PEACEBUILDING LESSONS-LEARNED PROJECT
PHASE II

Prepared for
The Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee

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Executive Summary

The Lessons-Learned in Peacebuilding Project has been an integral part of the work of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC) almost since that network was formed. A primary objective of the CPCC is to contribute to learning on peacebuilding in a systematic, strategic and focussed fashion that promotes shared analysis and enables the development of practical tools and best practices. The learning process thus includes as a critical component regular exchanges and dialogues among non-governmental organizations on the lessons that have been gathered from their work. Indeed, knowledge sharing and the identification of best practices have been and will continue to be the underlying purpose of the process.

Phase I of the Lessons-Learned Project consisted of: the development of a peacebuilding typology; the drafting of a preliminary lessons-learned framework that included a rudimentary questionnaire; the establishment of a lessons-learned advisory group; and an initial cut at learning lessons by applying the questionnaire to case studies provided by CARE Canada, Inter Pares and the Centre canadien d'étude et de coopération internationale (CECI). This resulted in the preparation of a report submitted to the 1999 NGO-Government Consultations on Peacebuilding.

The second phase of the project was designed to take lessons learned about peacebuilding a step further by incorporating into the methodology field visits to the projects under review. The field visits were short, due to budget considerations, but included interviews with project on-ground personnel, recipients and partners. The intention has been to dig a little deeper beneath the surface than in the first phase in extracting lessons learned from peacebuilding projects.

This report includes five case studies of peacebuilding projects:

- CARE Canada's Civil Society Strengthening Project in Bosnia. It looks at CARE’s efforts to promote the development of civil society by focusing on women, youth and the elderly. Care believes that civil society is the bedrock of a stable democracy;

- Rights and Democracy's (ICHRDD) Fund to Support Civil Society Policy Research in Guatemala. This Fund was intended to help Guatemalan organizations contribute to the implementation of the Peace Accords;

- The Centre canadien d'étude et de coopération internationale (CECI), also in Guatemala;

- The Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution's (CICR) Conflict Resolution Training Project in Rwanda. This project was intended to train people at different levels in Rwandan society in conflict resolution methods, helping them avoid the resort to violence in conflictual situations; and

- World Vision's Gulu Centre for the Rehabilitation of Child Soldiers, in Uganda. The
Centre has been operating since 1995 providing rehabilitation services for former child soldiers.

The CPCC learned many valuable lessons from this work. It learned, for instance:

- That the time and resources provided by donors for peacebuilding projects rarely match the project’s long-term requirements, with the result that projects often come to a close before their peacebuilding impact has been fully realized;

- that youth, who are often more flexible than adults as well as open to new ideas and in favour of change, can be an important focus of peacebuilding, providing it with energy and sustainability;

- that the process of building peace can sometimes be more important than achieving the stated goal of the project; the process brings people together and opens communication among them, giving them the sense of doing something that is meaningful, even if only in a small way;

- that it is critical to involve local actors in every aspect of the peacebuilding process from project design to implementation; local people provide insight and knowledge that the outsider does not have; men, women, children, the elderly, different ethnic groups, etc., each of whom may have experienced the war differently and who will have unique perspectives to bring to peacebuilding, should be among those represented locally;

- that flexibility in the field and on the part of the donors is a key ingredient in successful peacebuilding, allowing NGOs to adjust their projects and programs to particular needs and changing circumstances in the field;

- that an organization with an exemplary history, solid reputation, and deep experience in a country will be well served by those characteristics when it turns to the task of building peace; and

- that in peacebuilding it is not always possible (or smart) to be neutral. In Uganda, for instance, it was important that World Vision be seen as opposed to the Lord’s Resistance Army, which is mainly responsible for victimizing children in that war. World Vision’s opposition gave the children confidence.

While these and other lessons-learned from the case studies are valuable for those implementing projects in a peacebuilding environment, they are not necessarily generalizable and tell us very little about how these projects contribute to peacebuilding writ large. If we hope to engage in a comprehensive and meaningful approach to peacebuilding lessons learned, we will have to take account of the work that is being done at all levels in all spheres and how it relates to other work being done across and within levels.
Résumé

Le projet Leçons tirées en matière de consolidation de la paix fait partie intégrante des travaux du Comité coordonnateur canadien pour la consolidation de la paix (CCCCP), depuis la création du réseau ou presque. L’un des principaux objectifs du CCCCCP est de contribuer à l’éducation sur la consolidation de la paix d’une manière systématique, stratégique et ciblée, qui permette de faire la promotion des analyses partagées et qui permette de mettre au point des outils pratiques ainsi que des pratiques exemplaires. Le processus d’apprentissage inclut donc, à sa base, un élément primordial qui consiste en des échanges et un dialogue réguliers entre les organisations non gouvernementales au sujet des leçons qu’elles ont tirées jusqu’à présent, dans le cadre de leurs travaux. En effet, le partage des connaissances et l’identification des pratiques exemplaires sont et continueront d’être la finalité sous-jacente de ce processus. La Phase I du projet Leçons tirées était composée de plusieurs parties : l’élaboration d’une typologie de la consolidation de la paix; la rédaction d’un cadre de leçons tirées préliminaire incluant un questionnaire rudimentaire; la création d’un groupe consultatif sur les leçons tirées; et une première évaluation des leçons tirées en appliquant le questionnaire à des études de cas fournies par CARE Canada, Inter Pares et le Centre canadien d’étude et de coopération internationale (CECI). Tout cela a permis de préparer un rapport soumis aux Consultations de 1999 entre les ONG et le gouvernement sur la consolidation de la paix. La Phase II du projet a été conçue de manière à pousser plus loin les leçons tirées en matière de consolidation de la paix en incorporant dans la méthodologie utilisée des visites sur le terrain, là où se déroulaient les projets à l’étude. Ces visites sur place ont été courtes en raison des restrictions budgétaires, mais elles ont inclus des entrevues avec le personnel des projets sur le terrain, leurs bénéficiaires et leurs partenaires. Ces activités avaient pour objectif d’aller un peu plus en profondeur que la première phase et d’aller chercher les leçons tirées par des projets de consolidation de la paix. Le rapport en question inclut cinq études de cas de projets de consolidation de la paix : CARE Canada - Projet pour renforcer la société civile en Bosnie. Cette étude examine les efforts déployés par CARE pour promouvoir le développement de la société civile en se concentrant sur les femmes, les jeunes et les personnes âgées. Aux yeux de CARE, la société civile est le point d’ancrage d’une démocratie stable. Droits et Démocratie (CIDPDI) - Fonds pour la recherche en politiques sociales au Guatemala. Ce fonds a été créé pour aider les organisations guatémaltèques à participer à la mise en œuvre des Accords de paix. Le Centre canadien d’étude et de coopération internationale (CECI), également au Guatemala.

L’Institut canadien pour la résolution des conflits (ICRC) - Projet de formation dans le domaine de la résolution de conflits au Rwanda. Ce projet a été conçu de manière à former les gens faisant partie de différentes couches de la société rwandaise pour leur apprendre des méthodes de résolution de conflits et, ainsi, les aider à éviter d’avoir recours à la violence dans des situations conflictuelles; et Vision mondiale - Centre pour la réadaptation des enfants-soldats, à Gulu, en Ouganda. Le centre a été créé en 1985 et il offre, depuis lors, des services de réadaptation à l’intention d’anciens enfants-soldats. Ce travail a permis au CCCCCP de tirer de nombreuses leçons. Parmi ces précieuses leçons, on peut citer : Le temps et les ressources alloués par les donateurs dans le cadre des projets de consolidation de la paix sont trop souvent inférieurs aux besoins à long terme de ces projets. Par conséquent, il n’est pas rare que ces projets prennent fin avant d’avoir pu pleinement atteindre leurs objectifs de consolidation de la
paix. Les jeunes, qui sont souvent plus souples que les adultes, ouverts aux idées nouvelles et en faveur du changement, peuvent constituer un pilier important des opérations de consolidation de la paix, apportant à ses dernières l’énergie et la durabilité dont elles ont besoin. Le processus de consolidation de la paix peut parfois être plus important que le fait d’atteindre l’objectif convenu d’un projet; le processus permet en effet de rassembler les gens et d’ouvrir les voies de communications entre eux, ce qui leur donne l’impression de faire quelque chose de d’efficace et d’utile, même s’il ne s’agit que de petites contributions. Il est primordial de faire participer les intervenants locaux à tous les aspects du processus de consolidation de la paix, de l’élaboration des projets à leur mise en œuvre; les intervenants locaux apportent une connaissance approfondie que ne possèdent pas les intervenants externes; les hommes, les femmes, les enfants, les personnes âgées, etc. ont tous vécu la guerre de façon différente et ils ont donc une perspective des choses qui leur est propre. Ils peuvent tous contribuer à la consolidation de la paix et il devraient donc être représentés à l’échelle locale; La marge de manœuvre dont on dispose sur le terrain et celle accordée par les donateurs est un élément fondamental du succès des opérations de consolidation de la paix. En effet, cela permet aux ONG d’ajuster leurs projets et leurs programmes en fonction des besoins particuliers et des circonstances changeantes prévalant sur le terrain; Une organisation qui jouit d’antécédents exemplaires, d’une réputation solide et d’une expérience approfondie dans un pays pourra se servir de ces caractéristiques lorsqu’elle devra s’engager dans des activités de consolidation de la paix; et Dans les projets de consolidation de la paix, il n’est pas toujours possible (ni même intelligent) de rester neutre. En Ouganda, par exemple, il était important que l’organisation Vision mondiale soit perçue comme étant opposée à la Lord’s Resistance Army, laquelle est principalement responsable de la victimisation des enfants dans cette guerre. L’opposition de Vision mondiale a permis de donner confiance aux enfants. Bien que les leçons que nous avons tirées des études de cas soient précieuses pour les personnes chargées de la mise en œuvre des projets de consolidation de la paix, elles ne sont pas nécessairement généralisables et elles ne nous en disent que très peu sur la façon dont ces projets contribuent au mandat global en matière de consolidation de la paix. Si nous désirons adopter une approche holistique et cohérente à l’égard des leçons tirées dans ce domaine, nous devrons prendre en compte le travail qui s’effectue à tous les niveaux et dans tous les milieux, afin de pouvoir établir des liens avec ce qui se fait ailleurs et au sein de ces mêmes milieux.
INTRODUCTION

Learning lessons about peacebuilding is in vogue. Everyone seems to be doing it, international institutions, governments, universities, and, not least, non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This is a good thing, of course. The more we learn about how to do peacebuilding properly, the better we will do it. This rather simplistic but important maxim underlies the work that the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC) has devoted to learning lessons in building peace.

Since 1997, the CPCC a coalition of Canadian NGOs has been developing a methodology and framework for gathering lessons-learned from the experiences of non-governmental organizations in peacebuilding. This work has been undertaken to support one of CPCC’s primary objectives: to contribute to learning on peacebuilding in a systematic, strategic and focussed fashion that promotes shared analysis and enables the development of practical tools and best practices. The learning process thus includes as a critical component regular exchanges and dialogues among non-governmental organizations on the lessons that have been gathered from their work so far. Indeed, knowledge sharing and the identification of best practices have been and will continue to be the underlying purpose of the process.

Phase I of the lessons-learned project consisted of the development of a peacebuilding typology; the drafting of a preliminary lessons-learned framework that included a rudimentary questionnaire; the establishment of a lessons-learned advisory group; and the preparation of an interim report.¹ The latter included a synopsis of the work involved in testing and using the questionnaire to elaborate three case studies; it also included a review of other evaluation and lessons-learned experiences, which were used to assess and improve our own methodology.

At each stage, workshops and roundtables were held to share the results of the work-in-progress with the wider CPCC membership. The knowledge and lessons learned were presented to an informed and critical audience who could compare the information with their own experience and provide input to the development of the process and the advancement of lessons. In March 1999, at the Peacebuilding Consultations, the results of the work were shared beyond the CPCC membership with a broader audience of government and NGO representatives.

From the first phase of the project, the CPCC concluded that the peacebuilding community is at a very early stage when it comes to learning lessons about peacebuilding. It also indicated to the CPCC that a true learning process needs to include beneficiaries and partners, and should incorporate learning from the work of organizations similar to those under scrutiny. The lessons, the CPCC concluded, should then be shared as widely as possible among the peacebuilding community.

In this, the second phase of the project, the CPCC has advanced a more sophisticated methodology in order to extract more practical lessons by taking account of the opinions of

¹ CPCC, In Phase I of the learning project, the CPCC conducted documentary research and interviews with organizational personnel around three case studies provided by CARE Canada, the Centre d'étude et de coopération internationale (CECI), and Inter Pares.
partners, recipients, sponsors, and observers of peacebuilding programs. This phase of the project was designed to take lessons learned about peacebuilding a step further by incorporating into the methodology field visits to the projects under review. The field visits were short, due to budget considerations, but included interviews with project on-ground personnel, recipients and partners. The intention has been to dig a little deeper beneath the surface than in the first phase in extracting lessons learned from peacebuilding projects.
What follows is a report of phase II of the Lessons-Learned project. It includes five case studies of peacebuilding projects:

CARE Canada’s civil society strengthening project in Bosnia, looks at CARE’s efforts to promote the development of civil society by focusing on women, youth and the elderly. Care believes that civil society is the bedrock of a stable democracy.

The International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development’s (ICHRDD) Fund to Support Civil Society Policy Research in Guatemala. This Fund was interided to help Guatemalan organizations contribute to the implementation of the Peace Accords.

The Centre canadien d’étude et de coopération internationale (CECI), also in Guatemala (at the time this report was submitted to IDRC, this case study was still being revised. It will be added to the report upon completion).

The Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution’s (CICR) training project in Rwanda. This project was intended to train people at different levels in Rwandan society in conflict resolution methods, helping them avoid the resort to violence in conflictual situations; and

World Vision’s Gulu Centre for the Rehabilitation of Child Soldiers, in Uganda. The Centre has been operating since 1995 providing rehabilitation services for former child soldiers.

Aside from the case studies, the report includes annexes on the methodology and work on lessons learned being done elsewhere. These annexes flag the methodology that the CPCC used in this its latest work on lessons learned. That methodology was an attempt to bring a more rigorous and sophisticated level of analysis to bear when conducting field studies about lessons learned. The overview of lessons learned is intended only to provide an example of what is going on elsewhere with the proviso that we may may want to do further, more detailed work in this area.

The report concludes with some interesting findings regarding lessons learned by NGOs. But ultimately, it also illustrates how far we need to go if we want to elicit more meaningful lessons about how NGOs and their various counterparts in the peacebuilding endeavour can contribute, in the long run, to the building of peace.
CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

In May 1998, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development -- now known as Rights and Democracy -- (ICHRDD) established the Fund to Support Civil Society Policy Research for the Implementation of the Guatemalan Peace Agreements (the Fund). The general purpose of the Fund was to help civil society organizations in Guatemala participate in the 1996 peace agreement ending the civil war in that country.

In their submission to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) seeking support for the project, ICHRDD referred to the urgent need for peacebuilding in Guatemala.

The political culture of Guatemala is typical of a country that has been wracked by decades of internal strife: mutual intolerance is prevalent amongst the highly fragmented social and political actors, and effective public spaces are virtually non-existent. In such an adverse political culture the highly unique framework of the implementation of the peace agreements provides a crucial but very isolated space for dialogue around concrete public policy issues affecting the general interest.2

ICHRDD noted that most of the civil society organizations involved in the implementation of the peace agreements recognized that they were ill equipped to play the role expected of them. During the conflict, repression had decimated Guatemalan society, forcing many skilled people to leave and killing others. Therefore, civil society in general in Guatemala was limited in its capacity to translate its demands into concrete proposals and to use the political space available.

The avowed purpose of the fund was to support the somewhat under-resourced sectors of Guatemalan civil society (e.g. organizations representing rural communities, the urban poor, displaced populations) that were interested in the implementation of the Guatemalan peace accords.

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The Accords

The Guatemalan Peace Accords were signed in 1996, bringing an end to one of the longest wars in Latin American history. The accords, which established a framework for political transition and post-conflict reconstruction in Guatemala, were divided into three phases. The first phase saw the establishment of MINUGUA, an international verification mission, and the demobilization of armed opposition groups. The last phase involved the substantive implementation of the Accords, in law and practice, in the structure of the Guatemalan polity. But it was in the second phase that ICHRDD saw an opportunity. In this phase, eighteen Multipartite and Special Commissions were established under the Agreement on the Schedule for Implementation, Compliance, and Verification of the Peace Agreement. Eleven of the Commissions included representation from civil society organizations, primarily through the Coordinating Forum for Indigenous Peoples of Guatemala (COPMAGUA), but also from numerous other social actors. It was these commissions that constituted what ICHRDD considered an entry point for the Fund, since they provided “formal spaces for dialogue and negotiation between the Parties to the Accords and representatives of civil society organizations.”

ICHRRD’S FUND TO SUPPORT CIVIL SOCIETY INVOLVEMENT IN THE GUATEMALAN PEACE ACCORDS

In this context the Fund was established in May 1998. As ICHRDD points out, the concept of the Fund originated out of several intensive discussions on the Guatemalan peace process, including the Canadian Dialogue on Peacebuilding in Guatemala on October 9, 1997. Included in these discussions were Canadian NGOs and Canadian government representatives. They were instigated at the behest of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee and the Peacebuilding Division at the Department of Foreign Affairs and involved ICHRDD from the earliest stages.

For its part, ICHRDD had long been a supporter of civil society participation in the process that led to the 1996 Accord in Guatemala:

During this process ICHRDD observed that civil society organizations were in greater need of support to respond to both the political imperatives of transition and the specific responsibilities assigned to them by the Agreement on the Schedule of Implementation, Compliance and Verification.3

They concluded that the lack of technical and policy expertise and resources available to historically marginalized sectors of society seriously undermined their capacity to play an active role in the implementation process.4 Yet, after years of civil war characterized by violent

repression and exclusion from the political process, civil society in the post-conflict era now had both an opportunity and responsibility to play a role in the transition to peace.

ICHRDD received $400,000 from the Peacebuilding Fund at CIDA to establish the Fund in Guatemala. The Fund, which was to operate for 16 months, granted money to civil society organizations engaged in the peace implementation process for short-term consultancies, background or policy research, surveys, and action research initiatives. The purpose of the Fund was to reinforce the ability of those civil society organizations participating in the implementation and monitoring of the peace agreements to fulfil their obligations and commitments. To be eligible for the funds an organization had to be either directly participating in the commissions or indirectly participating through a representative.

**Objectives and Criteria**

ICHRDD hoped that the Fund would bridge what it saw as the gap between Guatemalan civil society’s capabilities and responsibilities. It sought to improve Guatemalans’ ability to engage in research and develop public policy proposals that would contribute to the peace process. More specifically, it gave priority to public policy research that is:

- Related to the Multiparty and Special Commissions and other processes established under the terms of the Peace Accords;
- conducted by civil society organizations working, directly or indirectly, with the Commissions or other closely related processes; and
- based on a broad process of consultation and diffusion of the findings of the research.

In turn, preference would be given to projects that had the potential to:

- Support processes of transition, particularly where these changes encourage the emergence of a new and democratic dynamic in the relationship between the Guatemalan State and civil society; and
- contribute to the reform of State laws, policy and practice related to the issues identified within the Peace Accords;

While one of the initial activities of the Fund Coordinator was to conduct a needs assessment in Guatemala, certain general needs were identified at the outset:

- The need to help civil society organizations represented in the peace implementation mechanisms develop concrete -- sometimes highly technical proposals;
- the need to provide most civil society organizations with longer term training and capacity-building;
the need for material resources that would allow representatives of civil society organizations to participate in the implementation process on a more equal basis with government; and

- the need to take the implementation process outside of the capital city and into the regions.

**Peacebuilding in Guatemala**

While the particular purposes of the project were to support Guatemalan civil society’s ability to contribute to the implementation of the Accords by addressing their specific needs, the overarching purpose of the project was to contribute to peacebuilding. Indeed the project was conceived with peacebuilding in mind, as that was defined by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). The DFAIT definition states that peacebuilding is “the effort to strengthen the prospects for internal peace and decrease the likelihood of [future] violent conflict. The overarching goal of peacebuilding is to enhance the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence.”

Noting that, as DFAIT admits, this definition is in some ways deficient, ICHRDD added depth to its understanding of the term by referring to the literature on peacebuilding. It looked at the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee’s (CPCC) definition, which elaborates on DFAIT’s understanding by stating that peacebuilding is a means to achieve human security. CPCC also explicitly refers to the need to build peace in pre-, mid-, and post-conflict situations. Finally ICHRDD noted that NGOs and research institutes tend to consider peacebuilding a long-term process, while the government usually interprets it as an 18-month window of opportunity.

In coming to its own conclusions about peacebuilding, ICHRDD referred to the work of Necla Tschirgi, Ken Bush and John Paul Lederach. While each elaborated on peacebuilding after their own fashion, ICHRDD identified three points in common that they used to inform the project in Guatemala.

- First, peacebuilding initiatives must focus on enhancing the domestic capacity to manage and transform conflict;
- second, peacebuilding is a dual process of building the confidence-relationships and process structures that strengthen and sustain peace initiatives over time, thereby avoiding a relapse into violent conflict; and
- third, transition to democratic governance requires that the peace process must simultaneously work to dismantle enclaves of authoritarian power still present in the emerging polity.
ICHRDD determined that the Fund in Guatemala should be structured around these three essential components.\(^5\)

**Functioning of the Fund**

In the NGO and government discussion preceding the establishment of the Fund it was agreed that the Fund should be managed by an institution perceived as neutral and credible by all potential partners and observers, which meant that it could not be a Guatemalan institution. Nor could it be a Canadian institution with a history of strong involvement in Guatemala, though it should be an institution with a well-developed field knowledge of Guatemala, as well as a good understanding of research issues and methods, including participatory and action research. Several Canadian NGOs suggested that ICHRDD would be the logical candidate. Nevertheless, ICHRDD was determined that the project should be treated as a community initiative and not one that responds primarily to its own institutional agenda.

ICHRDD hired a full time Canadian consultant based in Guatemala to act as Fund Coordinator. Reporting to the Americas Programme Officer at ICHRDD, the coordinator carried out a baseline needs assessment that included a survey of Canadian NGOs operational in Guatemala, civil society organizations involved in the peace commissions and mechanisms, international donors and Guatemalan research institutions. From this he proposed a detailed project design.

The coordinator was responsible for managing the Fund; disseminating information about the Fund to interested organizations, and helping prospective applicants develop and implement their proposals. He was assisted by an Advisory Board whose members were representative of Guatemalan society and who were knowledgeable about research issues and the target sector for the fund.

The Fund itself strove to be flexible, responsive, and transparent, with a minimum of administrative requirements. Proposals to the Fund were evaluated on the criteria outlined above and on whether or not they:

- Met basic academic and technical standards for research (the Fund would also consider providing academic and technical support to civil society organizations involved in policy development); and
- Involved participatory research methods that could lead to the development of public policy proposals within the framework established by the Peace Accords.

Three specific thematic areas were identified for support: land reform; reforms to the political system; and the status of women. In these areas the Fund sought to ensure that the

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themes of proposals were of historic importance, that is to say they addressed issues at the centre of past civil conflict and the implementation of the peace accords. The Fund also looked for the following conditions when considering funding:

- Social organizations that have some capacity to negotiate and conduct related policy research and have meaningful representation within the peace negotiations through the commissions and other related processes;
- a high-level of government participation within the negotiations, ensuring substantive contact between social organizations, the State, and in some cases the private sector; and
- a unique role for the Fund that did not duplicate the work of other international donors in these areas.

Other important issues that were identified included:

- Education and follow up to the report of the Multipartite Commission on Education Reform;
- judicial reform and follow up to the report of the Special Commission on Strengthening the Judicial System
- follow-up by social organizations to the report and recommendations of the Truth Commission for Guatemala; and
- fiscal policy, especially in relation to tax reform.

The Fund was designed with a specific set of social actor applicants in mind. These applicants had to be involved in the peace negotiations either directly through the commissions or indirectly through related processes. They had to be non-governmental, non-profit Guatemalan organizations or institutions that could contribute 20 per cent of the cost of research from its funds. They had to have the experience and administrative capacity to implement the project and previous experience with the issue.

The Fund Coordinator was responsible for receiving and processing project applications. He made the initial assessment of each application, rejecting those that fell outside the fund’s criteria. The organizations that had submitted more promising and viable proposals were provided with the necessary technical support required for further consideration. The revised projects were then presented to the Advisory Committee, which either recommended approval of the project as submitted, or with specific conditions; rejected the project; or asked for more information or specific changes to the project based on suggestions provided by the Advisory Committee. The Fund manager then presented approved projects to ICHRDD for a final decision.
The Fund began operating only after the manager had conducted an initial needs assessment, which he submitted to ICHRDD on June 30, 1998. That assessment included 50 interviews with Guatemalan social organizations and individuals, government officials and representatives of the international community. This study was used to determine program criteria, Fund materials, thematic foci and methodology.


That information consisted of a mail-out of Fund materials to potential counterparts, three public information sessions in late September, early October and additional meetings with organizations unable to attend the information sessions. The Fund manager also met individually with the representatives of 17 organizations to discuss the Fund.

LESSONS LEARNED

Lesson 1: Critical to the success of any peacebuilding enterprise is donor experience in and knowledge about the country, people and region in which it is about to be engaged. Knowledge and analysis prepares the donor for the task ahead and for the issues involved, and experience helps them to develop a level of trust among the people they will be dealing with.

One of the rarely mentioned but implied lessons of the Fund in Guatemala is the benefit that ICHRDD's experience in the country, dating back to 1991, provided in carrying out the project. Only a few of the interviewees commented on the well-established relationship between themselves and ICHRDD working on issues of human rights and the consolidation of peace. Nevertheless, this relationship established a basis of trust and comfort that helped ICHRDD implement the Fund quickly within its short time span and perhaps mitigated, in the eyes of the recipients, some of the fund's shortcomings.

ICHRDD, too, benefited from the knowledge both it and the Canadian community in general had gained from their long experience in Guatemala. Institutionally, ICHRDD has been deeply engaged since 1992 in analysis and policy work around Guatemala. It has also been involved in the consultative group on Guatemala since 1992 as well as a democratic development study on the country and Forum 96. As an ICHRDD official explained, this is a country where there has been significant analytical investment by many actors, especially since 1994-95, and the cumulative effect is a significantly enhanced capacity to generate good proposals. The lesson here may be that the collective fabric of analysis on the country here in Canada is an important factor for success in peacebuilding projects.6

6 Comments by Nancy Thede, Coordinator, ICHRDD.
Lesson 2: The limited resources available for peacebuilding projects mean that donors must consider time as a factor in peacebuilding. More precisely, they need to consider that while peacebuilding is usually a long-term undertaking, the projects that they seek to implement will only be funded for a relatively short term. Peacebuilders, then, need to design projects that can have an impact beyond their own lifetime not least by including as a component capacity-building for local individuals and institutions. Furthermore, they would be wise to engage with their partners in developing a follow-up strategy for the project that allows for extending the project through local means or parlaying its impact beyond the period of the donor's commitment.

The most glaring shortcoming of the Fund, commented on by both the implementers and many recipients, was the contradiction between the short time CIDA allowed for the project and the long-term requirements of peacebuilding. One member of the Advisory Committee advised that the error regarding time was an important lesson for the project. He noted that more time would have allowed the Fund to take shape more fully. He also pointed out that the Fund was designed to respond to the need to implement the Peace Accords, but that need outlasted the Fund and continues even today. Furthermore, increasing the capacity for dialogue between the State and Civil Society takes more time than the Fund allowed.

Even a Canadian official acknowledged that a shortcoming of the project was that it was short term rather than long term. While the Fund did manage to enhance the capacities of many of the recipients, perhaps more durable impacts would have been forthcoming from a longer project. The official did not blame ICHRDD for this but rather pointed to CIDA's reduced budget and the nature of the project as a pilot project.

Lesson 3: It is important that peacebuilding projects, as far as possible, benefit from local input every step of the way. Local input will help to complement the knowledge and analysis of the donor organization and dispel any impression of peacebuilding imperialism. It will also help to ensure that local capacities for peacebuilding are developed.

An important aspect of the Fund was the Advisory Committee, which was made up of prominent Guatemalan civil society representatives. This committee not only helped vet the proposals but also, in cases where this was needed, made helpful suggestions to the authors for their final submission. They also helped local organizations identify areas in Guatemalan civil society that needed work, for instance in the development of local research capacities. This, in turn, contributed to sustainability since that work is critical to the creation of a viable civil society. The Fund also benefited from the advice of Guatemalans who were knowledgeable about the local situation and particular needs. In turn, it enabled many of them to learn about issues about which they previously knew nothing. As a representative of the Advisory Committee noted, her involvement on the committee not only helped her to learn about different issues, such as taxes, but about the different realities of the country.
Local input and involvement is also a way to sustain, in some way, the project beyond its lifetime. A number of interviewees commented on the relationships that were established as well as on what they learned about research and project development through their participation in the project. These relationships and skills will be useful in carrying on local peacebuilding in the future.

Lesson 4: It is important to ensure that the project is as inclusive as possible of the community it seeks to work with. But the challenge for any peacebuilding project is the need to balance that inclusiveness against a limited time frame, internal coherence, and finite resources for the implementation of a project. That balance must be struck in cognizance of the need to achieve a demonstrable impact. Implementers of peacebuilding projects will need to strategize carefully about what they hope to achieve and leave behind after the project ends. They can only do this to the best of their ability, however, and in recognition that the proper scope for a project and an assessment of its impact will always be challenged by somebody somewhere. Those challenges are not to be feared, however, but welcomed as part of the critical analysis that should follow any project.

The Fund was partly intended to increase the ability of Guatemalan civil society organizations to contribute to the formal peace process in Guatemala. As a result, its criteria stipulated that projects, for the most part, should be linked to the various commissions involved in the peace accords. Some interviewees felt that this cast the net too narrowly, excluding access by those organizations not involved with the commissions. Similarly, one interviewee noted that many economic issues, such as public spending and taxes, were not completely addressed by the Fund. Others also worried that much of the research generated was not adequately linked to policy development.

There was also a suggestion that the Fund would have benefited from a closer association with the Guatemalan government through the Peace Secretariat. The Peace Secretariat was the government body in charge of implementing and monitoring the peace accords.

Again, the tight time frame for implementing the project may have had a bearing on the scope. With little time to prepare and organize, the Fund was bound to define its parameters narrowly in the interest of efficiency. Even then it was felt that the Fund was too much for one person to undertake. It was noted that, as a result, the Fund had difficulty making an impact and disseminating results.

Lesson 5: Nearly any peacebuilding project should have either as its direct aim, or an indirect byproduct, the building of communication among disparate local groups that are crucial to the building of peace in a society, whoever they may be, whether government actors, former opponents, or civil society organizations.

The Fund was established within a context of mistrust between civil society institutions and the State, and often among civil society organizations themselves. By linking projects to the peace accords and by encouraging interaction among state and civil society actors, the Fund
served as a channel of communication, helping to build "confidence relationships" among these various actors.

Lesson 6: Peacebuilding projects must address gender issues if they expect to be successful. No project can hope to have a lasting impact if it has not considered in its undertakings the different gender needs in any society -- male and female children, adults, and the elderly -- and how to address them.

The Fund only received one project related to indigenous women, which failed to achieve funding. However two women were included on the Advisory Committee and one of them noted that her participation built confidence in the Fund on the part of indigenous women, especially in the area of consultation where women are not well represented. Still, she felt that the Fund resulted in very little attention to women in Guatemala, especially Mayan women. This leaves an important component of Guatemalan society excluded. There may be valid reasons for this, but if so they need to be analyzed and understood. As one of the interviewees noted, more women could have been targeted for inclusion in the project and each project should have been asked to include a gender perspective.

Lesson 7: Similar to the above lesson, diversity is important. No society is homogenous, so it is important that as far as is reasonable no group is left out of the project, which might create resentment on their part and obstacles to the overall success of the project.

One of the interviewees lauded the diversity of the ICHRDD project, which was manifested in the makeup of the Advisory Group and the tendency of the fund to reach into different sectors. This diversity contributed to a diverse and multifaceted dialogue and a rich learning experience for everyone involved. Still, it will be impossible to be all-inclusive in most projects, so priorities and criteria need to be established at the outset.

Lesson 8: In many ways, timing of the project and the particular entry point chosen for peacebuilding will determine the kind and extent of its impact. This goes to the importance of pre-project analysis to determine the situation in the field, the various issues that need to be taken into consideration (e.g. gender), and the peacebuilding needs and requirements.

It goes without saying that, as one of the interviewees noted, the Fund was established at a critical period for the country when the peace accords were being negotiated in the Parity Commissions. The Fund allowed civil society organizations to contribute to, and have an impact on that process. While the Fund itself was a one-off enterprise, it kick-started a process that could have effects even after the Fund ceased to exist. Research and proposal writing skills were developed among civil society organizations, which could then use these skills in their future work and pass them on to others. In this sense the Fund had a multiplier effect, allowing organizations to develop skills that they could then use to seek support for other projects from other donors. For instance, one interviewee pointed out that the support of the Fund made it possible for the University of San Carlos to get funding from the International Development Research Centre for two other projects.
Some of the projects had policy implications. As one of the interviewees noted, the fund proposals served as instruments for negotiations within the framework of the Parity Commission. It was used as a base for indigenous organizations in their demands for the recognition of Mayan rights and for obtaining a multi-ethnic justice system. The Fund was a key actor for the continuation of the project of the Association for the Advancement of Social Sciences (AVANCSO) on the situation of education in Guatemala.

So, while the Fund itself was never intended to be sustainable, the timing of the enterprise and the selection of the entry point enabled the Fund’s immediate impact to reverberate in Guatemala beyond its lifetime, the critical point being that it focussed on capacity-building among the Guatemalans themselves.

It is important to note, nevertheless, that while this result was welcome among the interviewees, most of them still felt that the Fund should have had a second phase. Short-term projects in situations where the peace process is likely to be of extended duration can leave participants with the impression of a job half-done. Similarly, results attained can be lost if continued local or international support and action do not bolster them. For instance, while the work of AVANCSO was greatly aided by the FUND, which its representative stated was established at a crucial period for the organization, he lamented the fact that it was a short-term project, quickly realized and nearly as quickly finished.

Lesson 9: Try to avoid overlap, but if that is not possible cooperate to maximize the benefits of it. It may be that a certain amount of project overlap in peacebuilding is unavoidable, what with the scramble to do peacebuilding by a wide variety of Canadian organizations with the similar institutional foci, many of whom will inevitably submit project proposals to different funders for work in the same country. Unless this overlap is productive (which is not entirely impossible in a country with needs in a certain area too large for any one organization to handle) it should be avoided, or at least managed in a way that is mutually beneficial both to the donors and the recipients. This means, at the very least, constructive communication among the donors, if not outright cooperation or collaboration.

There was some concern expressed on the part of one interviewee that the ICHRDD Fund and the Fund for Democratic Development (FDD) run by CECI overlapped in that both projects were political and aimed at promoting research. Moreover, cooperation between the two projects was somewhat lacking. The interviewee felt that part of the problem lay in the fact that both the ICHRDD Fund Coordinator and the people responsible for running the FDD were too overwhelmed with their own work.

In spite of this overlap, it was pointed out that the Fund did address specific issues that other projects in Guatemala did not, especially in the area of citizen participation in politics through the development of public policy proposals. It also helped to strengthen civil society
and particular institutions. In general, it should be noted that the Fund had more specific objectives than did the FDD.
List of Interviewees

Andrea Giron, CIDA Representative, Embassy of Canada in Guatemala
Clara Arenas, Asociación para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales en Guatemala (AVANCSO)
(contraparte beneficiaria del Fondo de Investigación para Políticas Sociales en Guatemala)
Emma Chirix, Grupo de mujeres Mayas - KAQLA
(miembro del comité asesor del Fondo de Investigación para Políticas Sociales en Guatemala)
Juan Alberto Fuentes, Asesor de la Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL) y el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD)
(miembro del comité asesor del Fondo de Investigación para Políticas Sociales en Guatemala)
Miguel Angel Balcarcel, OIT
(miembro del comité asesor del Fondo de Investigación para Políticas Sociales en Guatemala)
Sergio Funes, Comisión Nacional Permanente de Tierras de COPMAGUA
(contraparte beneficiaria del Fondo de Investigación para Políticas Sociales en Guatemala)
Tania Palencia Prado, Iglesia Luterana
(miembro del comité asesor del Fondo de Investigación para Políticas Sociales en Guatemala)
Rev. Vitalino Similox Salazar, Conferencia de Iglesias Evangélicas de Guatemala
(contraparte beneficiaria del Fondo de Investigación para Políticas Sociales en Guatemala)
INTRODUCTION

Conflict resolution training is a well-known peacebuilding activity. Several Canadian organizations are disseminating this type of knowledge throughout the world, an enterprise that is endorsed by the Government of Canada. The general rationale behind this effort is that the spread of conflict resolution techniques can help some people settle their differences before they resort to violence. Conflict resolution training is also a means to improve the work effected by public and private institutions. This training seems necessary in a society like Rwanda, torn by war and genocide. Such conflict resolution training could be especially important where Hutus and Tutsi interact daily.

The Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution (CICR) located at Saint-Paul University in Ottawa has been training people in Rwanda since 1997, first in a pilot project then by a two-year project, both funded by the Canadian International Development agency (CIDA). This report aims at identifying the main challenges faced by the project managers in Rwanda and how they attempted to resolve them.

It is important to note that the CICR does not have long international aid experience, unlike some of the other NGOs studied in this report. Therefore, some of the lessons that they learned may not seem remarkable to some experienced aid workers. However, the lessons gathered by the CICR are very instructive of the difficulties faced by small and relatively inexperienced Canadian organizations operating abroad.

THE CONTEXT

The Rwandan genocide was the worst the world has seen since the Holocaust. However, it was not the first time that mass murder occurred in this little country of 7 million, or in its neighbour Burundi. Two tribal groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis, have been rivals in these

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1 One of the most objective sources on Rwandan history was prepared by the National University of Rwanda and is entitled Comprehending and Mastering Conflicts: The Case of the Genocide in Rwanda: Genesis, Consequences and Action Proposals, Butare, 1998.
countries for centuries. When the Tutsis first arrived from the northeast in the XIIth or XIVth century, the Hutus resented them and tried to limit their deployment in the Kingdom. However, the Tutsis prospered in cattle raising, then in crafts and trade, until some achieved prominent positions near the King of Rwanda. During their colonization of the region, from 1918 on, the Belgians selected the Tutsis as the tribe that could best manage the local administration and commerce, and saw that they received the best education and promotions in the country. After independence in 1962, the Hutus, wanting to gain more space in the public life of the country, tried to displace the Tutsis from their dominant position, through intimidation, discrimination, and outward violence. Massacres of Tutsis, usually engineered by Hutu mass movements, occurred notably in 1959, 1963, 1973 and 1990. The Tutsis sometimes responded in kind to those massacres, carrying out abuses of their own. Meanwhile, the situation became gradually untenable for the Tutsis in Rwanda. Masses of them, now excluded from higher education and employment, and subjected to ill treatment, fled the country to settle in Uganda, Zaire, Burundi, and Tanzania, and in Europe, North America and West Africa.

In 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) launched an offensive against Rwanda from its bases in Uganda. The relations between Uganda and Rwanda became very tense. Negotiations among the two countries led to the Arusha accords of 1992, which stipulated the deployment of observers from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the north of Rwanda. Problems continued and in June of 1993, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted resolution 846 requesting the creation of a UN Mission in Uganda and Rwanda. In August that year, new peace accords were signed in Arusha, and in October, the UNSC created the UN Mission in Rwanda (MINUAR) under resolution 872.

In the meantime, Hutu mass organizations started to plan again for new acts of intimidation and revenge against the Tutsi. The violence erupted after the assassination of the Presidents of Rwanda and of Burundi at Kigali international airport on April 6, 1994. Hundred of thousands of Tutsis were killed in a frenzy of barbaric murders that lasted until June. The murderers, encouraged by mass organizations, politicians, intellectuals and religious leaders, also killed many moderate Hutus who advocated peaceful coexistence with the Tutsis. In all, at least eight hundred thousand people perished. The MINUAR, an overmatched peacekeeping contingent, was unable to stop what the full-fledged genocide.

The exiled Tutsis rapidly mobilized their army and invaded Rwanda in May. They took power in Kigali, while the French were putting together Operation Turquoise intended to create a no-kill zone in the south west of the country. Thousands of Hutus involved in the genocide fled to Zaire, but were subjected to death by starvation, thirst, disease, and attacks from Tutsis. Several tens of thousands, and perhaps hundred of thousands, perished there. The Hutus left in Zaire (now Congo) even now hope to re-enter the country to establish their rule, supported by the Kinshasa government and by local tribes.

In Rwanda, the government, composed mostly of formerly exiled Tutsis, has been busy re-establishing law and order, and reconstructing their country. It did not take long for the country to return to a state of quasi-normalcy. However, the government still pursues efforts to
bring to justice the people responsible for the genocide. While some have been judged and
condemned by the International Tribunal on War Crimes or by Rwandan courts, many mass
murderers are still living abroad. Several killers and their accomplices still live in Rwanda, and
efforts to bring them to justice are under way, notably through the use of local courts and
traditional means of atonement.

THE CICR PROJECT

The CICR, located at Saint-Paul University in Ottawa, and headed by Dr Vern Redekop,
is a reputed centre of training in conflict resolution. The CICR has developed its own
methodology for conflict resolution, based on the learning and experience of modern psychology
and management science, but also on teachings from the Western Christian tradition, oriental
religions, and North American aboriginal cultures. The CICR trains Canadians, as well as people
from diverse countries, at different levels.

The CICR's main training courses are called TPN (Third Party Neutral) and are taught at
four levels. Low level courses are usually taught in a one-week format or less, while advanced
programs, notably to train new trainers, are longer. The purpose of these courses is to develop
capacities for conflict resolution and, more generally, spread a culture of harmony within
communities, workplaces, and families. The emphasis is on mediation, as the trainees from the
CICR are taught to act as neutral third parties in the event of disputes.

In 1997, the CICR received a one-year grant from CIDA for a pilot project in Rwanda.
The objective was to train a small contingent of Rwandan people in conflict resolution and to
evaluate whether it was possible to sustain this effort over time. The pilot project was successful,
the CICR having identified many organizational and individual partners and having trained a few
dozen people. CICR thus received another grant from CIDA for a two-year project in 1998-2000.
This more ambitious project was intended to set up a more permanent training structure in
Rwanda. The CICR aimed to train a group of 28 Rwandans at the highest level, so that they
could in turn train hundreds of their co-citizens and also establish a conflict resolution training
centre in Rwanda. To accomplish these goals, the CICR had to train a large number of Rwandans
at levels TPN-1 and -2 to further assess the applicability of their conflict resolution model, to
recruit future trainers, and to provide practice to their new trainers. In the following section, we
will summarize the activities of the CICR in this second phase and highlight the lessons that it
learned in the process.

ACTIVITIES OF THE PROJECT

The main activities of the project were to train a core of trainers who would in turn train
many Rwandans at low, medium, and high levels of proficiency in conflict resolution. The
project also involved training a large number of Rwandans from all walks of life in the basics of
conflict resolution. Another main goal was to create a structure in Rwanda, which could in time
become self-sustaining. The project also intended to spread general knowledge of the benefits of conflict resolution among decision-makers and the wider population.

**High-Level Training**

The CICR's goal was to certify 28 trainers who could eventually train other Rwandans at any level of the TPN program. While the CICR was quite successful with its program at the lowest level of training (see next section), it managed to train only 8 of a target 28 trainers.

There are several reasons for this, including unforeseen difficulties in identifying potential trainers and keeping them in the project. The time frame of the project was too short to allow for an extensive search and follow-up of trainers. The problems encountered by the CICR in setting up a permanent office in Rwanda also compounded the problem.

The first 8 trainers were trained in Ottawa, which was quite expensive. This choice of location was inspired by the fact that the CICR did not have an institutional partner in Rwanda at the time. Nevertheless, subsequent trainers were supposed to be instructed in Rwanda. Aside from high costs, there are reasons why the training in Ottawa was complicated. Some Rwandans could not obtain a visa for Canada, as the Canadian government feared that they might want to stay in Canada. During the training, some Rwandans openly considered asking for asylum in Canada, but were convinced to return home. However, one of them eventually stayed in Canada. The CICR has learned that training people here can be a source of trouble, but the initial course for Rwandan trainers went generally well, as evidenced by the high level of satisfaction demonstrated by the new trainers.

In the two years since this training took place, only 4 of these trainers have been certified by the CICR, meaning that they are certified to issue training diplomas at all levels and also to train other trainers. The explanations for this state of affairs constitute a good illustration of lessons learned by an organization operating in developing countries after a prolonged war.

The CICR has found that it is more difficult and expensive than expected to train and support the trainers. The CICR finds it hard to convince people to devote the time and effort to complete a trainer's program while they are trying to earn a living in a poor country. Many Rwandans, even among the elite, need two jobs to make ends meet. Even if their employers were to pay them to train with the CICR, the trainees would still need their moonlighting earnings. Furthermore, there is the risk that because they will be attending to their jobs the trainees will miss many sessions during their training. Therefore, the CICR may have to pay people to attend the lengthy program, which could be expensive, and would entail risks such as attracting people who would not have vested interests in the project.

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8 To be certified a person must have 1) attended one training session as an observer, 2) assisted another trainer on a training session, and 3) led a training session.
The CICR also found that completing the apprenticeships required much more supervision than expected. Furthermore, since the new trainers are already employed, completing their apprenticeships on a part-time basis is an extended process. A local structure blessed with people and means could allow for follow-up with the new trainers, keeping them interested in and current with developments in conflict resolution. However, as we will see later, the CICR project does not have such a facility.

The CICR learned that, as a rule, to certify a given number of trainers, it should train two to three times that number, as lack of competence and attrition take their toll.

Low-Level Training

In 1998-2000, in the second phase of the project, the CICR and its local partners trained over 700 people from more than 50 organizations at the TPN-1 level. Therefore, for the 1st level of training, the CICR has met and even surpassed its goals, even while it does not have as many local trainers as was planned at the onset of the project (see next section). The CICR learned that low level training can be done on a wider scale than expected when participating organizations are eager to send large sections of their personnel. The relatively low unit cost of training in Rwanda, as compared to Canada, is another factor favouring extended beginners_ training.

The recruitment of trainees by the CICR has been done mostly through contacting major institutions in Rwanda and offering to dispense the course to their employees and partners. The main organizations where the training took place were the Caisse sociale du Rwanda, a state fund; the R_seau des femmes pour le d_veloppement rural, a women rural solidarity organization; the Danish Centre for Human Rights, an organization that trains many Rwandan para-legals; and the University of Rwanda, the country’s main post-secondary institution, located in Butare, where the CICR's main local partner is located. Other institutions where people have been trained were the Gendarmerie Nationale, the CESTRAR trade union, and Save the Children (U.K.).

The CICR's trainer from Ottawa, Mr. Richard Batsinduka, has taught a large number of these people, but gradually, some of the local trainers have become very active, mainly at the University of Rwanda and in the R_seau des femmes. This involvement of local trainers has been quite successful in terms of meeting the numerical goals of the project. However, the CICR now feels that it will have to go beyond the organizations to which it has been providing training up to now, in order to maximize the effect of this training on Rwandan society as a whole.

One question that has bedeviled the CICR is whether or not to compensate the people being trained. This question inevitably arises for those training people in the developing world? Rwandan has been no exception. Several Rwandans have asked for compensation to attend the courses. The CICR has decided upon a policy of disbursing money only for expenditures incurred by the trainees. This has limited the costs and ensured that some of those interested only in money are kept at bay. However, this policy has limits. As the project progresses, it is possible that more people will hear about it and start clamoring for compensation, making it increasingly
difficult to provide the teaching without a stipend. Another tricky issue is that some people may demand opportunity cost compensation for training, claiming that it robs them of time for moonlighting.

In order to avoid a cost explosion caused by compensation demands, the CICR resolved to cater to public institutions and large NGOs whose members could be expected not to request compensation for receiving courses. This has worked so far, but the strategy has its limits in that it tends to restrict training to the elite strata of society. Also, potential trainees must be interviewed in order to assess if their expectations about the course are realistic.

**Establishing a Sustainable Local Structure**

Critical to the project were the establishment of a sustainable structure in Rwanda that would serve as a communication node, an information provider, and a centre of training. At first, the CICR proposed joining with another foreign NGO, but the arrangement was never realized as the prospective partner’s attention was focused on other issues. The CICR also discussed this matter with other foreign NGOs but most were interested only if long term financing were available.

Eventually, the CICR created a Centre for Conflict Resolution at the National University of Rwanda, in Butare, about a hundred kilometres from Kigali. The Centre has been established through an agreement signed with the university. Mr. Runyange, the former head of Human Resources at the university, who is paid in part by the university and in part by the CICR, directs it. It took some time to establish the Butare Centre, but in the last months of the CICR project, the centre has been quite active in training people on the campus. However, it has been less successful in gathering people from outside the captive university market. Also, it has not yet found monies to sustain its activities other than what was already contributed by the CICR and by the university.

A major obstacle in this regard is that the CICR-supported Centre is in competition for the attention of foreign sponsors and university administrators with another conflict resolution centre at the university. The other centre is a multidisciplinary academic organization led by professors and professional researchers, which has been directly sponsored by the UNDP. The position of university officials in this matter was disconcerting, as they pretended that the two centres were complementary and that they could coexist, even within the restricted confines of a small university. However, in practice, the two centres did not talk much to each other. For the representatives of donor organizations, this duplication was debatable, and they generally favoured merging the centres. The CICR are now considering integrating their centre with the UNDP-sponsored institute.

The CICR project did not have a formal structure in the capital city of Kigali. This created problems of coordination, of reach, and of follow up, notably, as most of the trainers, trainees, partners, sponsors and potential clients of the CICR live in Kigali. Mr. Runyange went to Kigali sometimes, but his main responsibility was at the university. The Canadian-based
CICR trainer went to Rwanda for only a few weeks each year. These intermittent presences of
the CICR could not match the action of a true local representative.

A Rwandan trainer could have been asked to take over the role of representative, but
most of these people work for organizations that are already busy and it is dubious that any of
them would find the time to act as a representative in Rwanda. There is also a problem of
possible rivalry and envy among the trainers if one of them was chosen to represent the CICR in
Kigali. Alternatively, another partner of the CICR might have been interested in hosting the
project, but there have been no negotiations on this. Perhaps an officer from a Canadian
organization interested in conflict resolution should be asked to provide some services of
coordination for a reasonable amount of compensation.

The CICR has learned that in this type of training project, the presence of a reliable
representative in the capital city is crucial. This, again, shows how much the choice of partners
matters in any foreign aid project.

Networking

The CICR has worked at establishing a network of local NGOs to stimulate the teaching
and practice of conflict resolution training. Currently, it has created an embryonic network,
mostly composed of organizations whose members were trained by the CICR. However, there is
no formalized cooperation and exchange of information among these organizations.
Furthermore, the Centre at the university has not had time to take up this function during the
short life of the project.

Public Outreach

The CICR had set modest public outreach objectives, such as media coverage, public
talks, etc. These objectives have been easily attained. In fact, the project could have had more
public impact than it had, notably through broadcasting and public meetings. However, many
people in the structure of the project were initially reluctant to stress public outreach past a
certain point. The CICR principals see conflict resolution training as a serious undertaking that
must be offered under appropriate conditions. They believe that two-minute sound bites about
conflict resolution are not going to make as much difference in Rwanda as proper training for
hundreds of selected people. Nevertheless, the CICR now realizes that, for a moderate
commitment of time and money, coverage by the media and public talks can increase the
demand for CICR training.
IMPACT OF THE PROJECT

Comments from the Trainees

The trainees of the CICR have been quite satisfied with the courses that they received. This has been demonstrated by their answers to the CICR questionnaires, and by the poll and interviews conducted during the project’s evaluation.

Many of the trainees expressed some disappointment at not having received a TPN-2 session after their initial introduction to conflict resolution. Also, many trainees feel that there has not been enough follow-up on the course. ‘For the CICR this raises the issue of guaranteeing a strong permanent presence in Rwanda for the task of financing advanced courses and recruiting for them. The CICR thinks that it will also be important in the future to send the former trainees questionnaires devised to measure their retention of knowledge over the long term. Eventually, the CICR partner in Rwanda will have to send former trainees some learning material to refresh their memory about what they have learned.

Use of the Training

Evaluating the impact of such a project is most difficult and leads only to uncertain results. In part, this may reflect a weakness of this particular project, as impact baseline indicators were not defined at the onset, or were too vague. But this difficulty also reflects the inherent complexity of evaluating peacebuilding, an activity that yields indirect and diffuse results over the long term. The goal of peace, or at least of diminished levels of violence, is affected by numerous factors such as the domestic political situation, the international political environment, economic conditions, social development, demography, educational and cultural progress, etc. The impact of foreign aid measures devoted to peacebuilding may be small in comparison to the influence of major historical trends. It is also very hard to distinguish among the respective impacts of different foreign aid, governmental and civil society initiatives on the local situation.

As was verified in written and verbal questionnaires, many trainees credibly claimed to have used the CICR training in their professional and private lives. However, there is no strong evidence that this training has made a considerable difference in Rwanda. There is no incidence as of yet of this training having been used to settle a grave conflict in Rwanda. There is no data available on the impact of this training in diminishing conflict among co-workers of large institutions such as Caisse Sociale. There are no statistics on the use of conflict resolution by Gendarmes or by members of R_seau des femmes. In all fairness, it must be said that significant results from conflict resolution will only occur in the long term, after scores of people from all walks of life have been trained at increasing levels of competency.

In the future, the CICR plans to set up stronger baseline indicators of impact by asking organizations to provide statistical and anecdotal data on the use of conflict resolution techniques by their employees and partners.
Representativeness of Trainees

Representativeness of all segments of Rwandan society was not an absolute condition for this project. The CICR had other goals in mind, such as ensuring that the trainees were influential in society. This meant that some categories, like Tutsis, have been over represented in training, since they constitute a large part of the elite strata in Rwanda. However, the CICR tried to increase its contingents of Hutus, of women, and of people from the countryside during the course of the project.

The proportion of Hutus in the training gradually increased, as the training was offered to a larger number of institutions. The contingent of women trainees has also steadily increased to reach about one half of the total, largely because of the excellent working relationship between the CICR and the Rseau des femmes. However, the trainees from the countryside are still under-represented, compared to the city dwellers.

In all, the CICR has been training people that mostly represent the city elites, rather than members of the traditional and rural communities. In all fairness, this state of affairs depends largely on the restricted time schedule of the project, which did not leave much room to look beyond the initial set of institutions and reach for other types of organizations. This type of extension beyond the urban elites often takes time, and only longer-term funding can guarantee it.

CONCLUSION

The CICR project in Rwanda has been cited by its clients, its trainees, and by knowledgeable observers as a worthwhile contribution to peacebuilding and democratic development in the country. It has positively influenced the life and outlook of trainees and has resulted in small-scale impacts on Rwandan society. The CICR met most of the objectives it had set for this project.

A first order of lessons learned by the CICR relates to the applicability and diffusion of its training in the African context. The CICR has learned in Rwanda that this type of mediation approach is understandable and usable by the Rwandans in their daily lives, at work, and in the community. Minor adjustments were made to the course and to the written material, but as a whole, the CICR package is understandable and potentially useful to Rwandans.

9 The Tutsis, the main victims of the genocide, share the same language, culture, religion, and places of residence as the Hutus. The Tutsis may be differentiated by some physical attributes, and also by their family names. The Tutsi minority probably now accounts for 10 to 15% of the population of Rwanda (there are no reliable statistics on this). However, Tutsis tend to be more educated and more urban than Hutus, which means that their proportion among the economic, political and administrative elites has always been superior to their actual demographic weight.

10 It must be mentioned that, in order not to arouse any problems in Rwanda, the CICR has not asked trainees about their tribal affiliation and has not set up precise quotas for increasing Hutu representative.
The CICR has also confirmed that there is a strong demand for this kind of training, from elite as well as mass organizations, from the Gendarmerie to women’s organizations to university administrators. Some partners are interested in the training as a way to acquire modern management tools, others see the training as a way to resolve the conflicts that can limit an organization’s work with its partners, and some see it as a way to create better prospects for the relations between Hutus and Tutsis in the country.

The project in Rwanda also confirmed to the CICR that basic level training in conflict resolution can be offered to large numbers of people, given a committed and dynamic core of local trainers. However, the knowledge acquired by the local people must be monitored, refreshed, and pursued, in order to maintain a good degree of skills in conflict resolution. This requires the constant efforts of a solid, self-sustaining and efficient local structure.

While many people in Rwanda expressed a demand for conflict resolution training, the CICR found that many of those were motivated more by the appeal of personal material gain than by objectives of self-improvement or peacebuilding. This is a constant problem in development projects, and there are many ways to cope with it. The CICR has decided not to pay its trainees, except for a stipend, and the policy has worked. The CICR has learned that established institutions in Rwanda can provide potential trainees who understand that the training will serve them in their own jobs and activities, and will not require extra compensation.

The establishment of an efficient permanent local structure has been a source of difficulties for the CICR. The CICR at first tried to arrange collaboration with foreign NGOs based in the capital city, but this did not work. From this experience, the CICR learned that other organizations claiming to be interested in conflict resolution work are not always going to cooperate genuinely. Furthermore, although many organizations use the term “conflict resolution”, it does not follow that they agree on what it entails, because this term has many different meanings.

The CICR signed an agreement for the establishment of a conflict resolution centre at the national university located in Butare. There are difficulties with this arrangement, as most of the potential long-term clients are in Kigali, while the structure is located in Butare. Moreover, the university does not give a full support to the CICR-sponsored centre, as it also backs up another one financed by the UNDP.

The CICR has also learned the value of counting on good partners in the country for providing the trainees who will make good use of their conflict resolution training. In truth, there are many such potential partners in Rwanda, as long as foreign aid programs foot the bill. The question is how to choose one’s partners. The CICR has learned that reliable partners can be found both in civil society and in the state. The CICR has decided not to choose one type of partner over another, and has found this open approach has been quite profitable for its own learning and for the diffusion of mediation knowledge in Rwanda.
While marketing and delivering training programs have their complexities, the CICR has also found that fundraising is a difficult endeavour for a small organization. There is much competition among development aid projects for the limited resources of a few states and international organizations.

Finally, the CICR has learned about the problems of reporting on and evaluating peacebuilding activities. Even as an organization uses modern management tools such as PPBS-derived methods or the well-known Results-Based Management approach, the indicators of peacebuilding success are hard to come by and to verify. The CICR plans to adhere to a strict definition of success and rely on precise indicators to assess its activities. However, the CICR feels that the effects of aid programs on peace can only be effected and verified after years of practice. Time will tell whether the modest CICR efforts will lead to improvements in the conflict resolution potential of the Rwandans.
List of Interviewees

In Canada (October-December 1999, June 2000)

Mr. Vern Redekop, CICR
Mr. Kendel Rust, CICR
Mr. Richard Batsinduka, CICR

In Rwanda (October 1999)

*Rue des femmes*: 5 trainees interviewed
*Gendarmerie Nationale*: 4 trainees interviewed
*Caisse Sociale*: 14 trainees interviewed
Mr. Ellis Ruhumuriza, *Caisse Sociale*
Mr. Protais Musoni, Secretary General, Ministry of Local Government
Mr. Assane Diop, Chief Economist, UNDPRwanda
Ms Angèle Aubin, *Centre d’étude et de coopération internationale*
Mr. Silas Sinyigaya, CLADHO
Capt. Anthony Ntalindwa, *Gendarmerie Nationale*
Mr. Richard Batsinduka, CICR
Mr. Françoise Munyantwari, ACORD
Mr. Mark Allen, CIDA, Embassy of Canada
Mr Mégard Runyange, National University of Rwanda, Butare
National University of Rwanda, Butare: 14 trainees interviewed
Mr JeanClaude NiweRukundo, Ministry of Local Government
Mr Claude Kabutware Rubonesha, PCMCR
Ms Judith Kanakuze, *Rue des femmes*
Ms Suzanne Fafin, UNDP Rwanda
Mr Michel Dubois, Oxfam Québec
Mr Innocent Ruterambuku, Oxfam Quebec
Mr Jean Paul Kimonyo, Scientific Coordinator, National University of Rwanda, Butare
Mr Jean Bosco Butera, ViceRector, National University of Rwanda, Butare
Mr David Seziquey, Save the Children UK
Save the Children UK: 5 trainees interviewed
Mr Vincent de Wilde, Danish Centre for Human Rights
Mr Fergus Karagen, Danish Centre for Human Rights
Danish Centre for Human Rights: 19 trainees interviewed
WORLD VISION'S

GULU CENTRE FOR THE REHABILITATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS

A Case Study of
LESSONS LEARNED
By
Linda Dale

INTRODUCTION

In Northern Uganda, World Vision Uganda's Gulu Centre for the Rehabilitation of Child Soldiers is recognized as an important symbol of resistance against the terror of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel force which has targeted children in its campaign to overthrow the Ugandan government.

In this war, now in its 12th year, over 14,000 children, (usually aged 8 - 14) in Gulu and Kitgum districts have been abducted by the LRA. Once captured these young people are forced to serve as soldiers and perform acts of extreme violence and depravity.

Children who escape the LRA show the effects of severe trauma. They require careful attention and support to achieve any level of recovery. Equally difficult has been the transition back to their families and villages.

The Gulu Centre has been providing rehabilitation services for former child soldiers since 1995. These programs have changed considerably over the past five years. The war, funding concerns and, most of all, the needs of the former child soldiers, their families and the Northern Ugandan community have required new approaches and adjustments in existing programs. This case study chronicles this path in its examination of how peacebuilding work must be responsive to the evolving social and political dimensions of a conflict.

BACKGROUND

The War in Northern Uganda

Northern Uganda is one of the poorest regions in a country famous for lush green beauty, friendly people and a succession of civil wars. As the birthplace of Idi Amin, a savage tyrant who ruled Uganda in the 1970s, the North holds a special place in this history. Today this past is matched by the North's celebration as the home of Olaro Otunnu, the UN special representative on children and war. This is a country of contrasts.
As in any war, its history and place inside Ugandan society have shaped the North’s current situation. Joseph Kony, a charismatic leader who grew up in the Gulu region, leads the LRA. Kony and his followers maintain that Museveni neglects the North in favour of the South, a claim recognized as holding some truth. Many understand this as a legacy or retribution for the years of suffering under Idi Amin’s rule.

In 1986 Museveni’s guerrilla army overthrew Milton Obote, Amin’s like-minded successor. Since that time Museveni has led the government with a power-base comprised largely of Southerners. And since the late 1980s, various rebel forces have taken up the cause of the North. The first of these was Alice Auma Lakwena (the "messenger") who began her movement in 1987 through the recruitment of disaffected soldiers and young people attracted to her strong charisma. Though she had some success, her forces were defeated and she fled the country, leaving an opening for a new leader as well as the precedent of using children as soldiers for a cause which, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, had some support from the people in Northern Uganda.

Joseph Kony became Northern Uganda’s self-declared "saviour" in 1988. In the early 1990s he made some progress. However, by the mid 1990s his fortunes were slipping. It was at this point that Kony began to very actively capture rather than recruit children, citing this as part of his military strategy as it gave his cause international attention.

Kony’s abduction of children coincided with an alliance with the Sudanese government. Sudan agreed to provide the LRA with military and logistical support. Since 1994 Kony’s main headquarters are inside Sudan - his army barracks and training station are located there. While not formally acknowledged, this agreement came with a price tag: Kony provides child soldiers for Sudan in its fight against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). So the child soldiers abducted by Kony from his home provinces are used as both mercenaries to fulfil his bargain with Sudan and as soldiers in his campaign against the Uganda government.

If this were not enough, Kony’s fighting tactics are beyond any normal code of combat. Like Alice Lawena, his predecessor, Kony claims that religious forces possess him. If so, these are quite evil voices. In their name Kony commands child soldiers to club pregnant women to death; cut off the legs of people riding a bicycle or hack off the arms and legs of tired child soldiers. Girls captured by the LRA are routinely passed amongst the officers until given to one as a "wife". Children who escape describe their time with the rebels as "worse than hell".

**Stories of Abduction & Life with the LRA Rebels**

*The day I was abducted by the LRA*
Ocen Charles, child soldier, 13, Uganda.
I was abducted in the morning. I had just finished sweeping the compound for my mother and had gone in the house. The rebels came to the door and ordered me to come out. I said, "No, I won't." They said they would shoot me if I didn't. So I went with them.

They made me lead the way. After a while, they asked, "Would you like to go back home?" I said, "Yes, yes I would." They said, "Okay, then, you can go."

So I started to walk away, just slowly like that. But then they yelled at me and pointed their guns at me. They said, "We've changed our minds, you have to come back." They beat me with sticks for not wanting to be a soldier. Then one of them put his gun barrel on my stomach. He ordered me to pull the trigger. I was the most scared. But the commander shouted, "No, stop, stop, we will keep him, he will be our soldier."

_I remember one time..._
Dwaka Dennis.
We walked and walked and walked and walked. I was really scared.
Because my leg started to swell. I knew if they saw it I would be killed.
Because that is what they did to children whose legs swelled.
Because they couldn't march so well.

We walked for a little time. Then a soldier looked at me and saw my leg. He said to me, "You need a rest, you look so tired. Don't you want a rest?" I got even more scared because I knew this meant that they were going to kill me, because when they asked you to rest that's when they kill you. I said, "No, no, I am happy to walk. I want to go further." So he let me go on.

My soldier husband
Amony Liliny.
The man said, "You are going to come to my bed." I refused; I went to sleep where I always slept. So he sent someone to get me. I still refused. Then he came with a knife. And he hit me four times - it really hurt. So I went to his place. He said, "If you continue to refuse, I going to beat you until you die." So I didn't refuse anymore.

The Establishment of the WV Gulu Centre

In 1995 schoolteachers in the Gulu/Kitgum area became openly concerned about the returned child soldiers in their classrooms:

"The children who had been abducted and then came back to school... returned with a very different attitude. They might not wish to sit directly to face the teacher, they would prefer
to sit by the door or by the window and they would keep getting up to look out the window to see if the rebels were coming.

As many, many were being rescued by the army; the community became very paralyzed, not knowing how to help these children. Through our community work we could see it was a problem and also the District Authority consulted with us and said, "Can you please help."

A child psychologist was identified to carry out a survey on the affected children - in the army barracks, in the community and with their parents."

Mark Avola, Gulu Centre Coordinator

The psychologist's findings were devastating. She drew a portrait of children at sea in a misery of loss, pain and guilt, unable to find any toeholds of connection between their past and the present life in which they so desperately wanted to fit.

A recommendation was made to create a centre of rehabilitation for child soldiers. World Vision Uganda, as the only non-governmental agency working in Northern Uganda at the time, was asked to set up this facility.

DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW OF GULU CENTRE'S PROGRAM

Phase I: Establishment of the Centre

WV's Gulu Centre opened on March 20, 1995. Its main objective was to provide a service to a community that felt both overwhelmed and unable to cope with the problems these children were presenting to themselves, their families and their communities. The Centre's goals were:

i. To provide returned children with appropriate medical treatment leading to a steady treatment;
ii. To provide all returned children with recommended therapeutic feeding learning to a physical recovery;
iii. To provide all returned children with an appropriate resettlement package leading to improved body hygiene and self esteem;
iv. To provide all returned children with psycho-social support through individual and group counselling techniques leading to a steady return to a normal life style in their communities;
v. To provide children, where possible, with productive vocational skills;
vi. To ensure that all received children are eventually re-united with their families. 1
WV's Centre was established in the middle of Gulu Town. To provide sufficient security, a compound surrounded by protective walls and doors was built. This measure was later confirmed when the LRA attempted to break down the Centre's back doors to recover "their" soldiers.

The staff received training in trauma counselling from a child psychologist. All had experience in working with bereaved children through WV's program with orphans. A tentative plan was established, one which estimated that the Centre would serve 20 children at a time. This predication proved to be a drastic under estimation. Within a week of its opening the Centre had accepted one hundred former child soldiers.

Most children arrived in varying states of malnutrition with cuts and bruises all over their bodies and legs swollen from long hours of marching. Mark Avola noted that many had "terrible wounds that you would not set your eyes to look at a second time."

The staff found that boys and girls showed different physical and psychological repercussions from their time with the rebels. Girls often had acquired STD (sexually transmitted diseases) or were pregnant. As they were frequently whipped, many suffered from infected scars on their backs and legs. Boys carried wounds from battles with machete cuts on their arms, heads and legs. Their different experiences were also reflected in social behaviours. While the boys were frequently aggressive and displayed military behaviours such as walking in single files, girls were more inward, cowering in fear at the sight of male staff.

So both the number of the children and the complexities of their problems were much greater than the Gulu Centre had anticipated. In these early days, the Gulu Centre was also juggling a complex of community issues. These included: 1) security concerns; 2) the community's lukewarm response to special programs for child soldiers and 3) elements of support for the LRA within the Northern Ugandan community.

The first model for the Gulu Centre involved a high level of community and home interaction. The Centre felt that the family, community and child required a gradual process of reconciliation where the child could alternate between the Centre and his/her home. Unfortunately, the high insecurity meant that this process was not feasible.

In 1995, Gulu was a town besieged. The LRA were actively abducting large numbers of children in the Gulu district. Roads in and out of Gulu town were unsafe. Rumours of rebel raids were constantly circulating, creating an atmosphere of fear and vulnerability. The government's army was providing little protection for Northern Uganda's civilian population. The whole area was in a state of turmoil. Complicating this problem
were the community's mixed feelings about a program for the rehabilitation of former child soldiers:

"Some didn't look at it with favour, to see these children being assisted. Because they considered them to be very bad children who had made all this pain in the community. Some wanted them killed as a revenge for what they had done. To see a child who has been "in the act" now benefiting was very unwelcomed by many people."

Mark Avola

At the same time there were pockets of support for the LRA's activities. These people saw the Gulu Centre program as one that was in the hands of the Ugandan government:

"Some even worried that we were an arm of the government and would push the children into the army. But as time went by they saw that the children were going home and this reduced the negative attitude."

Mark Avola

These factors meant that the Gulu Centre had a limited impact on overall community peacebuilding work. Instead, its major contribution was in direct, humanitarian service to former child soldiers. And, in time, the Gulu community began to see that the restitution of its children was an important factor in the recovery of the community.

Perhaps the most important endorsement of the Centre's work were the testimonials of former child soldiers as they returned to their home villages:

"When I first escaped from the bush, World Vision really helped me. I learned that my uncle had died while I was away, this devastated me. I thought, what is the point of me escaping if my family isn't here - there is nobody here, nobody to look after me or to care about me. I felt so burdened by sadness and my problems. I didn't know how I was going to get back to school, how I was going to have a life again. But the people at World Vision encouraged me; they encouraged me not to just give up, to believe in myself. They told me to keep hoping, to believe that things would get better, that I would begin to feel better. They helped me to keep my hope alive. They sent me back to school, that meant a lot to me, that they believed in me."

Girl, former child soldier.
Peacebuilding Component in Phase I

At this stage, the Gulu Centre's focused on emergency relief. Since no other NGOs were operating in the region, it fell on WV to provide services for all the returnees. WV's limited resources had to be stretched to meet the basic needs of hundreds of children.

While the primary purpose at this stage was humanitarian assistance, much of the Gulu Centre's work at that time set the foundation for future peacebuilding efforts in Northern Uganda.

At the community level, WV's establishment of the Gulu Centre was seen as an act of direct opposition to the LRA. For the many northern citizens feeling vulnerable to the savagery of the rebels' attacks, this support was highly regarded. For parents whose children had recently returned it provided much-needed assistance. As noted above, it took some time for the community to understand and appreciate this new service.

Equally important was the fact that World Vision stood up for the former child soldiers. Instead of dismissing these children as unredeemable, WV created a centre specifically geared to their needs. In doing this WV gave a concrete demonstration of the healing or peacebuilding steps required in the reconciliation and restoration of Northern Ugandan society. It recognized that a child's trauma of war cannot be ignored or swept aside, that it is important to deal with these issues straightforwardly. The fact that the Gulu Centre was established in the centre of town underlined this point.

Phase II: Program Assessment and Expansion
(1996 - 1999)

By mid 1995 the Gulu Centre was confronted by several issues that were hampering its program:

i. Security within Gulu Town was precarious at best. The army was unable to ensure civilian safety further than five kilometers outside town. Children at the Centre could not be allowed to leave the compound. Overcrowding became a problem as more than 300 nervous, restless children were cramped in quarters intended for much smaller numbers.

ii. Vocational training was the most realistic option for many youth that had spent years with the rebels. However space limitations at Gulu Centre made that impossible. The Centre could only provide basic skill training, mostly to keep children from becoming bored.
iii. The reconciliation and return of children to their families and home villages continued to be a difficult and complex business. Some families and communities rejected the returnees, either refusing to welcome them home or treating them coldly. Girls suffered from shame and humiliation, being teased by other youth and called "LRA whores." They often suffered from depression and asked to return to the WV Centre. Child soldiers who had committed atrocities were characteristically paralyzed by fears of retribution. All worried about recapture by the LRA particularly with the limited protection provided by the army.

iv. Cooperation with the Ugandan Army was a time-consuming business, one requiring enormous tact, energy and care.

As security issues reached a crisis level the army recommended that the children be moved to a safer place. In August 1996 over 300 children were transported to a former army barracks in a rural, isolated area in Keriodongo, one hour south of Gulu Town. The Gulu Centre was maintained as a reception for new returnees.

The Keriodongo site allowed the staff to think of new possibilities and programs. And as Northern Uganda's forgotten war finally began to gain international attention, new funding partners also came forward:

"When we arrived in Keriodongo we thought - wow. We saw another opportunity. The place was wide - we restructured our design to make a real training. Children liked it. That meant that they stayed longer - five, six or sometimes even eight months. Some children doubled their training - doing carpentry, furniture making, and bicycle repair. We introduced hair salon. The girls loved it. We opened up land and gave it to the children for gardening. When they were returning home we needed lorries because they would be carrying sacks of food. That was wonderful because they were bringing something to the family. The child wasn't just returning home bare-handed."

Charles, Keriodongo coordinator

Keriodongo had a friendly, relaxed atmosphere. A cooperative spirit developed as youth participated in cooking and the site's general maintenance. The large space offered privacy as well as areas for sports and games. Because most youth stayed a minimum of three months, more effective counselling was possible.

The Centre staff developed separate programs for girls and boys. For the girls this proved very helpful as they established a strong feeling of solidarity and support. The restoring of playfulness, particularly with the girls, was an important ingredient in their
recovery. Just as important was their participation in the Keriodongo community and receiving praise and recognition for their work.

If the Keriodongo site provided new programming opportunities, there were drawbacks. Its remote location meant that families had limited access to their children. Many parents were very frustrated by this and it made the reconciliation process more forced and formal. The location also removed the Centre from the community's view and thus reduced its effectiveness as a community peacebuilding initiative.

If the location posed a difficulty, these problems were exacerbated by a new government policy whereby villages were encouraged (some would say forced) to move to protected camps or villages.

These protected hamlets caused a huge disruption in the fabric of Northern Uganda's village life. People complained of feeling perched in camps, which provided limited sanitation facilities and few ways for residents to have a productive, active life. Many mistrusted the Ugandan Army's claims of better security. For returning children, this changed location was often unsettling. Without the solace of familiar physical surroundings and home life, many found it difficult to adjust, particularly as their parents were dealing with their own feelings of dislocation.

During this time the LRA made a bold military strike by capturing 40 girls at a boarding school. The tremendous anguish caused by this event removed most vestiges of support for the LRA. It also led to the formation of the "Concerned Parents Association", a group of parents of the abducted children who advocated for their release and gained international attention and support for their cause. This group worked closely with WV's Gulu Centre, partly because one of its staff members was a member of the association.

A second challenge for the WV Centre emerged during this time. GUSCO (Gulu Save the Children Organization) was founded and set up a rehabilitation centre for former child soldiers in Gulu Town. On the one hand this provided a welcome respite for WV's overly taxed centre, the common reason given for the establishment of GUSCO. It also demonstrated a major change in community thinking as local citizens, including the sheriff, sat on GUSCO's board. However, for WV, it was an adjustment and initially a competitive atmosphere developed between the two agencies as each claimed primacy of place in meeting the needs of the returnees.

GUSCO insisted on its greater authenticity as a local initiative as opposed to WV with its international connections. In response, WV pointed to the credibility gained from
many years of community work. GUSCO countered by pointing out that it was now based in the community where WV was apart, in Keriodongo.

While these issues were more about territory, the bigger and more divisive debate has focussed on methodological issues. Where the WV facility is founded on Christian principles, GUSCO's programs are based on traditional healing practices. Each has criticized the limitations of the other's views.

This methodology question will probably never be completely resolved. Both centres understand that their approach is the more appropriate one. And both approaches hold legitimacy and value, depending on a child's background. For a child from a church going family, a recovery program based on Christian principles is no doubt very effective. However, it holds much less merit for a young person with little or no connection to these beliefs.

Equally, traditional healing methods can provide a former child soldier with a community-level absolution that he/she desperately needs. But the use of culturally based approaches must be tempered by the degree to which traditional views have meaning for a child who may or may not have not grown up with these beliefs. Ideas of 'tradition' and 'culture' are very fluid in the late 20th century world and require careful defining in order to have meaning for youth that have been exposed to a variety of outside influences. For some children traditional culture is to be feared, not revered, particularly as Kony has contorted these practices to suit his role as a medium of the spiritual world.

These issues are complex and difficult to address. However, it is a great credit to both agencies that they have learned to respect each other and allow their differences. GUSCO and the WV Centre have become cordial community colleagues. The WV Centre has cautiously begun to participate in some traditional healing ceremonies. There is talk of joint programming, particularly around issues where there is common agreement on purpose and methods. There is considerable room for dialogue as both centres begin from the position of their total commitment to the children.

**Peacebuilding Component in Phase II**

Between 1995 - 1999 the Gulu Centre attended to the needs of over 5,000 returned child soldiers. The Centre's community based peacebuilding function was less direct. Peacebuilding work has many dimensions and involvement with children, particularly child soldiers, requires new views on how a community forgives and forgets violent acts. The existence of the Centre gave these children a second chance, an opportunity to begin to recover from the war and become productive citizens of their society in the future. Instead of hiding and feeling ashamed of their activities, the Gulu Centre proclaimed that the children were the victims, not the perpetrators of the war. While this might not fall into a
traditional definition of peacebuilding work, it is a much-needed service, especially in a war such as Northern Uganda where children's participation is a central fact of the conflict.

**Phase III: Stronger Emphasis on Community-based Peacebuilding Work (1999 - present)**

In the latter part of 1999 the WV Centre returned to its original intention of community involvement in programming and peacebuilding work:

"In order for peace to be sustainable the community has to be involved... A child can't help but question how, with all the protection that is around me - my parents, my relatives, the police, the army, the whole judicial system - how is it that I can be pulled from all these means of protection and taken into captivity in Sudan..... It is important for the community to understand how everyone is involved in the failure to protect that child..."

Mark Avola

The Keriodongo site closed in December 1999. During that year the LRA spent considerable time in Sudan. Fewer children were being abducted and even less were able to escape or be rescued by the Ugandan Army. As the immediate crisis receded, "donor fatigue" set in. It became both impractical and expensive to maintain the large Keriodongo site. WV returned to its centre in Gulu Town.

This move prompted WV to reassess its programs, a process resulting in a decision to base the vocational training program in the children's home villages. Local artisans were engaged to provide training on an apprenticeship basis. The Gulu Centre was maintained as a transition post for receiving new returnees.

The Gulu Centre also developed an extensive community caregiver program to assist in the transition of youth into their villages. By 2000 they had 600 volunteer community caregivers, 420 of these based in Gulu District.

The villages responded positively to this new approach, one which maintained that the primary responsibility for the protection and support of the children lay with the community:

"Gradually the community said, "we want to volunteer."
We weren't making World Vision people; we were making people people. Instead of going through us, we had them contact the local authority. They would send in their application to be trained. It had to be the community to identify people that would be acceptable to them. Many people were given training in trauma counselling so they could go back to their community to be like
a lamb amongst the people."

Mark Avola

This program has been a success. But it is risky work and involves a major transition for WV staff to being community facilitators instead of deliverers of direct service. Increases in LRA rebel activity can quickly undermine months of carefully established work and people's commitments to the restoration of village life. Northern Ugandans speak of the rebels as "very slippery", that they slide in and out of the countryside, seemingly at will. Caregivers and artisans fear for their lives.

However, there is a strong "determination to do this work" as Northern Ugandans recognize that they must reclaim their villages and address the many threads of history, culture and past injustices which have created the complex matrix of this long-standing war. Equally, WV recognizes that a return to the community is the only way to have real possibilities for change.

**Peacebuilding Component in Phase III**

World Vision's peacebuilding work continues to strengthen to the point that it is beginning to take its direction directly from the community:

"What is very important about the caregivers in the community is that they now identify the needs in the community and we program from them.... We now depend on the experience of the caregivers to tell us what we should do, how we can help."

Mark Avola

In the future the Gulu Centre also plans to involve returned children in community work, saying, "they understand the problem much better." This approach takes the problem full circle, making youth as actors for change in situations that have so drastically affected their lives.

New program needs are also emerging. By now, many returned children have been settled in their communities for two years or more. But they still speak of a deep loneliness, of feelings of displacement. Program follow-up or peer groups may need to be developed to support these young people. WV is also being asked to do family counselling to support parents crumbling under the stress of years of war, family instability and frighteningly insecure children. In both these cases Gulu Centre will probably need additional staff training and orientation for these new roles.

Of course, all program plans are at the mercy of the war. Recently Northern Uganda has enjoyed a period of relative peacefulness, so ideas for rebuilding the community come
more easily. When visiting the Gulu area you can feel the eagerness of the citizenry to return to normal life, to put the many years of conflict behind them.

In response to this, WV has become an active advocate for peace on the international stage. This is not an entirely new role - in the past WV has often provided speakers on the experience of war for international conferences. However, its recent participation in conferences has included discussions on peacebuilding initiatives.

In September 2000 Canada's International Conference on War Affected Children had a major focus on the situation in Northern Uganda. These talks were informed by the interventions of Mark Avola, Gulu Centre coordinator and two youth delegates who had been abducted by the LRA. As many people noted, the fragile progress made during these sessions was in large measure due to the contributions of these three delegates.

As the WV Centre evolves, its understanding of its role as a peacebuilder continues to change. The balance between service delivery/humanitarian assistance and proactive community peacebuilding work will inevitably continue to fluctuate. At this point, the emphasis is on community peacebuilding initiatives.

**LESSONS LEARNED**

The Gulu Centre case study offers a host of "lessons learned" for people working on peacebuilding issues, particularly those involving children. Many have already been addressed in this case study but the following points are important to highlight:

i. Peacebuilding programs involving children, particularly former child soldiers, have a complex of issues to address. Any agency working with former child soldiers must find ways to accommodate the direct service requirements of these young people while leading the community to have a more compassionate understanding of their needs. Central to this is the agency's educating of the community to broaden its definition of the role of these young people and the level of responsibility they have for their activities.

ii. Children are an important reference point in any community-based peacebuilding work. Concern for children can be a rallying point for peacebuilding work and can help break down long-standing competitive grudges in the community.
iii. Peacebuilding initiatives and rehabilitation programs for children must address the different needs of girls and boys. This is an area that is often acknowledged but little work has been done to address this programming need. At the Gulu Centre, progress has been made on this issue but much more is required both there and in all programs dealing with the needs of war affected children.

Gender based work to support child soldiers must be sensitive to many different factors: 1) the cultural/social background that defines gender roles and the position of girls and boys in the community; 2) the different war experiences of girls and boys; 3) the psychological impact of these different experiences, particularly on self-identity, self-worth, self confidence and trust of others and 4) the community to which girls and boys will be returned and their changed status as a result of the war.

iv. Children experience war trauma differently than adults, partly because their experiences are often different and also because of their age. In creating programs for young people it is important to begin from their understanding and definition of needs. Not all children require direct counselling but all former child soldiers do need to be given a renewed sense of worth and acceptance. This work cannot be all be done by a rehabilitation centre, it requires the involvement of the community.

"As the children grow, the problem grows and changes. As they open their minds and look around these children can see a ruined future. A bitterness can develop in them... So the intervention must be long-term and as involving as possible so that everyone becomes a participant in the issue."

Mark Avola

v. A peacebuilding agency's credibility is much stronger if it has been present during all facets of a conflict. Many people refer to the fact that WV was operating in Northern Uganda during the early days of the conflict when other agencies thought it was too dangerous. WV's evident loyalty and long-term commitment has been an important factor in gaining trust and support.

vi. Peacebuilding is about working with rather than resisting change. In conflict situations, new situations and circumstances are emerging all the time. World Vision has had to respond to events with flexibility and openness. The central ingredient in WV's success has been its constant focus on the children. All of its changes or program adjustments have been seen through this prism.

vii. Donors should provide long-term funding for peacebuilding efforts. This has been stated repeatedly by all evaluations of peacebuilding programs. Without that constant base of support, agencies cannot respond adequately to the needs of their community. Neither should donors expect agencies in conflict areas to predict future activities with absolute accuracy. For instance, a potential donor asked WV to estimate how many children it
would be receiving each month: an impossible question whose response is beyond WV's control to answer.

viii. Donors should be more than just money-givers. In whatever way possible, donor agencies should provide political support for the agency's work and the cause for which it is fighting. World Vision Uganda cited WV Canada's work with them as an example of the value of this type of partnership.

ix. In peacebuilding work, it is not always possible or even useful to be neutral, to see both sides of the question.

The fact that WV is understood to be strongly opposed to the LRA and its activities has made a big different to the children it supports. They need an advocate, someone who clearly says that what was done to them was wrong.

x. No one agency can do everything. It is important to understand the most effective role that you can play while at the same time recognizing how this fits into the overall context of the conflict situation. This is particularly true in working with children, as an agency must ensure that its way of meeting children's needs is consistent with the community's movement towards peace.

CONCLUSION

WV's Gulu Centre for the Rehabilitation of Child Soldiers demonstrates what can be accomplished through the efforts of determined and dedicated staff. In a few short years Gulu has grown from being a fairly ad-hoc reception and treatment centre to a community-based service playing an active peacebuilding role in the Northern Ugandan community. Of course, this has not been an easy path, particularly as staff have been operating with limited resources inside a totally unpredictable environment. There is always room for improvement in any facility. But the Centre's commitment to former child soldiers has had an enormous impact on the individual lives of the many girls and boys it has served. In doing this, the Gulu Centre has put into practice the fundamental principles of peacebuilding:

"I didn't know what I was going to do, I felt so lost. But they believed in me, they helped me and made me understand that I was a good person and that I could have a future. I thank them."

Boy former child soldier, Gulu
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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RESOURCES

Written Resources

Danish Red Cross, *Psycosocial Rehabilitation of Children Affected by Armed Conflicts and/or Violence*, Reference Centre for Psychological Support, Copenhagen, Denmark, 1998.


World Vision Uganda, Internal Documents and Project Proposals.


List of Interviewees

The following organizations and individuals were interviewed:

- community officials in Gulu District (4)
- representatives from US AID, UNICEF, Carter Centre, Danish Save the Children in Gulu Town (4)
- staff members from WV’s Gulu Centre and Kampala office (4)
- former child soldiers (12)
CARE CANADA'S

CIVIL SOCIETY STRENGTHENING PROJECT
IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

A Case Study of
LESSONS LEARNED
by
Robin Hay
Global Affairs Research Partners

CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

The war in Bosnia began in April 1992 and lasted until the Dayton Peace Accords were signed in December 1995. Like all wars it was bloody and vicious, but it was also singular in that it shattered any high-minded illusions about a post-Cold War New World order. The governments of the world mostly stood by as in the heart of civilized Europe neighbour slaughtered neighbour and a new phrase, “ethnic cleansing”, was invented.

Not so humanitarian organizations. CARE, for instance, began operating in the Balkans as early as 1993, with a project for the trucking and delivery of food, medicine, and other humanitarian supplies. The same year, CARE also opened a small project to provide shelter for displaced elderly and children at two residential centres on the Dalmatian coast of Croatia.

The height of the war in 1994 saw the launch of CARE's first major project for the supply of emergency water purification pumps to war-damaged neighbourhoods of Sarajevo. Soon after, CARE began what would become its largest project in terms of scope and funding—the REACH project, which provided life-sustaining relief in the form of material and other support (health care, psycho-social support) to vulnerable individuals suffering extreme deprivation because of the war. These included above all the elderly, but also displaced families, orphaned children, the war-wounded, and the handicapped.

By 1995, REACH was serving 30,000 beneficiaries at any one time, operating in more than 30 communities, and employing more than 400 Bosnian staff. It attracted praise and financial support from major international donors, including CIDA, UNHCR, OFDA,

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11 Much of this background is drawn verbatim from Barbara Shenstone's overview of CARE's work. See Barbara Shenstone, Overview. CARE's Peacebuilding Programme in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995-1998 (unpublished paper).

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ECHO, DFID, and from individuals and institutions in Austria, Germany, Norway, the UK, the USA, and Canada.

All these projects shared one overriding humanitarian goal: to save lives and reduce suffering. The REACH project, in particular, addressed the problems of one group “the elderly” that was in great need and being missed by mainstream relief efforts. The project took CARE into some of the worst living situations imaginable for a civilian population in the midst of war, and its wide scope “in all three ethnic communities, over a large area of Bosnia” depended on the skills, knowledge, and commitment of a large number of Bosnian staff, both professional (doctors, nurses, psychologists, social workers) and semi-professional (home-care givers, drivers, logisticians).

By the end of the war, then, CARE had developed an extensive operational infrastructure (with 10 sub-offices), and had acquired considerable local knowledge in the form of contacts with local authorities, information about local institutions and their capacities and needs, as well as a wide understanding of the social and physical needs of the nation’s most vulnerable populations. CARE was also committed to an even-handed style of operation that could function in the territories of all national groups and was known to all the parties in conflict.

With the war’s end in 1995, CARE undertook an assessment12 of its program to date in Bosnia and recognized that peace, and more precisely, the peace process implied by the Dayton Agreement, required new types of thinking and programming.

[I]t was not simply a question of switching gears from emergency relief programming to development programming, or imagining a continuum from one to the other. CARE recognized it was grappling with an entirely new beast, a country where peace remained extremely fragile, where there existed powerful forces that could undermine it in the short and long term, and where any activity, no matter how apparently benign, could do as much harm as good.

CARE determined that an overarching goal of all its programming should be to work with and for the positive forces for peace, and to avoid and mitigate the forces for further conflict and war. With this in mind it moved to develop a program for peacebuilding based on a very broad definition of the concept.

This definition recognizes that in peacebuilding there is a need for both state building (elections, legal reform, fiscal management, military reform etc) and attending to

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the human dimensions of war. The latter emphasizes the social and economic dimensions of peace, which includes attending to people’s needs, feeling, and aspirations. According to CARE, peace is built from the bottom up, the top down, and from the middle, both up and down. The task of peacebuilding, then, comprises a variety of disparate activities, including micro-enterprise development, targeted humanitarian aid, reconstruction of infrastructure, and citizen’s empowerment. It also includes many actors -- international, state, and sub-state -- working over a medium to long time frame. CARE concludes about peacebuilding:

There are no quick fixes, especially for changing attitudes and healing psychological wounds, and positive results can be swept away suddenly if hostilities re-intensify to polarize and isolate those in conflict. The roles of peacebuilding imply flexibility, sensitive analysis of local contexts, and a willingness to work with local individuals and groups. They emphasize the fundamental building block of peace -- the creation of a vibrant civil society.\footnote{Barbara Shenstone, \textit{Overview}.}

CARE identified a number of key areas where it felt highly qualified to contribute to peacebuilding

- Infrastructure reconstruction (focusing on community assets, capacity building, and citizen’s empowerment)
- Micro-credit to promote small businesses;
- Nurturing civil society
- Working in schools to promote tolerance, understanding, and peaceful problem-solving;
- Advocating national policies for the protection of vulnerable groups.

Notable about these activities was that they included, even after the war, attention to humanitarian aid for the vulnerable, and would continue to do so until such time as economic growth and recovery would allow society to provide for these things, or make them less necessary. The REACH program would continue until responsibility for it could be handed over to local officials and CARE would work to ensure that social welfare became a priority.
The CARE peacebuilding program in Bosnia, then, is rightfully called multi-faceted. Aside from the civil society-strengthening project, it includes:

- **The PAX Project**, which uses educational drama and theatre to address war-related trauma among children and youth and to promote peaceful problem solving and conflict resolution.

- **Project WELCOME**, a project to help deal with war refugees and displaced persons returning to their homes or re-settling in other communities. The project, which includes information centres in different ethnic communities, helps to deal with the social stress of returnees. The centres provide legal advice to individuals and groups and information on local social health and educational services. It also engages in trauma healing and problem solving/conflict resolution.

- **The NGO Foundation** was established as an independent organization to support the development of local NGOs in Bosnia. The Trust Fund runs independently of international assistance, providing technical and financial support to local NGOs as international funding runs out. While the NGO foundation has been able to attract support for specific projects (e.g. CIDA's Peacebuilding Unit recently funded CARE to implement a capacity building project to strengthen the Foundation), to date no donor has been willing to fund the endowment because such funding is not expensed but sits in the endowment indefinitely. Thus, while the fund was intended to act as a sustainable source of funding for NGOs, its own sustainability is questionable.

- **Social Policy Reform and Local Capacity Building** was an outgrowth of CARE's concerns that humanitarian aid for the most vulnerable in Bosnia must accompany initial peacebuilding efforts. In 1996 it began to lobby governments and international agencies concerning the need for national social policies to protect the most vulnerable in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1997 CARE spearheaded the drive for a national conference on social welfare and the protection of vulnerable groups, out of which was established a National Social Policy Task Force (NSPTF). This Task Force, for which CARE provided the secretariat, is co-chaired by the two entity ministers responsible for social welfare. It is working to build a social welfare system in Bosnia.

CARE's approach to its program was purposefully eclectic, experimenting with an assortment of activities, knowing that some in the long run may turn out not to have been worth the effort involved. This experimental nature has, in large part, been dictated by the fact that peacebuilding in Bosnia, and in general, is itself in its infancy, with little empirical knowledge about what works under what circumstances and what doesn't. While CARE admits that its peacebuilding program in Bosnia is somewhat experimental in nature, its various projects are underpinned by certain shared values, including commitments to:

- vulnerable groups (youth, elderly, disabled);
- groups engaged in community life and public good;
- widening the space for social and political activity at the grassroots level; and
- tolerance and flexibility in project design.

In these terms, the promotion of civil society is at the very least an implicit, if not an explicit, aspect of nearly every CARE project in BiH. They also help to explain why attention to civil society in BiH became an important and explicit focus of CARE’s efforts there. Ian Smillie, a respected Canadian development consultant, who did an evaluation of CARE’s project, noted that the lack of a vibrant civil society in Yugoslavia before the war may have played a role in allowing things to go as far as they did:

Blame for the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the ensuing war has been laid at many doors....What made the contributing factors more menacing, however, was the lack of institutional and public resistance to trends which in other countries would have been halted before they reached anything like dangerous proportions. The absence of a free press, weak or non-existent concepts of political democracy, and a stunted civil society made Yugoslavia and its component parts highly vulnerable to political opportunists and predators.¹⁴

If civil society was virtually non-existent before the war in Yugoslavia, the situation after the war was even direr. As CARE noted in its project proposal to CIDA:

In addition to the individual human toll and physical destruction, nearly all the social structures that constituted patterns of civic life were either gutted, disrupted or transformed by the war. These range from the smallest family unit, through local/community institutions, labour and commercial groups, professional and academic associations up to the largest national political and social structures. A clear consequence of the war has been the disintegration and weakening of community bonds, and the creation of mutual distrust, paranoia and hostility, in a once predominantly multi-ethnic society.¹⁵

¹⁴ Ian Smillie, PROJECT PHOENIX. Strengthening Civil Society in Bosnia: A Case Study

For CARE, the restoration of civil society in BiH is key to the building of democracy and peace. They cite the work of Harvard’s Robert Putnam who argues that neighbourhood associations, choral societies, and sports clubs are not just a by-product of social and economic prosperity, they are essential underpinnings of it. CARE concluded that in BiH supporting non-governmental groups and voluntary associations, would significantly contribute to the deepening and strengthening of the peace process, underpinning its formal arrangements with a variety of institutions and associations that can form the basis of future social and democratic development.

CARE’s Civil Society Strengthening Projects

CARE defines civil society as the many organizations, institutions, activities and forms of association that give expression to the diverse interests, convictions, and objectives of a committed citizenry. Examples of civil society organizations include church groups, women’s groups, unions, sports and leisure associations, NGOs, co-operatives, business clubs, self-help groups, youth/children’s clubs, academic networks, professional associations, chambers of commerce, and charities.

CARE emphasizes that civil society is a process rather than a goal, that is to say that the actual functioning of the organizations, the activities they conduct within and amongst themselves to achieve an end, is more important than the end itself. It is the learning and gaining of experience that really matters. The civil society process includes creative and useful confrontation and debate and encourages participation from all elements of society.

CARE’s program for civil society development is multi-faceted. The first phase of the program, entitled Building Peace in Northwest Bosnia-Herzegovina, began in 1996 with funding from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Focusing on Northwest Bosnia, Western Republika Srpska and Eastern Slavonia in Croatia, this program had four objectives:

- To repair two major public facilities in the health and education sectors, one in each region;

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17 For a good overview of this project see: Andrew Hamilton, Ibid.
to carry out four small-scale reconstruction projects, two in each region (small scale community infrastructure rehabilitation;

- to strengthen at least four local groups in civil society through technical and/or financial support: and

- to facilitate coordination among the Canadian contingent from SFOR, CARE Canada, and Queen's University in support of cooperative reconstruction efforts in Bihac.

The emphasis on small to medium sized infrastructure repair and reconstruction in the project is a reflection of CARE's finding that these types of activities are an effective entry for civic organizations:

For in fixing up a building or room, local groups can test their own mettle, can become known in their communities, and in engaging with local authorities for permits, municipal services, etc. can develop skills in advocacy and self-empowerment.\(^{18}\)

CARE's effort to strengthen civil society was added to with funding from Norway (NORAD) for Project Phoenix. This project was originally designed to facilitate the growth of Croatian and Bosnian civil society by providing technical and material support to a minimum of 16 grassroots organizations in the regions of Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), Western Republika Srpska, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The program continues with NORAD funding as well as a new grant from CIDA (Strengthening Civil Society in Bosnia & Herzegovina) as well as funding from the independent Mott Foundation.

The emphasis in CARE’s civil society programming is on youth, the elderly, and women. Its uniqueness among programs of international donors dealing with NGOs in BiH is that it insisted on working with associations that were already “organically rooted” in their communities, and as such would be self-managed, low budget, and driven by a volunteer ethic. This approach evolved from CARE’s determination during its assessment that most international donors were using local NGOs primarily for service delivery, with little long-term thought about their sustainability or survival.

To date, CARE has worked with a host of civil society organizations in Bosnia, providing them with technical and material support, small grants for equipment, and training. Those groups include:

\(^{18}\) Shenstone, *Overview*, p. 7.
The Association of War Invalids and Paraplegics of Una Sana (Bihac)
Preporod (Revival) Youth Group (Bosanski Petrovac)
The Association of Pensioners (Cazin)
Flamingo Youth Centre (Bosanska Krupa)
The Association of Paraplegics Cazin
Women from Una (Zena sa Une) Women’s Association (Bihac)
Youth Communication Centre (Banja Luka)
Golden Fall Voluntary Youth Association (Prijedor, Doboj, Bijeljina, Banja Luka)
Vidra’s Women’s Association (Banja Luka)
Nada Women’s Association (Prijedor)
Elderly Club 15-100 (Banja Luka)
DIS Alternative Youth Theatre
Banja Luka Summer Festival
Prijedor Youth Computer Club
AIESEC (International Association of Economic Students (Banja Luka and Pale)
Herceg Novi Conference on Social Policy and Welfare (Pale and Banja Luka representation)
Student’s Union - University of Banja Luka
Scouts Organization (Banja Luka)

CARE’s role in these projects is as catalyst and collaborator. It seeks no more than to strengthen the capacities of the local groups and encourages their active participation. The groups analyze their own needs, set goals, plan, implement, and monitor their work. Activities supported have included community action, improved membership and decision-making, enhanced sustainability (through income generation) networking and collaborative action among ethnic groups, improved equipment and facilities, and strengthened advocacy.

LESSONS LEARNED

Lesson 1: It is a distinct advantage when engaging in peacebuilding after war, to have had prior experience in the country and to have developed a reputation for even-handedness in dealing with different groups. A well established organization also usually has a well-established infrastructure and contacts in the country that it can use to carry peacebuilding to all communities.

Perhaps one of the most significant advantages for CARE in shifting from humanitarian aid to peacebuilding in BiH was its long experience in the country. Working since 1993, CARE had a much admired track record in Bosnia. As Ian Smillie noted, CARE had worked with the three ethnic communities, had supported local self-help efforts, and had thought through some of the larger implications of what it proposed in Project Phoenix.
Through its prior work, CARE had established a reputation for even-handed operations and an operational presence in all territories of the conflict. CARE, then, was well positioned to work with all sides, and to explore opportunities for inter-ethnic dialogue and reconciliation. Similarly, its knowledge of many different communities meant it was well placed to identify and work with local groups and partners in furthering the development of civil society. CARE’s commitment to the vulnerable, furthermore, naturally led it to remain involved with issues of social welfare and protection.

Lesson 2: Be open and flexible about the approach you take to peacebuilding and in dealing with partners and recipients. Be prepared to change direction or modify the program to respond to corrected perceptions of needs. Of course, such flexibility will often depend not only on the organizations themselves, but also on those who are funding the project. In CARE’s case, both donors (NORAD and particularly CIDA) were flexible and CARE itself had the advantage of a dynamic/experimental management structure.

CARE had some three-years experience working in Bosnia prior to establishing its civil society strengthening program. Not surprisingly, it approached that program with some well-formed notions about what was required and how that should be achieved. CARE soon learned that most of these notions would have to be scrapped. As Ian Smillie noted in his evaluation of Project Phoenix:

CARE soon discovered that a lot of its original ideas were not going to work. The idea of finding up-and-coming organizations that needed “intensive” management or financial training was not realistic. Several international NGOs had already established “capacity-building” projects, and most local organizations had attended one or even several of these. They complained that their real needs—mostly financial and political—were being ignored and [sic] favour of lengthy sessions on how to prepare “mission statements”, project proposals and reports. Some had already learned these basic tricks of the trade and did not need this sort of “capacity building”.

One of the hallmarks of the CARE project, then, has been its flexibility and the organization’s willingness to change direction. As one of the interviewees noted, the difference between CARE and others is that you can talk to them about what you want to implement, while others dictate programs and what will be funded, sometimes asking for things that are not needed.¹⁹ While CARE approached the civil society project in BiH with some ready-made notions about what needed to be done and how to do it, it was flexible

enough to change direction based on an assessment of the situation on the ground and information provide by its partners. This leads to a third lesson.

**Lesson 3:** It’s important to check project assumptions by conducting research to identify specific needs and appropriate methodologies. This research should begin with potential partners and individuals who have local knowledge of the area and in the field where the project will be operating.

John Crownover, CARE’s civil society program director, notes for instance that it is important to make sure programming is connected to the needs of the community. Organizations need to do research, then, to determine precisely what those needs are. Donors, in turn, must be open to adjusting their programs to those needs rather than proceeding with a program that fits predetermined criteria. The latter rather than the former is, lamentably, too often the case. Indeed, CARE’s program appears to be the exception to the rule, as Hata Mašinovic indicated in her remarks above. Bojan Stanević of Radio Balkan, part of the Youth Communication Centre in Banja Luka, parsed the need to do research into three elements. He stated that international organizations coming to work in BiH need identify what is needed, who is doing what, and how their work contributes to peacebuilding.

In conclusion, then, the elements of any particular project, even if they have been carefully shaped in project development, should always be checked against the reality on the ground once the project gets underway. Even CARE, an organization with longstanding experience throughout BiH, found it necessary to modify its civil society strengthening program based on what it found on the ground. To its credit, CARE was willing and flexible enough to do so.

**Lesson 4:** Working from the beginning in partnership with a good cadre of long-term local staff is very important. No one knows the situation in the field better than the local individuals and organizations that have lived and worked there, many their entire lives. They will also be there to carry on peacebuilding long after the donors have left. It is critical to the success and sustainability of the project that they be equal, willing, and enthusiastic partners.

Open and equal partnerships are critical to the success of CARE’s work in Bosnia. Roger Chamberlain, the project manager for PAX, goes so far as to state that it is problematic whether you can have peacebuilding without a strong, firm relationship with local organizations. His thinking is that you should take what already exists and build on it.

Long term peacebuilding in Chamberlain’s mind requires real collaboration. For one thing, outsiders coming into a country are in a sensitive position because they need local knowledge. To build a partnership in which local knowledge will be shared means taking your time and getting to know your partner. Establishing communication, building trust, and developing a common philosophy are key to the integrity of any partnership.
So is humility on the part of the donor partner. Sejo Đuljić, Chamberlain’s local counterpart in the PAX project, noted that their collaboration was successful because Chamberlain did not come in as an expert. His attitude was more like “I have knowledge, you have knowledge, let’s exchange that knowledge and do a job.” This contrasts with the attitude of many international donors who introduce themselves as experts. While they are usually welcomed into a war-torn situation where the needs are great, it is often the case that after a few days they are found to have misrepresented themselves. They are often beginners with little expertise in the job they are supposed to do. This leads, Đuljić notes, to a double disappointment: non-experts spending money on the wrong things.

_Dlesson 5:_ As far as possible include as partners and local professional staff, people from all sides of the conflict. This can be very difficult, especially in cases when donor funding is biased against one side, which has often happened in Bosnia. Vigorous donor advocacy in terms of working with all sides is sometimes required. In a multi-ethnic and partitioned society such as BiH this may require working in different geographical regions of the country where these groups are represented.

Deeply embedded animosities between ethnic groups are sure to remain after civil wars, especially ones in which atrocities take place. This must be an implicit consideration in any peacebuilding project from the beginning, with the added proviso that in some areas it will be impossible to quickly eradicate or, in some instances, even begin to address such animosities till some time has passed. Nevertheless, peacebuilding cannot take root unless and until such animosities are removed or channeled into non-violent expression.

By working in different regions in BiH and hiring professional staff from different ethnic groups, CARE ensured that its civil society strengthening project had an implicitly built mechanism for addressing animosities. For instance, CARE brought its staff together from the various regions for training purposes, a process which in itself helped them to overcome their prejudices.

CARE also sought to ensure that each of the civil society organizations it supported was open to any ethnic group, and this was true of every organization we visited during research to prepare this case study. Bringing the groups together opened their eyes to the fact that members of other ethnic groups shared their individual suffering. CARE found that this approach was particularly effective with youth in BiH that were natural “risk-takers” and rebelled against the nationalism coming from mainstream channels.

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20 Interview with Almedina Grozdanić, Civil Society Project, Bihac.
Lesson 6: Peacebuilders need to balance the open-ended, long-term needs of peacebuilding against the fact that funding is almost invariably available only for a relatively short period. It is important, then, to get things started as soon as a possible, especially networking, so that the initiatives can then take on a life of their own.

There will always be tension between the long-term requirements of peacebuilding and the fact that funding is usually time-limited. As a result, projects will often have to be abandoned or shut down before they have run their full course. CARE’s WELCOME project is an example. Its office in Doboj has run out of funding and will have to shut down long before the job is complete. As one of the staff noted, offices like their own are still very necessary yet at this critical point are having to shut down. This is absolutely the wrong time to shut down, they said, just as more people are returning. But ECHO, the donor, is closing up shop, which means CARE will have to look for another donor. The tension between long-term needs and short-term funding has effects that go beyond peacebuilding. For the local staff, for instance, the end of a project also means the end of a job.

As far as possible, then, peacebuilders need to ensure that their projects are self-sustainable beyond the funding time-frame. There are several ways to approach this. Roger Chamberlain of CARE’s PAX project notes that it is important to take what already exists and help the organization build on it. Indeed, CARE at the outset noted that most international donors tended to create civil society organizations in Bosnia as service organizations for their own work. Once the donor cut off funding the organizations ceased to exist. CARE, instead, sought to work with organizations that already existed, providing them with small amounts of funding for equipment or to help them renovate office quarters, but not for salaries. This they found to be very important in order to encourage voluntarism, a commodity in the BiH environment that has often been in short supply. The onus, then, was put on the organization to become self-sustaining. A good illustration of this principle in action has been the evolution of Kastel-fest, a cultural and arts festival in Banja Luka. While CARE provided initial funding for the annual Kastel-fest, its organizers, the Youth Theatre, can now proudly claim that 60% of the budget for the festival is now raised locally.

CARE also focuses its support for these organizations in a way that helps to make them sustainable. It emphasizes:

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21 Interview with Vlado Pijunovic, Information Officer, WELCOME Information Centres.

22 Interview with members of Youth Theatre DIS/Kastel-fest in Banja Luka.
capacity building and material support;

- networking and linkages;

- seminars, education, strategic planning;

- small-scale reconstruction and rehabilitation; and

- support of small income-generating projects.

CARE also helped to establish the NGO Foundation in BiH, which is intended to provide a more stable local source of funding for the third sector in Bosnia. This has been difficult, however, and the Foundation continues to struggle to meet this overall mandate.

**Lesson 7:** Focus and plan strategically. It is important not only to think in terms of the project or program’s sustainability itself, but beyond the project to how it contributes within a broadly conceived intellectually grounded peacebuilding framework.

During our interview, the outgoing Country Director of CARE’s program in BiH, Howard Bell was in a highly reflective mood about CARE’s work. While he was, for the most part, satisfied with the work CARE had done, he worried that the program was based on a “leap of faith”. The project was well implemented and operationally sound, he argued, but lacked an overriding philosophy about how it will contribute to the developmental well-being of society in the long term. He stated that there is a need to join the dots and be more explicit about how we are addressing peacebuilding writ large. Of course, his criticism is true about almost any peacebuilding project, all of which to a certain extent are based on leaps of faith. Nor was the Country Director’s viewpoint shared by CARE Canada as an organization. In fact, the other CARE staff interviewed strongly opposed this view.

Nevertheless, this issue, again, goes to the question of sustainability of the effort. It is partly addressed, as John Crownover noted, by ensuring that there are resources in the local community to carry on after the donor organization leaves.

**Lesson 8:** Peacebuilding sometimes involves taking carefully calculated risks and experimentation. While planning and strategic focus are important, in some instances, an organization may need to take a risk in order to kick-start a process.

Some of CARE’s most important accomplishments in BiH involved taking a risk. For example, its concern that social policy issues were being forgotten in the rush to

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23 Interview with Howard Bell, CARE Country Director, Bosnia.
reconstruct Bosnia, led CARE in 1997 to push for a cross-entity conference on social policy issues. It was the first conference of its kind to cross ethnic boundaries and did so at considerable risk. Kendra Gregson, who was principally responsible for organizing the conference, noted that one security incident would have set the whole process back enormously. Nevertheless, the payoff was huge. The conference resulted in the establishment of a Social Policy Task Force in Bosnia chaired by assistant ministers from both entities. Social issues, which Gregson argues, are as important to peacebuilding as infrastructure reconstruction, are now entrenched in the Bosnian peacebuilding process.24

CONCLUSION

In many ways, CARE Canada’s civil society strengthening project in BiH could serve as the poster child for this kind of peacebuilding. It became clear during the field work to prepare this case study that CARE is doing not only good and meaningful work in BiH, but is doing it the right way. Its long experience in the country and familiarity with the right and wrong way of doing things, ensured that CARE had already absorbed many lessons prior to implementing its civil society project. It took those lessons to heart. As a result CARE has furthered its reputation in the country and among the recipients of its peacebuilding largesse.

It is a well deserved reputation. An independent study rated CARE number 2 among 20 organizations working in Bosnia. The ranking was a result not only of the amount of money contributed to peacebuilding but in terms of how they helped in general.25 The most important lesson learned from this case study, then, is that CARE has not only learned many lessons, but applied them as well.

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24 Interview with Kendra Gregson, Social Policy Task Force, Bosnia.

25 Interview with Hata Mašinovic, Women From UNA, Bihac.
List of Interviewees

Mr. Nevin Orange, Bosnia Program Manager, CARE Canada
Vledo, Juzina, Information Officer, WELCOME Information Centre, Doboj, BiH
Ljubomir Juzina, Trauma Trainer, WELCOME Information Centre, Doboj, BiH
Mladen Andric, Driver, WELCOME Information Centre, Doboj, BiH
Lepa Jrancnin, Trauma Trainer, WELCOME Information Centre, Doboj, BiH
Aida Bogdan, Woman Action Vidra, BiH
Hatid_a-Di_a Pe_enkovi_, NGO Women From UNA, BiH
Bursa_ Aleksander, Regional Project Officer for Western RS, Civil Society Development Program,
Paranos Darko, Project Officer, Civil Society Development Program, BiH
Kendra Gregson, World Bank, BiH Country Office (Social Policy Task Force)
John Crownover, Program Manager, Civil Society Development Program, BiH
Howard Bell, Country Director, CARE Canada Program, BiH
Sejo Sead Duli_, Centre for Drama and Education, BiH
Roger Chamberlain, PAX Project Manager, BiH
Milan Miri_, Director, NGO Foundation, BiH
Almedina Grozdani_, Civil Society Project, Bihac, BiH
Alma Musli_, Civil Society Project, Bihac, BiH
Vlada Kladusa, Association of Pensioners, BiH
Sulejman Bajramovi_, Association of Pensioners, BiH
Jugoslav JevDi_, Scout Association, BiH
Representatives from the Youth Communication Centre, Banja Luka, BiH
CONCLUSION TO THE REPORT

It could fairly be said that our knowledge of peacebuilding is still in its infancy. While the concept certainly has intuitive appeal, we know very little about how peacebuilding works, under what circumstance it works, or even whether it works at all. Nor is it certain that we will be able to draw definitive conclusions about the effectiveness of peacebuilding anytime soon. We know that peacemaking has worked if a peace settlement, peace agreement, or cease-fire is arrived at as the end result of a diplomatic process. We know that peacekeeping has worked if the operation successfully keeps the peace until other more enduring processes are set in motion (and the operation can take its leave).

But when (or how) do we know if peacebuilding has worked? Unlike peacemaking and peacekeeping -- the other two members of the peace troika -- peacebuilding does not have a definitive end-state. It is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint how long we need to peacebuild, in any given situation, to ensure that conflict will not be renewed. How long does peacemaking need to be applied before we can safely say that it has done its work? If another conflict arises, even 10 to 20 years after the first, should we conclude that peacemaking has failed? More specifically for this particular study, can we determine, in peacebuilding terms, when, whether, or why a particular project or program has succeeded and how can we account for the result?

These are not easy questions to answer, primarily because building peace is almost always a multi-faceted undertaking. Depending on the circumstances, it may include activities and efforts at a variety of levels (regional, country, state, municipal, community, or neighborhood). A failure at one of these levels may doom the whole enterprise. It will also, in all likelihood, skew the peacebuilding results of a particular project.

A given peacebuilding project, for instance, may be internally consistent, that is it may meet the objectives it was designed to meet with the resources and within the timeframe allotted by the donors. Yet its impact on peacebuilding may be negligible, or at the very least limited, due to factors beyond the control of the project participants. How, then, should the project be viewed? Should it be seen as a success or failure? How should we interpret the lessons drawn from it?

This discussion begs the more fundamental question: are we learning lessons about peacebuilding or simply lessons about implementing projects in a peacebuilding environment? The distinction is subtle but important. If we are doing the former, the lessons we learn will enable us to develop projects or programs that better contribute to the building of peace in conflict prone societies. If we are doing the latter, the lessons we learn will enable us to implement better projects or programs with results that are internally consistent with the objectives of the project, but that may be very limited in their impact on peacebuilding writ large.
Both approaches are valuable, but the distinction between the two points to the need for greater precision when we talk about lessons-learned in peacebuilding. To what end are we learning these lessons and in anticipation of what result? The answer to that question should determine the approach we take to lessons learned. The CPCC is one among many organizations and individuals around the world that are engaged, in one form or another, in learning the lessons of peacebuilding. But as was stated about the concept itself, most if not all of these learning exercises are in their infancy. The CPCC’s own lessons-learned process has been underway for just two years. From the outset, it concerned itself with a set of realistic and realizable objectives:

To encourage organizations to think about their work in terms of peacebuilding;

- to extract some tentative lessons from the experience of a few organizations engaged in work in the field;
- to share those lessons with a wider community inside and outside government;
- to engage with other organizations that are conducting their own lessons learned processes; and
- to refine and revise our methodological approach to learning lessons as we go.

These objectives have largely been met over the lifetime of the project. The organizations that submitted their projects for study all agree that their participation in the process has been positive and useful in helping them think about the peacebuilding aspects of their work. The lessons from the first phase of the project were shared with the NGO and government communities through CPCC meetings, workshops and the annual Government-NGO Peacebuilding Consultations. The CPCC has developed close relationships with others conducting lessons-learned processes including the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the Collaborative for Development Action, and the European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation. It has shared its work with members of the Canada-Japan Joint Peacebuilding Learning Project. The methodology, which began as a typology of peacebuilding activities, first evolved into a lessons-learned framework (including a questionnaire), and then into a methodology for conducting research in the field. It will continue to be revisited and revised as a tool for NGOs that want to conduct their own lessons-learned activity.

But what about the lessons we are learning? From the outset, the CPCC has had modest aims in conducting a lessons-learned process, aims that were matched by modest resources. What would a typology of peacebuilding look like? Can we develop a framework for learning lessons? Could we achieve worthwhile results by applying the framework to a few cases with information supplied by the organization? Underlying, all of
this was the question of whether what we were doing was useful to the NGO peacebuilding community.

The first phase of the project, then, was experimental. While the lessons it elicited were tentative, it was clear from the reaction of the NGO and government communities that the process itself was worthwhile and yielded significant results. Given that reaction, and with the encouragement of IDRC, the CPCC decided to take its work a step further by venturing into field research. The thinking was that field research accompanied by a more rigorous and sophisticated methodology would result in the extraction of more empirically grounded lessons.

The results of the second phase validated this thinking. The CPCC learned valuable lessons both about implementing peacebuilding projects and about the process of learning lessons. It learned, for instance:

- that the time and resources provided by donors for peacebuilding projects rarely match the project’s long-term requirements, with the result that projects often come to a close before their peacebuilding impact has been fully realized. In Guatemala, for instance, some interviewees complained that the Fund ended, just as organizations were beginning to find their feet. For local people this might generate a sense of abandonment or a lack of seriousness on the part of the implementer.

- that youth, who are often more flexible than adults as well as being open to new ideas, and in favour of change, can be an important focus of peacebuilding, providing it with energy and sustainability. In the case of CARE Canada’s work in Bosnia, the youths we interviewed all seemed to be extremely self-motivated and willing to question or challenge official dogma.

- that the process of building peace can sometimes be more important than achieving the stated goal of the project; the process brings people together and opens communication among them, giving them the sense of doing something that is meaningful, even if only in a small way. Again in the case of CARE some of the older people involved in elderly associations were clear-eyed about the limited contribution they could make to peace overall, but grateful to have places to gather with their friends and keep occupied. Similarly, the local people from different ethnic groups hired to help CARE implement its civil society strengthening program found that by interacting with others from different ethnic groups helped to break down preconceptions and prejudices;

- that it is critical to involve local actors in every aspect of the peacebuilding process from project design to implementation; local people provide insight and knowledge that the outsider does not have; men, women, children, the elderly, different ethnic groups, etc., each of whom may have experienced the war differently and who will have unique perspectives to bring to peacebuilding, should be among those
represented locally; also if staff and their skills can be retained over the long-haul they bring important institutional memory to the project;

that flexibility in the field and on the part of the donors is a key ingredient in successful peacebuilding, allowing NGOs to adjust their projects and programs to particular needs and changing circumstances in the field; the peacebuilding environment is a shifting dynamic one, and in the cases under review here, those organizations that were flexible and adaptable to that environment were more likely to implement successful projects or programs;

that an organization with an exemplary history, solid reputation, and deep experience in a country will be well served by those characteristics when it turns to the task of building peace. The experience of the CICR in Rwanda, while valuable, shows the difficulties that newcomers face in a situation with which they are not entirely familiar; and

that in peacebuilding it is not always possible (or smart) to be neutral. In Uganda, for instance, it was important that World Vision be seen as opposed to the Lord’s Resistance Army, which is mainly responsible for victimizing children in that war. World Vision’s opposition gave the children confidence.

These are important lessons, to be sure, but they are far from generalizable, having been drawn from only five cases. Indeed, our experience with the Reflecting on Peace Practices Project, which included the examination of more than twenty cases, shows that even with a broader group of cases it is difficult to be confident that the lessons learned are generalizable. Moreover the lessons we learned differ little from what has been learned by organizations that have been implementing development projects or delivering humanitarian aid. While on the one hand this is good, on the other hand we have to ask if learning the same lessons over and over means that organizations to some degree fail to internalize them. Ultimately, then, we need to ask what these lessons mean.

This recalls the question voiced earlier: To what end are we learning lessons? Are they intended to help NGOs design and implement projects that contribute to peacebuilding? If so, we are probably claiming too much in this report. Peace is at the best tenuous in Bosnia, Guatemala, Rwanda, and Uganda. Nor is there any hard evidence that these projects are contributing to the building of peace in any of those countries. It is, quite simply, too early to tell. What we can claim is that these lessons may be useful to organizations hoping to implement similar projects or programs in a peacebuilding environment. The problem here has not been with the projects themselves, but with the disconnect between the methodology and what we hoped to learn by using it.

Of course, this was not entirely unexpected. The CPCC’s lessons-learned project has always been as concerned with advancing the methodology as it has been with gathering lessons. In fact the project was designed so that the two would exist in a kind of feedback
relationship. The methodology would help us learn lessons and the limitations of what we learned would point to the limitations of the methodology. The latter could then be improved in the interest of learning more sophisticated lessons.
What, then, is the value-added of this phase of the project? First, the NGO community in Canada can take the lessons and test them against their own experience, validating some and perhaps invalidating others. Second, in some cases, such as the need to match time and resources with peacebuilding requirements, NGOs can use the information gathered to deal with donors. Third, NGOs will be better informed about how others implement peacebuilding projects, and may be encouraged to share experiences. Fourth, the methodology can be adapted for use by NGOs to extract lessons-learned from their own experience. Fifth, judging from the knowledge we gained of what is being done elsewhere on lessons-learned, we can be confident that we are on the right track and asking the right questions.

But perhaps more than anything, what this phase of the project has shown is that we have to cast our net much wider if we hope to learn how projects can best contribute to peacebuilding. The approach used in this study is good as far as it goes, and certainly case studies will always be an important component of any lessons-learned methodology. Indeed, they have helped us uncover important lessons about implementing projects in a peacebuilding environment. But we have also learned that we need to be more precise when we think and talk about lessons-learned in peacebuilding. If we truly want to learn how to better contribute to peacebuilding through these projects we will have to look at the bigger picture and how projects like the ones under review in this report fit into it.

In its work on peace and conflict impact assessment, the IDRC has argued that analysis should take place at three levels: Country, program, and project.²⁶ The same is true if we hope to engage in a comprehensive and meaningful approach to peacebuilding lessons learned. We will have to take account of the work that is being done at all levels in all spheres and how it relates to other work being done across and within levels. This is certainly a daunting task, but now is the time to strategize about how to accomplish it and begin to take the next steps in doing so.

Those steps might include commissioning a study of several lessons-learned projects to critically analyze what is being learned across a wide body of work and what tools are being developed; exploring the possibility of joint evaluation processes with northern and southern NGOs, similar to the Canada-Japan Peacebuilding Lessons Learned Project; and producing case studies of projects of a similar nature and level in order to increase comparability. These are only a few ideas, but they could be the beginning of a broader approach to learning lessons about peacebuilding. That is the approach that this report seems to be turning us toward.

ANNEX I

AN OVERVIEW OF OTHER LESSONS-LEARNED ACTIVITIES

The work so far of the CPCC on lessons learned in peacebuilding is but a modest contribution to the work being conducted in this and related areas by a number of organizations and individuals around the world. Much of that work has been going on for years and is worth keeping abreast of in order to reflect on the work we are doing and to put it into perspective. The following is an annotated list of organizations that are engaged in some kind of lessons learned process in peacebuilding or a related field. It is not intended to be comprehensive, but merely to provide a sense of some of the work that is going on in the world. Our purpose here is merely to identify some of the many organizations engaged in some sort of lessons-learned activity, with a brief description (in some instances, every brief) of what they are doing. A more detailed analysis of their programs and findings will have to await a later phase of the project.

**Humanitarianism and War Project (H&W)**
The Watson Institute, Brown University
Providence, Rhode Island
Larry Minear

The H&W project is now in its third phase having been in operation for some ten years. The project consists of a program of policy research that focuses on the practical problems of (and solutions to) providing aid during violent conflict.

From 1990-96, the project participants conducted case studies in a variety of war zones around the world, including Europe, Asia, Africa, Central America and the Caribbean. In each of these studies they looked at the interplay of humanitarian activities with political and military institutions, focusing on operational issues and formulating practical recommendations. The result has been the publication of a plethora of case studies, handbooks, training materials, books, articles and op-Des, mostly intended for the practitioner but also of interest to policy analysts, academics, government officials, and the general public. The third phase of the project began in 1997 and has a strong focus on institutional learning by humanitarian organizations.

**Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP)**
The Collaborative for Development Action (CDA)
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Mary Anderson, Laura Olsen

The Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP) is being run jointly by the CDA and the Life and Peace Institute of Stockholm. The RPP is using a case studies approach to gather the experiences of different agencies involved in conflict focused programs. By
comparing and analyzing their different experiences, the RPP hopes to identify what works and what doesn't under different circumstances. The aim of the project is to improve the practices of agencies engaged in this type of work and thereby ensure increasingly positive outcomes.

A total of 28 cases have been produced in varying countries including Sri Lanka, Croatia, Burundi, Israel/Palestine, South Africa, Cyprus, the Philippines, the Balkans and in Latin America. These cases have been presented at workshops in Cambridge and Upscale held in October 2000.

War-Torn Societies Project (WSP)
Geneva
Matthias Stieffel
This project began in 1994 as a joint initiative of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development and the Program for Strategic and International Studies, Geneva. Its objective is to assist the international community and national actors to better respond to the challenges of countries rebuilding as they emerge from war. The project used what it termed participatory action research (PAR) in four country studies (Eritrea, Mozambique, Guatemala and Somalia) to gain a better understanding of the complex challenges involved in rebuilding war-torn societies and to create experimental spaces for interaction between different actors concerned with post-war rebuilding.

The pilot phase of the project concluded in December 1998. With its successful completion, the donors to the project decided that much value was to be gained by continuing and expanding the project to include other countries and contexts. On January 1, 1999, the WSP Transition Program (WSP-TP) began in order to establish a WSP successor body. In institutional terms, WSP-TP is established as a joint initiative of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and The Program for Strategic and International Security Studies (PSIS) of the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies.

Lessons Learned From Peace Support Operations
The Canadian Council for International Peace and Security (CCIPS)
Ottawa
Douglas Fraser
The mandate of the CCIPS is to develop and advance innovative Canadian policies on issues of international peace and security. It is currently conducting major research projects in a number of areas including one on lessons learned from peace support operations.

This study is based on the assumption that the experience of Canadian peacekeepers has, heretofore, been treated as anecdotal at best and has had little impact on current policies and preparation for future missions. This study will make recommendations to remedy this situation.
The Joan B. Roe Institute for International Peace Studies
University of Notre Dame

The Roe Institute’s education and research programs are organized around four themes, one of which is the role of international norms and institutions in peacemaking. In this research area, faculty and students search for ways to make intergovernmental organizations and other institutions more effective and representative and to increase compliance with fundamental norms of peace and human rights.

Analysis of deep-rooted Conflict
The Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution
George Mason University

The Institute offers Ph.D. and Masters degrees in Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Major research interests include the analysis of deep-rooted conflict and their resolution; the exploration of conditions attracting parties to the negotiation table; the role of third parties in dispute resolution; and the testing of a variety of conflict intervention methods in community, national and international settings.

The Humanitarian Policy Group
The Overseas Development Institute
London, UK

The Overseas Development Institute bills itself as Britain’s leading independent think-tank on international development and humanitarian issues. Its mission is to inspire and inform policy and practice that lead to the reduction of poverty, the alleviation of suffering and the achievement of sustainable livelihoods in developing countries. It provides high-quality applied research, practical policy advice, and policy-focused dissemination and debate. Its work centres on five research and policy programs, including the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG).

The objective of the HPG is to improve policy and practice of organizations and donors in response to conflict, instability, disasters and associated humanitarian needs. Its focus in the ‘90s shifted from natural disasters to man-made complex political emergencies. Its goal is to develop clear and consistent policy recommendations across a number of different but related areas, which are widely disseminated. Its researchers are currently working on issues of aid politics, policy and principles, accountability, evaluation, and natural disasters. HPG has played a leading role in the recent surge of interest in issues of learning and accountability in humanitarian assistance. ODI has also been working on surveying the field and proposing tools for conflict impact assessment.

The Overseas Development Council (ODC)
Washington, D.C.

Nicole Ball

The ODC focuses on the interrelationship between globalization and development, and improved multilateral responses to these linked challenges. The future of multilateral development assistance, with a sub-category on conflict resolution and peacebuilding, is one
of its programs. The goals of this program are to shape the evolving development cooperation agenda through analyses of key development problems and to contribute ideas and influence decision making on the redesign and future financing of multilateral development efforts.

Nicole Ball is the research fellow at the ODC responsible for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. She has produced a number of publications related to lessons learned in peacebuilding, including *Complex Crisis and Complex Peace: Humanitarian Coordination in Angola* (1998, with Kathleen Campbell), a report on lessons learned from UNOCHA’s involvement in Angola between 1993-1996; *Making Peace Work: The Role of the International Development Community* (1996); and *Conference Report on Making Peace Work: Lessons for the International Development Community* (1996). In addition to the work of Ms. Ball, the ODC hosted in 1999 a conference on improving the effectiveness of humanitarian and transition programs.

**Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment**  
**The International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa**  
Necla Tschirgi, Michael Koros

The Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program Initiative at IDRC is responsible for creating and developing the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment tool, a method for gauging the effect that intended development projects might have on the tendency toward peace or conflict in a particular area.

Initial work on the PCIA was conducted by Ken Bush who produced a working paper for IDRC in March 1998 entitled *A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones*. The paper served as a working document for two workshops held in June 1998.

This year the PBR-PI is launching Phase I of the PCIA project. In this phase they will start building contacts in the South to expand the evolving body of knowledge and expertise on PCIA and as to test the viability of building the multi-agency partnership required for a more extensive project on PCIA.

**The United States Institute of Peace (USIP)**  
**Washington, D.C.**

Among the research and other activities carried out by the USIP is a special initiative on Bosnia in the Balkans, which is largely devoted to discovering ways of facilitating the Dayton Peace Accords. One of the products of this initiative was a special report on *NGOs and Peacebuilding in Bosnia’s Ethnically Divided Cities* (1998).

This report included a section on lessons from NGO implementers’ and donors’ experiences in Bosnia. Some of those lessons included: Use participatory programming in post-conflict relief work; strengthen the community, not the leaders of the conflict; work
through partnerships within a community; help the whole community to improve conditions; direct humanitarian resources through private sector channels where possible to reintegrate resources; reduce commercialization and symbols of the international community at the local level; create a guiding donors' strategy and a practical set of coordination principles to accomplish it; and strengthen the public sector -- particularly at the canton level -- to establish partnerships with the emerging civil society.

Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU)
University of York
UK
The PRDU specializes in research, consultation, and training of professionals in the planning and management of reconstruction after war; humanitarian intervention during crises; and post-war recovery.

Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies
Catholic University of Leuven
Belgium
The Centre focuses on violent conflicts, field diplomacy, democratisation and conflict prevention, European security, security and conflict prevention in Africa, conflict impact assessment, missed opportunities, and peace architecture.

International Peace Research Institute, (PRIO)
Oslo, Norway
PRIO was founded in 1959 and was one of the first peace research institutes in the world. Its foundation was instrumental in promulgating peace research throughout the world. It currently runs four research programs: Conditions of War and Peace; Ethics, Norms and Identities; Foreign and Security Policies; and Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding. Under the latter program it runs a number of projects that have a lessons learned aspect, including the Balkan Dialogue. Most notable is its project called The Peacekeeper. Norway's contribution to peacekeeping in the Middle East: Lessons learned from UNTSO.

International Crisis Group
Brussels, Belgium
ICG is a private multinational organization committed to strengthening the capacity of the international community to anticipate, understand and act to prevent and contain conflict. ICG's approach is grounded in field research in which teams of political analysts based on the ground in countries at risk gather information from a wide range of sources, assess local conditions and produce regular analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-makers.

The organization is currently active in nine crisis-affected countries world-wide: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Indonesia. In Kosovo a team of
three analysts is reporting on the peace process and efforts to defuse tensions, establish the rule of law and create a functioning system of self-government. In August the ICG issued its latest report on Kosovo which comprised a fresh evaluation of the international Community’s performance in that country since the end of the conflict in June 1999.

German Development Institute 
Berlin 
Stephan Klingebiel
The Institute has produced a study on the impact of development cooperation in conflict situations. The purpose of the study is to explore the role that German development cooperation has played in conflicts and crises in the past, looking at both aspects that have defused conflict and those that have exacerbated it.

Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (INCORE) 
Londonderry
INCORE was established in 1993 as a joint effort of the University of Ulster and United Nations University. It purpose is to address the management and resolution of conflicts over territory and identity. It engages in research, training and other activities that inform and influence national and international organizations working in the field of conflict.

INCORE has established a Policy and Evaluation Unit to ensure that what is learned from research and practice in conflict is incorporated into policy and programs. It studies both successes and problems in the design and development of research that is intended to have a policy impact. Its goal is to make best practices more widely known. It is also involved in evaluating the impact of interventions in conflict in order to contribute to the development of practical initiatives in the broad field of conflict resolution and transformation. It is currently involved in the CDA’s RPP project Breaking the Cycle of Violence.

Breaking the Cycle of Violence, which is still in the development stage, is an action-research project to analyze lessons learned and generate and test new ideas for dealing with situations of conflict. It will bring together peacebuilding practitioners with researchers to share and analyze ongoing experiences and come up with new ideas and approaches.

Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) 
London, UK
FEWER is a multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary network of NGOs, academics, UN agencies and governments involved in conflict research, campaigning, and policy development. It spans Asia, Africa, North and South America, and Eurasia.

Research by FEWER members’ aims to support the overall network objective of providing early warning and informing peacebuilding activities. Members are involved in work on methodology development, conflict prevention best practice, and small arms flows.
Beginning in 1998, FEWER has been producing the annual *Conflict and Peace Analysis/Response Manual*, a framework for understanding trends in areas of potential and actual conflict, as well as identifying approaches for conflict prevention, reduction and peacebuilding.

**Conciliation Resources (CR)**
**London, UK**

CR was founded more than five years ago to serve as an international resource for local or national organizations pursuing peace or conflict prevention initiatives. The principal objective is to support sustained practical activities of those working at the community and national levels to prevent or transform violent conflict into opportunities for social, political, and economic development based on more just relationships.

CR has collected the lessons it has learned from its more than five year’s experience, a period of time in which it said the learning has never stopped. These lessons have been published in CR’s 2000 Annual Report.

**Centre for Conflict Resolution**
**Rondebosch, South Africa**

The Centre runs a number of projects and programs in a variety of areas from mediation and training services, to school programs, to prison projects. It also runs a case studies program which focuses on successful peacemaking at the grassroots level in Africa. The goal of the program is to build capacity in conflict resolution and case study methodology.

**Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network (CPR)**
**(Working group of bilateral and multilateral donors)**

CPR focuses on information sharing, coordination and best practices in peacebuilding, managing complex emergencies, early warning indicators and measurements for project evaluation. It has produced a compendium of Operational Frameworks for Peacebuilding and Donor Coordination.

**The McGregor School**
**University of Antioch**
**Antioch, Ohio**

The school hosts the Action Evaluation Project, which since 1993 has engaged dozens of scholars and practitioners worldwide in systematically defining, promoting and assessing success in conflict resolution and development projects.

**Conflict and Development Network (CODEP)**
**University of Manchester**
**UK**

The Contribution of NGOs to Peace Building in Complex Emergencies is a research project that examines the impact of NGO work on violent conflict, how NGOs contribute to
peacebuilding and how their work can be strengthened and supported. Case studies are being conducted on projects in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Liberia.

**European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation**
**Utrecht, The Netherlands**
A network of 70-80 European organizations interested in peacebuilding, The European Platform encourages the formation of national coalitions, conducts surveys on conflicts and their backgrounds, conducts media activities and education and collects case studies of “People Building Peace.” The European Platform has also established a working group to help NGOs enhance their programming in war-torn and war-prone societies.

**EU Conflict Prevention Network (CPN)**
**Ebenhausen, Germany (and Brussels)**
CPN is a network of European institutions and individuals which the EC and European Parliament draw on for policy papers and other inputs. It has commissioned International Alert and Saferworld to write a paper surveying the field and recommending how the EC might operationalize PCIA at the planning and evaluation stages. In October 1999, it published a manual on its conflict impact assessment tool, which is intended to assist practitioners to identify significant problem areas that have the potential to lead to violent conflict in a given country.

**Report on Evaluations of German Development Cooperation in Six Countries**
**The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development**
**Germany**
This report, published in August 1999, was commissioned to study the impact of German development cooperation in conflicts and crises. The countries examined included El Salvador, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Rwanda and Sri Lanka. Experts in teams of two, resulting in six evaluations that looked at the positive and negative effect of the German development program on conflict in the chosen countries examined each country. The aim was to identify factors in development cooperation that contribute to conflict prevention or resolution.

**Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs**
The ministry has conducted a lessons learned exercise of Norwegian experience in peace-making and peacebuilding in six countries: Mali, Sudan, Mozambique, Rwanda, Burundi, and Guatemala. It will soon be releasing the results of its two-tiered evaluation of its peacebuilding program and its broader development cooperation from a peace and conflict impact standpoint.

**Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC)**
**Paris, France**
The DAC Working Group on Monitoring and Evaluation is currently looking at options for evaluating the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance.
DFID is developing tools to measure the results of peacebuilding activities.
ANNEX II

METHODOLOGY FOR THE LESSONS-LEARNED PROJECT OF THE CANADIAN PEACEBUILDING COORDINATING COMMITTEE

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Descriptive

1.1. What type of activity is/was your organization engaged in? Where?

1.2. What is the history of the conflict in which it took place? What is the cultural, societal context?

1.3. Is peacebuilding taking place before, during, or after the conflict?

1.4. What were the goals of the undertaking and what did you want to achieve? Was peacebuilding expressively mentioned as a goal of the activity?

1.5. In the event that peacebuilding was not an explicit objective, why do you consider this project a part of peacebuilding?

2. Process

2.1. How did the idea for your intervention originate?

2.2. How did you fund the project? What were the main problems in this area?

2.3. How were responsibilities defined and attributed for the conduct of your project?

2.4. What were the main challenges in personnel issues? Did you have to hire people, to retrain people, or to re-direct people for this project?

2.5. How did you decide on your partners in the project and on your type and place of deployment?

2.6. Did you perform activities that were well known to you, or did you have to innovate?

2.7. Did this activity have any consequences on the overall structure, culture and procedures of your organization?
3. Relational

3.1. Who were the actors involved in the peacebuilding activity and what were their roles?

3.2. How did the different actors involved contribute to the success or failure of the peacebuilding effort?

3.3. Did your effort mesh with other peacebuilding efforts in the area, if at all?

4. Evaluative

4.1. Did your project have results in lessening violence or the threat of violence? Did it lead to a more peaceful situation, or at least to prospects for it?

4.2. How much control did you have over the outcome?

4.3. What other factors beyond your control had an impact on the outcome of the peacebuilding effort?

4.4. What unintentional or unanticipated outcomes resulted from your actions, if any?

4.5. What was the impact on specific vulnerable groups, such as women and children? Can it be disaggregated from the general targeted population?

5. Prescriptive

5.1. What else would you do differently next time and why?

5.2. What have you learned about peacebuilding that could be applied to other efforts, your own included?

5.3. What role, if any, did the Canadian government’s peacebuilding initiatives (fund and mechanism) play in your project and how could that role be improved?
ASPECTS OF THE LEARNING PROCESS

A- The first order of business in the lessons-learned process is similar to the familiar steps of program evaluation.

♦ What were the objectives and goals of the project?
♦ Did the project meet these goals?
♦ If not, why did the project not fulfill its objectives?
♦ What roles did organizational factors, partners, milieu conditions, lay in the attainment or non-attainment of some of the objectives?

B- The second aspect of learning involves understanding how the program fits in with other programs existing in the field.

♦ What other programs, locally or externally sponsored, aim to achieve results similar to those of the program in question?
♦ Did the organizations responsible for these programs coordinate their actions? How? If not, why not?
♦ What have you learned about coordination?

C- The third facet of learning is the study of the impact of peacebuilding activities in the recipient country.

♦ Did the project have an effect on peacebuilding in the country? What was it? Is it a localized or general effect? Is it short term or is it expected to develop in the long term?
♦ An organization must always consider the unintended consequences of its actions. These can be extremely revealing of the success or failure of a given program. Did the project have any unintended impact on local reality?

D- The fourth part of the process involves asking if the goals, objectives, activities and resources of the program were changed by evolving circumstances and unintended consequences.

♦ The exceedingly fluid nature of many peacebuilding situations makes this a critical question here. In seeking lessons learned, every agency should be constantly questioning whether its programs are in need of modification or redefinition.
Even if no modifications were made, one can ask whether the organization should have changed its programs and how.

E- The fifth aspect is to estimate if the organization as a whole, and not just some of its programs, is being affected by peacebuilding-related activities.

Were there changes in personnel outlook, in operational and managerial processes, in organizational culture, in non-peacebuilding programs that may have been a result of engaging in peacebuilding?

Too often, learning is only about program and project evaluation and fails to consider if a specific type of activity influences the organization as a whole. Registering these gradual and unintended changes to an organization may be difficult and may take time, but can be revealing about the consequences of peacebuilding.

F- The sixth facet is to exchange and compare the lessons learned by one organization to the lessons gathered by other organizations involved in peacebuilding.

The CPCC process is being specifically designed to do this. Other venues should also be used for comparison and discussion: for example, the annual Government-NGO Peacebuilding Consultations, meetings with representatives of donors such as CIDA and private foundations, learned conferences involving academics and representatives of think-tanks, and international gatherings of governmental and non-governmental representatives.
METHODOLOGY

The data collection for a thorough lessons-learned process can be long and difficult. Ideally, it would involve:

- the consultation of written material prepared by the organization, its partners and sponsors (projects, plans, budgets, evaluation reports, etc.);

- the use of quantitative indicators to assess impact and reach of the program (number of people touched by activities, etc.);

- the conduct of interviews with the organization's principals, and also with partners, recipients, and sponsors;

- interviews with observers of the project, such as fellow peacebuilding workers, journalists, government officials, academics, etc.;

- the consultation of externally written sources dealing with the actions of the organization and the context of its efforts (newspaper articles, learned publications, governmental reports, etc.).
CHECKLIST FOR THE CPCC LESSONS-LEARNED PROJECT PROCESS

1) Establish contact with the NGO

- Phone the official(s) in charge of the project. If possible, meet with them;
- Explain purpose of project;
- Make clear that this is not an evaluation, so they can speak without fear of repercussions;
- Make it clear that NGO involvement in the project will involve answering questions; making written material available; helping organize a mission; reviewing drafts of report; etc., but that their contribution will not require an excessive contribution of time and resources;
- Send CPCC document, short résumé, methodology document, if requested.

2) Gather literature

- General sources on PB in the country;
- Original project application;
- Interim reports;
- Evaluations by internal or external people;
- External sources on project such as newspaper clippings; learned articles, etc.

3) Read and analyze literature

- Identify objectives of project;
- List results and impacts;
- Prepare questions for interviews and topics for roundtables.

4) Interview main Canadian official(s) of the NGO

- Pass general CPCC questionnaire to official(s) if you have not done so, and ask them to put down a few answers on paper, or to start thinking about answers;
- Face to face interview with at least one manager;
- For interview, use general CPCC questionnaire, and this document;
- Complement the interview with phone conversations after, when needed;
- A discussion group with a few organization officials is also possible;
- Start preparing the mission as the interviews are taking place.

5) Prepare mission
- Brief the consultant or graduate student in charge of the mission (if applicable);
- Request that NGO officials in Canada ask their filed representative to arrange meetings with partners, beneficiaries, sponsors, other NGOs, observers, etc.;
- From Canada, contact local representatives to introduce yourself and to make sure that all arrangements are clear;
- Phone or write to local scholars and experts to request their cooperation and send them copies of CPCC documentation, short résumé, methodology document, NGO main documents.

5) Execute field trip

- Interview NGO’s field representative;
- Organize individual interviews with some partners and / or discussion groups with a few of them;
- Organize a roundtable with different NGOs involved in the same field of action;
- Meet the scholar or the expert who will work with CPCC on this.

6) Debrief with Canadian NGO official

- Meet the official, or phone him / her.

7) Write report

- Include reports from correspondents in the field, if needed.

8) Submit report to Canadian NGO official

9) Edit report and submit to CPCC
La médiation comme élément de transmission des valeurs civiques et démocratiques
(La mediación como elemento transmisor de valores cívicos y democráticos)

par
Francisco-José Valiente
Jean-François Rioux (supervision)

Étude de cas du projet du
Centro de Análisis y Propuestas para el Desarrollo Democrático (CAPD)
du
Centro para la Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos
(CALDH)

exécuté à l'intérieur du programme du
Fonds pour le Développement Démocratique
(FDD)
du
Centre Canadien d'Étude et de Coopération Internationale
(CECI)

Octobre 2000
I- Le projet
A- Objet du projet


L'objet précis du projet consiste à former les autorités municipales et indigènes des municipalités situées à l'intérieur du Département de Sololà à de nouveaux processus de négociation et de médiation. L'objectif est de présenter aux autorités municipales et aux représentants indigènes de Sololà, de Santa Catarina Ixtahuacàn et de San Lucas Tolimàn des voix alternatives de négociation et de médiation pour que celles-ci puissent mener à bien la reconstruction de leur tissu social. Un tissu social propre aux communautés locales grâce à l'émanicipation des valeurs locales. Le tout en vue d'appuyer le " projet national de construction de la culture de la paix ".

B- Contexte de consolidation de la paix au Guatemala

Après 36 ans de guerre civile (la plus longue en Amérique latine), 200 000 morts (tandu côté des forces politiques que dans l'ensemble de la société), 40 000 disparus, 100 000 réfugiés au Mexique et 1 million de déplacés à l'intérieur du pays

1, l'histoire politique du Guatemala nous montre que l'autorité (le concept et son exercice) s'est imposée de façon violente dans ce pays. À travers les dictatures et les gouvernements militaires qui se sont succédé aux commandes de l'État jusqu'en 1985, un seul acteur – l'armée – a maintenu une présence permanente sur la scène politique et implanté le joug d'un système économique et social fondé sur l'exclusion.

Une bonne partie du conflit tourne autour de la question agraire. La guerrilla, représentée par la Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), s'oppose ainsi à une petite oligarchie qui depuis toujours contrôle les meilleures terres au détriment de la majorité indigène.

Dès l'origine, l'État guatémaltèque a favorisé la concentration des ressources et des biens entre les mains des élites "ladinas", et les rapports sociaux se sont fondés sur la marginalisation et l'exclusion des peuples autochtones face aux décisions publiques. Expropriés de leurs terres à la fin du 19ème siècle et acculés à vivre dans des forêts incultes, les peuples autochtones ont été soumis au travail forcé de façon systématique.

Dès lors, comment créer un État ouvert à la participation de la société civile quand, dès l'origine, il a eu pour fonction principale d'approvisionner les grands propriétaires agroexportateurs en main-d'œuvre bon marché en utilisant des moyens qui n'ont rien à voir avec l'économie? En fait, plus encore que les partis politiques ou le secteur privé, c'est l'institution militaire qui a mis en marche l'importante affaire du marché d'exportation. Aussi, pour déjouer guérilla, l'armée guatémaltèque a utilisé des procédés dévastateurs. Elle a non seulement imposé le pouvoir militaire dans toutes les régions où s'étendait le conflit armé, mais également désarticulé les formes d'organisation communautaire et de résolution de conflit que les villages s'étaient donnés.

Les campagnes menées par les forces militaires au cours des années quatre-vingt contre les milices insurrectionnelles ont par la suite intensifiée les causes du conflit. D'un côté le déplacement de couches entières de populations (agricoles et indigènes) a eu pour effet d'accentuer le problème de terres (partage de celles-ci et réintégration des déplacés et anciens combattants). D'un autre côté, le concept de démocratie atteignit son niveau le plus bas avec l'arrivée des représentants militaires à la tête de l'État. Ces derniers ne permettant presque aucune forme d'opposition ni de réunion à cet effet. En plus, c'est lors de cette période que l'État de droit devint quasi inexistant et que l'on vit une forte concentration du pouvoir entre quelques représentants militaires.

La suspension définitive des opérations militaires et offensives eurent lieu le 20 mars 1996. Suivièrent, les accords sur le cessez-le-feu définitif signés entre le gouvernement guatémaltèque et l'URNG à Oslo le 4 décembre 1996 desquels 3 000 rebelles rendirent les armes. Ces accords de paix portèrent principalement sur la répartition des terres agricoles, la santé et l'éducation. En vue de l'accord final les parties acceptèrent, en mai 1996:
1- le principe d'une "modernisation agraire" qui prévoit la création d'un fonds destiné à répartir les terres au profit des travailleurs agricoles et à leur faciliter l'accès au crédit bancaire;

2- l'établissement de nouvelles normes sociales permettant l'identification des véritables propriétaires terriens et la correction d'abus (notamment auprès des travailleurs);

3- l'augmentation significative des impôts sur les terres en friche afin d'obliger les propriétaires à les travailler ou à les revendre en vue de les redistribuer aux travailleurs agricoles.


C- Objectifs et acteurs au projet

L'objectif du projet intitulé "La médiation comme élément de transmission des valeurs civiques et démocratiques" fut élaboré en un premier temps en vue de coordonner les capacités de développement municipal à San Lucas Tolimán. Dans le cas de Santa Catarina de Ixtahuacán, l'objectif consistait à renforcer la représentation municipale (maire et conseillers) et les pouvoirs qui lui sont afférents. Mais l'objectif premier reste le renforcement du Conseil Local de Médiation du Département de Sololá (qui compte les municipalités de Sololá, de Santa Catarina Ixtahuacan et de San Lucas Tolimán).

Les objectifs premiers du projet consistent donc à :

• Doter les mairies (maires et conseillers) des moyens nécessaires en vue d'apporter une certaine cohésion au niveau du pouvoir local municipal et rehausser le rôle des maires auxiliaires. Les maires auxiliaires on le statut "d'autorités locales" et sont élus ou nommés par
la population. Ceux-ci "font le pont" entre la population locale et l'autorité municipale (tout comme auprès des autorités indigènes).

- Intervenir et résoudre les conflits se posant au cœur des municipalités (ou à l'intérieur du pouvoir municipal). Ces conflits vont du manque de représentativité (exclusion) de certaines couches d'électeurs à la protection des droits des populations locales (droit de possession de leur territoire et de l'exploitation de celle-ci) en passant par la réintégration des déplacés (déplacés à cause du conflit ou des effets de l'ouragan Mitch) et l'amélioration des conditions de vie de l'ensemble de la population.

- Systématiser et rendre public les résultats des négociations entreprises à travers ce projet.

Pour ce faire, le Centre Canadien d'Étude et de Coopération Internationale (CECI) est pourvu d'un Programme d'Assistance Technique (PAT) au Guatemala mené par le Centro de Análisis y Propuestas para el Desarrollo Democrático (CAPD)

2 du Centro para la Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos (CALDH)3. Ce projet mené par CAPD/CALDH se trouve à être financé et appuyé par le Fondo de Desarrollo Democrático (FDD) du CECI au Guatemala4.

Ainsi, l'implication du CALDH débuta en 1994-95 alors qu'elle participait à titre d'ONG dans le processus électoral afin de promouvoir davantage les droits civiques et politiques des citoyens. La façon la plus convenable de le faire consista à créer des espaces de discussion politiques à l'intérieur desquels on put abondamment traiter des droits de la personne.

La participation civique du CALDH ne s'inscrit pas à l'intérieur d'un parti-politique. CALDH poursuit ses propres objectifs dans le cadre des lois existantes. Le Centro de Análisis y Propuestas para el Desarrollo Democrático (CAPD) fût alors créé. L'objectif consista à

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2 CALDH a établi le Centro de Análisis y Propuestas para el Desarrollo Democrático (CAPD), qui s'occupe de promouvoir les droits civils et politiques des habitants des localités rurales et d'aider au renforcement des appareils municipaux. Dans ce sens, un des buts de CAPD est de renforcer la représentativité du pouvoir municipal local. Ceci via une recherche et une promotion continue d'un consensus politique à l'intérieur même du pouvoir municipal (entre les maires, les conseillers municipaux et la population locale).

3 CALDH perçoit [les acteurs de] la société civile comme l'élément majeur pour que la démocratie puisse continuer à se développer dans le pays et pour que les objectifs découlant de la signature des accords de paix puissent amplement se réaliser. La société civile servant ici d'interlocuteur et de contrepartie à l'autorité gouvernementale (à l'État). Ceci explique la volonté qu'a CALDH de former et de créer et de renforcer les pouvoirs locaux civils à l'intérieur des instances municipales (maires, conseillers, groupes de consultations, etc.). Ces pouvoirs et leaders locaux devront effectivement exister en vue de représenter la population locale et de répondre à ses besoins.

4 Selon les informations fournies par le CECI, le FDD dispose de quelques 7,5 millions de $ Can pour l'ensemble de ses projets. Fonds fournis par l'ACDI.
accompagner (former et appuyer) les trois municipalités de la région de Sololà (Sololà, San Lucas Tolimàn y Santa Catarina de Ixtahuacàn) afin de faire la promotion des droits civiques et politiques des citoyens qui y vivent.

Les résultats furent concluants dans les deux premières localités. CAPD/CALDH arriva à leur enseigner (voire même inculquer) les divers éléments reliés à la participation politique. Ce projet a permis la formation de leaders communautaires (hommes et femmes), à l’intérieur même des populations locales, capables d’intervenir à titre de représentants sociaux et politiques pour le développement de leurs propres communautés. De par sa participation, les deux objectifs poursuivis par le CECI étaient :

1) de fournir un accompagnement technique (fournir des méthodes de travail et de négociation, tel que la création de séminaires de discussion, en vue de résoudre les conflits);

2) de provoquer l’ouverture d’espaces politiques pour en arriver à un " pacte de gouvernance ".

Quant au projet visé, celui-ci débuta avant même la collaboration de CALDH avec le CECI. On peut néanmoins formellement dire que le projet intitulé " La médiation comme élément de transmission des valeurs civiques et démocratiques " débuta dans la municipalité de San Lucas Tolimán en 1998. Celui-ci s’étendit en 1999 à trois municipalités du département de Sololà (San Lucas Tolimán, Santa Catarina Ixtahuacán y Sololà). Au cours de l’année 2000, le projet se déploya à l’ensemble du département de Sololà œuvrant avec divers acteurs de la société civile à l’intérieur de 14 municipalités différentes de Sololà via la Asociación Sololatc Unida para el Desarrollo (ASUDI). On peut donc voir à quel point ce projet a gagné en crédibilité

\[5\] Le pacte de gouvernance (ou pacto de gobernabilidad) fut présenté par le nouveau gouvernement Portillo aux différents maires du Guatemala le 24 janvier 2000. Suite à un engagement électoral, le gouvernement d’Alfonso Portillo entendit proposer un pacte ayant pour but de trouver et d’établir un consensus national entre les représentants légitimes de l’État (le gouvernement démocratiquement élu) et l’ensemble des représentants et leaders politiques et sociaux (maires, chefs syndicaux, représentants d’ONG, etc.). Les bases du consensus national devront être établies sur les points suivants : la sécurité du citoyen (assurer l’intégrité physique et morale de l’individu); la justice (établissement d’un système de justice convenable avec des gens – juges – convenablement formés); une démilitarisation du système à l’échelle nationale; les droits de la personne; la décentralisation du processus de décision; un développement rural; le développement et l’accessibilité à un système d’éducation adéquat; l’accès pour tout citoyen au processus politique national; la création d’un pacte fiscal.
et en répercussions. À titre de projet pilote, il est devenu une référence importante capable d'aider la formation de "composantes sociales organisées" (groupes ou ONG locales, groupes de pressions, etc.) favorisant la décentralisation du processus de décision tel que stipulé par le gouvernement dans son *pacto de gobernabilidad*.

L'intérêt du CECI portait sur l'ouverture de divers mécanismes locaux encourageant la participation civile au processus politique local. S'il y eut collaboration avec le CECI c'était pour que ce dernier donne un appui technique et financier. Cette collaboration s'établira sur des thèmes tel que :

- L'inclusion à la vie sociale et communautaire guatémaltèque des villages et populations traditionnellement marginalisés (femmes, enfants, personnes âgées). Une inclusion selon des approches participatives tel que la création d'espaces de travail et de discussion au sein des mairies incluant les marginalisés. Ceux-ci ont ainsi l'occasion d'exposer leurs situations et leurs nécessités face aux leaders et représentants communautaires. Le tout aura comme conséquence de leur assurer une présence au sein des organes municipaux de décision et de forger leur présence au cœur de la société civile (ils deviennent ainsi conseillers, maires auxiliaires ou autres).

- L'établissement de programmes d'action (commissions d'études sur la participation des habitants lors des divers processus électoraux, accès de ceux-ci au processus de prise de décision).

L'implication de CALDH se fit donc en fonction de la réhabilitation du tissu social et des valeurs civiques et éthiques (comme par exemple, la promotion du droit de participation au processus électoral) et ce grâce aux processus de négociation et la résolution de conflits. Il s'agit pour CALDH de créer des espaces de consultation (via des séminaires et forums régionaux). Des espaces de consultation entre les représentants locaux (municipaux) et les autorités gouvernementales, pour assurer une meilleure participation du citoyen au processus de décision national, et entre les communautés locales elles-mêmes en vue d'apaiser les tensions existant entre elles (voir cas de Santa Catarina et Nahualá). Grâce aussi à une entente négociée avec les autorités gouvernementales locales.

D- Le cas de Santa Catarina
Le cas de Santa Catarina est un élément important à l'ensemble du projet. Celui-ci est également particulier car il pose la question d'un partage géographique auquel ont dû s'adapter deux municipalités : Santa Catarina et Nahualà. Le problème de base repose sur la relocalisation de la ville de Santa Catarina qui a dû être déplacée suite aux ravages provoqués par l'ouragan Mitch. La relocalisation de Santa Catarina pose donc les problèmes :

- de partage de territoire avec la municipalité voisine de Nahualà (situation de conflit);
- de relocalisation et de réaménagement des citoyens de " l'ancienne " Santa Catarina dans des terres appropriées et dans des conditions de vies acceptables;
- d'identité sur la question du siège municipal (l'autorité) de la ville de Santa Catarina (conflits entre ceux qui sont restées dans " l'ancienne " et qui veulent préserver le siège de la municipalité à l'endroit original et ceux qui sont partis créer " la nouvelle " et qui y revendiquent le siège de l'autorité de la ville de Santa Catarina.

L'objectif de CALDH dans le dossier de Santa Catarina fut de fournir un appui et un accompagnement à la " mairie indigène " (alcaldia indigena). Celle-ci se trouve à jouer un rôle de conseiller municipal (pourvue d'auxiliaires municipaux) orienté vers les demandes et nécessités de la population locale majoritairement indigène.

Comme résultat final, Santa Catarina parvint à récupérer une partie du territoire disputé avec Nahualà (en vue d'y établir sa nouvelle municipalité ainsi que son nouveau siège municipal) en contrepartie d'une reconnaissance formelle et officielle de la municipalité de Nuahalà (qui n'était pas à ce jour acquise).

Le CECI joua un rôle important dans le cas de Santa Catarina. Les actions du CECI permirent l'ouverture d'espaces de discussion et de négociation qui permirent d'avancer sur des thèmes tel que le partage des terres, la participation des femmes aux échelons de décision et la création d'infrastructures sociales.
E- Méthodologie employée

Une des principales questions à l'intérieur de ce projet se pose quant à la façon de former les gens et de les rendre aptes au processus de négociation. La réponse repose dans l'étude des facteurs et thèmes reliés à la culture locale. Mais bien qu'il faut former les gens aux processus de négociation, ceux-ci doivent néanmoins intégrer eux-mêmes ces méthodes à leurs modes de vie. La mise en pratique passe par la création de conseils locaux de médiation. Donc, une fois les tensions et conflits dissous, on passa de l'étape initiale de formation à celle de la médiation entre parties opposées.

En ce sens, divers ateliers sur le thème de la consolidation de la paix post-conflit furent offerts et appliqués par le FDD à plus de 30 ONG locales. CAPD/CALDH pris en charge les questions relevant de la négociation et de la résolution de conflits. Le CECI agit dans tout ça comme organe de supervision, d’appui et de formation.

La méthodologie privilégié au cours de ce projet repose sur les principes de négociation et de résolution tel que proposé par le Harvard Negotiation Project. Appliquée à l'intérieur des communautés indigènes de la région de Sololà, cette méthodologie s'est avérée être très compatible avec les coutumes appartenant au droit Maya qui se fondent normalement sur le respect des intérêts de toutes les parties et l'établissement d'accords concrets entre parties opposées.

Le Conseil de Médiation Local (CML) oriente ses activités sur trois directions:

1) Consolider une autorité locale (un pouvoir décisionnel) propre au diverses municipalités, régissant la vie des populations.

2) Résoudre les conflits.

3) Appuyer le développement local (donner un élan aux structures sociales) afin d'empêcher un retour aux situations de conflit.

Dans le cas de Santa Catarina Ixtahuacan, les objectifs sont:
1) D’appuyer les autorités municipales pour le développement de la nouvelle communauté de Chiupatán (la nouvelle Santa Catarina, également appelée Alaska).

2) Lancer et ouvrir les pourparlers avec la municipalité de Nahualá (localité voisine à la nouvelle Santa Catarina) en vue de résoudre les conflits internes (conflits entre ces deux municipalités).

3) Proposer et développer des méthodes propres à la résolution de conflits.

II- LEÇONS APPRISES

A- Le cas ASEDSA à San Lucas Tolimán

Les principaux liens de collaboration existant entre le groupe ASEDSA (Asociación para la Economía y el Desarrollo Social Autosostenible), un regroupement coopératif local de la municipalité de San Lucas Tolimán qui a pour but de regrouper les demandes et besoins de la population locales pour que celles-ci prennent voie à travers les leaders locaux, et le projet du CECI, ici mené par CAPD/CALDH, se forgent à travers la discussion et la consultation. Les impressions d’ASEDSA sur le projet sont positives. Selon Jorge Tzunun, coordonateur d’ASEDSA, le projet, tel que mené par CAPD/CALDH, leur a, à ce jour, permis de mieux communiquer localement entre eux. À l’intérieur de la communauté de San Lucas et avec l’ensemble des autorités municipales du Département de Sololá.

Le travail effectué par ASEDSA repose sur quatre piliers :

1- développer l’éducation (scolarisation);

2- viser l’égalité des sexes et favoriser la participation de la femmes dans les divers secteurs de la société (agrique dans ce cas-ci);
3- viser une meilleure répartition des terres agricoles;

4- renforcer et consolider le pouvoir local.

CAPD/CALDH appuya ASEDSA dans sa démarche lui permettant ainsi de devenir un organe de coordination important. Un point de référence entre les leaders locaux (particulièrement à San Lucas). Ceci permit un développement social plus poussé (éducation, exercice civil par les citoyens, renforcement de l'autorité municipale locale) ainsi qu'une meilleure gestion des ressources municipales.

En matière de "leçons apprises", ce qu'ASEDSA retient de l'implication du CAPD/CALDH c'est leur apport en matière de formation (particulièrement sur le thème de la prévention des conflits). ASEDSA affirme que la population connaît bien les solutions aux problèmes locaux. Le seul problème c'est qu'elle n'a pas les outils appropriés pour les appliquer. Au cœur des litiges locaux : l'augmentation salariale des paysans travaillant la terre et les relations difficiles entre ces mêmes paysans et les propriétaires terriens.

Dedies à la promotion du dialogue entre parties opposées, encourageant, à titre de leaders communautaire, les voies non-violentes et pacifiques, ASEDSA adopta les modes de consultation populaire proposés par CAPD/CALDH. Selon ASEDSA, ces modes de consultation permirent de renforcer le leadership local des représentants municipaux. Mais l'élément le plus significatif que l'on doit encore aujourd'hui aux consultations fût qu'elles donnèrent lieu à la création d'espaces de discussion entre paysans et propriétaires terrien. Espaces qu'aucune des deux parties ne croyait à ce jour possible. Résultat des discussions : les propriétaires terrien ont fini par accepter que les paysans se dotent eux-mêmes de leur propres terres (qu'ils pourraient habiter et cultiver). Le tout sans en arriver à une situation de violence. On peut donc affirmer que les paysans ont aujourd'hui davantage de possibilités de s'émanciper socialement (scolarité, droits sociaux, capacités de négocier leurs conditions de travail, etc.).

La collaboration CALDH et ASEDSA permit également de renforcer les liens entre les leaders des communautés du Département de Sololà, eu pour effet d'améliorer la sécurité civile à l'intérieur des municipalités.
Enfin, en vue de renforcer les espaces sociaux dans lesquels pourraient davantage participer les citoyens, CAPD/CALDH réhabilita et donna, à partir de 1997, plus de pouvoir aux maires auxiliaires. L'objectif fut d'élargir le pouvoir aux différentes sphères sociales (vision horizontale du pouvoir) en vue de faire participer l'ensemble de la population aux enjeux les plus névralgiques de la communauté, tels que l'éducation et l'accessibilité aux sources et points d'eau. Le but consistait avant tout à voir à ce que l'information soit dûment retransmise, notamment en matière de fiscalité et de gouvernance (dans ces deux cas via la négociation des pactes et ententes nationales) ainsi qu'en matière de développement (stratégies à adopter pour un développement économique local, techniques, dialogues et négociations).

B- Le cas de Santa Catarina de Chiupatàn

Bien que l'on ai finit par donner le titre de siège municipal à la "nouvelle" Santa Catarina (Chiupatàn), plusieurs problèmes subsistent quant à l'implantation de cette municipalité dans son actuelle location géographique. Ces problèmes vont:

- de l'opposition existant entre ceux qui n'ont pas voulu quitter l'ancienne localité de Santa Catarina (Ixtahuacàn) et ceux qui sont venus fonder la "nouvelle", entraînant ainsi un manque de cohésion et de coopération entre l'ensemble des habitants (sentiment d'héroïsme chez ceux qui sont partis s'installer dans la nouvelle localité dénigrant ceux qui sont restés "en bas"; ces derniers ne voulant pas, à leur tour coopérer avec ceux qu'ils prennent pour des "fous");

- de la rivalité existant entre les habitants de cette nouvelle Santa Catarina et leurs voisins de la municipalité de Nahualà à qui on a amputé une partie de leur territoire en contrepartie d'une reconnaissance officielle (des affrontements entre villageois de Nahualà et Santa Catarina ont provoqué la mort de deux personnes et une quarantaine de blessés);

- des mauvaises conditions de vie auxquelles sont confrontés les déplacés dans ce nouveau territoire (qui doivent affronter, entre autres, la poussière, le froid et le manque d'eau).

a) **Leçons apprises par les autorités municipales de la "nouvelle" Santa Catarina**

Pour arriver à un accord avec la municipalité voisine de Nahualà, les autorités municipales de la "nouvelle" Santa Catarina ont dû se rendre à l'évidence qu'il fallait affronter
et régler les problèmes suivants afin qu’un plan régional soit communément proposé, permettant aux habitants des deux municipalités de vivre en paix :

- Éliminer les formes de désinformation ainsi que le manque de communication entre les deux localités (éviter les susceptibilités).

- Travailler ensemble afin de développer de meilleures conditions sanitaires pour les habitants de la "nouvelle" Santa Catarina, constamment confrontés au problème de la poussière (terre très granuleuse facilement éparsée par le vent et qui affecte les voies respiratoires).

- Régler par transport routier le manque d’eau tout en la gardant potable.

- Allouer de plus grands espaces agricoles aux habitants de la "nouvelle" Santa Catarina afin qu’ils puissent mieux s’alimenter.

- Renover ou reconstruire la route qui va de l’ancienne (en bas) à la nouvelle (en haut) municipalité de Santa Catarina afin que le déménagement des villageois soit moins périlleux et qu’ils puissent continuer à cultiver certaines de leurs terres qui se trouvent encore "en bas".

L’implication du CAPD/CALDH se fit donc dans la création de séminaires de discussion entre villageois de Santa Catarina, dans lesquels les perceptions négatives sur leurs voisins de Nahualâ furent présentées et débattues. Les conclusions des discussions menèrent souvent à la prises en compte que ces derniers vivaient comme eux, qu’ils devaient en grande partie affronter les mêmes problèmes qu’eux et qu’ils n’étaient donc pas si différents. Même si le problème de zonage rural entre les deux communautés restait (et reste encore aujourd’hui) évident et persistant.

Le même exercice fût proposé et effectué communément entre autorités municipales et villageois de Santa Catarina et de Nahualâ. Les résultats ne furent pas tous positifs. Des méprises persistent toujours, mais l’objectif de créer des espaces de communication, de négociation et d’information a été atteint. Grâce aux efforts entrepris par CAPD/CALDH et grâce aux travaux effectués par la Commission de Transfert (Comisión de Traslado) mandatée par le gouvernement central, des espaces démocratiques ont été créés et établis. Des espaces qui ont
permit de consolider la paix au sein de la communauté, grâce à l'implantation d'un équilibre social basé sur des valeurs éthiques, de respect et de justice entre villageois. Aussi, et de façon plus précise, CALDH a également aidé à établir des contacts directs avec la MINUGUA tout en attirant l'attention de la presse sur le cas de Santa Catarina (voir article).

a) **Leçons apprises par les membres du Comité de Transfert de Santa Catarina**

Selon les membres du Comité de Transfert de Santa Catarina

6, l'apport du CALDH à la résolution des conflits est évident. Ceux-ci ne se gênent pas pour affirmer que les ateliers de discussion, desquels de meilleures perceptions des habitants de Nahualà s'en sont dégagés, ont aidé à la consolidation de la paix en région. Ces ateliers firent réaliser aux villageois que les populations de la région, à commencer par eux, n'étaient aucunement pourvues d'un caractère violent et que c'était à eux, indigènes " marginalisés ", que revenait le mérite d'avoir entrepris les démarches en vue de déménager vers de meilleures terres.

De façon plus technique, les ateliers offerts par CALDH ont permit aux membres du Comité de devenir familier avec de nouvelles méthodes participatives. Méthodes qui leur ont enseigné les rouages du travail en équipe, de la coordination ainsi que le rôle à jouer en tant qu'individus impliqués à l'intérieur d'une organisation locale (le Comité de transfert). Que vont-ils y apporter à titre de villageois soumis à de pénibles conditions de vie ? Comment, à titre d'individus, vont-ils participer à l'instauration de meilleures relations avec la municipalité voisine de Nahualà ?

En conclusion, ce fut dans les moments les plus difficiles que l'implication du CALDH fut plus motivante. Les outils fournis par le projet intitulé " La médiation comme élément de transmission des valeurs civiques et démocratiques " mena :

* aux négociations de zonage rural et au partage des terres (mesures de celles-ci);

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6 Le Comité de Transfert de Santa Catarina est un groupe créé *ad hoc* par les villageois déplacés dans la nouvelle Sanata Catarina et entériné par le maire et conseil municipal de la nouvelle localité. Celui-ci se compose de villageois qui se sont respectivement portés volontaires en vue de traiter et de trouver un solution aux divers problèmes d'eau, d'électricité, de transport routier, des relations avec les communautés voisines, etc. Chaque membre du comité de transfert est responsable de l'un de ces enjeux et doit le mener à bien.
• à l'établissement d'un lien permanent de consultation entre le Comité de Transfert et les villageois qu'il représente (ces derniers lui donnant toute légitimité d'action);

• à traiter ensemble (entre représentants de Santa Catarina et de Nahualà et entre hommes et femmes) les problèmes communs (santé, eau, terres et mouvements de populations).

Mentionnons enfin que l'amélioration et la promotion du statut de la femme constituaient un des points majeurs au développement des local de Santa Catarina Ixtahuacán. Dans ce cas-ci, il a été important de les intégrer et de les former pour qu'elles participent à part entière à trouver des solutions aux problèmes existant dans cette localité. En ce sens, elles sont en grande partie responsables de l'acheminement de l'eau potable dans la municipalité. Constituant aujourd'hui une couche principale du développement local, les femmes ont notamment réussi à gagner leur place sans trop avoir suscité des réactions négatives de la part des hommes. Grande partie du travail de consultation offert par CAPD/CALDH consistait donc à sensibiliser les hommes aux rôles que devaient jouer les femmes.

III- CONCLUSION : LEÇONS RETENUES PAR LE CECI

De façon générale, les trois municipalités de la région de Sololà (Sololà, San Lucas Tolimàn y Santa Catarina Ixtahuacán) ont à ce jour bien profité du projet. Tel que mentionné, les résultats furent concluants dans les deux premières localités. CAPD/CALDH arriva à leur enseigner les éléments reliés à la participation politique : tel que le droit à la libre expression (valeurs reliées à la tolérance) et les droits aussi fondamentaux comme le droit à la vie (mettre fin aux attentats contre la personne). Les chose furent davantage différentes à Santa Catarina. Il fut difficile d'établir une relation de confiance avec les autorités locales municipales. L'objectif restait néanmoins d'arriver à établir un tissu social en réhabitiant les droits et valeurs éthiques des populations locales. Concrètement, on assista à l'implantation d'une autorité et d'un conseil indigène. Le processus d'accompagnement proposé par CAPD/CALDH dû se conformer aux valeurs culturelles locales.

Aux yeux des représentants du CECI au Guatemala, qui ont supervisé le travail du projet de " La médiation comme élément de transmission des valeurs civiques et démocratiques ", CAPD/CALDH a réussi à s'établir comme organe de consultation auprès des communautés du
Département de Sololà, à peu de frais et avec peu de moyens. Une des premières leçons que le CECI y retient est la nécessité pour eux de poursuivre et de développer une plus grande collaboration avec CAPD/CALDH sur le terrain. De toutes les organisations locales avec lesquelles CECI est associé, CAPD/CALDH est, selon eux, celle qui répond le mieux aux problèmes spécifiés par le projet.

Aussi, selon les représentants du CECI, le projet donna la possibilité à CAPD/CALDH d’être attentif aux autres enjeux importants se déroulant à l’intérieur du département de Sololà. Tel fût le cas de leur implication avec l’UDAK (voir annexe 2). C’est dire à quel point ce projet ne s’est pas simplement limité à accomplir ce qu’il s’était fixé comme premiers objectifs. Il adopta une vision stratégique large d’un processus qui ne devait en aucun moment exclure d’autres groupes sociaux défendant une cause légitime.

Ce qui est en grande partie acquis, c’est la création d’un " pont " entre, d’une part, la consolidation de la paix et la prévention de conflits et, d’autre part, le développement local (social et économique). La prévention de conflits à un niveau micro (sur des thèmes tel que le partage des terres et l’accessibilité aux sources d’eau) fut, dès un premier temps, pensé afin d’obtenir un plus grand développement local. CAPD/CALDH a aidé à activer une plate-forme globale entraînant un développement social et communautaire. Il y a donc eu un développement local qui s’est consolidé à l’intérieur des communautés de Sololà, Santa Catarina et San Lucas Tolimàn. Tout comme CAPD/CALDH, les autorités municipales de ces communautés ont aujourd’hui en leur possession les outils qui leur permettent de créer et d’établir de nouveaux projets de développement et même de les faire financer.

Autre point acquis : l’amélioration et l’avancement du statut donné aux femmes à l’intérieur du développement local. La promotion du statut de la femme (principalement indigène dans ce cas-ci) constituait un des points majeurs au développement des communautés. Tel qu’on l’a mentionné dans le cadre du projet de Santa Catarina Ixtahuacán, il a été important d’intégrer et de former les femmes pour que celles-ci deviennent des citoyennes à part entière (dans le droit et dans le devoir) pour le développement de leur propres communautés. Pour autant, le fait de traiter de la condition et de la place des femmes dans le développement local ne signifia en aucun cas d’exclure ou de déresponsabiliser une partie des hommes. Au contraire, il fallut les impliquer dans ce processus car il fallait que ces derniers soient sensibilisés et comprennent l’importance du rôle que les femmes ont à jouer. Tâche qui n’est
pas facile à accomplir dans le cadre des cultures mayas (où l'homme laisse peu de place à la femme au niveau du processus de décision).

Quelques résultats (acquis):

- La création d'un processus de dialogue permanent entre les autorités municipales de Sololà, Santa Catarina et San Lucas Tolimán.

- De plus grandes possibilités pour certains représentants villageois (leaders locaux) d'occuper des postes plus importants au sein des mairies.

- Le renforcement des organisations et institutions locales telles que la "mairie indigène" (alcaldía indígena).

- Le renouvellement du rôle des maires auxiliaires.

- Le renforcement du pouvoir des femmes dans le cadre du développement local de leur propre communautés.

- La récupération des valeurs civiques au sein des populations.

- La création de nouveaux liens entre anciens et nouveaux maires en vue d'établir de nouveaux agendas de consultation locales (créant ainsi de nouveaux espaces de discussion).

- Les thèmes associés au "pacte de gouvernance" (pacto de gobernabilidad) sont à l'ordre du jour des discussions menées entre les autorités municipales et aussi avec CAPD/CALDH.

- Le développement de nouvelles stratégies de travail pouvant mener à un plus large développement de la région. Par exemple, analyser l'impact que pourraient avoir les médias en diffusant périodiquement les problèmes propres au Département de Sololà, notamment le cas de Santa Catarina. Il faut également être à l'affût des problèmes qui se posent à l'interne. Par exemple, continuer à attirer l'attention des autorités municipales (notamment les maires) aux problèmes énoncés par leurs populations.
Une autre grande leçon à retenir est que bien que les conflits soient stoppés, rien n’est pour autant achevé. Il faut maintenir un suivi (garder un œil attentif) afin de renforcer le développement local.

Quant aux leçons apprises qui se sont, à ce jour, avéré moins positives, les représentants du CECI en retiennent particulièrement trois :

1- L’ensemble des acteurs impliqués aux projets (consultants CECI/FDD, CAPD/CALDH, représentants municipaux et bénéficiaires) ont jusqu’à maintenant dû se conformer à un "succès sommaire" des négociations menées entre les communautés de Santa Catarina, Nahualá et le gouvernement. Après la première phase de négociations (qui favorisa Santa Catarina Ixtahuacán), CAPD/CALDH cru au respect des accords de la part des habitants de Nahualá, ainsi qu’à l’élimination de toute forme de belligérance entre les deux municipalités voisines. Néanmoins, on peu aujourd’hui affirmer que les représentants de CAPD/CALDH n’ont pas assez propagé et diffusé les termes des accords à l’intérieur de la communauté de Nahualá. Aussi, lorsque les représentants du gouvernement vinrent prendre les mesures territoriales afin de départager ce que, selon les accords, revenait à Ixtahuacán, des affrontements survinrent entre habitants de Nahualá et de Santa Catarina Ixtahuacán, provoquant morts et blessés. Ces altercations eurent également pour effet de freiner le processus de transfert des habitants vers la "nouvelle" Santa Catarina (déjà entamé) et de rouvrir les accords au détriment des acquis de Ixtahuacán (ils finirent par obtenir moins d’espace que prévu). Les leçons qui sont ici à retenir porte donc sur :

- la nécessité de parvenir à tout moment à des accords acceptables et applicables de part et d’autre;

- le fait de bien propager les conditions des accords, telles qu’elles doivent être appliquées, à l’ensemble des parties;

- la nécessité d’exercer une "veille" (monitoring) sur les relations entre parties opposées afin que celles-ci restent au beau fixe.
2- Il est bien sûr important pour CAPD/CALDH de s'intégrer pleinement à la problématique locale, à l'ensemble des enjeux et au mode de vie de la population qui bénéficie de l'aide. Mais selon les représentants du CECI, l'assimilation des représentants " terrains " à celle-ci a occasionné, à quelques moments et bien malgré eux, certains retards chez les bénéficiaires. La grande difficulté dans un tel projet réside dans la capacité de respecter et de faire coïncider le temps d'apprentissage et de développement de la communauté locale avec l'échéancier du projet. Il s'agit d'y trouver une harmonie entre les deux. Selon CECI, CAPD/CALDH aurait dû agir de manière plus " proactive " avec les bénéficiaires en vue de les rendre plus participatifs à leur propre développement local (économique et social). CAPD/CALDH doit également entrevoir et planifier une stratégie de sortie car une fois dotées des outils nécessaires et après les avoir assimilés, les populations locales finiront par prendre en main leur propre destinée.

3- Il existe enfin un risque à pousser un processus de participation et de représentation démocratique lorsque celui-ci est mené en période de campagne électorale. Le risque est que le projet soit trop identifié à un mouvement ou un parti politique. Et qui plus est que les intérêts du projet ne convergent trop avec les intérêts d'un parti en particulier. Bien que l'on ne puisse restreindre les opinions ou les activités politiques des individus membres des communautés qui bénéficiaient du projet, le projet mené par CAPD/CALDH fut considéré comme trop associé aux intérêts du Comités Cínicos

7. Selon les représentants du CECI, les défaites encaissées par les Comités Cívicos aux élections municipales de 1999 eurent pour effet " d'user " politiquement le personnel du projet et de créer maintes désillusions chez la population qui avait mit beaucoup d'espoirs dans la victoire des Comités Cínicos.

Sur une note plus générale, et pour conclure, le CECI considère que l'une des plus importantes leçons provient de la nécessité pour tout projet et programme de systématiser (normaliser) ses travaux afin que ses impacts, procédures, fortes, faiblesses et objectifs soient clairement mis en valeur. Afin donc, que des leçons soient en bout de ligne retenues pour que les mêmes erreurs ne soient pas répétées et pour que les mêmes objectifs soient de nouveau atteints. Il est donc important de laisser les traces les plus complètes des projets accomplis, pour que ceux-ci puissent servir d'exemple à d'autres groupes et pour que les bénéfices puissent être exportés à d'autres pays où œuvre la coopération canadienne.

7 Expressions locales organisée, regroupements ou parti politique agissant pour la défense des intérêts des communautés marginalisés et pour une plus grande représentation politique de celles-ci.
ANNEXE 1 : PROGRAMME D’ENTREUVES

• Alan Quinn, Lucrecia de Paniagua
  Fondo de desarrollo democrático – CECI.
  24 janvier 2000

• Mario Minera
  Coordinador de Fortalecimiento del Poder Civil Local y Desarrollo Democrático Centro para
  Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos (CALDH)
  24 janvier 2000

• Jorge Tzunun
  Coordinador de la Asociación para la Economía y el Desarrollo Social Autosostenible
  (ASEDSA) y consejal de la municipalidad de San Lucas Tolimán.
  25 janvier 2000

• Miguel Guarxas Castro
  Alcaldía Indígena de Sololá.
  25 janvier 2000

• Juan Tuyuc
  Unión para el Desarrollo Alternativo del Área de Kaqchiké (UDAK).
  25 janvier 2000

• Carlos Bracamontes
  Alcalde de Panajachel y autoridades municipales
  25 janvier 2000

• José Tum Katinac, Cruz Tzep, Juan Sohom Tahay
  Autoridades municipales de Santa Catarina Ixtahuacán en Chiupatán.
  26 janvier 2000

• Manuel Sohôm, Marcos Ajpakaja, Antonio Tuyuc, Pedro Garcias, Manuel Isidro
  Comisión de traslado de Santa Catarina Chiupatán.
  26 janvier 2000
ANNEXE 2 : LE CAS DE L’UDAK

CAPD/CALDH appuya également la Uniôn para el Desarollo Alternativo del Area de Kaqchike (UDAK), groupe principalement voué à la réinsertion des anciens combattants guerrilleros à la vie sociale et productive. Les principales demandes de la UDAK reposent sur l’accessibilité, pour les ex-combattants, aux terres de production et à la commercialisation de leurs produits. En ce sens, le projet CECI, mené sur le terrain par CAPD/CALDH, offrit principalement de la formation en matière de négociation. L’objectif étant de renforcer le leadership des représentants locaux, membres de la communauté.

L’Appui offert par CAPD/CALDH à l’UDAK a à ce jour consisté :

- à analyser les objectifs de l’UDAK ainsi que leur réalisation au sein des communautés du Département de Solola;
- à élaborer de nouveaux projets;
- à faire partager les objectifs et problèmes de l’UDAK avec d’autres organismes locaux.

Lors de sa création en 1997, suite à la signature des accords de paix de décembre 1996, l’UDAK eu comme premier objectif d’acquérir, par voie légale, le titre d’ONG locale. Après avoir atteint son statut juridique d’ONG, l’objectif de la UDAK fut d’acquérir également une sorte de reconnaissance politique principalement de la part de la Mission de vérification des Nations Unies au Guatemala (MINUGUA) et de la Secretaria de la Paz (SEPAZ). Cette reconnaissance politique de la part d’une ONG tel que l’ONU ou de la SEPAZ équivaudrait à accepter les anciens combattants guerrilleros en attente d’une intégration sociale. Les maintes fautes et erreurs associés au mouvement révolutionnaire national, remettaient constamment en question la possibilité pour ces ex-combattants de réintégrer un poste, un lieu ou une fonction à l’intérieur de la société. Dès lors, ne pouvant laisser ces gens à leur propre désarroi, CALDH s’intéressa fortement à la question ainsi qu’aux efforts de l’UDAK.

La plus grande partie du travail effectué sur le terrain par CALDH consista à mettre l’UDAK en contact avec d’autres organismes publics ou privés de la région de Sololà. CALDH fournit une équipe technique ainsi qu’une méthode précise de travail en matière de réhabilitation. L’objectif du CALDH fut de comprendre et de partager la réalité dans laquelle vivaient ces ex-combattants encore marginalisés aujourd’hui. L’étude du problème permet en un premier temps de recenser le nombre d’anciens combattants vivant au marge de la société et de connaître, dans un deuxième temps, leur véritables problèmes (pauvreté, aucune opportunité d’emploi, dépourvu de terre, etc.) Ces problèmes furent ensuite présentés et débattus en réunion et en plénières face aux autres organisations du Département.

L’objectif ultime consistait à démontrer à toute la nation guatémaltèque le problème de marginalisation que vit cette couche d’anciens combattants démobilisés et d’effectuer des propositions au gouvernement central en vue d’obtenir compensation. Ces propositions visèrent à :

- rendre visible les ex-combattants démobilisés comme une classe prête à travailler dans le cadre des accords de paix;

- aider au processus national de réconciliation ainsi qu’à lutter contre la pauvreté qui affecte cette classe de démobilisés ainsi que leurs communautés;
3- à attirer l'attention de la communauté internationale sur ce problème en vue de mieux définir et développer le processus de paix et de réconciliation nationale.

CALDH donna des cours de formation en matière de résolution de conflits à l'UDAK. Les cours de formation permirent de créer des points de consensus entre l'UDAK et les bénéficiaires. On chercha, par exemple, à établir un statut d'égalité entre les plus démunis. À les traiter de façon égale tout en étant à l'affût de leur problèmes particuliers. Le tout avait comme objectif global de donner une orientation, des connaissances quant à ce qui se faisait dans le cadre général du pays. Informer les démobilisés démunis sur le processus général de paix qui avait cours dans le pays. Leur mentionner quels étaient leur droits politiques, à quels développements économiques devaient-ils aspirer, quelle était leur place dans cette nouvelle société de paix et revoir un peu le cadre historique du pays afin de mieux comprendre toutes ces années de guerre.
ANNEXE 3 : BIBLIOGRAPHIE, TEXTES CONSULTÉS

Photocopies de brochures du CECI expliquant les projets menés par le Fonds pour le Développement Démocratique. (être plus explicite ?)

Guatemala : Bâtir la paix
Le Guatemala sort d’une guerre civile de 35 ans dont l’enjeu principal était la condition des autochtones, majoritaires dans leur propre pays mais absents des instances du pouvoir. Le Québécois Alan Quinn et son homologue guatémaltèque, Lucretia de Paniagua, appuient des organisations déterminées à augmenter la participation des autochtones dans la vie démocratique. Un programme vaste, aux ramifications étonnantes.