“Faith, Social Activism and Politics: A study of the role of faith based organisations in influencing public policy in Lebanon”

CRTD.A (www.crtda.org.lb)
in collaboration with
IDRC (www.idrc.ca)

A final research report -- Draft

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I. INTRODUCTION

The present action research was initiated in late 2006 and proposed to analyze Lebanese confessional/faithe-based organizations (FBOs) and determine what impact they have on public policy dialogue and formulation in Lebanon, and what their capacity is to mobilise public opinion and popular support in favour of their political agendas. More importantly, the research examined the understanding, practice and attitudes of FBOs vis-à-vis governance, gender equality and citizenship.

The FBOs research was multi-tiered and included several inter-related components, namely:

- Local/regional/global literature review of FBOs in Lebanon and the MENA region (as and when available)
- Mapping of Lebanese FBOs with particular focus on those involved in health and education services
- A field research focusing on selected case studies representing most of the main confessions of Lebanon

Two additional outputs were added to the above owing either to an unexpected turn of events or to the identification of additional knowledge needs which were not predicted in the initial research framework. Indeed, and in the first case, the July 2006 war provided a macabre, yet unforeseen opportunity for investigating, even if in a rather superficial fashion, the role that FBOs played in the July 2006 relief and emergency actions. In the second instance, the research team realised that an understanding of the legal framework governing both FBOs and confessional communities is a condition sine qua none for successfully framing the field research methodology, crafting the research questions, agreeing a working definition for FBOs, selecting the relevant case studies and fine-tuning the analytical framework.

Whilst outputs of the various components of the research are available individually as standalone documents, this research report will provide an overall documentation of the totality of the research process with emphasis on the field research. The latter is based on the raw data collected from 12 individual case studies – representing ten different FBOs - the list and description of which is presented in the subsequent methodology section of this report.

I.1 Defining FBOs: Measuring the immeasurable

Framing a definition of an FBO was a tedious and complex process and went through several mutations as the research unfolded and as further knowledge and insight was gained as to what constitutes an FBO in Lebanon.
Several landmarks, sources of information and data determined and delineated the depth, breadth and contours of the FBO definition.

At the outset of this research, the FBO definition was mostly shaped by existing global literature essentially coming from Northern countries (mostly the USA) and, as such, mostly referring to Christian, and fundamentally missionary FBOs. Whilst the local/regional literature review indicated the need to reconsider the global definition of FBOs, both the legal study and the FBOs mapping were by and large decisive in the reformulation of the definition.

The starting point of the FBO definition included organisations generally possessing:

- specific values based in religious convictions that pervade the organisation’s work and ethos;
- a set of articles of faith—a set of “givens” determining what is “right” and “wrong” in certain situations (e.g. the issue of abstinence for a Catholic organisation or the issue of wearing the veil in Islamic organisations);
- an extensive network of co-religionists who will, when needed, support the organisation as an expression of religious community. (Bakewell and Warren 2005)

However, the field research per se adopted a more context-appropriate definition in the selection of FBOs in-depth case studies which amalgamated issues of ownership, legal status, profile of constituency, discourse and identity. As such, the FBOs definition adopted was one which included organizations that were directly owned by or affiliated to “confessional institutions”, or political parties with a clear confessional identity or agenda in addition to seemingly “secular” institutions but which operate within a confession-specific constituency or maintain confessional discourse and/or agenda.

I.2 Researching FBOs: An unexplored mine field

The FBOs research process was simultaneously an unusual and rich learning experience yet fraught with challenges and significant obstacles.

Many of these obstacles were but a reflection of the complexities, insidious yet overarching power as well as the significant and largely uncontrollable autonomy of FBOs in Lebanon. This was further exacerbated by an overall skepticism vis-à-vis research and the intrinsic value of knowledge generation and sharing. Across the board, most respondents expressed, in various ways, their cynicism vis-à-vis research and especially one that seeks to dissect intricate and largely patriarchal institutions such as confessions and FBOs. In doing so, most respondents were in fact expressing a view that change is neither possible nor desired, at least not for the time being.

Yet on the other hand, another set of obstacles was directly related to the limited familiarity of many of the local social researchers with the methods, tools, distinctive...
value and intricacies of qualitative research. All members of the field research team had amassed prior experience in empirical social research and were presumably familiar with the context of FBOs in Lebanon. Nevertheless, two main issues arose which could have potentially jeopardized the process and outcome of this research. Despite a very close accompaniment, training, capacity building and follow-up of the field researchers, it was rather perplexing to notice that skillfulness and mastery of qualitative research methods was very much limited. This was further compounded by the fact that, for many of the local researchers, the practice of reflexivity and objectivity was not without difficulty. At least two trends were noted and these constitute interesting case studies in teaching qualitative research methods in this region. The first was a case where the local researcher became so impressed with her case study that she almost lost her critical objectivity and endorsed the values and ways of working expressed by her respondents. In another diametrically opposite case, the field researcher was obviously critical of her respondent who represented a set of values and beliefs which were contrary to hers.

1.3 What next: Action, reaction or further exploration?

The FBOs research, as the reader will notice in this report, has generated important and breakthrough information. For starter, this research is the first to explore the diverse community of FBOs in Lebanon and challenge the myth of secrecy surrounding their operations and role in the making of Lebanese society/societies and politics.

On the other hand, it has generated a dynamics of dialogue and interaction with many of the selected case studies and induced interests amongst some with regards to the subject matter of the research. The research team was pleasantly surprised by the fact that a number of respondents took time and effort to ponder over issues of governance, citizenship and gender and found these interesting, relevant and worthy of further investigation.

The closure of the field research process per se leaves CRTD.A with a number of options and possibilities.

The quantity and quality of knowledge and insight generated warrants mechanisms of knowledge dissemination which are over and beyond what was initially planned. Thus, conventional and innovative forms of communication will be considered in order to ensure that the learning, findings and analysis of the FBOs research is shared as widely as possible.

The implication of the research findings clearly point out to the need to re-conceptualize and re-frame advocacy interventions on gender, citizenship and governance so as to take into consideration the necessity of targeting FBOs as key actors in shaping views, mindsets and policies on gender and citizenship and as major movers and shakers in shaping policies. As such, simply ignoring this pool of key players may now seem rather immature for those seeking to contribute to changing and transforming policies.
On a related matter, the research pointed out to critical research and knowledge gaps which warrant further in depth exploration both vertically and horizontally. It is obvious that the research has yet to exhaust all the various categories of analysis within the selected FBOs. In addition, and in terms of additional vertical exploration and research, future research plans should consider looking at FBOs related to confessional institutions which were not included in this research. However, looking at FBOs within other contexts also justifies further research with Syria, Jordan, Palestine and Egypt warranting interest in view of their multi-confessional nature.

Finally and perhaps most importantly is the fact that this research sheds light on a critical knowledge and skills gap in what pertains to the understanding and practice of qualitative research, at least in the case of Lebanon. This is further validating the need for immediate capacity building efforts in qualitative research and gender analysis as the pool of local women and men with such expertise is alarmingly limited thus further contributing to weakening overall prospects of good quality research in Lebanon and the region.

I.4 Overview of the FBOs research report: What to expect?

We invite the reader to practice reflexivity and step back from initial convictions, beliefs and dare we say, prejudice while reading this report. The findings of this report point out to several key issues most importantly is the fact that no matter what the demographical and confessional differences are, similarities are far more compelling in terms of ways of thinking, working and operating amongst FBOs notwithstanding their confessional and religious affiliations.

Often, the concept and practice of good governance, citizenship, participation, and gender equality hardly differ from one confession to the other, and consequently, from one FBO to the other despite the persistent insistence of each on their specificities, particularities and their significant difference and distinction from each other.

As such, the reader is invited to read and reflect on this research whilst detaching her/himself from her/his religious/confessional identity and affiliation.

This report goes through an in-depth overview of the methodology of the research whilst unveiling the complexities of practicing qualitative research on a subject matter which is highly controversial, politically charged and poorly researched in the past. In doing so, the reader will be able to capture some key learning that may be useful for designing a methodology for other qualitative research projects.

The report continues by providing the key findings and analysis drawn from the case studies and based on the three categories of analysis namely: a) governance; b) social policies; c) citizenship; and d) gender.
The report finishes with a conclusion section which brings together the analysis and interpretation of the data and information and provides directions for the way forward.

.II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This section provides an overview of the methodology designed for the FBOs research. In doing so, it will also seek to tease out some key lessons learned and the implication on future research.

This research is qualitative in nature and, as such, the methodology adopted is flexible and malleable and the research design is constantly subject to absorbing and appropriating changes between theory and the real world.\(^1\)

Overall, the FBOs research consisted of the following components:

1) **A local/regional review of existing literature on Faith Based Organizations:**

   The main purpose of this review was to compile and analyze existing published material and/or gray literature on the subject of FBOs in Lebanon and other Arab countries as well as the political history of the formation of confessions and confessional institutions in Lebanon. Equally time consuming as the other components of this research, this review clearly indicated that the subject of FBOs remains poorly researched by scholars and academic alike and particularly so in the MENA region. More so, and even in the international literature, and as the section below will show, the intersection of FBOs, governance, citizenship and gender is hardly, if ever, explored.

2) **A mapping of health and education FBOs in Lebanon:**

   The mapping of health and education FBOs was deemed necessary in an effort to frame a workable and context appropriate definition of FBOs. It was also a needed endeavor in order to comprehend the scale of FBOs in terms of their numbers, geographical and sectoral coverage, outreach to and profile of constituencies. The mapping dealt with a multiplicity of data sources, which were often contradictory and pointed out to a critical gap in credible and trustworthy information on FBOs. As such, this meant that the mapping exercise was quite a protracted process which main findings highlight the absence of a central source of quantitative, factual and statistical data on FBOs in Lebanon.

3) **A study of the legal framework governing confessions in Lebanon and their affiliate FBOs:**

   This was the most complex part of the secondary research as it involved an in-depth analysis of the legal and administrative relation between FBOs and the state amidst a

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situation of multi-layered complexities given the multiple and intricate differences amongst confessions. An added challenge here was the fact that the two legal experts recruited for this task, and who had prior familiarity in the legal status of confessions in Lebanon, were unable to research, reflect and analyze beyond their conventional legal parameters. Hence, the onus was on the FBO research team in attempting to draw the policy implications of a relatively complex and nebulous legal and constitutional framework. This research report will thus include insights and analysis constructed by the research team based on some of the data provided by the legal experts rather than their reports which are available separately for interested readers and users.

An anomaly of this qualitative research was the fact that the secondary studies, whether the local literature review, FBOs mapping or legal study, were done and completed before the actual field study. This, in hindsight, was the main mistake that the research team committed as, ideally, it would have been better to curtail the literature and other forms of desk review at the onset of the research whilst proceeding with the field investigation. Again, and with the benefit of hindsight, it is safe to say that there was an overestimation of the extent to which such desk research will actually shape and influence the field investigation. This is probably one of the key methodology lessons learned from the FBOs research.

**II.1 Sharing and validating results: An integral component of the research methodology**

A number of multi-stakeholders sharing and validation meetings and seminars were held at different intervals during the research. The first such event took place at the onset of the research and grouped researchers and academics, practitioners and media people. The purpose was to launch the research, share the outline of the methodology and instigate feedback and insights from researchers and others on the definition of FBOs and the highlights of the methodology and the research questions. For CRTD.A, this was also a space for validating the rationale of the research as well as mobilizing interest groups for subsequent stages.

Subsequently, three such seminars were held throughout the lifetime of the research with the purpose of sharing the different stages of the research whilst eliciting stakeholders’ responses on the progress made as well as on the preliminary findings. These events indicated the interest of the selected public in the subject matter of the research but also revealed both a lack of in-depth knowledge as well as a relative reticence in dissecting institutions which have a traditionally untouchable religious identity and prerogatives. Perhaps a most unusual finding of these knowledge dissemination events was the unexpected reserve expressed by several “scholars” who were wary of any attempt of researching FBOs with a few articulating various forms of plot theories as to the real Western driven motives for such a research. Obviously, knowledge quest and using knowledge for change and transformation were not deemed necessary by many a scholar and researcher.
By the end of the field research, preliminary results, findings and conclusions were drawn. These were presented during a validation seminar which grouped the FBOs leadership as well as representatives of the public and NGOs sector, academics and researchers as well as representatives from the media. Later on in this section, the feedback and responses elicited during this final validation workshop will be reviewed as well as their implications on the conclusions drawn from this research.

II.2  Detailed review of the field research methodology

II.2.1  Goal

The main goal of the FBOs research is to contribute knowledge and understanding on how and why confessional-FBOs have an impact on public policy and on the debates on good governance, citizenship, gender equality and social rights/entitlements in Lebanon.

II.2.2  Research questions

The composition of the research questions was guided and framed by the pre-existing ideas and concepts found in the CRTD.A’s research proposal and the ensuing literature review. While mainly derived from the research questions outlined in the proposal and not answered by the other components of the project, few were coined from the literature review and the discussions that were held with stakeholders in previous workshops.

Key research questions

How do FBOs influence government policies? Which policies do they work for or against and for what reasons? (With particular focus on gender and citizenship).

As such, the FBOs research sought to investigate the following:
- analyzing dynamics and operations of FBOs;
- investigating structure, composition, activities and relationships
- investigating how FBOs inform and shape ideas of governance, citizenship and the concept and practice of rights – investigate how FBOs contribute to shaping and influencing public policies.
Table 1: Key research questions and analysis highlights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTIONS</th>
<th>ANALYSIS HIGHLIGHT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FBO structure, composition and field of work</strong></td>
<td>- Does it reflect ideas of good governance, such as transparency and participatory practices?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What is the internal governance structure of the FBO itself?</td>
<td>- To what extent do they integrate religious/confessional considerations into their institutional decisions?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- How are decision-making processes and practices undertaken?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- How and on which basis are external relations decided and shaped?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(with other FBOs, with secular organisations, with international organisations)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FBO and state policies</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• How do they view state social policies (in the case of Lebanon, this refers to education and health policies, the dichotomy between the private and public sectors and its impact on differential rights and entitlements)?</td>
<td>- To what extent do they perceive their role as a <em>de facto</em> state?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What is their relationship with relevant ministries?</td>
<td>- What influence or capacity do they have in influencing and/or shaping policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What do they consider are their opportunities to shape government policies? How do they do that?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• What are the challenges they face in both?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FBOs, gender and citizenship</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How does each FBO perceive and understand citizenship, and women’s right issues?</td>
<td>- How do their definitions of gender and citizenship differ from international instruments?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How does it translate into their work?</td>
<td>- What are their views on good governance?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What policies does each FBO work for or against, and for what reasons?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• What are the challenges they face in both?</td>
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II.2.3 Process

In keeping with the nature and fundamentals of qualitative research, the FBOs research process was highly iterative in nature and entailed a solid capacity building component.

Following the recruitment of the field research team (carried out in stages as it was decided to carry out the case studies simultaneously given the time constraints), the Senior Researcher designed and delivered a full-fledged methodology training series on Qualitative Research using the FBOs research as application.

The Senior Researcher was closely guiding and monitoring the research process, overseeing the progress of the field researchers’ work, convening regular debriefing sessions and follow-up methodology workshops covering the essential landmarks of the research (e.g. conceptual framework review –gender, citizenship, social entitlements, participation, social policies, policy dialogue and formulation -, qualitative research methods, training on conducting interviews and focus group discussions, data collection methods and tools, data recording, data analysis, reflexivity and self-assessment of field researchers, maintaining research diaries, write up of outputs and case study reports…).

The debriefing sessions with the field researchers revealed some very interesting issues in conducting qualitative research in this context. Some of these issues were totally contrary to the prevailing common wisdom in qualitative research regarding the authority make-up as well as inequalities that usually exist between researchers and their participants. The balance of power between the FBO case study researchers and most of the participants in their case studies leaned heavily towards the latter. Mostly, FBO leaders decided which other participants should be interviewed, the length of the interview and focus group sessions, the withholding of common information and the questions that could be answered by staff.

On the other hand, the insider/outsider issue of researcher and participants sometimes played to the benefit of getting more forthright information and sometimes worked against it. In one instance the researcher had to use her maiden name throughout the research process to be accepted as an insider (in this case, insider means somebody from the same confession). In the case of the two western researchers, they sometimes felt that their identities made the process easier in the sense that participants were more honest and forthcoming feeling that whatever they said to a westerner would not be spread all over Lebanon. However, and in this case, the language barrier stood at times in their way.

As such, the research process included the following components:

- Training and capacity building of the field research team
- Inducting field research team on using qualitative research tools
- Organizing monthly de-briefing and mini-training meetings with the field research team
• Providing individual support and guidance to field researchers all the way through the production of the individual case study reports
• Undertaking direct, personal and often political interventions with FBOs when some reluctance from their part was detected

II.2.4 Research methods and tools

The field research method adopted was the **in-depth case study** using essentially **semi-structured interviews** and **focus group discussions**.

Data collection tools included:

- Interview guides for the semi-structured interviews and the focus group discussions
- Organizational fact sheet
- Direct observation

The interview guides were slightly adapted to fit the individual case studies. As such, the interview guides as well as the institutional fact sheets were tweaked according to whether the selected FBO was involved in education or health services.

The institutional fact sheet was in two parts. The first part sought to collect basic data and information about the FBO (e.g. establishment, legal status, profile of founders, location, services available and offered, by-laws, contact details, etc…). This part was used for all the case studies. The second part sought to collect gender disaggregated data on the FBOs staff and clientele. This part was modified according to whether the FBO is involved in health or education services.

All the tools developed and used are annexed to this report.

Data sources thus included:
- Organizational fact sheets
- Organizational literature namely brochures, communication material, leaflets, websites… (these were in certain cases very hard to find as it appears that several FBOs have yet to ride on the ICT bandwagon)
- Interview Transcripts
- Official organizational documents such as by-laws, budgets, audited reports,… (as the subsequent sections will indicate, these material were not easily shared with the field researchers)
- Focus Group Transcripts
- Field notes
- Researchers’ diaries (Reflexivity)
Table 2: Summary table of data collection methods and tools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>Questions and data gathered</th>
<th>Methods for collecting data</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| **FBOs organizational fact sheet** | - General information about the FBO  
- Number and type of its affiliated social organizations  
- Institutional information (*date of establishment, history, membership, by-laws, organogramme, ...*)  
- Gender disaggregated statistics of staff and clientele | - Start up introductory meeting  
- Direct interview with leader or assigned FBO liaison to fill out questionnaire  
- Cross-checking information with secondary sources and other published information where possible and applicable |
| **Interview**              | - Profile of FBO (*background, aims, clients and demographics, political or other affiliation, sources of income, financial accountability, financial policies...*)  
- Social (education/health) policies (*current analysis of challenges and opportunities at the policy level, analysis of relationship with public institutions, analysis of opportunities and difficulties in challenging, changing or strengthening existing policies, analysis of different existing form of cooperation,...*)  
- Citizenship (*probing FBOs existing views, definition, understanding and insights on citizenship, involvement in citizenship related work, liaison with other CSOs, etc...*)  
- Gender (*perception of equality and women's rights, related interventions, policies within the organization, links with other CSOs, etc...*) | Ideally, 5 individual on-site interviews with:  
- FBO committee/board member  
- Director  
- Finance officer  
- HR officer  
- Chief technical person |
| **Focus group discussion** | - Perception of unique feature of FBO that distinguishes it from other FBOs (e.g. curriculum, code of ethics, etc...)?  
- Analysis of organizational structure and governance system and impact on facilitating or otherwise hindering work?  
- Analysis of what needs to be changed within FBO structure and culture to make it a more democratic and transparent?  
- Analysis of how FBO aims are being translated into organizational and technical focus groups with senior and middle management and technical staff. | When possible, three focus groups with senior and middle management and technical staff. |
programmatic strategies and practices?

- Challenges faced in attempting to incorporate FBO culture in programmes and interventions?

It is critical to note here that the field research investigated current trends amongst FBOs specifically in relation to their internal governance and structure, their relation with the state and state policies, and the ways in which they view and practice inclusive citizenship and gender equality. The investigation of in-depth case studies is by no means a historical longitudinal case study, a matter which is not necessarily relevant or appropriate for this research and for its ultimate purpose.

II.2.5 Reflexivity: A major challenge and a condition sine qua none

The training and accompaniment of field researchers emphasized the importance of reflexivity. Field researchers were guided through this critical way of thinking and doing. This entailed that field researchers were always aware of inherent factors that would allow them to see or, otherwise, prevent them from seeing. In doing so, local researchers were constantly and carefully considering the phenomenon under study and the ways in which their own assumptions and behavior are impacting the research. This was particularly critical given the subject matter of this research. Indeed, field researchers were researching organizations and confessional institutions which have undoubtedly affected and/or shaped their lives directly or indirectly and vis-à-vis which they may be harboring either negative or positive views or positions.

To facilitate the process of reflexivity, field researchers were asked to keep their own research journals where they would record and document not only data and information but also spatial observations, thoughts, ideas, questions or emerging analytical memos. The research journal was used as a constant reference to reflect about theory and practice and inform and supplement the thick descriptions and thematic/conceptual analysis parts of the case studies.

Field researchers were not requested to hand in their journals and diaries as these were deemed to be private notes. However, few researchers chose to use excerpts from these diaries when writing their final reports.

Having said this, reading of interviews and focus groups transcripts has revealed some transgressions on the key and fundamental principle of reflexivity. Indeed, and in a couple of instances during a discussion on confessional values as well as gender equality with participants from FBOs, field researchers brought in their own views and convictions on these issues and which were in clear contradiction with those of their participants. In another instance, the field researcher who had a childhood experience of going to school in a confessional establishment, felt intimidated by her participant to the
extent that at various intervals during the interview, she had clearly given away her power as a researcher. We have tried, to the extent possible, to isolate data obtained when it was contaminated by the researchers’ biases or perception of the power exerted by their participant. Such data was only used for illustration, anecdotal or learning and methodological purposes.

II.2.5 Sampling FBOs: Who is in and who is out

Several considerations were observed in sampling the Case Studies many of which were derived from the results of the other components of the FBOs research namely the mapping and legal studies as well as the ensuing development of the FBOs definition adopted throughout the research.

Whilst confessional institutions, social confessional organizations as well as political parties were included as part and parcel of the FBOs definition and subsequent sampling process, issues of practicality, approachability and willingness to engage largely determined the make-up of the final sample of FBOs. These were very much the factors which determined who was in and who was out of the sampling pool.

Overall, the sample consisted of organizations which are either registered officially as NGOs (e.g. Al Mabarrat, Al Irfan, Al Makassed), are owned by a political party (Al Amal) or by a confessional institution (Dar al Fatwa, Higher Shiite Council, and various Christian Archbishops as well as the Geitaoui Hospital and the schools which belong to the Maronite Sacred Family).

This diversity however, created an important intellectual and methodological dilemma for the research. A case in point are the case studies which were in principle a confessional institution (say for instance the Sunni Dar el Fatwa) but where information were gathered from a particular service provided by Dar el Fatwa (say for instance the Dr. Khaled Social Institutions, an organization currently owned, operated and controlled by Dar el Fatwa after its founder, Dr. Khaled, passed away). The assumption in this case is that the case study (i.e. Dr. Khaled Social Institutions) would mirror the values, modus operandi, systems of beliefs and objectives of the mother institution (in this case Dar el Fatwa). As such, the reader will need to keep in mind the institutional and organic link between the organization under study per se and the mother institution.

The following table shows a list of the FBOs and the social institutions that they own and operate that were covered by the case studies, as well as the dates of establishment of both FBO and mother institution whenever available.
## Table 3: Participating FBOs, representative institutions and years of establishment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FBO</th>
<th>FBO YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT</th>
<th>REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTION(s)</th>
<th>INSTITUTION YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amal Movement</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Amal Al-Tarbawiyya Foundation</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanese Geitawi Hospital</td>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar Al Fatwa</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Dar al Fatwa Clinic</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Khaled’s Social Institutions</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National Greek Orthodox Schools – Tripoli</td>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Tripoli and Koura</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Irfan Tawheedieh Establishment</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Al Irfan Semkaniyye Schools</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Makassed Islamic Society</td>
<td>1878</td>
<td>Al Makassed Hospital</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Beirut and Souk al Gharb</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>St Georges University hospital</td>
<td>1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Melchite Patriarchate of Zahle</td>
<td>4th century AD in Furzol then moved to Zahle in 1727</td>
<td>St Rita School</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tel Chiha Hospital</td>
<td>1949 (started construction in 1906)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiite Supreme Council</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Al Zahra Hospital</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A comparative review of the FBOs data indicates that the Shiite FBOs are the youngest in terms of years of establishment but have grown and expanded exponentially in terms of types of services, geographical coverage, employment opportunities. Christian FBOs appear to have been the first to be founded followed by the Sunni FBOs. The historical trends and landmarks are further detailed in the literature review chapter of this report.
Although the number of case studies might seem restricted when compared to the total number of similar FBO-owned institutions in Lebanon, it is worth noting that the number of beneficiaries of those FBOs (at least wherever data was available and shared) reached to more than 155607 cases (both women and men) annually. Additionally, and again whenever data was made available, the job opportunities that those organizations offered were more than 11000 women and men, quite a significant number given the dire economic conditions in Lebanon and the difficulties that citizens face in securing sustainable employment. This does make the FBOs, as service providers, employers and economic actors and institutions, very important support to the already overloaded public system.

Finally, it should be noted that not all FBOs were forthcoming in providing accurate and updated information on their services, number beneficiaries as well as staff hence the limitation in analyzing quantitative data and statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FBO</th>
<th>SERVICES</th>
<th>STAFF</th>
<th>BENEFICIARIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HEATH</td>
<td>EDU</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amal al Tarbawiyya</td>
<td>7 schools</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>18785²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congregation of the Maronite Sisters of the Holy Family</td>
<td>5 hospitals and health centres</td>
<td>33 educational institutions</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar Al Fatwa</td>
<td>1 hospital and 2 health centers</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Tripoli</td>
<td>2 schools: academic &amp; VT</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Irfan Tawheedieh Establishment</td>
<td>9 schools</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Mabarrat Charitable Society</td>
<td>2 hospitals &amp; 2 health centers</td>
<td>14 schools &amp; 5 Vocational institutes</td>
<td>3600³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Makassed Islamic Society</td>
<td>42 schools</td>
<td>1 Hospital 6 health centers</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>6 schools</td>
<td>1 University Hospital</td>
<td>1553</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² Figure includes females & males
³ Figure includes females & males
⁴ Figure includes females & males
⁵ Figure includes females & males
### II.2.6 Seeking approvals from sampled FBOs

This was by far the most tedious and challenging exercise often coupled with the need to be creative and devise and try various strategies.

Personal contacts were a decisive factor in securing approval and in trust building thus paving the way for the introduction of the field researcher. Even when approval was secured, glitches were encountered along the way and immediate personal high level contacts were necessary in order to smooth the process.

Having said this, it is pertinent to note that overall, most FBOs contacted approved their participation in the research except for three peculiar and different cases.

1) *The Greek Orthodox Archbispohric in Beirut* approved the participation of their hospital and their Beirut schools network in the research and informed and instructed the responsible of both institutions to collaborate with the researchers. This was communicated as an instruction emanating directly from the highest authority in the institution, namely the Greek Orthodox archbishop for Beirut. Whilst the management of the Saint Georges Medical University Hospital readily engaged in the process and provided invaluable support and assistance, the director of the Greek Orthodox Schools network of Beirut simply did not respond to innumerable phone calls, e-mails, faxes, requests for meetings or any form of request for collaboration despite being instructed to do so by the Archbishop. After months of trying to chase him, we decided to replace the Greek Orthodox schools of Beirut with those of Tripoli where the management was not only welcoming but also fully transparent and willing to give information as well as discuss the issues raised by the research.

2) Another atypical case is that of *Hizbollah* where CRTD.A formally requested their consent to participate in the research and this request was mediated and endorsed by several political and prominent social figures. However, several months later, and after holding 9 introductory meetings, Hizbollah officially turned down the request and indicated that due to the prevailing political and security situation especially after the July 2006 war, the party has frozen all cooperation in any form of research even if it is only limited to the social services provided by the party’s affiliated FBOs. However, three other major Shiite FBOs...
had approved to be included in the study thus ensuring the accurate representation of the Shiite confession in this research.

3) Finally, Dar el Fatwa presented a particularly peculiar case. Indeed, and after official approval to take part in the research, and after an initial good encounter with the responsible of the Dar el Fatwa health services, the responsible of the latter suddenly took on a very reserved and at times hostile attitude and refrained to provide information. As such, this organization was replaced by the Dr. Khaled Institutions which proved to be more candid and at ease with the research.

II.2.7 Building the case studies: Interviews and Focus Group Discussions

Nine field researchers were assigned to thirteen case studies. All of them attempted to conduct a minimum of five interviews and three focus group discussions. This case load was also determined by the availability, dispositions and good will of FBOs participants as well as by reaching the “data saturation point” whereby no new information can be harvested anymore.

However, in certain cases “gate keepers” within FBOs, often individuals in leadership and key positions, were the ones to decide how many interviews and group discussions should and could be held and often who should be involved.

Focus group discussions seemed to be an alien concept to most participating institutions, hence in few cases, even if and when allowed; they did not generate rich data sets either because participants were not confident in speaking out in groups or because they found the questions rather difficult. In one particular case, focus group discussions were totally denied and only three interviews allowed (one of them as a group interview of two).

In total, this research is based on data collected from conducting 88 interviews (some of them of which were of a fact-finding nature) and 25 focus group discussions in which a total of 128 people participated. The following table shows the total number of interviews and focus group discussions conducted in each institution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FBO</th>
<th>Total individual interviews</th>
<th>Total Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)</th>
<th>Total participants in FGDs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amal al-Tarbawiyya Foundation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congregation of the Maronite Sisters of the Holy Family Schools</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar al Fatwa Health Establishments</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Interviews and Focus Groups conducted in all case studies
II.2.8 Data analysis

Data analysis started from the moment the researchers kept their research diaries and engaged in a process of reflexivity as well as in mastering field observation skills and recording them in their field notes.

However, and as is the case of qualitative research, analyzing significant amounts of qualitative data is a challenging process. The Senior Researcher thus provided individual and collective guidance and training to the field research team on how to process and analyze qualitative data.

This entailed building skills in:

(1) Writing thick descriptions in order to convey a detailed picture of what the field researcher has seen/witnessed. This includes observations, description of people, anecdotal stories, and details of the situation, mechanisms, logic and dynamics of the case study based on thorough observation. The purpose of thick descriptions is to enable the readers to enter the socio-cultural world of the informants and their surrounding FBOs and enable them to position the discourse and reactions of the informants. Thick descriptions are by far the flesh of this research and the basis for theorizing the reality observed and documented6.

(2) Processing data and identifying linkages between the research questions and the information collected. As such, field researchers taped and transcribed their interviews

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and focus group discussions and kept research diaries and field notes. Subsequently, field researchers read their transcripts literally and interpretively, and retrieved from each the information that answered each individual research question.

The outcome of this process was in the form of an individual research question matrix for each individual case study.

Gradually, the field researchers moved on to the next level of data analysis which entailed interpretive and deductive readings of transcripts. This process included the identification and tagging of data relevant to the research; labeling the information that matched these ideas and finally, defining and refining emerging themes and concepts.

Emergent themes and concepts were in turn plotted on an “analysis matrix” that highlighted the most salient data leading to such a theme/concept. This facilitated the process of attempting to find relational and causal linkages between the themes/concepts as well as common patterns amongst participating FBOs and the various trends within each such pattern.

II.2.9 Data trustworthiness

Since this research was based on qualitative methods, and given the subject matter of the research and its reliance on the insight and interpretation of participants, data trustworthiness was thus considered key to ensure research quality.

Thus, several mechanisms were put in place to ensure data trustworthiness and included:

- Regular discussions, cross-checking, de-briefing and validation with the Senior Researcher as well as during the field researchers de-briefing meetings with the Senior Researcher
- Cross-checking data at field level and using multiple sources of information
- Triangulation
- Informal additional side-interviews with sympathetic informants to complete or check information
- In limited cases, referring to external experts for additional insights and information
- Finally, the data as well as preliminary findings and analysis were shared with the FBO participants during a validation workshop during which all participants had the opportunity to react and respond to three presentations covering the mapping results, legal framework and findings from the field research. Details of the validation workshop are described at length in the subsequent section.

II.2.10 Insights from the final validation workshop with stakeholders
A validation workshop grouping the participating FBOs was held by the end of the field research and once a preliminary analysis was undertaken. The purpose of this validation workshop was to share and discuss these preliminary findings with the participating FBOs as well as other CSOs and researchers and to some extent, tease out the position of the FBOs regarding the main findings.

Four main inputs were shared during the final validation workshop, namely:

- A general overview of the FBOs research with special emphasis on the rationale and motivation for undertaking it as well as highlights of the methodology used notably the selection of the FBOs case studies;

- Main findings of the legal review including a presentation of the key historical landmarks which shaped and determined the legal framework governing FBOs and its implication at the level of the autonomy and remit of FBOs;

- Main findings of the mapping study including the depth, breadth and spread of FBOs and their relative size when compared to the whole pool of education and health providers, including the state;

- Key findings of the empirical field study include information on the case studies and the selection methods, relevant findings and conclusions of the 4 main chapter of the research (i.e. governance, social policies, citizenship and gender).

The main highlights of the final FBOs validation workshop were the following:

1) Much unexpectedly, many FBOs raised questions regarding the findings of the legal study, notably concerning the administrative and legal autonomy of Christian FBOs. As these findings were drawn from the exact letter of the law, the only explanation was that either the FBOs’ representatives were unaware of the provisions and privileges they have under the law or were reluctant to discuss these in public. In fact, many FBOs were particularly defensive about their autonomy from the state, a matter safeguarded by the constitution and its ensuing legal framework, and maintained that they follow statutory laws and regulations. As such, there was confusion, deliberate or otherwise, between the institutional autonomy of confessions and the limited regulations of their FBOs activities by selected state bodies such as the ministries of education and public health. In fact, this component of the research was the one which stirred most discomfort amongst FBOs.

2) Several FBOs provided useful suggestions for including additional information on the histories and legal frameworks of their respective confessions. A number of the participants’ suggestions were already included in the legal report but were
not covered by the summary presentation (i.e. the provisions of the Taef agreement, the 1936 law and the 1943 National Pact). It is noticeable that, whereas reluctant to give information about their budgets, services, activities and other factual and qualitative data, FBOs were nevertheless keen on ensuring that their confession was as visible as possible in terms of its history, greatness and contribution to Lebanon.

3) The issue of “pre-defining concepts” was raised by many of the FBOs and academics present during the validation seminar. In other words, participants were in fact suggesting that the research provides them, as a starting point, with definitions of key concepts such as citizenship, governance and gender rather than elicit their own definitions. However, the main aim of the research was not to start from global definitions of concepts but rather to tease out how do FBOs themselves frame these concepts and define them and how, subsequently, they put them in practice. One researcher suggested that the final research report includes a glossary of concepts and terms. Whereas the research is not intended to provide a quick recipe of definitions and concepts, each conceptual chapter does however start by framing the issue at hand for clarity purposes.

4) Amongst many of the participating researchers, there was much support to the need for gaining knowledge on FBOs and the way they work and as such, these participants were positive and enthused about the FBOs research and its findings. In fact, several participants noted that researching FBOs in Lebanon was both a necessary as well as a bold and courageous move as it challenges the taboo surrounding FBOs as well as their untouchable status.

Overall, there was a distinct feeling that the FBO research had touched upon rather prohibited issues, and in doing so, has opened a Pandora box in relation to FBOs and their seemingly unlimited and overarching social and political roles, power and prerogatives.

II.3 Researching FBOs in a tumultuous context: Major risks and potential breaking points

When the FBOs research was during its conceptualization phase, a number of risks were already foreseen and foretold. The research framework already pointed out to the potential suspicion and apprehension that a foreign-funded research will arise amongst Faith Based Organizations. Difficulties were already expected in accessing senior and mid level cadres within these FBOs as well as in accessing internal information and data and securing official approval. All these foreseen difficulties actually materialized and were to a large extent overcome.

In addition, and as the research proceeded, it was essential to predict and overcome a number of limitations namely the impact of the imposed confessional identities of the
field researchers. This was considered on a case by case basis as it was not deemed to be an obstacle for all the FBOs sampled. Where necessary, the confession of the field researcher was matched to that of the FBO.

Perhaps the most critical difficulty was the significant delays in securing official approval from FBOs leaders, a process which was fraught with suspicion and often lack of interest in research. In most cases, approval was secured essentially through the intervention of third party players ranging from the former Speaker of the House, the current Speaker of the House, former and current MPs, various political and media figures as well as individuals with known affiliation to political parties and/or confessional institutions. Approval was essentially granted on the basis of *bona fide*. Nevertheless, none of the case studies selected was committed to full disclosure, and, as such, the research heavily relied on the good will of the respondents/participants and their own judgment as well as their often unexplained decision of what to reveal and share.

On the other hand, it is essential to note that during the FBOs research, Lebanon witnessed an all out Israeli war (July 2006) followed by a painful aftermath, a protracted quasi-freeze and stalemate in political, social and economic processes, a internal war (May 2008), a Presidential election, and lastly a parliamentary election (June 2009). It would be reasonable to assume that such turmoil accompanied by insecurity and instability is hardly conducive for conducting research and hence the importance of being able to successfully complete this study amidst such turbulence.

Finally, it should be noted that field researchers documented and shared a number of limitations they encountered and which include the following:

1. It was often difficult to engage in thorny or taboo issues especially in relation to gender equality and/or confessional issues as they relate to citizenship. This was mostly encountered during Focus Group Discussions more so than in individual interviews as many participants felt ill at ease in expressing themselves candidly within a group.

2. The quality and depth of the qualitative information harvested was often dependent on the knowledge, maturity, hierarchical position and dispositions of informants.

3. The dearth of literature and research on FBOs meant that often, field researchers engaged in the case study without sufficient knowledge of the particularities of that specific FBO. As such, baseline information, which would have otherwise been gathered from literature review, often had be harvested from participants, namely those in high position and with sufficient institutional memory to provide background and context.
4. Few informants were intimidated by the tape recorder. In such situations, field researchers refrained from taping the interviews and had to rely entirely on simultaneous note taking.

5. Certain informants consciously withheld information. This was particularly odd in the case of seemingly public information such as institutional by-laws and audited accounts and budgets. In the subsequent chapters of this report, a detailed account of information received will be provided.

6. The most anecdotal limitation was the fact that many FBOs chose to hide their heads in the sand and refuse to be identified as being “Faith-Based”. This was to a large extent overcome by explaining to the informant the elastic definition of FBOs and hence, clarifying why their organization has been selected. Nevertheless, some informants were defensive and felt that is was their duty to reiterate that their organization is non-confessional and caters to the need of all communities without discrimination or distinction.

7. In specific situation, language was an issue (when field researchers were foreigners) and this was overcome by assigning other field researchers to assist in the data collection and recording process. Whilst this was not an ideal situation, care was taken nevertheless to ensure that translation was of high quality and reflected all the intricacies of the interview and focus group discussions.

8. Building trust was, as expected, a protracted and high maintenance process. Often, the commencement of the interviews and FGDs required holding several introductory meetings before management was trustful enough to allow for the interviews and FGDs to take place.

### II.4 FBOs Research Outputs

In addition to the various components of the FBO research, several other research outputs were produced including:

1. **Transcripts:** Verbatim and accurate accounts of the tape-recorded interviews and focus group discussions. Overall, interviews and focus group discussions were tape-recorded; however, in few instances, this was not possible because of the explicit request or refusal of the informant/s. For the purpose of the FBOs research, transcripts were documented in the language of the interview and then, carefully translated into English whilst ensuring thoroughness and an exact reflection of the interview. To be noted that four of the case studies were conducted in Arabic. Anonymity was preserved where necessary or
where explicitly requested by the informants. As such, the transcripts and the names of the participants will remain under seal as confidential documents unless otherwise explicitly allowed by the participants.

2. **Research question matrices**: Each individual field researcher teased out the answers to the research question and plotted them on the research question matrix. Information was segregated by source (i.e. interviews and FGDs). Consequently, a consolidated research question matrix was constructed. This consolidated matrix was used as the basis for the subsequent research outputs developed.

3. **Thematic/Concepts matrices**: Subsequently, findings were analysed and themes/concepts were constructed and plotted accordingly on individual conceptual matrices which were later consolidated into one single concepts matrix. It should be noted that these matrices will also be used as training and teaching material to complement CRTD.A’s qualitative research capacity building programme.

4. **Case study reports**: Each field researcher produced a case study report which outline included the following:
   a. **Executive Summary**
   b. **General Introduction** (locate the case study in the general research project)
   c. **Methodology** (how many interviews, focus groups? Issues of trustworthiness; Uses of reflexivity; limitations)
   d. **General Background** (Confession, FBO history)
   e. **Structure and Governance**
   f. **Health OR Education policies**
   g. **FBO and the state**
   h. **Gender analysis**
   i. **Critical issues on citizenship**
   j. **Conclusion**
   k. **References**
   l. **Annexes** (fact sheets, matrices, interviews and focus groups schedules, other additional material and information)

   It should be noted that the case study reports will not be published in their present form despite the wealth of information that they include unless specifically approved by each individual FBO. Otherwise, synopsis and executive summaries will be developed and made available for dissemination.

This final FBO research report is based on the four previous outputs of each of the twelve case studies. Additionally, the notes taken from the debriefing sessions and what was shared of the research diary between the main researcher and field researchers were a great asset and source for composing this final output.
III. FBOs IN THE LITERATURE

III.1 Setting the scene

Faith-based organizations (FBOs) have been active in the delivery of social services and humanitarian assistance since the end of the nineteenth century, mainly, though not exclusively, in the Global South (Clarke, 2005). Although they operate within the same arena as secular NGOs, they differ from secular NGOs in having an ideological or institutional affiliation to a religious organization (Ferris, 2005). In the 1990s, the development discourse, both from a scholarly as well as from a practitioner’s perspective, tended to focus essentially on the role of “civil society” as an important agent of change and development. This discourse tended to ignore the complex, and often important, role of religion and religious organizations in the development process (Clarke, 2005, Ver Beek, 2000). Donor organizations and development practitioners, however, have recently started to acknowledge the significance of FBOs in development and to integrate them into development programs accordingly. Berger (2003:1) states that: "although the modern mentality relegates religion to the realm of private life, FBOs represent a unique hybrid of religious beliefs and socio-political activism at all levels of society". But as yet, there is still relatively little investigation and analysis of the role of FBOs, compared to the wider range of studies available on their secular counterparts.

This chapter aims to highlight the main trends in the local and international FBOs literature (in both English and Arabic), and seeks to identify gaps in the current literature on confessional/faith-based organizations' impact especially in relation to their role in influencing public policy in Lebanon.

The literature review draws from local as well as international resources. The selection includes published and unpublished research, studies, books, articles, grey reports, journals and FBOs publications in Arabic and English. Although 125 resources were reviewed, only 32 of these were used in this chapter. Most of the reviewed sources were inconclusive or way too broad as they focused on NGOs in general without differentiating between secular NGOs and FBOs, or addressed the Civil Society sector in Lebanon as an all-encompassing category including political parties and other social and/or political formations. In addition, only ten publications discussed Lebanese confessional/faith-based organizations in relation to public policy.

III.2 Structure of the section

This chapter is in four parts: The first examines the global discourse on FBOs including the link between FBOs and development throughout the world, FBOs and conflict and concludes with a review of literature on typologies of FBOs. The second part focuses on
FBOs in Lebanon. It starts with a contextual section which overviews the growth of the NGO sector in Lebanon as well as their identity and roles. This is followed by a broad overview of Confessional/Faith-Based Organizations in Lebanon which includes a historical perspective as well as a brief account of their identities and role. The third part of the review examines the influence of Lebanese FBOs in public policies. The literature review concludes with a synthesis and an identification of literature gaps.

### III.3 Faith Based Organizations: The Global Discourse

This section reviews the role that faith-based organizations have played in development, and examines relevant literature throughout the past decade. In addition, it addresses FBOs and their role during armed conflict as well as their humanitarian interventions. The section concludes with a review of the general literature on FBO typologies.

According to Bakewell & Warren (2005), FBOs may be defined as organizations that possess:

- Specific values based on religious conviction and which pervade the organization's work and ethos.
- A set of articles of faith, i.e., a set of “givens” determining what is “right” and “wrong” in certain situations.
- Extensive networks of co-religionists, who will, when needed, support the organisation as an expression of common religious identity and belief.

However, Ferris (2005:8) states that while there is no generally accepted definition of faith-based organizations, they are characterized by having one or more of the following:

1. Affiliation with a religious body
2. A mission statement with explicit reference to religious values
3. Financial support from religious sources
4. A governance structure whereby the selection of board members or staff is based on their religious beliefs or affiliation, and whereby decision-making processes are based on religious values.

Ferris cites organizations working with the World Council of Churches as examples of FBOs active on an international level. Such FBOs, according to Ferris, have the capacity to raise around $1 Billion annually.

### III.3.1 FBOs & Development

Northern FBOs have been active in the delivery of social services and humanitarian assistance since the end of the nineteenth century mainly, but not exclusively, in the global South (Clarke, 2005). Development discourse in the 1990s was mainly focused on the role of secular civil society organizations as agents for development, and largely ignored the role of religion and religious organizations in the development process (Clarke, 2005, Ver Beek, 2000).
FBOs have played a significant role in the development of countries under colonial rule. International FBOs originating in the country of colonial power offered health and education services by opening schools, health centers and various charities (Clarke, 2005, Bakewell & Warren, 2005). During the 1950s and 1960s, NGOs, particularly faith-based organizations, continued to provide substantial relief and were maintaining the welfare of refugee populations. A study dating back to 1953 found that 90% of relief efforts during the post World War II era were provided by religious organizations (Ferris, 2005).

The end of World War II ushered in a period of independence for several states in Africa and Asia, however, the role of FBOs was consequently marginalized as emerging states took on a more prominent role and aid was subsequently channeled through new state structures (Clarke, 2005). By the 1990s though, development discourse had shifted away from the state, and later the market, towards civil society organizations. The Millennium Development Goals, adopted by the United Nations in the year 2000, largely reflected this trend. Similarly, tackling social development issues (such as poverty alleviation and to a much lesser extent gender equality) gained prominence over economic growth. At this time, there was a significant rise in number of FBOs throughout the world, which sparked renewed interest in the link between FBOs and development. A few writers have analyzed the link between faith and development from different angles. Ver Beek (2000) sheds light on the significance of spirituality in people’s lives and argues for the need to integrate faith into development. Clarke (2005) and Bakewell and Warren (2005) discuss the growing role of FBOs in today’s development agenda. Tyndale (2005) looks at faith and development from an economic perspective, and examines the means of linking secular with religious organizations, an approach which is also discussed by Ferris (2005).

Clarke (2005) gives several reasons for the proliferation of FBOs. He refers to the Ronald Reagan era, and the emergence of a ‘Christian-Right’ political movement, which gained further momentum with the election of George W Bush. The neo-liberal agenda espoused by Reagan, characterized by a rolling back of the state and a shift towards privatization, allowed FBOs to play a larger role in service provision. In developing countries, this has largely meant the implementation of structural adjustment programmes and the rapid liberalization of markets. The consequent decrease in government spending on social entitlements created a wider gap between rich and poor and exacerbated social exclusion, which led to an increase in the number and activity of FBOs, seeking to make up for the reduced role of the state in ensuring poor people’s welfare and other basic rights.

FBOs gradually began to play a more political role especially with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the hegemony of a market-centric economic model which stimulated a global trend of “democratization”. A case in point here are the FBOs and religious figures

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7 (UN website)
who actively participated in the opposition movements to totalitarian regimes in countries such as Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines (Clarke, 2005).

III.3.2 FBOs post 9/11

The attacks of September 11th 2001 and the subsequent declaration of a global ‘war on terror’ laid the foundation for a new security agenda, in which military intervention and aid were more closely linked and intertwined (Stoddard, 2002). The attacks were viewed from a religious perspective that made the work of FBOs generally and Muslim organizations specifically more difficult. As Minear (2002:8) explains: “Muslim organizations, especially those based in North America that deal in the international transfer of cash, goods and services overseas, have come under relentless scrutiny, and several have had their assets frozen and operations effectively halted by the US and Canadian governments”. It is believed that the US administration’s approach to Muslim organizations draws on Samuel Huntington’s thinking, as set out in his 1996 writing The Clash of Civilizations, in which he argues that the Islamic and the Judeo-Christian value systems are set on a collision course. Huntington’s analysis which associated Islam with fundamentalism, spurred world-wide controversy (Benthall, 2003). Analyzing post-September 11th US policies, Blachin (2007) argues that “in the context of the war on terror especially, 'faith-based' is implicitly counter posed to ‘extremism’…in US policy faith based is shorthand for ‘Christians we can do business with and extremism translates into Muslims’”. She cites an investigative report by the Boston Globe, which found that USAID spent $57 million from 2001 to 2005 (out of a total of $390 million allocated to NGOs) to fund almost a dozen projects run by FBOs in Pakistan, Indonesia, and Afghanistan. Of the nearly 260 FBOs that have received prime contracts from USAID in the past five years, only two are Muslim. Christian groups’ share of USAID funding has roughly doubled under George W. Bush, and accounts for 98.3% of all money given to faith based groups (Balchin, 2007).

III.3.3 FBOs in times of conflict

The end of the Cold War era witnessed widespread armed conflicts across several regions. The eruption of violence in the late 1990s in countries such as Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia led to an overall change in humanitarian policy that entailed linking humanitarian work with military intervention (Macrae, 2002). Moreover, the religious-based violence that ensued in ex-communist countries such as in former-Yugoslavia and Azerbaijan focused more attention on the relationship between religion and armed conflict (Little, 2006). According to Little (2006), there is currently a growing interest in ways in which religion can be used positively in conflict-affected areas. Groups motivated by religious-based ideas about peace and dialogue have facilitated informal, ‘Track II’ discussions between warring parties which have sometimes proved to be a useful alternative to traditional diplomacy. As Little (2006:14) states: “(It) consists of unofficial endeavors, usually undertaken by religious and other non-governmental
groups and individuals to assist official negotiations or to create an environment conducive to peace”. This trend is believed to place greater significance on the role that FBOs can play in conflict mitigation.

III.3.4 FBOs, philanthropy and humanitarian interventions

FBOs have traditionally been active in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Their involvement in philanthropy is mainly derived from religious beliefs and doctrines, which emphasize the importance of charity work in general. Muslim and Christian FBOs alike have worked in humanitarian assistance in conflict ridden areas such as Sudan, Bosnia, Sri Lanka and Lebanon. Currently, their involvement in relief assistance is seen as an asset, with the wide network of Christian and Muslim organizations across the world allowing aid to reach those in need relatively quickly. While it is mainly the work of UN agencies and big INGOs that is highlighted in the media at times of crisis (Ferris, 2005), secular governments in Europe have nevertheless resorted to Christian organizations for distribution of aid, as well as Muslim organizations in Africa, because of their ability to access various communities at the grassroots level and to reach remote and often inaccessible areas (Funch, 2006). According to Bakewell & Hannah (2005), “most faith-based Northern NGOs are largely working with partners in the South, often with those who share the same faith”. Having the same faith as the partner organization is viewed as important for setting up durable partnerships. However, Southern FBOs also partner with secular NGOs in the North.

The role that FBOs play in emergency assistance is often contested, as concerns are raised about the extent to which FBOs work in an exclusionary manner and prioritize religious identity in targeting needy communities or in selecting partner organizations to distribute aid. Moreover, some FBOs have used humanitarian assistance as a means to strengthen their political bases and promote their own ideologies. Others operate with the intention of converting those of other faiths to their own by supporting them in times of crisis (Funch, 2006). Another issue of concern is the potential of faith-based intervention to alter the balance of power and resources between parties in conflicts relating to religious identity. It is therefore difficult to disentangle humanitarian from other agendas when discussing the role of FBOs in humanitarian and relief work.

Ferris (2005) points out that another issue of concern is the framework within which FBOs operate. There is growing pressure on humanitarian FBOs to become more professional and accountable to donors, as neutrality is seemingly necessary in interventions in conflict areas. In this case, Ferris refers to Christian NGOs working in Sudan and who sided with the position and demands of the predominantly Christian Southern Sudanese.

The relationship between religious and political agendas is further explored in Flannigan’s (2006) analysis of the impact of the religious belief of humanitarian organizations operating in areas that have witnessed religious-based violence. Flannigan
surveyed NGO staff in Bosnia, Sri Lanka and Lebanon to trace the effect of their religious beliefs on their work. The survey results showed that 63.4% of employees who worked in an organization of the same faith as that of a party involved in the armed conflict confirmed that their religious beliefs affected and influenced their work.

### III.3.5 FBOs and Secular Organizations: Competition and/or collaboration?

In the past, FBOs have been seen by donors and development academics as entities that are qualitatively different and distinct from 'modern' secular civil society. Oxhorn (forthcoming) criticizes this "ethnocentric" normative framework, arguing that the Western model of civil society as a grouping of individuals with no value system other than the maximization of their respective interests is not useful in developing countries, particularly those with a weak state and/or lack of social cohesion. He notes the constructive role played by the Catholic Church in pressing authoritarian regimes in Latin America for greater accountability.

Ferris (2005) states that as religious and non-religious NGOs work in the same environment, they need to work towards consolidating their efforts and coordinate more. Tyndale (2000) looks at the ways in which faith-based and secular organizations (such as the World Bank) can coordinate their efforts given the growing need for integrating spirituality in the development agenda. She argues that poor people view their lives in a way that varies from that through which development experts and economists see them. She adds that this is largely due to faith. Tyndale proposes an alternative model for development that draws on religious values to validate the focus on the needs of the poor. The model entails introducing more equality in the distribution of wealth through the reconsideration of the taxation system, and the adoption of more socially responsible methods of trade. Moreover, gender issues, which are presumable considered a priority within the World Bank policies, can be discussed with religious figures of developing countries so as to be able to improve the status of women in patriarchal societies. Such writings reflect a growing awareness that, within several global circles, modernity is not necessarily linked with secularization.

Clarke (2007) however notes concern in certain sections within the UK Department for International Development that the faith identity of the poor should not be privileged over other identities which have more potential to empower them, such gender, class and sexuality.

Hula, Jackson-Elmoore and Reese (2007) further note in a discussion of FBOs in America, that the widely-held idea that FBOs have better ability than secular organizations to deliver services and interventions at grassroots level has not been subject to any rigorous and objective evaluation. They also note that whilst there is much discussion of FBOs capacity to deliver social services, there has been little consideration of how their involvement impacts the policy-making process itself. De Vita & Wilson
(2002) further discuss the role of FBOs in the U.S. through the change in legislation in 1996 known as ‘charitable choice’ that granted religious congregations the ability to have access to government funds similar to secular charities. Furthermore, the authors discuss the implications of President Bush’s attempts to loosen restrictions on collaborations between the U.S. government and FBOs. The main issues raised by critics are (1) the vagueness of the term Faith Based Organizations which makes it difficult to identify what an FBO is; (2) the criteria for choosing FBO partners of different faith, and (3) religious tensions that might arise among beneficiaries as well as in service delivery. On the other hand, the authors examine religious leaders’ views on this legislation and argue that FBOs may not be able to have access to government funds because of lack of capacity and concern over the possible infringement by the government on the authority of religious congregations through financial audits, etc. The article concludes that the ongoing debate on the role of FBOs is part of the issue of how to balance the relationship between state and church.

III.3.6 Typologies of FBOs

Clarke (2005) proposes a typology of FBOs based on five categorizations:

1. Faith–Based Representative Organizations: these have affiliated member organizations that work on development issues both locally and internationally. Examples include the Conference of Catholic Bishops and the World Council of Churches (of which the Middle East Council of Churches is a member).

2. Faith–Based Development and Charitable Organizations: these aim at spreading awareness about poverty among their religious constituencies and run poverty alleviation programs such as World Vision and Caritas. This type of FBO rose in number in the Arab world during the 1990s because of structural reforms in some countries of the region such as Egypt and Yemen, as well as armed conflict and state collapse. For instance, most of the newly formed NGOs in Yemen in 1996 were Muslim organizations, and a fifth of registered NGOs in Egypt in 1997 were Muslim organizations working on women and community issues as well as poverty alleviation.

3. Faith-Based Socio-Political Organizations: these include various forms of faith-based associations such as trade unions, political parties, guilds, student unions and social movements. Such groupings are distinguished from the other categorizations in that their primary function is not to enact the principles of their faith, but use faith for political purposes or as means for organizing diverse social groups. This category of organizations has a strong presence in both developed and developing countries, and has been largely neglected from the debate surrounding civil society and its role in development. These organizations are believed to be of great significance “amid the rise of identity politics as a driver of change in national and international contexts” (Clarke, p: 7, 2005).
4. **Faith-Based Missionary Organizations**: these have been historically active in development, and continue to play a role in helping the poor and in offering services throughout the world. This category includes mainly Muslim and Christian organizations which are known to have proselytizing tendencies.

5. **Faith-Based radical, illegal or terrorist organizations**: these stem from either „religious nationalism’ or „conservative religious politics’. “Such groups are common to all major faith traditions, but Islam has been predominantly implicated in the promotion of faith-based violence and conflict in recent years” (Clarke, 2005: 20). Examples of such organizations include al Qaeda, which is accused of spreading extremism, violence and hatred in the name of Islam.

A second typology proposed by Green and Sherman and endorsed by Clark\(^8\) classifies FBOs according to the pattern of application of faith in their work. In the development agenda, the role of FBOs has been surrounded by controversy as bilateral and multilateral donors question FBOs that target a certain religious community in favor of another or seek to convert people of other faiths to their own. This typology offers six categories of FBOs:

1. **Not Relevant**: religious beliefs are not reflected in the organization’s mode of operation;
2. **Passive**: religious beliefs are reflected in the organization’s involvement in charity work and in helping the needy;
3. **Invitational**: religious beliefs are openly declared to stakeholders;
4. **Relational**: religious beliefs are used as a means to build relationships with beneficiaries and stakeholders;
5. **Integrated**: religious beliefs are integral to the organization’s work with various stakeholders but do not interfere with the organization’s mode of operation;
6. **Mandatory**: religious beliefs are essential and an obligatory element for working with stakeholders.

### III.3.7 Highlights and conclusions

Research and scholarly interest in Faith Based Organizations appears to be rather nascent and very much emanating from a Western perspective. In fact, the existing typologies have all been established as of 2000. This recent interest also appears to be very much sparked by the 9/11 events and the ensuing “war on terrorism” and demonization of Islam.

In addition, the international literature on FBOs seems to point out to critical gaps in investigating and analyzing the role that FBOs play, whether overtly or covertly, in promoting which kind of development, equality and justice. As FBOs are, to the very

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\(^8\) See Clark (2005)
least, inspired by religious beliefs, it is also puzzling that very little investigation has been carried out on their role in reproducing and strengthening gender inequality and religious/confessional identities.

Aside from punctual and often individual case studies, the intricate relation between FBOs and their respective states is also under-investigated and as such, hardly any empirical information is available on the ways in which FBOs attempt to influence public and social policies. This may be due to the fact that studies have mostly focused on FBOs with international outreach rather than those with strong local presence within specific country boundaries.

The various typologies of FBOs identified in the literature review are undoubtedly a good starting point for building a Lebanon specific typology notwithstanding that what is available will need to be adapted extensively to take into consideration the various trends, geo-political realities, historical mutations and various FBOs formation and cross-borders linkages. Nevertheless, the international typology highlights some interesting elements for building a local typology and which have been partly used in this research namely ownership, identity, sources of funding and patterns of application of religious faith.

### III.4 Faith Based Organizations in Lebanon: Genesis, evolution and the present

Given the interrelationship between the secular and faith based organizations alluded to in Part 1, a contextual discussion of the NGO sector in Lebanon is seen as useful to underscore the information on topics surrounding FBOs in Lebanon. In addition, the genesis and evolution of the role of FBOs in Lebanon need to be contextualized both historically as well as sectorally (i.e. FBOs as part of the overall NGOs/FBOs and development sector in Lebanon).

#### III.4.1 Context - The NGO Sector in Lebanon

The focus on civil society in the development discourse during the past two decades has generated a vast literature on the concept and its application to developing countries. As a concept, civil society is defined by Lars Jorgensen (1996:36) “as organized activities by groups or individuals either performing certain services or trying to influence and improve society as a whole but are not part of government or business”. When discussing civil society in the Arab World however, further analysis is needed to dissect the existing political regimes and their effect on associational life. Tabar (1994) argues that applying principles of democracy and civil society in the Lebanese context is more problematic because of the political system, which is based on sectarian/communal loyalties. Oxhorn⁹

⁹ (forthcoming)
argues for a less proscriptive definition of civil society which reflects the diversity of social actors and processes throughout the world.

A total of fifteen books, articles and journals that discuss the NGO sector and its development at different periods of Lebanon’s history were reviewed. The report published by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) examines civil society in Beirut from the early 19th century to the 1990s. Traboulsi (2001) provides a map of NGOs working on poverty issues. Kingston (1996) analyzes NGOs during the civil war and their role in post-Taef Lebanon. Harik (1994) reviews social services offered by Lebanese militias and social organizations during the civil war.

In the next section, we will review the various stages of the development and composition of the NGO sector in Lebanon and outline the current context within which they operate.

The Growth of the NGO Sector in Lebanon – A Historical Perspective, Identity and Roles

Writings on the NGO sector in Lebanon refer to five stages in the growth of civil society, during which time the number of FBOs rose visibly. The first phase is from 1900 to 1930, the second from the 1940s to the 1950s, the third from the 1950s to the 1960s, the fourth from 1975 to 1990 and the fifth from 1990 to the present date. This section will provide a brief overview of the first, second and third phases and will focus more on the fourth and the fifth since there is a richer body of literature on those phases; including the LCPS report (1996), Harik (1994), Civicus (2006), Kingston (1996), and Majdalani (1999).

The First Phase (1900 – 1940) was characterized by a growth in the number of family and village associations formed by Shiite and Maronite families that moved to Beirut. Other organizations were formed by religious sects such as the Druze, Sunni, Orthodox and Armenians.

The Second Phase (1940 – 1950s) witnessed a continuation in the rise of sect-based organizations that served their own communities. Such organizations were mainly concerned with welfare, health and education issues. Majdalani (1999) stated that this trend was a result of the declaration of Lebanon’s independence in 1943, which led religious communities to seek ways to protect their existence and space as well as their autonomy under the newly founded state.

The Third Phase (1950s – 1975) was characterized by an upsurge in the number of non-sectarian organizations such as unions, guilds, and political parties (Civicus, 2006). The LCPS report also refers to a rise in the number of Sunni family associations and a fall in the number of Christian family organizations, as well as an overall increase in sect-based organizations. This phase also saw the emergence of leftist movements that attracted widespread support (Majdalani, 1999).
The Fourth Phase (1975 – 1990) The civil war in Lebanon was fought between 1975 and 1990, and brought about a breakdown of state institutions and the division of the country into de-facto confessional cantons (mainly Maronite, Shiite, Druze & Sunni) (Harik, 1994). It is difficult to paint a clear and comprehensive picture of the nature of organizations that emerged as a response to the needs of the Lebanese during the civil war, since the affiliations of various players are difficult to decipher. A number of political parties, such as the Lebanese Forces, mutated into armed militias and were able to control large areas (aided by existing physical geographic divisions) and expanded to become de-facto local administrations. The Lebanese Forces formed Public Committees in areas under their military influence, namely East Beirut whilst the Progressive Socialist Party created the Civil Administration of the Chouf mountains in 1983. The Public Committees created in 1976 branched out into 142 committees with 1400 employees, and offered services to about half a million Lebanese, including free medication, garbage collection, shelter to the displaced and later on branched with equal zeal into law enforcement. By the same token, the Civil Administration of the Mountain secured relief services to the Druze community in the Chouf and Metn districts by offering food and medical assistance to the injured (Ibid).

Other actors also participated in the provision of social services to make up for the void left by government institutions. As such, social/confessional organizations and political parties/militias created social organizations to serve members of their own communities. Services included medical assistance, relief aid, financial payments, shelter for the displaced, schooling, and welfare (c.f. Civil Society in Beirut). The Druze community, for example, formed the Druze Foundation for Social Welfare in 1983 to respond to the needs of its community due to the ongoing armed conflict. The Foundation was mainly active in relief work and later on it became a key player in the social development arena. Financial assistance was given out to families, children of martyrs, and to the handicapped during the war (Harik, 1994).

Within the Shiite confession, Sayyid Hassan Fadllalah, a notable and spiritual guide, created social organizations to provide assistance through schools, orphanages and clinics in West Beirut with particular focus on predominantly Shiite areas. These social institutions catered to the needs of Shites who were displaced from South Lebanon and the Bekaa. Hezbollah, an armed political party created in circa 1982, set up its own social organizations during the civil war, including the Islamic Health Society, established in 1984 for the provision of health services, and Jihad al Bina’a, established in 1988 for undertaking reconstruction and infrastructural projects (Ibid). This period was also marked by the rise of a number of other Islamic movements that created their own organizations such as Al Ahsb (Islamic Charitable Association – Sunnis) and Al Jama’a Al Islamiyyah (a form of the Muslim Brotherhood – Sunni) (Civicus, 2006).

In parallel, a number of NGOs participated in the delivery of humanitarian aid during the civil war, and attempted to coordinate their efforts and interventions in a collective fashion. According to Kingston (1995), the two most successful NGO groupings were the Lebanese NGO Forum – a gathering of predominately religious/confessional organizations, and the Collectif des ONGs Libanaises (CONG), a gathering of predominately secular NGOs. The Lebanese NGO Forum represented various religious communities and their affiliate institutions whereas the Collectif was mainly a grouping
of local NGOs (Ibid). Kingston however, does not explicitly clarify the indicators he used for measuring success.

The Lebanese NGO Forum (LNF) consisted of a number of FBOs and NGOs. The rationale behind this grouping was to link the various religious communities and bridge the divisions created by the war. In 1989 the LNF was able to attract up to 13 NGOs: 5 Christian, 5 Muslim (2 Sunni, 2 Shiite, and 1 Druze) and 3 non-confessionals. The LNF was able to improve the capacity of its member organizations to deliver relief by formulating unified action plans which cut across sectarian and non-sectarian lines (Ibid). The Collectif des ONGs Libanaises (CONG) was another cluster of NGOs that participated in the delivery of aid during the civil war. It sought to combine the efforts of NGOs to offset the increasing influence, outreach and fundraising ability of the LNF.

Although attempts by Lebanese NGOs to form coalitions served primarily as a façade for the benefit of external donors and as framework for political differentiation vis-à-vis the other coalition, these groups nevertheless succeeded in cutting across sectarian and geographic divisions in Lebanon through the provision of relief, and by bringing together various Lebanese communities for a common cause. Their activities mainly targeted the youth of Lebanon through organizing summer camps and trying to provide a civic space that defied the ongoing war run by the militias (LCPS, 1996). With the end of the civil war in 1990, both groupings were weakened as there was no longer a need for relief and humanitarian assistance and as such, their raison d’être was no longer valid.

Majdalani (1999) however states that although NGOs were active participants in the provision of aid during the civil war, their endeavor was held back by the geographic and sectarian divisions of the country. The absence and/or paralysis of the state led the warring militias as well as individual communities to create parallel structures to serve people based on their religious or political affiliation. Majdalani adds that although NGOs attempted to bridge social and geographic rifts created by the war, they failed to play a unifying role as this was not translated into more meaningful cooperation between communities. Moreover, Majdalani points to the fact that the NGOs sector was caught up in a paradox during this period. On the one hand, it attempted to promote peace and defy the militia/military system that emerged, and on the other the hand, it was forced to cooperate with militias in the delivery of services. NGOs were used by the war lords as instruments to widen their popular support and raise more funds (Ibid).

The Fifth Phase: Post-war Lebanon (1990 – 2007) Historically, civil action in Lebanon has been a combination of communal and sectarian ties (Karam, 2004). The protracted civil war led to severe destruction of the country’s infrastructure and a widening gap between rich and poor. The post-war government formulated a reconstruction plan which made the development of infrastructure and achievement of economic growth a priority over social and human development. The health and education sectors for example were allocated only 8.2% of the overall reconstruction budget (Kingston, 1995). The post-war political structure was fragmented because of rivalry among political forces and former war lords, who were now part of the new government (LCPS, 1996). Attempts of non-state actors to take part in the political process were ignored by the government despite
the former’s vital support to the Lebanese community during the war. Kingston (1995:9) notes that NGOs were weaker than trade unions in terms of lobbying the government because “(they) don’t have large membership bases and are not organic outgrowths of social movements but come about due to the initiative of a few entrepreneurs who have filled in the failing state at the time”. The country’s political elite sought to preserve a tight grip on their respective religious communities in order to maintain the status-quo (Kingston, 1996). These factors combined to produce a confessional system which secured for the poorest members of society only the minimum requirements needed to perpetuate the status quo.

Nonetheless, this phase was marked by a significant expansion in the number of NGOs as an average 250-300 new organizations enlisted on a yearly basis (c.f. IRIS Website, 2007). Although the overwhelming majority of new NGOs were mainly of a philanthropic and sectarian nature, a sizable number of advocacy NGOs also emerged and addressed previously neglected issues such as democracy, human rights and the environment (Ibid, Civicus Report). Ghosn argues that the main obstacle that NGOs faced in this period was the need to shift from relief provision to development. This was due to the “financial dependency on non-sustainable resources (humanitarian aid, donations, volunteering)” created during their wartime work (Ghosn, 1996:4). The lack of coordination with the government and an overall decline in foreign funding further complicated the work of NGOs, and put in question their ability to make the appropriate transition to addressing the post-war needs of Lebanese society. Moreover, the government’s mode of operation with NGOs was characterized by favoritism of key political figures and their organizations (Ibid). Karam (2004) emphasizes that the organizations that continued to operate in the post-war era tended to be confessional in nature as they had more influence and ability to secure funding (through their own connections) despite the overall decline of aid to Lebanese NGOs.

III.4.2 Faith-Based/Confessional Organizations in Lebanon: An overview

The significance of confessional/religious identity is deeply entrenched within Lebanese society because of the nature of Lebanon’s political system as well as the discourse on civil society in Lebanon as evident from the preceding section. Religious identity has been further used to build various forms of associations, and as a way to access wealth, political power and resources in Lebanon. Moreover, as mentioned in the LCPS report, religious organizations are “protected in the Lebanese constitution and play a pivotal role in managing the economic and social life of their communities”. It is therefore important to study faith-based organizations and the role they play in influencing policy in order to have a clearer understanding of the dynamics of the current socio-political scene. In particular, more attention needs to be given to the question of whether FBOs necessarily perpetuate sectarianism in Lebanon through their privileging of a faith-based identity, or whether, as Oxhorn (forthcoming) describes in the Latin American context, they offer the potential to empower citizens to build a more equitable political system through their mobilization of grassroots and focus on social development.
As indicated earlier, some twenty sources on FBOs in Lebanon were collected and reviewed within the framework of this literature review. Labaki (1984) is probably the only source that traces the genesis of religious/confessional institutions from 19th century to the 1980s. Thompson (2005) reviews the role of missionaries in the formation of the first social organizations under French Mandate. Thompson may be the only researcher who focused on gender as a category of analysis in her study. The rest of the collected sources essentially focus on Islamic FBOs from different perspectives such as Johnson (1997), Terc (2006), Hallak (2005), and Harik (2004).

**Evolution of FBOs in Lebanon**

Following is a historical overview of faith-based/confessional organizations affiliated with various religious communities. Thompson (2000) mentions the Capucins, Jesuits, Lazarists, Sisters of Charity, Sisters of the Sacred Heart, and the Sisters of St. Joseph as amongst the earliest FBOs to have been established in Syria and Lebanon. In addition, she also refers to American missionaries targeting Christian Arabs in Lebanon. According to Thompson, schools and hospitals in Mount Lebanon in the middle nineteenth century were run by missionaries after the massacres of 1860. The missionaries’ organizations were built to meet the needs of the Christian community in Mount Lebanon. As a reaction to increased interference by European powers in the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman rulers built schools and hospitals for Muslims. This pattern is reproduced throughout Lebanese history and amongst the various religious communities (Sunni, Shiite, Druze, and Orthodox).

With the onset of the First World War, the Ottomans closed French missionary schools in Lebanon and, as the French returned with a mandate to rule Lebanon at the end of the First World War, missionaries complemented the lack of resources of the French government devastated by the First World War. In addition, there was support to local religious schools which were given preference over public schools because of cost. Thompson describes the situation as follows:

> French missionaries, concessionary companies, and the military became the nucleus of a new French state devoted almost entirely to social services. Missionaries were invited to establish a school system, seen as an essential means of radiating French influence against competing claims from the British and Faysal. They readily filled France’s manpower gap because they were anxious to reclaim their schools, which had been closed by the Ottomans. More importantly, missionaries filled the budget gap. They brought with them funds collected in parishes throughout Europe, which the foreign ministry supplemented with subsidies. By March 1919, 150 private schools run mostly by French missionaries were holding classes. Local religious schools were also encouraged: the foreign ministry advanced an education subsidy of 50,000 francs to the Maronite patriarch on October 3, before French troops had even landed at Beirut. By

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10 They were also present in Palestine and Syria and also targeted the Armenian minorities.
11 See Thompson, 2000 p. 75.
May 1920, there were 740 private (mostly Christian) schools, while only 244 public schools had been opened. When foreign ministry officials protested to Gouraud that "neutral" (public) schools would better foster a rapprochement among Lebanon's various sects, they were told that it would cost too much." (Thompson, 2000, p.60, 61)

Labaki (1984) presents an overview of the rise of various institutions of Lebanon’s religious communities from the end of the eighteenth century to the 1980s. He refers to the growth of organizations affiliated with various religious communities. These organizations evolved from mainly familial/feudal forms of associations to sectarian organizations at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Labaki lists the main institutions for the main religious communities (Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Sunni, Shiite and the Druze) active in the political, educational and health spheres. Labaki also notes that the growth of the FBOs varied in time by confession. In addition, such growth also varied by region and by type of organization for each confession.12

Prior to the French Mandate, Labaki notes that the Greek Orthodox institutions were organized traditionally, and were recognized since the Ottoman period and were decentralized. The Sunni confession was the mainstream confession of the Ottomans. Consequently, its members were organized within the state institutions.

Members of the Maronite and other Catholic confessions were organized according to Labaki by familial/feudal institution, and their various organizations were loosely linked together. Religious institutions affiliated with the Maronite community such as the patriarchy and archbishopric date back to early eighteenth century. By 1984, there were seven Maronite parishes in Jounieh, Tripoli, Sarba, Beirut, Sidon, Tyre and Bekaa. The end of 17th century witnessed the emergence of various Greek Catholic organizations when some of the Eastern churches joined the Catholic Church while retaining the Eastern rites. This was manifested in Lebanon through the establishment of 7 parishes and one patriarchy in Beirut, Sidon, Baalbek, Tyre, Tripoli and Marjayoun (Labaki, 1984).

Similarly, the Shiite confession organizations were decentralized and organized mainly along familial/feudal lines and their religious and educational organizations were not tightly bound together. Members of the Druze confession however, were organized along tightly knit familial/feudal lines which included political, judicial, as well as military organizations.13

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Role, Identity & of FBOs in Lebanon: An attempt at modeling a typology

This section focuses on the role and identity of Lebanese FBOs using a temporal overview approach following that which was used in the various sources on the subject.

According to Labaki (1984) FBOs in Lebanon assumed a modernizing role in addition to their traditional social support role targeting their respective confessions in Lebanon. Labaki (1984) traces a general evolution of FBOs in the urban centers in Lebanon in his analysis of urbanization. FBOs evolved from the nucleii of religious organizations that used to support new migrants, essentially the clergy and place of worship. This was followed by institutions catering for personal status laws, religious and spiritual matters, judiciary, schools, and social as well as media organizations.

The process culminated in the creation of representative structures such as sectarian/confessional councils, political movements and parties that cater to the needs and articulate the formal positions of a particular confession.\(^{14}\) In addition, there is the implied modernizing role of Christians FBOs by Thompson in her description of the Christian educational and health organizations in the context of a chapter entitled „Bureaucrats: Mother France’s Civilizing Mission“ (mission civilisatrice) where religious schools proliferated because of lack of funds from the French government to finance secular public schools.

Maronite faith-based organizations are the oldest in Lebanon. Maronite orders and parishes in addition to higher ranking church organizations contributed to the foundation of schools since the 17\(^{th}\) century. The Maronite Antonine Order, for example, was founded in the year 1700. It started out as a missionary organization and later expanded to build schools, libraries and printing presses. In 1865, the Lebanese Maronite Monk Order was founded. It later branched out into several organizations that provided an array of educational and social services including schools and universities, such as the Holy Spirit/Kaslik University (established in 1948) which now enrolls thousands of students (Abi-Abdallah, 2003). According to Labaki, in 1978 the Maronite community had 206 schools. The first Roman Catholic school in Lebanon was created in 1811 and named the Eklirikyah School in Ain Traz. The Patriarchal school was established in 1865, the Eastern College in Zahle in 1898 and Saint John's school in 1945. Also according to Labaki, by 1978, the Roman Catholic community had 62 schools all over Lebanon in addition to Waqt\(^{15}\) Saydat Al Najat Hospital in Zahle and a number of local dispensaries.

One of the first Armenian institutions founded in Lebanon is the Armenian Catholic Patriarchate, established in 1842 in Kisrwan, and moved to Beirut at the beginning of the twentieth century. Its religious institutions include three orders for monks and one for nuns. In 1931, the Armenian Orthodox church moved its Patriarchal seat from Syria to

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\(^{15}\) Waqt is the Arabic word for Trust.
Antelias in the Eastern suburbs of Beirut. The Armenian Protestants are also organized in a union in Beirut. (Labaki, 1984) According to Labaki, by 1968 the Armenian community (all sects included) had 78 schools, a university and two theology schools in addition to Massah Al Arman Hospital in Azonyah and a number of local dispensaries.

The Sunni educational FBO, Al Makassed, was described by Labaki as an agent of modernization of the traditional school system (“kuttab”). The Makassed Philanthropic Association of Beirut was established in 1878. By 1980, it had branched into 20 schools in Beirut, and 46 in the villages, a hospital, as well as a medical college, a higher institute for Islamic studies, a teacher training institute and a nursing school. Other Sunni FBOs include the Saeb Salam’s Institute for Culture and Higher Education that was active since the beginning of the eighties and mostly involved in financing education. Other Sunni FBOs include the Makassed in Saida established in 1879 which had branched by the eighties into two secondary schools (one for boys and another for girls), a preschool and three free schools. Labaki also mentions the Islamic Center for Education (also Sunni) that includes a vocational training school in Saida and the University College of Imam Ouzai which specializes in Islamic studies in Beirut, and Azhar of Lebanon – an institution that trains religious scholars. Labaki indicates that overall, Sunni schools grew in numbers from 19 at the onset of the French mandate to 137 by the end of the 1970s.16

According to the LCPS report; traditional Muslim associations are described as non-governmental organizations, since they function independently from the state and have their own laws. “Most importantly, as non-governmental associations, they provide a buffer between their constituency and the Lebanese state” (LCPS, 1996: 86).

The Association of Islamic Charitable Projects – another Sunni FBO - was founded in 1930 in Beirut by Sheikh Abdul Rahman Al Hirari and was revived later on in 1982. The LCPS report states that one of the association’s aims is to proselytize, and its ideological agenda has raised questions and concerns ever since its creation. The association was able to widen its constituency, and, during the 1980s and 1990s, it was able to secure a seat in the Lebanese parliament (LCPS, 1996). The organization is active in educational, religious, health and relief services. Today it runs five schools across Lebanon, a university and offers medication and medical consultation through its health centers (c.f. AICSP Publication).

The Greek Orthodox Church is the second most important Christian religious establishment in Beirut. It runs a number of organizations that provide social, health and education services. The report makes reference to nine schools and one hospital managed by the church. Greek Orthodox organizations independent of the church have also been active in providing social, political, charitable and educational services. Saint Georges Hospital, which is currently run by the Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Beirut, was built in 1877. Social and educational services were provided through a number of institutions

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such as Dar Al Ajaza for the elderly (established in 1874) in addition to 9 schools and other social organizations.

The Shiite religious leader Sayyid Hassan Fadlallah founded a number of organizations during the civil war to cater for the needs of the Shiite community. Today Al Mabarrat is one of the largest FBOs in Lebanon and runs 14 schools and secondary schools, 14 special care centers, 4 health centers, 31 religious and cultural centers, 6 vocational training centers, and 6 care centers (c.f. Mabarrat Website).

Fawaz (2000), refers to al Emdad, Al Shaheed and Al Jareeh as social services organizations directly affiliated with Hizbullah and with a remit to cater for the needs of Shiite families with special attention to families of Hizbullah martyrs.

The Druze community for its part established a number of associations to offer health, educational and social services. One of the first associations was the Druze Welfare Association established under French mandate in 1929 with a stated aim to alleviate poverty, provide health and education services. It later on formed a women’s committee in 1960 and was successful in opening a school, a technical training institute, and public library and a health center. The Druze Foundation for Social Welfare was later founded in 1983 to respond to the growing needs of the Druze community because of the on-going civil war. Other Druze organizations include the Safa Sports Club created in 1939 and the Safa Social Association in 1974, specializing in social and cultural development, and the Women’s Friendship Association, set up in 1984 to respond to women’s needs and (LCPS, 1996).

Organizations following the Jewish faith were also included in Labaki’s account of religious institutions in Lebanon despite the demographic shrinking of the community since its official recognition under Lebanese law. According to Labaki (1984), in 1957, there were 11 synagogues in Lebanon in addition to Jewish religious schools and the Jewish Alliance school created at the end 19th century in Beirut, and the Michael Trab School founded in 1926.

FBOs in Lebanon as indicated in the above reading of the existing literature aggregate around Christian and Muslim confessions with a shy Jewish representation. Their major areas of activities include social, educational and health care.

Labaki proposes the following as a typology for educational FBOs in Lebanon: (1) institutions affiliated to religious organizations, (2) institutions owned or run by clergy, (3) associations aiming at providing services to a particular confession, (4) free schools subsidized by the state and owned by the members of a particular.\(^\text{17}\)

\(^{17}\) See Labaki 1984 p. 110
III.4.3 Highlights and conclusions

Given the size, depth and breadth of FBOs in Lebanon (as will be shown later on in the subsequent mapping chapter), it was indeed surprising to note the scarcity of full-fledged scholarly research on their role within the social, development and political scene in Lebanon and their influence on social policy.

Except for Labaki’s contribution, most local literature can be traced back to the civil war period in Lebanon as well as the post-Taef era. The reader can tease out that the main inspiration for most researchers is the study of civil society in Lebanon in general rather than a particular focus on Faith Based Organisations.

In addition, existing Lebanon specific researches seem to be heavily if not entirely inspired by the confessionalised political system in Lebanon where FBOs are conceptualized as peripheral entities rather than key players in that system.

Labaki appears to have been the first to have tried to conceptualize a rough typology of FBOs in Lebanon. However, the various rather basic categories he identifies are often very much overlapping. Labaki focuses essentially on ownership and affiliation of FBOs with less interest on patterns of application of faith or relation with the state and public policies. In addition, Labaki’s contribution is essentially based on a compilation and analysis of secondary information rather than on field work.

Other cited have attempted to find a connection between FBOs and political life in Lebanon however, they were unable to do so with any significant depth and breadth. This was probably due to challenges in getting first hand information, a challenge that this study has faced and which is a concrete indicator of the relative un-penetrability of FBOs. As such, and save for some very few exceptions which are in fact individual case studies, the local literature has little to offer in terms of data, facts and figures.

In addition to the paucity of local research, local researchers’ overwhelming interest with the role of confessions in Lebanon often takes precedence over their study of FBOs. On the other hand, the excessive obsession with studying organizations such as Hizbollah and its social branches with emphasis on their military operation may have over-shadowed any comprehensive scholarly interest with FBOs in Lebanon as a whole.

Interestingly, the literature indicates that the issue of women’s situation, position and roles are only broached in studies focusing on Hizbollah. Other studies remain, alas, impermeable to gender concerns and gender analysis. As such, the local literature is, by and large, and expectedly gender blind.
III.5 Faith Based Organizations Influence on Public Policy in Lebanon

Since religious communities in Lebanon are constitutionally guaranteed a large degree of autonomy in establishing their own social, judicial and political institutions, they are able to influence policy-making, at least through mobilizing their constituencies. Although FBOs influence on public policy-making is not investigated thoroughly in any of the sources collected, some nevertheless provide pointers as to such a role. Thompson (2005) touches upon social policy, citizenship and gender in Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate. Harik, (2004) and Johnson (1976) discuss the link between the provision of social services by Lebanese FBOs and access to political power. Harik (2004), states that the wide range of social welfare organizations offered by Hezbollah to its community allowed it to win support for its cause and gain access to the Lebanese Parliament in 1994. Similarly, Johnson (1976) highlights the significance of the Makassed organization to the Sunni community and its ability to influence the position of the Prime Minister. Terc (2006) argues that Makassed schools contributed to the building of Lebanese identity through the nature, ideology and philosophy of their teaching.

This subsequent section seeks to link Lebanon’s FBOs to public policy-making by referring to Thompson’s seminal work on social policy, gender and citizenship under French Mandate, and by analyzing two Muslim Faith Based Organizations namely Al Makassed Philanthropic Islamic Organization (Johnson 1976) and Hezbollah’s Welfare Organizations (Harik, 2004) and the means by which service provision has allowed both organizations to play a significant role in Lebanese politics.

III.5.1 Social Policy & Citizenship under French Mandate

Thompson (2005) presents a historical overview of gender, citizenship and social policy in Lebanon under Ottoman rule and subsequently, French mandate; a period when social organization started to play a significant role in public life. The author states that Ottoman rulers sought to protect their power from Western interference by focusing on military spending, and consequently, neglecting social needs. Education was therefore mainly concerned with schooling of future soldiers for the Ottoman army, and hence favored males over females for this end. Moreover, the presence of European and American missionaries from the nineteenth century onwards posed a threat to the Ottoman state as they targeted religious minorities by building schools and health centers. The Ottoman state reacted by building its own schools that taught Islam in an attempt to build loyalty and religious identity amongst the Muslim community, as Selim Deringil puts it (quoted in Thompson 2005:75) “in the second half of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire came into its own as an ‘educator state’ with a systematic program of education/indoctrination for subjects it intended to mould into citizens”. The Muslim community was supported through social services which were offered mainly by the state whereas foreign missionaries catered for the needs of the Christian community in health.
and education. As a consequence, most schools controlled by the Ottoman state were Muslim and most private schools were Christian. The Ottoman state also disregarded the needs of peasants and workers as the newly built schools were in the city. The Ottoman state was therefore unable to build a sense of identity and citizenship across demographic and socio-economic classes as it approached religious communities differently and privileged one group over another.

Thompson states that like the Ottomans, the French subsequently used social policy to build loyalty among groups that could serve their interests. This was manifested by favoring Lebanese over Syrians and Christians over Muslims. Within this context, foreign missionaries were used as a tool for the delivery of social services. However, unlike the Ottomans, the French provided health services for the poor free of charge and opened around 21 hospitals in Syria. Missionary organizations received large funds from the French High Commission to support their services, and, subsequently, the focus on public health expanded. Lebanon at that time had up to 30 hospitals, 12 in Beirut, 9 of which were private. A similar trend was evident in education, where missionary schools were supported by substantial funds from the High Commission. As Thompson (2005:78) puts it: “Like the Ottomans, the French saw education primarily as a vehicle to cultivate loyal cadres in the state bureaucracy, French–language study was made mandatory in state schools and made a requirement to qualify for state subsidies in private ones”. More students attended schools under the French mandate, but in Lebanon only 12.6% of the population was enrolled in schools, 54% of which were Christian (who made up 23% of the Lebanese population at the time). Furthermore, Thompson (2005:87) argues that girls' education was neglected by the French as “mention of women was omitted in the 1919 list of educational goals by the colonial lobby and again in the 1933 policy statement by the mandate’s top school inspector.” More schools and more educational scholarships were made available to boys. Because of the discriminatory social policy of the state, more girls were enrolled in private and religious schools which led to more Muslim girls being sent to Christian schools.

There was also a gender discrimination in the provision of social services. Private organizations, rather than the state, were responsible for provision of health and education for women as both the Ottomans and the French privileged males. Under the French Mandate, health services to the French army were prioritized over services to citizens (both men and women). For example, more funds were allocated to control the outbreak of venereal disease among the army compared to gastroenteritis which had widely spread among Lebanese citizens at the same time. Another change that occurred under the French mandate was a significant rise in the number of social organizations, which jumped from 31 under the Ottomans to 401 in Beirut alone under the French mandate. Such organizations ranged from political, religious and charitable to sports, human rights and professional. The French also introduced stricter requirements for the registration of new organizations (Ibid).
III.5.2 FBOs and Citizenship

Terc (2006) looks at the role that Al Makassed Philanthropic Organization played in Lebanon, and argues that, although the organization was originally created for the Sunni community; it had a positive impact on building a Lebanese identity through its schools. Terc (2006: 436) states that “from its inception, the Makassed Association mixed religious practice and its Sunni faith with concrete social, political and economic goals”.

Furthermore, Makassed schools enjoy a student enrolment that cuts across religious communities and social classes. This was evidenced by the schools it built in various areas of Beirut and the surrounding villages and was further emphasized by the admission of a significant number of students free of charge or on scholarships. The author also states that although the organization’s ideology is derived from Muslim doctrines, its schools introduced sciences and mathematics in both English and French under the French mandate. It was able to draw from foreign schools in its curriculum and educational approach. During the 1980s, the organizations sought to build a national identity linked to the Arab world at large. Its schools therefore started to offer subjects mainly in the Arabic language, since the Lebanese government grants institutions the freedom to select the language of instruction from middle school onwards. By introducing changes and modernizing its curriculum while attracting Lebanese students of various backgrounds, the organization was able to build a Sunni identity which did not contradict with the national identity (Ibid).

III.5.3 Women in FBOs

Fawaz (2000) discusses the role of women in three organizations affiliated to Hizbullah which are known as “the volunteer sisters” and argues that a number of factors including the type and flexibility of the structure of these institutions allowed them to have a stronger link to their target groups.

The “volunteer sisters” are active in Al Imdad, Al Shaheed and Al Jareeh Hezbollah organizations and work on “monitoring the FBOs’ relation with its beneficiaries” (Fawaz, 2000: 21). All these social organizations have networks of social workers which usually have around six male workers and an estimate of one hundred female volunteers. Men usually process applications submitted by beneficiaries and women coordinate between the beneficiaries and social workers.

The volunteer sisters’ task takes into consideration the needs of volunteers with families and grants them the ability to arrange their working hours according to their schedules. However, there are specific criteria for hiring women as volunteer sisters. First, they
should be living in areas they will be working in and second, they need to support Hezbollah’s ideology.

Moreover, Fawaz states that the role of “the volunteer sisters” entails much more than coordination as they visit beneficiary families on a regular basis and are able to directly interface and interact with families and listen to their problems and needs. As Fawaz (2000:22) mentions “often they get involved with children’s schoolwork, romantic or professional dilemmas. They have somewhat customized the relationship between the NGOs and the families as they have adapted and catered for the specific needs of the beneficiaries”. In other words, the work of “the volunteer sisters’ allows them to gain a better understanding of the fabric and intimate dynamics of families. As such, they are able to put forward recommendations for improving the organizations’ projects and identifying potential target communities.

The sisters also embody the party’s ideology through their Islamic dress code and overall attitude and valued. The author states that this contributes to strengthening the overall corporate culture of Hezbollah’s organizations and emphasizing the religious identity of the volunteers while they are working.

Although the role of women and men working with Hezbollah organizations are clearly segregated, the “volunteer sisters” appear to play an integral role in the provision of services and in securing a close relationship between the organization and its beneficiaries.

**III.5.4 Lebanese FBOS & Education**

Abou Chedid et al (2002) examine the link between public policy and faith-based schools in Lebanon. He looks at the school system in Lebanon in relation to the government’s policy and the teaching of history and religion in confessional schools. The article aims to view the extent to which confessional Lebanese schools promote inter-group learning through their curriculum and the extent to which they teach students about people of different religious backgrounds.

The text gives an overview of education policy in Lebanon under the Ottoman Empire, the French mandate and all throughout present-day Lebanon, where government educational policy continues to be fragmented as schools are given the freedom to teach history and religion as they see fit. The authors state that although Lebanon’s independence was declared in 1920 “its mandatory authorities organized education along particularistic confessional lines and ignored its national secular role” (Ibid: 7). This was manifested in article 10 of the Lebanese Constitution which is derived from the French Mandate that gave the right to religious communities to establish private schools as long as they do not violate “public order”. However, in 1993 there was an attempt to reform the educational system after the civil war. Various citizenship related concepts were introduced into the new plan such as “tolerance”, “democracy” and “ending
violence”. In addition, the new plan attempted to unify the school curriculum, to —.. standardize history and civic text books and make their teaching mandatory in all schools, to protect private education and to reinforce the public sector of education” (Abou Chedid et al, 2002: 3).

However, the plan faced opposition from a number of religious orders and policy makers on the grounds that it was imitating school systems in Jordan and attempting to diminish the non-state sector in Lebanon. As a consequence, the plan was scrapped and another plan was formulated namely “The New Framework of Education in Lebanon” which was subsequently approved in May 1997.

Although changes and revisions were formulated in consultation with “a joint committee comprising university professors, policymakers from private and public schools, and education policy makers form the Center for Educational Research Development” (CERD), the plan shied away from standardizing the teaching of religion and history.

Abou Chedid et al. carried out their study in seven confessional schools from 1999 to 2001. They also investigated students from different backgrounds. Four of the schools were run by Christian orders and the other three were Muslim schools. The study included conducting interviews with school teachers, students and education policy makers about their perspective of educational curriculum in Lebanon. By analyzing the answers of various stakeholders, the study unveiled that different versions of Lebanese history are being taught in schools. Each version favors a particular leader over others, and places a different emphasis on the importance of different historical periods. This directly affected students' perceptions and knowledge. In terms of teaching religion, the study highlighted the fact that deciding on religious instruction is entirely a prerogative of confessional schools. The teaching of religion and history therefore differs from one school to another and the syllabus of taught subjects is determined by the ideology of the school founder.

III.5.5 Relations between FBOs and secular organizations in Lebanon

Karam (2004) examines the evolution of social movements in Lebanon and the change in the type of NGOs that emerged in post-Taef Lebanon. He cites examples of social action organized by NGOs that attempted to introduce changes to Lebanon’s laws. One of those attempts was introducing the idea of separating religion from the political system in 1998 through the Gathering for Personal Status Law (a network comprised of a number of civil society organizations and NGOs). That network launched a campaign for introducing a law for civil marriage. President Hraoui agreed to introduce the bill for civil marriage to be voted for at the government and won a majority of votes. However, the Prime Minister opposed this bill and suggested its discussion by the Lebanese parliament instead. A number of religious Islamic leaders and FBOs openly opposed the bill and called for its rejection. They were supported by Islamic organizations and associations that organized a number of sit-ins in Beirut and Tripoli and joined forced in distributing leaflets
describing seculars and their organizations as being atheists. Religious leaders of both Christian and Muslim faiths along with a number of politicians and FBOS were able to build an opposition blocking the passing of the bill to the Lebanese Parliament.

Karam states that the campaign was able to attract wide support for its cause. For instance, student activists from various Lebanese Universities issued a petition for the support of civil marriage and held a meeting which was attended by 50 political parties as well as NGOs and student representatives. Participants in the meeting formulated a committee for preparing an action plan. Consequently, the committee launched a media campaign and prepared a petition in support of civil marriage. The movement was successful in mobilizing people all over Lebanon and held sit-ins at the house of Parliament and at the Council of Ministers. The committee prepared a two-year action plan which was able to collect 55 thousand signatures and mobilized the support of 75 organizations and political parties. Furthermore, the movement prepared a bill for civil marriage to be proposed to the Parliament. The Parliament eventually voted against the bill and fell under various pressures mostly exercised by confessional institutions (Karam, 2004). The failure to pass the bill for civil marriage highlights the influence that religious leaders and FBOs are able to exert on politicians and their capacity to shape public policies by impeding reforms.

III.5.6 Lebanese FBOs & Politics

The case of Al Makassed Philanthropic Organization

The Makassed Philanthropic Association of Beirut became the main Sunni organization in the early seventies and maintained strong ties with Sunni religious figures. As Johnson puts it (1974:58) “from 1918 to 1931 the Mufti of Beirut was the Society's President, and since 1931 the Mufti had held, at least in theory, the office of Honorary President”. Since Lebanon’s power-sharing formula stipulates that the seat of Prime Minister must be allocated to a Sunni, Sunni politicians have sought to develop and maintain strong ties with the organization since it has a direct influence in the selection of the Prime Minister. As Johnson (1976:68) states: "being President of the Makassed was at the very least a significant indication of social and religious status, this status combined with other status made a Makassed President a strong candidate for the Premiership."

Johnson provides a detailed account of the political crisis in 1970 caused by rivalry among Sunni notables over the elections of Makassed’s board of directors and which seriously endangered civil stability. The organization had witnessed a similar crisis before in 1966. The 1970 election however, was more severe as both the Lebanese government and the Mufti Hassan Khalid interfered. The Sunni community was split into two factions, those in favor of Saeb Salam as President of Makassed, and those who opposed him including notably Rashid Al Sulh and Othman Al Dana. Dispute started over registration of voting members of the Organization and the Mufti was proposed as a mediator. However, the Mufti opposed the election of Salam, who in turn refused the
mediation of the Mufti. The dispute expanded to include the cabinet. The Minister of Interior at the time, Kamal Jumblatt, stipulated a postponement of the election which worsened the situation and led the opposition to mobilize its constituency in the Sunni-dominated area of West Beirut. Use of arms was noted a day before the elections which threatened to lead the country into utter chaos. The cabinet had to hold an emergency meeting to avoid a dangerous slippage into violent armed conflict. Although the elections went ahead as scheduled, the events that followed were violent as demonstrations were held and frequent use of arms was noted. After mediation among different actors and protagonists, the Mufti had to abide by the government’s decision to accept the election results. The issue was settled when a new president was elected in 1970 and a new regime came to power.

The case of Hezbollah’s Social Organizations

Hezbollah was originally founded as a resistance movement to fight the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and moved to the delivery of social services in response to the needs of its constituency (Harik, 2004). Welfare social organizations affiliated to Hizbullah provided health and education services mainly in the southern suburbs of Beirut and the South of Lebanon; areas which had been historically neglected by the Lebanese government and which had further deteriorated because of the Lebanese civil war and repeated Israeli invasions. Hizbullah was able to develop a network of organizations to cater for the needs of its community while maintaining a respectable record in comparison to other Lebanese political parties, as it did not abuse government resources to finance its services (Ibid). This was manifested in providing a number of basic services such as garbage collection in the Southern Suburbs on a daily basis from 1988 onwards. It also expanded in health services by building in partnership with Sayyid Hassan Fadlallah, the Al Rasul Al Aazam and Bahman hospitals in the Southern suburbs where there are no public hospitals.

Another significant Hizbullah affiliated social organisation is the Jihad al Binaa, a non-governmental organization created in 1988 for the reconstruction and development of war-damaged areas. Jihad al Binaa’s services included the provision of shelter and housing to the internally displaced, WATSAN provision (latrine facilities, drinking water networks), and installation of electricity networks to communities in remote areas.

Hizbullah played an integral role in the provision of water and electricity during the years 1988-1990 because of the intensity of fighting that deprived the area of basic services. Jihad Al Binaa was able to build water reservoirs and supply water on daily basis to residents. The party continues to fill the gap left by public institutions in supplying water to residents of the Southern suburbs although the war has long since ended. The ability of Hizbullah to play the role of a sole provider of services undermines the government, as Harik (2004:85) states: “the fact that this work was undertaken by a political party and financed by a foreign country, Iran, rather than by the government’s Public Works
Ministry, certainly removes all doubt about the state’s capacity or desire to undercut the Party of God’s services in order to reduce its political appeal.”

Hezbollah’s large network of organizations both in Beirut and in the South has a large number of employees, who are most likely to be politically and ideologically affiliated with the party. By filling the gap left by the government, Hezbollah was able to mobilize a large constituency that guaranteed its success in entering the Lebanese parliament; it won 12 seats in 1992 and 9 in 1996 to become a fully recognized political party (Ibid).

**III.5.7 Highlights and conclusions**

It is evident that despite its importance, the role and influence of FBOs in public and social policy making is only scarcely investigated and researched. Only individual, though perhaps in-depth case studies appear to be available. These tend to focus on prominent FBOs whose role is well known especially during critical political junctures in Lebanon such as the case of the Sunni Al Makassed association. This example is particularly interesting as it provides a case in point about the role of Al Makassed in defining and shaping identity and citizenship. However, and given the fact that this case study was documented in the seventies, it does not reflect the ways in which Al Makassed may possible be a conduit of the role and impact of the premiership as well as of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in shaping modern day politics, allegiance, access to resources and the concept and practice of citizenship in Lebanon. Other case studies are mostly concerned with the branching of armed militia into social service provision, again during a period of total state breakdown where militias were keen on rallying their immediate constituency.

On the other hand, there is enough critical empirical evidence that girls were not the prime targets of FBOs, particularly so in the case of education where differential services and rights directly lead to differential identities and citizenship. Nevertheless, this does not seem to have sparked any significant research interest.

In his rather recent study of FBO schools, Abou Chedid is perhaps one of the few researchers who focused essentially on FBO schools but not in terms of the ways they influence or shape policies but rather on how they overcome and even override national policies by creating their own reality of religious and history education thus contributing to the process of creating different citizens’ identities.

This section of the literature review has further validated the assumption that research on FBOs role in public and social policy making is not only meager, it is also by and large gender blind and does not provide enough knowledge on the ways in which FBOs understand and transmit concepts such as citizenship, gender equality and good governance.

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18 Using the English translation of Hezbollah (The Party of God).
III.6 Synthesis, Limitations and Literature Gaps

The global discourse on FBOs reveals that although they exist in both Northern and Southern countries, the definition of FBOs has yet to be conceptualized. Current definitions in the literature are derived from the experience and work of Northern FBOs. There is a dearth of available sources on the debate surrounding the role of FBOs in development before 2000, and scant literature is available on Southern FBOs. There are very few sources that discuss the role of Southern FBOs in development. Interest in the work of Southern FBOs emerged in the aftermath of September 11th and the 'War on Terror', when Islamic FBOs came under increased scrutiny. It is also noteworthy that none of the sources collected discuss the role of Southern Christian or other non-Muslim FBOs.

Findings from the literature on the work of Northern FBOs indicate that both Christian and Muslim Northern FBOs play a significant role in humanitarian assistance and are considered effective tools for channeling aid in disaster areas (Clarke, 2005, Ferris, 2000 and Funch, 2006). Furthermore, aid is usually channeled through local FBOs that share the same faith as the Northern FBOs (Bakewell & Warren, 2005). The authors indicate that FBOs are likely to form partnership with Northern secular organizations (Bakewell & Warren, 2005). However, Funch (2006) states concerns about neutrality of FBOs. Ferris (2005) recognizes that FBOs can play a constructive role in development programs in partnership with secular organizations.

As for Lebanon, the review process underscored a lack of sufficient information and data sources on FBOs. What exacerbates the problem further is the absence of a centralized database on NGOs in Lebanon. In addition, there are logistical impediments. For instance, some of the documents listed in existing directories as being available were not and some resources were difficult to access especially in the aftermath of the July war.

Writings on the NGO sector/civil society in Lebanon do not offer in-depth analysis on the role of confessional/faith-based organizations. Arabic sources on confessional/faith-based organizations in Lebanon are scant. Those which are available are limited either to addressing the topic of the rise of Islamic movements in Lebanon, to Hezbollah’s social organizations or to FBOs’ own publications which are mainly descriptive and promotional rather than analytical.

None of collected sources discuss the link between confessional/faith-based organizations and the fundamental concepts of citizenship, democracy, gender or public policy-making; hence the need for further investigation into this relationship.

Most of collected sources on FBOs and development are viewed from a Northern perspective in terms of definition and typology, which emphasizes the need to develop a
workable definition and typology applicable to the Lebanese context. The typology presented by Labaki regarding FBO educational institutions may serve as a preliminary basis for such an endeavor though much more targeted data collection and analysis is required.

The literature review poses the following questions for further research:

1. How do FBOs view the Lebanese government’s social policies, and what is their relationship with the ministries of health and education? Addressing such a question would help in determining how they are able to shape public policies through the provision of social services.

2. What are the FBOs views and recommendations on how to strengthen citizenship through their school curriculum, namely teaching of religion and Lebanese history? And what are their views on unifying the history textbook? These related questions would be of use to assess if FBOs contribute either positively or negatively to building citizenship in Lebanon.

3. What type of structure do FBOs have (centralized, decentralized, etc), and what kind of decision-making processes exists? Addressing such a question would shed light on how FBOs view democracy and good governance.

4. How do FBOs perceive gender equality and women’s rights? How is this translated into their programmes and services? How does this translate into the way they work? Do their recruitment policies offer women similar opportunities and career paths? What values do they transmit? What is the ratio of female to male staff? And what is the number of women in decision making positions? How are women represented in leadership and higher representation circles within FBOs? Can women carve spaces and create voices to challenge patriarchal ways of working within FBOs?

IV. MAPPING OF FBOs IN LEBANON

IV.1 Features and methodology of the mapping

This mapping of FBOs in Lebanon was conducted as part of the research on the role of Faith Based Organizations in Lebanon’s public policy making. In addition to generating knowledge, one of the main purposes of this exercise was to frame a more comprehensive typology of FBOs in Lebanon and inform the process of case studies selection for the more extensive field part of the research.
The existing legal and administrative typology of organizations according to Ottoman Law 1909 on Political Parties and Associations in Lebanon points out to only two types of organizations namely political parties and non-political organizations (including NGOs, family guilds, and FBOs). This typology is not at all sufficient to tease out the size, profile and outreach of FBOs in Lebanon.

This matter is rendered even more complex given the multiple agencies that register NGOs and FBOs in Lebanon. The Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM) is expected and mandated to register the majority of CSOs/NGOs (including FBOs). However, many would also be registered with the Ministry of Youth and Sports (this would be the case of NGOs and FBOs focusing on youth and sports) whilst NGOs/FBOs formed as cooperatives are registered with the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.

This mapping exercise examines the activities of FBOs thus attempting to circumvent the hurdle of such multiplicity in registration.

This study was an on-going and iterative process envisaged to serve a number of objectives, namely:

1) Develop a database of FBOs in Lebanon involved in the health and education sectors;
2) Analyze the depth and breadth of their involvement in these sectors;
3) Identify relevant trends in ways of working, understanding and practice of citizenship and gender, outreach and involvement in social policies;
4) Inform the development of a typology of FBOs in Lebanon;
5) Inform the selection of the case study for the ensuing field work; and finally;
6) Serve as basis for future monitoring and documentation of information and trends related to FBOs in Lebanon.

The following outputs have been generated:

1. Sources of information on FBOs
2. An estimate of the number of FBOs
3. An overview of attributes, target population, range of interests of newly registered FBOs
4. An overview of health and educational activities of FBOs
5. Criteria and ideas for further in-depth analysis of FBOs

**Defining FBOs - Inclusion Criteria**

While there is no general consensus on a single accepted definition of Faith-Based Organizations, when the mapping study started, it used the following initial definition for categorizing an organization as an FBO:

- Organizations with specific values based on religious conviction, which pervade the organization's work and ethos.
• Organisations with a set of articles of faith, i.e., a set of “givens” determining what is “right” and “wrong” in certain situations.
• Organisations with an extensive network of co-religionists, who will, when needed, support the organisation as an expression of religious community.

(Bakewell & Warren, 2005)

From the global literature review, the following characteristics were also retained to identify an FBO (Ferris 2005:8):
1. Affiliations with a religious body
2. A mission statement with explicit reference to religious values
3. Financial support from religious sources
4. A governance structure whereby the selection of board members or staff is based on their religious beliefs or affiliation, and whereby decision-making processes are based on religious values.

In the course of constructing the mapping study covering the newly registered FBOs, and guided by accrued findings pertaining to the specifics of NGOs in Lebanon, the following criteria were used to construct the indigenous definition of FBOs based on which, subsequent case study selection was made:
1. The name of the organization should contain a clear mention of religion or confession or concepts that are by popular consensus regarded as faith based / faith inspired.
2. The objectives of the organization as articulated in the government notification / registration document contain a mention of a particular religion or confession or mention of objectives that are related to a particular religion / confession.

A third criterion was contemplated based on information generated from health and education institutions which highlighted the fact that there is a significant number of organizations that are founded by individuals of particular confession or pays allegiance to a political party of a particular confession. However, this criterion was later dropped as it proved to be subjective and inconclusive.

Another criterion was also entertained based on some of the findings of the mapping study. As such, an organization would be classified as an FBO if one of the founders is a member of the clergy. However, this was not a clear indicator of the nature of the organization and was therefore not applied in compiling the database. For example, one of the major NGOs in Lebanon, Mouvement Social, is founded by a priest but it operates as a non-sectarian organization. Thus, such a factor cannot be considered as a blanket criterion. Consequently assessments were made taking activities and culture of the organization as other criteria.

It should be noted that the mapping study also considered the case of confessionally based NGOs which are not out-right religious (such as for instance Amal and Hariri organizations). Such organizations do not have religious goals in their mission statement and are not limited to serving a particular community rather, they are set up by founders...
of a particular confession or have allegiance to a political party distinctly linked to a particular confession. We have retained this criterion as we have found it of critical importance in the case of FBOs active in the health and educational sectors.

As such, the above criteria were used as the foundation for a definition of FBOs in Lebanon as well as guiding rules for categorizing an organization as Faith Based Organization in the data base of FBOs registered between 1989 and 2007 hereafter referred to as newly registered FBOs (constructed by this research).

The time period considered for newly registered FBOs was adopted, as indicated earlier, from the year 1989 onwards due to lack of availability of official gazette prior to the selected year. This time period is nevertheless useful since it marks the registration of new organizations after the official end of the civil war that ravaged the country since 1975.

Finally, it should be noted that further refinements were made on the definition of FBOs. As such, associations that are academic affiliates of educational institutions run by FBOs (e.g. alumni associations or staff associations) were included as a separate category since they include a mix of faiths among their affiliated members (especially since FBO schools may employ staff or enroll students of a mix of faiths).

In summary, the following inclusion criteria were adopted for defining FBOs:
Name;
Objectives;
Activities;
Affiliation to a confessional political figure or institution.

Data sources used for accessing general information on FBOs included the following:
1) Official Gazette covering the period 1990-2009
2) FBOs websites
3) Listings available at the Ministry of Education (e.g. Guide to schools in Lebanon 2004-2005) and Ministry of Public Health (e.g. MoPH lists of hospitals and health services)
4) Other existing listings of FBOs and NGOs (e.g. list of hospitals registered with the Syndicate of Hospitals in Lebanon)
5) CRTD.A’s “Majal” monthly newsletter (especially the NGOs/FBOs monitor)
6) Press archives

Based on the above, the FBOs mapping study followed two parallel tracks:
1) A review and analysis of newly registered FBOs (1989-2007) to identify trends through analyzing identity and affiliation, objectives, sectors of involvement, etc…
2) A review and analysis of most prominent and established FBOs involved in health and education
IV.2 FBOs and the health sector in Lebanon

IV.2.1 The health sector in Lebanon: A case in point in state retrenchment

The key features and characteristics of the health care system in Lebanon are certainly in the overwhelming presence and role of the private sector as well as the predominance of tertiary care as exemplified in the relatively large number of hospitals all of which tend to be equipped with state of the art high-tech services.

Within the private health sector, FBO hospitals prevail both in terms of their number, level, quality and sophistication of tertiary services as well as the number of beds but not necessarily in terms of decentralized community outreach. In fact, one of the main findings of the mapping study is the fact that despite their significant resources and distinctive quality of care, FBO hospitals do not fare well with coverage and outreach when compared to the public sector facilities.

The Lebanese state has historically subsidized the private health sector mostly through contractual agreements between state institutions (the Ministry of Public Health, the armed forces, the national social security fund/NSSF, the civil servants coops, etc…) and tertiary care facilities. The criteria for selection of hospitals as recipient of government subsidies are actually beyond the scope of this research.

The public sector in Lebanon has always played a minor role in the provision of health care services. Historically, the private sector as well as non-governmental organizations and FBOs have been the major investors (NERA, 2003). The Lebanese civil war led to a further weakening of the ability and capacity of the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) to provide health services. This was coupled with an unregulated expansion in the services of the private sector, unjustified and substantial spending by the MoPH and an overall decline in the provision of primary health care services.

However, the Lebanese government attempted to reform the health sector after the end of civil war in 1990. This was translated in the implementation of a new strategy for MOPH in 1993. This strategy includes building and improving the quality of health services through existing Ministry-owned health care centers, setting up a major tertiary care facility in Beirut and enhancing the financing for health services. However, a few years after adopting this strategy, the MoPH’s problems persisted as expenditure continued to accumulate (World Bank, 2000).

Nevertheless, the Lebanese Economic & Social Council (ECOSOC) study of 2007 pointed out to some indicators of improvements in the health sector despite the persistence of critical endemic problems related to a lack of policy and investment as well as the poor quality of services and coverage (Nasnas, 2007).
The main problems that the ECOSOC report highlighted were as follows:

1. Substantial rise in spending on health without a concomitant improvement in the quality of services. Indeed, some 11.5 to 12.5% of the GDP is allocated to spending on health, a figure which is rather high compared to global standards especially given the poor quality of health services.

2. The role that the public sector plays in both financing and providing health services is minimal in comparison to the role of the private sector including FBOs.

3. Significant disparities in health care coverage provided by various insurance funds which generate varying benefit packages and uneven coverage of citizens.

4. High cost of average household spending on health services (almost 50% of household out-of-pocket spending is estimated to be on health care and services) thus creating a heavy burden on the poor.

5. The private sector, including FBOs, is the major player in the health sector and the main role of the government is to finance this sector rather than provide services and ensure egalitarian access. Indeed, the report states that “in terms of providing health care, the public sector accounted for less than 2%; the private sector bears the largest share of 89%, and other sources for the remaining balance” (ECOSOC, 2007: 357).

Financing health care in Lebanon

The main sources of financing of health care in Lebanon are identified as follows:
- The Lebanese government through the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Social Affairs
- A number of public social insurance plans such as the National Social Security Fund, the Civil Servants’ Cooperative and the Security Forces Fund
- Private companies
- Individuals

Funds provided directly by the public sector are administered by different ministries and various government bodies (see table 6). Moreover, different schemes are designed to target different groups of citizens. The ECOSOC report states that such heterogeneity in health programs generates discrepancy in the quality of health services and its related costs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Ministry in charge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Social Security Fund (NSSF)</td>
<td>Ministry of Labor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7 Percentage of Households covered by Type of Health Insurance in Lebanon 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Insurance</th>
<th>Percentage of Households Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Social Security Fund (NSSF)</td>
<td>17.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Servants Cooperative (CSC)</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uninformed</td>
<td>8.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Insurance</td>
<td>8.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Types</td>
<td>10.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Insured</strong></td>
<td><strong>45.90%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missing</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.80%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Un-Insured</strong></td>
<td><strong>52.30%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 7 shows that over half of the Lebanese population is not covered by any health insurance scheme thus reflecting the limited role of the government in securing health care, a basic right and entitlement, to all citizens. In other words, the figures show that more than half of the Lebanese have to pay the private sector for the cost of health care services.

**Unpacking the private health sector**

The private sector is a key player in the health sector which includes both not for profit and non-governmental organizations. This sector expanded considerably during the Lebanese civil war and remains by and large unregulated (World Bank, 2000). According to the same source, the total number of private hospitals in Lebanon is 165 of which 46 are affiliated to FBOs thus representing 27.8% of total private hospitals in Lebanon.
IV.2.2 Snapshots of FBO hospitals

Based on the data collection methodology described in the preceding section and on the FBOs database constructed by this research, the following factual and statistical information was gathered on the size and distribution of FBO hospitals (i.e. tertiary care facilities) compared to private non-FBO hospitals and public tertiary facilities.

Table 8: Distribution of hospitals in Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of hospital</th>
<th>Number and percentage of hospitals</th>
<th>Number and percentage of beds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>03 5472%</td>
<td>7324 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private non-FBO</td>
<td>95 55.5%</td>
<td>7139 40.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBO</td>
<td>46 27%</td>
<td>7854 44.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>545 533%</td>
<td>54323 533%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Distribution of FBO hospitals in Lebanon according to religion and geographical locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confession</th>
<th>Number and percentages of beds</th>
<th>Number and percentage of hospitals</th>
<th>Geographical concentration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>87% 88&gt;2</td>
<td>9&lt;6;7</td>
<td>Mount Lebanon, Baalbek, Beirut, North Lebanon, Nabatieh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>=7% ;;=;</td>
<td>&lt;3%; 8?</td>
<td>Beirut, Mount Lebanon, North Lebanon, Bekaa, Akkar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 722% =>;: 722% :<
Table 10: Distribution of Christian and Moslem FBOs in Lebanon according to confession and geographical location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confession</th>
<th>Number of hospitals</th>
<th>Number of beds</th>
<th>Geographical location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Christians</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0023</td>
<td>Beirut, Baabda, Metn, Kesrwan, Shouf, Akkar, Zghorta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronites</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5055</td>
<td>Beirut, Baabda, Metn, Jbeil, Kesrwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>Beirut, Aley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek catholic</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>Beirut, Zahle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek orthodox</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total Christians</strong></td>
<td><strong>8?</strong></td>
<td><strong>;;;=:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moslems</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>Baabda suburbs, Baalbak, Hermel, Bint Jbail, Nabatyeh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5701</td>
<td>Beirut, Baabda, Tripoli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>Shouf, Aley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total Moslems</strong></td>
<td><strong>7=</strong></td>
<td><strong>88&gt;2</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IV.2.3 Some key conclusions**

The selected figures presented above lead to a number of key conclusions related to the position of FBOs within the overall health sector in Lebanon. These findings are quite helpful in facilitating the analysis of the current and potential role played by FBOs in shaping, influencing or blocking particular social policies in this sector which represents one of the key pillars of citizens’ rights and social entitlements.

- The public sector is weaker in terms of number of facilities and beds when compared to FBOs. Yet, the public sector, notwithstanding its limited capacity and resources, is more evenly distributed geographically and with a wider outreach to peripheral and poorer areas.

- The proportion of Christian to Moslem FBO hospitals, both in terms of facilities and beds, is inversely proportional to the demographics of the population. This is largely due to the history of the genesis of FBOs within the socio-political context described in the preceding chapter describing the literature review. This same pattern transpired amongst the case studies which were selected for this research.
It is quasi impossible to uphold the key principle of universality of health coverage as a right and as an entitlement given the uneven quality of health care, the predominance of the private sector and the current prohibitive cost of health care. As such, both availability of and access to health care are major obstacles to citizen’s innate right to affordable and good quality health care.

The current distribution of tertiary FBOs facilities is a challenge to the common sense of economic feasibility and viability as such facilities cater to confessional communities rather than to specific geographical clusters. In other words, one is likely to find several FBOs hospitals and tertiary care facilities possessing state of the art technology within a small geographical area. The fact that each confession ought to have its state of the art technology and services has direct implication on costs and affordability.

IV.3 FBO Schools in Lebanon

Confessional institutions in Lebanon enjoy a constitutional right to set up their educational systems and services so long as it does not violate or destabilize public order and conform to statutory laws and regulations.

IV.3.1 Challenges facing Lebanon’s Educational Sector

The education sector in Lebanon was largely affected by the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990). During that period, schools were subject to frequent and even in some cases permanent closure because of repeated shelling and damage to the infrastructure. This situation undermined the overall quality of education as the ability of schools to function was continuously challenged. With the end of the civil war in 1990, the first attempts by the Lebanese government to reform the education sector was through building and reconstructing public schools. This materialized in building around 90 schools by the year 2004, all financed by the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CRTD.A, 2008).

However, according to Abou Chedid, Lebanon’s educational system has been largely affected by the confessional political system that limited its ability to become a tool for social integration (Abou Chedid et al: 2002). The Taef Accord of 1989 attempted to introduce reforms to the educational system through the unification of history text books and teaching civic education as a means for building a national identity that would create cohesion amongst various segments of the population, and through strengthening public schools. However, more than a decade after Taef, such reforms are yet to be implemented. A study on Lebanon’s schools found that the Ministry of Education was unable to introduce a standardized history book because of policy makers’ disagreement on the best approach to teach Lebanese history and politics. Moreover, teaching religion was another obstacle as the Ministry of Education was not able to develop a curriculum for religious teaching. As a result, religious teaching was by and large “privatized” as
private schools have the full liberty to choose whether or not to teach religion as well as the choice of religion and method of teaching with no official guidance from the Ministry (Ibid). This in fact has been common practice since Lebanon’s independence. Indeed, Lebanon’s post-independence constitution gives religious confessions autonomy in forming their own social, political and economic associations as well as providing their own religious teaching. As such, private confessional schools in Lebanon were allowed to teach their own version of Lebanese history and give religion classes accordingly. Further reforms were attempted in 1993 but were rejected by politicians and religious leaders alike. The 1993 failed educational reform proposal was substituted with yet another plan in 1995. The latter became known as “the new framework for education in Lebanon”. The new framework focuses on “...the structure, contents and styles of pedagogy of Lebanon’s curriculum”. A joint committee comprising university professors, policymakers from private and public schools and education policymakers from the center for educational research and development (CERD) developed the new framework for education in Lebanon which was officially endorsed by virtue of legislative Decree 12227, dated May 1997 (Abou Chedid et al: 2002: 5).

The new framework admittedly improve the educational sector in Lebanon as it led to the establishment of new public schools, a rise in the number of training programmes for teachers and a drastic change in the prescribed style of teaching. However, according to Abou Chedid, the failure to standardize history teaching in schools and the diversity and large autonomy of religious teaching remained a serious hindrance to the development of a unified national identity rather than the multiplicity of existing communal/confessional identities (Ibid).

Another key issue facing the educational sector in Lebanon is the size of allocation and investment from the national budget. According to Hamdan (2008), spending on education in Lebanon constitutes 11.4% of GDP; where households and the private sector cover 7% of that cost and the government covers the remaining 4.4%. The percentage that households cover is considered one of the highest in comparison to other countries such as the United States and France where this percentage is 2.2% & 0.4% respectively. Furthermore, although government spending on education saw an increase from 29% of total budget in 1973 to 39% in 2001, this was not necessarily translated into an improvement in the quality of education. It was rather paralleled with a rise in household spending on education from 8% in 1966 to 13% in 2001 (Ibid).
IV.3.2 Schools and school systems in Lebanon: An eclectic mix

According to CERD, Lebanon’s education system includes two types of schools:

a) Public, government-owned schools which budget is derived totally from the State treasury (1369 schools representing 49.6% of total schools and including 319871 students representing 35.6% of total students body); and

b) Private schools, themselves divided into two sub-categories (1389 schools representing 50.4% of total schools and including 576154 students representing 64.4% of total students body):
   i. Semi-free private schools which are not owned by the state but receive significant state subsidies
   ii. Fee-based private schools which are neither owned nor subsidized by the state

According to the above, there are almost as many government schools as private schools. However, only one third of students attend public, government-owned schools whereas the rest are enrolled in private schools. Thus, it is safe to assume that the private schooling system in Lebanon is the basis for education despite the fact that it is fee-based.

As indicated in the table below, a considerable proportion of “private schools” are actually FBOs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of school</th>
<th>Number and % of schools</th>
<th>Number and % of students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>5036 167%</td>
<td>056545 027%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private non-FBOs</td>
<td>532 057%</td>
<td>743444 037%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private FBOs</td>
<td>271 557%</td>
<td>030044 007%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7425 533%</td>
<td>563372 533%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FBO schools attract of the total of 54% of students enrolled in the private sector schooling system. Indeed, FBO schools have a significant outreach and enrolment capacity even though they may not reach the poorest and most peripheral areas. The distribution of Christian and Moslem FBO schools along with their students’ enrolment is detailed in the table below.
Table 12: FBO schools - Numbers and students enrolment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Number and percentage of schools</th>
<th>Number and percentage of students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moslem</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>722%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV.3.3 Snapshots of FBO schools

As in the case of FBO hospitals, the research produced a factual database of FBO schools which, given the multiplicity of sources of data and the all too often contradictions presented on the existing data, will contribute to informing future researches.

In this section, we will present highlights of the data collected.

Table 13: Numbers and students count of Moslem FBO schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confession</th>
<th>Number and percentage of schools</th>
<th>Number and percentage of students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>207%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>177%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>074%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14: Number and students of Christian FBO schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confession</th>
<th>Number and percentage of schools</th>
<th>Number and percentage of students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>1470%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>270%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syriac</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>005</td>
<td>533%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV.3.4 Some key conclusions

As in the case of FBO hospitals described in the section above, this following section will review some of the key conclusions and trends based on the overall figures and data compiled in the FBOs database.

- Private schools attract considerably more students in Lebanon. Of these, a considerable proportion is enrolled in FBO schools. This clearly indicates that a significant number and proportion of students, both male and female, are educated
according to FBOs values and systems of belief. Therefore, and given such and enrolment rate, FBO schools clearly play a major in education in Lebanon.

- Christian schools spread more or less all over the country including in geographical areas where Christian communities are small or even non-existent whereas Moslem schools tend to cluster in Moslem majority areas. In fact, there are practically no Moslem schools in Christian dominated areas.

- The reason for this disparity in geographical coverage by Christian versus Moslem schools may be due to the fact that Christian schools have preceded Moslem schools whereas most of the Moslem schools were set up during the civil war.

- Indeed, Christian schools were created and set up well before the geo-demographic fragmentation of Lebanon according to confessional lines as a result of the civil war. As such, Christian schools have enjoyed a historical advantage and consequently, a wider geographical coverage.

- Most Moslem schools were set up in historically neglected and marginalized areas with poor state services and infrastructure.

- FBO schools, both Christian and Moslem, tend to be located in high catchment and highly dense areas. Thus, they tend to be located in central areas and tend to be larger in size.

- In remote and peripheral areas, public and semi free schools prevail thus catering to the most disadvantaged. These however tend to provide mostly elementary and complementary education. As such, and despite their importance and wide coverage, FBO schools do not necessarily ensure right to education to all citizens especially not the most needy and deprived.

- There is a clear political affiliation of Moslem FBO schools (much less so in the case of hospitals and in the case of Christian schools). A similar trend is also noted amongst FBO universities.

.V. FBOs: A LEGAL OVERVIEW

IN PROCESS
VI. FBO STRUCTURE, DECISIONS, AND CULTURE

The sample of researched FBOs contains organizations of varying sizes and years of existence and experience, however, there are many similarities in their structures even if the ownership and services provided (whether health or education) differed.

This section looks into the internal governance structures of all participating FBOs, giving special attention to organizational structures, decision-making processes, transparency and participatory practices; then it looks at the external relations of the FBOs, whether inside or outside Lebanon; and finally describes the culture of the organizations researched, highlighting the extent to which the FBOs integrate religious/confessional identities into their decisions and daily practices.

VI.1 Governance

One of the major research questions that the twelve case studies looked into intended to delve into the internal governance structures of each organization. This actually serves two purposes: describing the set up of each establishment and supplying the general context within which each operates and shapes its policies and positions vis-à-vis the other areas that this study looks into, namely state policies, citizenship and gender issues.

VI.1.1 Governing bodies, organograms and by-laws

The ownership of the health and educational organizations covered in the case studies needs to be highlighted to enable the understanding of the organizational structures and decision making processes within each organization.

The ownership of the twelve organizations varied between a political party, a Maronite nuns’ order, three different Archbishoprics, a Patriarchate, the Sunni Dar al-Fatwa, the Higher Islamic Shiite Council and only three officially registered NGOs that fit under the definition of FBOs arrived at through the literature review and mapping study conducted by CRTD.A in earlier stages of this project.

Making by-laws available to researchers became quite a contentious issue on several occasions. Only five of the twelve establishments were willing to give copies to the researchers while four of them totally refused. The other three organisations either showed the researchers the by-laws on site but refused to give them copies while one researcher only received parts of the by-laws. The enigma surrounding either the refusal of handing out the by-laws or only allowing certain parts to be revealed on-site was often brought up during the debriefing sessions held throughout the course of the research. The
only feasible explanation reached was that the reticence of some organizations was due to the fact that in most of the cases there was skepticism on the part of participating organizations revolving around the purposes of the research and interest in conducting it. The withholding of by-laws actually reflects on the transparency of each of the organizations that denied the researchers this request.

Another issue that became apparent through the research process was the presence of organograms that often were not applied in practice. Under whatever nomenclature for governing bodies – boards, assemblies, councils or committees – most often the members are appointed by the head of the FBO. In some cases appointments and elections were combined and only in the case of the nuns were all members of the council elected, though by another nuns’ body.

In one particular case, there was no governing body at all! The clerical head had a priest represent him in the day-to-day activities of the FBO. There was another striking example of absolute power held by the head of the FBO where as Council of Commissioners has been “inoperative” for four years and the Clergy head undertook all of the Commissioners’ tasks on his own. In another case, the FBO by-laws stipulate that the board should hold a monthly meeting. However, it seems that such meetings are not being held since when the board chairman (who also holds an official function in the Confessional structure) showed the researcher the list of name of board members, he suddenly realized and was surprised to find out that there was the name of a woman on his board!

Some of the establishments have a two-tiered governing body. Despite such elaboration in organograms, the participants from such FBOs made it quite clear that the true power and decision making authority rested with the FBO head. This prompted a researcher to note that despite the fact that “the organogram mentions many departments and several bodies for decision making, one wonders whether this process is as institutionalized and sophisticated as it looks”.

Although expertise and professionalism seem to be required in all instances for upper management positions, it should be noted that even in establishments where there is total secular management, the sect of such lay people “coincides” with that of the FBO. The particulars of this observation will be further discussed in the next section on decision making.

VI.1.2 Decision making

In both Muslim and Christian organizations owned by a religious authority, the influence of the person who heads the authority is quite apparent. Although he/she may not be physically present at the site where each research took place, his/her personality and role loom large whenever issues related to structure, recruitment processes, or the organizational culture – to name but a few – were brought up in interviews and focus
group discussions. This does not in any way negate the fact that even in organizations headed by lay people the head enjoys similar authority and commands the respect of all the participants.

The centralization of power in the hands of the top person in the FBO was reiterated in most case studies, though in different ways. Examples include:

—The head of the organization has the final say in the appointment to higher level positions."

—The Board acts only as a rubber stamp.”

—Decisions such as hiring and exemption from fees are all taken by the Chairman of the Board.”

In the few cases where boards have more decision making powers, it is noted that the board is then made up of religious people. In such cases, all high ranking positions are filled by religious figures, leading us to look at it as “theocracy of the few.”

This intertwining and very intricate linkages between one theocrat (or several, as the case may be) in the managerial decision making in most if not all the establishments owned by religious authorities could in certain incidents reach the point where the theocratic elites overrule even small decisions taken by lower management and easily transgress communication lines established according to the organograms.

Theocratic encroachments aside, the two FBOs headed by secular people demonstrate exactly the same decision making behavior, with the political leader and/or president of the FBO described as the “first and last” decision maker.

Actually the recruitment policies and practices in all of the establishments studied appear to be very similar, only for top management positions, in minimal cases, and often all the way through to deciding on every single case of employment. In each case, the staff are mostly from the same sect -- or the same religion -- as the FBO, with few of them hiring from other religions but at lower levels of management.

**VI.1.3 Transparency and participatory practices**

Directly linked to the phenomenon of same sect staff and establishment, is the issue of how job opening are advertised (or not!), and how potential staff members are identified. Several cases are worth mentioning in this regard.

In certain instances, job seekers are told by a relative or friend to apply. Those applications are considered “voluntary applications” since they do not come in response
to an advertisement. Such applications are placed in the human resources data base for whenever there are suitable openings.

The issue brought up earlier regarding the establishments that refused to show or give some of the researchers a copy of the by-laws needs to be stressed here as part of the lack of transparency of the FBOs. The same applies to the decision making procedures where in some instances relationships tend to govern some decisions such as appointments as well as fee exemptions.

Another important topic pertaining to transparency that needs to be raised here is that of beneficiary exemptions from fees, especially that several of these establishments pride themselves on the fact that they cater for the poor and their religious ethics do not allow them to turn back a needy student or sick person.

The tendencies of not being as transparent as NGOs are generally expected to be as well as the mostly unilateral hierarchical decision making, impact on participatory practices within each organisation. Although present to varying degrees, none of the organisations revealed full participation whether in decision making or even taking part in annual planning processes whenever such a practice existed.

The minimal mention of participation in the interviews and case study reports not only confirmed the strict hierarchies of these organizations but also revealed that whatever types of participatory processes present were mostly rudimentary and stopped short of influencing any major policy or procedural changes within the organizations.

**VI.2 Relations and funding**

All the FBOs researched for this project have relations, both local and abroad, that in most cases benefit all parties involved in the relationship. Whether programme or policy oriented, the relations in most cases follow sectarian lines, although a few stand out for their multi-sect relations. More importantly, the relationships are inextricably linked with funding that it was virtually impossible to separate relations and funding into two different sections.

At the governmental level, all hospitals are associated to varying degrees with the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) since it is the accrediting body for all hospitals in Lebanon and the working standards at each hospital are defined by the MoPH. Over and above this critical relationship, MoPH covers the costs of needy patients. However, there is an annual ceiling set for such expenses by MoPH that varies each year.

Another government agency that seems to have a major role in the relationships of hospitals is the National Social Security Fund (NSSF). The Public Servants’
Cooperative (PSC) also has similar relations with hospitals. Both agencies cover medical bills to hospitals but in a different manner than the MoPH. While the latter pays the money directly to the hospitals, the former two have no financial transactions with any of the hospitals, but hand the money to the beneficiary. According to one participant, the coverage of the MoPH and NSSF is estimated at 90% of hospital patients, which puts those two governmental institutions among the most important bodies with which hospitals need to maintain relations. The particular issue of financial coverage from public institutions will be further discussed in the social policies part of this report.

On the other hand, the relations of schools with the public sector, are mostly with the Ministry of Education (MoE), the Centre for Educational Research and Development (CERD), and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA). The two ministries are sometimes essential in partially covering budgets. MoE contributes annually to the schools while MoSA covers the tuition costs of very poor and deprived children. Such relationships are not as smooth as the FBI schools would like them to be.

The relationship with CERD is of a different nature since in the wake of the Ta’if Agreement the government entrusted CERD with developing new curricula. After five years of work by a team of 350 people new textbooks were published beginning the school year 1997-1998. Several of the schools that participated in this project, reported that they collaborated with CERD in the development of the new curriculum.

Turning to the private sector and civil society including other FBOs and their institutions, the relationships struck up by the researched FBOs are definitely not as uniform as their relationships with governmental entities and vary according to confessional considerations as well as geographical locations. The information gathered in this particular area in all the case studies might not be exhaustive; still, it gives a clear idea of the typology of organizations each FBO seeks or feels comfortable with.

VI.3 Organizational Culture

The responses of case study participants and observations of the field researchers yielded more than direct answers to the research question pertaining to the integration of religious considerations into institutional decisions. Available data points clearly to the fact that religious/confessional considerations not only affect decisions but permeate all aspects of institutional life, creating in each of them a unique organisational culture. The ultimate example is found in a quote from a participant at Tell Chiha Hospital: “It was God’s guidance to build it here.”

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The mores and values within each institution often mirrored the Muslim and Christian principles of service to humanity and ethical standards required by both religions. All the institutions were proud of their religious identities. Despite this common pattern that exists in the twelve case studies, the differences in degrees of the religious identities and manners of expressing them is interesting enough to warrant some discussion here.

Some institutions revealed an open bias, if not a strict policy, to hire co-confessionals only.

Closely linked to the issue of employment is that of the dress codes found suitable for the staff in each institution. With very few exceptions, most of the organisations, both schools and hospitals, seem to take a strict view on dress code, more specifically the hijab, either in banning it or imposing it on female staff.

The services offered by these institutions, whether education or health, seem to have aspects of religious values attached to them. Examples such as what follows abound in the case studies:

“We are an Islamic society; therefore we have to serve everybody”

“We are a religious institution and cannot withhold service from anyone who needs it”

“What did Jesus do for us? Jesus went out to the community and healed the sick. So when you as a church are providing services it is one way of witnessing to the love of God. That is how I see it.”

Commitment to religious teachings also pervades when it comes to certain thorny issues regarding medical services, such as abortion, contraception, IVF, organ implants and euthanasia. Abortion is done only when the pregnancy threatens the life of the mother; contraceptive services are not provided; IVF is allowed only if the donor is the husband; organ implantation is allowed in some hospitals only if the organ is donated and not bought, and euthanasia is totally forbidden. Any such information available in all the case studies that looked into health institutions showed the same trend in this regard.

The schools that participated in the research do not have to face such life and death decisions. However, their positions regarding teaching of religion to students and the conduct of students and teachers clearly indicate, to varying degrees, the impact of religious teachings and manners.
What emerges out of the previous discussion is that common religious principles and values appear to be quite salient in most if not all organizations. Yet how does this reflect on the profile of the beneficiaries who receive the services from these organizations?

Satisfactory answers to such a question remained elusive throughout the research process. None of the organizations had any policies restricting “others” from benefiting from their services. They all used the value of helping humanity or teaching the new generations. The researchers could not spend time with the beneficiaries (neither was this planned anyway). Yet given that apart from the common service of humanity, each organisation one way or the other -- and to varying degrees -- exhibited its confessional identity in its policies, decisions and day-to-day conduct of affairs. Answering such questions becomes an interesting research venture.

VI.5 Thematic issues arising

Data related to FBOs governance and structure was collected from two sources. Factual data, figures and statistics were collected from the FBOs administration as well as public sources of information (e.g. websites, official publications, brochures, etc…). Yet, despite this being a straightforward matter, the researchers found difficulties in accessing financial data. Audited financial reports were either inaccessible or available for on-site consultation only. Gender disaggregated data was often not available simply because of the lack of awareness of having such data. Data disaggregated by confession were by and large not available perhaps owing to the taboo nature of confessionalism. Organigrammes, by-laws, internal constitutions, and other “legally required” documents were available and sometimes shared. However, the extent to which these were actually put in practice could not be investigated.

Participants from FBOs constituted the second source of first hand information. To be noted that participants were selected from various levels and specialization within the FBO. It is through them that the researchers gathered data and information about their own perception of the governance and structure of their FBOs and about what constitutes participation, democracy, consultation and good governance practices in these FBOs.

Four key themes were developed from this data and which summarize and conclude this chapter.

“Centralised decision making with partial participation”: Interviews, focus group discussions as well as direct observations indicated that most FBOs are very much hierarchical. Various forms of consultation do exist especially in what concerns technical issues. However, such consultations are not binding and do not follow clear or previously agreed mechanisms. Many participants indicated that the CEO or the Clergy has an ultimate say in most if not all decisions. Researchers noted that the CEO actually interferes in major policy issues as well as in day-to-day detail matters. Where a Board of Trustees or a Board of Director is present, it may not be operational or it may simply
act as a “rubber stamp”. Decisions are therefore highly centralized with one person acting as a reference on all matters related to the FBO. This person is either a clergy member or officially representing the confessional institution. This person is normally seen as safeguarding the interests and values of the confession.

“Confessional influence on institutional services and practices”: What the FBOs does or does not and the way it does it are all highly influenced and shaped by confessional values and dogmas. For instance, ethical issues are decided upon by confessional ethics committees which may include lawyers in their consultative and expert capacity. The head of the FBO or its spiritual guide are referred to directly to provide religious guidance on major and even mundane issues. Confessional considerations determine the types of services and the ways in which services are performed thus transcending considerations of rights and entitlements. Participants in fact perceive that the religious/confessional nature of their FBO is a source of comfort and reassurance to their clients rather than a constraint.

“Sectarian networks activated for mobilizing resources and services”: Data indicates that a significant part of the sustainability of the FBO is ensured through confessional networks. This can take various forms. Often, same-confessional communities in the diaspora are directly targeted and called upon to provide support. Confessional politics play a significant role in mobilizing resources namely through the support received from other same-confession organizations as well as governments. Of equal significance is the income received from the public (of the same confession) by means of meeting religious obligations. It is to be noted that such source of income can be used totally upon the discretion of the clergy with no obligation for transparency or accountability.

“Tolerance to practice one’s own faith with the approval of the dominant confession”: All participants pride themselves on being tolerant to other confessions. This essentially takes the form of providing services to individuals from other confessions, occasionally recruiting employees from other confessions (though not in key positions), and allowing “other religious practices to take place on one’s premises”. However, in doing so, the dominant confession of the FBO takes precedence over any other consideration. This form of tolerance is presented as a gesture of good will towards “the other”. It is a way by which participants perceive their confession to be superior by virtue of being presumably open.
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<th>CENTRALISED DECISION MAKING WITH PARTIAL PARTICIPATION</th>
<th>CONFESSIONAL INFLUENCE ON INSTITUTIONAL SERVICES AND PRACTICES</th>
<th>SECTARIAN NETWORKS ACTIVATED FOR MOBILISING RESOURCES AND SERVICES</th>
<th>TOLERANCE TO PRACTICE ONE’S OWN FAITH WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE DOMINANT CONFESSION</th>
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<tr>
<td>“The Board of Directors act as a rubber stamp, a safety valve for the Bishop to make sure that work follows his ethical/moral Guidelines.” (SGHMU, Interview 1)</td>
<td>“There is an ethics committee with a priest and lawyer which studies cases and problems that arise.” (Geitaoui Hospital, Interview 4)</td>
<td>“The US Foundation for SGUMH is trying to target Orthodox Lebanese to support the Hospital in supporting needy patients and expand services.” (St. George Hospital, Interview 3)</td>
<td>“The Muslims, if they want somebody to accompany them, if they know someone, if they have a Sheikh, they can ask for him. So they are being taken care of religiously. It is authorized.” (Geitaoui Hospital, FGD 1)</td>
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<td>“The Archbishop must know about each and everything especially when there are decisions to be made.” (Tell Shiha hospital, Interview 5)</td>
<td>“We are a Moslem society and our religious commitment reassures patients.” (Al Makassed Hospital, Interview 1)</td>
<td>“We have a protocol with the Hariri Foundation as well as with Al Makassed and the KSA government.” (Dar el Fatwa)</td>
<td>“Muslim students are free to choose, but at the same time parents who sign their children up for school here know that it is a church, a Christian school, a school that instills Christian values.” (St. Rita, Interview 5)</td>
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<td>“The Hospital is related to the Shiite Higher Council represented by the CEO. Everything goes through the CEO.” (Al Zahra Hospital, interview 1)</td>
<td>“The ethical guidelines of the hospital come from being a Greek Orthodox institution. Actually we did something that the Catholics have not, namely IVF.” (SGMUH, Interview 9)</td>
<td>“We collaborate with a shop which provides us with supplies. When we asked why this shop, we were told that he is related to the President of the association and gives us 50% discount.” (Al Makassed Hospital, FGD 2)</td>
<td>The teaching of the subject of religion in Al Irfan, enhances our students’ understanding of citizenship concept because the textbooks that we devised and produced focus on the common universal ethical values and norms that are present in all religions of the world.” (Al Irfan, Interview 2)</td>
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<td>The Board of Trustees is currently not operational and the Mufti undertakes this role.” (Dar el Fatwa, Interview 2)</td>
<td>“We refer to His Eminence on Sharia related matters.” (Al Kawthar, Interview 1)</td>
<td>“Al Amal al Tarbawiyya receives an amount of money called Khums with delegation from Ayatollah Sistani. Money from Al Amal al Tarbayiiah friends is also given during annual</td>
<td>“Religious classes and mass are an important component for awakening the faith amongst students.” (St. Rita School, Interview 3)</td>
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<td>“The board of directors plays a major role.” “As head of Amal movement, Nabih Berri is the final decision maker who sets the directions and educational policies of the organization.” (Al Amal al Tarbawyiiah, Interview 1)</td>
<td>“Several sports activities are not possible for religiously committed girls. Girls cannot take part in the Marathon with their long skirts and traditional attire.” (Al Irfan, FGD 1)</td>
<td>“Grants and donations are secured from the West especially friends of the Druze community.” (Al Irfan, Interview 3)</td>
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<td>“The Archbishop is the Chair of the school and has ultimate decision making power over education, moral and ethical aspects of school life.” (St Rita School, Interview 1)</td>
<td>“We need to be realistic. Al Irfan was founded within the framework of the Druze faith meaning that it has a specific identity that is not accessible to others despite our openness to all sects in Lebanon.” (Al Irfan, FGD 1)</td>
<td>“The school received assistance from Caritas and World Vision.” (St Rita School, Interviews 3 and 4 and FGD 1)</td>
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<td>“Sayyed Fadlallah is on top of the hierarchy and the ultimate reference and decision maker.” (Al Kawthar, Interview 1)</td>
<td>“The organization counts on income from Khums. Many Iranians give their Khums to the Imam and he channels part of it to the organization.” (Al Kawthar, Interview 1)</td>
<td>“With regards to the religion book, we had an experience with the Catholic schools. We developed a book with all the religious holidays and we explained them all.” (Al Makassed schools, Interview 1)</td>
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VII. FBOs, THE STATE AND PUBLIC POLICIES

The relationship between the participating FBOs and relevant state ministries and other agencies and state institutions was briefly described in the previous chapter. This chapter takes a closer look at this relationship by investigating FBOs views on the relationship and the importance (or lack) of having such relations. Then this chapter turns to FBOs views on various pertinent public policies, including the dichotomy between the private and public sectors and its impact on differential rights and entitlements. Finally the chapter looks at how FBOs impact public policies, the opportunities they have to do so and the challenges they face.

The legal status of FBOs outlined in the legal analysis that took place as part of this project on Faith, Social Activism and Politics indicates that ever since the Ottoman rule of Lebanon, the dichotomy between the legal status of religious entities and the state was established. Muslim religious authorities were part of the state, while authorities of other religions were recognized under the millet system which referred to non-Muslim religious minorities that enjoyed autonomy but were protected by the Ottoman state. This dichotomy was further encouraged under the French mandate and has been adopted by independent Lebanon up to this day. In other words, Muslim authorities are part of the State, and Christian authorities are totally independent of it.

This dichotomy should be mentioned here since it reflects on some of the participating FBOs in this study.

VII.1 FBO-State relations: Often strained but maintained

As mentioned in the previous chapter, financial relationships and transactions seemed to be of primary importance between the state and most of the participating FBOs. The major two complaints about financial aspects of the relationship were that the ministries delayed payments, although all the FBOs admitted that such payments would eventually be received. In any case, and according to many participants, these payments were perceived to be insufficient and poorly calculated. The other complaint, especially mentioned by hospitals, was the multiplicity of state entities they had to deal with in the financial coverage of patients.

The fact that the MoPH seems to be the poorest insurer of patients revealed a dilemma that many hospitals have to face. They need to make sure that their patients have enough funds to cover their treatment, but if, usually very poor, patients did not get enough financial coverage they are advised to seek financial support from a co-confessional FBO, religious institution or even political leaders (St. Georges Hospital case study). Such advice only strengthens the confessional referral system and tightens
the control of religious authorities, FBOs and political leaders over people from the same confession. This automatically weakens the already fragile State and makes the dual loyalty to country and confession an endemic reality.

        Whenever participants mentioned that they had positive relations with relevant ministries, this was qualified by a statement of sorts.

        Distance from the capital also seems to have an effect on the way state ministries and public institutions are viewed.

        The only state institution, whether concerned with health or education, that did not get as many criticisms as the others, was the Centre for Educational Research and Development (CERD). The fact that different representatives of various schools took part in the curricular overhaul that CERD undertook made many participants speak positively about the institution. Whether this positivism was due to the participation of many organisations in the process or because the new curricula were really improved as a result was not ascertained but obviously the mere fact of participation made several participants from the different schools in this study more familiar with what is taking place at CERD and felt they were actual stakeholders in and owners of the process, rather than only recipients of new curricula to apply in their teachings.

        However this positivism did not apply when it came to discussions of the history curriculum. Here, as will be shown in the next section, the sectarian schism in Lebanon has fertile grounds to develop and cause further drifting apart.

\textbf{VII.2 State policies: The pros and cons}

\textbf{VII.2.1 Educational policies}

        One of CERD’s major attempts was to unify the history textbooks to be taught in all schools of Lebanon. This attempt was strongly resisted by different actors and up to this day, each school teaches its own version of the history of Lebanon. The different “histories” of Lebanon that are being taught now ultimately impact the notion of citizenship that is discussed in the next chapter. In this chapter only the differences in views of the participants about such differences are discussed.

        Even though participants from most FBO schools agree, in principle, that there should be unified history textbooks for Lebanon, the views they express on what is the “true” version are so divergent thus making it impossible to envision a unified version in the foreseeable future.
The lack of a unified history for Lebanon in the various applied curricula gave rise to each confession teaching its own views of history and events that it considers of significance while others do not.

The participants did have some kind words for certain public policies. However, most of the policies were the ones that favored their institutions or gave them more autonomy. For example, Law 515 passed in 1996 giving private schools the right to raise tuition fees as long as they do not exceed the sum of teachers’ salaries and expenses was viewed positively.

Declaring standardized days off for religious and national holidays and distributing calendars to the students to explain the significance of such holidays was also positively viewed. The participants view this as conducive to “better understanding, mutual respect and tolerance” between students of different confessions.

Criticism was voiced about setting school starting age at four, since the schools that abide by such a policy lose out to schools that do not. There are many parents who would rather send their children at the age of three. Under the circumstances, the participants who voiced such criticisms said that when the state decided on something it should have the power to enforce it on everybody, rather than turning a blind eye on such violations.

### VII.2.2 Health policies

Discussions with participants from FBOs engaged in health services regarding health policies were significantly shorter and more to the point than those regarding education. Probably this was a result of what many of them viewed as “an absence of a public health policy” and “the state’s total neglect of the health sector.”

Otherwise, discussions mainly revolved around the multiplicity of state health social insurers and its impact on the patients as well as the hospitals themselves. Unanimously, this system was viewed as very irksome to hospitals and that changes should be introduced to streamline it.

Also on the negative side, several participants viewed that the Ministry of Public Health should stop acting as a third party and strengthen its role instead in establishing general health policies, coherent planning and standardized prices for health services as well as contribute to regulating the medical professions. Standardizing prices and fee-for-services seems to be an urgent issue as it was echoed often by hospital participants.

Participants were also wary of the growth of private hospitals that grow “like mushrooms”, viewing this as a problem that should be addressed in the state health
policy. They also viewed that another aspect that required improvement was quality assurance to ensure the provision of “care in a secure way, without risks for the patient.”

VII.3 The dichotomy: Public vs. private sector services

Whereas the dichotomy and tension between the private and public sectors is a global phenomenon, the case of Lebanon is particularly interesting given the intersections between confessional, class and political identities as well as the nature of the State in Lebanon and its historical retrenchment from the provision of social entitlements and basic rights to citizens.

This section examines the views and insights of participants on the dichotomy between the public and the private sectors which, as the reader will notice, is laden with value judgment and possibly informed with the ways in which FBOs would position themselves vis-à-vis the State with this position being very much related if not determined by that of their respective confession.

As such, this section will explore informants’ views on the role of the public sector as a duty bearer and the impact it has on differential social entitlements and citizens as rights claimants and the implication and impact on their unfettered access to their rights and entitlements.

VII.3.1 Views on who is better

Overall, most participants are convinced that there is a significant, and even irreversible, gap between the private and public sectors in terms of quality of services with the private sector almost unanimously believed to be delivering consistently better quality services. According to some participants, the private sector is seen as “the locomotive of progress” whilst public schools are regarded as being “static” despite the fact that “public schools teachers have more advantages than their peers in private schools”. Nevertheless, participants believe that complementarity between the two sectors is necessary. What is exactly meant by complementarity was not elaborated any further.

Other participants are even more critical in their views of the public sector. Indeed, some participants indicated that the public sector is least likely to improve because of ongoing political instability. Others indicated that the public sector suffers from rigid policies and is unable to monitor, control or even follow-up its own services and institutions. Other participants further maintain that quality control, staff development and space for dialogue are distinguishing features of the private sector.
VII.3.2 Impact of differential social entitlements

Participants had diametrically opposed views on the role of the public sector as a duty bearer. Whereas according to certain participants, the public sector should be the main provider of educational services with the private sector playing a minor supplementary role, other participants believe that the public sector should totally retrench from education in favor of the private sector.

In terms of the key concept of *Health for All*, participants indicated that this is not being applied by the public sector in view of its limited services, outreach and resources and given the absence of a national health policy. Furthermore, the same participants feel that the public sector fails in delivering its promises and moreover, it takes “wrong decisions which affect citizens negatively”. The same participants believe that by not paying its dues to the private sector, the public sector directly undermines the extent, quality and coverage of health services offered to citizens. In other words, patients covered by the public sector (i.e. the Ministry of Health) end up receiving worse quality health services given that they have no choice but to be covered by the worst insurer! In addition, most participants agree that the public sector is almost totally unable to cover the needs and entitlements of all citizens.

Similar views were expressed on the key concept of *Education for All*, as most participants seemed to believe that the public sector is not fulfilling its role in securing Health for All as a basic right for all citizens. This right is further undermined by the perceived poor quality of public education which is seen to undermine the life chances of poor citizens. For many respondents, children of poor families enrolled in public schools receive sub-standard quality education thus perpetuating a situation of a “permanent under-class of citizens”.

Most participants maintain that the private sector is the main actor in the provision of health and education for all and has no choice but to fill the significant gap left by the public sector. However, and upon probing, it is evident that cost recovery is an issue that determines quality and coverage of services within the private sector thus influencing to a large extent the availability and accessibility of social entitlements to all citizens.

VII.4 Impacting public policies: Alone or through unlikely alliances?

VII.4.1 Impacting educational policies

Overall, participants were by and large taken aback by the question on impacting public policies. This was especially the case of participants from educational FBOs.
This may be due to the fact that no matter what the policy is or is not, FBOs have enough leeway and space for maneuver that would allow them to overcome or circumvent any challenge caused by inconvenient or inexistent policies. As such, there were hardly any contributions or illustrations on how educational FBOs would seek to influence public policies! However, some participants believe that their FBO is setting the tone for public policies.

More generally, participants indicated that their institutions would revert to collaborative work with similar organizations to be able to have their voices reach the relevant state institutions. For educational establishments, obviously the Teachers’ Syndicate of Lebanon was the proper vehicle to voicing teachers’ demands and getting their way both with the State as well as vis-à-vis their own institutions. Despite the politicization of most Syndicates and Unions in Lebanon, participants from different FBOs, and as such from different confessions, make equal use of that instrument for collectively demanding their rights. For other issues however, other mechanisms that apparently had some success in negotiating with the state were mentioned.

Similarly, necessity makes for strange bedfellows, and obviously the need to impact certain policies has forced several of these institutions (though of different confessional backgrounds) to come together to affect some change. The Union of Private Schools seems one such mechanism where private and FBO schools of all confessions meet to discuss their issues with the state and take joint action often entailing challenging the State. Of interest here is that the Union is still not a registered entity and has no by-laws. Hence there has to be consensus on any decision that has to be followed up with the state since there are no stipulations regarding voting. Field observations carried out throughout this research, as well as informal discussions with FBO school leaders who meet within the framework of the Union seem to point out to some consensus on leading figures within the Union who benefit from the group’s trust despite confessional and often political differences and divergences.

Unfortunately, instead of using this existing and apparently functional body to initiate and undertake some major initiatives to improve state educational policies, the priority of the Union seems to have been set on claiming delayed contributions from state ministries and maintaining a unified front to face the financial demands of teachers. Otherwise, very punctual actions and achievements were scored by the Union such as for example convincing the Ministry of Education to have private school teachers participate in preparing questions for the official exams Brevet and Baccalaureate.

**VII.4.2 Impacting health policies**

Apart from the Union of Private Hospitals and the various professional unions such as the medical and nursing syndicates, the hospitals have not formed various lobbying mechanisms or networks like those established by the schools. If there are other
such mechanisms, it seems that they are minor since nothing of the sort was reported by any of the hospital participants in the case studies.

Such a situation mostly results in not being able to, and not even caring about, changing existing policies. This was the position reported by many participants where State policies were criticized, often harshly, but hardly any constructive alternative was presented. For participants another FBO (itself officially considered as state-owned institutions having and operating health establishments which work more as private sector entities) the issue was a non-issue, probably due to the official links that the FBO already has with the State by virtue of its legal status.

VII.5 Key policy themes emerging

The issue of FBOs and their relation to and influence on public policies is one of the four thematic pillars of this research. It has presented challenges which were of a different nature than the three other pillars. Indeed, the main two starting point of this theme are the fact that: a) in the case of rights and social entitlements, state policies are in fact non-existent and as such, the act of influencing would actually mean working for developing state policies from scratch rather than reforming something that already exists; and b) the legal and administrative relationship between FBOs and the state being significantly different by virtue of the religious affiliation of the FBO, which actually means that access and modes of influence, where they exist, would be markedly different.

In analyzing the data that was gathered in this section, five policy related themes emerged as almost constant amongst FBOs and despite the two confounding variables detailed in the preceding paragraph. A selection of quotes is annexed to this chapter in a thematic matrix to provide the reader with illustrations on each of these themes.

“Public provider stigma in absence of state policies”: For participants from both Muslim and Christian FBOs, the superiority of the private sector over the public sector was a strong conviction. In both health and education, the services of the public sector were often described as being of poorer quality with limited coverage and outreach. The public sector was seen as rigid and unable to improve. In addition to having poorer quality services, the public sector was also accused of jeopardizing the private sector through the lack of national policies or what is perceived to be faulty policies and practices such as poor regulation of the medical profession, poor monitoring, and protracted payments.

“Different strategies to influence policies”: Notwithstanding the inexistent and/or faulty policies, FBOs seem to have been able to devise various mechanisms and strategies to influence policies which are of direct relevance or usefulness to them. Existing coordination networks and bodies, both formal and ad hoc, have proven to be instrumental for dialoguing with the State or even challenging decisions or expressing dissent with various degrees of achievement and success.
“A convenient absence of national state policies”: The absence of state policies is not always bad for FBOs as it seems to have provided quite a lot of space for independent and often unregulated ways of working. Although most respondents expressed strong criticism and at times anger about this, many have however acknowledged that this has allowed private/individual initiative to flourish. It has also reinforced the conviction of some that service provision should be totally within the realm of the private sector, in this case FBOs, with the State playing only a minor regulatory role as well as that of a financier. As will be discussed later on in the Citizenship chapter, this is by far one of the most worrying of findings as it has critical implications on further the fragmentation of an already weak state as well as the total “confessional privatizing” of rights and entitlements.

“Cooperation and mutual support with public institutions”: Amidst the uneasy relations with the public sector and the over-arching concern with ensuring that the latter meets its financial obligations towards FBOs. These organization have nevertheless maintained some form of useful relations and entry points with public institutions. Clergy leaders and political leaders where appropriate, are resorted to facilitate or resolve problems or blockages encountered with public institutions. The data pointed out to few yet interesting illustrations of some FBOs taking an initiative to jointly collaborate with relevant Ministry to introduce a mini-policy which relevance and usefulness would have national outreach beyond the FBO in question, . This example notwithstanding, the data also shows that through permeating and penetrating state structures, confessions and their representatives actively contribute to state fragmentation and to conflicts of interest.

“Circumventing policies through customization”: The prerogatives with which confessions and their social institutions are endowed with have probably given FBOs significant freedom to circumvent policies through customizing their services the way they see fit and in keeping with their confessional beliefs and interests. The most poignant cases here are the cases of educational FBO where total freedom in customizing critical aspects of the curriculum, especially in what concerns religious, history and civic education, actually serve to strengthen confessional identities which would have been otherwise mitigated if not muffled by national state policies.

The inter-connection and obvious coherence between the five emerging policy-related themes are glaring. The themes point out to awareness and acknowledgment, and at times resentment, of the absence of state policies and its negative implications. However, insidious political and working relations are maintained with the state through confessional links whilst at the same time using the space and void created to strengthen the independence and freedom of FBOs.


## POLICIES THEMATIC MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PUBLIC PROVIDER STIGMA IN ABSENCE OF STATE POLICIES</th>
<th>DIFFERENT STRATEGIES TO INFLUENCE POLICIES</th>
<th>A CONVENIENT ABSENCE OF NATIONAL STATE POLICIES</th>
<th>COOPERATION AND MUTUAL SUPPORT WITH PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS</th>
<th>CIRCUMVENTING POLICIES THROUGH CUSTOMISATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“The obstacles are financial. State policies are wrong. Those who have no insurance or coverage cannot be treated. The state pays a lot of money but in a wrong way.” (Geitaoui hospital, FGD 1)</td>
<td>“At the level of the state, yes we can interfere. But I think it is always on an individual basis not at the level of the institution as such because in Lebanon, we have several communities.” Geitaoui hospital, interview 7</td>
<td>“There is a total absence of a health policy in Lebanon” (Al Zahra, Interviews 1 and 8)</td>
<td>“Anytime something does not work, we go to the Archbishop. He has contacts everywhere. He can directly call the Ministry or anybody else. He is important.” (Tell Shiha hospital, Interview 2)</td>
<td>“The curriculum which is not compulsory is revised by our experts. We keep them if they are good or useful or we revise them such as the religious and history textbook.” We added in history material on the “Palestinian issue.” (Al Kawthar, Interview 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“If you had a health system or policy that would safeguard the rights of doctors, you would not see such chaos. The Syndicate still admits new doctors with poor credentials.” (Tal Shiha, FGD 1)</td>
<td>“Our umbrella is the public sector. We try to improve things without necessarily saying that the Ministry’s curriculum is bad.” (Al Makassed, Interview 2)</td>
<td>“The State should not be involved in the provision of education. This should be entirely left to us.” (Al Makassed School, Interview 1)</td>
<td>“We mostly receive Social Security and Ministry patients. Less from the Ministry because they have a financial ceiling.” (Geitaoui Hospital, FGD 2)</td>
<td>“Irfan improvised within the new educational plan framework in relation to training of teachers and implementation of several aspects of the new curriculum and educational methodology.” (Al Irfan, Interview 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Public hospitals are weak and they function more like dispensaries.” (SGMUH, Interview 6)</td>
<td>“Our membership in the Hospitals’ Syndicates allows us to influence policies.” (Dar el Fatwa, FGD 1)</td>
<td>“The only matter that counts is individual initiative.” (Tal Shiha, FGD 1)</td>
<td>“Our hospital was the first to launch a breast cancer campaign adopted by the Ministry of Public Health.” (SGMUH, Interview 4)</td>
<td>“Being a Catholic school first, and depending on the Archbishopric, we have a catechism period in each grade.” (St. Rita School, Interview 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The state has a rigid system which is not flexible. Every employee thinks he has power over others. There is no control or penalty for wrong doing.” (Makased hospital, interview 2)</td>
<td>“As a well known establishment, we send our suggestions to the Ministry through the hospitals’ syndicate.” (Al Zahra Hospital, Interview 2)</td>
<td>“We do not have a relation with the State. We a have a stronger and much more important relation with the Catholic Schools Network.” (Saint Rita School, Interview 1)</td>
<td>“The Ministry’s system is useful for hospitals as it links income with meeting certain standards based on the results of the Ministry’s control mechanisms.” (Al Zahra, Interview 2)</td>
<td>“We are tied to the official curriculum. But in many classes, we can add or remove subjects according to teachers’ judgment.” (St. Joseph schools, Interview 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Relations with the state are always</td>
<td>“We try to improve things not just for us but</td>
<td>“Even the Minister knows that there is no</td>
<td>“Each sector has its role and should not</td>
<td>“We assume that the national curriculum is</td>
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characterized by insufficiencies, lack of money, not enough inspection, or computerization, no coordination amongst ministers, and the curriculum is not fully implemented.” (Al Amal al Tarbawyiah, FGD 3)

for everybody as a general policy. What the syndicate tries to achieve something, it is not just for Tel Shiha hospital but for the medical body in general. We did reach one good thing and that is to standardize medical fees amongst all insurers.” (Tell Shiha hospital, FGD 1)

health policy in Lebanon” (Dar el Fatwa, Interviews 2 and 3)

overlap with the other. The relation with the Ministry is fine except when it comes to payment.” (Al Makassed Hospital, Interview 1)

the minimum requirement. We cover it and add extras such as religious teaching where we produce our own religion textbooks. In our textbook, we include our pan-Arab and Islamic vision which is different from secular schools.” (Al Makassed school, Interview 3)

“There are no supervisory visits or follow-up procedures from the Ministry of education towards Al Irfan or any other private school.” (Al Irfan, FGD 2)

“Private schools are always working on improving the situation, Unlike public schools.” (St. Joseph school, FGD 1)

“There are contracts with the Ministry of Health and other third party payers including the armed forces and the civil servants coop.” (Dar el Fatwa, Interview 1)

“The Minister works with public schools, we saw the public schools. They are nothing in Lebanon. They do not have languages or good educational programmes. They are on a lower level than private schools.” (St Rita school, interview 3)

“Private schools play an important role in improving policies and services of public schools in view of the high level of competition.” (Makassed school, Interview 1)

.VIII. FBOs AND CITIZENSHIP

The issue of citizenship, both as a concept and in practice, was a critical category of investigation of this research. In this chapter, the research explores the FBOs’ perceptions and understanding of the meaning of citizenship and the ways in which this understanding is reflected in the organizations’ policies and practices. It is believed that this perception is influenced by confessional identities which in turn are transmitted to FBOs’ clients and constituencies thus shaping their understanding of citizenship and their relation with the state.
The idea that citizenship should be inclusive seems to be a contradiction in terms because our commonsense understanding of what citizenship means is that it is a status signifying membership, belongingness and identity. Often conflated with having a nationality, citizenship seems to imply automatic belongingness (and therefore rights and obligations) by virtue of having been born into a territorially defined nation-state. However, upon a closer examination we find that the history of ‘citizenship’ is far from being inclusive; it is a history of social exclusions and conscious and unconscious discrimination which translate into differential rights. These are based on the terms upon which belongingness is constructed and how our other identities - being a man or woman, belonging to particular class, religion and/or confessional group, having different sexualities - define who we are and subsequently what our social entitlements would or should be.

Broadly defined, the term ‘citizen’ connotes someone with rights and therefore imbued with dignity in and for themselves and not because they happen to be rich, powerful, belonging to a certain religion or confession or related through gender or other social relations, to more powerful groups in society. It also connotes that the person has the possibility to act, to contribute to society and to have a voice and a say. Thus citizenship is a way of defining personhood which links rights to agency (Kabeer 2002), but its history and present day practice is one of denial of rights and, therefore, agency of specific categories of people in every society.

Social institutions, both public (state, international agencies) and private (as in family, kinship and community and including in this case Faith Based Organizations), are often the gate-keepers in providing access to freedoms and deciding on entitlements.

Inclusive citizenship cannot be built without ‘active citizenship’. Thus citizenship from the point of view of agency implies investigating conceptions of justice and rights in the thick of engagements by claimants, how this expands the notions of rights and entitlements and in the process changes (even though incrementally) the rules of powerful institutions and the subjectivity of claimants.

In addition to an overall confusion as to what citizenship actually means, participants connected it to religious and confessional identities and allegiances. An identity crisis was noted amongst many a respondent where people were conscious of and keen on their confessional identity yet they remained somehow aware of the ways in which this confessional identity undermines a broader identity entailing a sense of belonging to a nation.

Of serious concern is the fact that hardly any respondent was aware of the importance of the relation between citizens and the state and the position of each as respectively rights claimant and duty bearer respectively. An important element in this relation, namely taxation and the ensuing accountability of state institutions, was not alluded to even by high level leadership and decision makers in the selected FBOs. In
fact, and in few cases, respondents were advocating for a further irreversible retrenchment of the state in favor of a more privatization of services for the benefit of confessional institutions.

**VIII.1 Perceptions and understandings of citizenship**

The concept of citizenship seems to be understood differently by the participants in all case studies. Often, it was discussed defensively, with the aim of proving to the field researchers that the participants’ respective FBOs served all confessions; in other words, citizenship means inclusion, tolerance and openness to other confessions!

However, this practice of serving people of all faith may be applied at the level of services and clientele but not as much in terms of recruitment.

In many instances, citizenship was mixed up with providing services to the poor and needy. This is seen as being in harmony with religious values and principles which promote charity and good will to all people.

In the particular case of health FBOs and given their overarching concern with cost recovery for their patients, citizenship right was almost totally equated with the right to health insurance and coverage.

“everybody should have insurance. This is a basic right. People are stripped off their insurance coverage at an age when they need it most. The basic principle of the National Social Security Fund is that healthy people should help in paying for health care of the less healthy and most disadvantaged.”

Certain participants expressed rather pessimistic views about citizenship indicating that “there is no such thing called citizenship in Lebanon and this is related to the history of the establishment of Lebanon solely on the basis of confessional identities”. For the same respondents, “links with and allegiance to foreign countries in order to overpower fellow citizens can only undermine the understanding and practice of citizenship.”

In one particular instance, participants made a blanket statement regarding the behavior of people as being indicative to a lack of citizenship. According to them: “Citizens are not loyal to their institutions. They will not hesitate to steal whenever they have the chance. Their loyalties to their institutions are in fact loyalties to political leaders and their external/foreign links”.

The politics of confessional identities overshadowed the real issues pertaining to citizenship. Several participants from different FBOs blamed the fragmented citizenship of Lebanese people on the State itself since it does not take a clear position vis-à-vis
citizenship. Others were blunter, stating that the adulation of political leaders, equated to paganism, does not foster citizenship; or that the discourse of politicians on citizenship is “only lip service,” thus entrenching a confessional system that reinforces inequality between citizens and that political leaders decide whether communities should get close to each other or otherwise.

In a couple of case studies the word „citizenship” was met with “surprise,” “awe” or from the more open participants with: “New question, I never had it before!” One respondent even found the matter laughable!

With such confusion in the understanding of citizenship, the dilemma of a unified history of Lebanon is evoked. Actually the latter could have been one cause for this vagueness regarding issues of citizenship.

The slogans of Health for All and Education for All were often mentioned in conjunction with citizenship. So all in all, it seems that welfare, social service provision and religiously-based charity are the main pillars of the understanding of citizenship amongst most participants.

**VIII.2 Translating citizenship into practice**

With such confused concepts and vague understandings of citizenship, the issue of translating the citizenship concept in the work of each FBO yields another mosaic of various activities, often unrelated one-off events which, at least in the minds of participants, related to citizenship.

At times emphasis on student’s behaviour, respect, tolerance and human values was mentioned. If the mention of equal employment opportunities came up, then this would soon be qualified with “except at higher levels”; or in a more straightforward manner: “We have merit based recruitment, but this comes after confessional considerations”. When the qualification was not made explicit, other questions or the field researchers’ observations revealed that this was the case anyway.

**VIII.3 Policies that work and others that do not**

There was a consensus amongst most of the FBO participants who were interviewed that there is a glaring absence of any form of public policies that encourages a common understanding of citizenship.

Amongst health FBOs, there was a quasi agreement that Lebanon lacks a national policy that ensures “Health for All”.

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For some participants, the Ministry of Public Health may say that it supports Health for All but at the end of the day; it does not foot the bill leaving patients at the mercy of third party payers. Health care thus becomes, according to them, less accessible for the needy. Such statements however, are somehow contradictory with information given about FBOs ensuring that all patients are cared for regardless of their financial means.

Participants from education FBOs pointed out that a starting point would be to agree on a unified history book.

However, several participants also indicated that the current civic education book they use is more or less useless in terms of contents and methodology and it is an irrecoverable and missed opportunity for transmitting values of citizenship.

**VIII.4 Thematic issues arising**

As indicated earlier in this chapter, citizenship was not only a confusing concept for participants, it was also discomforting and destabilizing at times. The research methodology had intentionally stipulated that no definition or clarification would be given to participants beforehand to stir the discussion; rather the participants would be expected to share their own intimate understanding of citizenship and its application within their FBO. The data gathered and its subsequent analysis led to the emergence of four citizenship themes which will be unpacked here. The reader can refer to the attached thematic matrix for a selection of additional quotes and illustrations.

“Citizenship linked to confessional identities:” Despite their best intention to transcend confessional boundaries and mindsets, most participants linked citizenship to confessional identities either at the onset of the interview or upon further probing. For some, it was “natural” to equate both. This is probably due to the fact that their mindsets are formatted to view an individual as belonging to a confession and nothing else. Milder views were rather apologetic and sought to argument that confessional belonging and faith do not undermine the act of being a citizen. On the contrary, faith for them can only help people become better citizens. For others, an FBO can only mirror the larger society and if the larger society is confessional, then one cannot expect a practice of citizenship within the FBO.

“Despite seeming openness to all citizens, confessional considerations are primordial for recruitment”: Recruiting from one’s own confession appeared to be a shared practice. For some, it was a *de facto* situation owing to the fact that candidates will tend to huddle in same-confession FBOs. For others, it was a totally justifiable practice since everybody else does it. A few cases acknowledged that whereas in lower level jobs, the FBO might recruit from other confessions, recruitment for higher management positions tends to be ring-fenced for same-confession candidates.
Recruitment practices along confessional line, though presented as a way to serve one’s confessional community, may also be read as a lack of trust towards and tolerance to other confessions.

“Services available to all but more so to same confession clients”: Adhering to higher religious/confessional values and norms was heralded by all participants and as such, this was seen as giving FBOs a mandate, if not an obligation to serve all needy people whether from the same confession or otherwise. Many participants pride themselves for giving service to members of other confessions suggesting that this places them on higher moral ground. Allowing clients from other confessions to perform their religious practices or waiving attendance of catechism classes for non-Christian students were given as powerful example of the tolerance practiced by these FBOs. However, and upon further probing, various forms of obvious or insidious discrimination appear. For instance, participants indicated that they tend to refer clients seeking financial assistance to sources which are compatible with their confessions!

“Charity rather than inalienable rights and social entitlements”: Participants were not very conversant or familiar with the key concept of rights. As such, providing health and/or education services is part and parcel of being charitable and helping on moral and religious grounds and fulfilling one’s “mission”. Participants were adamant on being in a position where they are actually accomplishing higher missions and where charity is a duty as well as an overarching value of their respective confessions. As such, participants presented what they consider to be vivid illustrations of their charitable commitment, namely treating and/or offering services to individuals of other confessions or to those who cannot afford to pay fees. Nowhere in the data was there a mention of poverty as being an injustice or a result of unequal division of resources or of education and health as being rights and social entitlements due to all citizens.

The four identified thematic concept are but a mere reflection of an intellectual alienation from the concepts of “citizenship” and “rights” which are replaced by “confessional identity” and “charity”. The latter are reproduced, strengthened and perpetuated in the way in which FBOs do business internally and provide services to the external world. It is safe to say that, as a result, such practices further undermine the concept of citizenship from evolving and maturing.
**CITIZENSHIP THEMATIC MATRIX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CITIZENSHIP LINKED TO CONFESSIONAL IDENTITY</th>
<th>DESPITE SEEMING OPENNESS TO ALL CITIZENS CONFESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE PRIMORDIAL FOR RECRUITMENT</th>
<th>SERVICES AVAILABLE TO ALL BUT MORESO TO SAME CONFESSION CLIENTS</th>
<th>CHARITY RATHER THAN INALIENABLE RIGHTS AND SOCIAL ENTITLEMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Citizenship is embedded in Imam Mussa’s Sadr slogan: “Lebanon is the final nation for all its people.” (Al Amal al Tarbawyiiah, Interview 7 and FGD 3)</td>
<td>“Everybody who works here is a believer.” (St. Joseph School, FGD 1). “All of us here are religiously committed.” (St. Joseph School, FGD 2) “All teachers are Christian.” (St. Rita School, Interview 6) “Here, the administration is Christian.” (St. Rita School, Interview 2)</td>
<td>“All orphans are welcome to our school but we give priority to the children of the Amal movement martyrs.” (Al Amal al Tarbawyiiah, Interview 4)</td>
<td>“The hospital has a mission statement that draws from the religious belief about helping and healing all the sick”. (SGMUH, Interview 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The hospital belongs to Dar el Fatwa and is headed by the Grand Mufti of Lebanon and he is everybody’s Mufti and he has to serve all people.” (Dar el Fatwa, Interview 2)</td>
<td>“Our hiring policies are open for everyone. Of course we have Muslim employees but they are not allowed to wear the veil.” (Tel Shiha Hospital, Interview 1) “The Islamic veil is compulsory.” (Al Kawthar, Interview 1)</td>
<td>“This is the reality of Lebanon. Confessions are separated. 90% of our clients are Sunni.” (Al Makassed, Interview 3)</td>
<td>“The hospital is known as a hospital for the poor so we do the maximum we can to help. The director gives special deductions on the bill on a case by case basis.” (Geitaoui, Interview 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Overall, we cannot talk about citizenship in terms of citizens being able to have rights because if they do not belong to a confession or a party, they cannot have rights.” (Al Zahra, FGD 3)</td>
<td>“Conditions for recruitment are linked to competence. You do not necessarily have to be a member of the Amal movement. However, displaying adverse opinions is of course prohibited.” (Al Amal al Tarbawyiiah, Interview 7)</td>
<td>“We do not discriminate against anyone, Muslim or Christian. The Hospital is not for the Melkite Catholic only. We have Muslim more than Christian patients.” (Tall Shiha, Interview 1)</td>
<td>“Health care is a service and a humanitarian duty and is a religious duty to help others.” (Dar el Fatwa, FGD 1 and Interview 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The words citizen and citizenship appear five times in the Amal Movement charter. Religious faith reinforces the idea of good citizenship.” (Al Amal al Tarbawyiiah, Interview 3)</td>
<td>“Some people from other confessions submit applications for employment. However, we do not give them priority as long as we can find people from our own confession.” (Geitaoui hospital, Interview 4) “We do not recruit outside our confession and there is nothing wrong with that. Nobody else recruits from</td>
<td>“Many, I am not saying all, who come to the hospital are Muslims, Shiite. They come from all parts of Lebanon and not just Beirut.” (Geitaoui, Interview 3)</td>
<td>“Students who are not able to pay their tuition fees are kept at school in keeping with Musa al Sadr’s message as well as the charitable nature of Al Amal al Tarbawyiiah.” (Al Amal al Tarbawyiiah, Interview 3)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
outside their confession. This is the reality in Lebanon” (Dar el Fatwa, Int. 2)

“The school reflects what happens between the Muslim and Christian communities.” (St. Rita, Interview 5)

“Recruitment is open to all but of course we advertise via the Holy Quran radio station.” (Dar el Fatwa, Interview 4)

“Our mission is to help our needy parishioners.” (St. Rita school, Interview 1)

“Based on their confessional background, patients are advised to seek financial assistance from their religious institutions and political leaders.” (SGMUH, FGD 2)

“My brother is a doctor in the hospital and he told me there might be an opportunity for a job if I am interested.” “I asked for a position here because my brother in law is here.” (Geitaoui hospital, Interviews 6/7)

“As a religious institution, we cannot withhold service to anyone.” (Dar el Fatwa, Interview 2) and (Al Makassed hospital, Interview 3)

“Preparing students to become good citizens does not necessarily require that they learn history. Civic and religious education are more vital and important to uphold tolerance.” (Al Irfan, FGD 2)

“The sect of the candidate is not a selection criterion except for senior level positions.” (SGMUH, Interview 6)

“The hospital is committed to treat all people with dignity, respect and compassion regardless of religion, sex, nationality, economic status, etc…..” (SGHMU mission statement)

.IX. FBOs AND GENDER

Social institutions play a critical in reproducing gender inequality through the ways in which power, roles, benefits, interests, responsibilities and resources are distributed and according to gendered patterns of decision making.

This chapter is based on the definition of gender as being the social meaning given to being a man or woman in a particular time and place as well as the assumption that characteristics used to define a man or woman do not stem from biological differences but rather through temporal social norms and beliefs.

As such, gender is by definition a social relation, i.e. a relation that is constituted and constructed by a particular society. Gender relations are ascribed relations. In other words, to describe the relation means to describe the gender. Gender relations are essentially relations of power and domination leading to what is commonly known as gender subordination. Gender relations are specific to places, societies and historical contexts. They change in response to wider contextual and/or global changes and are not fixed for all time.
Gender relations are intimately linked to and determined by the intersectionality of social identities such as class, cast, religion and confession, race, age, sexuality, etc.... Thus, there are significant differences amongst women and amongst men.

The production and reproduction of gender relations and gender division of labor occur within the framework of social institutions. By definition, institutions are understood as sets of formal and informal rules which shape people’s perceptions of their needs and roles. Institutions ensure the production and reproduction of social relations, social differences and social inequalities. Organisations, such as Faith Based Organisations, administer the rules as dictated by their corresponding institutions, in this case religious/confessional institutions.

Institutions and organizations have official ideologies and written and unwritten rules which produce and reproduce inequalities and difference through rules, activities, resources, people and a pattern of exercising power.

It is assumed that Faith Based Organisations, as social organisations, possess their own implicit understanding of what gender relations should be and that this understanding, is both implicitly and explicitly reproduced in their *modus operandi*. This reproduction of a particular view of gender relations permeates the behaviour of the FBO internally and externally.

As such, interviewees and interlocutors were probed about the internal policies and practices within their organisations at the level of recruitment, peer relations, equal pay for equal work, women’s career path, etc… Interestingly, respondents were either oblivious of this issue, convinced that “there is no problem” or adopted a defeatist attitude blaming both “society and traditions” for any and all ills becoming women. Externally, and in terms of service provision and relations with constituency and clientele, a number of FBOs linked their attitudes regarding gender relations to what is permissible within the boundaries of religion and more specifically, of their respective confessions. In a number of instances, FBOs were all too happy to give in to their constituency’s conservative views and as such, instating sex segregation amongst students, prohibiting girls from attending extra-curricular and sports activities or making available services by same-sex providers.

Overall, this was an area of investigation where respondents were either hesitant or simply unable to share thoughts and insights in a carefree and confident manner. Most importantly, this section reveals the extent to which NGOs are gendered and the powerful ways in which they reproduce a social hierarchy with which they seem to be comfortable.
IX.1 Perceptions and understanding of women’s rights

Whereas in the case of citizenship, very few of the respondents and interviewees were able to frame a clear definition of what citizenship actually constitutes, perceptions and understanding of women’s rights were diverse, often contradictory, and in general conservative. A number of participants indicated that women’s rights actually mean “freedom of action, liberty and mobility” whilst other respondents from the same FBO said that “these should not be confused with women’s right”.

Women’s “maternal role”, “caring nature”, “special needs” and “limited physical strength” were often invoked to explain and justify women’s poor representation in leadership positions and the gender segregation of many an occupation in the organization. In doing so, respondents also reproduced, reinforced and rarely challenged pervading views of women’s intellectual, social, and physical inferiority. Within the same vein, respondents went on in categorizing jobs according to their suitability to either of the sexes.

Whereas most participants indicated that their organizations had no discriminatory recruitment policies and did not practice any gendered favoritism, the gender gap in employment is due, according to them, to that fact that: “much fewer women than men apply for jobs”. This however, very much contradicts facts and statistics which clearly point out to the fact that women outnumber men in the lowest organizational echelons and in certain “women-specific” jobs such as nursing and other care related professions.

Interestingly, in four cases, participants indicated that they are witnessing a changing pattern in terms of women’s visibility and participation in the public sphere. One participant indicated that “global changes are producing a change in terms of their approach to educating women as future mothers”. Participants also pointed out that the “increasing enrolment of women in medical schools will undoubtedly change the gender profile of the profession”.

Several participants from different FBOs linked women’s rights to their rights as employees and workers. As such, they confirmed that equal pay for equal work is in principle practiced and maternity related benefits are offered according to the provisions of the Lebanese labour laws.

According to the participants, women’s bodily rights were very much determined by religious diktat in most FBOs. For those working in the health fields, abortion was neither allowed nor practised unless for medically prescribed reasons. However, there were different views about birth control where Muslim FBOs seemed more disposed and flexible in providing information and services to their clients. Sex education for students at puberty appears to be practiced though to varying degrees in different FBO schools and...
does not seem to follow any specific curriculum or methodology but is left to the discretion of the institution and as such, to the interpretation provided by the representatives of the confessions.

It was remarkable that hardly any of the FBO respondents addressed the issues of women’s rights and entitlements per se save in the case of one woman participant who indicated her concern that “Lebanese women cannot transmit their nationality to their children”. This for her indicated a clear violation of women’s rights. Similarly, very few respondents linked rights with equality, and, overall, emphasis of most respondents was on the issue of discrimination which, as obvious earlier, was justified and/or rationalised by the fact that women are different in their capacities, capabilities and needs. Religion was, in several occasions, cited as both a framework and a reference.

Overall, responses indicated that in most cases, women’s rights were not necessarily seen as an issue even though the gender gap and the glass ceiling are evident in organisational statistics. This, for many, only mirrors what is prevalent in society. Whereas it was difficult to elicit responses about rights and entitlements, it was evident that for most respondents, this was a matter relating to women’s visibility and mobility in the public sphere. An issue of concern is undoubtedly the predominant view that women have “innate caring and nurturing skills” which justify sex segregation in the professional field as well as the limited career paths for women. This is very much related to the fact that many respondents were very much convinced of differential abilities between women and men and consequently, of women’s poorer physical dispositions. Few of the women respondents seem to have a better awareness in relation to women’s rights and made reference to difficulties facing women’s advancement or to laws which discriminate against women such as the present nationality law. However, for a number of respondents, a transformation is already visible as women acquire more education or are forced to enter the market because of the overall worsening economic situation.

**IX.2 How do these perceptions relate to or differ from international instruments**

The issue of international instruments and the ways in which they relate, or otherwise, to respondents’ understanding of women’s rights was perhaps the most confusing part of this component of the research. As respondents had limited understanding and awareness of what constitutes women’s rights and gender equality, they were even less informed of international instruments and their provisions as well as to Lebanon’s commitment to enforcing the stipulations of these instruments. As such, a reference framework such as CEDAW was unknown to all respondents thus raising questions and concerns in relation to the implications of this lack of awareness on women and men’s knowledge and awareness of citizenship rights and entitlements and the total detachment of FBOs from such key instruments which appear to be irrelevant to them!
On the other hand, only one FBO respondent indicated that “it will be practically impossible to apply international standards such as paternity leave in Lebanon”. Unfortunately, the reason behind this statement was not explored and probed further.

In one poignant case, a position of “blaming the victim” was noted as one respondent indicated that “women should not ask for their rights but should fight for their place”. The same respondent added that “women should work for women and transmit values through role modelling.” Such a position clearly places the onus on women themselves and waives responsibility of the state and social institutions in ensuring equality, rights and entitlements.

**IX.3 Translating views on women’s rights into FBOs’ work**

This part of the research explored the ways in which the FBOs modus operandi, both internally and externally, actually reflects their views and opinions about gender equality and women’s rights. This is a critical aspect of the report as it indicates the various ways in which FBOs, both consciously and unconsciously, contribute to reproducing patriarchal values, thus perpetuating a situation of inequality for women.

Though participants confirmed that there are no written rules and policies which codify any form of discrimination against women in any of their FBOs, the unwritten rules and practices have indeed a powerful effect in “keeping women in their places” and in reproducing stereotypes and views of women as having different traits which determine what they can and cannot do within the FBO. All too often, participants maintained that “it is the pre-requisite of the job that determines the sex of the post holder rather than any form of explicit discrimination or sex preference or favouritism”. In fact, respondents seemed very much oblivious of the extent to which gendered prejudices permeate the system and create powerful barriers to women’s advancement and to challenging traditional gender roles and stereotypes.

Maternity leave and benefit, information, awareness raising and services about reproductive health issues (so long as they do not involve termination of pregnancy or in some cases provision of contraceptive methods or IVF) are provided by most health FBOs and are interpreted as a way in which “attention is given to women’s special needs”. Upon probing, most respondents further reiterated that this relates to giving special attention to women’s important roles as mothers and as cornerstones of the family.

Participants from a number of FBOs indicated that they either provide child care services to their women staff or facilitate their access to such services by way of alleviating their maternal responsibilities. However, whether the provision of such services is due to the FBOs concern to ensure maximum performance or whether this represents an awareness of the challenge that women’s caring role poses in determining women’s ability to maintain paid jobs is yet to be clarified.
Participants from FBOs involved in education indicated that values related to respect and equality are transmitted through religious teachings *de facto*.

The issue of the veil is a particularly thorny one. Whereas participants from two Muslim FBOs indicated that the veil is not compulsory, participants from other Christian FBOs were categorical in saying that wearing the veil is not allowed so as “not to give the possibility for patients to choose their carers according to their confession” or “allowing women who wear the veil to be unnecessarily conspicuous”.

Overall, education FBOs seem to put their views on women’s rights and gender equality into policy and/or practice through instating co-ed education or otherwise sex segregated classes or activities as well as through the provision of some form of sex education. In both education and health FBOs, the principle of equal work for equal pay is allegedly practised. Though in both education and health FBOs, there are clear and strong indicators of gender disaggregation of jobs, decision making prerogatives, career paths and degrees of responsibilities. Provision of statutory rights for women such as maternity leave are presented as “the organisation being sensitive to women’s special needs as they relate to their roles as mothers” though this “natural caring role” was not challenged by any respondent regardless of their FBO affiliation. Quite the contrary, women’s traditional roles are often encouraged.

**IX.4 Key gender themes emerging**

In gathering and analyzing qualitative data on how participants define gender and gender equality and how their definition, perception and beliefs shape and influence the way they shape and deliver services and link with public and social policies, a number of themes have emerged. This section highlights those gender themes which by and large resonated amongst all participants in this study. In the attached matrix, the reader will find a selection of quotes from various respondents and which serve as a compelling illustration of the emerging gender themes.

“Gender as a non-issue”: All participants were adamant that gender per se, gender equality as well as women’s right were not issues for consideration by their respective FBO. The reasons put forward were slightly different. For some, religion, either Christian or Moslem, has already granted women their rights and by the mere act of practising their faith through their work, they would be, by proxy, upholding women’s right. For others, an FBO is a mere reflection or a microcosm of its bigger community where things are perceived and done in a certain way. As such, it is not up to an NGO to challenge the social order where women are “naturally” inferior or at least complementary to men. A few take on the classical position of blaming women and giving them the full responsibility to challenge their situation and fight for their rights. In all cases, the issue of gender equality as well as the concept of equality itself are not recognised and even sometimes shunned.
“Confessional considerations determine position vis-à-vis taboo issues”: The gender specific taboo issues which were addressed in this research included reproductive rights, sex education, IVF and abortion, all of which relate directly to women’s bodily agency and right to self determination and to make one’s own choices regarding one’s own body and sexuality. All participants of all confessions were adamant in applying religious/confessional doctrines in dealing with these “taboo issues”. It is quite interesting that not one of the participants showed any flexibility or at least willingness to consider these issues from a perspective which is different than that of their own confessions. Quite the contrary, FBOs showed comfort and confidence in relying on their confessional authorities to decide on these matters for them thus reinforcing and reproducing the taboo and the sacrosanct nature of confessional diktat. In any case, women appear to lose out entirely in matters related to their bodily rights.

“Prevalence of traditional and stereotypical gender divisions of labour”: For all the participants interviewed, any post or responsibility within their organisation would determine the sex of the postholder. As such, FBOs appear to keep a typical glass ceiling pattern where women rarely make it to the higher echelons and where decision making, power and wisdom remain within the realm of men. Jobs which are described as requiring “strength”, “boldness”, “wisdom”, and “courage” are automatically identified as being male jobs and are de facto superior both in terms of authority and income with the exception of those which are manual and require physical strength. Other jobs which are described as being “soft”, or requiring “tenderness” or simply “short and manageable shifts” are perceived as being “feminine” jobs. In doing so, the FBOs contribute to exacerbating and perpetrating the traditional gender division of labour and in keeping power and authority in the hands of men.

“Women’s caring roles determine their career choices”: It is a de facto given for all participants, whether male and female members, that women are first and foremost carers and mothers. Public life and employment are possible only when women can manage to satisfactorily fulfill their caring and motherly duties. Some participants displayed a slightly more open position essentially by making day care facilities available for their women staff without insomuch challenging the assumption of women’s “natural” and “nurturing” role as mothers. This has also meant that women have been excluded from career advancement and promotion within FBOs and continue to constitute the majority of the lower echelons. Economically, this has meant limited economic rewards and returns for mother and a continued dependency on male kin.

The four emerging gender themes show perfect coherence in the participants’ position vis-à-vis women’s rights and gender equality and provide tangible proof about the ways in which the patriarchal mindset is reproduced in concrete programmes, activities and ways of working.

In reflecting on the ways in which this study has dealt with the gender related research question, it is safe to say that as CRTD.A, we have taken an implicit decision
not to be confrontational lest the entire research process is jeopardized. This overly neutral position meant that we did not probe participants enough on specific gender related issues (e.g. violence against women, religious family laws…) and shied away from the sensitive but highly critical issue of women’s sexuality and sexual rights, a matter which is primordial in the case of FBOs. Nevertheless, the data shows a worrying pattern of conservatism and gender inequality which is perpetrated and reproduced via powerful, well established and well resourced FBOs.

**GENDER THEMATIC MATRIX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENDER AS A “NON-ISSUE”</th>
<th>CONFESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS DETERMINE TABOO ISSUES</th>
<th>PREVAlANCE OF TRADITIONAL AND STEREOTYPICAL GENDER DIVISION OF LABOR</th>
<th>WOMEN’S CARING ROLES DETERMINE THEIR CAREER PATH AND CHOICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“No discrimination between men and women. We do not necessarily prefer a woman or a man. It depends on the position, what he/she is going to do.” (Geitawi Hospital, Interview 5)</td>
<td>“We are a Catholic institution, so this is what is forbidden to us: abortion, euthanasia, IVF since the Church is discussing these matters.” (Geitawi Hospital, Interview 9)</td>
<td>“The post will determine the sex of the post holder. Maintenance requires a man whereas there are more women in cleaning services.” (Al Zahra Hospital, FGD 6)</td>
<td>“If women are less career oriented than men, it is because of social reasons, because they have no time, or because they have other missions.” (Al Amal al Tarbawiyya, FGD 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Women make up half the population and it is not our job to ensure equal rights.” (SGUMH, Interview 5)</td>
<td>“Sexual education should be taught by experts in a decent way.” (Al Amal al Tarbawiyya, Interview 1)</td>
<td>“Women rely on their husbands’ income.” (Dar el Fatwa, FGD 1)</td>
<td>“Women have maternity leave, but have to find their own replacement.” (St. Rita School, Interview 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Women have more than their rights. I am against quotas. Women should not ask for their rights but fight for their place.” (Amal al Tarbawiyya, Interview 1)</td>
<td>“We do not set the rules as a hospital about what we should or shouldn’t do. In the case of abortion, Sunnis have their Fatwa which is different from Shiite.” (Zahra Hosp, FGD7)</td>
<td>“Nursing is a humanitarian profession and requires tenderness which women have but surgery requires physical strength.” (Makassed Hospital, Interview 2)</td>
<td>“Every organization which is part of the association has to have its own day care facility so that women can breastfeed during working hours.” (Al Kawtar, Int. 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“We do not say this is a woman or this is a man. Both have rights and responsibilities.” (Zahra hospital, interview 1)</td>
<td>“Our hospital pharmacy does not sell contraceptive and as a Catholic hospital, we do not promote its use.” (Tell Shiha, Interview 3)</td>
<td>“The conservative Druze community hinders women’s ability to reach decision making positions in Al Irfan.” (Al Irfan, FGD 2)</td>
<td>“Our education programme prepares young girls to become model wives and mothers.” (St. Joseph school, Interview 3) (Al Irfan, Interview 1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“Al Irfan views women’s rights within the prism of Druze faith that respects women and considers them as equal to men.” (Al Irfan, FGD 1)

“We apply correctly the religious policy. Abortion is forbidden.” (Tell Shiha hospital, Interview 3)

“We women are nicer than men. You know, the way they speak. So care workers have to be women.” (Dar el Fawta, Interview 5)

“The job may require working till midnight. This will probably impede her future marital life.” (Al Makassed hospital, FGD 3)

.X. KEY CONCLUSIONS

The FBOs research generated a wealth of findings not all of which have been included or captured in this research report.

Based however on what has been included in this report, some key conclusions can be drawn in attempting to address the main research questions.

These have been systematized in a way too reflect a certain order of magnitude.

- FBOs appear to be playing a role of a strong vector for maintaining Lebanon’s confessional status quo essentially through continuously confessionalising social and public policies as well as public institutions.

- Overarching international conventions to which the Lebanese state is presumably committed are by and large unknown and irrelevant to FBOs (e.g. CEDAW). As such, FBOs are oblivious not only to these conventions but also to the Lebanese state. This clearly undermines the possibility of any serious implementation of such critical conventions anytime in the near future.

- By virtue of their community outreach and overall hegemony within their own confession and the linkages created through securing both services, employments and other forms of procurement, FBOs appear to have very much confessionalised at least two sectors of the economy namely education and health where they are able and disposed to play the role of market regulators.

- The fundamentals of the concept of inclusive citizenship is that which reposes on rights and entitlements and where citizens are directly related to their state by virtue of being rights holder and the state as duty bearer. This key concept of citizenship which also embeds the concepts of inclusiveness and equality, notably gender equality is not very much upheld by FBOs.
In relation to the above, the overbearing role of FBOs in education and health is critical in shaping citizen’s access to rights transforming the latter to “relational right” rather than individual citizen’s right. As such, this context undermines the concept and practice of universality of rights and entitlements.

FBOs seem to transmit, reinforce and reproduce different understanding and practices of what they perceive as citizenship which in this case revolves around confessional identity and allegiance and where the concept of gender equality is non existent. In fact, FBOs in this case appear to be the anti-thesis of citizenship as representing a direct relationship between citizens and their state.

With high state debt and the galloping state retrenchment and disengagement of the state from its role as a duty bearer, this situation is likely to remain as is or even deteriorate with FBOs taking on a more active role in defining citizenship, rights and entitlements. Indeed, the government’s limited resources and its inability or lack of commitment to invest in entitlements and public services actually favors and encourages a further spread and outreach of the private sector in which FBOs play quite and important role.

A poor commitment to a national coverage in health and education resonated amongst most FBOs. The priority appears to be improving coverage and quality within one’s own confession. Yet, FBOs seem to be unable to ensure the full coverage of all their communities with the poorest falling off the cracks.

Education poses by far the most serious concerns as it vehicles specific constructs of social identities which are by and large based on patriarchy, inequality, and the subordination of women. Health also poses a key concern as it increasingly creates dependence which seems to amplify with the deteriorating economic situation.

Given the above, FBOs seem to favor social policies which would strengthen and safeguard their hold over their confessional groups.

Despite differences, FBOs of all confessions seem to operate similarly in terms of their governance, structures and the mechanisms through which they vehicle their own views of citizenship and gender equality. Indeed, leadership practices are highly vertical, patriarchal, top down and with little forms of accountability.

Aside from providing some special services for women to meet their needs as mothers, FBOs do not seem too preoccupied with women’s overall priorities or with addressing causes or results of gender inequality.

FBOs are created by confessional institutions and/or by confessional political parties and have a significant interface with and influence on citizens, both women and men. Such interface and influence may be considered to be
practiced by proxy on the behalf of confessional institutions and political parties.

- There is indeed an urgent need for continuous research and additional vertical and horizontal investigation involving additional participants such as for instance the clients, beneficiaries and users of FBO services.

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The books and reports are sorted in the alphabetical order. Each entry begins with the name of the author, followed by the title of the document, and the place and the date of the publication.
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