Exploring the dynamics of a regional approach to human security in the Southern Africa.


Alhaji M. S. Bah
2002

(Draft. Not for citation yet!)
Table of Contents

Acknowledgement ii
Acronyms iii
Forward iv
Abstract v
1.1 Introduction 1
2.1 Background to Security Cooperation 4
3.1 Human Security 6
3.2 New Security Paradigm in Southern Africa 9
4.1 Small Arms – Big Problem 11
4.2 Sources of Small Arms in Southern Africa 13
5.1 SADC/SARPCCO Small Arms Initiatives 17
6.1 The Organ on Politics Defence and Security 26
7.1 Conclusion 34
7.2 Recommendations 36
8.1 References 39
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my deep gratitude to the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) for giving me this opportunity to undertake such a crucial study at a time when Southern Africa is grappling with enormous challenges, especially in the area of human security. Special thanks goes to the entire team of the Peacebuilding and Reconstruction (PBR) Program Initiative – I am indebted to Gerd Schonwalder for his insightful mentorship in the past year to: Stephen Baranyi, Pamela Scholey, Galil El-Mekki, Coleen Duggan, Silke Reichraeth, Lauraine Clement, Eileen Alma, Wachira Maina and Cristina Zarowsky, all of whom contributed in various ways to make my internship fruitful.

Special thanks goes to the IDRC Centre Awards Program for making this piece of research possible: Rita Bowry, Jean-Claude Dumais and Chris Smart (PPD). Gratitude goes all the Centre Interns for the year 2002.

I am also grateful to all those individuals and institutions in Southern Africa that contributed to my field research – Virginia Gamba, Peter Gastrow, Richard Cornwell, Eleanor Abrahams, Noel Stott, Henri Boshoff, Mr. Joao Ndlovu, Ms Gina Tlokhale, Col. K. Tazira, Major Leonard Ndlovu, Col.S.S. Nyathi, Chernor Y. Jalloh, Markson Jombo, Mr. Edwin Bathsu, Prof. John Stremlau, Dr. Peter Arthur, Guy Lamb, and Prof. Timothy M. Shaw. I am also indebted to the following institutions: University of Cape Town, University of Pretoria, University of Zimbabwe, and the Southern African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA).

Finally gratitude goes to my wife Thumeka M.S. Bah, for her supportive role throughout this exercise.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress.</td>
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<td>ACRI</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative.</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union.</td>
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<td>ASAS</td>
<td>Association of Southern African States.</td>
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<td>BDF</td>
<td>Botswana Defence Force.</td>
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<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo.</td>
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<td>ECO WAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States.</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union.</td>
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<td>FLS</td>
<td>Front Line States.</td>
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<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of Mozambique.</td>
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<td>FCB</td>
<td>Fire Arms Control Bill.</td>
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<td>GFSA</td>
<td>Gun Free South Africa.</td>
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<td>ISDSC</td>
<td>Inter-State Defence and Security Committee.</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter Governmental Authority for Development.</td>
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<td>LDF</td>
<td>Lesotho Defence Force.</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movement for the Liberation of Angola.</td>
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<td>MK</td>
<td>Umkhonto we Sizwe.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization.</td>
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<td>NDF</td>
<td>Namibian Defence Force.</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization.</td>
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<td>NCAAC</td>
<td>South African National Conventional Arms Control Committee.</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development.</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement.</td>
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<td>OPDS</td>
<td>Organ on Politics Defence and Security.</td>
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<td>ONU MOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique.</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity.</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Permanent Co-ordinating Committee.</td>
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<td>RPKC</td>
<td>Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
<td>Rand Monetary Area.</td>
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<tr>
<td>REANMO</td>
<td>Mozambican National Resistance.</td>
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<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rassemblement Congolais pour démocratique.</td>
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<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference.</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community.</td>
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<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West African Peoples Organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union.</td>
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<td>SARPC CO</td>
<td>Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-ordinating Organization.</td>
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<td>SAPS</td>
<td>South African Police Service.</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program.</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations.</td>
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<td>UNAVEM</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission.</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.</td>
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<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army.</td>
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<td>ZIPRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Patriotic Resistance Army.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZDF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Defence Force.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZDI</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Defence Industries.</td>
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Abstract

This paper is an attempt to investigate the opportunities and challenges that confronts efforts at promoting human security through a regional approach under the rubric of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The central thesis of the paper is that it is better to address human security through a regional approach. However, the paper makes two sub-sets of arguments: that cooperation is higher on issues of low politics and lower on issues of high politics. In order to illustrate the above hypotheses, the paper focuses on two issues: SADC’s efforts to deal with the proliferation of small arms and the SADC Organ on Politics Defense and Security (OPDS), to illuminate the underlying dynamics of cooperation on low and high politics respectively. Analysis of the SADC small arms initiatives and the OPDS is informed by the national, regional, continental and international dynamics that shapes such initiatives in Southern Africa. The paper concludes that in spite of the broad conceptualisation of human security, which includes both freedom from fear and want, there is a clear agreement on the need to focus on non-military security in Southern Africa and to address such issues at the regional level. However, the rules, norms and procedures for implementing this common understanding are still fraught with controversy especially in the area of high politics. This is reflected in the controversial interventions in Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the name of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). At the same time the paper highlights interesting areas of progress especially in the area of functional cooperation. SADC’s adoption of the Protocol on the control of Firearms and other related materials is an important development in the area of functional cooperation, moreover, it is the first legally binding document on small arms and light weapons in sub-Saharan Africa. The paper recommends for more cooperation on issues of low politics (i.e. functional cooperation) which, will serve as a foundation for wider and deeper cooperation in issues of high politics, that will invariably have a positive effect on human security in the sub-region.
Exploring the dynamics of a regional approach to human security in Southern Africa.

1.1. Introduction

The Southern African sub-region offers unique opportunities and challenges in the area of security cooperation and the general promotion of human security. The fall of apartheid and the end of the Cold War presents unprecedented opportunities for cooperation on a wide range of issues including security. However, these opportunities are challenged by the history of suspicion and distrust that characterized inter-state relations in the sub region during the struggle for liberation and majority rule. Thus, the end of the Cold War coupled with major political developments in the sub-region starting with Namibia’s independence in 1990 and the peaceful transition to majority rule in South Africa marked the dawn of a new era in what used to be the most hotly contested area of sub-Saharan Africa. The sub region was the center of international attention as liberation wars were waged against the white-minority governments in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia and the two former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola. It also became the theatre of political and ideological battles between the two superpowers – the Soviet Union and the United States - with both sides propping up different factions in the sub-regions almost three decade long wars. The active involvement of the super powers contributed to not only prolonging the conflicts but further complicated the political dynamics in some countries such as Angola, where the bitter legacy of this rivalry is still been felt. At the same time the presence of white-minority regimes in the region served as a coalescing agent for the various states and liberation movements culminating in the establishment of the Front Line States (FLS) by Tanzania, Mozambique and Zambia in 1974, with liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC), the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) etc granted seats at FLS meetings. The FLS has its origins from the Pan African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa. The FLS became both the symbol and mechanism through which the struggle to liberate the people of the region was coordinated. On the economic front the independent states of the sub-region established the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)\(^1\) in 1980, with the aim of reducing their economic dependence on South Africa. With Namibia’s independence in 1990 and the

\(^1\) The founding members of SADCC were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe with Namibia joining the group upon attaining independent status in 1990.
increased prospect for majority rule in South Africa, SADCC was transformed into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, with South Africa joining the Community in 1994.

Unlike most other sub-regions in Africa, the common sense of purpose that arose out of the shared desire to liberate the people of the sub-region offers a unique opportunity for the establishment of a collective security regime and the promotion of human security. However, a major challenge arises out of this existing opportunity due mainly to the antagonistic inter-state relations – an atmosphere that was borne out of apartheid-South Africa’s policy of destabilizing its neighbors. The policy of destabilization pursued by the Pretoria government created an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust in the sub-region. The combination of opportunities and challenges in the sub-region produces what can best be described as a ‘bifurcated’ politico-economic and security dynamic. It should be mentioned at the outset that the dramatic political developments in the sub-region coincided with a global call for the broadening of the security approach from its narrow state-centric view to a people-centered security, *a-l-a human security*.² In an attempt to deal with the new security landscape, the sub-region initiated some measures to deal with the wider economic, social, and political and security challenges. The need for collective security emerged as one of the greatest concerns during this period of transition.

The fall of apartheid and end of superpower rivalry in the sub-region opened a window of opportunity for a sub-regional approach to human security. The sub-region is characterized by a wide range of challenges such as, uneven socio-economic development, large-scale unemployment, the rise of violent crime, water scarcity, the proliferation of small arms etc, all constituting a threat to human security. It should be mentioned at this point, that most of these problems are now internal and in most cases have region-wide consequences; hence the need for concerted efforts both at the national and regional levels.

² The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report was the seminal work in this direction – it defined human security as ‘freedom from fear and want’. Since the publication of the Report the notion of human security has crept into both academic and policy debates and has been frequently invoked even in controversial circumstances such the American led NATO war over the Serbia in 1999.
The central thesis of this paper is that human security can be more effectively enhanced if it is addressed at the regional level through cooperation. However, the paper further argues that prospects for cooperation are higher in dealing with issues of ‘low politics’ (e.g. small arms or functional cooperation) and lower when dealing with ‘high politics’ (e.g. military intervention and sovereignty). Cooperation on issues of ‘low politics’ is greater because such issues (e.g. small arms) are less politically sensitive, unlike ‘high politics’ (e.g. military intervention) that is politically charged and controversial, which often challenges the status quo.

For a clear demonstration of this argument, the paper will investigate attempts by SADC to promote human security through regional cooperation. In other words, an attempt will be made to address critical questions such as: to what extent can SADC adopt the ‘collaborative strategy’ used to liberate the peoples of the sub-region from minority rule be invoked to enhance their security? Put another way, how can the freedom of the people of Southern Africa be transformed into human security? In order to clearly demonstrate the position of this paper, I will focus on two main issues: firstly, small arms and light weapons to illustrate cooperation on low politics and secondly, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) to illustrate the dynamics of cooperation on issues of high politics. The analysis will focus on the interplay of forces at the national, and sub-regional levels and their impact on attempts at promoting a regional human security agenda through regional initiatives under the rubric of SADC. The crux of the analysis will focus on cooperative arrangements in dealing with the small arms scourge and wider security arrangements through the OPDS. However, before getting into some of the specific measures taken by SADC to promote human security, it is important for one to chart the evolution of security arrangements in Southern Africa, as this will give a clear picture of both the background and the future prospects of SADC in promoting human security, through regional cooperation.
2.1. Background to Security Co-operation

In Southern Africa, regional measures to address issues of politics, economics and security dates back to the early 20th century when sub-regional organizations such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 1910 between South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland; the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) which included South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland; the Front Line States in the mid-1970s and its sister organization the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC); and more recently the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the SADC Organ on Politics Defense and Security (OPDS) were established.\(^3\)

During the struggle against white-minority rule security co-operation in the sub-region was centred on the FLS and its security arm the ISDSC. However, with the fall of apartheid and the return of majority rule to all states in the sub-region, the FLS was disbanded, but its security arm, the ISDSC survived and has now been incorporated into the OPDS. With the dismantling of the FLS, the ISDSC membership was enlarged to include all SADC member states. The ISDSC is charged with the responsibility of coordinating co-operation on all matters related to security and defence through the establishment of appropriate mechanisms. It is anticipated that the ISDSC will likely continue its focus on ``multilateral military cooperation (including military and peacekeeping training and capacity building); public security (exchange of information on issues such as the cross-border movement of illegal goods and people, firearm and drug-smuggling); and state security (examining threats to regime stability).``\(^4\)

In 1992 at a meeting of Heads of states in Windhoek, Namibia, *The Treaty and Declaration*, establishing the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was signed. The following objectives were set out in the Treaty: Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration; Evolve common political values, systems and institutions; Promote and defend peace and security; Promote

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self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance and the interdependence of member states...etc\(^5\)

One of the bold initiatives of the newly established SADC is its attempt to formulate a regional policy on peace and security by broadening the notion of security to include non-military matters such as water, food and the environment. Between the signing of the SADC Treaty in 1992 to 1994, the SADC Secretariat was involved in coordinating efforts in formulating policies on peace and security. These efforts culminated in the adoption of SADC’s 1993 *Framework and Strategy* document, which called for the building of common political values based on democratic norms, the creation of a ‘non-militaristic security order’, and the need to address non-military sources of conflict and threats to human security, such as poverty and domestic political repression. The SADC *Framework and Strategy* document further proposed the following lines of action in promoting regional security: the adoption of a ‘new approach to security’ which emphasizes the security of people; the creation of a forum for mediation and arbitration; reduction in force levels and military expenditure; the introduction of confidence and security building measures and non-offensive defence doctrines; and the ratification of key principles of international law governing inter-state relations.\(^6\)

With SADC’s new vision of a widened approach to security incorporating non-military security, a Ministerial Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security, was convened by the Secretariat in July 1994 in Windhoek, Namibia. The meeting ended with recommendations to the Council of Ministers for the creation of a Protocol on Peace, Security and Political Co-operation consisting of the following structures: an independent human rights Commission; a SADC committee of foreign Ministers charged with ‘peace promotion’; a SADC Committee of defence and Security ministers; and a SADC Sector on Conflict Resolution and Political Co-operation. Thus in August 1994, the Summit approved the creation of a Sector on Politics, Diplomacy, International Relations, Defence and Security.\(^7\)

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\(^5\) For more information see *The Treaty and Declaration* establishing SADC, in Windhoek 1992,
\(^7\) See *The Ministerial Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security in Windhoek, Namibia, 1994.*
A June 1998 SADC Summit meeting in Gaborone accepted the recommendations of the SADC Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security for the creation of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS), and on 28 June, 1996 the Organ officially came into force. The Summit appointed President Mugabe as the first Chair of the Organ. In spite of the political controversy and acrimony that followed the establishment of the Organ, observers saw its establishment as a step in the right direction. SADC’s widening of its approach to security issues coincided with global calls for the broadening of the security discourse triggered by the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, which set the basis for the current debate on human security.

3.1. Enter Human Security

Traditionally, the concept of security has been concerned with understanding the causes of war and conversely the conditions of peace. However the end of the Cold War was followed by a new wave of crises and conflicts that led to calls for the redefinition of security. In this vain, both policy makers and academic scholars have advocated the broadening of the concept both horizontally and vertically. Expanding the concept horizontally involves creating an agenda that recognizes security as being dependent on factors such as political democracy, human rights, social and economic development, and environmental sustainability, as it is on military stability. To expand the concept vertically involves recognizing that people should be the primary referent for security. In this way, it becomes possible to identify threats to human security that emerge at the sub-national, national and transnational levels.

The Report defined human security as ‘...a child that did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons - it is a concern with human life and dignity...’. In other words human security was simply described as freedom.

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8 See SADC Summit Communiqué on the establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, Gaborone, June 1996.
9 The subject of human security in Southern Africa has been explored by scholars such as Tim Shaw’s Human (In)Security in Africa: Prospects for good governance in the twenty first century (1999), Laurie Nathan’s Beyond Arms and Armed Forces: A New Approach to Security (1992); Maxi Van Ardt’s In Search of a More Adequate Concept of Security for Southern Africa (1993); and the influential study by Ken Booth, A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Beyond Realism (1994).
10 Ibid, p22.
from fear and want. By defining security in these terms, the Report highlighted the need to focus on people-centred security - a radical departure from the traditional state/regime security. The Report however, pointed out that human security should not be equated with human development. Human Development is a much broader concept with the aim of widening people’s choices, whilst on the other hand human security is about how people can freely and safely exercise these choices with minimal fear that today’s opportunities would not be lost tomorrow.\textsuperscript{11}

In spite of the criticism that has been levelled against the 1994 UNDP Report for its broad conceptualisation, one area that it has generated a consensus is over the issue of personal security. The Report mentioned that personal security from physical violence is perhaps the most vital aspect of human security. The Report stated that: ```In poor nations and rich, human life is increasingly threatened by sudden, unpredictable violence. The threats take several forms: threats from the state, threats from other states, threats from other groups of people, threats from individuals or gangs, threats directed against women, threats directed at children based on their vulnerability and dependence….``` \textsuperscript{12} The Report criticized the traditional approach to security and stated that ```The concept of security, has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust…Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives.``` \textsuperscript{13}

It should however, be mentioned at this point that ```human security does not replace national security. A human security perspective asserts that the security of the state is not an end itself. Rather, it is a means of ensuring security for its people…from a human security perspective; concern for the safety of people extends beyond borders. Although broadening

\textsuperscript{11} For details see the \textit{1994 UNDP Human Development Report}, which reintroduced the notion of human security to the policy and academic discourse in the post-Cold War era. It should be mentioned that the notion of `human security` was one of the founding principles of the League of Nations following the end of the First World War, however its most recent incarnation lies with what has now become the seminal 1994 UNDP Human Development Report.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ibid}, p300.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid}, p22
the focus of security policy beyond citizens may at first appear to be radical shift, it is a logical extension of current approaches to international peace and security.”

Since the publication of the UNDP Report in 1994, both policy makers and academics have approached human security differently. For instance, the Japanese government’s approach to human security “covers all the measures that threaten human survival, daily life, and dignity – for example, environmental degradation, violations of human rights, transnational organized crime, illicit drug, refugees, poverty, anti-personnel landmines and other infectious diseases such as AIDS…” This broad conceptualization of human security differs from the more restrictive Canadian definition of human security that focuses on “freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety or lives.” In spite of Canada’s narrow approach to human security, it still encompasses a wide range of formulations ranging from physical threats, the rule of law, good governance, social equity, protection of civilians in conflicts, and sustainable development. The inclusion of these varying set of issues is a reflection of the open-ended nature of human security in both policy and academic circles.

However, it is pertinent to note that in spite of the varying approaches adopted by countries like Canada and Japan, the human security network, (of which both countries are members) and a coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have committed itself to the goal of “strengthening human security with a view to creating a more humane world where people can live in security and dignity, free from want and fear, and with equal opportunities to develop their human potential to the full.”

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14 In Canada the notion of human security was championed by Lloyd Axworthy, (then Minister of Foreign Minister) for details on the DFAIT’s conception of the new security paradigm see “Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World” Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Ottawa, Canada p4. Can be accessed at: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca Date visited: 26 Oct.2002
17 Other members of the human security network are: Austria, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Mali, The Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand and South Africa as an observer.
Although the definition of human security encompasses a variety of threats, I will focus on the ‘freedom from fear’ (personal safety) principally because threats posed by the effects of violent conflicts is one of the most pressing and urgent concerns within the Southern African context. Therefore, the paper argues that a comprehensive approach aimed at addressing violent conflicts and the means used in these conflicts should constitute the central element in promoting human security in SADC.

3.2. New Security Paradigm in SADC

In the 1990s, Southern Africa adopted the ‘new security’ paradigm, which equated security with development. With increasing threats to security, most of which are defined as internal, political, social, economic and environmental, as opposed to military in character, both policy makers and scholars have followed a path which, placed a premium on delicate judgments concerning the appropriate balance between a focus on military and non-military threats and responses. Coupled with the concern of a broadened approach to security, scholars and policy makers have approached security to address regional common security arrangements, preventive measures, peacekeeping, peace building and larger developmental concerns. ¹⁹ In this vein Booth and Vale, contend that “a broader security agenda is particularly pertinent in southern Africa. The states of the region do not constitute the textbook entities much loved by political science; they are for the most part juridical rather than social entities.” ²⁰ What has strongly emerged in the post-apartheid southern Africa’s approach to security is the acceptance of the fact that issues of security and emancipation need to be explored with fresh eyes, through the development of broader and critical perspectives.

Thus, SADC’s adoption of a new security ‘paradigm’ which encompasses both military and non-military issues marks a radical departure from the state-centric approach that characterized previous regional security arrangement. The new SADC framework puts

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emphasis on the security of people and broader developmental concerns such as poverty alleviation, eradication of killer diseases such as HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, violent crime, promotion of democratic values and principles, small arms and the protection of human rights. The new approach was clearly spelt out in Article (2) of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, which outlines the Organs objective as follows: ``protect the people and safeguard the development of the Region against instability arising from the break down of law and order, intra-state conflict, inter-state conflict and aggression; promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of State Parties….``

SADC`s broadened approach to security is premised on the principle that security is a holistic phenomenon that incorporates political, social, economic and environmental issues. One of the consequences of widening the security discourse is the shift in the referent object from the exclusive state-centric approach to include people. Consequently, the objective of security policy as espoused by the SADC framework document, go beyond achieving an absence of war to encompass the pursuit of democracy, sustainable development, social justice and the protection of the environment. The framework also recognizes that states can mitigate the security dilemma and promote regional stability by adopting a defensive rather than an offensive military doctrine and posture. It further emphasizes that ``…domestic security policy should pay greater attention to social sources of instability such as the problem of violence against women and children.``

The creation of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Committee, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee, and the Southern African Police Chief’s Co-operation Organization (SARPCCO), are some of the practical measures taken by SADC to enhance the promotion of human security. In spite of the diverging opinions over the functions and control of some of these institutions, most observers of political developments in southern Africa see their creation as a step in the right direction. For instance the Regional Peace-keeping Training Centre has trained over 200

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students from SADC member states and is currently developing a standardized peacekeeping training program to ensure the ‘interoperability’ of the armed forces in the region. SARPCCO has also undertaken several joint policing operations both at the bilateral and multilateral levels that have yielded positive results. The joint South African/Mozambican operation, code named Operations Rachel is perhaps one of the most significant bilateral undertakings since the establishment of SARPCCO in 1995. In the following section I will focus on the nature and extent of the small arms challenge in Southern Africa.

4.1. Small Arms - BIG PROBLEM

In Southern Africa, like most conflict prone regions of the world small arms proliferation is not a new problem. Due to the prolonged armed struggle the sub-region is littered with millions of small arms making the resolution of some of these conflicts extremely difficult and further endangering the safety of individuals in post-conflict societies. Most of the small arms found circulating in the sub-region entered the market between the late 1960s to the 1990s when there was a high demand by all players in the violent conflicts that raged in the sub-region. However, the end of the Cold War and superpower rivalry in the sub-region coupled with the liberation of the remaining minority ruled states of Namibia and South Africa, followed by the disarmament and demobilization of thousands of fighters, marked a new phase in Southern Africa’s attempt to deal with the problem of small arms proliferation. Both during and after the Cold War small arms were the weapons of choice by the various armed groups and states in the sub-region. The removal of the superpower umbrella gave a freehand to unscrupulous states and arms dealers who met the high demand for these ‘tools of war’ by actors in the multiple internal conflicts that erupted at the end of the Cold War.

It should be mentioned at the outset that during the Cold War the focus of UN disarmament programs was on bigger and more sophisticated weapons with little attention paid to light

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24 In March 1995, the government’s of South Africa and Mozambique in recognition of the daunting challenge facing their countries signed a bilateral agreement mandating the police forces of both countries to jointly engage in the search for and destruction of small arms and light weapons. The operation that was launched following the signing of the agreement was code-named Operation Rachel. Since the launch of Operation Rachel in 1995, a significant amount of small arms and light weapons, ammunition and other war related materials have been destroyed. By May 2002, approximately 1,200,00 ammunition, 2246 small arms and light weapons and 4 Anti-personnel landmines have been destroyed this year alone. For details see ‘Eight Years of Operations Rachel’, Focus on Small Arms in Africa, no2, June 2002.
weapons, making a lot of Conventions on arms control and disarmament irrelevant to the Southern African situation. In Southern Africa both during and after the Cold War the major challenge was not the threat of nuclear weapons (in spite of apartheid-South Africa’s nascent nuclear program) but rather the destruction and suffering caused by light weapons. It is perhaps in recognition of this deficiency that Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former Secretary General of the United Nations, highlighted the small arms challenge in a supplement to his Agenda for Peace in 1995. Boutros-Ghali introduced the term ‘micro-disarmament’ and called for ‘practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the UN is actually dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands.’

Four years later, Virginia Gamba a leading voice in the small arms debate in Southern Africa opines that ‘…the issues that are central to human and state security (in Southern Africa - my emphasis) and of concern at the threshold of the 21st century, are not the hard and cold concepts that prevailed during the Cold War era...’ but rather ‘…the micro-tragedy of human conflict and violence.’ The limited attention given to small arms by disarmament programs in the last century is probably explained by the preponderant nature of the state. However, a major feature of the end of the Cold War has been calls for the widening of the security discourse to include both ‘freedom from fear and want’ - a radical departure from the traditional security approach. Whilst the traditional security (state-centric) approach focuses on armaments and their use, concerns over small arms use and their proliferation are a central focus of the human security agenda. The difference between the two approaches lies in the fact that state security is preoccupied with more sophisticated arms, whilst the human security focus is on small arms and light weapons. What probably explains the difference is state security’s concern with inter-state conflicts as opposed to human security’s people-centered (intrastate) security – often revolving around criminality and internal armed conflict.

However, to say that small arms represent the ‘hard’ part of human security therefore in no way implies that it is the most important part. To promote freedom from fear, one has to understand the combinations of factors that cause the anxieties. Consequently, in Southern Africa there have been several initiatives taken to address the small arms challenge (thus addressing one of the anxieties) both at the bilateral and multilateral levels through SADC and SARPPCO. Before getting into the specific initiatives, a brief look at the source of these arms would help to provide a clear picture of the problem and how some of these weapons were transformed from ‘licit to illicit’ arms.

4.2. Sources of Small arms in Southern Africa

Most of the weapons currently found circulating in Southern Africa entered the sub-region during the Cold War when both superpowers and their allies supplied weapons to their respective clients in the sub-region. During the Cold War weapons supplies to the white-minority regimes came principally from western countries and arms manufacturers such as the United Kingdom, United States of America, the former West Germany, France, and Italy and Israel. However, with the imposition of UN sanctions on these regimes, private western arms manufacturers (often with the knowledge of their home governments) started supplying these regimes with weapons in flagrant defiance of United Nations arms embargo.

At the same time, the former eastern bloc countries including the Soviet Union, Cuba, China supplied weapons to the liberation movements. Arms supply from these countries was sent to organizations like Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in South Africa, the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in Mozambique, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe Patriotic Resistance Army (ZIPRA) in Zimbabwe and the South West African People Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia. Arms transfers to the sub-region took both covert and overt forms making it difficult to monitor the exact number of weapons that entered the region during this period. However, estimates of arms flow to the region as a result of the ideological competition are in the millions. For instance it is estimated that in Mozambique alone weapons imported during the civil war range from 0.5 to six million arms and ammunition, with only about 190,000 of these weapons collected during the UN

28 Ibid, p17
peacekeeping operation (ONUMOZ). Most of the weapons that were collected during this period were, however not destroyed and soon found their way into the illegal arms market in Mozambique and other neighboring states. Most of the weapons supplies to Mozambique from the former Warsaw pact countries consisted of MIG fighter aircraft, combat helicopters, battle tanks, missile launchers and thousands of AK-47 sub machine guns, sent as military aid to Mozambique in the 1980s.

During this period, also some Western countries in collusion with apartheid South Africa armed what they called anti-communist insurgents such as UNITA in Angola, RENAMO in Mozambique and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in South Africa. At the same time, on attaining independence, most of the new governments continued to import arms from their wartime suppliers. For example, it is estimated that between 1987 and 1991, the Angolan government imported 4.6 billion USD worth of arms, 90 per cent of which came from its former ally the Soviet Union. The strategy on both sides (Eastern and Western bloc) seemed to have been to arm as much people as people through the massive supply of small arms and light weapons to their respective clients. The long shelf life of these tools of war coupled with an increasing demand for them by warlords and criminal organizations ensured the continued use of these weapons even when the original political objective for their use has been met. In the case of Southern Africa this has meant the recycling of weapons from one conflict zone to another fuelling both political violence and criminal activity.

The illegal arms market has also been another major source of small arms flow into the sub-region. The uncontrolled proliferation of weapons into the sub-region coupled with the dire economic circumstances of former combatants have drastically reduced the market value of these weapons – making them one of the cheapest commodities in the market. For instance, the most popular weapon in the region, the AK-47 can be bought in Mozambique for a chicken or a small bag of maize…in Namibia for about R25, in South Africa for about R50, in Angola it can be swapped for a pair of shoes.

31 Ibid, p8
A good number of the weapons found in the market are also often stolen from security forces. It is estimated that about 12,000 weapons were reported stolen from Mozambican security forces, in 1994 alone.\textsuperscript{32} Through the illegal arms market weapons are smuggled across the porous borders of countries in the region, with most smugglers familiar with routes that were used during the wars when covert arms supply routes were established by both sides. However, weapons are also smuggled in and out of these countries by air, road, and rail and on foot. Some of the illegal imports of arms to the sub-region come from Europe and the United States. For instance Jacklin Cock quoting the Africa Fund observed that: `hundreds of semi-automatic pistols, revolvers, rifles, magazines and hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition, worth millions of dollars left the USA, but never arrived at their stated destination in Harare, Zimbabwe`.\textsuperscript{33} It is also believed that the illegal market receives some if its supplies from corrupt and poorly paid security officials who are alleged to exchange their weapons for cash and other valuables. A direct link has been established between corrupt practices and the frequent arms leaks in government arms depots.

In addition to the external supply, the establishment of local arms manufacturing industries by some countries in the region specializing mostly in the production of small arms and light weapons has aggravated the problem. The main manufacturers of arms in the region are South Africa and Zimbabwe with a sizable capacity in Namibia, which produces for the country’s basic defence. It is estimated that the Namibian factory has a capacity to produce 30,000 rounds of ammunition per day.\textsuperscript{34} The Namibian arms company is believed to have supplied the Namibian Defence Forces (NDF) during that country’s engagement in the DRC along with Angola and Zimbabwe.

The two biggest arms producers in the region are South Africa and Zimbabwe. Of the two South Africa has the largest capacity and by 1985 it was ranked as the tenth largest producer in the world. During the apartheid years the state production and procurement organization ARMSCOR developed into the largest industrial organization in South Africa. By 1990, arms became the country’s principal manufactured export, and the third largest export after gold

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} Ibid, 1999, p7.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Mlambo, opcit, 1999, p9.
\end{itemize}
and coal. In 1992, the company was commercialized and reorganized into two parts, DENEL dealing with production and ARMSCOR becoming the state-procuring agent.\textsuperscript{35} Arms produced in South Africa were used in the sub-regions conflicts as the Pretoria regime supported RENAMO and UNITA in Mozambique and Angola respectively as part of its policy of destabilization. South Africa’s arms production program has continued even after the fall of apartheid serving as a major but often controversial source of much needed government revenue. For instance in 2001, the country’s arms export (including to neighboring countries) totaled R1, 736,572,000 an increase from its 2000 export totals of about R1, 384, 569,000.\textsuperscript{36}

The Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) is the second largest arms producer in the sub-region. The ZDI was established in 1984 by the country’s Ministry of Defence and was later on registered as a private commercial company. The ZDI produces items such as small arms ammunition, explosives, rifles, mortars and rocket launchers, camouflaged combat clothing and webbing, modifications of military vehicles and the packaging of military food rations. The ZDI sells some of its products to both regional and international buyers, thus fuelling the small arms challenge in SADC.

The end of the Cold War also saw an increase in the flow of small arms to the region, mostly from unregulated East European markets from countries such as Ukraine and Bulgaria. The post-Cold War demobilization in Eastern Europe and the standardization of weapons by the new members of NATO left huge quantities of arms that were often traded to feuding parties and criminal organizations. A good number of these arms found their way into Southern Africa to meet the demand of the respective warring parties and criminal networks in the sub-region. Thus, at the end of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century the sub-region was saturated with millions of weapons whose presence pose a serious challenge to regional human security. For instance in South Africa alone there about 3.76 million licensed firearms for private use; approximately, 82 privately-owned guns are lost or stolen every day coupled with a continuous leakage from licensed, privately owned and state-owned pools of firearms into illegal circulation. Firearms account for 50\% of weapons used in murder and they are the

\textsuperscript{35} Mlambo, Op cit, 1999,p11.
\textsuperscript{36} For a breakdown on the type of weapons and the recipient countries see, the South African Export Statistics for Conventional Arms 2000-2001.
single highest cause of non-natural death (44%) in South Africa.\(^{37}\) Some estimates of the surplus weapons in circulation in South Africa put the figure at between 400,000 to eight million.\(^{38}\)

In Angola, after over two decades of war it is impossible to estimate the number of weapons in circulation in that country. For example, after the breakdown of peace talks in 1992, and the ensuing outbreak of war, the Angolan government distributed 700,000 weapons to civilians and out of these only 34,000, was recovered during the United Nations demobilization component of UNAVEM III.\(^{39}\) In spite of the lack of clear figures on the number of surplus weapons in Southern Africa, the role of these weapons in increasing political and criminal violence and general instability is not in question. The realization by government and non-governmental actors of the threat posed to human security by the presence of these `tools of violence` has led to sub-national, national and regional initiatives to curb this menace. At the regional level SADC in collaboration with SARPCCO and other non-governmental organizations have prioritized the fight against the proliferation of small arms. The different initiatives by SADC, SARPCCO and other bilateral efforts will constitute the next portion of this paper. Having explored the sources and magnitude of small arms flow into the sub-region, the next portion of this paper will focus on the different initiatives by SADC, SARPCCO and other bilateral efforts at dealing with the small arms menace.

**5.1. SADC/SARPCCO Small Arms Initiatives**

The magnitude of small arms proliferation in Southern Africa calls for a multifaceted and regional approach in order to effectively address this ominous threat to human security. SADC views small arms as a developmental challenge that should not be treated as an exclusive security issue. Consequently, SADC approaches the problem of small arms as a socio-economic challenge with wider developmental concerns. As a matter of priority SADC has committed itself to addressing the following: preventing, combating and controlling the

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\(^{39}\) Interview with Personnel of the SADC Small Arms Committee, Gaborone, 2\(^{nd}\) August 2002.
proliferation of and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons,\textsuperscript{40} along with mine action, disaster management and conflict resolution – issues that fall under the portfolio of the SADC Secretariat’s Special Programmes.

In May 1998, at a meeting between SADC and the EU convened by the Institute for Security Studies and Saferworld, the two parties agreed to a draft document titled, \textit{Southern African Regional Action Programme on Light Arms and Illicit trafficking}. The Regional Action Programme outlined four areas of possible co-operation between SADC and the EU: Combating illicit trafficking…; strengthening legal controls…; strengthening controls over civilian possession of firearms…; and promoting the removal of arms from society and the destruction of surplus arms…, by enhancing transparency, information exchange and consultation on arms, through public transparency, information exchange and consultation.\textsuperscript{41}

The Regional Action Plan was subsequently endorsed by both SADC and EU government ministers at a meeting in Vienna in November 1999 and served as reference material in all subsequent engagements on the small arms issue. This high level cooperation between SADC and the EU, is considered important because in addition to providing much needed financial and technical resources, it is anticipated to serve as a signpost for future collaboration between Northern and Southern partners in the fight against issues of common concern such as combating the proliferation of small arms. The Regional Action Programme which was reached through a process of inter-agency and inter-regional consultations bears testimony to SADC’s recognition of the need to adopt a multi-pronged approach to addressing the proliferation of small arms in the sub-region. Thus, in order to effectively tackle the problem of small arms a combination of actions needs to be taken in controlling the legal trade, removing surplus weapons from communities, improving the operational capacity of enforcement agencies and perhaps most importantly by tackling poverty which to some extent is believed to be responsible for the high incidence of gun-related crimes.

\textsuperscript{40} This commitment is clearly spelt out in the Preamble to the SADC Protocol on The Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials, 14\textsuperscript{th} August, 2001, Blantyre, Malawi.
In September 1999, EU and SADC officials met to discuss plans for the implementation of the Action Programme. The meeting was meant to find ways of addressing the following nagging concerns: the illicit trafficking in small arms in the sub-region; the need to improve legal controls and regulations over licensed firearms; and ways in which the culture of violence produced by an increased availability of firearms could be reduced. At the end of it’s meeting the seminar proposed the following as an action plan: Supporting weapons collection and destruction programmes in Southern Africa similar to those undertaken by Operations Rachel (between Mozambique and South Africa); the need to support governments that decide to destroy rather than sell their surplus stock of firearms; and the need to produce regional integrated plans for action in small arms control between the police and other agencies at the regional level.\footnote{Gamba, opcit, 1999, p66.}

One of the most significant breakthroughs in SADC’s efforts to address the problem of Small arms in Southern Africa is the adoption of the SADC Protocol on The Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials. The Protocol was developed by the SARPCCO legal subcommittee consisting of legal officers from the national police services of SARPCCO member states.\footnote{There are currently 12 SADC member states that have joined SARPCCO namely: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Out of the 14 SADC member states, it is only the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Seychelles that are not members of SARPCCO.} This is significant because it marks a giant step in the working relationship between SARPCCO and SADC. The Protocol was signed by all SARPCCO member states except Angola, which citing technical difficulties but nevertheless firmly supported the adoption of the Protocol. This Protocol is considered a significant step forward because it is the first legally binding document on firearms in sub-Saharan Africa.

In its Preamble the Protocol succinctly captures the small arms challenge:

Conscious that illegal firearms, most commonly used in the perpetration of crime, contribute to the high levels of instability, extended conflict, violence and social dislocation evident in Southern Africa and the African continent as a whole; the urgent need to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of firearms, ammunition and other related materials…
reaffirming that priority should be given to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of firearms, ammunition…." 44

The objectives of the Protocol are outlined as follows: Prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of firearms, ammunition and other related materials; promote and facilitate co-operation and exchange of information and experience in the Region and co-operate closely at the regional level as well as at international fora to effectively prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of excessive and destabilizing use and accumulation of, trafficking in, possession and use of, firearms, ammunition and other related materials in collaboration with international partners. 45

Article 5 of the Protocol on The Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials, stipulates that: "State Parties shall enact the necessary legislation and take other measures to establish as criminal offences under their national law to prevent, combat and eradicate, the illicit manufacturing of firearms, ammunition and other related materials, and their excessive and destabilizing accumulation, trafficking, possession and use," further emphasizing that: "State Parties shall enact the necessary legislation and take other measures to sanction criminally, civilly or administratively under national law the violation of arms embargoes mandated by the Security Council of the United Nations." 46 This clause has precipitated a wave of actions and programs by SADC member states starting with reviews of domestic arms legislations in Tanzania, Botswana, and South Africa to name a few.

In Tanzania the government has launched, The Tanzanian National Action Plan for Arms Management and Disarmament, the first of its kind anywhere in the world. The central elements of the Tanzanian National Action Plan are geared towards the: Establishment/sensitization of existing national bodies and agencies; Review of national legislation, administrative procedures and regulation followed by implementation of the new provisions; Training and capacity building; Developing international and regional cooperation and information exchange; Cooperation and interaction with civil society in order to build support for

National Action Plan and secure civil society involvement in its implementation; and Identification and action on critical areas of control such as cross-border entry points.47

This is a unique program that developed through a thorough and comprehensive process of planning and research, active engagement with regional and international arms control initiatives and close consultation and collaboration with civil society. The uniqueness of this initiative lies in the fact that it is founded upon a collaborative and inclusive approach, which recognizes the vital role that civil society can and must play, if sustainable peace, security and development are to be secured.

On the 27th July 2002, the government of Botswana recommended to Parliament a review of the existing Arms and Ammunition Act in order to incorporate the provisions of the SADC Protocol on Small Arms. Botswana is credited for being one of the first SADC member states to ratify the SADC Protocol on firearms and has also established national focal points consisting of: the Botswana Police Force (BDF), the Botswana Defence Force, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice, Customs, Immigration and is in the process of identifying non-governmental organization (NGO) partners.48

On 12 October 2000, after lengthy consultations and lobbying by non-governmental organizations such as Gun Free South Africa (GFSA), the South African Parliament approved the Firearms Control Bill (FCB), with the National Council of Provinces (the second Chamber) approving it on 10 November 2000. With the endorsement by both houses of parliament, the Firearms Control Bill became the Firearms Control Act. The process leading to the approval of the FCB was preceded by a series of submissions by civil society organizations to members of the Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security in the South African Parliament. As part of its policy to control the flow of illegal weapons, the South African National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCAAC) has also undertaken to destroy in stages all redundant or surplus firearms in government depots.49

49 According to a press release by the Chief of Defence Corporate Communications, Major-General Chris Pepani, by February 1999, the government had agreed to destroy 262 667 small calibre weapons.
The Committee recommended to Cabinet the destruction of all state-held redundant, obsolete, unserviceable and confiscated semi-automatic and automatic weapons and purpose-built sniper rifles of a caliber smaller than 12.7mm. The recommendation was approved by cabinet and in 1998, the Department of Defence took the decision to destroy all surplus, redundant and obsolete and confiscated weapons in its possession: a total of 271,867 small caliber weapons.\footnote{For a complete breakdown of weapons destroyed by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) see Nick Sendall and Maj-Gen., Zondagh, "Destruction of surplus stocks: South Africa’s progress,” Focus on Small Arms in Africa, No.2, June 2002.}

The South African Police Service (SAPS) is also carrying out a firearms standardization plan that will see the phasing out and destruction of all firearms that do not conform to police requirements. On 9 July, in marking the United Nations International Small Arms Destruction Day, the Southern African Police Service destroyed 22,787 firearms in Johannesburg.\footnote{For Details see the Cape Argus, 7 July, 2002.} In the broader regional context, the government has also entered into bilateral agreements with neighboring countries such as Mozambique in what is perhaps one of the most successful bi-lateral initiatives undertaken in the sub-region – Operation Rachel.

In recognition of the daunting challenge facing their two countries and the damaging effects of illicit trafficking in small arms on their nations, the South African and Mozambican governments signed a crime combating agreement in 1995. The agreement allows for the police forces of the two countries to coordinate joint operations in their common fight against cross border activities that negatively impacts on the safety and security of their citizens. This initiative grew out of the recognition that arms cachés in Mozambique were smuggled into the South African market. The agreement mandates the police forces in both countries to gather intelligence on arms cache locations. A team of police officers from both countries then destroys weapons discovered. South Africa pays the bulk of the operational costs and also provides technical assistance to their Mozambican counterparts in weapons disposal and destruction. One of the main characteristics of the operation is that they have been intelligence-driven. Due to its success the Operation Rachel has attracted a lot of support from private companies who give incentives to informers (mostly women and children) if they lead them to arms caches.\footnote{Gamba, opcit, 1999,p69.}
The success of *Operation Rachel* has been attributed partly to its unorthodox policing approach. Individuals with information of arms caches sites are involved in the operations and they are often remunerated for divulging any information leading the discovery of weapons caches. The strategy is based on the rationale that most of the cache caretakers know more about other caches. ‘If you prosecute at the outset you lose the persons co-operation to disclose other caches.’\(^{53}\) Below is an illustration of the arms discovered and destroyed since the launch of Operation Rachel in 1995.

**Weapons Destroyed from Operations Rachel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small arms and light weapons</td>
<td>1,127</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>5,683</td>
<td>4,388</td>
<td>2,314</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>2,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antipersonnel land mines</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>23,531</td>
<td>136,639</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>155,314</td>
<td>108,937</td>
<td>85,112</td>
<td>177,000</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Focus No.2, June 2002

**Breakdown of types of Weapons destroyed in the first four phases of Operations Rachel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Rachel I</th>
<th>Rachel II</th>
<th>Rachel III</th>
<th>Rachel IV</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>5,584</td>
<td>4,712</td>
<td>11,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antipersonnel Mines</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>5,160</td>
<td>6,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landmines</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand Grenades</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand Grenade Detonators</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detonators</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>890</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{53}\) Ibid, p69
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mortars</th>
<th>292</th>
<th>3,726</th>
<th>2,997</th>
<th>7,015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Launchers</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projectiles</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>2,340</td>
<td>5,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boosters</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannon</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds of Ammunition</td>
<td>23,182</td>
<td>136,631</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>155,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>3,674</td>
<td>1,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other accessories</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>876</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dr. Norman Mlambo 1999.

At the annual SADC Summit in Maputo, the Council of Ministers agreed to constitute a SADC Small Arms Committee, with a mandate to look into all issues related to small arms and light weapons. At the same time the EU-SADC Co-operation Executive Committee at a meeting in Cape Town recommended the creation of a EU-SADC technical group on issues around small arms. The SADC small arms committee has representation from all member states and is chaired by the presiding Chair of SADC. The creation of this Committee is considered a significant step forward because it will serve as an important focal point in the Southern African sub-region.

In 1999, SARPCCO received formal recognition from SADC and was immediately delegated to sit on a working group mandated to draft a SADC policy on small arms. The SARPCCO Legal Committee, whose mandate covers all legal issues constraining effective policing including the harmonization of laws, was subsequently invited to formulate a SADC Protocol on small arms. At its inception in 1995, SARPCCO was given a broad mandate which is to: ``Promote, strengthen and perpetuate co-operation and foster joint strategies for the management of all forms of cross-border and related crimes with regional implications.`` The gravity of arms trafficking in the sub-region is succinctly captured in the Preamble to the SARPCCO Declaration.

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54 Gamba, Opcit, 1999,p66.
55 For details see the SADC Protocol on The Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials, Blantyre, Malawi, August 2001.
To date SARPCCO has satisfactorily discharged its mandate and now acts as the implementing agency of SADC programs and policies on small arms in the sub-region. Between 1995-1998 SARPCCO had conducted three joint operations and recovered 624 stolen vehicles, 85 firearms and 129,000 rounds of ammunition and 838 arrests were made. In view of the successful joint operations, the SARPCCO final Communiqué at its July 1998 meeting in Gaborone stated that: "The success of the three operations during the year under review was an indication of what can be achieved when police agencies act together with a common purpose in the fight against crime."56 Between May 2000 to April 2001, SARPCCO undertook a total of six intelligence operations during which it recovered 320 stolen vehicles, 79 firearms and 20,071 rounds of ammunition. The Permanent Coordinating Committee of heads of Criminal Investigation Services (PCC) whose mandates covers strategic and operational planning, helps to plan all SARPCCO operations. The PCC helps to plan and execute all joint operations targeting priority crimes in the region including; motor vehicle theft; arms trafficking; stock theft; and illegal immigration.57

From the time of its inception in 1995 to 1997, SARPCCO conducted nine operations targeting firearms trafficking, motor vehicle and other organized crime syndicates in the sub-region. Between February and March 1997, Operation V4, which involved Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, was launched. In a twelve-day period during this operation, a total of 1,576 stolen vehicles were recovered. Other operations undertaken are: Operation Midas, June 1998, covering Lesotho, South Africa and Mauritius; Operation Atlantic, July 1997, covering Botswana, South Africa and Namibia; Operation Stone, April 1998, covering Angola, Botswana and Namibia; Operation Sesani, April 1999, covering Botswana, Tanzania, Malawi, South Africa and Zimbabwe; and Operation Makbulu, July to August 2000, covering Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.58 These operations are credited for the recovery of large quantities of illicit and stolen firearms and also led to the busting of some regional crime networks.

In the light of the above analysis, one could argue that SADC has undertaken some significant initiatives in its fight against the proliferation of small arms in the sub-region. These initiatives are reflected both in policy proclamation such as the SADC Protocol on small arms and practical measures such as joint police operations through the SARPPCO framework. The analysis indicates a clear consensus on SADC small arms initiatives, however, other SADC initiatives, especially those dealing with military security provokes a great deal of political sensitivity, as will be illustrated in the ensuing analysis of the political acrimony and controversy that followed the establishment of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS).

6.1. The Organ on Politics Defense and Security

The SADC organ on Politics Defense and Security was established in 1996. At its inception on 28 June 1996, the Summit Communiqué defined the major objective of the Organ as the promotion of Peace and Security in the Region, by making sure that it: “protects the people and safeguards the development of the Region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict, inter-state conflict and aggression; promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and defence and establishes appropriate mechanisms to this end; develop close co-operation between the police and state security services of State Parties in order to address: cross border crime; and promote a community based approach to domestic security….” The Communiqué also provided that the Organ would function at the Summit level, operating independently of other SADC structures, as well as at the ministerial and technical levels. Its Chair would rotate among a troika on an annual basis (the current chair would closely liaise with the outgoing Chair and the incoming Chair).

The euphoria surrounding the establishment of the Organ did not last long, as it was immediately dogged by controversy and political squabbling that could best be described as a ‘tug-of-war’ between the two regional giants: South Africa and Zimbabwe. The relative autonomy of the Organ as outlined in the Communiqué became the most contentious issue that virtually rendered the Organ inoperable for the better part of the 1990s. South Africa,


60 Ibid.
for its part, maintained that the Organ should be a SADC sub-structure and should report directly to the SADC Summit. The South African position was based on Article 10 of the SADC Treaty, which provides that the SADC Summit is the "supreme policy-making Institution of SADC" and is "responsible for the overall policy direction and control of the functions of SADC."61 Although South Africa did not dispute the fact that it was the Organ’s responsibility to address intra- and inter-state conflict, it strongly contended that addressing conflict in the region remains a core function of SADC, hence the need for the Organ to be part of SADC.

On the other hand, Zimbabwe, asserted that the Organ should function under a separate Chair, as essentially a parallel structure to SADC. Zimbabwe was of the view that the Summit envisions the newly established body to operate separately, based on the principles of the Front Line States. In projecting its argument, Zimbabwe invoked the Gaborone Communiqué, which provides that "The Organ on politics, Defense and Security shall operate at the summit level, and shall function independently of other SADC structures."62

In the early 1990s, Zimbabwe had canvassed the idea of having SADC focus on exclusively economic issues and advocated for a new version of the FLS to be responsible for politics, defence and security. Zimbabwe rationalized the need for this strict division on three grounds: firstly, it felt that confidentiality would be compromised if security issues were entrusted with the SADC Secretariat, whose operations was heavily reliant on foreign donors; secondly, Botswana controlled SADC and received the bulk of donor resources by virtue of the SADC Secretariat being based in Gaborone; and finally, and perhaps most importantly, high intensity conflict should be dealt with along the lines of informal and flexible political arrangements of the FLS. Thus according to Nathan, "one of the underlying concerns was that formal rules and procedures would compromise sovereignty on matters of 'high politics' and constrain national and multilateral freedom of action in crisis situations."63

62 Opit, Ibid, 1996
63 Laurie, Nathan, ”Organ Failure”: A Review of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security, (draft paper) Centre for Conflict Resolution Cape Town, South Africa p13
The suspicion and mistrust that characterized inter-state relations in the sub-region coupled with what often tended to be a personality clash between President Robert Mugabe and Nelson Mandela further complicated efforts at establishing a collective security mechanism in Southern Africa. Whilst President Mandela favored a more structured, rules-based and centralized approach to security issues, President Mugabe favored the loose and flexible style that characterized the operations of the FLS. The South African policy was viewed in some quarters as an attempt to destroy the rich legacy of the FLS, and even the Organ itself. This, according to Lt. Col. W. Tapfumaneyi, a leading voice on security issues in the sub-region, “has led many to suspect the influence of a ‘hidden hand’. Fingers have been pointed at some Western Powers and at the machinations of the still inordinately white South African civil service.”

Thus between 1996-1999, the Organ could not be effectively operational due to political differences that tended to divide the region into what could loosely be referred to as: the militarists camp (Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia) and the pacificists camp (South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania). The polarization of states in the sub-region has rendered SADC incapable of intervening in a timely and cohesive manner. The controversial sub-regional responses to the Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) crises are clear manifestations of the rift that was created over the control of the Organ.

In September 1998, South African and Botswana troops entered Lesotho on the invitation of the Prime Minister, who had requested military action to stabilize the crises that had erupted in his country. At the center of the crises in the mountain Kingdom was the results of national election that were disputed by the opposition parties. The crisis reached a critical point when a group of junior military officers mutinied and imprisoned their superiors threatening to plunge the country into full-scale violence. In consultation with Mozambique and Zimbabwe, South Africa and Botswana sent troops to Lesotho in what was codenamed Operation Boleas. The joint South African/Botswana operation met stiff resistance form the Lesotho Defence Forces (LDF) plunging Maseru, into chaos and anarchy, as angry residents targeted South African businesses in the city.

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It should be mentioned at this point that under a 1994 agreement dealing with crises in Lesotho, SADC mandated Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe to be the guarantors of stability in that country. However, in spite of the SADC mandate the intervention drew serious criticism on several grounds: firstly, that the intervening countries did not get the approval of all SADC member states and as such should not be canvassed as a SADC-operation; secondly, the crises in Lesotho were internal and did not threaten regional stability, hence the intervention constituted a violation of Lesotho’s sovereignty; and thirdly, that the operation was inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the UN Charter. In spite of which side one takes in the ensuing debate, a major outcome of Operation Boleas was that it highlighted the legal, military and political complications surrounding actions by states in the name of collective security when the rules and procedures are not clearly defined and agreed upon. This ad hoc intervention was reminiscent of the controversy that followed ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the early and late 1990s respectively.

Perhaps the most controversial intervention that has polarized SADC member states more than anything else since the establishment of the Organ is the Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean intervention in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the name of SADC. In August 1998, the government of President Laurent Kabila of DRC was faced with a rebellion in the northeastern part of the country that threatened his government. According to the Kabila government, the new rebel group known as Rassemblement Congolais pour démocratie (RCD) was supported by Rwanda and Uganda – interestingly enough both countries supported Kabila in his war against the late President Mobutu Sese Seko. President Kabila, feeling the increasing pressure from the RCD and its Rwandan and Ugandan allies, pleaded to SADC for help to fight off what his government referred to as a foreign invasion. In response to Kabila’s plea, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe convened an emergency summit of regional leaders at Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, to find a solution to the crisis in the DRC. The meeting was attended by leaders from Angola, DRC, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. At the meeting a four-nation committee of representatives from Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe was created.

65 Article 11.1a of the SADC Protocol on Politics Defence and Security clearly states that: “In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, State Parties shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, other than for the legitimate purpose of individual or collective self-defence against an armed attack.”
to help secure a cease-fire. Upon receiving the recommendations of this four-nation committee, President Mugabe forwarded the proposals to an ISDSC meeting in Harare and later declared that SADC had unanimously agreed to Kabila’s requests for military assistance. The following day, the Defence Ministers of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe declared that their three countries would send troops to assist a fellow SADC member state that is suffering from external aggression.66

The three intervening states (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe) signed a *Defence Pact* with the DRC agreeing that external aggression against any of the four member states would be considered as an aggression against all of them. The signing of the *Defence Pact*, by the group of four left no doubt in the minds of observers of their preference of a militaristic approach to the DRC crisis. It was a clear demonstration of their belief that a political settlement can be achieved through the pursuance of a military option – a position that ran counter to South Africa’s diplomatic approach – thus dividing SADC into two. Observers of political developments in SADC have attributed the militaristic strategy adopted by the Zimbabwe led-group of four as both economic and strategic. According to Rocky Williams, “all four countries stood to benefit strategically from a well-disposed president in the DRC who was under an obligation towards them. Militarily two of the ‘defence treaty’ countries – Angola and the DRC-required a DRC that was purged of the complex web of adversarial military groupings such as UNITA and the UNITA/Eastern DRC rebel groupings/Rwanda force alliance. Politically, all four countries stood to benefit from a more closely knit relationship capable of countering the diverse political threats to their national interests of facilitating the economic growth of their respective countries.”67

It should be remembered that at the start of the rebellion against the Mobutu regime in the mid-1990s, South Africa under President Mandela had tried to negotiate for what some observers saw as a `soft landing’68 for the advancing Kabila forces and a safe exit for the late

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66 For details see Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities, Geneva, Switzerland, UNIDIR, 2000/3
68 Interview with officials at the Zimbabwe Ministry of Defence, Harare, 25 July 2002. During the interview the officials mentioned that the conflict in the DRC was centred on the perceived shift in the control of that country’s strategic minerals. DRC by joining SADC was seen as moving out of the sphere of
President Mobutu Sese Seko. As negotiations were going on in the Atlantic aboard a South African Naval Vessel, the Kabila forces marched on the DRC capital, Kinshasa, much to the annoyance of President Mandela who felt betrayed by Kabila’s deceit – a feeling that characterized relations between the two countries under the leadership of both men. South Africa felt sidelined by Zimbabwe’s political maneuvering and as the SADC Chair convened an extraordinary Summit in Pretoria, to which, the Presidents of Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda as well as the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) were invited. The South African government challenged President Mugabe’s authority to send troops on behalf of SADC, strongly advancing a diplomatic solution as the only viable route towards resolving the crisis. Both the Angolan and Zimbabwean Presidents did not attend the SADC extra-ordinary Summit meeting convened by President Mandela the SADC Chair.\(^{69}\)

The failure to reach a common ground on ways of resolving the crises in the Congo and the ensuing tensions and acrimony between South Africa and Zimbabwe greatly diminished SADC’s role as a honest broker in the DRC conflict. Both Presidents Mandela and Mugabe engaged in what could best be described as a ‘verbal warfare.’ For example, in direct reference to the South African President, Mugabe bluntly stated that: ‘No SADC country is compelled to help a brother country. But those who don’t want to help should keep quiet about those who want to do so.’ In a clear acknowledgement of the divisions within SADC President Mugabe said ‘We must now enlist the OAU which has an organ for conflict resolution. It is not possible for us to resolve it as SADC because we are divided.’\(^{70}\) At a SADC meeting held during the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit in Durban, President Mandela made a surprising about-face by announcing that SADC unanimously supported the three SADC countries’ military intervention in the DRC. However, Mandela’s acquiescence to Mugabe’s actions did not signify his approval of military action but rather a lack of interest in engaging in verbal warfare with President Mugabe. In spite of this sudden about-face by President Mandela, the South African government (even under President Mbeki) has continued to champion a negotiated settlement. According to Horst Brammer,

\(^{69}\) Ibid.

the Deputy Director of SADC Political Affairs in the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, "Mandela’s announcement was purely an attempt to reflect some form of unity in SADC. South Africa did not diverge from its position that a standstill, ceasefire, and elections were necessary for a true resolution to the conflict." 71

It should however, be mentioned that the tension over the control of the Organ has been diffused significantly since President Thabo Mbeki’s accession to power in South Africa. In addition to South African-led continental initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the newly established African Union (AU), Pretoria has adopted a more conciliatory foreign policy of engaging both its neighbors in SADC and the AU at large to discuss issues of common concern. The truce that resulted from the new era of relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe and the active involvement of other neighboring states such as Mozambique and Swaziland both as Chairs of the Organ during this period has contributed to a resolution of the differences over the control of the Organ. The thorny issue over the Organ’s relative independence has been resolved and is clearly articulated by Article 3.1 of the revised SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation signed in Blantyre, Malawi, on the 14th August, 2001, which states that "The Organ shall be an institution of SADC and shall report to the Summit". The revised Protocol further sets out the following structures for the Organ: the Chairperson of the Organ; the Troika; a Ministerial Committee consisting of Ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, public security and state security from each state; an Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPSDC) comprised of, ministers responsible for foreign affairs from each of the State Parties; an Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) comprising of ministers responsible for defence, public security and state security from each of the state Parties; and such other sub-structures as may be established by an of the ministerial committees. 72 At the time of writing South African led-peace efforts in the DRC were starting to bear fruit following the July 2002 signing of a ceasefire agreement between the Presidents of the DRC and Rwanda in Pretoria, South Africa. The agreement calls for the withdrawal of all foreign troops present in the DRC within 90 days of the signing of the

71 Berman and Sams, opcit, 2000,p178.
72 For details on the functions of the respective sub-structures of the Organ see, the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, Blantyre, Malawi, 14th August 2001. Note that 13 out of the 14 SADC member states signed the Protocol. Angola preoccupied with its internal security situation did not sign the Protocol.
agreement. By the first week of October 2002, most countries with troops in the DRC had
honored the agreement and withdrawn their forces.73

In spite of the controversy that plagued the Organ since its inception, the sub-region has
undertaken significant steps in other areas of regional security cooperation. For instance, the
establishment of The Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPKC), at the Zimbabwe
Staff College, is an important step in SADC’s attempt to improve its peacekeeping capacity.
Since its establishment, the RPKC working in close collaboration with the Inter-State
Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), has played a crucial role in providing initial
training, planning and execution of major regional peacekeeping exercises such as: Exercise
Blue Hungwe April, 1997, Blue Crane, November 1998, and Exercise Tanzite, 2000 and Tulipe,
May 1999. The importance of these exercises is to bring together the various Armed Forces
in the region in joint training exercises and through this to remove the fears of mistrust
existing in the sub-region and to make the various forces inter-operable. For example, Blue
Hungwe the first regional Peace Support Operation (PSO) hosted by Zimbabwe brought
together a total of eleven SADC member states: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The
main objective of the exercise was to bring together military contingents and civilian police
from member states in order to participate in a PSO exercise.74

Apart from organizing and planning peacekeeping training exercises with the RPKC, the
ISDSC has also established a satellite communication system linking the various SADC
governments. This "high level-hotline" was installed in 1999. Each member state has been
given two terminals, which they will place as they see fit with one likely dedicated to the
office of each nation’s defence Minister. These terminals are intended to be under 24-hour
supervision. At the same time under the ISDSC’s supervision, SADC has committed itself to
creating a standby brigade. Each country will earmark formed units as well as headquarters

73 By the time of writing, Rwanda had withdrawn its last contingent of 1000 troops from the eastern part of
the DRC. This is significant because Rwanda had the largest number of troops in the DRC and in the past
had refused to withdraw its forces citing fears of Hutu/Interahamwe (the 1994 genocideists) cross-border
raids into Rwanda. Zimbabwe has also withdrawn the first set of 2000 troops from the DRC. The death of
Jonas Savimbi and UNITA’s reduced military threat, dampened the MPLA’s government’s strategic
interest in the DRC conflict. These are important developments that promise a restoration of peace to
SADC’s largest and perhaps most complex member state.
74 For Detail on Exercise Blue Hungwe, see Blue Hungwe Report Book One, 1-17 April, 1997, Nyanga,
Zimbabwe, Ministry of Defence, 1997
staff. It should be mentioned that this particular agreement has experienced delays due to the impasse over the Organ.\textsuperscript{75} However, it should be mentioned that in spite of the impasse over the Organ the sub-region has continued to pursue efforts at improving security co-operation and the enhancement of regional human security through various means as discussed above.

Conclusion

Attempts at promoting human security through the building of a collective security architecture such as the OPDS, has brought to the fore the tensions that arise out of such efforts. The continued eruptions of violent domestic conflicts and the often contradictory and inconsistent response by the leaders in the region points to the compelling need for the establishment of a regional security architecture that will ensure coordinated and consistent responses to future conflicts in the sub-region. SADC’s bold attempt at addressing wider regional security issues leads to the following conclusions:

Firstly, that the broad conceptualization of human security (i.e. freedom from fear and want) makes it a useful but difficult analytical tool. For instance, analysis of SADC initiatives on small arms and the OPDS presents limited but important aspects of the larger human security agenda – i.e. addressing freedom from fear. However, what is perhaps most significant is that the notion of human security presents a unique opportunity for a widened approach to security to include non-military security as espoused by SADC’s 1993 \textit{Framework and Treaty Document} which, defined security to include broader issues of socio-economic development. Through the adoption of a new security paradigm, Southern Africa is beginning to develop new norms for collective security through the OPDS and common security through SARPCCO and other regional mechanisms and initiatives.

Secondly, that there is a general understanding and acceptance of the need to promote human security in the sub-region. However, there is a lack of a cohesive approach, which, has often led to controversial and contradictory responses, as was the case over the Lesotho and the DRC interventions. These interventions shows that there are no clear agreements on the ways and means of enhancing regional human security through a collective approach especially on issues of ‘high politics.’ Some of the lack of consensus can be attributed to a

\textsuperscript{75} Berman and Sams, \textit{opcit}, pp166-170
lingering suspicion of post-apartheid South Africa’s policy in the region especially in the area of security – a situation that dates back the days of apartheid and minority rule in the region. The political bickering that developed between Presidents Mandela and Mugabe over the control of the SADC Organ, can be attributed to the suspicion by President Mugabe and others in the region that South Africa’s security policy was driven by a small but powerful remnants of the apartheid era elites operating in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and middle ranking and senior military officers in the SANDF.

Thirdly, there is greater political receptivity within SADC for cooperation on issues of ‘low politics’ than ‘high politics.’ For example SARCCO’s successful operations is largely attributed to the fact that it avoids getting trapped by the crippling issues of high politics. The ease with which the SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms was approved compared to the political impasse over the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security are glaring manifestation of this trend in the region. However, the successful launching of joint peace support exercises under the auspices of SADC coupled with joint police operations is a clear demonstration of the fact that more opportunities exist for security cooperation at the functional than the political level. Thus, issues of sovereignty and intervention still remain sensitive political matters, making states less amenable to bind themselves to a set of norms and values especially in the area of high politics.

Fourthly, responses to the DRC conflict has contributed to exposing a deep rift in SADC that can largely be attributed to the existence of different approaches to security cooperation in the region. Whilst some SADC member states eschew non-military means of resolving conflicts, others are more inclined to a military approach to resolving political problems. For instance, whilst the Zimbabwe-led group favored a mutual defence pact on the DRC question, the South African-led group on the other hand promoted the idea of a collective security regime. Perhaps the difference in approach can be explained by the existence or non-existence of democratic norms and values in the respective states. However, caution needs to be exercised over these generalizations, as exceptions exist within the different camps. For instance Swaziland, which is not democratic is aligned to the pacific camp, whilst Namibia, which is democratic, is aligned to the militarist camp.
Fifthly, the end of apartheid has left states in the sub-region with no identified common enemy, dampening the regional resolve to tackle issues (especially security) with a cohesive collective resolve. The existence of different political traditions in the respective member states ranging from established democracies, pseudo democracies to authoritarian regimes is perhaps a major factor that shapes their response to conflicts in the sub-region.

Finally, it should be realized that an effective mechanism(s) to deal with human security could only be built if there is a clear consensus on the rules, norms and directions of that structure(s). In a region that is averse to having ‘regional hegemons’ consultation, dialogue and consensus should be the guiding principles of such attempts. The controversy that was triggered by the South African-led intervention in Lesotho and the Angola/Namibia and Zimbabwe interventions in the DRC highlights the political, military and legal complications that arise when collective enforcement action is taken on an ad hoc basis. The Nigerian-led ECOWAS intervention in Liberia and Sierra suffered from the same complications due largely to its ad hoc nature - the intervening countries were accused amongst other things of violating not only the ECOWAS Treaty but also the OAU and UN Charters, which clearly state that collective security enforcement should only be undertaken with the authorization of the UN Security Council.

Recommendations

- SADC should give priority to ‘functional’ co-operation (less politically sensitive issues such as combating the proliferation of small arms), whilst it embarks on confidence building measures to create the right atmosphere for wider and deeper political/security co-operation. Thus, SADC like ECOWAS and IGAD should avoid taking a ‘big bang’ approach to political/security co-operation.

- SADC should engage in more joint Peace Support Operation exercises involving civilian organizations. This will not only make the militaries of the respective SADC member states interoperable but would also assist in cultivating a strong culture of civil-military relations. Improving civil-military relations would invariably bolster wider peace-building efforts in the sub-region.
• Efforts should be made to link the SADC Protocol on Firearms with other sub-regional initiatives such as the Bamako Declaration, the ECOWAS Moratorium and the Nairobi Declaration, with wider continental programs such as NEPAD and the African Union and international efforts like the UN Program of Action on Small Arms. This can be done through information sharing and research or what could best be described as a `reciprocal learning` process.

• SADC should make efforts to link SARPCCO with other sub-regional policing organizations or the agencies responsible for implementing small arms initiatives in the respective regions. There is a compelling need to widen and deepen police cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa because some of challenges to human security such as small arms proliferation and drug trafficking are both cross-border and cross regional in nature. Thus, there is a compelling need to strengthen the SARPPCO Legal sub-committee to enhance greater harmonization of policy on issues of common concern.

• The OPDS should be strengthened with clear binding legal agreements on the rules and procedure for collective security action in the sub-region. The establishment and strengthening of such rules will reduce the political controversies and acrimony that characterized the contested interventions in Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This will also minimize the risk of inaction when action is needed by SADC member states to deal with issues in the sub-region that has the potential of threatening regional peace and security.

• SADC should establish an effective Early Warning and Conflict Resolution Mechanism. The creation of such a viable structure will allow for the monitoring of potential violent conflict zones and the peaceful resolution of conflicts before they erupt. This would minimize the `fire brigade` approach to conflicts within SADC in particular and sub-Saharan Africa in general.

• Finally, SADC should undertake a study on how to generate revenue in the region for its operations. It should ensure that at least 55 to 65 per cent of its budget costs are internally generated. Relying on huge donor funding especially in the area of
security could lead to suspicion and political acrimony that often degenerates to accusations of a ‘hidden hand at play’, as was manifested by Zimbabwe’s opposition to the location of the Organ on Politics Defense and Security (OPDS) at the SADC Secretariat. For instance, in the struggle over the control of the OPDS, Zimbabwe was of the view that since the SADC Secretariat was highly dependent on donor funding locating the OPDS at the Secretariat will compromise sub-regional security.
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