Support for Social Sciences Research in the Southern Cone - Volume I
# SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN THE SOUTHERN CONE

## VOLUME I

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SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN THE SOUTHERN CONE

PART I

I. Introduction

In 1977 the International Development Research Centre commenced an institutional support program for a small number of social science research centres in the Southern Cone. This was done with the understanding that the grants were necessary given the political repression of the social sciences as part of the rapid and undemocratic changes of governments in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina. Whereas today the general character of the regimes in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay remains blatantly repressive, the internal dynamics of the situation in each of the countries has changed. The level of outright terror has certainly abated since 1977, yet in its place the more subtle process of institutionalizing a closed, authoritarian and highly unequal society has been inexorably advancing, in the economy, the rural sector, and the educational system. Social Science research, understood as the systematic, comparative and critical study of social structure and its processes, continues to be limited as a result both of oppression and of economic and political changes.

During this same period external donor agencies policy for social science research in the Southern Cone, at times the sole support of many institutions, appears to be shifting away from support to social science research, in many cases toward more action oriented programs.

The present report, based principally on information gathered during visits in July 1980 to over 20 private research centres in the Southern Cone and extensive open-ended interviews with the social science community in Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina and Chile, purports to provide some idea of the conditions under which social science research is being carried out in these countries, its role in society, and its future. Its specific objective is to answer the questions: How have social scientists and social sciences research institutions been affected by the authoritarian regimes of the Southern Cone? In what form are the social sciences viable at the long and middle range?, and, How can external support best facilitate this viability? A parallel evaluation (Anthony Tillett "Social Science Research in the Southern Cone of Latin America") on the importance of institutional support on the administrative, academic and policy lines of the five specific institutions which received support under the Special Institutional Grant Program of IDRC since 1977, matches this report.
Part II contains a description and analysis of each center visited.

Background

The following reflections sketch in brief, broad strokes, some of the changes that have occurred after the Chilean military coup in 1973 and subsequent similar takeovers in Argentina and Uruguay.

These takeovers took place after 40 years of unbroken democratic governments in Chile and Uruguay, the most prosperous countries of the region by levels of industrialization and employment in addition to other social indicators, and therefore theoretically the most democratic. This is one of the facts that makes them and the changes they have brought about most difficult to understand.

The better known aspects of the authoritarian regimes installed during the 1970's, and the twenty-five year Stroessner government in Paraguay are the immediate and dramatic: the tortures, jailings, exiles and purging of universities. Three thousand Chilean social scientists left the country after the coup with assistance from CLACSO and a wide array of international and national agencies in North America and Europe. In the first semester of 1980 alone, over 500 professors were dismissed from Chilean universities, the majority for political reasons. Close to twenty thousand "desaparecidos" (missing persons) remain unaccounted for in Argentina. Yet, however impressive figures of this nature, they tend to obscure some of the longer range effects on society as a whole of the main characteristics of the regimes: the ideological control by the state, the exclusion of free and independent thought, and the emphasis on technocracy at all levels of social and economic planning.

A basic feature of the new economic models in Argentine, Chile and Uruguay is their mixture of "liberal" neoclassical economics with rigidly authoritarian and repressive politics. A related facet is the total divorce between the economic models and any social or political variable. The following focuses on the middle and long range effects of the social sciences of these aspects of the governments in the Southern Cone especially those concerning economic policy.

Effects of Economic Policy

One of the most prominent results of present economic policy in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay is the enormous reconcentration
of wealth. This is accompanied by the decreasing role of the state in providing services of health and education, resulting in higher absolute levels of malnutrition, illiteracy, increasing infant mortality among the population, and reductions in university enrollment. The state’s role in the economy is increased, however, for example in the armament function, intervention in the collective bargaining process between workers and industry, and management of other sectors of the economy.

In Chile, for example, wealth has been concentrated in the hands of an elite of a dozen or so economic clans at the expense of a considerable contraction of wage income and a forcible increase in productivity. At the end of 1978, six major clans controlled two thirds of the total assets of 250 companies. A maximum of 50 individuals control the entire private banking set up and through it 60 percent of all bank credit. Two other important elements in the growth of the clans have been their acquisition, at bargain prices, of nationalized industries and the lifting of price controls which destroyed all but the strongest competitors. The sale of more than two-hundred state owned companies between 1973 and 1978 amounted to a virtual subsidy by the state of the clans. (Latin American Weekly Report, WR 80 02, January 11, 1980 p. 11).

Subsidy to national industry in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay has in part been abandoned, as have protective tariffs on imported manufactured goods. Speculative capital from abroad enters the countries attracted by arbitrary and artificial exchange rates. The new foreign investment is extensive but does not represent new productive capital. Rather, foreign funds are essentially buying up existing plants and foreign banks are providing short-term loans with no long-term development effect. The state takes an important role in this process through the modification of the tax structure. For example, Argentine economy minister, Martínez de Hoz, in July 1980 announced a new economic package including cuts in income tax and incentive to investors in the shape of increased facilities for securing loans from abroad. In the new package the so-called "fourth category" of income earners, including many members of the professional classes will no longer pay income tax. Sales tax (IVA) was raised on all goods and services from 16 to 20 percent, and businessmen were relieved of the responsibilities to pay contribution to the pension system and to a housing fund which amounted to about 20 percent of the total paid out in salaries. (L. A. Weekly Report, WR 80, July 19, 1980, p. 28.)

Social Effects

In order for the economic models to function with a decrease in real wages to the worker and effective impoverishment of the middle class, the state has had to neutralize the representative
organizations of society including labour unions, pressure groups and political parties. As was observed recently by Latin American Weekly Report, the cost of the economic model of Argentina is born principally by wage earners, and the real test of the model's stability will come when the military are obliged to lift their present strict control over the country. (L. A. Weekly Report, WR 80 11, March 14, 1980.) For, although perhaps evident, it is nonetheless essential to recall that the changes described above were not the result of a popular referendum but rather were imposed on society. They were neither wanted, discussed, nor chosen.

How does a society react to a model imposed from above, with scant respect for individual liberty. The most dramatic demonstration of opposition is the existence of political prisoners of which the recent officially accepted figure of 1,272 political prisoners in Uruguay is an example. (L. A. Weekly Report, WR 80-30, August 1, 1980.) Yet, political prisoners represent only the most extreme expression of a general inability of a society to participate through non-existent representative and democratic channels in regard to changes which touch on many aspects of everyday life. There is slight opportunity to reflect on and respond to modifications, no past experience to compare them with, and no memory to relate them to.

The economies set up under the authoritarian regimes need efficient managers and administrators — emphasis is placed in general on that which is instrumental. Most debate on the social effects of the model, including the extreme concentration on the one end and increased malnutrition and lower levels of education on the other, is closed off. The immediate effect on education is the disappearance of any critical thought or teaching: schools of philosophy are shut down, sociology is either eliminated or radically altered, and economics limited to only one school of economic thought.* Interdisciplinary studies that might relate social effects with economic policy tend to disappear. Emphasis in the university is placed on social sciences from an instrumental perspective, all that is measurable and manipulative in addition to a large dose of outright censorship and arbitrary expulsion of students.** Greater dedication is given to the fields of mathematics, statistics, management, and micro-economics.

* Popularly referred to as the Chicago boys. However, even a Chicago boy can be censored. The head of the Economics Department of the University of Chile, Andre Sanfuentes, was recently thrown out for disagreeing with the government figures on income distribution.

** In Cordoba, a province of Argentina, new mathematics has been prohibited as has structural semiology.
Access to the university is limited not only because of a general decrease in educational level of the population (a country such as Argentina that had practically full coverage of primary school education is beginning to demonstrate significantly higher levels of drop out and repetition) but also due to increasing transfer of costs of higher education to the student.

**Effects on the Social Sciences**

The object of study of the social sciences is society, through the systematic, comparative and scientific understanding of social structure and processes. The selection of the specific areas of inquiry of the social sciences has been defined on the basis of those social phenomena that a particular society considers problems or priorities. This does not mean that the social sciences are always welcome guests. Rather, that their sphere of activity is defined in accordance with the same forces and contradictions that constitute society. The question is, what happens to social sciences when debate is closed off in a society, when no reasonable consideration of policy options occurs, and when no rational decision making is possible as no information is generated on the differential social costs of policy?

The fact that the present models of economic development in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina have separated the issue of social efficiency from that of economic efficiency has led to a marked decrease in demand for social sciences, in part concerned with the social implications of development and the determinants of change. Few people, few areas, and less funds are available from traditional sources of support for the social sciences, the national planning offices, national councils of science and technology, ministries of education, health or welfare. Research that would explore alternatives or critically evaluate present policies is no longer feasible, nor desirable.

It is not as if no research funds were available from the state, rather the focus of these funds, as those of education has shifted. In Argentina, the National Council of Scientific Research and Technology operates with an annual budget of 700 million dollars and a full-time staff of approximately 700 researchers. Only 19 of these, however, are in the category of social, economic and juridical sciences. Funds are primarily channeled to applied research in medicine, biology, chemistry, mathematics, and statistics. Basic research has been practically eliminated.
Another tendency that is becoming apparent is that instead of (or in addition to) oppressing the prevailing social sciences researchers and centers (as was the case upon their initiation) authoritarian regimes have begun to unfold their own counter models of social sciences to provide a rationale for economic and social policies. For example, in Chile a research center with funding of approximately five million dollars has been established under the direction of the daughter of General Pinochet. The Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos, CIME, in Argentina can be included in this same category.

The social sciences have responded to the authoritarian regions by forming private research centers integrated by those professionals who could remain in the countries. These centers have been the recipients of considerable support from outside sources. However, as a result of modifications in the policy of these sources in addition to internal economic factors, the long and middle range viability of these centers is beginning to appear less certain as the situation which precipitated their creation appears to become more and more stable.* The following pages present a brief mapping of the institutions that have appeared in the countries since the onset of authoritarian governments (and in some cases before) their role, rationale and function, and principal research problems and fields. Consideration is then given to their institutional viability and the question of how external support (and other mechanisms) can best facilitate this viability.

II. Private Social Science Research Centres in the Southern Cone

Role, Rationale and Functions

At the most elementary and instrumental level, private research centers (the majority formed since 1973) in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are helping to maintain a pool of valuable human talent in place in their countries, and productively at work in their professional specialities. If the centers did not exist, many of the skilled social scientists clustered under their institutional umbrella would assuredly have joined the exodus that—following the rash of military coups in the region—has massively depleted the Southern Cone's reserves of well-trained, high-level manpower working in the social sciences.

* The recently approved Chilean constitution strengthens the presidency and weakens the role of congress. It leaves the way clear for Pinochet to occupy the presidency for at least the next 11 years.
The private research centers of the Southern Cone are islands of "intellectual breathing space" in a generally closed environment, characterized by tight military control of the universities and widespread censorship. By conducting themselves with prudence, till now, the new institutions have managed to give their staff members a considerable margin of intellectual freedom and the means with which to conduct research in an unfettered and independent fashion.

The private centers play an important role in their national settings in maintaining a tradition of scientific excellence and critical, pluralistic inquiry in their respective fields. The consequence of this is considerable given the repeated purges of faculty, strict censorship in the classroom, and rigid control of permissible subject matter in the universities, which have meant their drastic deterioration over the last decade. In this environment, the private research institutes have a significant role to play in preserving standards of high professional quality in the social sciences. In some cases, they also are maintaining entire disciplines—most notably, sociology—that virtually have been expunged from the university landscape.

No matter what their specific thematic focus or disciplinary emphasis, the research programs of virtually all of the private centers share a number of common characteristics. First, they are all focused on problems relevant to their national settings. Second, they are pluralistic in approach. Third, they are increasingly multidisciplinary in focus, in recognition of the fact that the problems of the real world cannot be readily compartmentalized in neat, disciplinary pigeonholes. Finally, the researchers involved see social science and their own research as a means of comprehending their own national realities and on that basis formulating rational, viable alternatives for the future, while keeping open a possibility of critical scientific analysis of the present social structure and processes.

The present military authorities generally discourage any discussion of alternative development possibilities and policies. The development process and the formulation of rational development policies, however, necessarily involves the consideration of different opinions and their probable consequences. When only one option is officially proclaimed to be permissible, the entire process loses its logic and policy making at the macro-level becomes an anti-rational exercise. In this setting, there is not much that private researchers can do, except with their publications and roundtables, to keep alive a measure of public consciousness and debate. In the long term, assuming the current regimes are not eternal, their work may make a major difference in development alternatives.
A final and important role of these private institutes is to bring scientific knowledge about their national settings, to the attention of foreign audiences. However, officially marginalized in their own milieu, they are beginning to get a respectable hearing in influential circles abroad.

Principal Research Foci and Fields

Among the Southern Cone network of private research centers, one finds an immense diversity of programmatic themes and specific research topics that are being treated either collectively or individually by the participating professionals. A simple list of all projects completed or now underway would appear to be a highly eclectic and scattered assortment. Nonetheless, as one begins to inspect this research more closely, one begins to discern a number of unifying threads and concerns, as well as a number of subject areas that are receiving special and sustained attention.

At the most basic level, all of the research conducted by these private centers represents an attempt to dissect and analyze the national reality in which they are imbedded, with the implicit or explicit purpose of using this empirical base as a platform for devising more human and equitable development strategies for the future.

Within this quadrant, a fairly substantial body of work has been devoted to studies of the historical roots and causes of the present scenario in the Southern Cone. The assumption is that a more informed understanding of the key factors leading up to the current epidemic of repressive, military governments is an essential element in elaborating more feasible solutions and strategies in the future. Work in this area ranges from the highly specific (e.g., research on the impact of certain concrete policies of the Unidad Popular Government of Chile on the subsequent turn of events) to the more general (e.g., a study of the sources, content and evolution of authoritarian ideologies in the Southern Cone in the 20th century.) What binds these studies together is a common intent to use the past as a means of gaining a more meaningful and systematic understanding of the present.

Another significant body of work is devoted to documenting and analyzing the present trajectory of events and, more specifically, to assessing the empirical changes that are occurring both in major sectoral areas (the educational system, rural organization, the urban labour force, et al.) and in the global organization of society. The purposes of this research are multiple. At one level, they are intended to "bear witness" to what is occurring, particularly in terms of the welfare of
the poorer sectors of the population. At another level, these studies are challenging much of the official dogmas about the efficacy and benefits of the economic and social models now implanted in the Southern Cone. And, finally, the researchers involved in this stream of investigation are convinced that any viable developmental solutions for the future must be squarely grounded on an empirically-based diagnosis of present realities. If they are elaborated without such a data-hard platform, they are likely to be merely utopian.

Many of the studies in this area, not surprisingly, are clustered around the economy, both at the macro- and micro-level, with specific emphasis on the social costs and implications of current economic policy. A second cluster is focused on the rural sector, again with special attention to the effects of present policies on the welfare of the rural population. Three other major targets of investigation are the educational system, population (with particular attention to the labour force), and the effects of present policy on urban and regional development. Again, as in the other areas of research, the effects of the present system on social welfare is a primary concern.

A third but smaller group of studies is now being focused on alternative strategies for the future. Again, the economists are taking the lead here, but not without taking social and political variables into account. Researchers in education, the urban field, and rural development are also beginning to turn their attention to the future, albeit recognizing that they still have substantial "social book-keeping" to do on the present before delving too far and too fast into the realm of concrete policy options. Finally, across the thematic and problem-oriented board, a fairly numerous group of researchers is beginning to consider in common -through from their different disciplinary and problem-oriented perspectives- ways of reconstituting a new democratic and participatory order in the Southern Cone as the framework for any concrete policy prescriptions and alternatives they may elaborate.

Whether focusing on the past, the present or the future, one of the major concerns infusing the investigations now underway at the Southern Cone's private research centers is the role of the state and public policy in the affairs of society and its citizenry. Even when the main topic of research lies elsewhere, on rural development, economic policy, et alia, the impact of the state is a variable that continually rises to the surface.

**Principal Problems**

Each of the private social science research centers spread across the Southern Cone has -in varying degree- its own share of small, internal, specific difficulties. However, at
the macro-level, there are a number of major problems that virtually all of these centers share in common and that may, indeed, eventually affect the health and vitality of them all. The key problem continues to be the same which brought them into being in the first place — the absence of any other mechanisms within a society for the scientific study of social structure and processes and an environment hostile to any reflection of this nature. Today, the principal manifestation of this is economic.

All of the economies of the Southern Cone are characterized by a dual phenomenon: a steadily increasing inflation combined with an artificially low and relatively stable exchange rate for the dollar. That situation is particularly acute in Argentina, where the inflation in 1979 rose more than 150 percent while the dollar, relative to the peso, barely inched its way upward; but all of the Southern Cone countries, to one degree or another, share the same economic circumstance. Since virtually all of the private research centers are wholly dependent for their survival on dollar financing from international donors given the absence of national funds for this type of activity, the effects of the current economic situation on their programs are extremely serious. Operating budgets are constantly escalating, while the value of resources are progressively eroding.

Till now, most of the centers have kept the problem under manageable control by widening their circle of donors and, at the same time, snipping here, paring there, sending researchers out on sabbaticals, and reducing certain program activities. Both these strategies, however, have their limits. The number of potential donor agencies is finite, as is their available budget. On the other side, small program economies cannot continue indefinitely without, in the final analysis, reducing the center concerned to a shell or, equally self-defeating, cutting the intellectual heart out of the program.

A second problem stems directly from the excessive dependence of all these centers on international financing. At an intellectual level, this situation may eventually (albeit not necessarily) produce certain distortions in the research agendas of the centers or produce an "enclave" effect in the societies concerned. At a more instrumental level, given the funding styles of most international donors, the staff of these research institutes must constantly be "selling" projects in order to survive, with virtually no turn-around time between the completion of one major investigation and the preparation of the next research design. Indeed, in most cases the two processes overlap, which must necessarily affect the quality of research production. The degree to which this circumstance affects individual centers is, of course, variable.
Till now, the problem has been moderately alleviated by the fact that the Ford Foundation was willing to provide basic "institutional support" grants to a number of centers, thus giving them a modest but guaranteed platform from which to operate and negotiate specific project support from other donors. Ford is now withdrawing from that style of assistance, which suggests that the problems of survival through the "sale" of projects is likely to be severely exacerbated in the future.

Following on the above, the fact that all of the centers must deal with a multiplicity of donors—each with its own interest, priorities and style of operation—has begun to place an enormous and, indeed, counter-productive burden of paperwork and expended time on the shoulders of the research staff. Since none of these centers can afford much by way of administrative infrastructure, the burden of complying with the demands of various donors falls upon the professionals themselves.

Another order of problem altogether concerns the next generation of social scientists in the Southern Cone. Before the economic crisis began to take on excessive proportions, centers were able to offer interim employment to junior researchers who could, under these circumstances undergo a certain "apprenticeship" experience by working with the senior staff. As money worries have become an overwhelming concern, this kind of program activity has been largely eliminated. On the one hand, this circumstance bodes ill for the future of young, talented social scientists whose options are being increasingly foreclosed. On the other hand, and in the longer run, it will also affect the intellectual vitality of these centers themselves. A final problem resolves around the question of publication. Much of the research now being produced by the network of private centers is circulated in limited mimeographed editions among a necessarily restricted audience. The problem here seems to be not so much one of censorship, but of money (plus a certain lack of expertise about the professional side of the publishing enterprise).

Alternative "Survival Models" in the Southern Cone

The majority of private social science research centers were founded in response to the waves of repression that spread across the Southern Cone in the 1970's and the accompanying purges of the university systems in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay.* The earliest members—CIEPLAN in Chile, CEDES,

* Excluded from this typology are CIE in Argentina and CIDEL in Chile, which existed before the coups and are part of a network of Jesuit-sponsored research institutes that extends around Latin America.
CEUR and CENEP in Argentina, CIESU and CINVE in Uruguay—shared several characteristics in common. First, they were established with full-time research staffs, independent physical facilities, and their own research infrastructure and publication series. Second, apart from some sparse local contract work or occasional staff consulting assignments, these centers were wholly dependent for their survival on funding from international donors. (In fact, all of the centers named above were launched with "institutional-support" grants from the Ford Foundation.) Third, these centers were established with the assumption—whether implicit or explicit—that the emergency through which the countries of the Southern Cone were passing would not be unduly prolonged. Hence, they were not initially concerned about their excessive dependence on international funding. Also, in the economic circumstances of the time, a dollar went a long way and these centers could subsist in austere but adequate circumstances on the grants they could muster on the international circuit.

In the interim, circumstances have changed rather dramatically. In the first place, the Southern Cone "emergency" has become an institutionalized condition and is not likely to run its course in the short-term future. The original private research centers of the type described above (which have since been joined by FLACSO and PIIE in Chile) are in for the long haul. And, given the internal politics of the environments in which they operate, it is unlikely that they will be able in the foreseeable future to generate much by way of local financing to alleviate their dependence on external donors.

Meanwhile, the economic scenario in the Southern Cone has been steadily eroding the value of the support they receive from outside. Their circumstances are no longer simply austere, but in some cases close to the edge of bankruptcy. Accordingly, while this particular "survival model" has been highly successful till now, its viability is no longer so assured as it once was.

The new models now being tested in the Southern Cone are all of relatively recent vintage. The two principal types can be classified either as "holding companies" (the Academy of Christian Humanism and VECTOR in Chile) or research confederations (CIPMA and CENECA in Chile and PEHESA in Argentina) with a certain core infrastructure.

Both the Academy and VECTOR were established to give haven to clusters of scholars displaced from their traditional professional posts. But unlike the earlier model of a private research center, these institutions—apart from a director and some administrative personnel—do not directly employ any full-time staff. Rather, they host research projects that come under their protective umbrella with outside money of their own. They also try to serve as intellectual forums for the community at large across a broad
range of disciplines, as the situs of seminars, roundtables, short courses, et alia, and as a catalyst for free and open dialogue in a repressive environment. Because they are new, it is not yet clear in what direction these two institutions will evolve. Much will depend, undoubtedly on the amount of funds they can generate abroad. Their costs, till now, have been covered from rather restricted sources (the Church, in the case of the Academy, and European Social Democratic sources, in the case of VECTOR.)

The CIPMA-CENECA-PEHESA model also functions without full-time staff, but is a different category of center altogether. These institutes are organized on the basis of a quasi-membership, brought together by a shared interest in a common thematic area (urban and regional studies at CIPMA, culture and society at CENECA, and social and economic history at PEHESA.) Like the Academy and VECTOR, these centers host projects on an interim basis that are financed by monies from the outside. However, in this instance, the centers themselves have a defined research program and a set of research priorities, and they institutionally seek out external financing for one or another project. In addition to research, all three of these centers conduct seminars and undertake occasional teaching. In all three centers, the directors serve ad-honorem. CIPMA's infrastructure costs are covered by membership dues; CENECA has subsisted through a potpourri of local and international contributions; and PEHESA till now has been able to stay in business by using the premises and facilities of another local Argentine center, CISEA. However, this new kind of organization presumes that all researchers associated with the centers can maintain themselves with some form of employment elsewhere.

Conclusions

In short, the future of social science research activity in the Southern Cone currently carried out by private centers appears to be uncertain. This uncertainty comes at a time when the role of the social sciences is more crucial than ever, when many of the more well accepted theories of development are being questioned, and when the need to advance in the scientific study of social structures and processes in Latin America and of Latin America with the rest of the world is most pressing.

The centers and individuals that are addressing alternative models of development that have explored the possibility of bringing together the study of economic efficiency and viability with social equality, are finding it increasingly difficult to operate. They were all created by external support. The societies were not and continue not to be in a position to support them. What then should be the continued role of the external funding at a time of budgetary cuts in general in social science and decreasing buying power of the dollar. This is the subject of the final section of this report.
The previous pages have addressed briefly the effects of the authoritarian regime of the Southern Cone on social sciences, i.e. the elimination of most forms of government support, both financially and politically from social science activity and the subsequent establishment of private research centers funded principally by external donor agencies. The question of viability of the different centers under the present economic condition has been examined basically in terms of the main problems facing the centers today: dependence on outside sources, lack of national funds, inability to carry out training and publication programs. The following examines how external support could best facilitate the viability, not only of the existing centers, but of social science research in general in the Southern Cone. Here the four major programming options appear to be: individual research support, project support, program support, and direct institutional support.

First some preliminary comments on the four options:

1. These options need not be mutually exclusive and can be fruitfully employed in various combinations. The problems faced are too complex to address with unilinear or unidimensional strategies.

2. The private centers share a number of common problems. Conceivably, some of them could be more productively addressed through a centralized or coordinated mechanism with resulting economies of scale for all the centers concerned.

3. While the private research centers share many common characteristics and problems, there are also differences: structural, financial, thematic. These differences argue for flexibility of approach on a case by case basis albeit within the framework of a consistent, coherent, overall set of policies.

4. Finally, the need for any donor agency to set out a policy and specific programs in coordination with the other donor agencies working in the field in order to maximize results and avoid placing unduly diverse and burdensome requirements on the research centers, or inadvertently overemphasizing one line of activity while collectively neglecting another. The most obvious example here is the shift of the Ford Foundation away from institution support (an institution that lacks a bare minimal infrastructure cannot continue to mount productive research programs and projects).
Individual Research Support

A program of individual research support, by itself, will clearly have only a marginal effect in terms of sustaining the network of private centers now operating in the Southern Cone. In combination with other program mechanisms, however, it can be a highly useful form of assistance. Whatever the merits of large-scale programs and projects, the individual investigator is still a crucial figure in the research process. Indeed, if traced back to their source, many of the most productive team programs and projects began as a germinal idea in the work of a single researcher who managed to strike intellectual pay dirt. To close this window altogether would be counter-productive, especially in the prevailing circumstances of the Southern Cone. Aside from the intellectual arguments, some of the tactical advantages of a program of individual research awards can be briefly summarized as follows:

1. For many of the small, private centers in the Southern Cone over the last five years, the ability of individual staff members to qualify for research grants on the international circuit (through such sources as the Social Science Research Council in the U. S., CLACSO, PISPAL, Guggenheim, etc.) has been crucial in enabling the centers to maintain a critical mass of researchers in periods of severe financial strain.

2. Individual research awards permit donor agencies, as well as the recipients themselves, to explore new lines of investigation that may, in the long run, prove highly fruitful. (If they don't, the financial loss will be reasonably small.)

3. Individual research awards also are a means of sustaining talented scholars who may temporarily find themselves adrift without any institutional base, but who might subsequently be absorbed into a more stable setting if given the necessary lead time. (The small group of Uruguayan historians recently incorporated into CINVE are a case in point.)

4. Individual awards can extend the outreach of a donor agency beyond the thin tier of private centers now operating in the Southern Cone, and provide the opportunity to identify and help the isolated scholar who has the potential to make a solid contribution to the overall research enterprise.

However, there are also disadvantages for any assistance agency in maintaining a program of grants for individual scholars. Thus:

1. If a program of individual research awards has any significant size, the burden on the staff capacity of an external assistance agency will be excessive. No single person, or
pair of persons, could possibly read all of the submissions that might be generated from the Southern Cone (let alone judge them with appropriate care.)

2. Equally important, it is unlikely that any assistance agency will have the staff capacity to assess the merits of individual research proposals that will not only be thematically diverse, but would cover the range from economics to anthropology, from social history to political sociology, and on across the disciplinary spectrum.

There are, of course, ways out of this impasse. One might be a system of outside "readers." A second, following the Guggenheim model, would be a network of scholars who are annually invited to assemble in an ad hoc committee to select a small slate of research fellows in Latin America. On a larger scale, however, perhaps the most efficient and constructive mechanism is the CLACSO program of individual research becas for the Southern Cone, in which decisions are made by a seven-member, multidisciplinary jury comprising some of the leading scholars in their fields from Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. CLACSO's annual competition was initially launched in 1975 with a hefty grant from the Ford Foundation, but has subsequently managed to attract funds from other donors who recognize the merits and efficiency of the program.

Project Support

In financial terms, the difference between project and program support can be a very fine line. A comparative, longitudinal survey research project can be far more expensive (and long-term) than a so-called research program. Within the context of the private social science centers of the Southern Cone, however, the distinction is probably worth preserving, even though many of the merits and disadvantages of both approaches may be similar. The advantages of project support — viewed from the perspective of both the donor and the recipient — would seem to be as follows:

1. Project support is finite. Within a definite time horizon, a specific piece of research, mutually considered to be important, will be executed and brought to a publishable conclusion.

2. Project support, if sufficiently ample and well designed, can help a center incorporate younger social scientists into a particular research venture and thus give them — albeit temporarily — a certain apprenticeship under senior supervision that might not be available to them elsewhere in today's Southern Cone.
3. Project support not only can help a center to pursue incrementally its major research concerns, but also—if research salaries are included in the budget—will enable the center to maintain a portion of its staff over a reliable time span. These advantages are especially important for some of the smaller and newer institutions in the Southern Cone.

4. Project support is a means by which an external assistance agency can be constructively helpful while "testing" the quality and viability of a center with which it has not worked before or with which it is insufficiently familiar.

5. Project support, with a reasonable overhead charge built into the budget, can help a small center sustain itself. (If there is no overhead charge, on the other hand, project support can actually cost a center more than it helps.)

While project support has multiple advantages, it also has disadvantages that should be carefully weighed. To wit:

1. If a center is forced to survive solely, or almost completely, on project support, it may find itself leaping at any opportunity for financing, even if the content of the project does not coincide with its main lines of interest or expertise. Now that Ford is withdrawing from institutional support, this problem may be exacerbated in the future.

2. Most project support is based on premises derived from more stable and traditional research settings. That is, if an agency is considering a research proposal submitted by a faculty member of, for example, El Colegio de México or the Catholic University of Perú, the presumption is that the chief investigators (and their institution) are surviving while the research design is elaborated, polished, reviewed and, if necessary, modified. That presumption is non-functional in the case of most private centers in the Southern Cone. Scholars engaged in an ongoing project are under the gun to produce and "sell" a new project before they have completed the first one. The intellectual result is certainly not optimal. Somehow or other, donors should find a means of providing a requisite amount of "turn-around" time in their allocations for project support. Otherwise, the system will defeat its own ends.

3. When a research project is sufficiently ambitious to require financing from more than one donor agency, the problems are multiplied. One donor will want the project to be comparative; a second will insist on the inclusion of extra variables; a third will want an "action" component, etc. One solution would be that donors intent on seeing a research project reach a satisfactory conclusion be prepared to
finance it fully. Another would be coordination among donors, which, however, might be more difficult to achieve in this terrain.

4. Finally, project support, if not carefully allocated, can distort the intellectual balance of a private research center.

Program Support

While many of the comments about project support will also apply to program support, there are, of course, important differences. First, many of the institutions included in the roster do not have distinct "programs" in any meaningful sense of the term. Clusters of projects under a broad umbrella do not necessarily add up to an internally consistent, coherent and accumulative program. In other words, program support is not necessarily appropriate for all private research centers in the Southern Cone. In cases where it is suitable, however, it would seem to have several important advantages, as follows:

1. Program support normally has a longer time frame than project support. It, therefore, gives the recipient center a greater stability and assurance of being able to carry out its intended work.

2. The results of program support, since they are likely to be cumulative, can be far more significant than a scattered spray of projects.

3. Program support enables a cluster of researchers to work together on a central set of projects without the constant distraction of having to market a new project before the year is out. Undoubtedly, that relative security over a period of three years or so will add to their intellectual productivity.

The problems of program support are in many ways similar to those entailed in project support. The big difference is that the magnitude of money is greater and, hence, the possibility of distorting a center's intellectual balance is commensurately higher. In the final analysis, program support will be most productive and advantageous when it responds to the priorities and purposes that the recipient center has defined for itself a priori.

Institutional Support

One cannot reasonably discuss the issue of institutional support without considering such issues as magnitude, duration, et alia. Grants under this rubric can range from a capital
Endowment of significant size to a modest, annual contribution of $20,000 to cover some core operating costs for a few years. There are multiple permutations in between.

The basic feature of institutional support, in any of its several guises, is that it is untied to any specific piece of research (although it may certainly be tied to specific line items, such as salaries, publications, administrative infrastructure, library acquisitions, or other basic operating needs.) Among those advantages provided by institutional support within an overall program of support for the social sciences are:

1. A modest amount of institutional support can insure that a small private center will have the necessary platform from which to negotiate more significant project and program support on the international circuit.

2. Institutional support can help insure that a center will have at least the minimal infrastructure required to sustain important research projects and to keep its staff together between projects.

3. At a less tangible level, the willingness of a respected donor agency to help bankroll a Southern Cone center could be an important factor in bringing other donors into the play.

4. Institutional support can help a center parley its resources and research into something exceeding the sum of its parts. (For example: CPES in Paraguay has for some years used its institutional support from the Ford Foundation to enrich the research conducted under contract with such narrowly focused agencies as AID.)

Conclusions

Keeping in mind the observations that appear at the beginning of this section: the need for a combination of strategies; the need to search for economies of scale in certain phases of a research process; the need for flexibility and, finally; the need for coordination among donor agencies, the following conclusions can be reached concerning the role of external donor agencies in guaranteeing the continuation of social science research activity in the Southern Cone:

1. There is a need to provide core institutional support to some of the centers in order to insure their continuation.
2. Core institutional support should not exclude the possibility of program or project support but rather provide the necessary platform from which to negotiate other forms of support by maintaining a minimal infrastructure and staff between projects.

3. Each center should be analyzed separately under a common policy of keeping together a group of researchers and allowing sufficient financial breathing space in order to elaborate projects, carry out training activities, and continue with lines of research not necessarily tied to projects.

4. Program Support should be the first option in centers organized in such a way as to be able to receive this option, i.e. organization of staffing and research priorities. At the present, this appears to be more the case in centers with more subject specific areas such as economics or education. In other cases, project support can be designed so as to facilitate a transition to Program Support.

5. Project Support as a flexible and innovative mechanisms should continue for the social sciences research centers in the Southern Cone. However, it should be administered in such a fashion so as to insure that the project indeed responds to the priority of the center; and that it can be to a certain extent abstracted from the research program (if such a program exists;) in other words, projects should be more high risk, both for the center as well as for the donor agency.

6. Each center should be analyzed comprehensively and a package of institutional-program or project support designed and negotiated both with the center and within the Social Sciences Division of the IDRC, in order to insure the coordination of the donor agency itself internally and with other agencies.

7. Individual research support should continue through existing regional mechanisms, some traditionally supported by the Center, FLACSO, PISPAL, others, that cover slightly different subject areas and clients, should be included, such as SSRC, USA, which have the qualified manpower to judge and administer support of this nature.

8. Careful consideration should be given to support within an existing or new region framework for documentation and publication activities, in order to devise economies of scale for these increasing expensive and neglected activities. The same holds true for meeting and other communication activities among the scientific community.

9. Finally, in view of reduced budgets and increased demands, both qualitatively and in time, the support for social sciences in the Southern Cone must be handled on a more systematic and coordinated basis by IDRC with the explicit purpose of guaranteeing their continued viability.
PART II

Uruguay

CIESU (Centro de Informaciones y Estudios del Uruguay)

Background

CIESU's origins are deeply entwined with the political changes that ousted the elected government of Uruguay in 1973 and dissolved the congress. CIESU founder, Carlos Filgueira, at the time of the coup was the director of the Institute of Social Sciences of the university which was intervened soon after the takeover by the military. The first research undertaken by CIESU was financed by the United Nations as part of a regional study of brain drain which included Uruguay. The first institutional core support was given in 1975 by Ford Foundation (20,000 yearly for two years, renewable up to seven years.) IDRC support for CIESU commenced in 1976 with a project on the graphics industry.

Prior to the coup, the relationship between social scientists and the public sector had passed through a stage of close collaboration during which the development theories of CEPAL had considerable impact. (Many social scientists were advisors to the government in the development plan of the agricultural sector.) However, in the period immediately before the takeover, the university and researchers, in line with the general crisis of the Uruguayan society, were in opposition to the government.

In 1973, with the intervention of the university, the Institute of Social Sciences was rapidly disbanded and its staff replaced by non-professionals. At the moment of the coup, there was only one private center of significance, Economía Humana, tied to the Catholic Church. After 1973, Economía Humana assumed a stronger role, in part in response to the disappearance of social science research activity within the government and university.

Until 1973, the Uruguayan social science community at large had shied away from assistance from international agencies, including not only such U. S. donors as AID or the Ford and
Rockefeller Foundations, but also the United Nations, the OAS. et alia. As a result, in 1973 the community could not immediately plug into the international circuit in ways that their Argentine and Chilean colleagues could. It took them some time to develop the necessary contacts and institutional channels to fill this breach.

Along the same line, before the coup, few Uruguayans took advantage of fellowship opportunities for study in Europe or North America. Any advanced training they undertook outside Uruguay was normally confined to Latin America (e.g., FLACSO, CELADE, etc.) Since the University of the Republic was, in its heyday, one of the best institutions of higher learning in Latin America, the Uruguayans developed solid professional competence in their specialties, although somewhat isolated from the mainstream of international social science.

CIESU was founded in 1974. The first years were heavily dependent on personal resources of the researchers and outside funding, crucial not only to survival, but for the legitimacy and protection it provided. CIESU as a research institute perceives its role as one of responding not to the demands of a society for research but rather as being concerned with keeping open social science research in the country. Although taken independently the researchers can identify the directions they would want their work to assume—for example the analysis of the labour force, employment, changes in social stratification, or policy analysis—the selection of research has been determined mainly by where funding has been available. Working within the most consistently and profoundly repressive setting in the Southern Cone, CIESU survives in Uruguay taking a less critical line against the government than researchers working outside the country, absorbing new, young researchers with considerably lower salaries than they could earn abroad.

**Economic Situation**

The present budget of CIESU is approximately US$130,000 made up of many small projects and grants. The budget is 100 percent dependent on foreign sources, a situation which has made CIESU vulnerable under the present monetary policy of the government which maintains the dollar exchange rate below actual value. In practice this has meant that CIESU losses approximately 20 percent on its budget each year (inflation 40%, devaluation 20%). 90 percent of CIESU budget goes toward salaries, which absorb most of the loss of value of the dollar. (For example, a middle level government official earns approximately US$1,000 monthly, a private physician between US$3,000 and US$4,000, while a senior researcher in CIESU US$700.)
There is scant chance of funds being made available to CIESU for research in the immediate or mid-term future from national sources. Their only alternative is external funding.

The Ford institutional grant of 20,000 yearly will end in 1982, and is not renewable although the prospect of project support is open. Presently, CIESU has a staff of eight full-time senior social scientists two or more of which study abroad each year. There are four junior researchers and an administrative staff including a librarian. (Average salary for senior is 700, junior 400, administration 300.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>1980</th>
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<tr>
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<td>ECIEL</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
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Institutional Viability

CIESU is probably the single institution in Uruguay with the capacity to maintain a tradition of competent, empirically-based, pluralistic work in the non-economic social sciences. Were the center to disappear, the next generation would have to start from scratch. CIESU has multidisciplinary capacity—sociology, political sciences, demography, and now history—with which to deal with a wide range of problem areas and issues. In addition, the center has the finest social science library in Uruguay, which is an invaluable resource for what remains of the intellectual community at large, as well as for students. The center is well plugged into the Latin American network, both at the policy level (Filgueira's annual consulting assignments for CEPAL) and at the level of CLACSO commissions, ECIEL, PISPAL, PROTAAL collaborative projects, et alia.

In terms of results, the CIESU staff have published a steady and considerable number of monographs of good professional level.

However, in order to survive, CIESU has had to tackle just about any research project for which it can obtain funding. Precisely because CIESU has not been able to establish a
coherent intellectual identity and a set of consistent research interests and priorities, it is ipso facto at the mercy of any international donor agency that comes along.

One alternative that would help resolve this immediate dependence of external project funds would be to establish some mechanisms for longer-term funding such as program support or eventually an endowment set up among a pool of agencies, the capital of which would remain constant and the center would be supported by the earnings, subject to conditions and evaluation by the donor agencies.

Support of this nature could cover those areas most difficult to finance by traditional project funding sources, such as history (a small group of historians presently survives in CIESU maintained by funds from other grants.) Areas with more possibility of support, such as population and women's studies, would continue under projects.

CINVE (Centro de Investigaciones Económicas)

The information from CINVE is somewhat different from that on the other institutions visited. The reason for this is that CINVE is going through a reorganization that will affect its staff and financial base.

The second semester of 1980 is an important turning point for CINVE regarding the definition of future activity. Although the center is young (five years since its foundation and three years of effective research) the time that has passed has permitted the development of a different perspective on research and a greater confidence in the stability and continuation of CINVE. Up to the present, achievements include: the institutional consolidation of the center, the grouping together of researchers in the area of economics, and the insertion of CINVE in a national and international research community while participating as much as possible in the academic life of the country. CINVE has produced results in the areas of technology and the effects of economic policy on the development of various sectors. These studies have covered the period between 1959 and 1977, a period which marked the transition to the open liberal economic model applied today. The studies have focused on: the cattle raising sector of the economy, policy impact, and the process of generation, dissemination and adoption of technology; the links between technology and employment; and export industries, specifically leather and the impact of economic policy on exports.
The first semester of 1980 marked the completion of the majority of the work undertaken in these areas. CINVE is beginning to look toward a longer term strategy together with a program to train younger researchers and to send researchers abroad for graduate studies.

The basic objective of the program which CINVE is putting together for the next period of its operation is the analysis of the economic process that has occurred in Uruguay since 1973. No such interpretation has been carried out in the country on this period, during which there were important changes in the international scene which greatly affected Uruguay. Five areas will be included in this overall analysis: economic policy, financial structures, external sector, agro-industries, and the state.

This program has commenced with the incorporation of CINVE in the regional program of CEDES, CIEPLAN, and CEBRAP on comparative policies of economic normalization in the Southern Cone. As part of these projects, CINVE presented the proposal to IDRC on exchange rate policy, inflation and relative prices. In the area of financial structures, CINVE presently has no professionals who are carrying out research. They hope to bring in a new person who will be in charge of this area. In the studies of the external sector, CINVE is carrying out a study with ECIEL on the evaluation of the policy of export promotion. This area will be expanded. The area of agro-industries is where CINVE has done much of its past work. Studies will open new areas and will analyze these in relation to the economic policy of the country.

The putting into practice of a program of research integrated in the fashion described above will demand a number of adjustments in the actual structure and functioning of the center. These structural changes will permit the continuation of previous research and the advancement of the five program areas, so that these can be brought together for an overall interpretation of the economic phenomena of Uruguay.

This program will imply that financial support for CINVE will need greater flexibility in order for CINVE to manage its resources with relative independence in regard to areas. The financing of a program on the basis of projects would run the risk of an inefficient distribution of resources and the possible distortion of the objectives of the program. Once a program grant that would cover the five areas described above is guaranteed, CINVE will look to outside sources of funding only for specific projects. CINVE is planning to carry out a program of this nature with a staff of no more than ten researchers including both junior and senior. Additional researchers would be brought in to reinforced certain areas.
Politically, at the moment, CINVE sees itself passing through a very crucial period. The conditions do not exist to make public statements and the center must be more careful than ever given the possibility of a new constitution and elections next year. CINVE has made a niche for itself in Uruguay under the present regime with the modest, small studies carried out on very specific issues. What it will try to do now is much more ambitious, and to a certain extent more fundamental, in that it will attempt an analysis of economic policy in Uruguay since 1973 on the basis of official data and in coordination with similar studies carried out in other countries in the Southern Cone. CINVE will begin to point out alternative and long-term consequences of these policies. To a certain extent, this means that, in Uruguay, CINVE will become the national planning office out of the government. It will carry the national accounts. This program would also permit setting up a training program for younger researchers, something which is not possible in the university as it operates today.

The above bring to mind a number of questions, such as how much does this cost, how can it be set up in some way which insures continuity, and how can junior researchers be integrated in a program? Luis Macadar, the head of CINVE, will present, before the end of the year, the plan for the economics research program of CINVE and with it personnel and budget requirements. By this time, the first small grant in the economics unit to CINVE entitled "Exchange Rate Policy, Inflation and Relative Prices" should be approved, this will mean that for 1980-1981 IDRC's link with CINVE will be solely on the basis of this project. This should have careful monitoring, both academically and administratively, in order to decide by mid 1981 if it will be possible to support CINVE in a more ambitious economics program, specifically covering the five points mentioned above.

Paraguay

CPES (Centro Paraguayo de Estudios Sociológicos)

The situation in Paraguay is quite different from that observed in the other countries of the Southern Cone. The dictatorship of Stroessner has gone on for over 25 years. This means in practical terms, that Paraguay has had the same minister of education for the last 25 years. The situation of social sciences is also very different from that of the other countries. There is only one center effectively functioning in an independent open critical line in regard to social sciences. This is the Centro Paraguayo de Estudios Sociológicos directed by Domingo Rivarola.
The history of the Centro Paraguayo de Estudios Sociológicos, CPES, is very much the history of Domingo Rivarola. He began his contact with the social science through his role in the Paraguayan University as a student leader. Later he was much influenced by Gino Germani and Argentine social scientists.

The role of CPES in Paraguay under Rivarola is not the same as that of the other social science centers of the Southern Cone. These, apart from all other functions, are trying to preserve the remnants of what was once a flourishing, vibrant, wide-ranging social science community. CPES, by contrast, is trying to build a tradition of empirically-based, scientific research and analysis where none existed before. In line with the above, in its early years CPES undertook a number of functions that social science centers elsewhere in the Southern Cone do not need to do, for example, (1) the sheer generation of data in what was virtually a data vacuum (e.g., on population, educational enrollment, et al.); (2) the preparation of basic research bibliographies as a resource for any scholar who might subsequently undertake investigation in and on Paraguay; (3) the establishment of the first documentation center in the country; and (4) the launching of the first social science journal in Paraguay. Quite a bit of this early work was highly eclectic, an effort to fill in a seemingly endless number of holes. But it paid off, and CPES can now address itself to pursuing a more cohesive and longer-term program of research.

As the only group attempting to carry out social science research activity in Paraguay, CPES has contacts with the international funding agencies which finance research in other countries of the region. These contacts are facilitated by the fact that Rivarola is in close contact with CLACSO and has participated on its Board of Directors. This has allowed him to travel in the region and establish links with other centers. It also allowed him to set up with CLACSO the first CLACSO course on rural sociology which was held in Paraguay. Funding sources have been varied, including AID, Interamerican Foundation, Ford, and IDRC, for projects covering basically two areas: rural development and education. As a result of outside funding sources the center has been able to consolidate an institutional base, purchase a house, and acquire equipment which permits a minimum of self-financing at least in the administrative aspects of the center. They have purchased a photocopying machine which allows CPES to finance their own photocopying, and a computer processing equipment which is rented out and thereby provides another source of funding. The CPES operates on an annual budget of approximately US$80,000, made up of funds from the Ford Foundation (institutional), IDRC support for projects, support from Interamerican Foundation for a rural development project and the support from ECIEL.
Today, CPES has reached what can be considered a stage of institutional stability. They are faced with the questions of where they will go next in terms of institutional orientation and lines of research. This need for institutional definition comes in a time when Paraguay is passing through a series of changes which will considerably alter the structure of society as it has been up to the present. These changes are caused by the gigantic new investments and infrastructure in hydroelectric power together with Argentina and Brazil which are being done in Paraguay. This will represent a great increase in cheap hydroelectric power which will naturally affect industrial development of the country.

Paraguay, which has been essentially an agriculture country up till now, is beginning to witness processes of increased urbanization and industrialization. This will affect the demands on education and development programs throughout the country.

Among all the other changes being generated by the massive hydroelectric project, and the consequent arrival of all manner of international banks and companies on the local scene, is a widespread demand for short-term consultant services, feasibility studies, et al. Rivarola and his colleagues could probably make a fortune in this new marketplace. It is a temptation, however, that he would like to avoid. The reasoning is the following: Paraguay is changing. Most significant, General Stroessner is now 65 and, for the first time in 25 years, people are beginning to talk openly of alternative futures. If and when a new (and perhaps more enlightened) generation of governors and planners arrive on the scene, CPES is probably the only institution in the country that would be capable of providing them with the wide-ranging, empirical data, analysis and diagnoses of important national development issues that could be the bases for effective policy-formulation. Rivarola would be loath to trade in the long-term potential of this contribution for the immediate financial rewards of short-term feasibility studies.

As a center, CPES has always been concerned with the issue of self-financing. They have acquired the house where they operate and, as mentioned above, the equipment which permits a minimum self-financing of administration. Given the favorable conditions on urban land prices, they are now in a position where they could sell the house they have purchased and use the land for a building where they could have a number of floors in addition to generating income from rent. They are also considering the alternative of selling the present local and building a permanent site in the outskirts of Asunción. The issues of institutional stability, as well as those of formation of human resources, appear, therefore, to if not be solved, to at least
have planned for. The center now has two individuals with doctoral level degrees, Luis Galeano and Ramón Fogel, who will be returning this year with their Ph.D.s. CPES has an ongoing seminar with recent graduates of sociology on methodology, as well as a permanent seminar with a group of bilingual studies to give them elements of social science methodology. On a regional and international level, the center continues to play an active role in CLACSO, specially regarding the area of rural sociology, and ECIEL where they have participated in the education program. Internationally, they have signed an agreement with the University of Illinois whereby they exchange scholars and carry out joint work. They have recently acquired an IBM composer and hope through this to be able to undertake their own documentation and publication activities whereby they will be able to disseminate considerably more information from Paraguay than they have in the past. In documentation, they form part, together with the Instituto di Tella in Argentina, and CIESU in Uruguay, of the Regional Documentation System, SEDOC SUR.

CPES is indeed a unique resource in Paraguay. In its way, it probably plays a more critical role in its national setting than any single one of its companion centers elsewhere in the Southern Cone. CPES is remarkably productive, especially given the size of its staff. Not only does it undertake a considerable body of research and publish with consistent regularity, but it also takes the time to offer training to students and to offer counsel to visiting researchers, ministry officials (especially from the education ministry), and any other relevant callers.

CPES is modestly increasing the size of its staff by bringing in junior researchers and, in the process, is extending its multidisciplinary range and capacity.

The main lines of research of the Centro Paraguayo de Estudios Sociológicos have been education and rural development. The former under the direction of Grazziella Corvalán and the latter under the direction of Domingo Rivarola. In education they have carried out a study of determinants and costs of education with ECIEL as well as work on vocational education. They have also worked in the area of bilingualism and have done a small survey on rural education and literacy, in addition to work on teachers. Today, with the changes rapidly occurring in Paraguayan society, they continue to see as priority the area of technical and vocational education. This would be closely related to the studies they have begun on rural education in order to complete the cycle from the studies of illiteracy in rural areas and problems of primary education to the study of the possibilities of diversified and technical secondary education.
CPES has had two projects with IDRC. The first as part of the regional study on population distribution policies and the second a study of colonization under the population program. They have two new proposals on the table: "Formación Técnica y Desempeño Ocupacional en el Sector Industrial", and "Tecnología Agropecuaria Apropiada".

The education project is a much more modest proposal than that of technology. It is a fourteen-month study of approximately US$50,000 which would study the demand in the Paraguayan industry for trained human resource. This would include a typology of industries in the country and demands by types and sectors. It would also include an analysis of the present curriculae and available sources of technical and vocational education, concluding with recommendations on new curriculum and orientations of technical and vocational education.

The technology project would be much more ambitious and would center first on a typology by regions of the country and a break down of uses of different types of technology in the agricultural sector. This project would also include rural education aspects.

CPES has carried out a large diversity of projects, given mainly the need to have outside financing and the necessity to adopt their own program to where funds are available. The idea of having one large project, which would be a project but also to a certain extent an institutional program of rural technology (which could also integrate many of their rural education components) would be perhaps the most appropriate line of activity of IDRC with CPES over the next two years.

Argentina

CEUR (Centro de Estudios Urbanos y Regionales)

CEUR is not really a new institution, but rather the reincarnation of an older entity. CEUR was originally established in November 1961 as a center for urban and regional studies at the National University of the Litoral in Rosario (under the acronym IPRUL.) The leading force behind the group was Jorge Enrique Hardoy, recently returned to Argentina with a degree from the Harvard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies. Hardoy was then, and continues to be, a Renaissance man in the urban field, with a record of production that extends from studies of pre-Columbian cities to research con contemporary Cuba's urban reforms to technical "think pieces" connected with HABITAT and similar developmental enterprises. He enjoys an international reputation (and, in fact, was offered tenure
some years ago by Kingman Brewster, then president of Yale University, with the mandate to establish a new graduate program for Yale in the urban studies field.) Under Hardoy's leadership, CEUR developed as a multidisciplinary unit with the capacity for highly applied work in municipal and regional planning and, at the same time, a critical preoccupation with urban and regional development theory. By the late 1960's, they had emerged as the preeminent group in their field in Latin America. (The only remotely comparable institution in the region was CIDU, founded at Chile's Catholic University in 1966, which hit its creative peak in the early 1970's under Guillermo Geisse's leadership, but then lost much of its excitement — and much of its personnel — in the wake of the Chilean military coup of 1973.)

All Argentine institutions have had their share of trauma in the last 15 years. CEUR, however, seems to have suffered a higher quotient of vicissitudes and upsets than most. In 1965, the basic core of what was then IPBUL was ousted from the University of the Litoral in an intramural power play. With Hardoy at the helm, most of the team migrated to Buenos Aires and found temporary haven under the umbrella of the National Council for Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET.) From that precarious base, they subsequently were able to negotiate a more permanent arrangement with the University of Buenos Aires. However, six months after they had settled into that institutional niche, they were again precipitously dislodged by the actions of the Ongania military regime (which threw out Argentina's elected president, Arturo Illia, in June 1966.) Their next recourse was to become an associate center of the Di Tella Institute, which provided them with institutional and juridical cover. A year thereafter, with the active encouragement of the Ford Foundation (which was about to make an endowment grant of $2.1 million to di Tella), CEUR was directly incorporated into the Institute as one of its core social science centers. That marriage, despite recurring acrimony, endured for almost a decade. By 1977, however, the tensions between CEUR and the new Di Tella leadership had reached the breaking point and what was left of CEUR's senior members (Yujnovsky, Vapnarsky and Gazzoli) decided early in the year to strike out on their own as a private, independent center.* The Ford Foundation gave support so that

* Hardoy, at this point, had been forced by political circumstances to take up residence in England. José Luis Coraggio, CEUR's best theoretician, had fallen afoul of the military regime and fled to Mexico. Alejandro Rofman, another talented "senior," had found it prudent to accept a job in Brazil. And Oscar Moreno, CEUR's most provocative "young Turk," had been impelled by the same set of political events to settle in Venezuela.
this could be possible. The group was set up in a small office with CEDES and CISEA in March 1977. In 1977, with support from IDRC and SAREC, it was able to set up the independent locale it has today.

With a grant from the Ford Foundation, CEUR, in 1972, had launched an experimental, tutorial graduate program in urban and regional studies. Although the program only went through two full cycles and had to be terminated in 1976, it left CEUR with a pool of reasonably well-trained young researchers who could be drawn upon as junior staff for the new, private center. Second, following the Chilean coup of 1973, the seat of the CLACSO Commission on Urban and Regional Development had been transferred from CIDU in Santiago to CEUR. The Commission, which had a four-year grant of approximately $60,000 per year from the Ford Foundation, gave CEUR a regional presence and projection. Also, since CEUR housed a portion of SIAP's publishing program, the new center's regional outreach, even with a seriously depleted staff, was enhanced further.

In the last year, Hardoy and Rofman have returned to Argentina and to CEUR. Coraggio will not return in the near future (since he is still listed as a "fugitive" by the Argentine authorities.) Moreno's future is uncertain. And, perhaps most important, the Ford Foundation's grant for the CLACSO Commission has expired.

Today, CEUR has moved away from theoretical studies to what could be called semi-applied studies. Previously, CEUR was more concerned with the development of theory in regard to urban and regional development in Latin America, including the discussion on development poles and decentralization. Today, it sees its role in the continuation of a social science research activity in the area of urban and regional development and in maintaining a critical and analytical stance in regard to the changes occurring in Argentinian society, complemented by the dissemination of materials and the participation in as many forums as possible. The possibility of some support from the government or from public institutions for this work is quite remote. The possibility of being able to participate as consultants for projects is also unlikely although CEUR is working in the Municipality of Río Negro in a study of policies of regional development with a daily of Río Negro which is financing a series of journalist articles on regional development.

In addition to urban studies and studies of housing, at the Latin American level, CEUR is working on the urban history of Argentina and in the analysis of the socio-economic effects of the urban codes in Buenos Aires on the popular sectors. In training, once the post-graduate program with di Tella was terminated, which included approximately 12 students with full
time scholarships for two years, CEUR has set up a system of tutoring based on their research projects. These training activities are carried out in close collaboration with national and regional centers among these CISEA, FLACSO, and IDES. In the future, there is a possibility of a training program linked with the Colegio de Graduados del Instituto Económico which wants to develop activities in the center and provinces of Argentina and which would request that CEUR carry these out.

The immediate and mid-term institutional viability of CEUR is quite uncertain. It is not the case here to go into an evaluation of the quality of the work, as this is internationally recognized as one of the leading centers in urban and regional studies in Latin America, with a continued history of training and publications and a strong regional vocation. However, there appears to be a real emergency at the moment which puts in doubt the future of CEUR. Its present budget of approximately US$200,000 is made up of institutional support from IDRC, Ford Foundation, and SAREC. Both IDRC and Ford Foundation support will terminate this year. The rest of the budget is composed of smaller amounts connected to projects. Of these, two are national funding sources, the Río Negro newspaper and US$10,000 from the province of Misiones. CEUR is attempting to develop other sources of national support, but finds this unlikely as it would imply evolving institutionally from an academic and training center to a consulting firm which would certainly modify the fundamental objectives of the institution. Ford Foundation has informed CEUR that they will not be given further institutional support and that the prospect of project support is remote although not impossible.

CEUR will have a deficit beginning next year of some significance. CEUR is collaborating with CEDES and CIEPLAN in an attempt to develop more viable long-term strategies for survival as centers in the Southern Cone. This will include an in-depth analysis of their budget structures, sources of financing, and administrative costs. A longer-term strategy of institutional assistance would mean modifications of the present structure of CEUR, cut downs in staff, and changes in administration and publication costs. This modification will include for example cases such as those of visiting scholars, presently housed in CEUR which rather than representing any earning to CEUR implies liabilities in space and assistance. (Visiting scholars do not pay overhead to CEUR under present agreement.)

One of the ways IDRC could assist at this point of CEUR's evolution would be to support the development of mechanisms by which professional activities could finance some operations without distorting the academic and essentially analytic nature of CEUR together with its training function. It is towards this difficult balance that IDRC transition funds for program, project, or institutional support would be oriented.
CEDES (Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad)

CEDES was founded in 1975 by a small group of social scientists in Buenos Aires who had earlier been affiliated with the Torcuato di Tella Institute.* In essence, CEDES was created to serve as a base for research on the political and socio-economic realities of Argentina and, more generally, Latin America. For CEDES' staff, this ambitious research agenda is not an academic exercise. Rather, confronting a harsh and repressive political environment, they want to use their professional skills to explore and analyze the dynamics of the contemporary Argentine State and to examine the relationships among the state, civil society, the economy, social classes, and various bureaucratic and political actors. The implicit notion is that a more informed understanding of these phenomena is a necessary precondition for formulating more efficacious and democratic solutions for the future.

CEDES' preoccupation with the state and politics in part reflects the fact that the original group of founding members were all trained in political science. It also reflects, however, the Argentine situation.

By all standard indicators (income per capita, education, density of population, et alia) Argentina is far in advance of almost any other underdeveloped country. Its politics, however, are not. Since 1930, with the exception of Juan Perón in his first term of office, not a single elected president in Argentina has served out his prescribed period in the 'Casa Rosada (and Perón was jettisoned by the armed forces during his second elected term). This contradiction between socio-economic affluence and advance, on the one hand, and political instability, desarray and outright violence, on the other, flies in the face of most conventional paradigms and the mainstream of so-called "development literature."

Although the initial CEDES staff was almost entirely composed of political scientists, after a short time they recognized that their research agenda demanded a multidisciplinary approach. Thus, they recruited two sociologists (Elizabeth Jelin and, subsequently, Jorge Balán) and then rounded out their ranks with a nucleus of economists (Adolfo Canitrot, Roberto Frenkel and Guillermo Flichman.) While each discipline has its

* In the period 1974-78, through a series of curious, internal purges, the di Tella Institute not only lost some of its most talented individual researchers, but also spun off whole clusters of people who subsequently regrouped as CEDES, CEUR, CENEP and CISEA.
own requirements, approaches and methodologies, CEDES is trying to insure that there is no rigid division between economics and the "softer" social sciences. Rather, there is an attempt to achieve a synthesis of the different perspectives that each discipline brings to bear on the problems of the real world. CEDES' staff are now firmly linked into a broad network of scholars concerned with such questions as governance, democratic organization, the evolving economic order, and a host of other issues that are beginning to bedevil underdeveloped and developed countries alike.

Between 1975 and 1979, the center's staff published 22 articles and 5 books (not to mention a voluminous body of essays and monographs that circulated in the form of memographed "working papers"). Moreover, CEDES' publications have attracted a broad audience that extends well beyond the borders of Argentina. The in-house series, Estudios CEDES, circulates throughout Latin America. CEDES materials also have been accepted for publication in Studies in Comparative International Development, Latin American Perspectives, the Latin American Research Review, and the occasional papers published by the Institute for the Study of Human Issues in Philadelphia and the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C.

As mentioned above, CEDES, as CISEA, began under the covering of di Tella, and CIAP. In 1975 they were given a rapid transition grant from the Ford Foundation of US$125,000 for three years and a grant of a further US$225,000 for an additional three years. With this last grant, institutional support from the Foundation will terminate. They have received other institutional support from SAREC US$55,000 in 1978, US$80,000 in 1979, and US$82,000 in 1980. When CEDES was first established, approximately 10% of these funds went to administrative costs. Now, these have increased to almost 35% including publications, infrastructure, administration and maintenance. Earlier, the institutional support they received went towards projects and enabled CEDES to carry people over between projects. Now this is needed for administrative support.

In terms of staff, CEDES has at the moment eight full-time researchers. Their core group is ten, but two are presently abroad. Earlier, they had reached almost twenty researchers. Their budget for 1980 is US$400,000. Salaries are managed on the basis of a cooperative whereby levels are kept the same for all senior and for all junior researchers, and project money which comes in at specific salary levels is adjusted.

The question to be examined concerning CEDES, the institution with by far the largest budget of any visited, are similar to those raised in an evaluation carried out on CEDES in 1979 by Richard Fagen of Stanford University,
Dudley Seers of the Institute of Development Studies, and Adam Przeworski of the University of Chicago. In this document, no questions are raised on the quality or importance of the work of CEDES and of the great courage of the researchers working under such adverse conditions in Buenos Aires. They do questions some of the style of operation and some of the staffing and training policy and administration and reappointment issue. The doubts concern the long-term institutional viability of what is basically a cooperative of high level researcher, competing for projects at an international and national level. CEDES itself is conscious of this problem and is beginning to work more with sending some of its researchers outside the country and, therefore, reducing institutional pressure on staff salaries. They are also looking towards more sources of national funds, more realistic ways of dealing with administrative costs, and the design of a training program for junior researchers. They are in contact with other centers (CEUR and CTEPLAN) on this, and specifically are looking for ways of reaching economies of scales in documentation and publications.

CEDES would indeed be a center to be examined for institutional or program support. This support would be oriented towards a transition of CEDES to perhaps a smaller group with more people in and out of the country, and would address the issue of national support, not only financial support, but also in terms of insertion with civic groups and different organizations in society, taking into consideration the leadership CEDES has taken regionally in political, social, and economic studies, and to a certain extent the subsidy it continues to give to other research centers and junior researchers in the region.

CEDES has presented two projects to IDRC for consideration, the first: "La Educación Como Factor de Creación de Opciones Ocupacionales para los Jóvenes" by Oscar Landi, and "Multiple Residence Households and Temporary Migration: The Case of Bolivians in Argentina", by Jorge Balán.

Adolfo Canitrot and Roberto Frenkel, the two chief economists in CEDES on the economics research program of the institution, are interested in exploring possibilities of IDRC support for the economics program. The two main activities of the economics program are the regional project on policies of normalization in Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, financed by the Ford Foundation, SAREC, and UNDP. This is a macro-economics project that looks at inflation, liberalization of the economies, and capital markets in these countries and the effects on the national economy.
The Argentinian project is almost finished, although there will be more work to compare the date from Argentina with Chile, and to analyze the impact of the liberalization of the economy on national industry. (The focus of the Chilean study has been more on the effects of the economic policy on distribution of income.) The other project the economics team is participating in are a series of workshops on international economics and external financial liberalization coordinated by Ricardo Ffrench-Davis in five countries: Chile, México, Colombia, Argentina, and Brazil. This project is coming to an end. The economics group stressed the need for support of IDRC for the macro-economics program. At the moment, their sources of funding are quite limited, their only sure project for the rest of the year is with the Ford Foundation for approximately US$60,000. They consider the fields of macro-economics important, in that they are one of the few groups, together with CIEPLAN and CEBRAP, that is looking at social effects of these models and alternatives. The priorities for support for the macro-economics program is the continuation of the normalization project in a second stage. For this purpose, they would desire a maximum degree of autonomy within broad lines of program support, in other words a package marked with certain areas.

It will be important to see the alternative of the macro-economics program within CEDES, as part of an institutional support package, given that this is one group where few other sources of funds are available. This could be considered perhaps next year, in the economics program of Social Sciences Division.

CENEP (Centro de Estudios de Población)

CENEP was founded in 1974 by four refugees from the Center for Social Research (CIS) of the Torcuato di Tella Institute in Buenos Aires. Their dismissal from the Institute—supposedly based on an evaluation of their academic work—was part of a series of internal purges that, in subsequent years, led to the successive departures from di Tella of the scholars who now comprise CEDES, CISEA and CEUR.

The four founders of CENEP had all been trained abroad in the 1960's and were considered to be extremely well qualified by most observers. Zulma Recchini de Lattes earned her doctorate in demography from the University of Pennsylvania; Alfredo Lattes holds an M. A. in demography from the same institution; Ruth Sautu, with an undergraduate degree in economics from the University of Buenos Aires, has a doctorate in sociology from the University of London; and Catalina Wainerman, a product of Cino Germani's Department of Sociology in Buenos Aires, subsequently earned a Ph.D. in social psychology from
Rounding out this senior tier in the new CENEP were four "juniors," two of whom had received advanced training at CELADE. In subsequent years, it has been CENEP's practice to have at least one of these younger people abroad at any given time working on a doctoral degree.

CENEP's initial survival strategy was to locate itself under the juridical umbrella of the Bariloche Foundation, which provided the fledgling institute with physical quarters and basic office furnishings. Unfortunately, following the Argentine military coup of 1976, the Bariloche Foundation hit its own "time of troubles" and CENEP was cast adrift. Luckily, it was able to obtain its own personalidad jurídica (legal standing), but the loss of Bariloche's office facilities imposed an added burden on CENEP's modest operating budget.

A second major blow came in early 1977. For a relatively lengthy period, Zulma Recchini, together with two other members of the CENEP staff, had been engaged in a project to rationalize and modernize Argentina's National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC). With the arrival of the new military authorities, most of the staff associated with this endeavor were fired. Then, in January 1977, the key statistical expert with whom Recchini was involved "disappeared." (He still has not reappeared, which leads to the strong presumption that he never will.) Although Recchini herself was not fired, she resigned both on principle and because of the futility of doing any further, constructive work with INDEC. The demise of this project was not only an intellectual blow for CENEP, but also a financial setback, since the INDEC affiliation had been a relatively important and stable source of income for CENEP.

CENEP is the only institution in Argentina that is producing a coherent, well-executed body of research on population issues and on the complex inter-relationships between demographic phenomena and socio-economic development. CENEP's multidisciplinary staff have strong academic credentials. They are professionally competent, highly productive, and their work is well-regarded in international circles. Considering their numerical size, they are producing an impressive amount of publications and working papers. They also have a strong outreach to the outside world. More than most other private centers, CENEP has maintained a consistent concern with the next generation of scholars. Within their own ranks, the senior group has made sure that they maintain a corps of junior associates, and also have insisted that these younger persons earn the credentials needed to catapult them eventually into senior status. Moreover, virtually all of CENEP's senior personnel teach at the private University of Belgrano (a commitment that carries with it a very meagre economic return) and also have collaborated with colleagues elsewhere in offering training to potential new talent.
Since 1974 CENEP has had Ford Foundation support (US$25,000 annually for four years. US$30,000 the following three years.) These funds have gone towards infrastructure and acquiring some equipment. Yet, hit by inflation, these funds buy increasingly less (for the same offices in 1975 they paid US$390.00 while today they pay US$1,200.) The overall budget of CENEP is US$200,000.

All researchers are under full-time contracts with exclusive dedication. They are permitted to earn up to 12% percent of their salaries, under certain exceptions 25 percent, in outside teaching. Anything over this must be returned to the center. The basic monthly salary of the senior researchers is US$1,200 a month in addition to the thirteenth salary and vacations. In CENEP, as in most of the other centers visited in Argentina, the researchers are under contracts which pay only salary, in other words no social benefits. Researchers are required to have their own health insurance and do not receive any other type of benefit except vacations and in some instances when the contract is over a year, the thirteenth salary. Seven percent of monthly salary goes to the government for the "Caja de Previsión."

Up till now, CENEP has not changed its objectives in order to find other sources of funding, nor has it let its researchers have any less than a full-time contract. They are one of the few centers that has been able to generate 25 percent of its income with national funds. By 1982, they hope to have raise this figure to 40 percent. The present break down of activities is: 50 percent research, 25 percent teaching, and 25 percent technical assistance. The later two produce income, rather than expenses.

In most prudent fashion, CENEP has been able to establish these technical assistance links to some of the less politicalized and more remote reaches of the Argentina bureaucracy (e.g., the Misiones project.) While this kind of activity is indeed a source of locally-generated income, it probably cannot be pushed further than CENEP has already done without damage to the institution. (The damage could be of two kinds: either the erosion of CENEP's basic research function or, more serious, the hostility of a military regime that prefers not to know, or to dislike outright, the realities of its own population profile.)

There are two alternatives of survival for CENEP in Argentina under present budget constraints: to reduce the time of the researchers or to spend time in other types of lucrative activities. As a group CENEP has decided not to undergo either of these changes, but to try to maintain the model of full-time researchers and the dedication to research which they have had since their initiation. If this is not possible, they would prefer to disband the center, in which case the researchers would most likely leave the country.
The national environment for a center that is primarily concerned with demography is quite complex. National statistics activities have fallen greatly (the census of 1970 has not been published and there are very few sources of reliable statistics in the country.) The government is not carrying out this function and the major industries have very little data. CENEP has considered the possibility of designing some sort of stable activity which would also be remunerative, oriented towards the design and implementation of a series of statistical data for the country. This would not be entirely unrelated to the research activities of CENEP and would generate resources with which to cover administrative costs.

CENEP has discussed this possibility with various sectors of industry and development in the country, and they have expressed their interest in receiving data of this nature. CENEP would be interested in exploring with IDRC the possibility of support in order to design a mechanism which on the one hand would allow them to maintain an up-to-date data base for the country on fertility, mortality and migration, and also permit an income. CENEP will continue as it has in the past to the degree that they are able to design some sort of remunerative activity and convince the national context that activities of this sort are not only useful but worth paying for.

IDRC has financed CENEP with two studies in the past, and will probably continue to be interested in their areas of research, these being studies of the family, studies on migration, studies on human resources, studies on the image of women's work, and studies on women's work in rural areas. In spite of the fact that projects from CENEP will continue to be attractive, it would be interesting to try to explore how support could be given to CENEP to develop a mechanism to produce its own resources through the design and implementation of a data base or statistics center for Argentina.

Without being over optimistic, the opportunity provided by CENEP to establish some rapport with Argentinian bureaucracy on a technical level is perhaps indicative of a manner of supporting social sciences, partially, through other relationships similar to these in fields such as urban planning or public administration. Yet, it is also true that these areas, compared to demography, have a much more political "orientation" than does that of statistics. However, as pointed out by CENEP, there are issues of great potential political conflict in an activity of this nature, as for example the data that is beginning to come out of the IDRC supported program on infant mortality which shows greatly higher levels than those officially
mortality which shows greatly higher levels than those officially reported by the Argentine government.*

CISEA (Centro de Investigaciones Sociales sobre el Estado y la Administración)

CISEA is concerned with the study of the management of the economy and with the behaviour of the productive forces in relation to the power structure of society. (The fact that Argentina is going through, in economic terms, the longest crisis from the point of view of the wage earners since 1929, puts these themes in special perspective.)

Between 1968 and 1972 CISEA was financed by national resources. After 1972 and its break away from CIAP and di Tella, it recourse to foreign sources in the form of short-term consulting contracts with international agencies (researchers worked one month outside and one month inside the country.) This solution is no longer viable. If at the 1975 level of the dollar they needed US$30,000 to operate, today with a similar number of researchers (six or seven) they need US$ 150,000.

The question is how does CISEA stay alive as an institution. In fact, in 1979 CISEA did not have funds to pay the principal researchers. The budget for this year of US$80,000 covered only research assistants, administration, and administrative personnel. This funds were mainly from SAREC, untied funds which permitted work in areas of interest to the research institute itself, such as studies of the dominant economic and industrial groups in the country and the relationship of these to civil society. How and why do they keep going with no apparent let up in their budget problems? Salaries are low, the average salary for a chief researcher is US$1,500 compared to the salary in Argentina today of approximately US$3,000 for a starting professional in medicine (a doctor's visit is costing today about US$60.00.) A secretary earns US$550.00 half-time, while in any private sector activity an accountant will earn about US$5,000, and the director of a company about US$8,000. In spite of this situation, CISEA today has a staff of five full-time equivalent senior researchers and three assistants.

* Another sensitive political issue which was brought up by CENEP in regard to their relationship with the Argentine government is the present handling of the census which will be carried out next year. This census is being done at the lowest possible technical level, ignoring most of the advances and in fact technical basis on which any census is set up. CENEP fears that the census will not be valid for the country, nor will it provide a basis for planning.
CISEA has an aggressive training program which includes traditional seminars with other centers in Argentina, non-traditional seminars with labour unions and other organizations and a permanent seminar with leaders of different sectors of society including industrialists, trade unions, and political party leaders. They also have a course with FLACSO and IDES which is open to younger researchers. They do not, however, have any contact with the university for formal training.

CISEA sees few alternatives, both immediately and in the longer range. The possibility of maintaining CISEA through consulting is difficult in addition to taking time away from academic activities and probably modifying the nature of the institution. There are also difficulties in trying to put together an endowment fund which would be very risky and difficult to manage within the present financial environment of Argentina. Its administration would also take considerable time away from academic work.

The center is able to continue because of a policy of cooperative salaries and the existence of a common fund of projects which in their opinion avoids the competition for funds among researchers of the same institution which occurs in other centers. They would prefer not to do this, as it would break the unity of the team and would tend to lead to a situation where priorities would be defined outside the center on the basis of where funds are available.

CISEA is a small active, cohesive group of researchers which has demonstrated an impressive level of production. They seem to get by with much fewer funds than other centers, perhaps due to their cooperative management of funds once these enter the center and also given the fact that each individual researcher in effect subsidizes much of his own work by many times not charging salaries. The question is, how long can it last and if in this form it should last? Obviously, CISEA has strong motivation to continue its work and to integrate with Argentine civil society in the analysis and criticism of the changes undergoing the country. They are preparing alternative solutions to many of the present economic policies and are in essence keeping track of where the present economic policies are taking the country. The researchers under different political circumstances would be among the leaders in the national planning offices and ministries of economy. However, in the present circumstances they are forced to work outside the system, in a manner in which the work of the researchers themselves subsidizes the center, in that salaries are low, and many times not effected. A first reaction from the point of view of what an IDRC strategy could be with an institution of this nature is that it
would simply have to look at a flexible program of institutional support, within the dimensions of the present salary levels and with a great deal of space so that CISEA could continue to identify its own areas of research, training, and dissemination. A program of this nature would certainly help an institution to survive during this period and would probably lead to a greater integration of their activities with the rest of Argentine society.

CIE (Centro de Investigaciones Educativas)

CIE is concerned with research in education, including formal, non-formal, and vocational education. CIE has had two projects with the Center both parts of regional projects: (Studies in Pre-School and Primary School Interaction, Latin America) coordinated by Johanna Filp in CIDE, Santiago, and a study coordinated by Rodrigo Vera (Experimental In-Service Teacher Training.)

CIE was established in 1971 with financial support from the Ford Foundation. CIE received US$140,000 between 1972 and 1975 and US$90,000 between 1976 and 1979 as Ford institutional support.) The origins of CIE and its continuation today are closely tied to the Catholic Church. CIE is an offspring of CIAS (Centro de Investigación y Acción Social) in Buenos Aires. The support to CIE by the Ford Foundation was given at a time when a number of other Jesuit education research centers were given similar support, CIDE of Santiago de Chile, and CEE of México.

CIE has a somewhat firmer financial base that other social science research centers. They were able to purchase their locale which includes ample space for courses and a documentation center. Some salaries are covered by the church hierarchy. Nonetheless, CIE has had political problems similar to those of other research centers in Argentina, in fact, there are a number of individuals who have been connected with CIE who continue to be on the lists of that disappeared in Argentina. Some feel that this was due among other reasons to the fact that CIE became quite closely identified with the Perón Government in Argentina, and as a result in 1976 with the military takeover was hit quite hard.

At present, CIE presents a wide constellation of funding sources including Ford, Dutch government funds, various Catholic agencies, (European, German and Belgian) and IDRC. None of these, however, are institutional support with the exception of Ford's. CIE has a permanent staff of between 12 and 15 persons and a yearly budget of approximately US$300,000.
Although CIE has begun to work closely in various provinces and the city of Buenos Aires with a group of teachers, they are quite pessimistic concerning the possibility of any sort of national funding support for their programs. They have contact with many of the private groups working in the country, for example Director father Storni participates in the permanent seminar of CISEA on Argentine development. CIE researchers have access to data from CONET, the National Agency for Vocational education, and hope in the future to receive some fundings through this institution. They are finding it easier to deal directly with Departmental and Municipal Educational authorities than with national authorities.

As with other research institutions concerned with education, such as PIIE in Santiago, and CIDE in Santiago, CIE is not suffering as much as other private centers from the cutbacks in international funding for social sciences. Education continues to be a priority, in fact it is perhaps more of a priority today with funds from more varied sources such as the World Bank and other international agencies. (Ford Foundation continues to have an interest in education.) However, this does not mean that they are not faced with the same difficulties regarding the difference of the dollar level which greatly affects their salaries. In addition, there are always more funds available for action programs than some of the basic research or more innovative research in education which CIE would like to carry out. Therefore, in terms of IDRC position with CIE, it is important to coordinate more closely the research priorities in education and perhaps provide it with a "favoured status" type relationship whereby one or two programs or projects of the certain level would be insured each year or every two years in the areas of basic research or more innovative research programs, subject to review by the Center and discussion with CIE.

IDES (Instituto de Desarrollo Económico y Social)

IDES is something of a rara avis in the Southern Cone. It is not a center in the strict sense of the term. Rather, it is an association (or federation) of individual social scientists, albeit with a program and infrastructure of its own. Founded 20 years ago in Buenos Aires, IDES has incrementally developed a broad range of activities that are a service to the social science community at large. It also has managed to survive and sustain these activities for two decades in an environment marked by continual turbulence and, in particular, by special adversity and trauma for the social sciences.
IDES now has a membership of approximately 600, comprising not only academic social scientists, but also government technocrats, planners and other action-oriented professionals. It is perhaps this pluralism—not only professional, but also political—that helps account for IDES' survival record.

IDES has a wide range of activities: IDES can offer juridical sponsorship to research projects that, under current circumstances, might otherwise flounder; it maintains a library open to scholars and students alike; it fields an array of round-tables, seminars, workshops, et alia, that provide a common meeting-ground for Argentina's scattered social scientists; finally, IDES publishes an excellent tri-monthly journal, Desarrollo Económico, that enjoys a wide readership.

Perhaps most significant, however, IDES mounts a variety of courses and lecture series for students whose needs cannot be met at this juncture by Argentina's bowdlerized universities. It should be noted that many of the professors for these courses are drawn from the network of private research centers now operating in Buenos Aires. Because most of these centers feel they cannot take the risk, in the present Argentine environment, of fielding formal training programs on their own premises, IDES has become an important channel through which they can reach the next generation of social scientists.

IDES subsists virtually entirely on funds generated within Argentina. (The exceptions to that rule are a donation of US$25,000 from the Ford Foundation in 1979 to help the Institute strengthen its publications program, and an earlier donation from IDRC for Desarrollo Económico.) IDES has sustained itself for 20 years with the dues of its members, the sale of its journal, fees accruing from its courses, and local donations. The institute has not wanted any basic institutional support from abroad. However, given the present situation of the social sciences in Argentina, the demands on IDES are escalating. With the present state of the economy, it may well become increasingly difficult for IDES to respond to those demands. If economic circumstances continue on their current trajectory, IDES may have to look to foreign agencies for help.

Modest assistance to IDES—if needed and requested—could have a multiplier effect that cannot be readily achieved by support to any single center. The arrows, of course, run both ways. That is, without the existence of a healthy network of private social science research centers, IDES would lose a significant portion of its clientele. On the other hand, without IDES, the center themselves would lose an important, central resource and forum. The implication here for the IDRC is that it would seem feasible, at a minimum, to keep IDES in sight.
CIEPLAN (Corporación de Investigaciones Económicas para América Latina)

In 1976 a group of economists working in the Catholic University of Chile left the university and set up CIEPLAN, a private, non-profit organization to carry out social and economic research relevant to development policies and strategies in the Latin American region. CIEPLAN operates in Santiago de Chile under legal status approved by the ministry of justice in 1976.

Between 1973 and 1976 the group which had begun in 1970 had been able to sustain itself in the Catholic University with limited national funds and support from Ford Foundation. When the decision was made to leave the university the CIEPLAN economists began the search for major sources of funding with the Ford Foundation and UNDP (through the Regional Program on Employment for Latin America.) These two sources made up about 70 percent of their financial support. The remaining 30 percent came from a series of institutions among these Social Science Research Council, IDRC, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, CEPAL, PISPAL, SAREC, and IFDA/ILET. Since 1976 CIEPLAN has not received any national funds for its operation, although its members continue to be active in teaching either in the Catholic University or the University of Chile.

Today, CIEPLAN provides a dissident model for the present economic policy of the country. This is done through their research, and widely disseminated through the press and other information media.

CIEPLAN considers this role increasingly important as the economic model currently enforced in Chile begins to acquire its own ideological foundation and justification in economic research. New research centers on the extreme right are beginning to provide justification for the Chilean economic model in the terms of "a new technified democracy" or limited democracy. A new center, Corporación de Estudios Públicos, is directed by the daughter of Pinochet and contains a large contribution from the American Enterprise Institute. This demonstrates the intellectual challenge to the social sciences of authoritarian regimes such of that in operation in Chile, and the new economic models they are putting into effect. As part of this challenge, CIEPLAN has set up a cycle of conferences in Chile with economists from the United States and other regions of the world, including a program of exchange with MIT. They are also organizing conferences with Latin
Americans, Enrique Iglesias, Raúl Prevéich, as well as members of the Brandt Commission, Rodrigo Botero and Eduardo Frei to discuss the implications of the Chilean model and the South North debate.

The research program of CIEPLAN is organized around three major areas: employment, underemployment, and poverty; (2) international economics; and (3) public policies and the role of the state. In the employment area the research effort has been oriented towards the better understanding of the performance of labour market in Latin America, and the relationship with the national industrialization programs. The literature exhibits a gap in this respect as it has scarcely addressed itself to the case of semi-industrialized, urban, open economies. Related processes such as the internal migration movements, characteristics of informal urban workers, basic needs problems, factors influencing wage rates among others, are studied. In these areas relevant policy conclusions constitute a basic concern.

The area of international cooperation has been mainly devoted to the study of the process of Latin American economic integration and policies towards foreign investment. A textbook on international economics for developing countries for teaching at university levels was published as part of this program. Current work concerns the implications of recent changes in the international economy from the standpoint of developing countries with special emphasis on international monetary phenomena. CIEPLAN is coordinating a series of workshops with well-known specialists in this field. An appraisal of experiences of trade and financial liberalization in cases like the Chilean is under review.

The third area is concerned with public policies and the role of the state. A basic study is focused on stabilization and institutional transformations of policies undertaken by governments in the Southern Cone of Latin America and Brazil. This is being jointly carried out with CEDES and CEBRAP in an interdisciplinary study to better understand the rationale of public policies.

This academic work has been disseminated in the publication of thirty two essays "Estudios CIEPLAN", twenty three technical notes, twenty one short articles, six books published in Spanish and three published in English. In addition to university teaching, CIEPLAN is also concerned with dissemination to a wider public. At least ten short articles were written during 1979 in different journals, a fair concentration in "Hoy" a weekly and "Mensaje" a monthly. Ten seminars were held to discuss current issues of general interest such as: the situation in the fields of education, health, housing, basic
needs and poverty, military doctrine, inflation, and unemployment. On an academic level, CIEPLAN staff members are involved in boards and advisory committees of national and foreign organizations for example, the directory of the Latin American Social Science Council (CLACSO), the Social Science Research Council, the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, the journal of Development Economics, the Trimestre Económico, the Program on Social and Population Research for Latin America and the joint study program on international relations of Latin America, among others.

CIEPLAN is also becoming increasingly involved in studies of the short-term impact of the economic policy in Chile. This has placed a great demand on CIEPLAN for interviews and other public presentations. In this program CIEPLAN has put together a series of basic economic indicators for employment and unemployment in which they have shown the errors in the official figures. They are also beginning an index of prices to the consumer and an index of growth of production.

CIEPLAN, on the basis of the supposition that the situation in Chile will change, is concerned with the lack of alternatives to the present model. They do not see themselves as an economic planning office in opposition but rather as an academic center that studies with as much detail as possible the different sectors and aspects of the economic program. The myth exists in Chile that if the present regime changes, great economic disequilibrium will occur due to revindications of wage earners and the exit of foreign capital from the national economy. One of the points CIEPLAN is concerned with is how this disequilibrium can be managed in the short and mid-term.

The continued existence of CIEPLAN looks rather uncertain. Grants and contributions from the institutions mentioned above have made it possible to survive from 1976 on. However, during the last six months the financial situation of CIEPLAN has deteriorated as a consequence of the changes introduced in the economic policy of the Chilean government. From mid 1979, the exchange rate has been frozen as part of the effort to reduce inflationary pressures. Up to then, the general policy has been one of minidevaluations. Under the present policy, there is a steady deterioration of value of foreign currencies as the internal inflation rate is on the order of 30 or 40 percent a year. The real value of the foreign funds that CIEPLAN has been able to secure is decreasing at that rate. This implies that the normal budget for 1979 of US$350,000 is being projected to at least US$450,000 for 1980.

Under these circumstances, CIEPLAN is not able to keep its present staff nor its normal trend of activities. Different alternatives are being considered. The reduction of expenditures is a limited possibility as almost two thirds of
expenditures are related to wages and salary, which are low on a national scale. Some staff reduction has occurred as voluntary withdrawals have not been replaced. The present staff of CIEPLAN are four full-time senior researchers, four secretaries, two assistants, one half-time professional concerned with dissemination and one half-time librarian. Levels of salaries are decided by a point system based on academic quality and dedication to the institution. (PH.D. candidates earn US$1,200, the equivalent in the private sector will be approximately US$3,000 and for example the director of a bank in Chile will earn approximately US$10,000 a month.) Salaries are without any type of social benefits or insurance. Seventy five percent of the budget goes in salaries. This budget from 1976 to 1978 was US$310,000 a year. In 1979 this had increased to US$330,000 and in 1980 US$390,000. The figures on the index of prices, exchange rate, real budget and needed budget are the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Inflation rate</th>
<th>Index of prices</th>
<th>Exchange rate</th>
<th>Real budget</th>
<th>Needed budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>31.67</td>
<td>310,000</td>
<td>310,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>328,000</td>
<td>366,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>390,000</td>
<td>454,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>468,000</td>
<td>545,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>510,000</td>
<td>595,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The support from UNDP will terminate in 1981 (two stages of three years each of approximately US$85,000 yearly.) Ford Foundation has finished a second phase support in August 1980 of US$125,000 annually for two years. There is some possibility of continued Ford support. All other sources of funding, Ebert and SAREC add up to US$219,000 for 1981, meaning that there will be a deficit of US$250,000 that year. After 1981, there are a number of alternatives. The first is that CIEPLAN disappears, the second that they reduce staff time, and the third that they reduce the dedication of the staff, in other words, that staff can work half-time other places or take leaves of absence or jobs in universities outside the country. None of these are very positive alternatives and all will mean a substantial deterioration on the level of work. CIEPLAN has reached an optimum size for its operation and feels quite strongly that its policy on full-time dedication from professional staff has been responsible for the high quality of the work of the institution. At the moment, there is no possibility for national support or support through the universities.
CIEPLAN has presented a project to IDRC "A Program of Research on Macro Economic and Balance of Payment Issues." This is program support rather than project support and will cover three years. The amount requested for the program would cover more or less the deficit that CIEPLAN has from 1981 on with the understanding that they will find other sources of support from traditional and new agencies to complete the rest of the budget. This program will help CIEPLAN stay alive during this period in the hope that there will be in the future a diversification of sources of funding and some possibility of national support. The alternative is to close the institution.

FLACSO (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales)

FLACSO was founded in 1957 by UNESCO as a regional, master's-level training center for Latin American sociologists. Since then, it has probably had the most checkered history of any institution in this survey. While fascinating to trace, FLACSO's long series of transformation and travails, the following is confined to FLACSO's role in Chile since the military coup of 1973.

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, FLACSO's multi-national staff and student body were severely buffeted. (Several professors and students were detained, and two students died while in the hands of the authorities.) FLACSO's directive council closed the teaching program in Chile, transferred their headquarters to Buenos Aires, and began to decentralize the FLACSO operation, eventually creating new sedes in Ecuador and México. Left behind in Santiago was a small group of Chilean researchers, who gradually were joined by a group of "internal academic refugees," many of whom had been dislodged from Chile's Catholic University (including Brunner, Chateau, Garreton, Lechner and Varas.) Having wreaked havoc in FLACSO, the Chilean authorities -somewhat belatedly- recalled that it was a regional institution protected by an inter-governmental treaty, whose signatories comprised Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, México and Panamá. At that point, recognizing that it would not be to its advantage to begin unilaterally violating its treaty agreements (and certainly mindful of such issues as Antofagasta, the Beagle Islands, et al.), the Chilean regime suddenly adopted a relatively benign posture toward the FLACSO sede in Santiago. For the next five years (i.e., until June 1979), FLACSO functioned in Chile as a research center in sociology and political science -but with very special advantages. Thanks to its regional status, it was able to operate with relative immunity in a setting that, especially in the early years, was starkly and severely repressive. It became something of a "safe house" where scholars from the community at large could congregate,
have access to scarce bibliographical materials, and engage in intellectual discourse with their peers. Because the building was fairly commodious, FLACSO was able—apart from its own staff—to provide work space for a number of scholars who had no institutional affiliation, but had managed to obtain research grants from outside agencies. It housed the Chilean sub-committee of CLACSO. Between 1974 and 1976, it sheltered the Chilean clearing-house for academic refugees assisted by CLACSO, the World University Service, the Latin American Studies Association in the United States, and Britain's ODM. Also, FLACSO's library—again, thanks to the treaty—held one of the few relatively uncensored collections available to social scientists in Chile. In sum, especially in the first three or four years after the coup, FLACSO played a critical role in maintaining a certain margin of free "intellectual space" in Chile.

At the same time, FLACSO's Santiago wing was in perennial financial trouble and in constant combat with the new FLACSO authorities in Buenos Aires, whose treatment of their Chilean colleagues was extraordinarily autocratic. An annual allocation of approximately US$80,000 from the Chilean Government—earmarked exclusively for FLACSO's building and administrative infrastructure—kept the institution physically in business, but all other donations had to be channeled through the central headquarters in Argentina and often did not arrive at their proper destination in good time. In this period, it was not uncommon to find FLACSO's Chilean researchers four months behind in their salaries, even though external grant funds were presumably available to cover them. The net of this situation was that, while FLACSO continued to function as an intellectual oasis for the Chilean community, its own intellectual productivity was less than it should have been.

As recorded in Frieda Silvert's evaluation of FLACSO's research, dated March 3, 1979, FLACSO's senior staff were addressing important and challenging questions; they also were innovative and sophisticated in their approach; but the rate of actual completion and publication of research was not, at an institutional level, commensurate with the performance of CEDES, CIEPLAN, et al. FLACSO-Chile's institutional situation changed drastically in 1979. First, at the regional level, FLACSO's directors in Buenos Aires were unseated and a new administrative structure was elaborated, headed by Daniel Camacho in Costa Rica. More important, at the local level the Chilean Government—respecting all of the legal niceties involved—withdrew from the regional FLACSO treaty, leaving the Chilean sede with no official backing and without the Government's annual outlay for its rent and administration.
Under the leadership of José Joaquín Brunner, the Chilean contingent of FLACSO decided to hold together, and thus joined the network of private social science research centers in the Southern Cone. Juridically, it now operates as a "program" of the Academy of Christian Humanism. It also maintains a certain tenuous status as a "program" of the regional FLACSO system. However, regardless of the juridical formalities, it is essentially a private center, with its own staff and physical premises. (The physical premises, needless to say, are far smaller and sparser than they used to be.) Also, it is now wholly dependent for its survival on financing from abroad. While it is currently subsisting—just barely—on a pot-pourri of "emergency grants" from the IDRC and the Ford Foundation, plus assistance from several other donors, its future funding prospects do not, at this moment, look especially promising. Because many of its senior researchers are highly talented, they can undoubtedly put together a patchwork of individual and project support from a variety of sources, but whether this solution will be sufficient to sustain FLACSO institutionally is another matter. To put the matter in some comparative perspective, between June 1, 1974, and June 30, 1978, the Ford Foundation provided a total of $383,000 to FLACSO for basic institutional support of the Santiago sede. It is difficult to visualize how FLACSO will now replace that institutional revenue, especially at a moment of escalating inflation and deflated dollars, and also compensate for the loss of support from the Chilean Government.

Complicating the funding picture is the fact that FLACSO's research program is thematically amorphous and not focused on topics that reflect the typical preferences of international donor agencies. The institution does have a certain "proyecto intelectual," which essentially revolves around the question of democratic order and the prospects for reestablishing the foundations for democracy in Chile (and elsewhere in Latin America.) But the approach is eclectic, the search for new theory outweighs the kind of empirical "problem-solving" projects that many international agencies prefer.

The research is grouped in four principal areas: (1) structure and political processes; (2) social movements; (3) culture, education and ideology; and (4) international relations.

(1) Structure and political processes includes the following projects:

"Teoría, Condiciones Históricas y Demandas Democráticas en Chile," Manuel Antonio Carretón, Norbert Lechner, and Tomás Moulian. This study addresses: the critical development of the concept of democracy; the historical conditions of democracy; in Chile; and alternatives and democratic demands.
- "Tendencias de Cambio en la Sociedad Chilena, 1973-1980", José Joaquín Brunner, Arturo León, Tomás Moulian, Carlos Portales and Autosto Varas. This project identifies the principal tendency of change in the Chilean society from 1973 to 1980: the government and the political institutions; the transformation of the productive base and the function of the principal economic agents; the emergence of a new organization of culture and the role of the agencies of socialization and transmission of ideology; and the role of the arm forces in regard to the insertion in a world economy and international political and military relationships.

- "Políticas de Saneamiento, Morbilidad, y Mortalidad, un Estudio de Caso," Angel Flishfish. This case study examines the social, economic, and technical factors in the decisions that have been taken on the distribution of resources for specific projects of drinking water and sewers in Santiago and the impact of these services on the rates of mortality and morbility among the population.

- "Estructura y Procesos Políticos en Regímenes de Excepción," Augusto Varas. This is an analysis of the transformations that have occurred in the field of political struggle in Chile.


(2) Social movements includes:

- "Organización y Participación Populares en la Constitución y el Carácter de las Alternativas de Desarrollo," Rodrigo Baño, Leopoldo Benavides and Enzo Faletto. This study analyzes the relationship between development styles and popular participation within Latin America in the last fifty years.


- "La Transformación de Latifundios Tradicionales a Empresas Agrícolas, Diferenciación Económica y Política," Sergio Gómez. It examines the changes of traditional latifundistas to modern agricultural industries and the different stages of this process.

- "Condiciones de Vida en los Sectores Populares Urbanos," Jorge Chateau and Arturo León. The information that is gathered from this work will permit the implementation of different studies on questions related to the situation of the marginal sectors.
(3) Culture, education and ideology includes:

- "La Organización Autoritaria de la Cultura en Chile," José Joaquín Brunner. A study of the processes of culture affected by authoritarianism.

- "Cultura, Pobreza y Estrategias de Participación," José Joaquín Brunner, Jorge Chateau, Julieta Kirkwood and Arturo León. This is a study of poverty, and the cultural factors that influence this and the results.

- "Las Transformaciones de la Universidad en Chile y la Formación de los Intelectuales," José Joaquín Brunner and Manuel Antonio Garretón, studies the transformation of the university since 1940 and the different changes in the formation of intellectuals, in particular the links with the principal social forces of the state.

(4) International relations includes:

- "Estados Unidos y el Cono Sur de América Latina," Carlos Portales y Augusto Varas. This study develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of the policy of the United States towards the countries of the Southern Cone of Latin America and applies this framework to different policies in North America to the region with the Instituto de Estudios de los Estados Unidos de CIDE, México.

- "Orientaciones y Gestión Política de las Relaciones Internacionales en Chile," Carlos Portales. This project, linked to Transformations in the Chilean Society 1970-1980, gathers together the work that has been carried out in regard to international relations of Chile.

- "Consecuencias Económicas y Sociales del Gasto Militar en América del Sur," Carlos Portales y Augusto Varas. The objective of this project is to study on a regional level and by country the social cost of the arms expenditures and the impact of military expenditures on the basic needs of the different social sectors.

- "Armamentismo y Desarme en América del Sur," Carlos Portales y Augusto Varas. This project is the framework for the study on international relation of military in Latin America that has been developed in the program since 1978. Its central objective is to describe and update the information on arms in the regions and analyze the political phenomenon related to the arms expenditures, the economic and social consequences of the acquisition of arms, and the production at the national level.
"Relaciones Políticas Internacionales de la Unión Soviética con los Países Latinoamericanos," Carlos Portales y Augusto Varas.

FLACSO has a program of dissemination which includes the following seminars and meetings:

1. Permanent Seminar of Analysis on Chile. The objective of this is to bring together university students to analyze contemporary Chilean policy. All the researchers of FLACSO participate in this seminar as do researchers in the social sciences in Santiago. The seminar is coordinated by the director of the program. The students can come from any university and field of study.

2. A series of seminars on the military, human rights, and disarmament. This is coordinated by Carlos Portales y Augusto Varas and participants are different groups: university students, women, journalists, etc.

3. The third project is an international seminar FLACSO/UNESCO on "Bases Conceptuales para la Resolución Pacífica de Controversia." This seminar will be held in Costa Rica coordinated with the government of Costa Rica, the Instituto de Investigaciones para la Paz of Viena, Austria, and UNESCO.

In the field of documentation, FLACSO has a project for a documentation center on the United States and the Southern Cone of Latin America. This is within the agreement signed between the Instituto de Estudios de los Estados Unidos, CIDE, México. Other events include a seminar on the United States and external policy in Latin America and a workshop on rural studies which will bring together researchers from CEPAL, FREALC, SUR, GIA, CANPROCOP, Centro Belarmino and other cooperative organizations.

In conclusion, FLACSO is the last bastion of sociology, political science and political sociology in Chile. While many private centers (PIIE, CIEPLAN, et alia) employ individual sociologists and political scientists in their problem-oriented programs, FLACSO is the sole site where the disciplines themselves are pursued, sustained and strengthened.

Most members of the core group have been excellently trained abroad at the doctoral level at a combination of locales including Oxford, The University of Paris, the University of Michigan, the University of California, the University of Freiburg, etc.
Although FLACSO's research program, as noted earlier, is somewhat amorphous and certainly not the standard fare of most "action-oriented" donor agencies, FLACSO's investigators are addressing a series of questions -participation, equity, social change and social justice, culture and poverty- that lie at the heart of the current crisis and problemática of the Southern Cone. FLACSO planned series of courses and seminars could be an important contribution in the present Chilean ambiance.

In 1979 FLACSO had to face two crisis. The first was the withdrawal of Chile from the agreement with FLACSO which meant that FLACSO no longer had legal standing in the country. This created a number of problems which were solved by the agreement signed between FLACSO and the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano. This crisis brought about the economic crisis because the withdrawal of Chile from the agreement meant that the Chilean government no longer gave funds to FLACSO. This economic crisis was solved temporarily by emergency grants from IDRC and Ford and the continued support from SAREC, UNFPA, the British Council, UNDP, PISPAL, FLACSO, IEUF and some other small national funds from students.

Although salaries in FLACSO are very low (the average salary of a senior researcher is about US$700) the situation continues to be very serious for funding, specifically funds for administration. FLACSO must pay between US$10,000 and US$12,000 a year for rent in addition to other administrative costs which reach approximately US$35,000.

This situation of FLACSO is further deteriorated by the fact that many Chileans who went into exile after 1973, are now beginning to return to the country and cannot find any place to work. FLACSO is particular, giving its role in teaching and research, is being pressured by these returnees.

FLACSO has presented two proposals to IDRC for consideration, in the area of education "La Universidad y la Formación de los Intelectuales en Chile," and "Teoría, Condiciones Históricas y Demanda Democráticas en Chile," Garretón, Lechner y Moulian.

The subject areas with which they are concerned and the general program of FLACSO with the possible exception of education do not fit within the categories that IDRC has traditionally supported in the social sciences. For this reason, and giving their very important role in Chile today as an academic group and as a training center, in addition to the documentation center which is just beginning to be set up again, it would appear that FLACSO would be a most likely recipient of a long or mid range type institutional support if this can be worked in a program in coordination with IAF, Interamerican Foundation, SAREC, and perhaps Ford Foundation. If this is not possible, the individual projects should be considered with some special status category.
The Grupo de Estudios Agro-regionales is made up of researchers of different disciplines: agricultural engineers, geographers, rural sociologists, all with specialization in the agricultural sector. The group began in 1977 with research on the development of agro-industry in Chile and the study "Cambios Estructurales en el Sector Reformado de la Agricultura, su Efecto, y la Demanda de la Fuerza de Trabajo Campesino y las Migraciones Rurales: 1964-1978." In 1978 GEA began to publish a bulletin on agrarian studies to disseminate the results of research in rural areas. In 1979 GEA was given the support of the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano and of the Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO). The same year it began a study on the use of land in Chile with the objective of developing a regionalization scheme of the country.

The work plan of GEA is divided in three areas: research, dissemination, and evaluation of projects. In the area of research, they have the following projects in development. They are studying two aspects of the development of capitalism in the Chilean agricultural sectors: the strategies of the food agro-industries, and strategies of survival of the different groups of "campesinos." The first is studied in a project financed by Ford Foundation, which compares two cases: the dairy industry in the south of the country, and the fruit and vegetable industry near Santiago. The second is part of a study financed by PISPAL that considers the family strategies of survival and the reproduction of the work force among "campesinos."

Studies in preparation include an agreement with the International Institute of Social Studies of the Hague in Holland, and FLACSO in Santiago to elaborate a conceptual framework and methodology for a study of the effects of the agrarian reform on one sector of the agricultural entrepreneurs. This study would reach some general conclusions on the evolution of the entrepreneur sector in Chile, Perú, Bolivia and México. It will begin in 1981. In dissemination GEA has among its permanent activities an agreement with FLACSO, Santiago, to coordinate a series of meeting with various research teams all linked to agrarian studies. GEA has published a quarterly bulletin since 1978, distributed in specialized centers in Latin America and Europe. This bulletin is financed by the Ford Foundation and supported by the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano and FLACSO. GEA also publishes a series of working documents.
GEA is a very small group which has just commenced with five members and a half-time secretary. Its budget is very low, about US$40,000 a year and it operates on premises lent by SENECA. Members include two Ph.D. level, one MSC and two graduate sociologists. They have the support of CLACSO and are working closely with FLACSO with an aggressive policy of dissemination. They have presented a project to IDRC, a micro-economic study of the small producer in Chile. This is a group that perhaps in a couple more years can find an increased consolidation as an institution, or could become part of one of the other groups studying agricultural economics in Chile. They perhaps could best be supported with a project during this transition period.

PIIE (Programa Interdisciplinario de Investigación en Educación)

PIIE was founded in 1971 as a research center of the Catholic University of Chile. In 1977, it became an independent entity, under the institutional umbrella of the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano. Since 1977 PIIE has defined as priority areas for research the development of interdisciplinary studies on education and the socio-economic conditions of the marginal populations of Chile and Latin America. The current program of research has the following objectives:

1. To characterize the educational development of Chile, detecting those factors that historically have been linked to the expansion and improvement of education for different social groups, and the exclusion of others; the identification of the structural variables that affect the unequal distribution of educational services; and those factors that determine differences in the educational process, permanence in the school and, hence the early departure from the educational system of different social strata.

2. To characterize the educational situation of groups in the lower social strata in order to supply empirical data on the characteristics of the educational institutions available, and explore the problems these present under conditions of poverty. PIIE is interested in pedagogical, psychological and linguistic problems related to curriculum, to the school community in general and the characteristics of the processes of teaching and learning for least privileged groups.

3. To evaluate the impact of innovative education projects and identify those experiences that attempt to produce changes both in individuals and groups as well as in the social context in which they are conducted.
PIIE has worked in the characterization of the limitations of low income students: the relationship between teacher and student; the use of text books, the effectiveness of the teacher, and problems of achievement and drop out. Special emphasis has been placed on projects addressing technical professional training, formal and non-formal education, and problems related to the attention of the pre-school child in populations of limited resources.

The area of educational experimentation has included the design and implementation of a set of projects of action research oriented towards the educational and cultural development of poor communities with educational strategies that involve participation in the solution of problems. PIIE has carried out studies on the distribution of resources and the factors which affect the demand for education and problems of education and employment.

The sources of financing of the program since it left the Catholic University (where salaries and overhead were paid by the University) has been an institutional grant from the Ford Foundation and a smaller institutional grant from IDRC for a period of three years, in addition to resources assigned to specific projects from national and international sources. These funds have not been sufficient to enable PIIE to carry out a program of research, publications, and training of their own researcher and of junior assistants. The lack of resources has forced PIIE to discontinue the collection PIIE Estudios. The absence of their own line of dissemination has resulted in a significant reduction of the presence of PIIE in the national debate on education.

In spite of these limitations, PIIE continues active in research and dissemination of results. In the study of education and development, PIIE has published three articles while in the area of operations of systems of formal education, it has carried out three studies and is in the process of carrying out a fourth with four published articles. In adult education, it has published ten articles and in learning and innovation it has carried out one doctoral level thesis and is in the process of carrying out another. PIIE has organized two workshops, two evaluations in action research with numerous articles and presentations. During the last academic year, 1979, PIIE carried out ten studies and published thirty three articles or presentations in seminars. The researchers at PIIE have also participated in many national and international seminars. A series of regular meetings are held in PIIE every Tuesday to discuss education in society. with individuals outside the program.
During 1979 the links between PIIE and the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano were strengthened. PIIE has carried out monthly meetings with all the groups of researchers in education that are members of the Academia to discuss research in the field. PIIE also directs and supports infrastructure and staff the work of the Círculo de Educación of the Academia. This includes the preparation of round table discussions and monthly meetings on topics of education.

PIIE has just negotiated a new grant with Ford Foundation which no longer is institutional support but rather a program support grant. The IDRC grant will soon be coming to an end this year. The rest of the funds for operation are based on specific projects. These specific project grants, mainly from European sources, are closely tied to action research and action programs of PIIE. The Ford Program Support covers the study of different aspects of the educational system in the country since 1973.

The present staff of full-time PIIE employees includes five senior researchers: the Director Rafael Echávarria, the Deputy Director Ricardo Hevia, Ana María de Andraca, Salomón Magendzo and Marcela Gajardo. There are two junior researchers, Gabriela López who is also the Executive Secretary of PIIE, and Consuelo Gazmuri. Gabriela is only half-time. There is also one secretary and one assistant. There are approximately ten researchers who are working in PIIE related to specific projects either in field projects or in the central program.

Salary levels in PIIE are quite low. 1979 levels for senior researchers were US$650, junior US$550 and administrative US$350. This year they have been raised to US$800 senior, US$700 junior, and US$600 administrative. PIIE has a salary policy for the people working in the core of the organization. When other researchers negotiate projects directly with a funding agency, they have more leeway in terms of their salary level, but must leave a 15 percent overhead with PIIE on the project. The administrative costs of PIIE are high, they calculate these at approximately US$53,400 a year including administrative personnel, overhead, materials and any publications. If the salaries of the director half-time is included, this raises overhead to approximately US$70,860 including direction, administrative personnel, rent, materials, library, travel and others.

Almost the entire budget of PIIE is dependent on outside funds. This year they have only one national project for which they had to form a separate legal entity within PIIE as funds from the government would not go to the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano. (This is a small study with the Junta Nacional de Jardines Infantiles, approximately US$13,000.)
PIIE is faced with two immediate problems. Under the present economic conditions, PIIE will not disappear, however it will lose quite a few of its core staff. The characteristics of its research program will change shifting away from basic research on the education process in Chilean society and towards more action oriented technical assistance programs due to the orientation of the fundings. Publications will become increasingly more difficult especially those coming out of PIIE itself and not published by other institutions. Finally, training has been discarded almost completely under the present economic constraints.

PIIE has formed an internal committee to look at sources of self-financing, these are in contact with other research institutions in Chile trying to find economies of scale with publications or training. Alternatives for self-financing are: consulting, training in secondary schools, training at a graduate level, and consulting through international agencies such as the World Bank. The problem is all the alternatives distance PIIE from its basic research objectives.

The present situation of the PIIE staff is the following:

**Core Researchers**

- **Rafael Echeverría** PIIE Director (sociologist, doctorate in sociology, London) is financed half-time by the Ford Foundation and half-time by institutional funds overhead from projects until February 1982;

- **Ricardo Hevia**, Deputy Director (Ph.D. candidate Stanford) is financed half-time by Ford Foundation until February 1982 and half-time by IDRC until November 1981;

- **Gabriela López**, Executive Secretary (master in education, Catholic University of Chile) is financed half-time by Ford Foundation until February 1982 and half-time by CCFD (France) until December 1981;

- **Salomón Magendzo** (Ph.D. Pennsylvania State University in educational psychology) is financed full-time until August 1980;

- **Marcela Gajardo** (master in sociology Essex) is financed until August 1980;

- **Ana María Andraca** (M. A. University of Wells and doctoral candidate) is not financed;

- **Consuelo Gamúri** (M. A. in education, Catholic University of Chile) is financed half-time until August 1980.
- Ernesto Schefielbien (Ph.D. in education, Harvard) is not financed;
- María Angélica Kotliarenco (Ph.D. in psychology, University of London) is financed half-time by CCFD (France) until December 1981;
- Abraham Magendzo (Ph.D. in education, University of California) is financed part-time by Development and Peace, Canada to March 1981;
- Liliana Vaccaro (M.A. in education, Catholic University of Chile) is financed full-time by Novid Holland to August 1980;
- Rodrigo Vera (Ph.D. in philosophy, University of Lovaina) is financed full-time by IDRC until November 1981.
- Carmen Luz Latorre (doctoral candidate in education, University of Paris) is financed full-time by IDRC until August 1981;
- Verónica Edwards (Professor of Philosophy, Catholic University) is financed full-time by Development and Peace to May 1981;
- Luis Eduardo González (Ph.D. candidate in education, Harvard) is financed by a scholarship from Ford Foundation;
- Adriana Delpiano (M.A. education, Centro de Estudios Avanzados IBN, México) is financed full-time by Development and Peace, Canada, to May 1981;
- Carlos Clavel (Commercial Engineer, University of Chile) is not financed.

The principal problems currently faced by PIIE can be summarized as follows:

1. They do not have the financial condition to carry out basic research. This distorted their original research orientation and is due first to the effects of the dictatorial regime operating in the country, and second to the priorities of financing agencies particularly European that have shifted a great part of PIIE's efforts towards projects of action and applied research. This situation is further deteriorated by the lack of opportunity of PIIE staff to reflect on the action research experiences and to take advantage of the same projects to achieve more profound perspectives on education research. Time and financial constraints do not permit this type of reflection.
2. The interruption of publications. PIIE Estudios was discontinued because of lack of financing. There are few alternatives publications to disseminate PIIE research either nationally and internationally. This has led to a significant decrease in the presence and influence of PIIE in the academic discussion in the country and in the more wide ranging public debate on education.

3. The present structure of financing, particularly that which will begin in September 1980, offers little flexibility to respond to the frequent occurrences in education in the country specifically in regard to government policy. This has been somewhat and partially overcome by reinforcing the activities of the Círculo de Educación of the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano.

4. Given the present financial conditions, the core of researchers of PIIE has been disbanded effective August 1980. From now on the researchers will be financed only to the degree that they have funds from projects. This will not only impede the development of some of the institutional work of importance, but will also create conditions of instability which will lead to some of the researchers having to leave both PIIE and the country. Those who remain will have considerably lower salaries.

5. The lack of funds for training, in-service and of new researchers has limited the ability of PIIE to upgrade its staff and to participate in seminars, congresses and academic meetings.

IDRC's contact with PIIE in the past has been through two specific projects. (Rodrigo Vera "Experimental In-Service Teacher Training," Carmen Luz Latorre "Plumbers and Electricians"). Both these individuals are not part of the core PIIE staff, nor are the projects part of what PIIE refers to as its institutional program, in other words the study of educational policy in Chile since 1973 and the relationship between education and poverty. Rather they are specific studies on vocational education and in-service teaching training.

After analyzing the other possible sources of support for PIIE, it is clear that IDRC and perhaps Ford Foundation are among the few agencies which would be able to give funds for what PIIE refers to as its institutional program. The action research and applied research can be picked up by European and Church connected agencies. It would probably be difficult to justify a further grant to PIIE this year as the two projects mentioned above are just beginning. However, we should be conscious of the fact that these projects are not contributing substantially to the institutional project
of PIIE nor are they providing funds for the sorely needed items of training and publications. If the Center is to continue its relationship with PIIE, the issues mentioned above as the disbandment of a high-level group of researchers should be considered in designing, with PIIE, support from 1980 on. This would perhaps be equivalent to an education program support or an educational institutional support plan for a center which can present a specific program of research on different aspects of education in Chile and a qualified group of researchers to carry this out. This program or project would commence the second semester of 1981 and would have as its principal objective that of providing PIIE with sufficient support for salaries and services so that it does not have to completely abandon the basic research it is carrying out on the relationship between education and society in Chile. In justifying a program of this sort, it is key to stress the founding role that PIIE has had with the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano in the circles of education, as well as the continuing activity of PIIE in organizing the first discussion groups and seminars on the problems of education in Chilean society.

(Postscript)

PIIE as FLACSO, GEA, and other institutions, are under the umbrella of the Academia. When we met with the Academia, we discussed the possibility of presenting a large institutional support program to a number of agencies among them SAREC, Ford, Interamerican Foundation, and IDRC which would include support for the programs of the Academia, among these PIIE. This perhaps could be a mechanism which would cover those activities of training and publications that PIIE at the moment cannot finance. There is, however, a certain reluctance among the programs regarding what exactly this Academia package will contain and how the academic independent and autonomy of the programs and centers can be maintained when the financing comes directly from the Academia and when the negotiations with outside agencies is filtered through the Academia.
CIDÉ (Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Educación)

CIDÉ works along three main lines, the development of programs, education research, and dissemination:

1. Program Development:
   - The design and implementation of training programs in mathematics;
   - "Padres e Hijos;"
   - "Formación de Animadores y Asesores Juveniles;"
   - Popular education with simulation games;
   - Sex education;
   - Instruments for educators; and a
   - Joint project with the University Simón Rodríguez in Caracas.

2. Research:
   - Threshold Studies on pre-school and primary education;
   - The Tracer Studies;
   - The evaluation of the program of school, nutrition of the Junta Nacional de Auxilio Escolar y Becas;
   - The Evaluation of the Results of the Program of Mathematics for Adults;
   - Studies of education and language and education and work;
   - A program on vocational education and apprenticeship, the study of the present education system in Chile; and
   - A text book on sociology of education.

3. Diffusion and dissemination:
   - "Resúmenes Analíticos en Educación;"
   - "Cuadernos de Educación," a monthly; and
   - Working documents, and information to the press;
   - CIDÉ also has a number of meetings and seminars.
CIDE has a staff of 67 including auxiliary field and professional personnel. There are 16 senior researchers who are heads of the distinct projects in the center. The budget of CIDE is over a half a million dollars approximately US$562,000 (66,000 is transferred to other centers.) The break down by origin of these funds is presented in the following graph.

**Budget by Origin 1979 (approx.)**

I. Foreign Funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Agencies</td>
<td>8,115.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral Agencies</td>
<td>216,800.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Foundations</td>
<td>57,403.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Agencies</td>
<td>85,314.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant Agencies</td>
<td>63,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracts Venezuela</td>
<td>32,784.00</td>
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</table>

Sub-Total 463,416.00

II. National Funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Agencies and</td>
<td>72,608.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subscriptions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Printing Contracts</td>
<td>25,925.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 561,949.00

Transferred to other Centers 66,200.00

Most of these funds are not dedicated to research as such but rather to the action programs of CIDE.

The financial position of CIDE is quite strong, given that they have their own operating center and a widely diversified sources of funds due to their mix of action, research, and dissemination. CIDE received a small endowment from Ford Foundation and substantive support from Interamerican in the past. IDRC policy with CIDE has been very much one of projects (IDRC has financed a series of projects from CIDE, some coordinated only in Chile and some regional.) CIDE will be presenting two proposals next year, the continuation of Johanna Filp's Threshold Study in the workshop with teachers, and the project coordinated regionally by Corvalán on Vocational Education.
There is little reason for changing IDRC policy in regard to CIDE as it is neither facing an institutional crunch nor are traditional sources of financing disappearing. However, what IDRC should consider is more coordinated action in terms of projects, in other words, having an idea of what CIDE has in the pipeline and being able to give them some indication of support with sufficient lead time for institutional planning.

Academia de Humanismo Cristiano

The Academia de Humanismo Cristiano was created in 1975 by the Cardinal of Santiago, Raul Silva Enríquez by resolution. The specific objectives of the institution are: to establish permanent programs to study the fundamental problems of mankind; to develop activities that promote the communication among intellectuals within the country and abroad; to insure the continuity of the social sciences, arts, and communication concerning the problems of man and society; to promote the creation of permanent groups of specialists; and to promote teaching activities and extension activities in social and human sciences. The Academia is organized around: Projects (short-term activities approved by the director); Programs (more permanent); Research.

Projects developed up to the present include: Political economy of Chile 1973-77, directed by Humberto Vega; Political Philosophy or authoritarianism in Chile, directed by Humberto Giannini; Critique and Reform of the Current Legislation in America for the Protection of Human Rights, Hernán Monteaulegre; and Origin and Development of Traditional Catholic Thought in Chile and Political Projection.

The programs within the Academia are: PIIE, Programa Interdisciplinario de Investigaciones en Educación; Programa de Investigaciones Agrarias, which includes FLACSO, GIA and GEA; Programa de Investigaciones Aplicadas en Economía del Trabajo which covers: the conditions of the working class and organizations in Chile; the situation of human rights; the economic conditions of the working class, and the social costs of the political economy.

Also, within the Academia, the Circulos de Estudio provide an opportunity for discussion with members of the community at large and academics of the programs of research of the Academy, and serve as a place of reception for Chilean academics returning from abroad. The Circulos of the Academia in 1979 included: philosophy, economy, health, journalism, sociology, law, architecture, planning, education, university, agriculture, economy, and the conditions of women.
The Academy is probably one of the most complex institutions included in this survey of the Southern Cone. Part of the complexity stems from the breadth of activities that the Academy is sponsoring—research programs, specific research projects, circulos de estudio, seminars, round-tables, a quasi-academic journal, etcetera—across a wide spectrum of disciplines and problem areas. Unlike almost any other private institution in the region, the Academy has no real research focus or priorities (except for its stated concern with studying "the fundamental problems of mankind"). In its intellectual sweep and eclecticism, it is more closely akin to a university than a standard research center.

Adding to this complexity is the fact that the Academy has not yet fully defined its institutional role in the current Chilean setting. With the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile now in the hands of a military rector, some persons associated with the Academy see it as developing into an alternative Catholic University. Others view it more as a holding operation, providing haven to scholars who have been marginalized or "displaced" by present political circumstances and maintaining pluralistic intellectual endeavor and dialogue in the community at large until such time as the current situation softens or changes. A third coterie of persons associated with the Academy would like to see it function as a Christian Democratic think-tank, under cover of the Church umbrella. A final cluster of people regard the Academy simply as a useful, instrumental device, offering bona fide legal status and protection to research teams that otherwise, in the present coyuntura, would not be able to operate with the juridical credentials needed to set up shop (and, more important, needed to receive donations and research contracts either locally or internationally.) These varying visions and political tensions still exist among the Academy's directive council and clientele after five years of operation.

Whatever may be the layers of executive and academic staff in the structure of the Academy, the ultimate power of decision-making on all issues, large or small, rests with Chile's Cardinal Raúl Silva. In his approach to the Academy he must obviously, and necessarily take into account a significant number of considerations and variables that would not weigh heavily—if at all—with most secular agencies. (Among other things, the Cardinal is presiding over a divided Church in Chile, with some bishops supportive of the current regime and others willing to stake everything against it. To reconcile these differences and insure that the Church is not institutionally damaged, the Cardinal has to do a delicate balancing act, which occasionally produces its effects inside the Academy.) In sum, the Academy—however pluralistic it may seem—is most definitely a Church entity, with less autonomy, in fact, than the pre-coup Catholic University, which was administered by an elected, secular rector.
Precisely because it is a Church entity, the Academy can offer a measure of protection to the programs and activities under its mantle that is greater than the "cover" granted by most secular institutions. Unless the incumbent military regime is prepared to make a frontal attack on the Church (which is most unlikely,) the Academy and its projects can safely stay in business. In an authoritarian environment, that circumstance is an invaluable advantage.

The government cannot take away the Academy's personalidad jurídica (unless, again, it is willing to do battle with the Church itself.) The Academy's legal status derives its legitimacy from a Chilean decree-law that dates back to the 16th or 17th century, which confers on the Church the power to form a multiplicity of organizations without recourse to the secular authorities. Because Chile is still a very legalistic society - albeit in a most peculiar way - that decree-law still carries weight. It is one of the reasons why a number of research teams that are essentially anti-clerical have nonetheless decided that they would prefer the safety of the Academy's juridical umbrella to the uncertainties of some other legal accommodation.

Many of the activities conducted by the Academy - especially the círculos de estudio, the continuing series of conferences and round-tables, the journal, et alia - are a breath of fresh air in a generally closed environment. The impressive number of persons that the Academy has drawn into its orbit through these programs is testimony to the significance of the Academy's role in the present setting. The Academy can, and has, provided shelter for programs and projects that might otherwise have foundered once they were cast adrift from their traditional university moorings. (PIIE and FLACSO are prime examples here. There are others.)

However, the persisting tensions - both theological and political - inside the Academy are an obvious detriment. While the Academy has obviously done a large number of useful things, it still has not achieved a clear institutional definition, in large part because of its own internal conflicts.

The Academy has been far less successful than most other private research institutions in the Southern Cone over the last five years in generating funds from international donors. It is difficult to decide whether the problem is simply one of lack of experience, or whether the international donor community has been put off by the Academy's seeming lack of internal control and definite purpose. A final factor may be the Academy's strong identification with the Church, which can be a problem for secular donor agencies, especially if they are asked to provide an "institutional-support" grant. It is hard to wager on an institution that cannot definitively define
its own trajectory. Finally, the future of the Academy is uncertain. Cardinal Silva is fast approaching retirement age, and it is not yet sure who his successor will be. Obviously, any new incumbent will have his own views and priorities vis-a-vis the Academy.

The centers which form part of program of the Academy give 5 percent overhead on their budget to the Academy. With these and other funds from the church hierarchy, the Academy exists. At the moment the Academy is, or appears to be, at a point of transition. It was set up as an emergency and took under its wing many programs as the emergency spread. However, the centers themselves do not seem to be at a point where the Academy could coordinate their activities or their search for financial support. The Academy is putting together a package grant for institutional support for the programs and for many of the training activities. This will be a large project presented to SAREC, Ford, Interamerican Foundation, and most likely IDRC. The question to address on the package is how much does it reflect what the programs themselves (up to now relatively autonomous) need in terms of institutional support, and how is the issue of autonomy of selection of research areas treated. Potentially, this could be a solution for many of the problems facing the Chilean research institutions. However, to do so, the Academy would have to reach an agreement with institutions on the management of funds and of research priorities.

VECTOR

In many respects, VECTOR is the secular analogue of the Academy of Christian Humanism in Chile. Like the Academy, it sponsors workshops, seminars and lecture series, it serves as an umbrella for research; it publishes working documents and a monthly bulletin, Informe de Coyuntura Económica. Also like the Academy, VECTOR is concerned with academics who have been discharged from their traditional university posts or who are trying to relocate in Chile after several years of exile abroad. While it describes itself as a "centro de estudios económicos y sociales," it does not have a permanent, salaried staff of investigators; rather, it acts more as a sponsor and coordinator of research and other activities. In sum, both in structure and modus operandi, VECTOR is more akin to the Academy than, say, to such traditional, private research centers as CIEPLAN or FLACSO or CIDE.

Despite the similarities, there also are marked differences between VECTOR and the Academy. To understand the basic divide between these two institutions, one must first understand Chilean history. The conflict between Catholics and Masons,
between clerics and anti-clerics, has been an important feature of the Chilean scenario for over a century. It has had repercussions in academic, especially visible before the coup in the long-standing rivalry—if not outright animosity—between the Catholic University and the University of Chile. It also has had significant spillover into the political arena, not simply between the Christian Democrats and the left, but inside the left as well. (The MAPU and the Izquierda Cristiana have their links to the Church; the Socialists and Radicals are distinctly anti-clerical.)

At the moment, both institutions are trying to be pluralistic: the Academy has assisted Socialist and Communist researchers, and VECTOR has a token Christian Democrat on its board. Nevertheless, each institution has a distinctive coloration that is well understood in the Chilean community. What they essentially share in common is their opposition to the current, official control of education and research. To this end, they have even shared people and activities together. (Humberto Vega, for example, whose research is formally sponsored by the Academy, also participates in VECTOR’s economics workshop. There are other, similar cases.) At rock bottom, however, the two institutions have a decidedly different "world-view."

VECTOR’s activities are basically organized around and through its program of workshops (talleres.) These workshops, as of 1979, were focused on the following thematic areas: the economy, basic education, higher education, the labor movement, and something called "comunicación social." (An earlier workshop dealing with the agricultural sector was disbanded last year when the key researchers concerned, today GEA, decided to transfer their programs to the umbrella of the Academy.)

In all of its thematic areas, VECTOR’s approach is more applied (and political) than that of most other centers included in this survey. For example, in the educational area, VECTOR does not simply sponsor research, but offers a course entitled "Política Educacional y Realidad Nacional" to teachers drawn from the public primary and secondary school system. In the labor field, it provides—again, in addition to its research—direct advisory services to labor leaders. While that latter activity might seem to be somewhat risky in the current environment, much of VECTOR’s work in this area is conducted in collaboration with the Vicaría Pastoral Obrera, which provides a certain measure of protection. The institution has received funds from SAREC and from some of Europe’s Social Democratic Foundations and governments.

VECTOR offers a secular alternative to the Academy. That is a healthy development in the present Chilean environment, especially for researchers who would have reservations about
affiliating themselves with a Church entity. Also, VECTOR has good linkages to the exile community (especially in México.) At some time in the future, it might be a useful vehicle for helping integrate many returning exiles into the local job market. Finally, VECTOR is the only independent institution outside the Church that is directly addressing itself to the problems of organized labor in Chile. The labor sector is so sensitive at this point that few academics are willing to involve themselves with it except at a considerable intellectual distance. VECTOR is thus filling an important gap.

However, VECTOR is a vulnerable institution. The Academy is backed by the weight and presence of the Church. VECTOR has no such protection, and could readily be put out of business if the Government chose to do so. That is one of the reasons why many researchers who would ideologically prefer to work with VECTOR have opted for the Academy as the safer bet. Therefore, an external donor interested in helping VECTOR would do well not to consider anything approaching institutional support, since the institutional picture is somewhat precarious. In this situation, project support would be the most indicated course.

CIPMA (Centro de Investigación y Planificación del Medio Ambiente)

CIPMA was organized in 1979 as a private academic "corporation" focusing on the related problems of human settlements and the environment. Most of CIPMA's founding members had originally been associated with CIDU, the urban and regional development center of Chile's Pontifical Catholic University. After the military coup in 1973, some of them had been forced to seek employment outside the university system. Other, who managed to hold onto their university posts, nonetheless found it impossible to pursue innovative research in the new, militarized environment. Their solution was to create CIPMA as a vehicle for independent investigation, collaboration and dialogue.

In basic style and purpose, CIPMA fits within the general category of private research institutions that have sprung up in the face of spreading authoritarian governance in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. At the same time, CIPMA is a unique and unconventional species in that overall genus. With the exception of one lone girl Friday, CIPMA has no paid, permanent, full-time staff. The directive council—including CIPMA's president, Guillermo Geisse—give their time and intellectual energies to the center ad honorem. CIPMA's basic nucleus of specialists participate in the institution not as staff, but
as "members." In most cases, their salaries come from employment elsewhere. Only when specific research projects are under way, with guaranteed financing from external donors, does CIPMA contract "staff," and then only for the duration of the project.

In contrast to the centers set up in the immediate wake of the military coups in the Southern Cone, Geisse and his colleagues have tried to insure that CIPMA's basic infrastructure can be financed from within the Chilean community. Accordingly, they have devised a formula of contribution from CIPMA's membership on a scale sufficient to keep the Center in operation even in periods when the lines to the international donor community may be slack. A core group of "socios colaboradores" has been assembled who were willing to make an initial donation of 30,000 pesos each and subsequently to provide an additional 1,000 pesos per semester for CIPMA's upkeep. (Most persons in this group either are employed by a U. N. agency or, as in the case of Geisse himself, can supplement their local earnings with consultancies or short-term visiting professorships abroad.) So that individuals in less comfortable circumstances can also have a stake in CIPMA, a second category of "socios cooperatoras" has been established, with a required contribution of only 2,000 pesos per year. These donations will be modestly supplemented over time by fees generated through CIPMA's courses and seminars for advanced students and professionals.

To make this model viable, Geisse has established a core infrastructure that is extremely frugal. CIPMA's locale, a modest private home on a side street, rents for 12,000 pesos per month. With telephone, electricity, the girl Friday, and a few extras, CIPMA's core operating costs as of January 1980 were in the neighborhood of US$500 per month. No doubt, inflation will elevate that figure over the next year. However, if there is a modest deficit, it is expected that CIPMA's "Socios colaboradores" will be able to make up the differences from their collective pockets.

Intellectually, CIPMA's terrain is human settlements and the environment. Within that broad territory, CIPMA is mounting a long-term, three-tiered program of research comprising theoretical and analytical studies, descriptive and diagnostic reports, and prescriptive forays into policy and planning. But stressing this core research program, the center also is organizing a continuing series of conferences, workshops, training seminars and publications. The approach in all these activities is multidisciplinary and focused not only on the spatial and physical dimension of the urban-regional continuum, but also on its socio-economic characteristics and effects and, indeed, on its cultural impact. Furthermore, there is a clear disposition in the CIPMA program to treat urban, regional environmental systems not solely in technocratic terms or with the criteria
of economic feasibility and efficiency, but in terms of their impact on the quality of the life of the great mass of the urban and rural population.

CIPMA is engaged in the kind of "critical" social science analysis that is characteristic of most of the new centers that have recently been founded across the Southern Cone. In the specific case of CIPMA, the intellectual purpose is not simply to lay bare the key features, costs and inequities of the current Chilean socio-economic model (and of models elsewhere in Latin America,) but also to design more balanced developmental and environmental strategies that may, in the intermediate or longer-term future, have direct relevance for governmental policy and planning.

In pursuing these intellectual ends, CIPMA's membership have an explicit set of normative concerns that they bring to their technocratic topics. In their approach to spatial and environmental questions, the key, modifying adjective is "equitable." In their consideration of the complex issues involved in the problem of human settlements, they explicitly assume that the inhabitants should have some voice in the decisions that affect their lives, their well-being and their socio-cultural situation. The notion of "participation" recurs repeatedly in CIPMA's statement of purpose. A concern for human welfare, in its broadest and most basic dimension, is also a connecting thread in all of CIPMA's projected activities. In sum, underlying CIPMA's technocratic area of specialization is a very explicit set of democratic principles.

The specialists associated with CIPMA, and the junior members that they are recruiting to their ranks, are a talented and dedicated lot. Guillermo Geisse, CIPMA's president, directed CIDU in its most innovative and productive years. He has an international reputation, which has yielded academic invitations from as far afield as UCLA and the University of Warsaw. Also, as the coordinator of one of the sub-programs of CLACSO's Commission on Urban and Regional Development, Geisse is able to link CIPMA into the regional network of scholars and, in addition, to channel some of its efforts into the terrain of comparative research.

Institutionally, the CIPMA format represents a new kind of intellectual "survival model" in the Southern Cone. Since 1973, the institutional alternative for independent-minded scholars in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay has been a growing network of private research centers, typically characterized by a full-time staff and a core infrastructure financed almost entirely by money from abroad. Till now, this model has been successful in a respectable number of cases. It
does, however, have its finite limits. International donors, whether private or governmental, do not have endless resources; moreover, the resources that they now can deploy in the Southern Cone are being progressively diminished in real terms. Even the most successful of the new, private centers in the Southern Cone are increasingly squeezed between a deteriorating dollar and mounting, local inflation.

In this setting, the CIPMA "model" seems to offer an interesting, constructive alternative. While CIPMA must obviously look to international donors to finance its research projects, it can nonetheless subsist and conduct an array of other activities when the donor market is lean. Also, because its membership is linked into a considerable array of institutions (ILPES, CELADE, CIDU, the Academy of Christian Humanism, the CLACSO Urban Commission, et alia,) CIPMA can sometimes dovetail its research with projects housed elsewhere and thus indirectly benefit from funding flowing through another pipeline. In sum, CIPMA can pursue a number of flexible options that are not readily open to most private institutions that must, as a first priority, meet a high monthly wage bill. It also can be relatively selective and independent in the research projects that it chooses to undertake.

Because CIPMA is less than a year old, it would be premature at this stage to attempt to assess the long-term viability of this alternative "survival model."

Nonetheless, CIPMA does have certain advantages that leave grounds for cautious optimism. The Center's format seems to be very neatly and realistically attuned to the contemporary scenario in the Southern Cone. Because CIPMA's members are almost all well-trained in a technical specialty under the general rubric of urban and regional studies, they have more possibility of gaining steady employment or, at least, supplementing their earning through consultancies and the like than, for example, a political theorist or a sociologist. If they can keep up their present momentum, and if they succeed in marshalling funds for their research program, or for specific research projects, from the international donor circuit, their prospects for survival and success would appear promising.