Making a Difference?
External Views on Canada's International Impact

By Robert Greenhill

The Interim Report of the External Voices Project
A Canadian Institute of International Affairs Special Report
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About the Author

Robert Greenhill is Senior Visiting Executive at the IDRC. Born in Alberta, Robert has extensive international experience and has written or presented on development, innovation, international trade issues and corporate social responsibility to audiences all over the world including the Mayor of Shanghai and the World Economic Forum in Davos. One of Canada’s most experienced international executives, Robert worked with McKinsey & Company and, most recently, was the President of Bombardier International, the international arm of Bombardier Inc. Robert was the founding President of the Banff Forum and sits on the boards of the Canadian Policy Research Networks (CPRN) and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. This report represents his personal views. Robert can be reached at rgreenhill@idrc.ca

About the Canadian Institute of International Affairs

The Canadian Institute of International Affairs is a non-profit, non-partisan institution dedicated to promoting a better understanding of international affairs amongst Canadians.
Summary: Decline and Opportunity

"I see Canada at a crossroads: where to go, what role to play."

The goal of the External Voices Project is to assess where Canada has made a significant difference since 1989 and to identify where Canada could make a difference in the future, by drawing upon the expertise and perspective of international thought leaders. Some 40 experienced politicians, academics, NGO leaders, and civil servants from 19 countries were interviewed during the second half of 2004, using the Chathan House rule: that is, no quotes are attributed to individuals. (Please see the Appendix for a list of those interviewed.)

The findings are both sobering and exciting. They are sobering in that they portray a Canada whose international performance and, to a certain extent, international reputation have fallen over the last 15 years. In particular, our influence on United States foreign policy, our contribution to international security, and our role in development are perceived to have withered. The context for the future is seen as even more challenging. Institutions in which Canada played an important role, such as the G8 and NATO, are seen to be losing influence. Increasingly active major players such as China, Brazil, India, and Mexico and sharply focused niche players such as Norway are seen to be taking on roles traditionally filled by Canada. As one European put it, "The current trends are against Canada's influence."

The findings are exciting in that they highlight bright spots where Canada did make a real difference: South Africa, land mines, the human security agenda, balancing closer economic integration with reconfirmed political independence. They sketch out a future in which Canada could make a tremendous difference, if we choose to and if we make the choices effective.
Interviewees describe a world fraught with important challenges that increasingly outmoded international institutions are ill equipped to meet. Canada is seen to have a unique geopolitical position that, combined with the right strategy, could allow us to make a significant difference: putting muscle behind the human security agenda; acting as a "global think tank" on tough international issues and governance challenges; crafting the next North American agenda; providing renewed leadership in development; and using education to build relationships with a new generation of decision makers around the world. The picture is one of significant decline in the recent past but also of real opportunity in the immediate future.

The keys to renewed relevance? Differentiation and focus. "Decide on a few areas, invest deeply, and become indispensable: in these areas Canada should be considered pre-eminent, in terms of experience, capabilities, and resources." Interviewees identified three elements that are seen to be missing in Canada's approach today: a willingness to make clear choices; a consistency in choices and in relationships (especially with the US) over time; and a determination to build world-class assets in those niche areas where Canada has chosen to lead. Any one of the ideas listed in the previous paragraph could make a significant difference to the world and to Canada's role within it. None of them will happen without a major change in our mindset and our allocation of resources.

Making a Difference? External Views on Canada's International Impact is the interim report of the External Voices Project. A final report, incorporating further interviews and additional research, will be published in the summer of 2005.
Canada's Influence in the World

"Where has Canada made a significant difference over the past 15 years? Nothing comes to mind."

The year 1989—when the Berlin Wall fell—was a watershed in international relations. In January 1989 NATO faced the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact across a divided Germany. Two years later, Germany was reunited within a united Europe, the Soviet Union had disappeared, and new countries had appeared along its former borders. In 1989, the G7 was the unrivalled centre of economic power. Today, China has joined the World Trade Organization (wto) and, together with India, has shifted global economic attention to Asia. The world has changed since 1989. This study attempts to assess our effectiveness in this new world.

Our measure of effectiveness was whether Canada had made a significant difference. Just being present would not meet the test. A significant difference means that because we were present, positive outcomes occurred that would not have happened, or at least not so quickly or so well, or negative outcomes were avoided. A high standard, to be sure, but the appropriate one if our goal is real impact. In today's crowded world, lots of countries make a showing, quite a few make a contribution—but only a few make a difference.

After all, from 1989 to 2004, Canada spent some $243 billion on diplomacy, defence, and international development. Smaller countries with fewer resources have made a significant difference over the past 15 years: Sweden in development, Australia in East Timor, Norway in peace brokering. The Gates Foundation has transformed the fight against HIV/AIDS and other infectious disease with commitments of $6 billion. Is it not reasonable to expect to make a "significant difference" in at least a few areas with a quarter of a trillion dollars?
Unfortunately, although almost all interviewees expressed affection for Canada, the general view was that Canada's role has been marginal over the past 15 years. "Canada has played a positive role in the world, but impact? That is a bit questionable." Several interviewees could identify no examples where Canada had made a significant difference over the past 15 years. Most identified only one to three examples. These examples tended to be clustered in two periods: the Brian Mulroney years until about 1992, and the years when Foreign Affairs was under Lloyd Axworthy.

Canada is perceived as having started the post-Cold War period relatively strong, with an effective diplomatic corps and a respected foreign minister supporting an activist prime minister who was interested in international affairs and prepared to take risks, and who cultivated—and leveraged—strong personal relationships with key international actors.

All experts who expressed an opinion noted Canada's positive and often courageous role in supporting majority rule in South Africa. Canada leveraged its position at the G7, the Commonwealth, and the Francophonie, cajoled international leaders, supported the Front-Line States, and engaged both the African National Congress and the South African government with development assistance and governance support during the transition period. As one African leader said, "Canada was very important—no other word for it."

Canada is also perceived to have played a significant role in laying the foundations for regional and global trade agreements - the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the WTO. Canada is seen as having shown that increased economic integration could go hand-in-hand with political independence.

Foreign observers see Canada as having been very effective in building and leveraging strong relationships with the US during this time. As one US observer summarized: "Mulroney was influential." This effectiveness was enhanced by strong (if not always harmonious) working relationships between the two countries at the ministerial and administrative levels. While Canada, as one American put it,
"declared itself a friend," it aggressively pursued its own agenda both internationally (environment, South Africa) and in bilateral negotiations (acid rain, declaration of full northern sovereignty). The Canadian government is seen to have leveraged its relationships very effectively in pursuit of Canadian interests in bilateral negotiations. "We got taken to the cleaners by you guys over acid rain," said another American who was very close to the file, "but Mulroney got no credit because he sang with the president."

Canada also cultivated strong high-level relationships with France and the United Kingdom. "Mulroney was very close to Thatcher yet had a strong rapport with Mitterrand," said one continental European observer. The best indication that Canada is seen as close to but independent of the US is that all three countries (plus Russia) were supportive of Mulroney's potential candidacy for secretary-general of the United Nations. Such support would be inconceivable—particularly from France—unless Mulroney was perceived as an independent voice.

His abortive candidacy for the position of UN secretary-general appears to have been the high-water mark of the Mulroney era. It was dropped for domestic political reasons—in particular, Charlottetown and the national unity crisis. The unity crisis and a difficult fiscal situation increasingly preoccupied national leaders. Budgets for the military, development, and diplomacy were cut. Canadian involvement in international peacekeeping was tarnished by the Somalia debacle. Canada was already retreating from the international scene by the end of the Mulroney years.

This retreat accelerated during the early Jean Chrétien years. The new prime minister entered office clearly focused on critical domestic issues: national unity, the deficit, and restoring Canadians' faith in the federal government. Significant new budget cuts were imposed on all departments. Externally, interviewees see Chrétien as having been conservative, risk-averse, and uninterested in international affairs except as a trade opportunity.
Despite the rhetorical differentiation from the outgoing government, the Liberals provided continuity on the trade agenda, ratifying NAFTA and joining the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group. However, they reinforced a determination to show that political independence was also maintained. A number of Canadian observers noted that Mulroney's closeness to the US had led to a backlash at home. As a result, the incoming government positioned itself at a greater distance from the US.

This particular element was seen in spades under Prime Minister Chrétien when Canada refused to join the "coalition of the willing" in Iraq. The fact that Canada refused, and got away with it, is seen as significant by many observers. "Canada's action was an inspiration and a comfort to us," said an interviewee from a smaller country.

The accomplishment most strongly associated with Canadian leadership during the Chrétien government is the Landmine Treaty. There is a difference among experts over the value of the treaty. However, there is no debate over the power of the process. As one critic noted, "Although I disagreed with the position, there is no doubt that Canadian leadership made a profound difference." Another said, "We were facing a juggernaut." A third observed, "The US discovered it could no longer dictate the pace and scope of the process." Canada went outside the normal UN process and proceeded successfully without the agreement of the world's only superpower. By leading a coalition of like-minded states and key civil society actors, Canada is seen to have assembled a networked virtual superpower—the diplomatic equivalent of the PC-based supercomputer.

Foreign Affairs under Lloyd Axworthy is also seen to have played a leadership role in many aspects of the human security agenda, including the International Criminal Court, restrictions on the trade in conflict diamonds, and initiatives during Canada's term at the UN Security Council to protect civilians and child soldiers. The Canadian-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and its report, The Responsibility to Protect, are considered by a number of interviewees to have been extremely important in setting out new norms for a state's obligation to protect its citi-
zens—and for the international community's responsibility to intervene if it does not.

External interviewees are deeply divided on the utility of the human security agenda and therefore of Canada's leadership role in it. Most, including initial doubters, view it positively. "I was skeptical that it was too broad; now, I think the idea of humanitarian intervention is useful." Several interviewees, American and non-American, noted with some cynicism how the rise in Canadian rhetoric in this area coincided with a reduction in military commitments to do something about it. Moreover, both friends and foes of the human security initiatives questioned whether these initiatives reflected the strong commitment of a nation or the passions of one man. A number noted that Canada seems to have reduced its aggressive support for human security since Lloyd Axworthy's departure.

Canada is seen to have made a specific difference in Latin America in 2000, when President Alberto Fujimori's attempt to push through a deeply flawed election led to a political crisis in Peru. Lloyd Axworthy and the Canadian diplomatic corps receive high marks for their effective handling of this delicate situation. Generally, Canada's engagement in the Organization of American States since 1990 is seen by Latin American observers to have been a positive development.

Canada's involvement with the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) gets a very mixed response. Canada gets some marks for "pushing on a not-so-open door, particularly with the Bush administration," to get NEPAD adopted at the G8 summit at Kananaskis. However, views are divided on NEPAD's effectiveness, and there is a general sense that Canada provided only transitory leadership on the issue.

In addition to traditional diplomatic initiatives, Canada is seen to have made a difference throughout this period in three less traditional ways.

Canada is seen to have produced effective internationalists. External interviewees noted the leadership roles played by Maurice
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Strong, Stephen Lewis, Louise Arbour, David Malone, and others. Canadians and external interviewees also noted the high number of Canadians playing effective roles at every other level in international organizations and NGOs.

Canada is seen to have played an important role in the education of developing-country elites. Investments made many years before showed results during this period. Interviewees provided numerous examples. The International Development Research Centre provided research support to Professors Fernando Cardoso of Brazil and Ricardo Lagos of Chile; they both became presidents of their countries during this period. Singapore’s ambassador to the UN in this period had studied at Dalhousie. Many of the up-and-coming civil servants in southeast Asia had attended training courses jointly provided by the Canadian International Development Agency and the Singaporean government.

A number of interviewees from Europe and the developing world said that Canada made a difference by providing a successful, distinct socio-economic model. Canada is seen as a model in the way that it combined North American economic dynamism, European social justice, and fiscal responsibility. Canada is also seen as an increasingly important example of a successful multi-ethnic society. In an external reaffirmation of the view of Canada as a model citizen, as expressed by Jennifer Welsh in her recent book, At Home in the World, these interviewees see Canada as making a difference by showing others what is possible.

However, despite specific successes, 1989 to 2004 is seen as a period of decline. Canada is perceived to have become overextended—“You spread yourself too thin, you are basically everywhere and nowhere”—and strategically directionless—“I see Canada at a crossroads: where to go, what role to play.” Interviewees from around the world noted a major deterioration in Canada’s performance in at least three major areas; in our relationship with the United States, in our leadership role in development, and in the international significance of our peacekeeping and other international security activities.
Canada's Relationship with the US

"Canada has taken itself off the list of friends."

When discussing our relationship with the US, it is worth distinguishing between our roles as neighbours and as international interlocutors. Geography made us neighbours, and hundreds of years of interaction and numerous trade pacts have made those links even stronger. Neighbourhood, or continental, policy is focused on trade, movement of people, and homeland security. This relationship has a momentum of its own, based on massive and mutual economic self-interest.

Our interviews suggest that there is very little linkage between neighbourhood relations and international relations, although both can be helped by good relations at the leadership level. No one—not the severest critic of our role in land mines or the International Criminal Court, or of our stand on Iraq—suggested that our foreign policy would affect our trade relationship with the US. Conversely, there was no suggestion that a more supportive international policy would in any way help resolve challenging bilateral issues such as softwood lumber.

Arguably, neighbourhood relations have strengthened over the past 15 years. NAFTA has had a major structural impact. Canada's fast response to 9/11, with the "smart borders" initiative and close security co-operation, has allowed the Canadian border to remain open.

If we are concerned only about economic relationships with our southern neighbour, the solution may be simple: ensure that we are not a security risk, and our borders will remain open. Certainly there will be trade issues, but these will be resolved through NAFTA machinery or by assembling the right coalition of actors on both sides of the border to lobby the White House and Congress, rather than by some
grand bargain involving international issues. In this case, Canada may be content with its low profile on international issues. As one person said, "In Washington, Canada tends not to have an identity. This often has a lot of benefits."

If, however, we aspire to have an impact on the rest of the world, the challenge is very different.

American interviewees—Democrats, Republicans, and career officers alike—observed that Canada has become almost irrelevant to U.S. foreign policy making. "Over the past 12 years there has been a real falling-off of the relationship." "You are not on the radar screen down here, including with foreign policy elites." "Never did anyone in the planning process say, 'Before doing this we must talk to Canada.'" As one well-informed Canadian put it, "Ten years ago, we had little influence in Washington. Now we have less."

This issue goes deeper than the Bush administration's unilateralist approach to international affairs. Susan Rice, undersecretary of state in the Bill Clinton administration, noted in a recent paper: "While Prime Minister Chrétien and President Clinton enjoyed a warm personal relationship and met on numerous occasions, as did their respective national security advisers and foreign ministers, Canada's influence on day-to-day U.S. policy was marginal ... For almost a generation, the U.S. has conducted foreign policy largely without regard to Canada's perspective."

Why should we care if the U.S. listens to our views? As one Canadian asked: "Why just the U.S.? Why not China too?" Indeed, some of Canada's successes—such as with land mines—came without U.S. government support (although American NGOs played a critical role). However, as the head of one international think tank said: "If you have ideas, one way to have influence is through the U.S." Moreover, being perceived as having influence with the U.S. is an important part of our credibility with others. Almost every description of Canada by non-Americans included our being "close to," "a neighbour of," "a bridge to" the U.S.
So why are we not relevant to US foreign policy making today, and what should we do about it? Interviewees identified three issues: the ability of our national leaders to establish deep, trust-based relationships with their American counterparts; the consistency and appropriateness of our strategic posture toward the US; and the relevance of our national assets.

Both Canadians and Americans see Brian Mulroney as having had, even by historical standards, a particularly strong relationship with both Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. "Canada was effective under Bush 41 because of the president's relationship with Mulroney," said one American. Jean Chrétien, by contrast, is perceived to have "oozed discomfort," at least with the George W. Bush administration. At the same time, Chrétien's longest-serving foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, "kept trying to stick it up the Americans' nose," according to a non-American who knew him well. Whatever the domestic appeal of this attitude (which appears to have been considerable, judging from rising satisfaction in the polls over Canada's foreign policy), "Canada was seen as less trustworthy" as a result.

The concerns raised were not of substance but of style and behaviour. In the pre-Iraq period, the UK agreed more often with Canada than with the US on key human security issues, such as land mines and the International Criminal Court. Yet, in this period, Tony Blair was seen as having successfully transferred a close and effective personal relationship from Bill Clinton to George Bush, while Jean Chrétien did not.

If our problems were anchored solely in personal relationships between leaders, there would be some grounds for optimism. Initial indications are that the personal rapport is much more effective between Paul Martin and Bush. Both US and Canadian interviewees expressed a positive reaction to Bush's recent visit to Ottawa.
A deeper challenge appears to be the inconsistency of our strategic posture toward the US. By strategic posture, we mean the clear and consistent indication of how one country intends to treat another. Our strategic posture should be grounded in our national interests and reflective of our national assets. The problem people raised is that we don’t seem to have a strategic posture—or more that we have several, and we keep on switching them. American and non-American observers noted that our attitude toward the US seemed to change significantly between prime ministers and, even, during the Chrétien period, between foreign ministers. Our inconsistent attitude makes it less useful, and more risky, for US decision makers to fully engage with Canada on sensitive international issues.

However, the fundamental challenge is that of assets, defined as the sets of capabilities and the willingness to use them that make one country useful to another—or that make a country difficult if it is crossed. What useful assets do we bring to the table in 2005 to translate a strategic posture—whatever it is—into real influence? Why should the US (or anyone else) talk to us on a major international issue? What unique insights, special relationships, or other differentiating capabilities can we bring to bear?

American interviewees identified numerous assets that they thought had provided Canada with some strategic relevance to the US over the last 50 years, but they noted that many of these assets had deteriorated:

- "peacekeeping, but for the last 15 years you have lived off your reputation" (peacekeeping is by far the historical asset mentioned most often by Americans)

- "a bridge between the US and the UK ... but the UK co-opted your strategy, positioned themselves as the bridge between the US and Europe"

- "a bridge between the US and the UN ... As the UN matured, and US ambivalence toward the institution grew, this approach became fragile"
leaders "worth talking to, worth exchanging ideas with" (referring to Pierre Trudeau)

In summary, our challenge in retaining relevance to the US goes well beyond the issue of individual compatibility between leaders, however important that may be. The core challenge is to have the strategic posture that works for us and is effective with them, and to have the key national assets to give that attitude meaning.

When asked which countries are punching above their weight in relationships with the US, American and non-American interviewees identified three: the UK, Australia, and, somewhat counterintuitively, France. All three are seen as having the clearly defined strategic postures and the appropriate assets to give them real influence with the US.

The UK’s strategic posture toward the US is seen to be that of a fully engaged ally. "It is possible for nations to punch above their weight. Great Britain has had tremendous impact. They have capability and are willing to use it." Another added, "The UK has built itself into our institutional decision-making process. They made themselves part of our decisions, contributed ideas." Assets include what many interviewees consider the best diplomatic service in the world, a "demon ability in the Foreign Office for drafting," strong intelligence assets, and an effective full-service military. In exchange, the UK believes that its leverage over the US gives it leverage over the world.

Interviewees noted that Australia’s strategic posture is that of a long-term partner and solid regional ally. It takes this approach because it lives in a tough neighbourhood. Ever since the Second World War, Australians have been very aware that no one but the US could ensure their security. Australians are seen to have a small but focused and effective military and a willingness to use it. Their Pacific location makes them a valued regional asset. As a result, "When Australia’s PM visits, people feel a partner is coming. When Canada’s PM comes, people feel it is an obligation to be fulfilled."
France is seen to have positioned itself as a foil to the US with capabilities that cannot be ignored. "The French have influence because they have capacity, and we know that, no matter how pissed off we are at them." American interviewees identified French assets as including a Security Council veto, differentiated intelligence assets, and some of the toughest troops in the world.

In all three cases these strategic posture/asset bundles are coherent, consistent with national interest, and anchored in national capabilities. The basic strategic postures of France, Australia, and the UK are seen to be relatively consistent over time—beyond individual chemistry and party affiliations.

What should our strategic posture toward the US be—the attitude that works for us and is effective with them? What assets should we leverage, enhance, or create from scratch to ensure that our strategic posture toward the US—or toward other countries—is effective? Interviewees have various opinions. However, the general view is that Canada's strategic posture should be, as one American put it, "close to the US, but not of the US." As a non-American put it, "Canada will be taken more seriously if it crafts an independent policy that focuses on different ways of making things happen than the US, that leverages Canada's high level of trust with the developing world, reasonable goodwill in Europe, and historical credibility with multilateral institutions."

Canada's low level of influence on US foreign policy today, while showing a decline from the Mulroney period, may not be atypical. Canadian interviewees noted the very difficult relationships between Lester Pearson and Lyndon Johnson, between John Diefenbaker and John Kennedy, and between Pierre Trudeau and Richard Nixon. However, while it may be typical, it is certainly not inevitable. American and other interviewees believe that with a more effective engagement at the individual leadership level, with an appropriate and consistent strategic attitude, and with international assets that are relevant in the 21st century, Canada could increase its influence on US foreign policy as well as with the rest of the world.
The most challenging element will be ensuring that our strategic assets are relevant to today's international environment. Interviewees' comments on international security suggest that this is not the case today.
International Security: 
Our Need to Recapture the High Ground

"Canada will continue to be irrelevant unless there is a political will to change. Today it adopts high moral standards from a safe distance."

A country’s military capability is one of its most important assets. Unfortunately, many of Canada’s defence assets are seen by international experts as largely irrelevant to today’s real international security needs. The strong message from international security experts is that refocusing our military assets on a few distinct areas could enhance our security at home and make a real difference abroad.

It is difficult to exaggerate the extent to which Canada is seen to have dropped the ball on its international security obligations, peacekeeping in particular. Words used to describe Canada’s military included “atrophy,” “confusion,” and “irrelevant.”

In UN peacekeeping, Canada is seen to have virtually fallen off the map. One peacekeeping expert said, “Since Somalia you have disappeared.” Another said, “You must know—to all intents and purposes, you are no longer here.” Although there was praise for Canadian troops when they were appropriately applied, as in Ethiopia in 2000, the general sense is that there is no longer the political will by Canada’s leaders nor the strategic commitment by Canada’s military for Canada to really make a difference in UN peacekeeping.

The contrast between historical glory and present near-irrelevance is nicely summarized on the Department of National Defence website, which notes (without any obvious sense of irony): “Canada has a long and proud history in United Nations peace support operations ... According to the United Nations (UN) monthly summary, dated 30 September 2004, Canada is the 34th largest contributor of
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military troops and observers to the UN." In 2005, we are not seen as a declining force in UN peacekeeping—we are seen as essentially gone

This absence is seen by interviewees as a great loss, for the UN and for Canada. It is seen as a loss for the UN because of the quality and discipline of our troops (Somalia notwithstanding), the effectiveness of our staff officers, and our deep institutional experience with peacekeeping. It is seen as a loss for Canada, as peacekeeping—or, increasingly, peacemaking—is an important international role for which we are seen to be uniquely qualified. "Canada had a huge comparative advantage in both reputation and expertise."

During the past 15 years, Canada was also involved in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. In the Balkans, under the UN and then under NATO, "Canada was present and visible right from the beginning." We are seen to have made an important contribution, particularly in the critical provision of relief during the siege of Sarajevo. However, we are not seen by either European or American interviewees to have made a significant difference at the strategic level, and our military and diplomatic contributions were not deemed sufficient for us to have a seat at the Contact table.

In Afghanistan, our past leadership of and ongoing involvement in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force are seen as welcome and useful. However, there were questions about whether the entire operation, including Canada's involvement, was at a level below critical mass and set to fail. Some interviewees saw the mission as having successfully positioned itself as a peacekeeping force rather than an occupation force and as "having done successfully in Kabul what the Americans failed to do in Baghdad." Others saw the mission either as failing or as "holding on by its fingernails." The real test of Canada's commitment to this area may still be to come.

Today, Canada is contributing less than 2 per cent of the troops engaged in UN-run or other internationally sanctioned international security operations (not including Iraq). We have reached the point where Médecins sans Frontières (MSF, or Doctors Without Borders)
consistently deploys more professionals to the front lines around the world than the Canadian armed forces. In 2004, MSF, with a budget of only 8 per cent of the Canadian military's, had about 1,800 foreign professionals and 17,000 local staff deployed at any one time in critical regions around the world, while Canada managed to deploy about 1,600 troops.

What should Canada do to improve its military effectiveness? External experts made three sets of suggestions.

*First and foremost, enhance protection of Canadian sovereignty and continental defence.*

International observers saw a focus on a reinforced continental defence capability as having real merit: "It is an interesting proposition in terms of public diplomacy. To the US, Canada can convey a message of burden sharing on continental defence. At the same time, there is an important message to Canadians: we are really going to strengthen Canadian sovereignty and we are going to protect the Canadian heartland."

This would require superior coast guard and interdiction capabilities. It would also require an enhanced ability to intervene quickly in case of terrorist actions within Canada and to deal effectively with large natural or terrorist-caused disasters.

Such an approach could involve new levels of co-operation with the US (for example, on coastal surveillance). Some Americans suggested that such a strategy could involve participation in ballistic missile defence. However, no one suggested that such participation would be essential.

*Second, make a distinct contribution to international security.*

There is a strong consensus that Canada could make a significant difference in international security if it focused on a few critical areas. Interviewees identified three areas: an air-mobile brigade with
stand-alone capability; constabulary and security training; and post-conflict reconstruction.

There is extraordinarily strong support among security-minded experts from the developed and developing worlds for Canada to develop a stand-alone mobile brigade. The first reason is that there is a real need for such capacity; secondly, Canada is seen to have the competence and the goodwill to use this capacity in ways others could not.

"The thing we are not good at doing is reacting promptly when we see the political situation deteriorate. Canada would make a real contribution if had a force of 5,000 that could be projected into a region, including 2,000 to 3,000 in the first weeks, that could be kept there for two months."

"It could be a rapid conflict resolution force, it could provide rapid humanitarian relief, or it could provide muscular enforcement of the responsibility to protect." "Design a stand-alone capability. The mission could be done by Canada completely autonomously. Presently it is a maximum mission for France. Bring in others, but under Canadian leadership."

Canada is seen to play a uniquely valuable role in cases where the other countries with such assets today (the US, the UK, and France) might have difficulty being involved for political reasons. "The Maple Leaf would be a lot more welcome in many areas than our GIs." Various like-minded countries—Norway, Belgium, Austria, and the Netherlands—were suggested as possible partners in deployment under Canadian leadership.

With this capability, Canada could also help others play their role more effectively. As one African leader said, "The African Union has established a security council. It has no logistics capability. Canada could provide airlift, command and control, training in peacekeeping."
Canada is also seen as being able to play a differentiated role in policing and security training. Canada's broad acceptability as a country and its police officers' multicultural experience are seen as real assets. Rather than setting up a separate constabulary unit, like the French gendarmerie or the Italian carabinieri, both European and American interviewees suggested that existing police units, especially the RCMP, take on this role. However, these interviewees noted that police forces have no spare capacity; indeed, they are often overstretched with domestic responsibilities. Therefore, a structural change would have to be made to have this capacity on an ongoing basis; for example, increasing the RCMP corps by 2,000 officers so that 1,000 could be overseas at any time and another 1,000 would be preparing to go or going through structured reinsertion in the corps after their return.

For these reasons, Canada is also seen as well positioned to take a leadership role in training: training UN troops from other countries as well as training indigenous troops and police officers in post-conflict situations. Canada has experience in all these areas, but the issue is scaling up in order to make a difference on an international level.

The final area where Canada is perceived as being able to make a significant difference is in a more rigorous and comprehensive approach to post-conflict or failed-state reconstruction. "What we need most—the west, the international community—is to deal effectively with future failed states. If I could think of someone who could provide nation-building capability, it would be Canada. Restore order, get the government system up and running, set up temporary power. Canada could play a leadership role, a distinct role. A role very different from the US." This goes well beyond security per se. It would require a whole-of-government approach, as is being attempted with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. While others, such as the British, are actually identified as being better at this role than Canada today, no one is seen as better positioned to take the leadership role on it in the future.
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Third, review all military assets and support operations to assess their relevance to 21st-century priorities.

During the past 50 years, Canada has had a conventional, high-technology, full-service military engaged in an international projection of force as part of an alliance whose goal was to contain an aggressor that threatened western Europe and, from there, potentially the world. This is no longer the situation today. The US has a massive and growing superiority in high-tech conventional weaponry. "There will be a long period—perhaps 30 years—during which the United States faces no peer competitor."

There is little support for Canada's maintaining a conventional, high-technology, full-service military. It is seen as strategically redundant because it replicates, often in sub-critical-mass quantities, assets that the west already has plenty of. It is seen as financially unsustainable as the cost of state-of-the-art combat systems continues to mount.

- "It is hard to build constructive arguments for a full-service military. Cannot defend it except to say, 'Gee, what will others think if we don't have these systems?' I think the status quo is not sustainable, it will be attrited and become less capable. Canada will be embarrassed from time to time."

- "The problem with the Canadian military is that it tries to be an all-service military. You probably cannot afford the next generation of weaponry anyhow."

- "The last thing Canada should focus on is expensive, high-lethality military combat roles. Our [US] military is maybe too large in high-lethality combat operations."

- "The question is, can you afford high-tech weaponry? Or will you buy a little bit that will make no difference, and not have the capacity to invest in alternatives that do make the difference."

This mismatch between historical assets and present security needs is not seen as unique to Canada. One American said, "In my
view, defence strategy is in a state of disarray worldwide. There is less money, no clear view, and vested interests pushing for sub-critical-mass defence-industry projects, resulting in no boots on the ground and no money for bullets.” A European added, “Because enormous industrial investments were made over the years, we are spending enormous amounts for equipment we don’t need.”

Where Canada’s high-tech weaponry was applied in the past 15 years, it is seen to have played a token role, rather than making a strategic difference. Canada’s F-18s in Kosovo and the first Gulf War, like our naval units in the Persian Gulf, were seen as “welcome and useful, but strategically insignificant.” They represented assets in which the west has a significant surplus capacity. As one interviewee said, “We can always find other F-18s.”

In other words, these expensive assets provided no distinct, diplomatically valuable contribution beyond that which could be provided by less expensive assets, such as special operations teams. Canada is seen to have made a showing, to have been a member of the posse, but not to have had distinct assets or capabilities that allowed it to make a real difference.

Interviewees from the US and Europe had a number of specific, hard-hitting suggestions to align Canada’s defence assets with 21st-century security requirements.

- “Have a coast guard but no blue-sea navy.”
- “Keep some residual naval capacity that can show the flag, patrol coasts, and provide coast guard duties. Maintain a very residual air defence.”
- “You don’t need submarines ... maybe some anti-submarine capacity, but no submarines.”
- “Forget destroyers.”
- “I would not replace the F-18s.”
Making a Difference? External Views on Canada's International Impact

These views are not unanimous (for example, one interviewee said that submarines possibly should be kept). However, they are the views of a strong majority of the more than 20 people who commented on our international security role.

The strong majority view is that the focus of Canada's international security efforts should be our army. The navy and air force should focus on continental defence. The intercontinental role of the air force and navy should be confined to transporting the army to where it needs to go. Effective tactical lift (such as C-130Js) is seen as a critical component of the mobile brigade. However, there is a difference of views on the need for strategic lift (such as C-17s). A minority of interviewees think independent strategic lift is important; however, two-thirds of the experts who expressed an opinion said it was unnecessary because a combination of Canadian tactical lift, with US and commercial strategic lift, could do the job. Transport ships are seen as useful to support the mobile brigade. However, it was seen as inefficient to have an entire blue-water fleet in order to meet periodic escort duties."NATO allies could provide escort duties."

Refocused military assets are seen to support a renewed international influence. "Your influence would be greater if you could make a significant difference in key cases where the US (and others) are interested but won't or can't go in. You're going to have much more influence than if you continue to have symbolic capabilities that in larger-scale conflicts don't make a difference."

Given the strategic imperative of linking our attitudes to real assets, one thing is clear: we cannot maintain a credible human security attitude without real human security assets, such as the mobile brigade. "Canada is not a serious entity with just diplomacy. If you don't have an impressive little force that could do real work, and a willingness to use it, you will not be taken seriously."

The world actually seems quite comfortable with Canada being a Boy Scout who helps little old ladies across the street. However, today we are the Boy Scout who stands on the corner, telling others how to help little old ladies across the street.
Development: From Leader to Laggard

"In the '70s and '80s, Canada belonged to like-minded countries making a difference in development. Canada was truly one of the leaders. Canada has totally lost that in the past 15 years."

Canada historically played a leadership role in development co-operation. Canada was involved in the original Colombo plan in 1951. Interviewees pointed to Canada's historical leadership role on many development issues, including education and gender issues. Today, Canada is seen to have lost this leadership role, both in absolute terms and in comparison with other countries.

Development experts from the US, Europe, and the developing world made very similar comments. "Starting about 1990, the Canadian International Development Agency started to lose its edge. "CIDA does not have leadership or focus." "For most of the '90s Canada was not playing a galvanizing role." "Looking back 15 years, Canada was a clear leader in international development with high commitment, progressive policies, and very good outreach. Much of this reputation has disappeared over the past 15 years. Today, Canada is small to invisible."

What drove this deterioration in Canada's reputation over the past 15 years? External development experts point to two issues: a crisis of funding, and an absence of sustained political leadership.

Canada cut its development aid in the late 1990s more deeply than most G7 countries. Official development assistance declined to a low of 0.24 per cent of GDP, from 0.5 per cent a decade earlier. As a result, even with recent increases, "Canada's international aid contributions are miserable—it now appears to be satisfied comparing itself to the US. Canada is well below the European average. In total dollars, it gives only half as much as the Dutch."
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At the same time CIDA has had 10 ministers since 1989. Experts identified a number of quality concerns arising from this absence of sustained political leadership.

- Ministerial credibility and effectiveness: "Development is clearly not seen as important: how many ministers have there been over the last five years?" This turnover has a negative impact internationally as well as internally: "To make an impact, a minister needs to be part of an international network. This takes time. Canada's ministers are often new, and when they get to know the issues and become known, they are replaced."

- Lack of focus and too many, changing priorities: "Today, Canada is all over the map—having seven priority sectors means no priority sectors." "What I have seen in Canada is that you have a new priority every year. You are not serious."

- An aversion to taking risks: "Starting about 1990, CIDA started to lose its edge: it became exceedingly bureaucratic."

- Slow, erratic decision making: "We made a proposal. A year later they contacted us to say they had lost the original proposal and asked for another copy. Several months later they contacted us with an approval and said the money had to be spent by the end of the planning year—in 60 days."

As one astute external observer noted, "CIDA is in a vicious circle. Twenty years ago it was important. It spiralled down as development co-operation was not considered important. As it was not attractive to powerful ministers, it became even less important."

At the same time, Canada is seen as being capable of doing excellent work. CIDA was recognized for having done some very innovative work on Internet interconnectivity in Africa in the 1990s: "Canada played a unique role in the adoption of the Internet ... connecting African universities to the rest of the world." In health care, CIDA and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) have had some real successes: "Canada has supported one of the most suc-
cessful experiments in health care systems in the world in Tanzania.” The concern seems to be that these successes are sporadic and disjointed.

The importance of effective governance is underlined by the generally higher ratings received by the IDRC. As one senior American observer said, “The IDRC is a terrific scientific institution—the US doesn’t have anything like it.” Although government-funded, the IDRC has an independent board composed primarily of thought leaders and development experts from both inside and outside Canada. This appears to have enabled it to maintain a greater focus and consistency. Nevertheless, funding restraints have hurt IDRC as well. The American observer added, “The IDRC’s budget is too small to have real impact. It is at the same level as 10 years ago.”

At the same time, the competition for leadership in development co-operation is getting tougher. Other countries, particularly in Europe, are setting new standards for both the quantity and the quality of the aid they provide. When asked to identify the countries that are doing the best in development co-operation, international observers consistently chose one or more of the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK.

The Netherlands has a very disciplined, whole-of-government approach to aid. The Dutch have a special unit that evaluates the impact of all government activities (e.g., trade, agriculture policies) to ensure policy coherence. In order to deal with transparency concerns, they involve the government auditor’s office in building the capability of recipient countries to provide project tracking and accountability. Sweden and Norway are celebrated for both the quantity and the quality of their aid assistance. They focus on specific areas, such as gender equity, that have a strong political constituency at home as well as a demonstrated need abroad. In order to forestall politically driven “priorities of the month,” Sweden has put in place legislation to place the development programs at arm’s length from the domestic political process.
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However, perhaps the most interesting benchmark is the UK's Department for International Development. Ten years ago, DFID was considered a middle-of-the-pack development agency. Today, it is generally considered to be the best in the world. What drove the difference? "In a word: leadership."

"Labour came in determined to improve international development assistance as part of their program." When the Labour party took office, the government appointed a powerful minister, Clare Short, and gave her full cabinet rank. She had an important political (and financial) ally in the chancellor of the exchequer, Gordon Brown, and the understanding and support of Prime Minister Tony Blair. She stayed six years.

Short imposed focus and drive on her organization. She believed that DFID should—and could—make a real difference. "She recruited the best and the brightest" from the UK and abroad. She encouraged discussion and debate. She demanded excellence. Today, as a continental European admits, "DFID is by far the best development organization internationally."

Canada's declining performance in international development is starting to have an impact on Canada's broader reputation. An influential international observer—who is not a development specialist—noted, "I thought of Canada as a major player in development. You come across in general perception like a Norway or a Sweden. However, when I looked at the facts, Canada has been getting a lot more credit for aid than it deserves."

What should Canada do, if we aspire to recover our historical leadership position? The example of the UK shows how a large development agency can be transformed with the right leadership. In order to make a real difference, external observers made these suggestions for Canada.

- Keep the minister in the position long enough to make a difference. Appoint the CIDA minister, not Finance, to represent Canada...
at the World Bank (as development leaders such as the UK and Norway have already done).

- Focus by area of expertise or by region.
- Build capacity in the focus areas, and realize that people who are well suited for one area may not be effective in another.
- Review internal operations.
- Keep at it, and do not change the priorities from year to year.

Interviewees acknowledged that the issue of focus was a complex one. There are a few sectors where people thought Canada could make a real difference: governance, health care systems, education. When it came to geographic focus, however, a number of interviewees from around the world questioned whether direct poverty reduction should be the only driver. Many thought that human and international security concerns, geographic and demographic links, or the ability to affect a society at a key transition point should also be considered. Depending on what they thought should drive the decision, different interviewees suggested Africa, the Middle East and Afghanistan, the Caribbean and Mexico, or Ukraine as areas to focus on.

Interviewees also expressed the strong view that real leadership will require Canada to increase its funding in line with that of other development leaders. Arguably, quality is more important than quantity—but both are necessary for real leadership.

Years ago, under the urging of Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, the international community set the goal of providing 0.7 per cent of GDP for international assistance. Five European countries have met the goal and another six have formally committed themselves to doing so by the 2015 target date for the Millennium Development Goals. "It has become a horse race in the European Union. Every six months another couple of countries set concrete targets to reach the 0.7 per cent. Canada has not set a date to reach the 0.7 per cent
goal.” As one observer noted, “The present government policy to increase spending by 8 per cent annually, even if maintained, means that Canada will fail to meet the 2015 deadline ... Canada needs to make a concrete commitment to the 0.7 per cent if it does not want to lose all credibility in development.”

The year 2005 is seen as critical for Canada’s commitment to international development. This is the year that the international community will review the world’s progress toward the Millennium Development Goals. This is also the year that the UK hosts the G8, and Tony Blair (who has committed the UK to the 0.7 per cent target) has made it clear that Africa and international development assistance will be front and centre. Canada needs to decide if it will match and stay in the game, or fold.
Choosing to Make a Difference

"The current trends are against Canada's influence."

"Canada could play a leadership role, a distinct role, a role very different from the US."

Looking ahead, geopolitical trends are seen as further reducing Canada's influence if we maintain a business-as-usual approach. With the right strategic focus, however, Canada is seen as being able to make a significant contribution to many of the major issues facing the world today.

There is a strong view among many external and Canadian interviewees that general trends are against Canada's influence. A thoughtful European said:

NATO's importance is declining; it is becoming a very second-order institution. As Canada was a significant player, this limits Canada's influence. The European Union is taking more and more of a role in defence, yet, by definition, there is no role for Canada in the EU.

The G8 in its current incarnation is possibly declining in importance, although this is less certain than with NATO. Today it is insufficiently representative of the forces that are shaping the international economy. As it moves to a G10 or a G12, this enlargement will dilute your country's influence, simply because there are more players. Also, the larger it gets, the stronger the likelihood of a G3 (US, China, Europe), maybe a G4 (with Japan), from which Canada would be excluded.

Canada's chances of becoming a permanent member of the Security Council are nil. As the council's permanent membership broadens, not being a member will also be seen as reduc-
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In total, this is an unpromising backdrop for Canada's influence.

Others noted that the greater international role being played by large countries, such as India, China, and Brazil, and the increasingly effective niche roles being played by smaller, focused countries such as Norway and Australia are increasing Canada's competition for international influence.

Nevertheless, Canada is seen as having some very distinct characteristics which give it the potential to play an important role in resolving some of the major issues facing the world today.

Interviewees see the international system as being under tremendous stress. International security issues associated with the Middle East and the Caucasus are seen to be a major challenge for decades. This instability, combined with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, poses a threat to societies all over the world. The period of relative commodity surplus of the last 20 years is over—there is likely to be increasingly intense international competition for scarce energy, water, and maritime resources. Global warming and the resulting possibility of abrupt shifts in the climate or in the ocean's currents are seen as massive unresolved issues. The HIV/AIDS epidemic and the SARS outbreak are seen as precursors to the possibility of deadly waves of infectious diseases rapidly spreading through the global aviation system.

Effective multilateral responses are seen as critical to resolve these transnational issues—yet the multilateral system itself is seen to be in crisis. The international order in place since 1945—with a Security Council dominated by the victors of the Second World War, a strong Atlantic alliance united in opposition to a common opponent, and a global economic and political system dominated by the west—is seen as a reflection of a historical international reality that no longer exists. "Conditions are like those facing Truman in 1947: the old order is gone, the new order is not yet established."
Choosing to Make a Difference

Interviewees see an urgent need to solve some of these important transnational issues. They also see a critical need for a renewed multilateral system to manage these and other issues in future. The vast majority, including those who are most critical of our recent performance, see Canada as having the national characteristics necessary to play a strong, and possibly unique, role in meeting these challenges.

Interviewees have a remarkably consistent view on Canada's distinct international profile as well as on its ability to make a real difference internationally. Our international personality is clear, at least to others. We are seen as an internationally engaged, economically and socially successful, increasingly multi-ethnic country. Our bilingualism is seen as a real asset in diplomacy and in international security (especially in Africa). Our foreign service is considered competent. We are perceived as generally pragmatic and effective problem solvers. We are seen as close to but (particularly after Iraq) independent from the US.

We are seen as one of the most internationally connected countries in the world because of our extensive demographic links and our extraordinary set of international relationships (G8, Commonwealth, Francophonie, Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation, Organization of American States, and others). At the same time, we are perceived as structurally disinterested on many issues because of our moderate economic size, detached geographical position, and lack of colonial involvement. This simultaneous involvement and relative detachment make us unique among G8 members. Canada is admired by some, liked by many, and disliked by almost no one. "There is no animosity toward Canada."

For these reasons, Canada is seen by many to be an important bridge between the US or the G8 and other countries. We are also seen to have been a particularly effective bridge between the state system and civil society. Because of our strategic situation and historical role, Canada is seen as a credible multilateralist. It is seen as being in accordance with our national interest as well as our values to support a rules-based international system that constrains the
ability of large states to terrorize other states or their own citizens. "When one is modest militarily and limited economically, it is important to be virtuous, to have a very consistent policy, to be consistent in one’s actions, and to have a reputation for no ulterior motives."

Indeed, many interviewees welcomed Canada as a source of engaged moral leadership and critical thinking on tough international issues. "I see you as our gentle moral conscience." "Canada has provided moral authority." "Moral leadership ... a reputation for ideas, an open mind, independence, capacity, and idealism." "Canada is trusted." Several, however, warned of the danger, particularly in recent years, of this role descending into sanctimonious and hypocritical lecturing from the sidelines. "You can play a role as a disinterested power, as long as you don’t project an offensive sort of moralism."

At its best, Canada is seen as being capable of first-rate international initiatives that combine morality with pragmatism and draw upon Canada’s rich network of bilateral relationships and multilateral affiliations to make things happen. These qualities are seen as very important, given the present global situation.

Interviewees identified a number of specific areas where Canada could leverage its geopolitical position and particular skill set to make a significant difference. Two areas have been discussed here at length already: a distinct contribution to international security and a renewed leadership in international development. In addition, three other areas were raised in numerous interviews.

1. Public policy advocacy: Canada as global think tank

One very senior and experienced interviewee said, "With so many urgent issues today, important global problems—the political impact of globalization, infectious diseases, proliferation—don’t command enough attention. How do we focus on one or two issues and solve them? There Canada could play a useful role." Along the same lines, another suggested, "Canada could see itself as the world’s think tank."
Choosing to Make a Difference

It could provide a market for clear-headed, slightly disinterested thinking. This would be especially valuable as you are seen as close to the US, but not in lockstep." A Canadian interviewee echoed this view of Canada making a difference by "taking a long-term view, being on the right side of the question, and then having the ideas and the processes to act at the right time."

What would it take?

- "Focus on a few issues that are important to decision makers."

- "Bring in the best from around the world—you do not have the capacity to do it all yourself."

- "Make sure it is linked to real policy: it cannot just be a talk shop."

Canada is seen to have taken this approach successfully in a number of areas already. The Human Security Program of Foreign Affairs is seen as an excellent recent example. With an annual budget of some $10 million, it has had a major impact, in the minds of a number of interviewees, on the international human security agenda. It focuses on an area of importance to Canadian leaders. It coordinated the Canadian-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which assembled from around the world some of the best minds on the matter. It has resulted in new international law on a number of human security issues.

Canadian leadership on international public policy advocacy is seen as very doable and very important. As one interviewee said, "The good thing about this is that it does not require a lot of money. This allows a country of Canada's size to have a real impact." As another said simply, "Ideas are incredibly important."

Several areas were identified for a possible policy advocacy agenda: reform of the UN and the multilateral system, including the L20; a new nuclear fuel cycle protocol to reduce the dangers of proliferation; conservation of the oceans; a proactive initiative to address potential oil shortages; a post-Kyoto climate change accord; and, of
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course, pushing the human security agenda to the next level of global implementation.

2. North American leadership

There is a sense that “North America will become more important to the US in the next 20 years than in the last 20 years.” Issues such as energy, security, immigration, and the environment will all have a strong North American focus. Both Americans and Mexicans expressed an interest in Canada taking a leadership role in laying out a new North American agenda.

A number of international and Canadian interviewees also stated that Canada should significantly increase its direct involvement with Mexico. It is seen to be in our interest and Mexico’s that Mexico be aware of Canadian public policy models: for example, in health care. A strong, collaborative relationship with Mexico is seen as increasingly important, given Mexico’s growing demographic and economic role within NAFTA and the growing importance of Mexican Americans in US politics.

3. Education

Canada is seen as being positioned to become one of the global centres for international education, together with the US, the UK, and Australia. External interviewees identified three elements.

- Universities bringing in the best students from around the world and establishing partnerships or campuses abroad.

- Canadian development agencies, such as the IDRC and CIDA, supporting education and training in the developing world. In particular, the idea of full scholarships for the best and brightest from the developing world is seen as very attractive.
Canadian government agencies engaging directly with their counterparts around the world to gather best practices and to share our way of doing things when appropriate.

The final report of the External Voices Project will examine the practicality of these suggestions in more detail.

What is the difference between the status quo, where Canada's influence is on the decline, and the fairly exciting scenario laid out above? Differentiation and focus. For Canada to make a difference, it will have to develop a differentiated international policy—"decide on a few areas, invest deeply and become indispensable. In these areas Canada should be considered pre-eminent, in terms of experience, capabilities, and resources." Interviewees identified three elements that were seen to be missing in Canada's approach today: a willingness to make clear choices; a consistency in choices and in relationships (especially with the US) over time; and a determination to build world-class assets in those niche areas where Canada has chosen to lead.

Shifting Canada's international policy making from being "everything to everybody" to having a strategically focused international agenda would not be easy. It would be a "paradigm shift, a big idea" that many would resist. However, it is considered a particularly exciting and valuable strategy for Canada: "You are small enough to have to do it—large enough that it could have real impact."
Conclusion

"About the past, I will declare only this: Canadians have come increasingly to exaggerate the significance of their past performance in world affairs." DENIS STAIRS

Our preliminary findings strongly suggest that Canada's performance since 1989 is nothing for a country of our wealth and history of international engagement to be proud of. Our performance appears to have been well below our exaggerated rhetoric, well below our historical performance, and well below global expectations.

Yet there was absolutely nothing necessary or inevitable about the decline in Canada's international impact over the past 15 years. True, the international scene has become more crowded. Yet Canada's relative economic position has strengthened over the past 15 years. Not only is our fiscal position particularly strong, but the relative size of our economy has grown, compared with those of all G7 countries except the US. In the meantime, as noted, smaller countries such as Australia and Norway have carved out distinct value-added roles. We have a size and a position that should allow us to do much more. As one Australian said, "We belong to practically nothing, you belong to practically everything."

The world believes that we can make a difference, and the world needs us to make a difference. "The world needs more Canada" is a nice slogan. Our interviews suggest that what the world really needs is more from Canada: more commitment, more focus, more impact.

Canada will spend some $100 billion on defence, development, and diplomacy over the next five years. We need to refocus that $100 billion to ensure that, in the future, we make a real difference rather than just making a showing.
Appendix

Note: All quotes and references in the main text are from international interviewees unless explicitly noted as being from Canadians.

Non-Canadians Interviewed

Yoginder Alagh: former minister of science, technology and power; chancellor, Central University of Nagaland (India)

Mats Berdal: professor, Department of War Studies, King's College, London (Norway)

Nancy Birdsall: president, Center for Global Development (US)

Jorge Braga de Macedo: fellow, Centre for Economic Policy Research; professor, New University of Lisbon; former finance minister (Portugal)

Jermyn Brooks: director, Transparency International; former global managing partner, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (UK)

Richard Burt: former US chief negotiator in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks with the former Soviet Union; US ambassador to Germany, 1985-1989; assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs, 1983-1985 (US)

Patrick Cammaert: military adviser, UN peacekeeping operations (Netherlands)

Nelson Cunningham: managing director, Kissinger McLarty (US)

John Dauth: ambassador and permanent representative of Australia to the UN (Australia)

Ged Davis: managing director, Centre for Strategic Insight, World Economic Forum; formerly head of Shell's energy scenarios team; director of UNAIDS "HIV/AIDS in Africa" scenario project, 2002-2003; facilitator and lead author of the emissions scenarios for 2000-2100 for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1997-2000 (UK)
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Bill Emmott: editor in chief, The Economist (UK)

Gareth Evans: CEO, International Crisis Group; former minister for foreign affairs (Australia)

Lee Feinstein: deputy director of studies, Council on Foreign Relations; former principal deputy director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State; special assistant for peacekeeping policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense (US)

Hage Geingob: executive director, Global Coalition for Africa; former prime minister of Namibia (Namibia)

Octavio Gomez Dantes: director of performance evaluation, Health Department of Mexico; former director of health policy, Center for Health Systems Research, National Institute of Public Health (Mexico)

Richard Haass: president, Council on Foreign Relations; former director of policy planning, US State Department (US)

John Hamre: president, Center for Strategic and International Studies; former US deputy secretary of defense, 1997-1999 (US)

David Harland: chief of the UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (UK)

Jorge Heine: ambassador of Chile to India; member of the executive committee, International Political Science Association (Chile)

François Heisbourg: head, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégiqje; former Senior Vice President (strategic development), MAFRA-Défense-Espace; director, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London (France).

Eveline Herfkens: UN Secretary-General's executive coordinator for the Millennium Development Goals Campaign; former minister for development co-operation (Netherlands)

Joseph Jockel: professor of Canadian studies, St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York (US)

Henry Kissinger: former national security adviser and secretary of state (US)

Jim Lindsay: vice-president, director of studies, Council on Foreign Relations; former director, global issues and multilateral affairs, National Security Council (US)
Appendix

Andrew Mack: director, Human Security Centre, Liu Institute (Australia)

Simon Maxwell: director, Overseas Development Institute; president, Development Studies Association of the United Kingdom and Ireland (UK)

Norah Olembo: executive director, Africa Biotechnology Stakeholders' Forum; former director, Kenya Industrial Policy Institute (Kenya)

Francesco Olivieri: Italian permanent representative to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; former diplomatic counsellor to the prime minister as well as the prime minister's personal representative (sherpa) for the G7-G8 process (Italy)

Michael P. Peters: executive vice-president, Council on Foreign Relations, former career officer, chief of staff, United States Military Academy, special assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (US)

Jim Reed: Fulbright Scholar, Centre for International Governance Innovation (US)

Susan Rice: senior fellow, Brookings Institute; former US undersecretary of state for Africa (US)

J. Stapleton Roy: career ambassador (retired), former ambassador to Singapore, China, and Indonesia and assistant secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. (US)

Jeffrey Sachs: Earth Institute, Columbia University (US)


Hans Sulimma: former German ambassador to Canada (Germany)

Naoki Tanaka: president, 21st Century Public Policy Institute (Japan)

Tidjan Thiam: former minister of development (Côte d'Ivoire)

Mahbubani, Kishore: Dean, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore and Former Ambassador of Singapore to the United Nations. (Singapore)

Perrin de Brichambaut, Marc: Director for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defence (France)
Canadians Interviewed

A number of leading Canadian diplomats and academics were interviewed in this project in order to develop a “Canadian list” of areas of potential impact and to get important details on specific issues or incidents raised by the external interviewees.

Amit Chakma: vice-president, academic, and provost, University of Waterloo

Andrew Cooper: associate director, Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)

John English: executive director, Centre for International Governance Innovation

Allan Gotlieb: former ambassador to the US

George Haynal: former assistant deputy minister, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Paul Heinbecker: former ambassador to the UN, Director, International Relations and Communication Program, CIGI

Donald Johnston: secretary general, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

John Kirton: head, G8 Research Group, Munk Centre for International Studies

Denis Stairs: McCulloch Professor in Political Science at Dalhousie University

Jennifer Welsh: professor, author of Canada: At Home in the World
What people are saying about...

Making a Difference?
External Views on
Canada's International Impact

"If you want Canada to count in the world, read this report. It is a concise, informed appraisal of why Canadian foreign policy has declined, and proposes realistic and specific initiatives which could re-assert real Canadian influence."

Joe Clark
Prime Minister of Canada, 1979-80
Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1984-91

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"Invaluable. Based on interviews with senior foreign policy thinkers from around the globe, Making a Difference? documents what many of us have surmised about Canada's declining role in the world. Not cheering news, but beautifully done."

Denis Stairs
McCulloch Professor in Political Science
Dalhousie University

* 

"Robert Greenhill's thorough and provocative study on Canada and the world shows us where we are. More important, it shows us where, with determination and vision, we can be."

Andrew Cohen
Author of While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World

* 

"Knowing what your best friends think of you is a useful prelude to doing something about it."

John Polanyi
Nobel Laureate
University of Toronto