The money sent to the areas of origin by migrants does not necessarily contribute to the economic development of those regions. For instance, it is very likely remittances are rarely used to increase agricultural productivity by the acquisition of modern agricultural equipment. Kane and Lericollais
(1975:186) in their study of the Soninké migration to France observed that money sent to the villages is used to pay the wages of seasonal agricultural workers and to buy cattle (as capital, not as an agricultural investment). Although a portion of the money is used to buy agricultural equipment, it is not the sort of equipment that would allow new cultivation methods to be developed and which could lead to increased productivity. Finally, a large portion of the migrant’s savings is invested in areas other than the rural places of origin. For example, some is invested in real estate in the capital city, Dakar (Kane and Lericollais, 1975:185).

**Return Migration and Rural Modernization**

Return migration is one strong feature of population movements in Africa. This backflow of temporary and permanent returnees to the areas of origin is believed to have contributed to some marked social and economic changes. Caldwell (1968:377) notes that an urban-rural human network on a national scale has been created, which has made the diffusion of social and economic changes in rural areas comparatively easy. The ideas and money brought back by migrants has given encouragement to the villagers to provide goods and services for sale. Dorjahn (1968:59), in his study of the effect of labour migration in Liberia has suggested that return migrants introduced the first real alternative to village life, brought a broader perception of the world, and contributed to rising expectations. Most of the technology and capital needed for cash cropping — cocoa, coffee, rubber, and seeds — were secured by migrant labourers. There were also organizational changes in the household of return migrants as a result of exposure to an urban way of life. For example, there was the gradual development of cash retail trade, as many local producers put up their goods for sale to serve local needs.

One study by Kane and Lericollais (1975:187) reached different conclusions regarding the consequences of return migration. They concluded that the Senegalese returning home from France did not contribute to rural development because the limited skills they had acquired in France were useless in the villages. Furthermore, the returnees tended to invest their savings in urban real estate and consumer goods.

**Other Consequences in Rural Areas of Origin**

Other effects in African rural areas of origin that have been postulated are more tentative. Byerlee (1974:559-560), for instance, claims that out-migration has negative effects on areas of origin since it leads to substantial capital transfers from rural to urban areas. He observes that:

> “The highly selective nature of rural-urban migration with respect to education indicates that migration involves not only a transfer of labor but also a considerable transfer of capital from rural to urban areas. Given that education represents a significant proportion of investment of African rural households, the currently high proportion of unemployed school-leavers in urban areas represents a misallocation of investible resources away from agricultural production ... Clearly, rural-urban migration has implications for educational policies particularly expenditure on rural education and the rural-urban orientation of school curricula.”

Another probable effect postulated by a number of authors is that out-migration tends to reduce the population growth rates in rural areas. The
most obvious and direct mechanism through which this may occur is by the disproportionate removal of the population of family formation ages. In the African context, where cyclical and temporary rural-urban or rural-rural migrations are very common, other mechanisms capable of producing declines in the birthrate have also been suggested. The fact that husbands are separated from their wives for fairly long periods is believed to be responsible for lower fertility levels in certain parts of Africa. Addo (1975:407) notes that this effect has been used to explain the relatively low fertility found in northern Ghana.

Consequences in Urban Places of Destination

The rural-urban exodus of migrants in Africa has led to the rapid growth of towns and cities. While the overall proportion of the population living in urban areas in Africa is low relative to other developing regions, such as Latin America or Southeast Asia, the African experience has led to the same policy problems. Underemployment and unemployment and expanding areas of makeshift housing are all highly visible in the cities.

The literature contains a wide range of opinions on the potential consequences of rapid urbanization. Some authors emphasize the more negative results over the short run, while others foresee eventual favourable consequences. Segal’s views (1972:280) are representative of those held by researchers who highlight the detrimental effects of rural-urban migration:

“The rapid growth of shanty towns on the periphery of large cities leads to the spread of disease, which strains the medical facilities of the average city far beyond their capacity. The masses of unemployed and underemployed youth in close contact encourage the spread of prostitution and crime, and political unrest, all threats to an ordered and peaceful community and to the stability of the government itself.”

These conditions are regarded as resulting from the creation of a far greater demand for employment and services than the public and private sectors can provide. In African cities urban growth has exceeded the growth of urban services. Inadequate supplies of housing, water, electricity, public transport, drainage, and educational and recreational facilities in urban areas are widely documented. In Morocco, for example, Hance (1970:283) found that over half a million urban residents lived in bidonvilles (slums) in 1960. Of these, 180,000 lived in Casablanca, while one-third of the populations of Algiers, Oran, and Annala were slum dwellers. These conditions undoubtedly place severe strains on the capabilities of local and national governments to provide needed urban services. On the other hand, it is possible that there are “some positive externalities of urbanization associated with increasing returns to scale in provision of public services” (Bylerlee, 1974:561).

The data on unemployment, housing shortages, and poverty in urban areas of Africa cannot be disputed. However, these facts cannot by themselves be taken as evidence that migration and urbanization patterns are leading to negative consequences for the people involved. The individual migrants themselves may see the situation quite differently. Banton (1957:146), for example, argues that “migrants prefer urban squallor to the more humdrum life of the villages.” It is clear that migrants recognize many of the disadvantages that they face in urban areas. Thirty-seven percent of Caldwell’s (1969:121) respondents in urban Ghana when asked whether town life was “just like you thought it would be” did not think so. Many noted that town life
was unexpectedly crowded, offered few jobs, and had high living costs. Even with such difficulties, however, most migrants already in the urban areas consider their plight to be temporary. These perceptions are consistent with what the typical migrant is — young, ambitious, and of above average education. These migrants appear to be consciously taking into account the costs and benefits incurred in migration and act as though they are planning to maximize their future returns. Whatever their failings, urban settings in Africa continue to provide higher incomes and greater opportunity than do rural areas; this, as was noted in the review of determinants of migration, is precisely the cause of continued movement from rural to urban areas.

Consequences in Rural Places of Destination

Migrants from rural to rural areas usually respond to many of the same factors that lead to rural-urban migration. However, the rural areas of destination generally offer few social services, educational opportunities, or “bright lights” that usually attract migrants. Thus, it would seem that migrants go where wages are higher or where lands are available. Not surprisingly, rural-rural migrants tend to contribute to increased production and to experience improvements in their own living standards.

The case of the Ivory Coast can be used to illustrate these points. In the Ivory Coast, migrants represent about two-thirds of the salaried labour force in agricultural activities, or 17% of all male workers in agriculture (Remy, 1973:19). It follows that the migrant labourers contribute significantly to the economic well-being of the Ivory Coast, and that they themselves are attracted to the agricultural areas by economic incentives. Ghana, which had a significant proportion of foreign migrant workers in its agricultural labour force, provided a good example of the contribution of the migrant labourers to its economy. When the foreign migrant workers were forced out of the country in 1970 agricultural production, particularly that of cacao, declined (Adomako-Sarfoh, 1974).

Colonization, either organized or spontaneous, may also be very important in rural development. The opening of new lands increases the total cultivated surface, and hence overall production (Remy, 1973:90). If the additional land brought under cultivation is great enough, it can compensate for the problems associated with poor quality soils. Extensive agriculture at low levels of technology may result in better labour productivity than intensive agriculture (Van de Walle, 1973: 195). For example, in Senegal, peasants involved in a colonization project were able to farm larger areas with fairly primitive equipment. In the new lands, yields were particularly high for groundnuts, which require extensive land surfaces.

While some colonization projects in Africa have been judged successful, others have failed. Dubois (1971:146) notes that a settlement may fail when credit for seed and equipment is inadequate. Sawadogo (1975:18) notes that in one case, the farmers used their earnings to buy consumer goods and did not reinvest them in additional lands or in better technology. Berry (1972) found that in Tanzania small agricultural development schemes were relatively successful in spite of serious difficulties.

Overall Impact on the Economy and Society

At this level of analysis the literature on internal migration in Africa is extremely weak. Except for some very rare exceptions, most references to these
consequences are conjectural. Mabogunje (1972:242) and Segal (1972:281) assume, for instance, that the rates of population growth for a country as a whole should decline as a result of rural-urban migration. They believe that this would occur as rural migrants internalize urban values of lower fertility. Segal also assumes that rapid urbanization should lead to earlier industrialization. Other authors have postulated that rural-urban migration contributes to modernization. It is claimed, as reviewed earlier, that return migration is one of the ways by which migration contributes to accelerated modernization. Another mechanism mentioned is social mobility; rural-urban migration by facilitating upward social mobility helps to erode the grip of tradition.

A very recent macroeconomic study in Morocco (Mertaugh, 1976, mentioned in Gaude and Peek, 1976:331-332) is apparently the only instance in which the system consequences of rural-urban migration in an African country have been empirically analyzed. The results of the study, summarized by Gaude and Peek below, suggest overall beneficial consequences, although through differential impacts on rural and urban economies. Mertaugh found:

"... that higher rates of rural-urban migration lead to an increase in total real income in Morocco and that, as a result of these higher rates, the share of urban goods produced in the traditional sector increases and the growth rate of agricultural output declines."

These results, however, should be accepted cautiously. Data limitations and the assumptions generally required in econometric modeling may affect the final outcomes.
Part IV

Policy Implications

There is an assumption widely held by African politicians and government planners that more emphasis should indeed be put on the improvement of agriculture and rural services as a way of more effectively distributing human and capital resources. Not surprisingly, most countries in Africa attempt to integrate important national development projects with the goal of improving agricultural production and rural services. One stated or implied consequence of these developmental policies is the reduction of the rural-urban differentials that to a large extent are responsible for the rural-urban exodus. If these goals were achieved not only would the agricultural sector benefit, but also the pressures currently being experienced by the cities would be reduced as less rural inhabitants would move there. Yet, there are many obstacles to actually implementing such programs in a fruitful way. The following examples discussed at an Economic Commission for Africa (United Nations, 1973) special seminar on statistics and urbanization are indicative of some of the policies currently pursued by African nations geared to economic development and the elimination of regional inequalities.

National Development Projects

The Economic Commission for Africa’s report includes many examples of such projects, particularly those involving the damming of rivers for electric power, flood control, and irrigation. The Aswan project in Egypt is a classical case. Farmers were moved out of the zones to be flooded by the new lake and resettled in areas where new lands were being opened through irrigation. The Volta Dam in Ghana followed a similar pattern. Beginning with the 1970-71 Development Plan, Ghana has pursued other programs to improve the road network, spread rural electrification, and provide other inputs to rural areas. In Nigeria, the Niger Dam placed heavy emphasis on improving fishing, controlling floods, and fostering development in adjacent rural areas.

Population Distribution Programs

Policies favouring rural development are widespread in Africa; however, in only some cases have they been pursued with a strong enough administrative resolve and sufficient funds to have a clear impact. Intensive efforts, moreover, tend to be rather recent in origin, hence it is not yet known how intensive a program must be in order for it to have success. A potentially interesting comparison could be made between Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia, three East African countries with rural development programs. Of the three, Tanzania has the most intensive program, but in the African context, both the Kenyan and the Zambian programs seem relatively strong. Tanzania has focused heavily on resettlement of rural peoples in its program. In its second five-year plan (1969-74), for example, it included plans for the resettlement of the landless Wachagga families from Moshi into the Mwesi highlands. More
recently, the resettlement program has been greatly expanded and now includes obligatory movement of thousands of scattered farm peoples into nearby villages and new settlement areas. The villages and new settlement areas are, according to the current development plan, to be focal points for expanded services, including agriculture extension activities. Kenya's and Zambia's programs have a more diffuse orientation. The measures in Kenya include: rural extension programs, redistribution of land, and settlement programs. Zambia noted the heavy migration of rural peoples to Lusaka and Kabwe in the 1963-69 period, and the 1972-76 National Development Plan placed emphasis on rural roads, schools, hospitals, clinics, and other facilities to stem the outflow.

We may conclude that there is a strong interest in Africa in rural development and that, in some nations at least, this is closely related to emerging population distribution policies. The impact of various rural development schemes and national development programs on population distribution in Africa is not known at the present time. This reflects both a research weakness and the recency of some of the projects and programs. Fortunately, at least some research on these topics seems to be currently underway.
Asia
Introduction

Much has been written about internal migration in Asia. The phenomenon is intimately associated with the process of economic development and this review will attempt to summarize, compare, and criticize how others have tried to relate the two. Since migration and the factors of growth interact, one must approach the subject from two perspectives: how development variables have affected migration; and how population shifts, in turn, have influenced economic growth. In fact, one may take the position that there is a mutual interaction between migration and development.

Most of the works included in the bibliography were written on the basis of what was collected in the most recent censuses. In many cases, few reliable censuses exist prior to 1960. Before that, many of the studies were either classical or geographical surveys carried out for academic purposes; few were oriented toward policymaking. Some of these works are included as a necessary part of the historical perspective. What follows will be an attempt to trace the research trends apparent in selected nations of the region. It is impossible to do this for all of them and some of those reviewed are incomplete.

For example, Thailand offers a typical progression of research on migration in the region. Before 1960 only limited studies were conducted as data and interest in the topic were scarce. Representative of some of the earlier work is Textor's (1956) study of the northeast samlor (pedicab) drivers. Migration research received considerable impetus when the results of the 1960 census became available. Much research was done on the Bangkok area, especially by Sternstein (1971) and Goldstein (1972a). The census also aided a number of Thai researchers testing for the causes of migration using multivariate tabular or regression studies (Siripak, 1965). Thomlinson completed the first full-scale monograph on Thailand's population in 1971 including a thorough discussion of migration.

Other countries in the region have shared similar research experiences, where the study of migration initially focused on the village and changes occurring there. This was followed by descriptive analyses of the patterns of movement using the first dependable censuses. By the 1960s a number of developments occurred. One was a focus on the implications of migration for the metropolitan urban centres. This produced a number of studies of urban squatter communities. Another was a desire to explain migration using multivariate statistical analysis. Seldom were these approaches combined.

Some national and linguistic groups are not adequately covered in this review simply because the search failed to reveal any relevant reports. Southeast Asia, Burma, and Indochina appear to have been relatively ignored by those interested in internal migration. South Asia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and
Ceylon (Sri Lanka) have received very little attention, in contrast to that lavished on India. In the Near East, only Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq are covered. There have been studies done in Iran but these were not available.

Language presented little difficulty as most of the significant works found are written in English. Some Korean articles and several official Thai documents were not read because no translations were available. Indonesian literature presented the greatest obstacle because a number of works were written in Bahasa Indonesia or Dutch. Almost all of the work done on the Indian subcontinent and in the Philippines is in English.
Part I
Determinants of Migration

In this section some of the main factors that have been used to account for internal migration in the Asian region are reviewed. As may be presumed not all contributing factors have been equally studied; more emphasis has generally been placed on the more immediate determinants of internal migration. One result has been that a number of very important influences have been neglected, such as influences associated with structural characteristics determined by exogenous economic forces, which while not immediately related to internal migratory movements can be regarded as antecedent conditions through which other factors operate. In the review of causes of internal migration, consideration will first be given to the structural factors related to foreign economic forces followed by a review of other structural parameters. Lastly, some of the mechanisms through which the structural factors exert their influence will be analyzed.

Structural Factors

Foreign Economic Influences and General Development Strategies

Most of the analysis done on Asian migration treats it as a dependent variable — how population shifts are affected by factors of socioeconomic development. However, a fitting introduction to a review of the literature on the topic might be a discussion of where such prolific research has been weakest. From it, one can gain an important insight into why more needs to be done on a seemingly well-documented aspect of the subject.

The consensus among economists is that, in great part, the world is an “open system.” That is, most nations depend on each other to survive and the economic affairs of one nation are intertwined with those of her trading partners. Therefore, it seems to be a blatant omission that those who concern themselves with studying the movements of labour forces should disregard the external sector (international trade and payments) in their analyses.

This is not to say that social scientists have been completely unaware of the problem. The Asian literature reviewed showed that some authors realized the existence of an important link between foreign trade and labour migration. Withington (1967) mentioned that overcrowded Java’s main vent for her population surplus, the island of Sumatra, earns 70% of Indonesia’s foreign exchange. Only 16% of its population is engaged in secondary or tertiary sectors. Cummings (1974) attributed the dramatic change in migration from the southern Thai provinces to changing world market conditions for tin and rubber, the chief resources processed for export. In 1960, 12 of the 14 changwads (provinces) in Thailand were areas of in-migration. By 1968, as a result of lowered demand for rubber, 13 of the 14 claimed greater out-migration.
Huge foreign institutions, such as American military installations, have also made their mark. Reforma (1972), for example, suggested that the growth of the Philippine cities of Olongapo and Angeles is due to the fact that both are just a stone's throw from American Pacific defence bases.

However, many authors who do mention the effect of the external sector on migration are largely preoccupied with more immediate causes of migration, such as employment. They do not trace the thread of causality another step to the foreign conditions that may have provided either the capital or other incentives to boost job opportunities. Would they, they might find that vast internal policy measures designed to control and direct population flow are being counterbalanced and frustrated by external factors beyond direct governmental control.

Aside from deliberate policy measures, a change in the market for a country's exports occasioned by the development of a cheaper substitute, could also dislocate people. The impact on migration of a world decline in demand for natural rubber in Thailand was mentioned above and one suspects that similar repercussions must have occurred in Malaysia and Indonesia.

Finally, the all-important aspect of international investment needs to be examined. Domestic investment itself is only lightly treated in the literature reviewed and the paucity of information on external capital flows is even more alarming. Frequently, less developed countries are so eager to pile up foreign investment that the spatial impacts of such changes on population trends go unrecorded. The location decisions of foreign firms, such as Dole in the Philippines, has led to the burgeoning of new towns and the increased congestion of established cities. Also, one must note that the military investments in bases such as Clark in the Philippines and Udorn in Thailand, are supplemented by indirect boosts, such as the freewheeling spending patterns of sailors on shore leave.

In conclusion, although it may still be domestic employment that ultimately determines migration, one must also consider whether or not those opportunities were provided by foreign or domestic capital, for the policy options may be different.

**Land Distribution and Agricultural Productivity**

National resource allocation has been considered a possible determinant of migration. Most important in this respect is the distribution of cultivable land. Population pressure is the most cited of all land-related factors. It is often mentioned as the "push" component in many of the works that use "push-pull" approaches. Authors using this approach argue that many migrants, especially those of low status, have little information on their ultimate destination and, hence, population pressure on the land may be the primary cause of out-migration.

Agricultural technology supposedly influences ownership but Gelia T. Castillo (1972) found that those involved in a change of ownership status during the Green Revolution cited factors other than dispossession by landlords. However, she did not elaborate whether or not these changes caused any movements. Oya Ozyurekli (1970) mentioned that the massive gulf between rich and poor in land ownership (9% of the population owned 51% of
the land) in Turkey meant a lower per capita income, which in turn influenced migration. However, no studies were reviewed that attempted to research any direct links between land tenure and population shifts.

Some macro-type studies also attempted to gauge the carrying capacity of the land. However, many such measures are misleading and may give the wrong impression of actual conditions. Wertheim (1964) pointed out that simply dividing the number of acres of cultivable land by the population would be inaccurate. For example, in Indonesia, as in most of Asia, there are two types of cultivation used: swidden (slash-and-burn) dry agriculture, which requires a great amount of land, and paddy rice farming, which uses the soil more intensively. Thus, directly comparing the yield per capita of Sumatra and Java, where the two types are practiced, would be completely meaningless.

Studies have also been done comparing productivity differentials between regions. The TURA report in the IDRC-supported Cooperative Regional Development Project (1970) measured the gross domestic product of Thailand by industrial origin in the four economic regions and compared them with migration statistics. They found that agricultural productivity (yield per rai) was lowest in the region with the highest rates of out-migration. The southern region, its annual income supplemented by mines and quarrying, declined in its rate of in-migration as gross domestic product fell due to price declines. The central region had the highest annual rate of growth led by an expanding manufacturing sector but, since the national capital area was not included in the division, the region lost migrants to Bangkok anyway.

Sicat (1972) also showed interest in this type of analysis and found that, for the Philippines, regions with low output growth rates were those experiencing net outward movements in population. Regions with high total growth elasticities, on the other hand, were those with high in-migration rates, which implied that Philippine labour was indeed responding to employment opportunities. However, the author did not reach any major conclusions about migration since his interest in population shift was limited to one chapter in a book concerned with the country's total economic growth. Nevertheless, the method of relating regional economic growth variables to migration would seem to be a worthwhile task.

**Intervening Mechanisms**

**Modernization of Agricultural Production**

The decreased availability of land can theoretically be offset by investing in technology to intensify cultivation (Widjojo, 1963). In lessening the population pressure on the soil, migration can be stemmed. However, Pravin Visaria (1972) noted that if the labour-displacing effects of technical change exceeded the employment-creating effects, then migration would surely result. Further, the movement could very well depend on the status of tenure. Agricultural innovation should be added incentive for the landowners to stay put. But what of the landless labourers whose jobs are being taken on by more efficient machines? And what of the tenant farmers whose leases are terminated by the owners once they start turning in a profit?

The information for the region — and there is not much of it — is mixed. Visaria (1972) seemed to believe that the landless workers in India created a great deal of internal movement after the so-called "Green Revolution."
However, the data based on a survey carried out in only two villages in Ratnagiri was not sufficiently convincing. Nothing was said about the effect on other classes. Gelia Castillo (1972) noted that in the Philippines, with the exception of high-yield rice varieties, agricultural innovation has not been extensive enough to influence labour force participation. She did note that areas with desirable worker/land ratios paid higher wages, improving the economic lot of resident labour. Roger Montgomery (1973) suggested that control of water resources was needed in Java in order to permit effective utilization of the new techniques. The problem there was in allowing the land to be available for a second or third crop and this could be helped by producing new rice varieties. New rice strains did not have any effect on agricultural employment because they were only meant to make Java self-sufficient in rice. Prachuabmoh and Tirasawat (1972) shared the same views about northeast Thailand as the excessive dryness of the land, without the technology to harness and use water resources, made the people subsistence farmers.

Thus, there is little direct evidence to suggest that the agricultural innovations have had a direct influence on migration.

**Income Differentials**

The emphasis that many analysts place on this particular factor is underscored by Robin Pryor's (1969, p. 74) statement that:

"The level of economic development of a country is integrally linked with the nature and magnitude of employment opportunities, and positive growth in these spheres is causally related to the initiation and development of migration patterns."

Many of the studies reviewed for the Asian region simply assume this "causal link" and, after documenting the various patterns of population flow among the regions within a country, they attempt to see whether these flows are consistent with the location of employment opportunities. This approach is widely used in attempting to explain rural-urban migration. In fact, one author (Eames, 1969) even defined economic development as the transfer of a portion of the labour force from rural agricultural production to urban manufacturing processes. Rural-rural flow is sometimes explained in these terms but with additional indices for underemployment (such as the per capita income level).

Traditional economics has always reserved a niche for labour migration in its theoretical framework. At the heart of it all are the W. A. Lewis (1954) and Fei-Ranis (1961) models that hold that employment opportunities and/or a constant wage differential will cause a transfer of labour to industrialized sectors of the economy from agricultural ones. Since labour presumably had only zero marginal productivity in rural employment, such a transfer must lead to an increase in productivity. The resulting surplus is gained by the employer, who either invests it himself, or who is taxed by the government disposing of the funds according to the country’s development priorities. The employment differentials between the rural and urban sectors of the economy should disappear but the fact that unemployment persists in the former and grows in the latter has prompted further explanations.

These traditional models were given a new twist when the concept of expected wealth differentials as a cause of migration was introduced. It was
not the actual level of wages or income at the place of destination that attracted migrants, but what they expected those levels to be in relation to their present standards. Thus, unemployment at the destination of a migration stream could be incorporated into the theoretical framework. Harris and Todaro were among the pioneers in exploring this aspect. They theorized that an expected wage, which depended on a nominal minimum wage discounted by the urban unemployment rate, prompted people to move to urban areas. When this expected wage was greater in the urban than the agricultural real wage, there will be urbanward migration.

Among the criticisms leveled against this textbook type of approach, Turner's (1970), is that rapidly rising wages often induce factor substitution (capital for labour) leading to added unemployment. Further, the wage distortion could cause misallocation of labour resources. It is also questionable whether agricultural labour does have a marginal productivity that is close to zero. Warriner (1970) warned that one must distinguish between two types of surplus. On the one hand there is unemployment caused by seasonal variations in the demand for labour. On the other hand, labour underutilization can result over a period in which population increase is greater than the increase in agricultural productivity, all other factors being equal. Thus, the labour force may be fully employed at peak seasons and its marginal productivity may not be zero.

Larry Sjaastad's (1962) human capital formation approach is an alternative that looks at the migration decision as an investment. Using this approach, one can predict the approximate levels of population flows by cost-benefit analysis: the costs of migration being both psychological and monetary and the benefits discounted over future time. Critics counter with the observation that potential migrants do not rely on such elaborate mechanisms as cost-benefit analyses and that it would thus be folly for academicians to assume that they do. Migrants frequently have little or even distorted information about their place of destination.

Others claim that a certain threshold income size is needed before people migrate. The ECAFE summary report (United Nations, 1968) concluded that the very poor are not the most likely to move and that there was “more migration from families in the higher income brackets than from those in the landless worker group.” (p. 29)

The theories noted above on the effect of various wealth differentials between regions of migration have been tested (with appropriate adaptations) in the Asian region. What follows will be a representative survey of the findings. The classical Lewis-type models have been tested in Asia (albeit not very thoroughly) and were found wanting. Mendoza-Pascual (1966) found that the so-called “vast pool of illiterate labour” in the Philippines, which made up the fluid surplus that was supposed to move to the jobs, did not have zero marginal productivity as previously assumed. Those who moved were better educated than those who stayed and their departure did have an impact on source productivity.

De Voretz (1968) also came to the same conclusion using regression analysis. He tried to predict migration with a regression equation using the relative differences in per capita income in the sending areas, the relative aggregate income growth rates (to measure expectations) and distance (to
measure costs and information). He also tried to predict migration using absolute differences in wages and growth rate between the sending and receiving areas.

He found that the income growth rates that represent employment opportunities were insignificant in affecting migration, thus explaining the employment problems at the points of destination. Using Sjaastad’s human capital approach, he then measured Philippine migrant response to income differentials netted for cost, considering distance and the level of education. He concluded that only very large income differentials induce people to move, and that such income gains are available only to the educated migrants. The surplus productivity that these people generate is not absorbed by the employer because their marginal productivity is greater than zero. Larry Sternstein (1974) confirmed these findings for the Bangkok area where rural-urban migration is not “a drift to the city of disendowed and uncertain rural folk” but is movement for jobs already secured or for schooling.

The most quoted article that incorporates Sjaastad’s approach for the region is Alden Speare’s (1971) work dealing with migration differentials in Taiwan. He attempted to test two hypotheses: that monetary factors have more of an effect than nonmonetary ones in determining migration, and that background variables (such as age, sex, or education characteristics) are not important in affecting it, once other factors are controlled. He concluded that a person is more likely to move if the present value of all future monetary benefits from moving is greater than the monetary costs involved. The results supported both of his hypotheses and thus it is the expected change in income that accounts for the decision to migrate.

Perhaps the best of the regression studies is Michael Greenwood’s (1971) on internal migration in India. He found that the difference between discounted present values of income between areas of origin and destination were particularly significant in long-term migration, although distance was found to be an important intervening variable. The latter is indicative of the high costs of moving in a large country such as India. In Thailand Thavorjit (1973) used four different kinds of earning differentials as variables: the ratio of provincial earnings to national earnings including and excluding the national capital. She concluded that pull factors caused migration patterns in Thailand.

Several useful studies do not depend on regression equations to assess how the income and expenditure patterns of migrants may have affected their movement. Textor’s (1956) delightful account of differences in food and clothing consumption, savings patterns, and the habits of the northeast pedicab drivers in Bangkok is an example of this. Goldstein (1972a) observed that, although the monthly income levels per person in the village and Bangkok are considerably different (24 Baht as opposed to 876 Baht), the number of people working per family would make a substantial difference in the latter but not in the former. So, in Bangkok fewer members per family are in the labour force. Padki’s (1964) study of out-migration revealed that, at least with regard to Bombay, it is not the higher income level of households that attracts migrants but the higher salary of the principal wage earner. This is because these male wage earners tended to move and the rest of their families
stayed behind. The same can be said of Bangkok’s pedicab drivers or the visiting maids of the Visayan Islands of the Philippines.

The main reason migrants give for moving is the availability of higher paying jobs at the urban places of destination, where most of the studies were carried out. Lee Man Gap’s (n.d.) survey of migrants in Seoul noted that 17.1% of those who moved did so for job-related reasons (looking for or taking a job). The second cause was educational opportunities, either for the migrants themselves or for their children (15.3%). Then came political reasons (fleeing communists) (8.7%) and poverty at the rural source (7.4%) (p. 8). Thammasat University’s social work survey (1971) had an even stronger bias for employment opportunities. About 80% of those interviewed in the slum area of Klong Toey came to Bangkok to find a job and another 30% were there for job reassignment. Kinship was the next highest migration-inducing factor at 9% and only 1% of the interviewees gave education as the primary reason for moving. Further, 31% chose to live in Klong Toey because it was near where one or more members of the family worked (p. 71). Many other studies done in the urban places of destination echo these results although the proportions are also quite varied. Employment opportunities are always ranked at the top of the list, as the primary inducing factor in helping people move.

The surveys carried out at the rural source generally give contrary results. Typical among these is Gaur and Nepal’s (1962) study that found that 61.1% of those they interviewed in eastern Uttar Pradesh gave poverty at the rural source as the primary reason for wanting to move. Another 11.1% cited increases in family size. Although these potential migrants may be the same ones who might give employment opportunities at their urban destinations as the primary reason, once they have moved, it is significant that they have little notion now of what awaits them in the city. Padki (1964) differentiated between older migrants to Bombay who had since returned to the villages and younger ones who were aspiring to move. The older ones listed inadequate family occupations at the rural source as their primary reason for moving and also mentioned their preference for jobs in Bombay. The newer migrants, however, mentioned the fact that they had been assured jobs in Bombay as the primary reason, followed by a preference for work in that metropolis. Inadequate family occupations only ranked a distant third. No studies were reviewed of urban areas as a source of migrants.

This is as far as the literature goes in trying to test the relevance of academic theories in Asia. Many other authors who try to explain why people migrate in terms of “differentials” start their articles by exposing the inadequacies of the “push-pull” approach to the problem. However, for one reason or another, they usually manage to rely on this tug-of-war methodology for their analysis anyway. Some are limited to very simple observations about the abject poverty at the source and the numerous opportunities available in the place of destination. Others resort to elaborate regression models. The emphasis on each is different; some citing employment differentials as the determining factor; others, income, and still others, wages. Each wonders whether their pet factor acts as the source to push people from misery (because they are still unemployed and miserable after the move) or at the destination to attract them with the promise of a better life (because they were not that badly off before the move). Generally, and not surprisingly, out-migration studies
emphasize the role of "push" and in-migration studies, "pull." It seems to be a matter of where the study is done for perceptions of alternatives are strongly influenced by place of residence.

Noneconomic Determinants of Migration

Social Change and Conflict

In the multicultural and arbitrarily bounded nations of Asia, social conflict has always had something to do with the movement of peoples. Most of the studies dealing with such phenomena have been by socioanthropologists, historians, or political scientists as social conflict is difficult to quantify and has been ignored by more quantitative sciences.

Perhaps the most comprehensive treatment for the region is by Geoffrey McNicoll (1968). In studying the "nonsecular" trends of migration that he traced for Indonesia, he mentioned the population-displacing rebellions that plagued the country before and after its independence. For example, the Darul Islam movement, a Javanese revolt, sank economic opportunities in rebel held areas so much that the towns of Tasikmalajs and Bandung grew by 390 and 480% respectively. The PRRI / Permeta Rebellions in Central Sumatra led to heavy out-migration as troops of the central government took over. Goodman's study (1973) of Vietnamese migration and Sandhu's analysis (1964) of the Malayan Emergency are other examples.

A. Y. Dessaint (1971), in discussing the plight of northern Thailand, wrote that social conflict was only the immediate cause of migration. Observing villages there, he found that although the pressure of the land was an ever present factor, it took some social conflict, either within the tribe or without, to trigger the movement. On the other hand, Indian authors have always had the notion that the subcontinent's caste system has been a barrier to not only social but geographic and occupational mobility.

Political and ideological differences related to migration have received little attention in the literature. For example, racial disparity between the Chinese and other ethnic groups of southeast Asia has not yet been analyzed in relation to migration. McGee, in many of his works, discusses their occupational concentrations as opposed to Malays but no study of the Philippines, Thailand, or Indonesia reviewed does more than acknowledge their presence. However, even though it does not figure heavily as a cause for migration, its consequences still have to be studied in greater depth.

Ecological Changes

This area is one of the least covered topics in the migration literature for the region. Again, this seems to be an unforgivable oversight in a land of alternating monsoons and drought. Doris G. Phillips (1959) indicated that the once fertile but now salinated soils of the southern and central region of Iraq have led to increased levels of migration from there to the northern sectors. However, this is the only statement that accounts for changes in man's natural environment. Wertheim's (1964) classical geographic article described the changes wrought by the dry-rice farming methods of the native Sumatrans.

Aside from changes in soil quality and natural disasters, there are also those wrought by man such as defoliation, massive flooding resulting from dam construction, and others.
The Role of Population Growth

Many studies cite "population pressure" as one of the main factors leading to internal migration. Yet, in few instances do researchers bother to define it or to analyze it. As a result, little in the way of a definite conclusion can be drawn from the work reviewed here. Ulack (1972), for example, did incorporate this variable in his research on the influx of Visayans from the central regions of the Philippines to the south. Elvira Mendoza-Pascual (1966) devoted a whole monograph to the problems caused by population pressure in the Philippines. She used the idea of the "carrying capacity" — the ratio of noncity population to cultivated farm areas. She then traced the migration flows within the region.

Many anthropological and semianthropological studies which confine their research to the area of origin explain out-migration by population pressure. Cunningham (1958) noted that the massive Toba-Batak exodus from the Lake Toba region of West Sumatra to the coastal urban centres of the East was due to the lower income levels resulting from population growth. Inadequate land combined with a high birthrate led to the moves by the Toba population, most of whom felt that they were entitled to the empty colonial plantations of the eastern flatlands. A. Y. Dessaint (1971) studied the migration of the Thai Lisu minority in the highlands and found that their migration decision, although considered at length because of the lack of additional agricultural lands, needed a catalyst — such as a family or tribal quarrel to set it off. Gaur and Nepal (1962) surveyed two Indian villages and even attempted to measure the pressure: the villagers were found, on the average, to work from 1.6 to 3 acres per household with a large proportion of the people being landless.
Part II

Migrant Characteristics

Many studies link the causes of migration to the characteristics of those who take the initiative to move. What follows will be a discussion of various migrant characteristics to reflect how they have been used to relate to causes.

Age

The general consensus is that those who are most likely to move are the young adults either eligible for work or eager for marriage. For example, Mendoza-Pascual remarked that the highest level of migration in the Philippines tended to be in the 15-24 age-group for males and 20-24 for females. The national average was in the 20-24 age-group. Wen Lang (1972) found a similar pattern in Korea. Lee Han Soon (1971) also noticed an older peak for female migrants and calculated that 83.5% of them were under 39. Prachuabmoh and Tirasawat (1972) noticed that, in Thailand, 41% of "first movers" were in the 15-24 age-group while only 18% of the population could be included in that category (p. 47). There did not seem to be any studies which disputed these findings in the other countries of the region.

By far the most cited explanation for these patterns is the employment opportunities available for the 15-24 age-group. They are frequently underemployed in the rural homestead but feel that in urban areas they are likely to find jobs.

Another frequently cited explanation is the "bright lights" theory. Analysts simply assume that the younger people are eager for a taste of life outside the isolated village. Other researchers have postulated that young people are more likely to migrate because they have not established a family although the relationship between marital status and migration is not clear.

Other explanations frequently mentioned include dissatisfaction with the family work, or a long-standing tradition for the young males to go off to find fortune before returning to the village with the proper bride price. These explanations are usually elicited from unsuspecting migrants interviewed at the place of destination. Some are just the result of speculative commonsense musings of an author.

Sex

The general trend found for the region does not run contrary to one's expectations about newly developing countries. One hypothesis suggests that as migration reflects a response to employment opportunities, the less developed a country is, the more dominant males would be in migration streams. This is explained by the assumption that females would be more restricted in their movements by traditional societies while modern influence would erase most of these taboos.
Most Southeast Asian data show a majority of male migrants. The distorted sex ratio found by Eames (1969) in India that biased the population of urban centres in favour of males is a representative finding. There are exceptions, however. Chief among these are the data for the Philippines that showed that females are more migratory than males, no matter what the distance. (This is evidenced even in international migration to places like Canada, where Filipino nurses and other female migrants outnumber males leaving their country by 4 to 1.) As Dr Yun Kim (1972, p. 16) explained:

“This is perhaps related to the fact that the Philippines is more westernized and modern than other neighbouring countries; Philippine women are perhaps more likely to pursue their careers independently in places other than those of their birth.”

The data for Korea also show a converse trend from the expected “norm.” The data for Thailand are confusing: Sternstein (1974) argued that there was a heavily male-dominated trend toward the urban employment opportunities. However, this is in complete contrast to the TURA (1976) report and to Pryor’s (1969) data that, especially in the 15-19 age-group, females were more dominant.

There have been few studies testing the age-old Ravenstein hypotheses that females are more migratory than males in short distance moves, but that the reverse is true of long distance moves. Pryor (1969) suggested that such a statement cannot be confirmed for Asia and he hypothesized that “females tend to predominate in short distance moves and in the later stages of the development of a migration stream, while males tend to predominate in long distance and pioneering moves, and in the earlier stages of the development of a migration stream.” Ulack (1972) seemed to confirm similar findings for the Philippines.

Differentiating between male and female migrants is a task given very high priority in most migration studies. However, attempts to explain why sex selectivity should be relevant have been inadequate. The greater tendency of women to move as development levels increase, seems to be an all too simple gauge for economic development. Of course, sex selectivity could have important repercussions in the birthrate and, consequently, in employment patterns at both source and destination. However, most analysts do not treat this in detail.

Skill Levels

The data for the region in general seem to indicate that those who migrate are not the “dregs of society” or the vast pool of illiterate labour, which classical models might predict, but the ones who are relatively more educated than those they leave behind. Michael Greenwood’s regression study of India (1971) found that the coefficient for educational level in the region of origin was positive, highly significant, and suggests that “in India the propensity to migrate does indeed increase with increased education” (p. 148). Prachabmoh (1972) estimated that in Thailand 10% of the country’s migrants have 7 or more years of school as compared to 2% for nonmigrants (p. 32). Malaysia showed the same results.

The reasons given for this high degree of educational mobility include the greater number of employment opportunities and the amount of information
available to the educated ones. Schooling may also reduce the importance of
tradition and family ties as the student becomes aware of other values in other
places. The ECAFE (1968) report's conclusion that the tendency to migrate
increases with the length of formal education is therefore not surprising.

The evidence also suggests that not only do the educated ones migrate but
they move to areas with already high levels of education. This is especially true
of the rural-urban flow, such as to Bangkok or Manila where the finest
institutions of higher learning are located. However, since the location of the
educational and employment opportunities are often one and the same, it is
hard to tell which incentive elicits the greater response. One would suspect the
latter more than the former for most age-groups.

The question of whether or not certain professions tend to employ more
migratory personnel has produced a number of answers for the Asian region.
Consistent with the notions that: (1) migrants tend to be more educated than
their stay-at-home counterparts; (2) that a certain threshold income size needs
to be reached before undertaking a move; and (3) that it takes a certain amount
of adventuresome dash to shake a peasant loose from his native moorings; the
bulk of the literature seems to agree with Prachuabmoh and Tirasawat's (1972)
conclusion that those in the lower occupational levels were, on the whole, less
mobile than those in higher levels. They found that only 18% of the farmers,
but 54% of the government officials were multiple-move migrants in Thailand.
As previously mentioned, Richards (1972) in a study of migrant workers in
four urban factories concluded that the unskilled workers tended to be more
stationary after finding their first job.

The reasons for occupational differentials are many. First of all, if
farmers were included among those in the lower status (and they often are),
then they would tend to be immobile, especially if they own the land they till.
Officials, on the other hand, are subject to the fickle fancies of bureaucracy
and are shifted according to the governmental need. Secondly, low class
workers have less information about job availability elsewhere and, since they
are mainly unskilled, are never quite sure that they will find employment once
they pick up their stakes. Thirdly, there is the frequently quoted suggestion
that "traditional" people are less mobile. The modern Asian is supposedly
unfettered by the ties that bind his poorer brothers to the places of their birth.

However, there have not been many studies done that confirm whether
or not the perceptions of the migrants correspond with the macro-opportunity
structure. In the case of rural-urban migrants, the migrants responded to the
promise of job opportunities and, given the higher urban unemployment rates,
it would seem that many were deceived by their instincts. However, the
Thammasat University social work survey (1971) found that although
the migrants to Bangkok were still classed as low income earners, they
were earning more than the national average and a full 92% of those who
wanted jobs had them. Laquian (1972c) in a survey of six Philippine cities
found that the slum and squatter dwellers, although some have no regular
sources of income, appeared to be more progressive than their relatives who
stayed behind. There is still a definite gap in the analysis of the urban
socioeconomic structure and whether or not migrants have the proper view of
it. Most studies simply assume that they do not.

Simkins and Wernstedt (1971) commented on the subject concerning
rural-rural migration. The ideas of the Visayan movers seemed to be consistent
with the opportunities in Mindanao. However, there is evidence that, once a tradition of migration has been established, the ideas about a prospective destination still linger, long after those opportunities have disappeared. Again, the literature did not elaborate further and certainly, some work needs to be done to test migrant aspirations.

There have been more detailed studies that narrow down the occupational differentials to specific professions. Stoeckel and his colleagues (1972) revealed that most migratory professionals in Bangladesh are business people, mill and office workers, the self-employed, and servants. Wen Lang (1972) for Taiwan and Visaria (1972) for India agreed with the most commonsensical conclusion, that those engaged in the transport industry were the most likely to move. Donn Hart (1971) drew up several tables for the out-migrants of Barrio Caticugan and the maids outnumbered all other categories. A notable exception that argued that the process of migration added to the burden of India’s poor, is Bogue and Zachariah (1963). They provided a list of “migrant-hiring” and other industries in West Bengal, which supposedly confirmed that a large share of migrants were stuck at low status jobs. However, this did not mean that they were not better off than before or that they were enjoying a higher standard of living than their rural relatives.

Occupational differentials can also be analyzed from another angle. Visaria (1972) noted that out-migrants from a certain Indian village, once they reached the place of destination, tended to work in the same occupation. Textor’s (1956) study of the pedicab drivers from northeast Thailand is of course a perfect example of this phenomenon. This is most likely due to the geographic and traditional structures of society that made the people specialize in a profession. It could also be indicative of the educational level attained and on the personal or family “contacts” used in finding jobs.

Kinship and Ethnicity

Relatives are one of the most important links for the potential migrant. They provide information and material support prior to the move and also play an important supporting role after arrival in the city. Simkins and Wernstedt (1971) noted that many of the Visayan villagers of the central Philippines, who moved to the fertile and uncrowded homesteads of Mindanao, did so at the urging of close relatives. Eames (1967) concluded in his study of urbanward migration from a North Indian village that “the joint family system operation in the village enhances rather than hinders the movement of the married male” (p. 177). Although the migrants interviewed by the author did not take their families with them to Bombay, they still found it easy to migrate because the loved ones left behind were still cared for by the traditional extended family system prevalent in many societies. Thus, their incomes were greatly enhanced as one or two members earned rupees in the city while the rest tilled their native soil. Bruner (1961) also discussed the family's role in easing the psychological, as well as monetary, demands of migration as movement in Sumatra, from Batak villages to Medan, evolved into a steady interchange over the years.

Another factor that interacts with migration in much the same way as kinship is ethnicity. Textor (1956), in his analysis of the Bangkok pedicab drivers from the northeast, remarked that “in his native village, the
Northeasterner belonged to a social structure that was stable and integrated, and served to meet most of his felt needs fairly well” (p. 20). Thus, because of the long tradition of migration from the northeast, the potential pedicab driver knew that he would be working and living with others who were accustomed to similar habits. Further, he always had a good deal of information from those who returned and doubtless envied the prestige they enjoyed upon their return to the villages.

Some analysts also seem to think that some ethnic groups are inherently migratory. The Ilocanos of the Philippines are probably the best example for the region. These hardy men, who till mountainous and largely infertile soil in the northwestern coast of Luzon, have occupied diverse places and positions over the years, from taxi driving in San Francisco to assorted responsibilities in Malacanang, Manila’s presidential palace. Yet, one must be reminded that an ethnic group is not inherently migratory because of genetic wanderlust, but because of socioeconomic conditions — such as poor soil — that have forced a tradition of movement to evolve.

Analyzing the effects of kinship and ethnicity cannot be vigorously done unless one correlates migrants with the number of relatives or former townspeople at the place of destination as Speare (1971) did. Most of the published material is based on simple observation of human nature and one suspects that the evidence will be limited to that for a long time to come.

**Stage Migration**

The only Asian work that tests stage migration for the region is McGee’s (1971a) study. He concluded that “historically Southeast Asia has not followed this pattern entirely” but he did not produce hard facts to back the statement up. He ended the section by saying that “until further evidence is available, a conclusion on the patterns of Southeast Asian step migration will have to be left in abeyance” (p. 108).

Return migration and cyclical migration can be added to the long list of processes ignored by Asian analysts. Prachuabmoh and Tirasawat (1972) confessed that “there is a scarcity of knowledge about the extent of return migration” although it is obviously important in providing information to future migrants. Cyclical migration has even been less adequately treated; knowledge is limited to Textor’s (1956) statements about the periodic return of pedicab drivers to Bangkok in agricultural off-seasons.

**Origin of Migrants to Rural Areas**

“Farm-farm” migration is discussed in the Asian region. However, the bulk of the research has tended to be anthropological or semianthropological in scope with microlevel observations often substituted for data. Others are policy-oriented papers that set out to test whether or not a government’s attempt to redirect migration back to the countryside has been fruitful. The works of Paul Simkins and Frederick Wernstedt on the Philippines are probably the best examples of all those that deal with rural-rural movement in the region. They followed up the well-known trend to migrate from the central Visayas to Mindanao and found that many of the migrants were rural settlers. There were few documented attempts to study patterns of migration other than rural-urban.
Part III
Consequences of Migration

Consequences in Rural Places of Origin

The movement en masse of a group of people from a community has dramatic effects on the demographic characteristics of those left behind. The movement also influences the social and economic growth of the place of origin. Little has been written about this phenomenon, however. Some vitally important questions are still unanswered, as research is still directed at documenting patterns of migration, migrant characteristics, and causes of migration. Some of these questions include: have the returns to labour increased or decreased? Has the productivity of the land changed? Has population pressure been eased? Have possible scale economies been so depleted that further capital inflow has been made unprofitable? Have remittances raised per capita income? Have employment opportunities changed? The research has indeed been incomplete on these aspects of Asian migration.

Although many articles detail the demographic characteristics of migrants, few of those reviewed carry the analysis a step further to compare the “before” and “after” conditions in the place of origin. Most are limited to comparing the patterns found among migrants with those of nonmigrants. Such data may be useful in forming the policies needed to control and direct population shifts. However, the effect of those shifts on the structure — the “feedback” effect — has tended to be relatively overlooked. Migration’s other aspect, as an independent variable affecting socioeconomic growth, has thus not been adequately studied. For example, little evidence has been gathered to show whether the movement of people from a particular area has led to an older, less educated and predominantly female population remaining there. There have been studies on rural-urban differentials in age, education, and sex, such as those carried out by Prachuabmoh and Knodel (1974), based on their interpretation of the data from the Thai longitudinal survey. However, it is uncertain whether these differentials can be attributed fully to the effects of rural-urban migration.

Little attention has been focused on the effects that migration has on changing the sociodemographic characteristics of the areas of origin. Most efforts in this direction have been limited to examining changes in the level of “modernization” in the out-migration region. For instance, Schnaiberg (1970) found that the outlook and patterns of behaviour of those villages maintaining close contact with Turkey’s larger cities tended to be vastly different from those of their more remote counterparts. However, most studies are again limited to differentiating whether migrants exhibit greater or lesser levels of “modernity” than in-migrants, with regard to fertility or other aspects of social behaviour. Studies such as those by Goldstein (1971a) and Goldstein and Tirasawat (1972) show that in the case of Thailand there are vast differences between the fertility levels of the rural and urban populations. Yet little is
known about the effects of migration on fertility levels in the rural source areas: have they increased as the more “modern” residents move out or have they been lowered as a result of contact with more progressive practices of the urban places?

Changes in the composition of the labour force as a result of out-migration have important repercussions on the economic conditions of that source. If there is unemployment or underemployment, then migration may decrease the labour surplus and relieve the pressure for those staying behind. Per capita income might even go up. At full employment, the classical models postulate that wages should be raised by a decline in the labour force. More work is needed to verify or refute these theories in the Asian case. It must be noted, however, that a rapid rate of population growth may negate the potential unemployment-reducing effects postulated by the simple model.

The income-generating effects of migrant remittances are also very widespread. Large enough amounts might be the main impetus for regional economic growth. They can be used for consumer goods or to invest in capital stock, such as modern farm implements, to raise agricultural productivity. Remittances can also have a profound effect on further out-migration. In the case of migration to cities from agricultural areas they could lower the differential between rural and urban levels so that any incentive to migrate would be greatly diminished. On the other hand, this extra income could be just the amount needed to push the rest of the family above the “threshold” level and make them capable of surmounting the costs of migration.

Most of the studies on the effect of Asian migrant remittances are based on microlevel research. Typical among these is Donn V. Hart’s (1971) study of Barrio Caticugan. He found that many of the women working outside the barrio were sending remittances regularly and one had even sent so much that her parents were able to build a new house. Gaur and Nepal (1962) found that, as a result of these remittances, bank accounts were opened in rural India and many of the previously landless tenants were able to acquire titles. Visaria (1972) likewise found that cash remittances reduced the need for farmers to sell small surpluses and enabled them to generate savings. However, the saving was invested, not in agriculture, but in better housing, which seemed to be a more immediate need. Padki (1964) was probably the most systematic in his research. In a study of two Indian villages, he made salary comparisons based on a survey and a resurvey. He showed that remittances did indeed have an impact on the income level, although he did not mention any additional benefits.

Other aspects of the consequences of migration that need to be researched further include its effect on agricultural productivity at the place of origin. It is not clear whether a decline in the labour force has led to lower levels of output or whether a decline in labour surplus and the resulting higher wages has increased production, assuming that natural increase has not more than made up for the population loss caused by out-migration. The social implications of out-migration need to be explored as well.

Consequences in Places of Destination

Many of the same questions concerning the effects of migration on the place of origin can be posed for the place of destination. However, the
research has generally been weak in providing answers on consequences at either end of the migration stream.

Changes in the demographic characteristics at the place of destination can be effected by migration. Shifts in the age and sex composition of urban labour forces could, for example, influence the type of economic opportunities entrepreneurs might want to invest in. Another important aspect is education. Greenwood’s (1971) regression study indicated that migrants in India tended “to go to places that display relatively high levels of educational achievement” (p. 148). However, the evidence on whether they were more educated than people in those places, or whether their migration has had a profound impact on raising or lowering the overall educational levels in these same places, has been conflicting. Mendoza-Pascual (1966) in her study of Philippine population redistribution, was able to emphatically state that “migrants, on the average, were better educated than the population at places of destination. This is in accord with the universal urge to select a habitat where one’s qualifications are at an advantage” (p. 72). If one were to agree with Greenwood’s assertion that these places of destination already had the highest literacy levels in the nation, then migrants must indeed be the “cream of the crop.” However, others such as Bogue and Zachariah (1963), who compiled lists of migrant-hiring industries, found that they held the lowest-paying jobs. Either this means that there is gross injustice in the treatment of these well-educated migrants or the methods of analysis have resulted in discrepancies in the data.

In urban areas receiving rural in-migrants, the fertility of the migrants is expected to be higher than that of the native urban population, since the latter are exposed to more modern attitudes about family life. However, such is not the case with at least one country in the Asian region. Gerry Hendershot’s (1971) study relating cityward migration and urban fertility in the Philippines found that migration was so selective that those who came to Manila from other places had, on the average, lower fertility levels than those born in the metropolitan area. He asserted that the females who migrated had already been exposed to or were ready to accept the fertility-reducing values of urban life and it took only a short time for them to adapt. Thus, even though the newcomers still had higher fertility levels, these were more than counterbalanced by the lower fertility of older migrants. It must be noted that had controls for educational levels been used, the results may have been different. Goldstein (1971a) had similar results for Thailand: “compared to nonmigrants in their place of destination, the fertility levels of lifetime migrants are not very different; but those of 5-year migrants are considerably lower” (p. 37). There are two implications in this: movement to urban places has rapidly reduced the fertility levels for migrant women and, if there is movement out of the large cities to other parts of the country, migrants might lower levels there too. There is thus no evidence to show that the massive flocking of rural people into urban areas has led to greater fertility in the latter areas.

Migration can have profound effects on the types of economic opportunities available at the place of destination if it creates economies of scale that could result in the growth of capital investment in the area. It can also result in diseconomies, both social and monetary if unemployment persists as a result of the labour surplus. McGee (1971b) notices that Malaysia’s cities tended to attract a specialized work force of Malays who
knew the urban administrators and federal employers. The result has been a Malay-run government and a Chinese-run economy. However, most of the authors reviewed were more concerned with how economic growth impinges on population growth rather than the other way around.

In the case of rural-urban migration, many analysts warn that, even if rural-urban differentials are lessened, it is the urban wage rate that is falling to very unacceptable levels (Thavornjit, 1973). However, there do not seem to be any sure measures of wage and income and how these have been affected by migration inflow, although enough data have been collected to confirm the fact that rural-urban migrants' incomes have been enhanced at the places of destination. Textor (1956) for example calculated that some pedicab drivers in Bangkok earned enough baht to enable them to extend their rural homesteads in the northeast. Laquian (1972c) wrote that, although the average monthly income among squatters and slum dwellers in the Philippines was very low (P 150-250 per month), their economic condition was "quite acceptable to them, at least, compared with their original condition in life." (p. 88).

Thus, no matter how low on the economic ladder they are at the place of destination, rural-urban migrants have still enhanced their wage and income levels by moving. There is no evidence, however, that the in-migrants should be blamed for lowering urban wages to unacceptable levels since these are usually fixed in any case. Certainly a study should be done to compare urban wages "before" and "after" migration to see whether these significantly fluctuate with the supposed glut in the labour force occasioned by migration. Thus far, the only studies made have shown that the migrants themselves have enjoyed a higher standard of living. Whether or not their native urban counterparts are suffering because of their presence remains to be seen.

The consequences of migration to individual migrants is often emphasized in the literature. Many of the slum and squatter studies comment on the plight of these movers, who frequently find themselves in an environment totally alien to their rural customs. Migration requires not only economic but also social dislocations. Some authors, such as Speare (1971), tried to discount the social costs, but it is evident that among migrants to the urban centres social dislocation occurs.

Laquian (1972) considered the slum dwellings of Philippine migrants as a traditional zone retaining much of the rural character within an urban area. Thus "they cling together and form primary group associations to make life in the city more bearable" (p. 6). If they succeed without grave sociological dislocations, then they are further incorporated into the urban stream.

The level of sociopolitical conflict may, of course, be heightened or lessened at the place of destination by migration. In rural-rural migration, the political consciousness of these peasants, called "protoproletarians" by McGee (1973), may be increased as they encounter situations they have never faced before. There is always the possibility that in the slums of some primate city the initial tensions of revolt are seething, especially when the gap between the rich and the poor is inordinately large. There have been many studies of the political activity among slum dwellers such as the reports of Laquian (1972b) and Stone (1973). The possibility of ethnic quarrels in Kuala Lumpur has also been described, where the in-migration of Malays to take over government
positions but not economic ones, has led to confrontations with the prosperous Chinese business communities.

Discontent has also been a product of rural-rural migration. Many of the native Sumatrans, for example, resent the encroachment of Javanese who practice different forms of agriculture and are taking up land that was always theirs. This has been documented by Wertheim (1964) and Withington (1967). The problem is aggravated by the fact that the settlers do not adopt the ways of the land to which they migrate but keep their own which leads to social as well as economic segregation. The same is true of the Philippines, where the Christian Visayans have settled in the traditionally Muslim grounds of Mindanao. The result is sporadic civil war. It will take a government that is aware of social as well as economic problems to be able to overcome these conflicts, which have not been accounted for in policy implementation.

In the case of rural-rural migration processes, the lot of those farmers who moved but retained their occupations was also better than at their previous places of occupation. Simkins and Wernstedt (1971) found that, compared to their original homesteads in the Visayan Island, the rural-rural settlers of Mindanao enjoyed a 62% increase in the size of their farms, and obtained significantly higher yields (p. 102). Productivity was also enhanced by the planting of secondary diversified cash crops.

However, in some cases, especially when migration was government-sponsored, the consequences have been hardship and misery. Tongoantiang (1968b) lamented the lack of planning in Indonesian transmigration programs that resulted in the migration of Javanese rice farmers, accustomed to the fertile paddies of their native island, to the extensive but rough soil of Sumatra, parched by slash and burn agriculture. Thomas and Block (1970) in a smaller scale study, found similar results when the Thai government forcibly moved northeasterners to make way for a new dam. Further, although no evidence has been forthcoming, authors are already cautioning against inundating traditional destinations of migration, such as Cagayan and Mindanao in the Philippines and Sumatra in Indonesia with settlers as there are already signs that population pressure will lead to lowered productivity and increased land tenancy.

**Overall Impact on the Economy and Society**

In the classical economic model, when surplus labour leaves the land, the man/land ratio should decrease and there should be a more efficient allocation of factors of production. If the economy were at less than full employment in the urban areas, then wages would be depressed to their equilibrium levels. If, on the other hand, there is unemployment in the rural area as well, then the farmers and peasants arriving in urban areas would compound problems there. None of the articles reviewed delved specifically into the problem of efficiency in factor allocation, although a few commented on the possible effects of mechanization (or capital intensification) on population movement.

Although many authors seem to be aware of the effects of migration on the distribution of wealth or opportunity, not many have tried to analyze it. Padki (1964) stated that family incomes in rural areas were raised by migrant remittances, but not in comparison to urban levels. If indeed, labour as a
factor of production responds positively to economic opportunity, then income disparities should be cut down. Again, the literature search has come up empty-handed here.

The effects of social and occupational mobility on the migrant have also been discussed. McGee (1971b) investigated this aspect among the incoming Malays to Kuala Lumpur. He found that, when the government first moved in and started to attract migrants, Malays found jobs easily and the rise to the top was swift. Since then, the movement upward has stagnated and ethnic conflict has begun to manifest itself. Eames (1969) detected that although Indian migration was still constrained by occupational classification according to caste, the greater interaction in the urban area has led to cracks in the social barriers separating these groups of people. Khuri’s (1967) comparative study of Shi’ites and Greek Orthodox in Lebanon found that when the latter migrated they did not feel compelled to seek shelter in ethnic enclaves and were readily accepted in urban areas while the former retained their traditional rural trappings.

The emotional stresses for the individual migrant, then, have been compounded by problems of economic security and upward mobility. However, the rural people have shown great adaptability, but only with the help of the transplanted social institutions in the slum and squatter communities. Otherwise, the dislocations are too massive and, if no work is available in this transitional stage, potentially volatile situations can result.
Part IV

Policy Implications

Conscious Government Efforts to Affect Migration

Official stances on migration have been taken by almost all the nations of the region although not all of them have been properly documented. Perhaps the best known is the constant effort by Indonesia to relieve Java of its surplus population by the policy called transmigration. Malaysia is known for its resettlement schemes during the Emergency and presently for a federal land development scheme designed to stem the tide of urbanization. The Philippines and the nations of the Indian subcontinent have had similar, but less publicized attempts at influencing population flow. Less spectacular and less overt means have been employed as well, such as tax exemptions and subsidies.

Widjojo (1970) gave a brief account of the long-standing Indonesian attempts to direct the Javanese to the Outer Islands. It started with the Resettlement Scheme of the 1930s which failed miserably to attract many settlers because the government’s failure to investigate soil conditions, plan land use, or develop the land, led to grave misfortunes for the incoming settlers. Transmigration started again 20 years later with the goal of trying to provide employment for Java’s landless peasants. Again, organizational problems and a shortage of irrigation and transport facilities forced the authorities to settle for less than the target levels. Wertheim (1964) felt that transmigration was also faced with the depletion of cultivable land available in the Outer Islands. Further, a lack of dynamic regional planning led to independent migration of farmers practicing wet-rice agriculture coming into contact with the swidden farmers native to the area. McNicoll (1968) suggested that what was needed was not depopulation or repopulation of Java but investment elsewhere so that a demand could be fostered for that island’s industries. Otherwise, the expense of shipping thousands of migrants and return migration would wipe out any gains achieved by a resettlement policy. As Tangoantiang’s (1968b, p. 40) assessment aptly puts it:

“... population movement must not signify solely transfer of poverty, but it must be undertaken selectively to such a degree that it will have the best demographic and economic effects, whether for the area of departure or destination.”

The Malaysian resettlement projects of the Emergency have been studied by Kernial Singh Sandhu (1964). These projects displaced thousands of rural settlers and enclosed them behind barbed wire for the duration of the rebellion to deplete the guerillas’ peasant base. Most of these settlements have since flourished, however, and the thriving “new villages” have given Malaysia one of the highest urbanization rates in the region.

In more recent times the government has embarked on land development schemes in East Malaysia where the chronic labour shortages have retarded
investment opportunities in the area (see Ongkili, 1972). Lee Yong-Leng (1970) studied the situation in Sarawak where the government was trying to resettle the Dayaks into viable economic units.

The same remedy has been prescribed for Thailand’s unevenly distributed and fast-growing population. Ng (1968) concluded that “state-sponsored land settlement projects are the obvious solution in bringing relief to the congested areas and at the same time averting the imminent danger of mass migration to the cities” (p. 180). The Thais have set up four types of new settlements most of which are plagued with problems of social and cultural assimilation and infertile soil.

Most government-sponsored projects that have tried resettlement projects have been less than successful. The problem lies in combining communities of mixed origins, which are mutually suspicious and suffering from abysmal government planning and complex bureaucratic controls. Simkins and Wernstedt (1971) studied the case of the frantic but fruitless efforts of the Philippine government to initiate such sponsored schemes in Mindanao. After Manila de-emphasized the government’s role, the Visayan population responded enthusiastically. It seems that Sri Lanka is the only country to have had very happy experiences dealing with the problems of resettlement (Zachariah, 1969). Apparently, a good part of the surplus population in the rural areas was absorbed by the relocation schemes. However, that government also made certain that subtler but equally important programs supported the new settlement areas. According to ECAFE (United Nations, 1968), income transfer projects to rural areas were started and the necessary amenities provided, such as roads, dispensaries, and irrigation facilities.

There has been a continuing debate in economics as to whether growth is fostered by first building the infrastructure to attract the industries or to attract industries first to make roads, dams, and the like worthwhile. In either case, it is unlikely that such construction would not cause population shifts. Perhaps the most comprehensive analysis done in the Asian region is by M. Ladd Thomas and Edward L. Block on resettlement in northeast Thailand resulting from the Pa Mong Dam system (1970). They review the transition period between the government’s decision to build the dam and the actual start of the construction work. The dams were due to displace some 44,455 rural families (270,000 people) who had been tilling some of the most fertile soils in the region, with average yields of 250 kg/rai as opposed to 169.2 kg/rai for the whole northeast. Most of the relocation sites were situated around the dam site, based on the government’s premise that people would prefer any conditions close to home to more favourable ones farther away. The bulk of the report focuses on the problems caused by the bureaucratic attempts to force people to move: unfulfilled promises, squatters in the relocation sites, inferior soil at those sites, and a host of other administrative problems. The authors’ main conclusion is that because of the many planning shortcomings the dams may not aid regional development. Of course, that was based on observations made before the dams were finished and their potential for power and irrigation remained untapped. It might have been more useful if they had also analyzed the flows in and out of the region as a result of the employment or other opportunities created by the dam.

Another “dam” project that has attracted both migrants and studies has been the harnessing of the Maria Cristina Falls in Mindanao, which has led to
the rapid urbanization of Iligan city. Ulack (1972) measures its indirect effect as the hydroelectric power generated at the sites has attracted dynamic industries to the area. As a result, there has been a large inflow of migrants from that perennial source of Philippine manpower, the Visayas.

**Government Policies Indirectly Influencing Population Flow**

Perhaps because it would take a massive and detailed review of past government policies, little attention has been given to the impact of "unintended" measures — those designed for some other purpose but that ultimately lead to shifts in population. Typical of these unintended measures is the development of infrastructural facilities. Simkins and Wernstedt (1971), for example, mention how the location of highways in the Philippines has influenced the patterns of settlements. Sandhu (1964) has described that in Malaysia, new villages have been located around the main highways.

An ECAFE (United Nations, 1968) study concluded that infrastructural investments by national governments could help cancel some of the employment and other differentials between regions as well as between rural and urban areas. The report cited as evidence the relative success of rural nonfarm activities (such as industrial estates), irrigation schemes, and other technological improvements in stabilizing the rural population.

**Policies Recommended by Studies**

The ECAFE (United Nations, 1968, p. 50) report concluded that:

"... some rural-urban migration is bound to take place inasmuch as it is a necessary concomitant to economic development. Government efforts should be directed not to stemming the tide of migration but to assisting the process more deliberately and purposefully."

Still, the debate rages over whether rural-urban migration is a measure of economic development or whether rural-rural movement should be fostered to relieve cities supposedly flooded by a surging sea of humanity. Those who believe that most Asian countries are "overurbanized" (too many city dwellers for their stage of development) seem to be in the majority. The following is a sampling of their views on how to reduce the flow to the cities.

Most are aware that rural-urban migration cannot be tackled simply by transporting people from one place to another. The most often mentioned palliative for the phenomenon is increased investment in rural areas. This could be done at the microlevel by attempts to improve soil productivity through irrigation, crop diversification, or the development of rice varieties, as suggested by Montgomery (1973) and Richards (1972). Macrolevel innovations to divert the tide would include providing the inducements for the development of growth poles, industrial estates or even satellite towns or cities with prescribed land use as recommended by Mehta (1962) and Goldstein (1972b). This would also mean laying the infrastructure necessary to make such projects worthwhile (Warriner, 1970).

One study that was "against the grain" was Munro's (1974) assessment of the Turkish situation. He felt that rural out-migration had to be encouraged because of underemployment in the country's agriculture. Although in peak
months unemployment could be as low as 1%, it averaged 49% over the year. This implies, of course, that literacy levels have to be raised, along with agricultural productivity. In addition, an employment program for the urban areas designed to cope with the incoming population is another must.
General Overview: Future Studies

Although there already seems to be a library full of literature on internal migration in Asia, much of it is repetitious. Study after study compares and contrasts migrant characteristics and patterns of movement without dealing with their causes and consequences. Those that do comment on causes engage in age-old static push-pull analysis despite its obvious inadequacies. Consequences are almost totally neglected. The literature, then, is wary of testing theoretical formulations, but revels in dry empiricism bound by strict disciplinary traditions. It is neither useless nor disappointing, but one wishes that the research on Asia were not as underdeveloped as the area under study.

In general, the most noticeable omission is the lack of comparative studies. As John Friedmann et al. (1970, p. 12) put it:

"Scientists working on Africa ignored Latin American evidence; Latin Americanists have remained blissfully unaware of Asian studies; Orientalists have worked in isolation from Africanists. And so the circle of mutual ignorance is joined."

Even interregional studies have been few and have failed to inspire any similar work. It is useful to reproduce Friedmann's thumbnail critique of the literature on urbanization in order to illustrate some of the shortcomings of research on internal migration in Asia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current</th>
<th>Desirable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>disciplinary</td>
<td>interdisciplinary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>focus on closed urban subsystems (cities)</td>
<td>focus on open national systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>little explicit use of theoretical models, except for urban-rural dichotomy</td>
<td>extensive use of models based on core-periphery paradigm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no explicit comparative focus</td>
<td>explicit comparative, especially cross-cultural, focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structures emphasized (comparative static analysis at best)</td>
<td>dynamic process interaction emphasized, with structures as the limited condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policy questions not central to analysis</td>
<td>policy analysis central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urbanization studies without relation to more comprehensive processes such as national and spatial integration</td>
<td>urbanization studies tied back into national development and spatial integration: a systems approach</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The same criticisms can also be leveled against studies of rural-rural migration.

Other general comments on what can be done to improve the quality of research include McGee's (1972) insistence that more emphasis be placed on the "processive" elements — or structural changes, such as shifts in systems of production — that lead to the decision to migrate. He called on analysts to separate the capitalist and noncapitalist (bazaar-type) labour markets and to
study the interaction between them. Bose (1972) called for more "historical perspective" in the making of census reports, instead of using them merely to compare the data with the preceding decade and not allowing any trends to be seen.

More specific research goals have been summarized by the ECAFE (United Nations, 1968) expert working group on internal migration and by others. Among the points cited is that there should be a more concerted effort to study migration processes, other than direct rural-urban or rural-rural movement. For example, Goldstein (1971a, p. 24) noticed that Bangkok was experiencing heavy out-migration that was not only restricted to return migration. He concluded that:

"... the very existence of such a movement argues strongly for more research on population exchanges involving movement both to and from the urban metropolis in order to assess the impact which such movement has on the migrants themselves, on the smaller urban and rural places to which they move, and on the other person with whom they interact."

Other patterns that need further work, according to the ECAFE report, are stepwise and chain migration, which can reveal some important characteristics of the nature of a country's urbanization process. It would also be useful to differentiate between patterns that are government-induced and those that are "voluntary."

The ECAFE (United Nations, 1968) report also noticed that socio-economic changes caused in urban areas by in-migration and those caused in rural out-migration areas need to be studied. Part III of this review was devoted to summarizing the lack of research regarding the consequences of internal movement. Specifically, detailed economic studies, on the costs of providing employment at the source to retain rural population or of extending opportunities at the urban destination; on the flow of goods and money (such as remittances and investment capital); and on the effect of shifts in demand, need to be undertaken. Further, as Torres et al. (no date) pointed out, studies on urbanization should not be carried out with only passing reference to the agricultural sector. Similarly, analysis of rural flows cannot ignore urban conditions and why the cities failed to attract the rural migrants.

Finally, research on the role of the external sector should not be ignored any further. Any government policies designed to affect the distribution of the internal labour forces should be wary of connections with foreign conditions and decision-makers must be guided accordingly. Otherwise, the less developed countries' most vital productive factor, labour, may be tragically misallocated.

The above are only some of the new areas that analysts considered important for further research on internal migration. Despite the massive amounts already produced, these studies are obviously needed, but the authors should be conscious of what their colleagues have already done, not only to avoid duplicating the work and repeating the mistakes, but also to discover and fill in the extensive gaps in the literature.
Latin America
Introduction

The present review is primarily concerned with analytic issues involving the interrelationships between socioeconomic factors and population movements in Latin America. In this respect the review is selective, since it focuses only on the more analytic studies within the broader literature on migration available for the region. Many studies of migration in Latin America concentrate on the description of the volume and direction of migratory flows, on the number of moves that individual migrants make in arriving at their destination, and on the age, sex, and educational and occupational characteristics of the migrants. The present review will refer to findings from these studies only insofar as they suggest hypotheses or provide additional research findings on the causes, consequences, or policy implications of the migration patterns that they describe.

Policymakers and social planners are primarily concerned with the answers to analytic questions involving the interrelationship between population movements and socioeconomic factors. They may wish to know, for example, whether investments in a village or regional centre will attract workers and other business activities to create a "growth pole" for a subregion, or they may wish to know whether the outflow of young workers from a rural area to nearby towns will lower agricultural production. The need for analytic studies, especially for those that provide perspectives on the global-historical features of the interrelationship between population and development has been stressed in a number of recent Latin American theoretical works on migration (see Marmora 1973, and Singer 1973). We agree with the need for analytic studies, but this review is limited to a discussion based on contemporary empirical studies.

The review is in four parts: Part I reviews issues and available research on the socioeconomic determinants of migration. Part II describes the characteristics of migrants. In this section an attempt is made to go beyond the lists of findings in descriptive studies on migrant characteristics and to hypothesize on social and economic factors, which, in different developmental contexts, may account for variation in migrant characteristics and in the consequences that selective migration has on sending and receiving communities. Part III discusses the limited evidence on consequences of migration. Part IV, the final section, briefly reviews a number of issues related to the impact of different population distribution policies that Latin American governments have advanced.

This selective review was facilitated by the availability of several other review articles, many of them written in Spanish or Portuguese, on population movements in Latin America. In our initial selection of principal works in the field we relied heavily upon reviews by Butterworth (1971), de Oliveria and
Stern (1972), Muñoz and de Oliveria (1972), and Di Filippo (1974). Part IV of this review is a condensation of the paper on “Public Policy and Migratory Behavior” by Laquian and Simmons (1975). In addition to the major works identified through these reviews, we examined a number of recently published articles, conference papers, and unpublished reports.

The present review adds some new issues, perspectives, and research findings to those discussed in previous reviews and, we hope, will assist in the further integration of research findings for the region.
Part I

Determinants of Migration

Factors that limit opportunity in the long-settled rural regions of Latin America where many migrants, to both cities and other rural areas, originate have been studied at two levels of analysis: (1) basic structural factors in the economy and society, and (2) mechanisms through which these structural factors operate. There seems to be a high level of consensus in the literature on what the basic structural factors are. However, there seems to be less agreement on the mechanisms and dynamics through which they operate.

Structural Factors

Two historical factors limiting opportunity in the rural sectors of Latin America are mentioned frequently in the literature: the structure of land tenure, and the levels of agricultural productivity.

Land Tenure

Agricultural lands are highly concentrated in the hands of a few owners. For example, Barraclough and Domike (1966) in their report of land tenure in seven Latin American nations conclude that agriculture in Latin America is largely concentrated in latifundios (defined as farms large enough to provide employment for 12 or more people). The prevalence of latifundios varies considerably among the seven countries studied, from 20% of the total cultivated lands in Argentina to 65% in Chile. Minifundios (small farms) constitute a relatively unimportant geographical segment in most of the countries, occupying about one-quarter of the farm lands of all the seven countries combined. Yet “minifundistas and landless farm workers (were found to) constitute nine-tenths of the farm population in Ecuador, Guatemala and Peru and make up over two-thirds of those in agriculture in all the study countries except Argentina” (Barraclough and Domike 1966, p. 98).

Agricultural Productivity

Agricultural productivity is generally low and food production on a per capita basis in some countries of the region has actually failed to keep pace with the growth of population. This has happened in Chile, Colombia, and Peru where agricultural production has increased at percentage annual growth rates of 1.8, 2.4, and 2.3, while population has increased at 2.5, 2.8, and 2.6% per year respectively (United Nations 1970a).

Land tenure and productivity, moreover, seem to be interrelated in Latin America. Available evidence shows that the latifundios have lower land productivity than do the minifundios, whereas the reverse is true as regards labour productivity. The latter follows from the higher ratio of land to labour in large holdings. Agricultural holdings of intermediate size, meanwhile, fall somewhere between the two extremes.
As Table 1 indicates, the differences in land productivity arise largely because the large landowners tend to put under production only a small proportion of their total holdings. But even when the proportion of lands under cultivation is taken into account, the large landowners produce less per hectare than the owners of smaller farms. Agricultural production per worker is greater on the more extensive latifundios due to the use of machinery and other labour-saving devices.

Intervening Mechanisms

Since there is very little debate on the extent to which land tenure and agricultural productivity limit opportunity in the rural area, much of the research literature on determinants of migration has focused on the mechanisms through which these structural features operate to affect population shifts. Most authors have stressed relatively direct mechanisms, such as:

(a) the impact that the land tenure situation has on access to farm lands; and

(b) the impact that low productivity has on agricultural wages and incomes.

Other authors have dealt with more indirect mechanisms, such as:

(c) how the stagnation of the rural sector leads to a slow pace of employment creation, and results in high unemployment and under-employment;

(d) how the introduction of modernizing influences in the rural sector at times aggravates the employment conditions in rural areas;

(e) the conflict between social classes and violence that has erupted in many localities as a result of the class structure, and the limited opportunities in rural areas;

Table 1. Relative value of production in latifundios (multifamily large) as a percent of that of minifundios (subfamily) for selected ICAD countries.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Per ha of agricultural land</th>
<th>Per ha of cultivated land</th>
<th>Per agricultural worker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The minifundios (subfamily farms) were defined by ICAD as "farms large enough to provide employment for less than 2 people with the typical incomes, markets and levels of technology and capital now prevailing in the region." Latifundios (large multifamily farms) were defined as "farms large enough to provide employment for more than 12 people."

Source: Gilbert 1974a, table 24, p. 135-137.
the soil erosion and ecological damage that result from overfarming on small plots that support most of the rural population or from inefficient farming practices on some of the large farms; and

(g) the high fertility rates of poor, uneducated rural families.

Below, we discuss some of the literature treating each of these mechanisms.

Access to Farm Lands

The concentration of large proportions of agricultural lands in a few hands in combination with large increases in the size of the rural population has been frequently postulated as one of the primary causes of out-migration. For instance, Montoya Rojas (1967) indicates that an increase of 61.3% in the population of the rural community of Pacaraos, Peru, together with the lack of access to land for the young people, caused unavoidable out-migration. Thus, we see that restricted access to land operates to increase out-migration particularly in the context of a rapidly growing rural population. Shaw (1974) set out to investigate the empirical relationships between land tenure and rural out-migration through the analysis of population and agrarian censuses. He obtained high simple correlation coefficients ranging from .51 to .88 between out-migration (estimated from slow rates of population increase) and the proportion of minifundio farms in the regions he studied. From the analysis of the structure of the land tenure system of 16 Latin American countries and their rural emigration rates, he was able to conclude that “systematic increases in either the proportion of minifundio farms or the proportion of the land held by latifundistas are accompanied by a higher rate of rural emigration,” and that “the rates of rural emigration in the 16 countries are higher when the proportion of land held by latifundistas is higher than when the proportion of farms held as minifundios is higher” (Shaw 1974, p. 130-131).

Table 2 shows the average yearly migration rates obtained where various percentages of the land are held in latifundios and minifundios. The

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries with 0-50% land on farms exceeding 500 hectares</th>
<th>Countries with 50-100% land on farms exceeding 500 hectares</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-50% Farms less than 5 hectares</td>
<td>50-100% Farms less than 5 hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N 5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Shaw 1974, p.131
out-migration rates have been found to be the lowest for that group of
countries having under 50% of its land in latifundios and where less than 50%
of the farms have less than 5 hectares. The highest rates are obtained for the
countries where land concentration is highest and where over 50% of the farms
have less than 5 hectares.

Income Differentials

In the classical economic formulation of migration theory, regional
differences in the marginal productivity of labour, when translated into wage
differentials, encourage workers to migrate from regions of low wages (usually
rural areas) to regions of higher wages (urban areas). However, this
formulation fails to take into account the following features of the labour
force market. Job opportunities are often restricted to people with certain
skills, skills rural people may not have. Nor is labour perfectly informed about
wage conditions in different areas. Furthermore, as is poignantly evident in
developing countries experiencing very rapid rates of population growth
relative to growth in employment, the supply of labour tends to exceed
demand even in those regions that are experiencing the most rapid economic
growth.

These problems with the classical model have led to the development of
new models that incorporate wage and unemployment differentials between
areas by occupation. Noteworthy progress in this regard is evident in the work
of several authors. Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970), for example,
have postulated that migrants take the likelihood of being unemployed into
account in assessing wage differentials. Thus, both wage levels and
unemployment levels become essential determinants of migration. An
important question in this regard is: Given the prospects of being unemployed
(or underemployed) no matter where one goes, will an individual prefer the
village or the city? Although we have no statistical evidence on this question
for Latin America, it may be that many will prefer the city since income, if one
were to get a job, would be higher and since public services and social
amenities are better in the city. There is also the possibility that, with wage
rates in the city being higher, one employed relative may be able to care for a
number of kin, until they can find work. Unfortunately, there is too little
information available on levels of unemployment and their relationship to
migration in Latin America to answer these questions.

Fortunately, there is more information available on wage levels and their
relationship to the rural-urban exodus and to regional migration patterns, but
even here the data are of uncertain reliability. The figures in Table 3
comparing salaries in agriculture and manufacturing (as a proxy for urban
wages) for certain Latin American countries can only be taken as indicative.
However, the large discrepancies between the two sets of figures clearly
indicate the monetary advantage that manufacturing has over agriculture.

A number of studies have applied regression techniques to aggregate
census data to assess the relationship between wages and migration. Two of the
studies examined have dealt with Brazil. Using data from the 1950 census,
Sahota (1968) assessed the effects of a number of regional variables on the
estimated migration rates of males aged 15-29 (young migrants) and 30-59
(middle-age migrants). Some of the key variables considered were wage rates,
Table 3. Average salaries paid in agriculture and manufacturing in selected Latin American countries, 1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of salary</th>
<th>Monetary unit</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Agricultural as a % of manufacturing wages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Hourly</td>
<td>Colon</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Balboa</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>29.90</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>Guaraní</td>
<td>5814.00</td>
<td>7604.00</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


education, urbanization, density, geographic distance, and various aspects of per capita income. The results of the study showed “that internal migration in Brazil is highly responsive to earning differentials.” Distance was a powerful deterrent to migration, and urbanization had some effect but neither was as significant a factor as the income differential. Overall, the role of economic costs and returns was found to be the dominant factor affecting the behaviour of migrants. Graham’s (1970) analysis of the effects of earning differentials on migration for the 1940-60 period clearly tends to support this conclusion. An interesting additional finding of this study was that income differences did not adequately explain in-migration to the frontier states. He concluded that for states where land is plentiful, future prospects of economic returns are more important than actual wage differences. An individual’s migration to a frontier area may be an entrepreneurial venture in which current returns on investments of capital are foregone to realize a long-term gain.

From the evidence above, it is clear that migrants do not make decisions based upon false or totally distorted perceptions of the economic circumstances in other regions. Margulis (1967) in his very detailed study found, for instance, that nonmigrants at origin believed that of those friends and relatives who had migrated to Buenos Aires, 82.4% were no worse off in any way than before migrating, and that 76.7% were better off economically than before. Interestingly enough, they were also fully cognizant of the many pitfalls inherent in migration. Only 37.3% of the respondents interviewed at origin held that it was easy to gain employment in Buenos Aires. MacDonald and MacDonald (1968, p. 628), in their study of migrants in Ciudad Guayana, Venezuela, conclude:

“We have seen ... in our investigation of motives for migration and opinions about the relative attractiveness of various centres of migration, an indication of the open, pragmatic, reality-oriented state of mind of the Venezuelan common man. We have, as well, a demonstration of the way in which informal, fragmented information is perceived and built up by a largely illiterate mass of people into a coherent and fairly accurate appraisal of reality.”

Studies by Schultz (1971) and Carvajal and Geithman (1974) have focused on regional wealth differentials and internal migration. Schultz’ study took into account levels of regional population growth rates, and the main
conclusion was that the “evidence confirms that interregional migration in Colombia responds to market forces drawing rural labor to the cities from regions where the returns to labor are relatively low and the supply of labor is growing relatively rapidly” (p. 163). Carvajal and Geithman’s analysis of Costa Rican data also supports the relationship between migration and regional earning differentials. Using a 10% sample of the 1963 population census of Costa Rica, they were able to investigate the impact of individual characteristics on the decision to migrate. By calculating each individual’s relative income, which was defined as “the ratio of the individual’s actual income to the income normal for his or her socio-economic reference group,” and holding other factors constant, they concluded that specific income differentials between regions for specific occupations are important factors in the decision to migrate.

**Modernization of Agricultural Production**

Rural out-migration can also result from the introduction of technological innovations and rising productivity per worker. It is frequently assumed that the introduction of machinery is likely to displace labour. In a case cited by Barraclough and Domike (1966), exactly this happened. They noted that “on a 15,000 hectare hacienda in Ecuador, owned by Swedish interests, half of the resident population were sent away when the farm was transformed into one of the most ‘efficient’ in the country” (p. 95). However, the theory that improved agricultural technology increases out-migration is not by any means unanimously accepted. Some researchers from Latin America and from outside the region have indicated that agricultural modernization may well have the opposite effect. Di Filippo (1974), for instance, holds the view that as fertilizers and irrigation become available and previously marginal lands are brought into cultivation, the demand for labour is likely to increase. Sinha (1973), after reviewing evidence from the Punjab region in India, has concluded that agricultural modernization can lead to higher rural labour demand.

Singer (1973) has dichotomized the conditions that may lead to rural out-migration. As capitalistic methods of maximizing production and profits are introduced into rural areas with the institution of modern agricultural techniques, the productivity of both land and labour is increased. In his view this process leads to the unfortunate displacement of rural workers, in spite of other benefits the process implies for economic development.

He cites “change factors” as the cause of out-migration resulting from technological innovation. Conversely, he blames “stagnant factors” for the out-migration that is produced by inadequate land resources or by exploitative land-holding patterns more typical of the semi-feudal conditions found in many Latin American countries. The latter he sees as detrimental since it results only in removing the excess population from the land without effecting any changes in production. These views are of course hypothetical, since there is little empirical evidence available on them.

**Conflict between Social Classes**

Lately, an association between violent conflict and internal migration has been argued for Latin America. Guzman et al. (1962, 1964) in their 2-volume work on “La Violencia” in Colombia describe a long period of rural upheaval.
lasting in that country from the 1950s until the present. Close to 200,000 persons may have died as a result of armed conflict in this period. The authors feel that the violence led to high rates of rural out-migration. Schultz (1971) in his regression study provides some limited empirical support for this hypothesis. He found a positive association between the amount of reported violence in several regions and out-migration from them at all ages, except for the age-group 17-21, which he claims is the age-group that includes most of the instigators. McGreevy (1968) notes that a proportion of rural-urban migrants in Colombia reported violence as the principal cause of their moving to the city, but the proportions were high only in studies conducted in areas where violence was concentrated (e.g., the state of Tolima). Other recent conflictive situations include the “soccer” war between El Salvador and Honduras that led to the return to El Salvador of thousands of settlers from that country who had gone to the relatively sparsely populated Honduras, and the Cuban revolution, which resulted in the emigration of an estimated 500,000 Cubans. Although these two well-known cases had consequences better treated under the topic “international migration,” they are indicative of the potential influence of social conflict in leading to population redistribution.

Soil Erosion and Ecological Damage

Soil erosion and ecological damage in extensive regions of Latin America have been associated with poor agricultural practices and with exploitative use of natural resources by large landowners. As a recent United Nations (1974, p. 17) publication notes:

“In the agricultural sector inadequate farming practices, associated with prevailing systems of land tenure and the response of landowners to prevailing social and economic incentives have led to the neglect of millions of hectares of good agricultural land and abandonment of marginal areas. Overgrazing has ruined natural pasture land and has led to consequent wind or water erosion; slash and burn techniques for land clearance have deforested large areas; and in zones of commercial forestry, attempts to replant the cutover areas are rare. Again the results can be seen in the widespread erosion, the permanent denuding of hill country, the consequent silting up of rivers, and the creation of conditions leading to recurrent flooding over large areas.

The results of such bad management are apparent in Chile where 20 million hectares or 80 percent of the nation’s agricultural useable land is eroded to some extent, and the rate of erosion continues at 40,000 hectares a year. The consequent silting up of rivers and ports has put various types of industrial activity in danger, reduced the value of dams, caused loss of life together with ruining large areas of good agricultural land.

In Argentina, too, overgrazing of the pampas has destroyed thousands of hectares of pastureland as well as in the Chaco and Patagonian regions. The resulting erosion has affected 20 million hectares of which 20 percent is considered to be severe.”

Overintensive land utilization and farming in lands unsuitable for cultivation have also resulted in the destruction of the natural environment. Lack of access to good agricultural lands in regions where the best lands are held by latifundistas, or excessive population growth in areas having limited farming territories have forced the poor peasants to plant marginal lands not well suited for that purpose, or to the excessive utilization of small plots of
land resulting in their exhaustion and eventual infertility. As the same United Nations (1974, p. 17) study quoted above indicates:

“In other countries ... rural population pressure has destroyed hillsides and other marginal lands as minifundistas apply primitive, intensive methods on land cleared of forest and unsuitable for such farming. The position is most severe in lateritic soils and in tropical countries such as El Salvador where the spread of subsistence agriculture has occurred at the expense of deciduous forests.

Increased population densities have forced the minifundistas to change from shifting to permanent working of the land, while fallow has been decreased to three to five years with consequent widespread soil destruction and erosion.

Population pressure in rural areas of Mexico has caused problems of an even greater scale, with 150 million hectares eroded and from 150 to 200 thousand more seriously affected each year.”

The implications for rural out-migration are obvious and do not require elaboration. Yet to our knowledge there are no empirical studies detailing the impact of this ecological damage on population movements.

**The Role of Population Growth**

The relevance of increased population growth, although universally recognized as having a significant effect on out-migration, has been regarded by analysts from two perspectives. The first attributes the high volume of rural out-migration to the failure of the rural sector to assimilate the growing population. Simply stated, the population is growing too fast. In this interpretation, population growth is the determining factor, although mediated to a greater or lesser extent by structural, economic, social, and technological factors that impede the full utilization of labour in agricultural areas (Barraclough and Domike 1966; Schultz 1971; Shaw 1974). The second interpretation, in effect, blames structural, economic, social, and technological factors, and considers population growth as no more than an aggravating condition (Singer 1973, 1974; Marmora 1973). Within both contexts, albeit somewhat differently, the problem is perceived as one in which the growth in economic opportunities (employment) fails to match the growth of the population. Schultz (1971, p. 161), found support for these interpretations in his study of migration in Colombia. The pressures, moreover, were not evenly felt by all the generations, as the younger but larger cohorts find ever-growing competition for the available jobs. As he puts it:

“The relation between population growth and out-migration is ... most noticeable for the young (up to the age of 26). Perhaps because each generation is a poor substitute for another, the youngest generation experiences the strongest competitive employment pressure from the growth of their own numbers, a pressure that depresses local returns to their labor and forces them to migrate ... a one-tenth reduction in population growth is associated with a one quarter reduction in rural out-migration.”
Part II

Migrant Characteristics

The process of internal migration can be seen as a cumulation of individual acts made in response to perceived opportunity differentials. Because not all individuals can take advantage of existing opportunities to the same extent, those who migrate do not constitute a random sample of the population group from which they originate. Rather, they represent those who are most knowledgeable about opportunities elsewhere, those who face the fewest obstacles in moving, and those who are most likely to improve their circumstances by moving. Since migration is a response to regional differences in social and economic opportunity, the social and economic characteristics of migrants can vary across countries or regions as well as over time in any given setting. As socioeconomic conditions change in sending and receiving areas (perhaps in part due to changes in the economic opportunity structure created by previous waves of migrants) the characteristics of the migrants and the volume of migration may change. In the following section, we review several migrant characteristics, with particular attention to variations between those nations at different levels of socioeconomic development and with different opportunity structures.

Age

The broadest generalization that can be made about migrants concerns their age. Migrants are overwhelmingly young adults. The greater tendency for young adults to migrate is consistent with several fairly universal features of social organization in relationship to age. Young people are less likely to have a marriage partner, a village position for which they are responsible, or to have established themselves in a trade or occupation. Consequently, they have fewer institutional ties to hold them and it may be expected socially that they go their own ways and arrange their lives as they see fit. Moreover, not being encumbered with family obligations, they are free to move alone and the cost of moving is lower.

The proportions of children and older people migrating vary, and may reflect the marital status or affluence of the young adult migrants. Young children who migrate, typically move with their parents. Cardona and Simmons (1974) noted a previously undocumented increase after age 45 in the age distribution of migrants to Bogota, Colombia. This may be a result of older parents coming to the city to join the children who have previously migrated.

The age structures within migration streams may vary. In Colombia, for example, Flinn and Cartano (1970) found that the age structure of migrants to urban areas differed considerably from the age structure of those going to rural areas. They found that over 80% of the migrants to a shantytown in Bogota were under 40 years of age, whereas only 52% of the migrants to a rural community were that young. This may reflect the higher levels of
education of the young, which suit them better for urban employment, or it may reflect their greater adaptability to change.

The developmental process itself may create special circumstances that tend to encourage the migration of young people from the settled rural areas to cities or to "frontier" regions in the nation.

Rapid population growth may be one factor encouraging the migration of young people from settled rural areas. The reduction in infant mortality that has occurred and that continues to occur throughout Latin America has led to a marked increase in the numbers of living children per family. Cultural patterns and economic conditions in the rural areas in turn have developed over a long period of time and are often unprepared to provide enough opportunity for all the children who now survive. As a consequence it seems possible that resource allocation problems that increased family size creates for parents and for kin may be an important factor in decision-making about migration. It is not necessary for there to be population pressure on the land in order for a crisis to take place. Much will depend on social and economic organization. In Latin America, as we have seen, excessive concentration of land in the hands of a few owners and inefficient agricultural practices create the conditions of overpopulation among certain sectors of the population even though overall rural densities may not be high.

As we shall see in the analysis below (under the topic "Skill levels" in this section of the review there is evidence that rural-urban migrants are more likely to come from the wealthier rural families. Strain from rapid population growth per se would not be a reason for their movement, given their relatively privileged positions. Less is known about levels of out-migration and about the factors that influence these levels among the children from less advantaged rural families, since fewer of these migrants move to cities where the bulk of the research on migrant characteristics has been done. Migrants from poor families may be more likely to move to other rural areas or small towns, and the extent to which strain arising from rapid natural increase was a factor in their decision to migrate remains to be investigated.

Another view argues that development often has a direct impact on the traditional cultural patterns that guide behaviour as modern attitudes, values, and norms enter the rural milieu. In Margulis' (1967, p. 89), opinion:

"... within the community the traditional forms prevail, but they are continuously undermined by the new levels of aspirations ... which have been introduced by the mass communication media. The result is that although the traditional guidelines still prevail they have lost their harmony, their integration. Life within the community is devalued, as are its ends: to continue living in the same manner, in the prescribed form, is destroyed by the introduction of the idea of change and progress, through the new levels of aspiration and the brilliant attractions which the city constantly offers. The devaluation of community life creates a climate of depression and sadness that encourages migration."

(translated from Margulis, 1967, p. 89)

The younger members of rural communities are exposed to new norms and values while they are growing up, and as a result they may be the most open to change. For example, Conning (1971) has hypothesized that migration can be regarded as a mechanism that allows more aspiring, better qualified and
informed individuals to move to more complex areas where they can find opportunities commensurate with their abilities and desires. He offers no direct test of this hypothesis, although the argument is quite consistent with the fact that a very high proportion of those who leave the Chilean villages that he studied migrated out at a young age in order to continue their schooling.

Following a similar logic, Critto (1973b), Margulis (1967), and Montoya Rojas (1967) have each separately argued that the failure of the areas of origin to satisfy the needs of some individuals produces out-migration. In their opinion the impact of the educational system and mass media leads to greater changes in the needs of some individuals than in those of others. Dissonance between needs and opportunities is solved by migration of those whose values no longer correspond to local opportunities.

A direct test has been done in Latin America on the hypothesis that migrants and nonmigrants differ with regard to awareness of opportunities, attitudes to change, and other social-psychological characteristics. Simmons (1970) compared the attitudes and aspirations of rural-urban migrants with rural nonmigrants in order to test the hypothesis that rural-urban migrants tended to have higher levels of intelligence, knowledge, and mental flexibility. The sample included recent migrants to Bogota, Colombia, and nonmigrants from a region where many migrants had originated. The results of the study called into question the validity of the hypothesis. It is true that migrants had higher aspirations than nonmigrants in the place of origin, but it was also found that migrants had higher levels of formal schooling, and this was closely associated with their high interests and aspirations. Considering migrants and nonmigrants with the same level of formal schooling, there were no differences between the groups in terms of interests and aspirations. Simmons (1970, p. 144, italics added) concluded that when migrants and nonmigrants with similar levels of schooling are compared:

"recent migrants to the city do not appear to be more intelligent, more aware of the relevance of 'distant' political or economic events for their own well-being, more empathetic, or more perceptive of what the future may be like, than are rural non-migrants in the place of origin."

This would suggest that the variables that determine the extent to which rural- and village-born children continue in school also determine the likelihood that they will migrate to an urban area, whether the move is made to continue education or after education has been completed. The variables that determine level of schooling may have more to do with the migrant's parents' economic status than with their own aspirations per se. Of course, this is only one study, carried out in a country where access to schooling, particularly beyond the primary level, is extremely limited. More studies are required before any conclusion would seem warranted.

One might conclude that one could reduce or stop the migration of young people from rural areas through an expanded program of educational and work opportunities in the rural sector. The way in which Cuba was able to slow the process of metropolitan growth by directing migrant streams to the smaller urban areas in the mid-1960s is evidence that this can be done, provided that it is well coordinated and controlled (see Acosta and Hardoy 1972). However, under other circumstances there may be different results. Bazan (1975) has noted that the sugar plantations on the Peruvian coast, which were
nationalized and turned into cooperative farms under the current military government, have undergone profound social changes, and now have better schooling, better health care, and higher standards of living than previously. But, only the older generation are socios (members) in the cooperatives, and the young must leave in increasing numbers to find employment.

It seems clear that future investigations should be less concerned with simple generalizations about the fact that migrants tend to be young adults, and more concerned with the possibility that there may be substantial variation in the reasons why young people migrate, and correspondingly in the impact that their migration has on the developmental process. For example, in many more-developed countries where educational opportunities are accessible but largely concentrated in large urban settings, youths may leave the rural area for study reasons and once trained they may not return home because there would be few opportunities for them there.

Sex

The predominance of either sex in a migratory stream can result from the operation of different variables. Some of the most important factors affecting the sex composition are: (a) where the migratory flow originates; (b) where it is directed; (c) what distance is involved in the migration; and (d) at what ages the migrants move. In Latin America, in most cases, females outnumber males in rural-urban streams.

Bogue (1969, p. 764) has advanced an hypothesis to account for the variation in the sex composition of migrant streams in terms of socioeconomic developmental stages, which we may elaborate as follows: The initial stage is characterized by a preponderance of male migrants. Economic uncertainties are greater in this initial stage, insofar as the social norms in many cultures tend to “protect” women by restricting their contacts to kinship networks and community; men are encouraged to take the risks associated with movement. In this stage the men may leave home for short periods only, or they may send remittances back to their families. Ultimately, the migratory process becomes routine and institutionalized. At this time, male migrants are more likely to settle permanently and to bring their wives and children with them. Hence, the number of female migrants may begin to equal or exceed the number of male migrants.

In Latin America, where urbanization levels are high and migratory streams well established, women seem to outnumber men (see the evidence reviewed by Gilbert 1974a, p. 113-114). Elizaga (1970b) has indicated that in Latin America the number of female migrants usually exceeds that of males in moves to metropolitan areas. An exaggerated case has been noted among migrants between the ages of 15 and 24 to Santiago, Chile, where there were only 64 men to every 100 women (Herrick 1965). This pattern cannot be explained merely by the fact that migration has become stable and less risky for women.

Ever since Ravenstein’s seminal work The Laws of Migration appeared, a relationship has been postulated between sex selectivity and distance. Females are supposed to be dominant in migrations over short distances. Whether this generalization holds for Latin America has never been satisfactorily established. Although the effects of distance on the volume of migration have
been found to have the expected consequence of reducing migration (Levy and Wadycki 1974), not enough attention has been given to possible sex differentials. Nevertheless, some studies do seem to indicate that this may be the case. The greater availability of certain “female” jobs in nearby urban areas may act as a more powerful inducement to short distance female migration, whereas males may be more involved in long distance migration to “frontier” areas and to distant regions that require seasonal farm labour. Adams (1969) notes that Colombian girls living close to large cities can readily obtain employment as domestics, clerks, and industrial workers.

In contrast to the hypothesized tendency for women to predominate in short distance moves, in Peru women tend to predominate in long distance moves and men in short distance moves (Allers and Applebaum 1968, p. 28-29). This long distance migration of women in Peru is quite likely a function of the market for domestic servants. The large cities (particularly Lima) are relatively distant from the populated rural areas where domestics are recruited. Yet there were some 90,000 women in domestic service in Lima alone in the period 1966-67 (Smith 1973, p. 193). These women represented close to 10% of all women in the economic ages (i.e., between 15 and 60 years of age), and over 60% of all women who actually worked in Lima. Not surprisingly, women predominate among migrants to this city (Lowder 1970) apparently in response to the great demand for their services. When one considers that Lima is an archetypical case of the “primate city” (a large city that continues to absorb nearly all the urban growth in a country) with approximately one-third of the nation’s population living in it, the profound impact that the opportunity structure for domestic servants has on migratory patterns for women must be evident. Thus, the distance that women migrate seems to be more a function of the location of opportunities for them than a function of reduced “risk taking” per se.

Substantial variations in sex selectivity by age are observable in Latin America. Females tend to migrate at somewhat younger ages than males, but the relationship is not clear cut. Differential availability of employment opportunities by sex, culturally determined sex roles, and social limitations associated with marriage and motherhood during the life cycle impose constraints that limit the ages at which women are responsive to available opportunities. Elizaga (1970a), while showing that women migrants predominate at all ages, shows that the sex ratios by age fluctuate considerably in Santiago. At the peak migration ages of 15-29, there were 62 males for every 100 females. For migrants aged 30-49 years, the ratio was 75 males for every 100 females. Other studies, such as the one by Martine (1972), also make clear that sex selectivity varies considerably by age. It is reasonable to assume that at older ages female migration responds more to family obligations than it does to economic factors; hence at those ages the sex selectivity of migrants is less pronounced.

**Kinship and Ethnicity**

Certain ethnic or regional groups are sometimes more likely to move than others, indicating occupational specialization in these groups or other cultural characteristics that facilitate or inhibit their movement. The example of entrepreneurial migrants from Mexticacan, Mexico, discussed by Rollwagen (1971), represents an extreme case. Natives from this region can be found in
many cities throughout Mexico conducting the business in which they have specialized — the manufacture and sale of ice cream.

Ethnicity can facilitate the migration process. That a common cultural identity can lead to the perpetuation of a migration stream is evidenced by the presence of ethnic Indian enclaves in many Latin American cities, and by the spontaneous colonization attempts by certain indigenous groupings in parts of Andean America and Central America. Butterworth (1962) argues that the migration of Tilantoqueño Indians to Mexico City is related to the presence there of earlier migrants from the same ethnic group. Officially sponsored colonization projects have been aware of the advantage of cultural homogeneity to the subsequent adaptation by migrants. In Bolivia, for instance, government-sponsored colonization schemes have emphasized the cultural commonalities by designating certain regions to be settled exclusively by Aymara Indians (Edelmann 1967). By providing a culturally homogeneous environment, planners felt that the probabilities of success of the colonization scheme would be enhanced.

Cultural isolation may lower the incidence of migration. An example is provided by Lowder (1970) who wonders why there has been so little out-migration from the Puno region of highland Peru even though the region is densely populated and has suffered heavily from droughts and famines over the years. A likely hypothesis is that the Indian population of the region remains isolated from Lima and other urban growth poles in the country due to its distinctive language and culture (see Gilbert 1974a, p. 109). How and when the cultural isolation of groups such as the Puno Indians will begin to break down may depend heavily on future patterns of economic and cultural penetration into the region from outside. A general hypothesis for future investigation is that migrant streams to the city in multiethnic societies will become increasingly heterogeneous over time, as communication and information networks expand.

The presence of relatives or friends in prospective areas of in-migration can act as an additional attraction to persons who are considering the possibility of leaving their areas of origin. Not only can they count on the assistance provided by these friends or relatives, but they are also more likely to be exposed to information about the areas. Herrick (1965) found that 83.9% of the recent migrants to Santiago, Chile, had friends or relatives who could provide some kind of help. Of the migrants studied by Margulis (1967) to Buenos Aires, 82.9% indicated having friends or relatives there at the time of their first arrival in the city. Over 84% of migrants to Monterrey, Mexico, indicated the presence of relatives or friends at the time of their latest arrival in that city (Balan et al. 1973). Thus, it may be concluded that the costs involved in migration are reduced by the monetary and moral support that the migrants receive at destination from people whom they knew before arrival.

For the least skilled migrants and for those arriving with less economic resources, the residential patterns of earlier migrant friends and relatives tend to make the transition softer. Flinn and Converse (1970) reported that in a Bogota shantytown close to 30% of migrant household heads had friends or relatives from the same area from which they originated living in the same neighborhood. Kemper (1971) also notes that the place in a city where a newly arrived migrant is likely to settle is very much determined by where family members or acquaintances live.
Skill Levels among Migrants to Urban Areas

There is a high proportion of migrants in the socially visible slum housing on the fringes of large cities in developing nations and this often leads to the mistaken impression that all migrants are in the lower strata. In fact, there may be equally high proportions of less visible migrants in other social strata, including the elite. Migrants to large cities tend to be disproportionately from other (smaller) urban centres and from higher status families in towns and villages. As a consequence, the migrants tend to have higher levels of education and more skilled occupations than do those who remain behind.

In Latin American rural areas, the more education a person has, the more likely he is to migrate. Rural-urban migrants are usually better educated than nonmigrants at origin. Herrick (1965) has estimated that whereas only 8% of the migrants to Santiago, Chile, had no formal education, close to 20% of the residents outside the city had none. In Monterrey, Mexico, migrants had more education than nonmigrants at origin (Browning and Feindt 1969). Likewise, regions whose population have more education are more likely to have higher volumes of out-migration. Conversely, Adams (1969) for Colombia and Conning (1972) for Chile, indicate that areas in which lower educational levels prevail exhibit lower out-migration than areas in which educational levels are higher.

Some writers have speculated as to some of the institutional-structural factors that accentuate educational selectivity in Latin America. Schultz (1971) holds that education in rural areas leads to out-migration since better educated individuals can best respond to available opportunities outside their areas of origin. Margulis (1967) and Preston (1969) have indicated that the curricula followed in rural areas encourage out-migration by failing to emphasize agrarian skills. Another structural dimension emphasized in the literature that stimulates migration of the better educated from rural areas is that most institutions of secondary and higher learning are located in urban areas. Natives who complete their elementary education in rural zones have to out-migrate if they desire to continue their schooling or their childrens’ (Adams 1969).

Balan (1969) has suggested that the “skill” selectivity of migrants is determined by the level of economic development. In early stages of development urban centres are small and tend to serve administrative roles and not economic production and distribution roles resulting in very limited opportunities for urban employment. Any rural-urban movement at this stage, according to Balan’s model, is more likely to involve the sons and daughters of the rural landowning elite who come to the city for education and perhaps to take on a professional or administrative job. There are a few opportunities for people of lower social rank to fill selected positions in service occupations. Later, more urban employment opportunities are created but information about them spreads slowly to the rural areas, transportation is difficult, and the villagers in the rural sector have no urban occupational skills. Children from nonelite families begin to move increasingly into the cities for education and for employment, but at this stage migrants tend to be from families with at least some wealth (e.g., owners of stores or small or intermediate-sized farms etc.). These are also people with higher educational aspirations and greater contact, through commerce, with urban life. Eventually, services and construction in the urban areas expand, communication between villages and
cities increases, and population growth and/or technification in the rural areas combine to increase the relative attractiveness of the city for peasants. Rural-urban migrants at this latter stage come with increasingly less education than those who migrated at previous stages.

Consistent with Balan's argument is the hypothesis that the skills that migrants have and the size and occupational complexity of their places of origin may be interrelated. In least developed nations or in earlier periods of development of more technologically advanced nations, where all villages are small and dependent on agriculture, there will be little occupational differentiation. Migrants to large cities will necessarily be of rural rather than small town origin, and if the number moving is substantial they will tend to be occupationally undifferentiated from nonmigrants in their home town. But in more developed nations with more developed regional networks of towns and cities, a higher proportion of migrants to large cities may be urban in origin and may have urban occupational skills. Herrick (1965), for example, has noted this to be the case in Chile. Where educational systems and specialized occupations have penetrated rural areas the occupational characteristics of migrants can vary more widely and have a more dramatic impact on both sending and receiving areas.

In reviewing selected historical data on characteristics of migrants in six Latin American nations at distinct levels of urbanization and socioeconomic development (ranging from Guatemala to Argentina) Balan (1969) found some support for his general hypothesis. Browning and Feindt (1969) show that migrants to Monterrey over the past several decades have shown marked changes in educational and occupational characteristics such that recent migrants are much less skilled (in absolute terms) than those who came earlier. They characterize the early migrants as "pioneers" who had to overcome barriers to arrive at the city and who by implication were able to move in part because they had the resources to overcome these barriers. The current movement they characterize as "mass migration" of the relatively disadvantaged people in rural areas, whose movement is facilitated by the fact that migration is now an institutionalized process, in which most potential migrants have friends and relatives in the city who can assist in the transition to life in the city.

Expanding on Balan's argument, Browning and Feindt (1969) have further suggested that at this latter stage only those with financial resources and technical skills may be able to survive in the rural areas, hence selectivity may actually be negative, with the least capitalized and most poorly educated dominant in rural-urban streams. However, this is only an inference from the changing composition of rural-urban migrants from areas surrounding Monterrey, Mexico, to Monterrey itself. No measure of the educational and occupational background of all out-migrants from this rural zone is available, hence one does not know if the better educated, more occupationally skilled out-migrants from this predominantly rural zone are now destined for larger urban centres, such as Mexico City itself, where the opportunity structure may be more open to skilled migrants. In addition, there is no direct evidence in the study on the changing structure of income opportunities for unskilled and semiskilled workers (as farm mechanization, for example, might provide) in the sending region, which would support the hypothesis that the least skilled are being, in a sense, "forced" to leave.
The Balan approach may be most representative of countries in which all urban growth is concentrated in "primate" cities. It may be less appropriate for nations in which there is an urban network of towns and intermediate cities. For example, Simmons and Cardona (1972) have noted that the occupational and educational levels of migrants to Bogota, Colombia, have not changed over the past 40 years. Recent migrants still have rather high levels of education and occupation relative to nonmigrants in the major origin areas. As a result few of the small, near subsistence level farmers from nearby areas move directly into Bogota; whereas 68% of the highland population surrounding Bogota live on farms, and in isolated rural hamlets, only 20% of the migrants to Bogota come from these farms and hamlets. Most of the migrants to Bogota, then, are from the towns, villages, and small cities in the region. However, for the most part, these towns, villages, and small cities are continuing to expand although the growth is generally slower. McGeevey (1968) has hypothesized that this growth may be due to migration of the farm population into the towns and regional cities. He further hypothesized that some, but not all, of the emerging opportunities in these towns that attract the rural population may be created by the departure of former residents of these towns, as they in turn move to larger cities. Unfortunately, little is known about the characteristics of migrants to small towns and intermediate cities in Colombia (or elsewhere). But, since the migrants to the towns predominantly originate in rural areas where occupational skills and educational levels are lowest, one may infer that they are less skilled or educated than those migrants going to large cities (Adams 1969, p. 532 provides some support for this possibility). If this is the case, and these towns and cities continue to grow by absorbing those migrants leaving the farm sector, then Bogota as a principal urban centre may never experience the latter stage suggested in the developmental model (and possibly supported in part by the case of Monterrey), where less skilled migrants from farms and isolated hamlets flood to the metropolis.

Skill Levels among Migrants to Rural Areas

Evidence relating migration to education levels in cases other than rural-urban migration is very sparse. In recent years attention has been directed mostly to the investigation of the characteristics of return migrants. It has been often assumed that return migrants were largely those who had failed to adapt at the destination. Yet the proportion of rural people in some regions who have spent time in the city seems too great for this to be the sole reason. For example, one-third or more of the adult men in towns near Bogota, Colombia, have spent more than 6 months in Bogota at some time (Simmons and Cardona 1973). Although some migrants do return because they have been unable to achieve their goals, a great many more do so for other reasons. Many of them return for family reasons (Chi and Bogan 1974) but others do so, apparently, because they have gained skills that allow them to benefit by returning. Whether return migrants come home for economic and career reasons, or for family reasons, will vary from one setting to another, as the following two examples illustrate.

(1) Balan et al. (1973) have studied educational levels in relation to rates of return migration to Monterrey and Cedral, Mexico. They found that return migration was positively related to education in Monterrey (a large city) but not in Cedral (a village). They attribute these differences to the
two types of out-migration from these areas; Monterrey, primarily a receiving area, and Cedral, primarily a sending area. Natives from Monterrey leave for schooling and job training to establish themselves better on their return. In the case of Cedral, a rural community, the situation is different: most of the returnees go back to the village for family reasons, but the better educated normally do not return.

(2) In contrast, Simmons and Cardona (1972) found that a proportion of migrants who had returned from Bogota to a nearby rural district were relatively skilled and highly motivated individuals who on their return were capable of making significant contributions to the well-being of their areas of origin. Many, after acquiring new skills in the areas of destination, returned to apply their skills more profitably. Not surprisingly, given restricted educational opportunities in rural areas, a high proportion of the businessmen, professionals, agricultural technicians, teachers, and other skilled workers in this rural area were rural-born people who had completed their studies in the city. Of all the migrants from the rural areas, those most likely to return were children of landowners. It would seem that they had economic interests in the areas of origin that pulled them back.

Chi and Bogan's (1974) findings for Peru suggest a similar pattern. The new conception of return migration that arises from the contrasting findings of these studies clearly suggest that the causes for return migration are not as simple as previously assumed. Generally, however, it would seem that return migration can be regarded as a response to a combination of economic opportunities mediated by family contacts and occupational skills. In this sense return migration may be similar to other migratory processes.

The finding of Martine (1972) that migrants bound for rural areas in Colombia had lower educational levels than the migrants to Bogota or other urban destinations suggests an hypothesis. Perhaps return migrants will be relatively skilled if returning to small- and intermediate-size urban places and will be relatively unskilled if returning to predominantly farm areas. Such an hypothesis would help explain the contradictory findings cited above.

Place of Origin

Very little is known about the size of the various migrant streams, including all sources and all destinations, in Latin America. The studies that have touched on this, however, indicate that migrants leave large and small cities as well as farms and towns, and that the volume of migration of rural people is very high. Martine (1972), for instance, has estimated that approximately 7.5 million Colombians out of a total population of 17.5 million, or close to 37% of the national population, had changed their usual place of residence by crossing their native administrative boundaries at some time prior to the 1964 census. Interestingly enough, Martine calculated that only 12.6% of the migrants were found in Bogota, while 51.5% were in other urban areas and a surprisingly high 35.9% in rural areas. It should be noted that Martine's estimates actually understate the extent of moves since they are based on place-of-birth statistics that conceal multiple migrations. Nor do his estimates take into account moves that did not cross political-administrative boundaries or the return of migrants to their initial area of origin. One might speculate that if these additional types of migration were considered, half or more of the
population could be defined as "migrant" and migration rather than being the exception would be the rule. Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to make international comparisons of the various origins of migrants, or of the total volume of migration, since existing census data include grossly different size "source" and "destination" areas that would hide varying proportions of short-distance moves, some of which may be from urban origins and others from rural origins.

Given the high volume of migration in Latin America, it seems safe to assume that migrants may originate in any kind of settlement. The literature tends to emphasize "rural-urban" migration due to the fact that, in balance, this is the predominant direction of the flow. Yet even the majority of migrants who settle in urban areas may not necessarily come from rural areas. Many may be from other, smaller urban areas. Or if they were born in rural areas, they may have lived in smaller urban areas before moving on to the city. Investigators have been aware of these transitory aspects of migration, but some confusion is still observed in the literature on the following kinds of questions: Does "origin" refer to a migrant's place of birth or to his latest place of residence? Does "rural origin" mean that the migrant is from a farm or a rural village?

**Origin of Migrants to Urban Areas**

It was first believed that most urban-bound migrants reached the cities directly from rural origins. As research has accumulated it has become increasingly evident that the process is not so simple. Where the migrants can come from and where they can go is determined in part by the structure of urban settlements in a country. In countries in which the nonmetropolitan population is primarily farm-based, urban-bound migrants are likely to be of rural farm origins. In countries where there is a significant network of small cities and towns, migrants arriving at the large cities may be predominantly urban-born. Thus, countries that have large farm populations, such as Bolivia, should have more migrants of rural farm origin than countries such as Chile, which have better developed urban systems. Migrants from densely populated regions in which there are many urban nuclei (e.g., the area around Bogota) are more likely to be urban in origin than migrants from areas with low population densities and many small hamlets rather than towns (e.g., the semiarid Mexican North). However, migrants to any destination are likely to arrive from many different origins, and as we shall see, in many different ways.

In Chile, for example, 20.4% and 10.9% of the male migrants born in rural areas reach Santiago from urban and semiurban areas, respectively. In contrast, 9.2% and 11.3% of the migrants arriving from rural areas were born in urban and semiurban places, in that order (Elizaga 1970a). These figures clearly indicate that a lot more than the simple rural-urban moves are taking place. Many individuals move back and forth from one type of place to another. Not only do many rural-born migrants arrive in the metropolitan area from intermediate destinations, but many urban-born migrants reach Santiago from rural areas indicating that some urban-rural migration is taking place. The great majority of the migrants, however, whether directly or in a series of moves, arrive in Santiago after leaving localities with over 5000 inhabitants. Sixty-five percent of the male migrants to Santiago and over 63% of the female
migrants arrived from urban areas. Only 10.9% of the males and 12.8% of the females came from rural places. Since in 1960, 68.2% of the population of Chile was estimated to be living in urban areas (Elizaga 1970a, p. 12), migrants to Santiago do not appear to originate disproportionately in urban areas. In other countries, however, migrants to the great metropolises appear to have mostly urban origins. Concerning the place of origin of migrants to Bogota, Simmons and Cardona (1972) found that most migrants reached that city after leaving small cities and towns. Although in the Boyaca-Cundinamarca region close to two-thirds of the population live in hamlets or rural-farm areas, only 22% of the migrants to Bogota actually came from hamlets or farms in that region.

The failure at times to distinguish between place of birth and place of origin to destination appears to have introduced some confusion into the literature. The recognition that many migrants reach their destinations in more than one move has helped elucidate the contradictions involved in rural population losses through out-migration, the growth of the metropolitan populations through in-migration, and the apparent urban origin of many of the migrants.

**Origin of Migrants to Rural Areas**

This has received much less attention than the origin of migrants to urban areas. Some studies, such as the one by Martine (1972) reviewed above, have tried to estimate the total volume of migration to rural destinations. Most studies about migrations to rural areas, however, have dealt with colonization projects of one kind or another (e.g., Edelmann 1967; Preston 1969).

It is generally believed that most migrants to rural areas originate in other rural areas. As the results of the Elizaga (1970a) study also suggest, this is an erroneous conception. Preston (1969) has even stated that in colonization attempts in Bolivia "about half the colonists are not peasants." He indicates that in colonization programs such as the one he describes, the financial demands are such that only individuals with some resources could successfully undertake the migrations. These individuals are obviously not the impoverished, unskilled rural inhabitants who the programs are intended to benefit. Most likely many of the colonizers are individuals who have had some urban exposure where they have been able to acquire either some capital or skills. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that in most rural-destined migrations, whether temporary or permanent, a high percentage of the migrants have a rural background. People with a farming background are more likely to adjust to the more primitive conditions in rural areas, and they have skills that are easily transferable.

Occurrences of cyclical or seasonal migration, although known to be frequent in countries that specialize in the production of exportable commodities from plantation agriculture have barely been investigated. Urzua (1975) indicates that these migrations are quantitatively important in Central America, the Caribbean, Colombia, Brazil, the sugarcane areas of Argentina, and the eastern part of Bolivia. Other important seasonal migrations are the ones that involve crossing national borders, as between Mexico and the frontier regions of the United States; of Guatemalans into Mexico; of farmers from Nicaragua and El Salvador into Honduras; and of Bolivians into the sugarcane areas of Argentina. Most of these temporary migrations are into
farm regions that depend on relatively small permanent agricultural work forces during the greater part of the year, but on large temporary (migrant) labour during planting and harvesting. It may be assumed that most of the persons who participate in seasonal migrations come from a rural background. However, many, when not involved in the seasonal agricultural activities, probably spend part of their time in the cities among the urban underemployed. Unfortunately, no direct evidence is available to investigate this theory.

**Stage Migration**

Migrants who arrive at their eventual destinations indirectly from their places of birth are said to do so in stages. Various patterns of stage migration have been described in the literature. Some writers, such as McGreevey (1968) speculate that it follows the “fill-in” pattern in which recently arrived migrants from the rural areas occupy the slots left vacant in small towns and cities by out-migrants. Others, such as Kemper (1971) argue that migration is characterized by “stages” in which rural migrants move first into small urban areas and after having spent an adaptation period there move on to metropolitan areas. The same author also describes a type of stage migration that involves intergenerational moves. As he puts it “the man who left the village for the small town does not reach the metropolis, but his children do” (p. 43). Which of these particular cases predominates, if any, is anyone’s guess. Evidence on stage and fill-in migration is simply not available, since very little is known about population movements between rural-farm areas, small villages, and intermediate cities. This is because very few special surveys containing a migratory history have been carried out in such locations.

What we do know about stage migration is primarily from surveys in large cities. The majority of the studies read for this review indicate that direct migration is the most prevalent type. For instance, in studies on migration to Monterrey and Bogota by Balan et al. (1973) and Simmons and Cardona (1972), direct migration was found to be the most prevalent. Elizaga (1970a) reports that 64.4% of the males and 70.8% of the females 14 years of age and over interviewed in Santiago, Chile, had arrived in that city in a single move. However, the corresponding percentages for the migrants over 25 years of age were 34.6% for the males and 42.4% for the females. It appears that large cities tend to draw most of their migrants directly from nearby areas. Whether they are settled or of a more rural character may likely depend on the developmental stage and/or the geographical distribution of people of the country or area in question.
Part III

Consequences of Migration

Very few studies have seriously considered the possible consequences of internal migrations. However, speculations do abound on the possible consequences derived from empirical and theoretical generalizations obtained largely from the study of socioeconomic relationships in other parts of the world. In the pages that follow we attempt to summarize some of these speculations as well as the scant empirical evidence in the literature. Since most of the research and speculation on internal migration in Latin America has dealt with rural-urban moves, we shall restrict ourselves to a review of consequences in rural places of origin and in urban destination centres.

Consequences to Rural Places of Origin

Changes in Size and Composition of the Labour Force

It is often argued that migration removes excess labour that the agrarian sector cannot absorb. If so, the levels of rural unemployment should be lowered. Perhaps also, the resultant reductions in land-labour ratios may produce increases in labour productivity that should eventually be translated into improved rural wage rates. In sum, as Morrison (1973, p. 18) states, “out-migration acts as an economic adjustment mechanism by reducing local labor surpluses and lessening competition for scarce employment.” It is questionable, however, whether the impact of this adjustment in developing societies, with highly stagnated rural sectors and very rapid rates of population growth, is sufficient to increase rural wages or lead to increases in agricultural productivity. More likely, and at least as long as population continues to grow at a fast pace, out-migration simply removes unemployable labour without actually producing strong enough changes in the labour market to affect the wage levels. In fact, the age structure may be distorted by the exit of the younger and more productive segment of the native population. As a result a diminishing proportion of prime working age adults must support a relatively greater share of children and aged residents.

Preston (1969) has illustrated the impact of out-migration on the age composition of the labour force in his comparison of two rural villages in Peru. In one of them out-migration was frequent, and in the other, very limited. The former he found to have lower proportions of men aged 20-34 and women aged 20-29, and higher proportions of the population above age 55. The deterioration in the dependency ratios furthermore aggravates the economic situation at origin through changes in the quality of the labour force. As Morrison (1973, p. 18) indicates: “Out-migration usually draws away (the) more highly qualified members of the labor force—the young, the educated, and the skilled—the labor force left behind tends to be overaged, undereducated, and underskilled ... Prolonged and heavy out-migration ... leaves behind those persons who are least able to cope with the unfavorable conditions that led others to depart in the first place.” Since through migration
the areas of origin lose the more capable people likely to provide leadership that may promote change, out-migration may be seen as a process that hinders social and economic progress.

Outlet to Social and Economic Tensions

As Balan et al. (1973, p. 312) see it, "out-migration ... serves the important function of maintaining the status quo." It reduces the tensions between social classes by providing alternatives to individuals who are dissatisfied with their position in life, and ameliorates the conflicts that arise when competitive normative systems are brought into contact with each other, as when modern urban values filtering down to rural populations compete with traditional ways of life. Margulis (1967) has proposed the same hypothesis. Out-migration harms the areas of origin by helping preserve archaic value systems that interfere with the implementation and acceptance of social change.

However, the feedback effects of return migration that follow out-migration may have favourable consequences in the areas of origin. Increased contacts with more dynamic regions and the return of relatively skilled workers have been postulated as factors that may contribute to the socioeconomic development of backward areas (Feindt and Browning 1970; Simmons and Cardona 1972). People must migrate out to get these skills, and although not all out-migrants return, the impact of those who do may be significant.

Another consequence of migration is the cash remittances of migrants to relatives who have stayed behind. As Balan et al. (1973, p. 313) have discussed for Cedral, the additional income brought back can mean the difference between extreme economic need and relative abundance to the communities of origin.

Fertility

Lastly, declines in the rates of natural population growth in areas of out-migration can be postulated, as lower proportions of adults in prime reproductive ages contribute to the fertility of the region.

In addition, increased contacts with the more "modernized" sectors through contacts with return-migrants may influence the value system of the rural communities, and rural inhabitants may internalize lower fertility norms.

Consequences to Urban Places of Destination

Studies dealing with the consequences of migration on places of destination are few and far between. Those that touch on this topic are more frequently based on indirect rather than direct evidence. For example, indirect evidence is available through studies that examine how individual migrants have fared economically over time.

The evidence is overwhelming that over time migrants tend to improve their economic circumstances. Balan and Jelin (1970, p. 616) have stated about migrants to Monterrey, Mexico, that:

"Under certain conditions (age at arrival in the city, family background, place of origin, etc.) the migrants compete successfully with the natives,
and in the majority of cases experience some upward social mobility in relation to the non-migrants."

The economic "success" of the migrant group is frequently equated with their impact on the community of destination. This is a questionable line of reasoning. Migrants might improve their own position at the expense of the total system, or at least at the expense of nonmigrant groups. Lower unemployment levels for migrants than for natives at destination, as for example, reported by Herrick (1965) for Chile, may well result from a situation in which the migrants are willing to work for less pay. The higher public expenditures for services in urban rather than in rural areas may benefit the migrants but raise the taxes that urban residents must pay for them. Unfortunately, there seem to be no studies focused on this issue.

**Labour Force**

Since the youngest and most productive individuals tend to out-migrate, we may expect that they will benefit their destination areas by increasing the proportion of the labour force in prime working ages. In a study in Santiago, Chile, fully 77.2% of the male migrants and 79.3% of the female migrants were in the age-group 15 to 59, whereas the percentages of men and women of that age in the total population were 41.6% and 43.9% respectively (Elizaga 1970a). Whether the influx of young migrants raises, in addition, the skill levels in areas of destination, cannot be as readily answered. Although migrants, in relation to their populations of origin, may have superior skill characteristics, they may be less skilled than the native population of the areas into which they migrate. This appears to be the case in Bogota, Colombia (see Simmons and Cardona 1972). Nevertheless if the migrants bring skills with them needed to the areas of destination, these areas will benefit insofar as they are able to utilize skilled manpower educated at the expense of the areas of origin.

**Wage Levels**

Migration into large cities may also have some effect on wage levels. Under perfect free-market conditions, the excess labour in the urban employment markets should lower the wage rates, as workers compete with one another for available positions. However, labour markets do not operate entirely on the basis of supply and demand principles. Balan (1969), for instance, has discussed the effects that class background, family name, and access to education have on a person's employment opportunities in Latin America. He argues that one must have the appropriate credentials to even compete for a job and that the credentials for the more skilled jobs tend to be held by a privileged minority.

Kogut and Langoni (1975, p. 327) have made the observation that in rapidly expanding urban economies, wage rates vary with the skill levels involved. They claim that:

"labor demand from the high-skill sector is less elastic than from the low-skill one, which is simply a reflection of the more limited substitution possibilities; clearly, while skilled workmen can replace unskilled, the converse is not true; moreover, whereas plant is complementary to skilled personnel, it tends to replace the unskilled ... When economic growth accelerates there is an immediate rise in the demand for labor. By its
nature, this increased demand is not skill-neutral; because of the more rapid development of the modern sector, which is skill-intensive, it is above all skilled workers who benefit. This "partiality" of expanding demand, together with the short-term inelasticity of the skilled-labor supply, gives rise to the payment of economic rent for such labor ... The earnings of unskilled workers thus tend to diminish by comparison with those of the skilled, rendering the distribution of income still more unequal.”

The critical point here relates to the effect this differential behaviour of the wage-setting mechanisms by skill level may have on socioeconomic growth. Although the increasing gap may not be best from the point of view of social justice, it may help a more rapid capitalization as it assures a continual supply of low-skilled labour at low costs. As the labour force becomes more skilled, pressures will begin to operate to limit its further wage increases, leading in the long run, to a more equitable income distribution.

**Economies of Scale**

Economies and diseconomies of scale have been postulated as resulting from the massive entry of migrants into urban areas. Higher population densities can produce economies of scale in both production and distribution of goods and services. However, there has been some debate regarding the postulated advantages that can be derived by the concentration of national populations in large urban centres. Some authors have speculated that after a certain population size is reached, the economic advantages are negated by rapidly increasing per capita costs. But as Alonso (1969, p. 1) points out:

"there is no agreement as to the size at which this occurs; nor, for that matter, is there solid evidence that costs do in fact increase with urban size for a given level of services and facilities."

**Social-Political Participation**

Superficial conceptions of who the urban-bound migrants are and how they live blamed the social and political instability characteristic of many countries of the region on the concentration of the migrants in the urban centres. According to many authors, the dehumanizing living conditions under which the migrants are assumed to live result in the weakening of the normative value system and in subsequent social disruption. Schulmann (1966), a sociologist with this view, has been quoted by Mangin (1971, p. 68-69) as saying when referring to the migrants and the places where they live:

"It is the rudest kind of slum, clustering like a dirty beehive around the edges of any principal city in Latin America. In the past two decades poor rural people have flocked to the cities, found no opportunities but stayed on in urban fringe shantytowns squatting squalidly on the land ... Living almost like animals, the tugurio’s residents are overwhelmed by animality. Religion, social control, education, domestic life are warped and disfigured."

Empirical studies of migrants in the big cities have contradicted these assumptions by showing that not all migrants are illiterate rural peasants, nor are the shantytowns colonies of despair. A majority of the migrants are better prepared for urban life than was first believed, and many come from urban backgrounds (towns or small cities). Others, as Nelson (1969) argues, tend to
adjust fairly easily and rapidly to the urban environment. The migrants, in general, do not differ so greatly from the native-born urban population. Hence, there is not sufficient basis to link social and political instability to internal migration. The summary made by Cornelius (1969, p. 855) of the findings of his study in Mexico can be used to schematize briefly what appears to be the present consensus:

"We find little empirical evidence to support the standard conception of the city as essentially a radicalizing environment. Nor does there appear to be an empirical basis for frequent perceptions of imminent threat to existing authority structures stemming from the rapid influx of migrants to cities ... We find that there is little or no difference between migrants and urban born individuals on many indices of social condition, political attitudes, and behavior patterns, and that the ratio of migrants to non-migrants is probably one of the less critical factors accounting for urban political phenomena."

**Housing**

Among the most visible consequences of large metropolitan-bound migrations are the ecological transformations which result particularly in the locations and types of dwellings that migrants occupy. Among the most striking are the concentration of migrants in central sections of cities and the creation of peripheral shantytowns. For many migrants and urban poor alike, to move into a shantytown may improve their social and economic standing. Whether when taking advantage of "sites and services" schemes (World Bank 1972) or establishing themselves in nonprepared sites, illegally or legally as in the so-called "sites without services" (Cornelius 1975), the migrants contribute to their own economic well-being and that of the cities where they live by adding to the capital stock through the construction and improvement of housing facilities. "Sites and services" schemes allow poor people to build their own shanties from whatever scraps of materials they can get, supplemented by some standard building materials provided through government credit. "Sites without services" schemes provide only a plot of land.

As Flinn (1968, p. 88) notes:

"Given time for capital accumulation some in-migrants to the central city shift from the densely populated, central city slums to a peripheral clandestine barrio where they have better living conditions. This intra-city movement is also related to occupational mobility. In-migrants who possess financial assets and skills tend to settle in the shantytown fringe. Thus, the clandestine barrio in this study appears to be a "shantytown suburb." Though definitely not a "middle class suburb," the barrio represents a higher socioeconomic level than the transition zone and the workingmen's barrios of the central city."

**Pollution**

The sudden unplanned concentrations of population in Latin American cities have created certain ecological problems that just recently have begun to receive attention. Although many of these problems have resulted from very much the same causes as the in-migration to the cities (the concentration of industrial plants in a few cities, for example), the latter tends to aggravate the conditions. As a United Nations (1974, p. 18-19) report has indicated:
"The pollution of air, land and water in cities such as Santiago, Lima, Buenos Aires, São Paulo and Mexico City particularly, but in many other centres where population and industry are concentrated, has proved at times to be almost as intense as the worst experienced in the industrialized nations ... Domestic heating and private rubbish burning are responsible for a certain portion of the air pollution, but the worst contamination is caused by industry and the motor vehicle ... Similarly, the contamination of rivers and of water systems has followed from the lack of balanced development in the continent. The cities provide the most obvious examples of contamination of water courses of whatever size ... all serving as receptacles for sewage and other kinds of waste."

As a result, health conditions in many of these cities may be threatened. Given the present policies followed by many Latin American countries of "industrial development at any cost" this situation may get worse in the future. For example, in August, 1975, the Brazilian government passed a law by which "no plant should be closed down for infringement of pollution regulations if its production was 'of high priority for national development and security'." (See Latin American Newsletter 1975, p. 271.)

**Overall Impact on the Economy and Society**

It has been hypothesized that internal migration responds to and at the same time emphasizes the patterns of regional inequalities characteristic of the earlier stages of economic growth. As Alonso (1969, p. 8) has noted:

"... concentration is typical of the take-off stage of development ... equalization takes place as the economy matures ... In the early stages of development, the advantage lies with the developed centers, which enjoy the existence of overhead facilities, external economies, political power, spatial preferences of the decision-makers, in-migration of the more vigorous and educated elements from the underdeveloped regions, flows of funds from the wealthy in the hinterlands to the financial markets in the cities, and a variety of other factors."

Based on arguments like these, many analysts have concluded that migration contributes to a more efficient functioning of the economic system as the more resourceful labour moves into the dynamic sectors of a country where their skills can be better used in conjunction with more abundant and sophisticated technological inputs. Hence, for them migration will contribute to a higher rate of economic growth for the system as a whole. Other writers have argued that this conclusion is erroneous since what they see happening is a poor allocation of resources. They indicate that many of the capital investments in urban areas inhibit the process of economic development, as when scarce resources are used to build aesthetically pleasing public works in the big cities. Meanwhile, they note, the stagnation of the rural sector is allowed to continue as there are not sufficient funds to create needed infrastructural works in agrarian zones, or enough revenues to accelerate the modernization of agriculture. The result is that many of the countries of the region have to rely on imports to fulfill their food needs, while the productivity levels in the agricultural sector remain very low.

The migration of labour to the economic centres contributes significantly to social mobility as many migrants who would have been unable in their places of origin to improve their socioeconomic standing find it possible to do so in the rapidly expanding urban centres. These consequences may be direct,
as when an overly qualified individual moves to an area that can use his skills, or indirect, as when a migrant or his children can acquire an education or other skill that will eventually make upward mobility possible. To the extent that migration permits social mobility, it assures the tranquil evolution of the social system. The accumulated evidence on social mobility generally supports the contention that many, if not most internal migrants experience some sort of upward mobility. Whether migrants do better than natives at destination is a different matter. Some studies, such as the one done by Raczynsiki (1972) in Santiago, Chile, indicate that migrants do not do as well, whereas others, such as the one by Balan and Jelin (1970), show that migrants of urban origin do as well as the metropolitan natives in Monterrey, Mexico. Obviously, differences in the characteristics of migrants as well as in the populations of the areas into which they migrate can produce different results. As Simmons (1974, p. 19) has indicated:

"there exist wide differences between the cities in social economic development patterns and in recent cultural influences. Generalizations about social mobility patterns in Latin America as a whole may be possible, but only if they also take into account the wide diversity within the region."

A decline in the rates of natural increase in countries experiencing quantitatively important volumes of rural-urban migration has been hypothesized. It is argued that since fertility levels are normally lower in urban localities, rural-urban migrants will lower their fertility in adapting to the urban setting (Martine 1975). Empirical studies, however, have found that rural-urban migrants may have high or low fertility, and that the impact of urban living on fertility is more complex than expected (see a worldwide review of evidence by Zarate and Unger 1975). Simmons (1970), for example, found that migrants to Bogota who arrived at an early age and who had passed several years in the city were more likely to be using contraception and to have smaller families than rural nonmigrants with the same level of education. The urban-born native, however, had lower fertility than the rural-urban migrant. Merrick (1974) found that migration led to a widening of regional differentials in fertility in Brazil during the period 1950-70. This may have occurred as a result of both the educational, marital status, and age characteristics of the migrants, and the adoption of contraceptives by rural-born migrants moving to urban areas.
Part IV

Four Migration Policy Approaches

It is convenient at the outset to broadly distinguish “intentional” migration policies from “other” policies that unintentionally influence migration. Intentional migration policies have as their explicit objective a change in human settlement patterns. Examples of such objectives include decisions of governments to freeze the size of a metropolitan area or to open a relatively underpopulated frontier area.

Our focus in this paper is primarily on policies whose objective was to influence migration patterns. However, one cannot ignore policies with other objectives that indirectly influenced migration. In fact most programs and policies that are used or that could be used to influence migration are established to achieve some broader objective. Thus, for example, one reason for land reform programs may be to slow the rural exodus, but the overriding policy concerns will be social justice and the welfare of rural peoples. Policies that favour the colonization of frontier lands, the growth of intermediate cities in less favoured regions, and the eradication of slum housing in the metropolitan areas also tend to have other objectives.

Most policies and programs that have been or could be justified at least in part in terms of their effect on migration into metropolitan cities can be subsumed under one of the following five strategies:

1. **Stop** the flow of migrants at the source by encouraging the people to “stay on the farm” through land reform or other mechanisms.
2. **Redirect** the flow of migrants to rural “frontier” areas (colonization).
3. **Redirect** migrants to intermediate urban “growth poles” (industrial estates) and “new cities.”
4. **Return** the rural-urban migrants to their hometowns or otherwise discourage them from staying in the metropolis. This may be done through an “entry permit” approach, busing programs, or the control of ration cards and other privileges.
5. **Accommodate** to existing patterns of rural-urban migration in an attempt to provide services and programs that will improve the lot of migrants, especially low-income migrants living in marginal metropolitan housing.

Policies to Stop the Flow at the Source

Many programs have been implemented by governments in Latin America to improve the living conditions of people in rural areas. Such programs may

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1 This section is a condensation of a more general paper by Laquian and Simmons (1975) based on evidence for Asia and Africa, as well as Latin America.
have, as subgoals, the desire to increase agricultural production and to "keep rural families on the farm." Among this wide variety of programs and policies, two approaches that have been at least partially justified in terms of their effect on rural-urban migration seem to be particularly noteworthy in Latin America: land reform programs and regional development programs.

**Land Reform**

The strongest argument for land reform is, of course, social justice. However, it has also been argued that if farmers get control of the land, they will be less prone to move out of rural areas, as the land serves to anchor them to a place.

The relationship between land reform and rural-urban migration is not clear, however. A United Nations document (U.N. 1970b, p. 271) has noted that: "assuming that a temporary slowdown in rural migration in developing countries would be desirable, the premise that agrarian reforms would contribute to this slowdown is largely hypothetical and needs to be tested in the light of actual experience."

Some of the limited evidence on this topic for Latin America suggests that land reform can slow down the rural exodus under certain conditions. Burke (1970), for example, presents evidence indicating that ex-haciendas in a region in Bolivia have increased their population between 50 and 100% since the land reform program was instituted in 1953. He notes that "in addition to the natural increase in population on these ex-estates, there has been a substantial migration to these lands from the indigenous communities, villages and cities" (Burke 1970, p. 421).

In other cases, evidence suggests that land reform supports an accelerated rate of out-migration from the land. This may be the case particularly when other goals of the land reform, such as increased production, are met. The nationalization of the large coastal sugar plantations in Peru under the military government after 1969 provides one example of what can happen. Some of the plantations, such as Casa Grande, were relatively modern and efficient prior to the takeover, whereas others were relatively backward and inefficient. The government turned the plantations into cooperatives in which the workers became members (socios) and as such were able to collectively share in administration and profits. Attempts were made to improve agricultural techniques, upgrade capital inputs and improve social services in the communities. Standards of living in some cooperatives at least appear to have increased rapidly, as evidenced by the proliferation of consumer goods, such as television sets and modern appliances. Although one might question the social justice of spreading the wealth among the new owner/members only, and not sharing some with less privileged workers and farmers elsewhere, the land reform effort must be evaluated as having achieved many of its goals.

The revolutionary shift in control over the land and in living conditions did not, however, appear to discourage out-migration. Quite to the contrary, there is evidence that the young men and women are leaving in large numbers. This may reflect several basic factors, such as a slowing in the demand for labour due to higher productivity on the farms, or an increase in the demand for education now that the heads of families are more affluent. The key mechanism directly associated with the exodus is, however, clear: only
the older workers become *socios* and their children have no special privileges on the cooperative farms (Bazan 1975). Thus, landownership may have slowed out-migration among the older generation, but the reform did not give land to the young and they continue to move to the cities.

**Community Development**

Aside from attempts to improve the lot of rural people by increased production and agrarian reform, many developing countries are also encouraging the development of rural communities through various programs falling within the field of community development. Economic motivations and social justice are influential factors in a person's choice to move or stay. Community development, by encouraging identification with a community, involvement in local affairs, and by developing community leadership, may serve to encourage people to stay where they are. The hope is that when people have a stake in their own communities they will be less inclined to leave them.

In Bolivia, for instance, Preston (1970) has shown that encouraging the development of small hamlets along newly constructed roads was regarded as a viable alternative to the out-migration of the rural population. It was felt that the development of the hamlets and villages could provide some of the amenities of urban living, while preserving the intimacy and warmth of more traditional rural communities.

Evidence of programs of rural community development that have served to keep people on the land are more difficult to encounter. Even Cuba, which provides a relatively successful example of a "return to the land" movement, is really a mixed case. The emphasis on agricultural development in Cuba after 1964 served to slow the growth of established cities, but at the same time scattered rural peoples were being settled in towns with a broader range of improved services, and urban centres throughout the nation were being outfitted to serve as ports or manufacturing locations (Acosta and Hardoy 1972).

The large-scale government housing program in Venezuela may provide another example. Beginning in the late 1950s Venezuela attempted to build well-constructed inexpensive dwellings to replace the traditional wattle-and-daub thatch-roof huts (MacDonald and MacDonald 1968). By 1965, nearly 50,000 of these dwellings had been constructed. The program has by now had a substantial impact on rural housing, although exact figures are not available. A survey of rural nonmigrants and rural-urban migrants, however, has shown that neither improved housing in the rural areas nor a shortage of housing in urban areas have been major reasons for staying in the rural area. Availability of work opportunities and the presence of kin in the cities to help during the adjustment period seem to be much more important in the decision to move or stay. For example, 90% of those who had directly benefited from the rural housing plan in the rural areas gave housing shortages in the city as a reason for not migrating, as opposed to more than 45% in the same group who gave family or work reasons for not migrating (MacDonald and MacDonald 1968, p. 425).

**Policies to Redirect Migrants to Other Rural Areas**

Colonization projects and programs to upgrade living conditions in rural areas have been enacted by Latin American governments in attempts to
redistribute the population. These types of programs are very attractive since they serve the double purpose of slowing down migration out of rural areas at the same time that they improve the socioeconomic conditions under which families in the agrarian sector live. Officially sponsored colonization projects have frequently evolved from the spontaneous illegal takeovers of unexploited private or government-owned lands by landless peasants that have occurred in practically every Latin American country. Urzua (1975) concludes that whether such colonization schemes have been successful in retaining the settlers and in slowing their migration to the large urban centres has depended on the amount of technical and financial backing that they have received.

A case in Bolivia demonstrates the way in which the success of colonization schemes depends on a variety of infrastructural supports. The highlands and western mountain areas of Bolivia constitute only 41% of the total national territory but contain 93% of the population (Edelmann 1967). A major colonization program has been operating in Bolivia since 1962 to increase agricultural production and to prevent the encroachment by foreign interests in the eastern lowlands (since independence Bolivia has lost half her original territory to neighbouring states). In some zones at least, the colonists are provided with temporary homes, livestock, tools, a limited amount of credit, schools, and the services of a health clinic. However, unforeseen problems emerged particularly regarding inadequate marketing mechanisms for the bumper crops that the colonists soon began to produce. Roads to the cities were inadequate and often washed out at critical times of the year. These circumstances greatly reduced the contribution of the new colonies to food production for urban areas and had a negative impact on the communities themselves. Despite such problems, however, only about 6% of the colonists appear to have returned home in the first 4 or 5 years (Edelmann 1967, p. 46). This low rate of return may be taken as an indication that circumstances in the places of origin were even more difficult than in the colony.

In contrast, Montoya Rojas (1967) has cited the failure of a colonization project in Peru to benefit the rural inhabitants whom it was intended to help since no aid of any kind was given, with the exception of the road that made the virgin lands accessible. People from outside the region with sufficient capital were the only ones capable of settling the area profitably. Many of these individuals appear to have been of urban rather than rural origin. We may conclude that, though there have been some measures of success in resettling people to less congested areas, the financial costs, administrative requirements, and unanticipated problems have exacted a high price.

**Growth Poles**

Many studies have shown the importance of economic factors in migration. The possibility that a person will find jobs or better economic opportunities for himself and/or his children in a certain place often triggers the move. Such prospects are the magnets that attract people to large metropolitan areas. Policymakers, therefore, have concluded that if alternative job opportunities can be made available in other areas people would go there rather than to the large cities.

Left to their own devices, entrepreneurs in a market economy normally locate factories and industrial plants close to cities to have ready access to markets, skilled labour, utilities, and services. In an attempt to influence such
decisions, some governments have set up industrial estates where incentives were extended to entrepreneurs in the form of free land, services, special tax considerations, exemptions from certain regulations, etc. However, the massive costs of planning and implementing industrial estate programs (both in direct outlays and subsidies) have had a sobering effect on most governments. In some instances, despite heavy subsidies, the industrial estates have not been successful.

The Mexican government has tried several industrial estate programs. One of the more serious efforts was at Ciudad Sahagun where the state set up some industry and provided services and incentives for private manufacturers. However, despite the fact that this industrial estate is only 60 miles from Mexico City, few private firms came. Lavell (1972) concludes that, for both market and political reasons, more companies have located in Mexico City than have been dispersed as a result of such government programs.

The case of Chile, where foreign automobile manufacturers were forced to assemble automobiles in the city of Arica in the north of Chile, is an example of fiscal and legislative means used in regional development efforts without the direct financial participation of the government (Johnson 1967). As in the case of Mexico, market causes led to the failure of this attempt by the Chilean government to decentralize its economy. Peru, in contrast, seems to have been more successful in attracting private companies making radios, dehydrated foodstuffs, aluminum products, etc., to industrial estates there.

Even "successful" programs of industrial estate development may have little success in influencing patterns of population movement. To begin with, the estates are usually capital-intensive and do not employ large quantities of labour. Furthermore, they attract highly skilled individuals instead of the mass of unemployed or underemployed. Finally, undercapitalized entrepreneurs are rarely able to provide the services and amenities needed by skilled workers and these workers are either content to remain in the city or they leave the industrial estates in disgust afterwards.

An important experiment to create an urban alternative in Latin America is the expansion of Ciudad Guayana in Venezuela. From a small mining town at the confluence of the Orinoco and Caroni rivers, planners and engineers created a city for a population of 300,000 to be reached by 1980 (Rodwin 1970). The development authority for the region established a steel mill and expanded nearby ports. Vast investments were made in social overhead and infrastructure. As Gilbert (1974a, p. 265) has noted:

"Venezuela had enormous funds from petroleum revenues with which to support the Guayana project; between 1965 and 1975, its income was budgeted at U.S. $3.8 billion, of which U.S. $2.0 billion would come from the national government. The size of this budget can be seen if it is compared to the total government budget of neighbouring Colombia, a country with more than twice as many inhabitants. While the Venezuelan Government spent U.S. $200 million annually on the Guayana project, the Colombian total budget was a mere five times higher."

This scale of investment in Ciudad Guayana is rarely within the reach of countries that do not have Venezuela's oil and mineral wealth. Even with full financial support, however, Ciudad Guayana has had problems. From the
outset, the orderly projections of planners were upset by migrants who flocked to the area and built their shanties in every section. In time, the city extended services and amenities to the poor residential populations.

From the review of country experiences, it is clear that to successfully serve as an alternative area of development, a location needs to be rich in resources and far from the central city. It should have a combination of rural and urban characteristics to form an integrated whole. It has to be planned as a region, more or less self-contained, though planning should be linked to national development.

**Turning Them Back**

Faced with rapid rural-urban migration to metropolitan areas, some developing countries have taken direct measures to stop or discourage it. Direct and explicit policies designed to encourage migrants in the cities to return home have not been documented for Latin America. However, there are countless examples in almost every country in Latin America of the use of force, including armed troops and bulldozers, to remove squatter settlements or to prevent them from springing up. Not all residents of squatter settlements are migrants from the countryside, but a high proportion are. Thus, policies that have limited the spread of squatter housing and other less expensive housing forms in large cities have had, as an indirect consequence, an impact on the ease with which poor rural-urban migrants are able to survive in the city. However, the evidence would suggest that such actions have not made life so difficult that the migrants seek to return home. To the contrary, with the few exceptions, the history of illegal squatter settlements in Latin America over the past 15 or 20 years suggests that pressure from rural-urban migration on the cities has led to partial and even complete victories of marginal housing settlements in the face of official force to do away with them. The early success of large squatter settlements in and around cities in Peru and Colombia certainly support this view (see, for example, Matos Mar 1961; Havens et al. 1965; and Cardona 1969).

**Accommodating Migrants in Metropolitan Areas**

Two contrasting ways in which governments are attempting to deal with the lack of services to low income residential areas in the metropolitan cities are:

1. **Large-scale building of "inexpensive" housing.** Such programs are not common since the total cost to governments is often too high. Jones (1964) reports that in Caracas over a 4-year period some time ago (1954-58), the government bulldozed several *barrios* of shanties off the hills on the eastern part of the city and built in their place 85 "super blocks" of between 150 and 450 apartments each, housing a total of 160,000 people or nearly 13% of the metropolitan population at the time. It was not anticipated that the flood to the city would continue, perhaps encouraged by the available housing in the building boom, nor that slum housing would soon begin to grow up around the new blocks, populated by families that could not afford the high (although subsidized) rents there.

2. **More common in countries without Venezuela's economic resources have been "sites and services" schemes where poor people are allowed to
build their own shanties from whatever scraps of material they can get, supplemented by some standard building materials provided through government credit. In such schemes anything that will alleviate urban housing needs is considered to be helpful. Thus, public officials in some countries no longer ask for housing that would give so many square meters of living space per person, nor do they plan for piped water in every house. They similarly point out that communal taps, pit latrines, or even pail collection systems for sewerage are better than nothing.

Summary of Policy Options

Rural-urban migration and rapid urbanization in the world are determined by the interaction of fundamental socioeconomic, ecological, and biological forces, including rapid population growth and excess labour in rural areas, shortages of land in settled rural communities, soil erosion, ethnic conflict, and, perhaps most importantly, the economies of scale in production and distribution of goods and services associated with the urban way of life. Public policies often have little control over many of these factors and where they do have some impact (say, in areas of trade, industrial investment, and the location of social services) programs are often introduced without any particular regard to their impact on the size and distribution of human settlements, or to the subsequent impact of these variables on the development process itself. It is not surprising, therefore, that when specific policies are implemented that do seek to influence the pattern of human settlements, they are often not effective. The momentum of other government policies and of the broad dynamics of socioeconomic change are far more powerful than the specific policies.

In our review of specific policies that have been pursued at least in part for their potential impact on migration and settlement patterns, we found that some simply did not work and that others tended to have the opposite impact of that expected. Our tentative conclusions may be summarized briefly as follows:

(1) Attempts to return rural-urban migrants to their rural areas, or to prevent them from entering the city seem to be largely unworkable in the cases examined. Not only are these programs ineffective but they encourage a number of undesirable side effects, such as corruption. The presence of such programs would seem to indicate an inadequate appreciation on the part of the government of the causes of rural-urban migration.

(2) Land reform and other programs designed to bring about social justice and increase farm production will at best have only a short-term and limited impact on the exodus from settled rural areas. This is particularly the case in successful programs where increased productivity eventually leads to a reduced demand for labour. A long-term regional plan with land reforms should therefore be designed to absorb surplus labour resulting from the land reform itself.

(3) Attempts to redirect migrants to alternative locations, either virgin rural lands or intermediate “growth pole” urban areas seem to have been successful in many cases. This is partly because these approaches require a more integrated approach to planning, in which employment opportunity, services to attract and hold migrants, market circumstances, and
economic infrastructure must be considered together. These approaches do of course have their problems. The provision of an adequate economic infrastructure to a region in order to permit or encourage growth is often much more expensive than it would appear, and hence the more successful programs of this kind are often found in countries where the governments have considerable financial resources at their disposal, or where a combination of market circumstances exists that will attract private capital and initiative once some initial government investments are made.

(4) Programs to reinforce metropolitanization and encourage rural people to move to the large cities by providing special housing and employment opportunities have scarcely been tried in developing countries, due in great part to fears about the negative impact of such settlement patterns on the quality of human life and the cost of social services. Yet, in many countries the net impact of government investments and programs is (unintentionally) designed to encourage urbanization. Since the negative impact of the continued growth of large cities is largely hypothetical and has not yet been tested empirically, we shall have the opportunity to see whether in fact it is correct as evidence is collected in the future. Programs that seek to reduce the cost of providing housing and essential services in metropolitan areas tend to increase the likelihood that metropolitanization will become a viable strategy for development, at least under some circumstances.
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