Prospectus for the Peace, Conflict and Development Program Initiative for 2005-2010

Proposal Submitted to the Board of Governors

Program and Partnership Branch
International Development Research Centre
Ottawa, Canada

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# Table of Contents

- List of Acronyms .................................................................................................................. 3
- Executive Summary ................................................................................................................. 4

1. Background and context ........................................................................................................ 6
   1.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 6
   1.2. Development challenges .................................................................................................... 6
   1.3. International and Canadian foreign policy and activities ................................................ 9
   1.4. Lessons from previous program phases .......................................................................... 11
     1.4.1. Lessons and findings from our external review .......................................................... 12
     1.4.2. Lessons from our programming experience ............................................................. 13
     1.4.3. Lessons from programming in violent contexts ......................................................... 15

2. Vision, objectives, outcomes, and thematic entry points ..................................................... 17
   2.1. Definition of terms ............................................................................................................. 17
   2.2. Vision ................................................................................................................................. 18
   2.3. Objectives .......................................................................................................................... 18
   2.4. Anticipated program outcomes .......................................................................................... 21
   2.5. Entry points and programming approaches ...................................................................... 21
     2.5.1. Democratic processes in governance and peacebuilding ........................................... 21
     2.5.2. Political economy of peace and conflict ..................................................................... 23
     2.5.3. Security and insecurity ............................................................................................... 26
     2.5.4. Violence, trauma, justice and reconciliation ............................................................... 29
   2.6 Programming approach ..................................................................................................... 30

3. Implementation ........................................................................................................................ 32
   3.1. Activities/programming modalities .................................................................................... 32
     3.1.1. Research programming .............................................................................................. 32
     3.1.2. “Knowledge conveying” ............................................................................................ 35
   3.2. Partnership .......................................................................................................................... 36
   3.3. Communications ................................................................................................................. 37

4. Evaluation .................................................................................................................................. 38

5. Anticipated challenges/risks ..................................................................................................... 38

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 41

Annex 1: Programming considerations in/indicators of pre-conflict, conflict and post- conflict contexts .................................................................................................................. 47
Annex 2: Evaluation plan, 2005-2010 ........................................................................................ 56
Annex 3: Table of current and pipelined PCD projects ............................................................ 58
Annex 4: Indicative PCD pipeline, 2005-06 ................................................................................. 63
Annex 5: PCD PI Team ................................................................................................................. 66
# List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee</td>
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<td>CRIES</td>
<td>Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales</td>
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<td>CSVR</td>
<td>Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada, pre-2004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department of International Development</td>
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<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
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<td>ECCP</td>
<td>European Centre for Conflict Prevention</td>
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<td>EASF</td>
<td>Expert and Advisory Services Fund</td>
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<td>FAC</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Canada</td>
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<td>FLACSO</td>
<td>Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
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<td>ICTJ</td>
<td>International Center for Transitional Justice</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>internally displaced persons</td>
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<td>IIDEA</td>
<td>International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IPA</td>
<td>International Peace Academy</td>
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<td>JSSR</td>
<td>justice and security sector reform</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NORAD</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>NSI</td>
<td>North-South Institute</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>official development assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>PCAI</td>
<td>Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment</td>
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<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
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<td>SEE</td>
<td>Social and Economic Equity</td>
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<td>TRJ</td>
<td>transitional and restorative justice</td>
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<td>UBC</td>
<td>University of British Colombia</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WSP</td>
<td>War-torn Societies Project</td>
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Executive Summary

As PBR submits its third programming prospectus, the external context within which it will operate poses significant challenges and opportunities. What is known and understood is that violent conflict, conflict prevention and peacebuilding are complex and multi-faceted in their dimensions, and require comprehensive solutions. Political, economic, socio-cultural, international and historical factors combine and reinforce each other in a myriad of combinations to influence emergence of peace and conflict in each context, and require careful unpacking if effective solutions are to be designed and implemented. Reflective of the continuing and long-term challenges to working in the peacebuilding field, and the fact that conflict to peace transitions are not linear, PBR is changing its name to “Peace, Conflict and Development” (PCD). PCD will address itself to four thematic entry points:

- democratic processes in governance and peacebuilding
- political economy of peace and conflict
- security and insecurity
- violence, trauma, justice and reconciliation.

The field of peacebuilding research has expanded considerably since PCD first began programming. However, much of this research is generated by researchers and organizations situated in the North, despite the fact that most conflict and peacebuilding activity occurs in the South.

PCD will continue to support research that is on peacebuilding and its specific issues, as well as research for specific peacebuilding contexts. PCD’s programming works to enhance accountability within peacebuilding contexts, as well as support the development of the peacebuilding field in the South. For PCD, there are horizontal and vertical axes of accountability. Horizontal accountability runs between citizen to citizen, and vertical accountability runs between the citizen and civil society, the state and the international community. PCD also interacts with and supports Southern actors as generators of knowledge, rather than merely recipients or repositories of information. The PCD program uses this as the starting point for approaches to further development of peacebuilding as a field of research and endeavour in the South. These three axioms underpin the following five PCD program objectives or expected outcomes:

- PCD-supported researchers generate evidence-based findings that can be used by civil society actors to encourage, and national and international decision-makers to consider or implement, context-relevant and effective policy and program decisions on the parameters of peacebuilding policies and programs that are used to address causes of violent conflict, prevent its resurgence, and foster gender and socially equitable development.

- PCD-supported projects help build domestic ownership of peace processes, and to civil society’s ability to socially audit, make transparent, and hold accountable state and international peacebuilding actor decision-making, as well as to the
ability of state and civil society actors to effectively engage and hold accountable international peacebuilding actors who are intervening in their national contexts.

- PCD-supported projects are means through which state, non-state and extra-state actors can engage with each other in informed debates on the shape of peacebuilding in particular contexts. In this way, PCD-supported research serves to open spaces for discussion and dialogue, and contributes to the legitimacy and sustainability of peace by encouraging local and national state and non-state actors to interact constructively in the policy-making process.

- PCD-supported researchers are engaged in regional and global peacebuilding debates and processes aiming to influence global policies and practices and giving greater weight to local and regional priorities and perspectives.

- PCD-supported projects are used to build capacity for more rigorous, methodologically creative, and collaborative (between researchers, civil society actors and decision-makers) research.

PCD will develop more thematically-focussed programming during this prospectus period, while remaining largely responsive to Southern actors’ articulated priorities for their countries and regions. PCD will also build on lessons learned from previous programming periods, including the workload imperative to balance our portfolio between large and small projects, projects designed to build research capacity and those intended primarily for policy influencing, and projects with various levels of risk (associated with context or issue). The PI will also take up lessons highlighted by its various evaluations and external review, including the policy and capacity-building utility of supporting cross-regional comparative research approaches, the need for PCD program officers to maintain deep contextual knowledge for maximum program effectiveness, the utility of full project-to-policy influencing funding, the need to support and help develop project partners’ adaptive mechanisms, tools and methodologies to deal with unstable contexts.

Our programming experience and evaluations also guide us to develop several new programming approaches, including: maintenance and selective new development of programming in contexts still undergoing violent conflict; maintenance and continued development of critical approaches to the field of peacebuilding; explorations of ethics in peacebuilding and conflict research and the relationship between political violence and criminality; the launch of a new program focus in violence, trauma, justice and reconciliation. At the same time, PCD will not focus programming in other areas of peacebuilding research, such as: “hardware” issues (landmines, arms development, etc.), straight human rights monitoring, peacemaking/peacekeeping (except for local capacity-building to engage with international intervention), community resource management conflicts, and alternative dispute or conflict resolution (especially when it occurs outside contexts where structural change/reform is being planned and implemented or in small community contexts).
PCD Prospectus Phase III (draft 3)

The long walk, the constant struggle for peace, continues. It never was an easy road, and is certainly not so now. We have to reconnoitre many difficult twists and turns, and find answers to complex moral and practical questions. A global partnership on all aspects of the quest for peace, makes that road considerably more negotiable.


1. Background and context

1.1. Introduction
In this new prospectus, the Peacebuilding and Reconstruction (PBR) program initiative flags several new directions, including a name change to “Peace, Conflict and Development” (PCD). Following this introduction, the prospectus describes the basic development challenges related to conflict and peacebuilding. The prospectus then briefly reviews what other international donors and organizations are doing in the field to identify PCD’s niche, Canadian and international policies and initiatives that are relevant for PCD’s programming, and lessons from our two previous prospectus phases. PCD’s programming vision and objectives are discussed before articulation of PCD’s substantive entry points (democratic processes in governance and peacebuilding; political economy of peace and conflict; security and insecurity; violence, trauma, justice and reconciliation). The prospectus then outlines implementation of the program, including a description of global and regional approaches to research programming and “knowledge conveying” activities, such as mini-explorations, conferences and synthetic paper production. Partnership, communications and evaluation strategies are briefly outlined, and the prospectus concludes with a discussion of the PI’s anticipated risks and challenges to its programming.

1.2. Development challenges
The new century opened with renewed challenges to the peacebuilding paradigm with 9/11 and its aftermath. Indeed, the global peacebuilding project of the post-Cold War 1990s, ushered in with UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace, has withstood and engaged several crises in its short lifespan, including the utter failure of the Rwandan genocide and intervention in Somalia, state building in East Timor and comprehensive intervention in Kosovo, and current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and the “war on terror”. Each is marked by its own lessons and trajectories for the field of peacebuilding, including debates on how to deal with and rebuild “failed states”, issues of civilian protection, conflict prevention, the evolution from peacekeeping to peacemaking to peacebuilding, and the challenge of and to state sovereignty.

1 For reasons of clarity, “PCD” will be used in reference to all previous, current, and future activities, challenges and accomplishments.
The current post-9/11 context has shone the spotlight on radical uses of religion, as well as debates on and responses to “failed”, “fragile” and “weak” states, where Taliban Afghanistan manifested the convergence of both phenomena. Radical and organized religious actors—especially Islamist groups in the Middle East and Asia (as well as Europe and North America)—are the focus of the current “war on terrorism”. Yet, the picture is not as simple as the popular Western interpretations suggest (Kelsay 2002). Religious radicalism is not limited to Muslims, but is found amongst all major religious groupings (Marty and Appleby, 1991-2002) and in part fuels several current and recent conflicts (e.g. Buddhist extremists in Sri Lanka, Hindu fundamentalists in the Gujarat riots, as well as Jewish and Muslim extremists in Israel-Palestine). Moreover, political Islamist groups have variously been Western allies (e.g. mujhadeen trained and sponsored by the CIA in the US’s fight against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan), become political parties engaged in electoral politics in their national contexts (Hizbollah in Lebanon), or manifest liberal political aspirations (Esposito 1994, Kurzman 1999, Kalin 2001).

Policy debates on failed states typically centre on questions to do with aid effectiveness and new forms of trusteeships, while scholarly analyses examine causes of failure as well as the roles and utility of external interventions. An important and enduring gap in both literatures is a focus on national and local agency, and how to support and build on it (Baranyi 2004). An even greater gap is the absence of historical political economy analyses of state failure and security that highlights the relationship between peace/conflict and development (Bilgin, Morton 2002).

Before and after 9/11, international responses to war and armed conflict have been many and increasingly comprehensive. Multiple responses to and analyses of the phenomenon of violent conflict have proliferated at the regional and international level, as well as amongst international non-governmental organizations. Yet, despite this proliferation of response and analysis, there remain surprising gaps in our knowledge and understanding of durable peace, violent conflict and its prevention, and even more so from a Southern perspective. As a result, the peacebuilding endeavour since the end of the Cold War yields a mixed record. While recent evidence points to an overall decline in armed conflict (Marshall, Gurr 2003; Mack et al forthcoming), other studies (cited in Lund 2002) suggest that durability and quality of peace is fragile and tenuous, easily subject to persistent crises and recidivism. Regardless of the record of peacebuilding success

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2 The term “failed states” is usually used to characterize states unable to provide basic public goods (security, infrastructure, essential services such as health and education).

3 For a sampling of these responses see the OECD-DAC Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict, UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, the UN Secretary General’s Report on “Prevention of armed conflict”, the International Crisis Group’s multiple analytical reports (available at http://www.crisiseb.org/), and International Alert’s work with INGOs and NGOs (see http://www.international-alert.org/).

4 Two of the most recent studies, Marshall and Gurr (2003) and Mack et al (forthcoming) cite an overall decline in armed conflict, while other studies tend to portray a much more mixed assessment of peacebuilding success (Lund 2002). It should be noted that Marshall and Gurr (2003) is a large “n” statistical study with consequent limitations on contextual and qualitative analysis while many of the studies cited by Lund are smaller, comparative case study analyses.
during the past fifteen years, factors such as the current international crisis of 9/11 and its aftermath as well as persistent challenges to durable continued peace, threaten to obscure modest gains made in peacebuilding and lessons learned in peacebuilding practice.

What is known and understood is that violent conflict, conflict prevention and peacebuilding are complex and multi-faceted in their dimensions, and require comprehensive analytical, policy and programmatic approaches to their solution or implementation. Politics, economics, socio-cultural, international and historical factors combine and reinforce each other in a myriad of combinations to produce trajectories for peace and conflict in each context, and require careful unpacking if effective solutions are to be designed and implemented.

For IDRC, the primary challenge in regards to peacebuilding is related to the development of the field of peacebuilding research and capacity in the South. Much of applied and policy-relevant peacebuilding research is predominantly conducted and commissioned by northern NGO, bilateral and multilateral agencies, is preponderantly focused on monitoring, “best practices” and “lessons learned” approaches rather than based on analytical and methodological depth, and effective policy-maker and advocate planning for and use of peacebuilding research remains underdeveloped. Moreover, peace and conflict researchers in the North and South rarely engage with each other’s work. Scarcity of development funding for this research area (or research more generally) and the generally utilitarian approach to peacebuilding research as described above contribute to and exacerbate the field’s underdevelopment.

Nonetheless, recent and intensified critiques of peacebuilding practice reinforce the need to take on Southern perspectives on peace and conflict (e.g. WSP-IPA 2004). The importance of continued support to Southern peacebuilding research is underlined by armed violent conflict’s persistent threat to human lives and livelihoods and its obstacle to political, economic and social development in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. IDRC’s recent “matrix consultations” reinforce the importance of supporting work on peacebuilding in every region within which IDRC operates. While the nature of armed conflict has changed significantly since the end of WWII, moving from the predominance of inter-state wars to a prevalence of intra-state armed conflicts, their transnational nature persists, relying on transfer of arms, resources, human trafficking and communications across national borders. Ethnic, racial, national and/or religious identities intersect with economic and political inequalities to produce intra-state tensions and intra/extra-state networks that sustain violent conflicts (Duffield 2002; Humphreys 2003), reflecting the continued evolution of post-colonial and post-Cold War national, regional and international dynamics and relations (Smyth 2001; Douma 2003; Marshall, Gurr 2003, 15; Ignatieff 2004). Much more is also now known and acknowledged about the gendered nature of armed conflict and its differentiated impact on men and women, with phenomenon ranging from sexual violence, to trafficking of women and girls as sex slaves and combatants, to sexual extortion and exploitation of women and girls for humanitarian assistance (UN 2002; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002).

However, understanding women as agents in peacebuilding is much better understood than women as agents in conflict and combat. Moreover, understanding of war-affected children has also advanced. Among many issues having to do with children in war-torn
contexts, those having to do with child combatants and their reintegration, forced recruitment through kidnapping, child-centred transitional and restorative justice, and a range of human security dilemmas all need much more attention (see McKay and Mazurana 2004 for discussion of some of these issues).

Peace and violence are highly complex, fluid and multi-faceted. Political and economic “root” or structural causes of violence are entangled with culture, race, ethnicity, religion and history. Moreover, generative causes of violence shift and multiply over time, creating a web of primary reasons for armed conflict, making peacebuilding a fraught task composed of multiple priorities, including: demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of armed combatants; judicial, policing and security sector reform; political institutional reform and rebuilding; enhanced/improved and sustainable livelihoods; equitable and visible distribution of material and political resources; and resettlement of refugees and internally-displaced persons (IDPs). For peace to be durable, post-conflict societies need to perceive justice being done, security being ensured, and livelihoods being fostered. The transition from violence to peace development is neither linear nor formulaic, and requires persistence, patience, and long-term accompaniment by supportive regional and international actors. Actual conclusion of durable peace accords/arrangements and their implementation remains a challenge. Finally, much more needs to be known about conflict prevention, the dimensions of conflict and insecurity (especially within countries where international interventions are being implemented or planned), and how to manage the transition from short-term stability to durable peace and development.

These issues represent multiple challenges that loosely cluster under four categories:

- Democratic processes in peacebuilding and governance
- Political economy of peace and conflict
- Security and insecurity
- Violence, trauma, justice and reconciliation.

Taken together, they represent a tightly interlocking set of challenges associated with violent conflict, prevention and peacebuilding that need to be simultaneously or sequentially addressed in order to secure durable peace and development. The boundaries between each problematique are porous, and analyses leading to effective policy and programmatic interventions need to reflect this interplay. As outlined below in section 2, these four challenge areas represent the key thematic entry points for PCD programming over the coming five years.

1.3. International and Canadian foreign policy and activities

PCD has traditionally engaged in issues relevant to larger Canadian foreign policy concerns, and has situated itself as part of Canada’s “foreign policy family”. As such, the program initiative is mindful of Canadian foreign policy priorities, and where possible, seeks to work in complementarity with FAC, CIDA, and other Canadian foreign policy

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5 For investigations of peace durability, see Zartman (1995), Stedman et al (2002), and Darby and MacGuinty (2003).
actors. PCD also works in tandem with other international actors with shared priorities and values.

A consensus set of approaches seems to have emerged from the international community’s body of shared knowledge and experience in dealing with armed violent conflict, including prioritizing notions of human security (freedom from fear and want) over singular “hard” security approaches; privileging human rights and rights-based approaches; doing no harm and reinforcing local capacities at all levels; working with local actors with clarity, transparency and flexibility; working through a conflict prevention lens; promotion of democratization, equitable power-sharing amongst social groups, state legitimacy and accountability. Nonetheless, multilateralism has been significantly challenged by the war on Iraq and its particular consequences for the UN. In response, a “blue-ribbon” committee has been struck by Secretary General Kofi Annan for the express purpose of UN reform. In addition, and as mentioned above, debates on proposed changes to the parameters of ODA to include security-oriented interventions also represent important challenges (see the Reality of Aid 2004 report for an early indication of this).

At the time of this writing, the Canadian government is in the midst of an international policy review. Nonetheless, it can be expected that the review will address Canada’s significant contributions to the debates on peace, conflict and security with its promotion of the notion of “human security” (DFAIT n.d.), its sponsorship of the ICISS and its report, The Responsibility to Protect, and its contributions to UN Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. While “human security” is valuable as a concept, it has its considered critics, most importantly in the notion that human security as it is currently configured captures almost everything under the developmental and security umbrella. As such, as a concept, it has little explanatory power and few guidelines for policy prioritization. Its value lies in its inherent critique of traditional state-centric security approaches and its rallying power towards a more developmentalist analysis of and set of responses to security and insecurity (Paris 2001; Uvin 2002). Moreover, human security’s unexploited potential lies in building a theory of security “that maps the intersection of individual forms of harm or insecurity to the state, conflict and violence”, a method in line with feminist theory-building in other sectors that traces linkages from the individual through various phenomenon and social structures (Baines n.d.).

Human security and “responsibility to protect” can be viewed as inter-linked and mutually reinforcing approaches; however, the Canadian government seems ready to adopt a “3D+” approach (development, diplomacy, defence + justice, policing, corrections and other relevant ministries and agencies), with “peace, order and good governance” as its new maxim to encapsulate this arrangement (CIDA 2003; see Ignatieff 2004 for an articulation of the “POGG” concept). “Governance” is emerging as a key Canadian government development approach to dealing with conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and can notionally include institutional, judicial and security sector reform, constitutional development and power-sharing arrangements capacity-building.

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6 For an elaborated discussion of these approaches, see OECD-DAC (2001).
and elections and political parties. Nonetheless, retaining the softer, human-centred and developmentalist approach to security will remain a challenge in the current global context, as will promoting the notion of “responsibility to protect” in the wake of the war in Iraq and its disastrous outcomes (Wood 2003). The annual Canadian Peacebuilding and Human Security Consultations held in October 2003 articulated Canada’s new approaches, as well as identified several challenges and issues that lie ahead, including: reinforcing multilateral cooperation; reasserting rule of international human rights and humanitarian law, including the centrality of human rights in peacebuilding; overcoming widespread objection to the human security concept and “responsibility to protect”; effectively addressing the feminization of poverty and violence and the problem of “consultation without influence” of women in peace processes (Wood 2003).

PCD’s programming has specifically set out to engage with a selection of international initiatives, including official and unofficial campaigns to support implementation and elaboration of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on “Women, Peace and Security”, the European Centre for Conflict Prevention’s (ECCP) global NGO initiative on civil society and conflict prevention, and the Canadian sponsorship of the “responsibility to protect” initiative.

In 2002, PCD sponsored an exploratory paper and international workshop on new directions for women, gender and peacebuilding, using resolution 1325 as a starting point (Strickland and Duvvury 2003). Following from this exploration, and in part collaboration with FAC, PCD is currently developing research programming that focuses on trafficking of women and girls in conflict contexts, demobilization and reintegration of women and girl combatants and abductees, and gender and transitional and restorative justice processes. In addition, PCD is developing a global-comparative research project with International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) entitled “Gender and Reparations: Opportunities for Transitions to Democracies?”. This project responds to the UN Secretary General’s and UNIFEM’s reports indicating that women victims of political violence continue to be denied justice and called for support for developing a better understanding of and options for redress for women.

Since 2002, PCD has been in discussion with Canadian and international actors on participation in ECCP’s international NGO/civil society conflict prevention initiative. Our support has taken the form of supporting project initiatives that link Canadian and Latin American actors to the process, as well as networking Latin American actors with each other and to the global initiative.

As of 2004, PCD has supported small initiatives that bring southern actors into the debates on the “responsibility to protect”, notably those led by Liu Centre at University of British Columbia that bring together NGO activists in the African Great Lakes region for discussion of the concept and exchange of experiences and ideas for further analysis and promotion of regional and international protection mechanisms.

1.4. Lessons from previous program phases
IDRC’s Peacebuilding and Reconstruction program initiative was first constituted in 1996, and at the time was one of the first research-oriented responses to the challenges of
peacebuilding. Since then, PCD has diversified regionally (from a focus on southern Africa to at present all regions where IDRC operates) and established a body of work in key areas of the field, notably in governance/democratization, security sector reform, political economy questions and critical perspectives on the peacebuilding endeavour. PCD believes that research can be used as an effective tool for peacebuilding processes in specific contexts used by southern or local actors, and as a means to deepen and broaden regional and global understandings of the challenges and continually shifting parameters of the peacebuilding field. That is, PCD has supported research for specific peacebuilding processes and on the nature of peacebuilding itself. Most importantly, PCD has used its program for southern and civil society capacity-building to engage in peacebuilding processes that are frequently northern-led and defined, concluded and decided by official elites and armed combatants.

1.4.1. Lessons and findings from our external review

PCD’s recent external review (Brynen et al 2003) highlights several program strengths and areas for further development. First, the review noted the relative strength of PCD’s Latin America and Middle East portfolios, and emphasized the utility of country and region-specific concentrated programming in that it has favourably positioned PCD to establish credibility, a clear presence and profile, and maximum and meaningful policy impact, as well as facilitated the promotion of local and sub-regional networks. PCD’s regional diversification beyond southern Africa was implemented in response to the PI’s previous prospectus-end external review (Gillies, Klepak 1999) that suggested PCD’s programming would be strengthened through engagement with other countries/regions. This programming approach will continue into the next prospectus period in further regional development of Latin American and Middle East programming, as well as development of country and regional programming in Asia and eastern Africa.

The review also praised PCD’s global programming approach that supports South-South, North-South, and North-South-South research networks and partnerships. This development is an enhancement of previous approaches to PCD’s global programming, and is more focused on developing effective strategies for Southern research capacity building and networking, as well as for constructive and critical Southern engagement with peacebuilding debates. While there are significant challenges associated with this programming modality (see “Anticipated risks/challenges” section), the political and substantive benefits that potentially accrue to participating partners through their engagement are significant. These include a thickening of research findings that can underpin particular policy influence or programmatic objectives, and exchange of knowledge and experience that can strengthen the legitimacy of critical southern perspectives on specific peacebuilding approaches, such as security sector reform, democratization, and so on.

Directed exploration of the issue of research ethics in conflict contexts was picked up by the reviewers as a priority for the PCD team as it is as yet under-researched.\(^7\) The team

\(^7\) While the team reviews each project on the basis of ethical and other considerations, the reviewers indicate that the internal IDRC ethical standards fall short of Tri-council terms (which the reviewers also do not recommend as adoption of these guidelines). It is important to note that the reviewers are not
shares the reviewers’ view that attention to conflict research ethics stands to make a substantial contribution to much-needed debates on this issue. As such, PCD intends to launch an exploration of this issue in this prospectus period.

The review positively endorses PCD’s critical interrogation of the peacebuilding enterprise and the notion of “peace” itself, and highlights the important contribution this direction makes to global debates in the field. The evaluators emphasize that this trajectory of programming stands to make important substantial contributions to global debates, and that this critical attention is important in the current “9/11” climate. The signal factor for PCD in selecting themes must be their relevance for Southern actors at the affect of peacebuilding processes. The review pinpoints PCD’s embrace of peace as about ensuring justice rather than simply achieving cessation of violence, which distinguishes PCD’s program from many international programs working on PCD issues, and positions the PI to be substantively and constructively critical. PCD will more clearly direct its programming towards the achievement of accountability of international actors/interveners to national actors (both governments and civil societies) where interventions are directed, as well as accountability of national governments to their citizenry.

1.4.2. Lessons from our programming experience

Other program lessons centre on the question of global modes of programming that require sensitive management and respect of our Southern partners’ priorities. The external review favourably notes PCD’s support for southern-led or north-south-south initiatives as opposed to northern-led initiatives that happen to include southern participants. However, as also noted by the reviewers, this development is coupled with challenges to developing networks and “scaling up”, including the frequently low-level priority partners in conflict situations hold global comparative modes of programming as compared to focus on the immediacy of their own national and local contexts and issues. Indeed, a networking and scaling up programming strategy also hinges on ethics in peacebuilding research, where Smyth (2001) highlights the ethical problematique of research that makes only an intellectual contribution to our understanding of peace and conflict. Almost all of the researchers PCD works with are driven to make concrete, practical contributions to their immediate contexts in the short- to medium-term (justifying programming “close to the ground”). Global scaling up and international networking frequently does not hold out this promise. This set of questions goes to the heart of IDRC’s mandate—for whom is IDRC supporting the research? Whose needs are being met? In this spirit, PCD research networking, scaling up, and other modalities need to be vehicles or means towards building Southern capacity, not ends in themselves, and must be developed according to Southern assessments of utility.8

Several issues emerge when reviewing PCD-conducted project and program evaluations. They include the need to re-think the “flagship” program approach of the previous prospectus, the value in fully resourcing projects, the demands of attempting to build

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8 For a discussion of the merits and limitations of networks, see IDRC (2003, 5-6, 14) and Stein (2003).
research capacities of non-traditional researchers, the utility of limited country-level focus, and programmatic limitations of small-grants approaches.

PCD has learned lessons about the human resources demands required for sustained intellectual engagement and leadership, as well as for fund-raising, in “flagship” program approaches through its experiences with landmines and Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)\(^9\) programming (Baranyi and Reichrath 2002). While there are no “flagship” approaches articulated in this current prospectus, PCD will support specific thematic areas that cross-cut our regional/country programming. Thematic programming will serve to multiply and scale up the sum total of PCD’s discrete projects into greater wholes, using mechanisms such as international conferences and network-building, synthetic reports, and so on.

Financial and human resources are constant themes running through PCD’s internal evaluations. Also highlighted are the need to include resources to allow projects to exploit their full potential for policy influence (Nhira 2000; Hassan 2001) and the extraordinary human resources demands of supporting non-traditional researchers (Nhira 2000; Hassan 2001; Baranyi, Reichrath and Pinkney 2002). In response to PCD’s internal evaluation findings, the PI returned to a full-funding approach during the previous prospectus period. In line with Centre trends, this approach will continue into this programming period. In response to the human resources demands of support to non-traditional researchers, PCD will continue to pursue a strategy of mixed portfolio management, as well as encouragement to advocacy groups and researchers (as well as policy-makers) to combine forces in specific projects.

PCD has regularly grappled with questions on the need to diversify geographically (see for instance, Gillies, Klepak 1999; Baranyi, Reichrath and Pinkney 2002). PCD’s most recent external review suggests that PCD has its global-regional-country balance of programming about right (Brynen et al 2003). When it comes to research-to-policy influence, concentration in a small selection of countries makes most sense, given the need to “develop local knowledge, robust programming frameworks and accompaniment capacity required to generate even…modest [policy] contributions” (Baranyi, Reichrath and Pinkney 2002, 11). IDRC’s recent matrix consultations and SEE meeting during 30-31 March 2004 also underlined the value of deep contextual knowledge. The degree to which peacebuilding policy research can promote interventions that run counter to elite or powerful vested interests should not be overestimated, and requires a sophisticated understanding of context and broad network of contacts in order to gauge possible policy openings and timing. As for policy-relevant research in regional programming, challenges associated with capacity and timing loom large: “[regional programming] presupposes the simultaneous emergence of policy space in several contexts, and of partners who are able to seize those opportunities plus coordinate their research and policy engagement efforts in a timely manner” (Baranyi, Reichrath and Pinkney 2002, 19). PCD will continue its strategy of developing country programming in a small selection of countries, and will support regional programming as regional opportunities and priorities emerge. Global and regional programming will engage researchers both

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\(^9\) An external evaluation of the PCIA program is due for completion by the end of 2003.
inside and outside our country foci in order to balance the value of greater spread of PCD programming with contextual depth in selected countries.

1.4.3. Lessons from programming in violent contexts
Several lessons can also be drawn from PCD’s previous programming prospectus on working in contexts marked by political violence. One of the main issues is the nexus of challenges associated with workload and team resilience, IDRC priorities for demonstrable policy and practical influence, challenges associated with time-bounded administrated grants, and the imperatives and conditions of building capacity in war-torn contexts. In “normal” development contexts capacity-building is a labour-intensive enterprise, but in conflict and post-conflict contexts the task takes on added challenges as a result of significant and profound harm done to every social institution due to violent conflict (Nhira 2000; Baranyi, Reichrath and Pinkney 2002). Two researchers characterize the implications in this way:

damage done to social relations by the violence and therefore the fragility and fragmentation of its institutions, from the family, the traditional organization of local communities, to the institutions of government…. [where] transfer of knowledge and organizational culture (informal and formal education) between the generations has broken down, leaving a human resource deficit…. [and] breakdown of trust in human relations and confidence in planning for the future (Barakat and Chard 2002, 826).

In this type of context, open-endedness is more conducive to capacity-building than closed timelines, and space for learning and experimentation is more conducive than a priority on demonstrated policy influence. Hands-on support by context-knowledgeable IDRC program staff is in all cases a requirement of good monitoring in these contexts, which are also marked by volatility and extreme fluidity.

PCD has also learned that a variety of adaptive practices and mechanisms in project design and support are necessary inputs in projects in violent contexts, for instance in Sierre Leone (Hassan 2001) and Palestine. Palestinian PCD-supported researchers have adapted research methodologies and sampling (where relevant), maintain dual offices and sets of records, have laptops and cell phones, and have adopted video-conferencing and other measures as means to overcome political instability and imposed constraints on their mobility. Human support for our partners at times of political upheaval, as manifested in regular communications by telephone and email, are also significant. These investments yield returns in higher-quality research, improved timeline management, and most importantly, deeper partnerships and mutual understanding.

In addition to PCD’s external review, two studies on IDRC’s overall programming in Palestine and Nepal to assess continued programming viability in violent contexts. Both reviews validate the decision to continue programming in the two countries. Moreover, PCD’s commissioned evaluation of Angolan programming (Nhira 2000) argues points that have been borne out by PCD’s continued programming in Palestine, including preservation and enhanced PCD/IDRC credibility that positions us well for influence once the protagonists return to the negotiating table. Indeed, PCD’s decision to remain engaged in Palestine has already borne fruit in PCD’s support of the Cambridge Forum project, which explores dimensions of third party intervention in Palestine-Israel and
where the project’s outputs have had significant reach onto planners’ desks in mapping
the upcoming Gaza withdrawal (Brynen et al 2003, 11; Sayigh 2004). Our Palestinian
partners have repeatedly asserted the importance of IDRC funds as one of the few sources
of “strategic” support remaining in the country, and this holds lessons for PCD’s potential
engagement in other conflict-ridden contexts. Conflict, and especially post-conflict,
contexts are typically flooded with donors offering humanitarian aid and development
funds geared to infrastructural and institutional reconstruction. However, few sources of
funding are made available for learning, exploring and experimenting with options—a
key requirement for “the process of restoring the institutional life of peoples devastated
by misfortune” (Barakat and Chard 2002, 834).

The Palestine portfolio has continued to address central—and sometimes “sensitive”—
issues to the Palestine-Israel conflict, including adolescent Palestinian trauma and
violence, third party intervention roles, settlement expansion and so on. Several
programming modalities have been critical to this success that can be generalized to other
contexts, including: bringing a regional or cross-regional comparative approach to the
research so as to not pinpoint Palestinians explicitly on sensitive topics; ensuring PCD’s
partners include participants with explicit and high-level policy and practice links in
projects that address central issues to the conflict; judicious use of, or partnering with,
northern and diaspora-led organizations/projects that are better placed to acquire data or
implement research necessary for building capacity of southern negotiators and policy-
makers with evidence-based or high-quality research.

Nonetheless, entry into new conflict contexts should not be a decision taken lightly. As
PCD considers new country foci in east Africa and Asia, we will consider our previous
and current experience in Palestine, Colombia and Angola (Nhira 2000) demonstrating
that PCD support in contexts still undergoing armed conflict is most likely to succeed
where a community of researchers with relative capacity and institutional bases already
exists and where those researchers are linked into policy and practice circles, and even
more optimally, where PCD or IDRC has already-existing relationships (see Annex 1 for
a more complete elaboration of these criteria).

Finally, considerations of partner and IDRC staff security come into play when
programming in volatile contexts. PCD programs on a responsive basis, and especially
so when it comes to violence-ridden contexts. Country-based and connected partners
possess the most accurate assessment of what kinds of research is possible in context,
including how such research should be implemented, and respecting this is one guarantee
of researcher security (and also, of eventual decision-maker acceptance and even uptake).
In PCD’s project development and review process, we take special care to assess viability
of the research from a security point of view, including researcher safety, protection of
research subjects and data, dissemination strategies, data-gathering methods, and our
ability to effectively monitor the project. IDRC staff also take appropriate precautions
when travelling to conflict contexts, including liaising with Canadian embassy and
representative office staff in situ, carrying cell phones, using known or secure modes of
internal transport, working in collaboration with other agencies, and so on. Our capacity
to develop and monitor projects in other violent contexts will hinge on PCD program
staff prior contacts, or better yet, where IDRC can forge institutional agreements with UN or other agencies operational in context.

Based on the above lessons, PCD will undertake a series of changes in program organization and approach, as articulated below in sections 2 and 3.

2. Vision, objectives, outcomes, and thematic entry points

2.1. Definition of terms
In this new prospectus phase, the Peacebuilding and Reconstruction program initiative will change its name to “Peace, Conflict and Development”. This name change is meant to convey and address several meanings. First, the inclusion of “conflict” in our title signals our awareness that the conflict-to-peace continuum is not linear, and frequently sees recidivism to violence and uneasy, unstable and partial peace. Moreover, the division between political and criminal violence is not straightforward, with linkages between the two phenomena. In this new phase of our programming, we will no longer limit our programming to “post-conflict” contexts, will maintain current programming in select contexts marked by armed violence (Palestine, Colombia), and will carefully consider engagement in additional such contexts, as well as engagement in select “pre-conflict” contexts where opportunities for conflict prevention work may exist (see Annex 1 for guidelines).

For the purposes of our programming, conflict refers to violent political conflict involving massive loss of human life (or threatening to result in this in the case of conflict prevention work). A basic working definition of this is a “prolonged combat between the military forces of two or more governments, or of one government and at least one organized group, and incurring the battle-related deaths of at least 1,000 people during the entire conflict” (cited in Paris 1997, p. 54, n.2). In addition, the PCD program may address conflicts where there is mass organized violence (state or non-state) against an identifiable group or groups (ethnic, religious, racial, linguistic), resulting in significant numbers of deaths, casualties and/or “ethnic cleansing”.

We have decided to remove “reconstruction” from our title because it is an imprecise expression of what our program supports. “Reconstruction” often refers to rebuilding infrastructure in disaster or war-torn contexts—something this PI has never addressed through its programming. Of course, there is such a thing as social, political and economic reconstruction, but this is a bulky term for a PI title. Our PI takes a maximalist approach to understanding peacebuilding, which necessarily addresses these more long-term reconstruction processes that in many ways are indistinguishable from development processes more generally. Peacebuilding approaches are unique in that they take place in and address specific war-torn circumstances, often with specialized functions such as DDR and TRJ. Sound development measures that address horizontal inequalities,

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10 See Annex 1 for an articulation of context evaluation guidelines for PCD programming in conflict contexts.
democratic political spaces appropriate for managing conflicts, and distributed wealth and growth can do much to prevent violent conflict or its return.

We define “peacebuilding” as the pursuit of policies, programs and initiatives that seek to create the conditions for war-affected societies to transform or manage conflicts without violence in order to address longer-term goals for peaceful co-existence, democratic governance and sustainable socio-economic development.

2.2. Vision
IDRC’s Evaluation Unit reminds us that vision statements express “the ambitious thinking underlying the program”. Visions extend beyond the reach of any program’s capacities, but a program’s activities should contribute to and facilitate the ends articulated in its vision statement (IDRC 2004, 2). As such, PCD’s vision is as follows:

PCD’s research programming is used to contribute to the transformation of unjust and violent power relations in society, where research makes heard audible voices at the margins in order to address root causes of violence and prevent the resurgence of armed conflict, and where basic human rights are protected, impunity is halted, and accountability between leaders and the led, the powerful and the weak, is established and enhanced.

Conflict actors, victims and local, national and international policymakers share a common commitment to solving social, political and economic conflicts through peaceful means. States put in place and finance effective and transparent public institutions for the protection of human rights, democratic governance and economic development. Multilateral institutions and bilateral donors better understand and are better able to recognize and capitalize upon local capacities for generating peace and promoting processes for social and economic development. International assistance policies are better informed by rigorous analysis of local contexts and thus better address the challenges of bridging humanitarian relief, recovery, peacebuilding and longer-term development.

PCD’s partners build the capacity of decision-makers in the North and South to work inclusively and cooperatively to develop and implement progressive peacebuilding and development policy, programming and practice, and to open space for democratic dialogue. These policies and practices are guided by considerations of legitimacy, equity and equality, and are built upon a foundation of inclusiveness and local credibility. PCD’s program supports these ends by working with researchers, policy makers and advocates to implement and use research to achieve these ends, and fosters research capacity and initiatives to strengthen research results and networking between stakeholders in the South as a means to their achievement.

2.3. Objectives
Objectives “describe the results that a program intends to help bring about over [a program’s] lifecycle”, and describe the program’s outcome, reach and impact results that contribute to the achievement of its vision (IDRC 2004, 2).
PCD will continue to support research that is both on and for peacebuilding. PCD’s programming works to enhance accountability within peacebuilding contexts, as well as support the development of the peacebuilding field in the South. For PCD, there are horizontal and vertical axes of accountability. Horizontal accountability runs between citizen to citizen, with citizen-to-citizen dialogue sometimes mediated through state institutions and/or NGOs and civil society organizations. Vertical accountability runs between the citizen and civil society, the state, and the international community. While horizontal accountability enhances understanding and dialogue between social actors in any given society, vertical accountability and responsibility is a key feature of well-functioning and transparent democratic governance.

PCD also interacts with and supports Southern actors as generators of knowledge, rather than merely recipients or repositories of information. The PCD program uses this as the starting point for approaches to further development of peacebuilding as a field of research and endeavour in the South. These three axioms underpin the following five PCD program objectives:

1. PCD-supported researchers generate evidence-based findings that can be used by civil society actors to encourage, and national and international decision-makers to consider or implement, context-relevant and effective policy and program decisions on the parameters of peacebuilding policies and programs that are used to address causes of violent conflict, prevent its resurgence, and foster gender and socially equitable development.

2. PCD-supported projects help to build domestic ownership of peace processes, and to civil society’s ability to socially audit, make transparent, and hold accountable state and international peacebuilding actor decision-making, as well as to the ability of state and civil society actors to effectively engage and hold accountable international peacebuilding actors who are intervening in their national contexts.

3. PCD-supported projects are means through which state, non-state and extra-state actors can engage with each other in informed debates on the shape of peacebuilding in particular contexts. In this way, PCD-supported research serves to open spaces for
discussion and dialogue, and contributes to the legitimacy and sustainability of peace by encouraging local and national state and non-state actors to interact constructively in the policy-making process.

4. PCD-supported researchers are engaged in regional and global peacebuilding debates and processes aiming to influence global policies and practices and giving greater weight to local and regional priorities and perspectives.

5. PCD-supported projects are used to build capacity for more rigorous, methodologically creative, and collaborative (between researchers, civil society actors and decision-makers) research.

PCD programming works to influence and support researchers and policy-makers in the North and South, as well as Southern advocates working towards progressive peacebuilding measures in their own societies and networked intra/inter-regional and global actors working to build knowledge, exchange experience and develop policy and practical strategies. PCD’s primary partners are researchers and research-practitioners primarily in Southern universities, research centres and NGOs who have developed projects that engage local advocates and policy makers in research-to-policy and practice initiatives. PCD also supports research for background, exploratory or theory-building reasons, especially where this is useful or essential for building the southern or regional fields of peacebuilding research. Indeed, our own programming experience tells us that policy-directed research is often executed on short timelines and is designed to address a narrow cut on specific issues. On the other hand, deeper background research or research for knowledge generation can set the foundation for future policy change (Baranyi, Reichrath and Pinkney 2002, 28). Sometimes, PCD-supported project ideas emanate from Northern universities, NGOs or multilateral organizations that seek to include or engage Southern actors as partners in the project or policy influence process. Finally, PCD also supports regionally and globally comparative research projects or networks that are primarily designed to support research capacities and knowledge about peacebuilding that can inform theory and practice.

PCD prioritizes support to research projects designed to foster evidence-based policy-making, or that are meant to promote debate over peacebuilding policy and program issues. Sometimes, policy influence is exerted directly, through researcher engagement with advocates and policy-makers. However, in other cases or contexts, policy influence is leveraged through exposure of research findings in the local media, or through strategic partnership with bilateral and multilateral organizations, which reference the research in their engagement with local state and multilateral actors, or in their own programming and policies.

It should be noted that anticipating effects of research programming is inevitably a risky business. As the Auditor-General noted in her 2003 review of IDRC, results are “more uncertain in research than in many other kinds of activity.” Nonetheless, as also noted by the Auditor-General, research managers, while not in control of outcomes and impacts, can nevertheless “seek to influence them through certain activities and outputs such as research projects and findings” (OAG 2003, 10).
2.4. Anticipated program outcomes
Individual PCD supported projects and networks will vary in accordance with their geographic focus and depending upon their operational context (conflict, post-conflict or prevention). The balance of activities funded by PCD will collectively produce the following:

- A set of research outputs available in peer-reviewable and policy accessible format that contributes to national and international debates on the legitimacy, credibility and sustainability of peacebuilding policies and programs;
- A body of experience using research as a tool towards greater accountability, transparency, and analysis in governance and reform related to peacebuilding, and for promotion of public debate, dialogue and engagement on specific peacebuilding policies, programs and processes;
- A body of researchers who can ably generate rigorous and convincing knowledge on variety of issues relating to governance, political economy, security, and violence, justice and reconciliation, and capable of constructively engaging with state authorities and international actors;
- A collection of sector-specific critical assessments of the record of international peacebuilding efforts and a series of recommendations to re-orient national and international approaches for formulating public policies in war-affected countries.

2.5. Entry points and programming approaches
PCD’s program is responsive, meeting requests for support from research institutes and universities, policy-makers, South-South and North-South-South networks, and civil society organizations. As a result of, and in response to, PCD’s recent external review recommendations, PCD will balance focus in our programming with sufficient thematic breadth to capture southern priorities at the global, regional and national level, while also accommodating the complexity of the conflict and peacebuilding problematique by encouraging multi-disciplinary approaches (including economics, political science, anthropology/sociology, law, social and gender analysis, participatory/action research and other qualitative and quantitative methodologies). During this prospectus period PCD will support research through the following entry points:

2.5.1. Democratic processes in governance and peacebuilding
Institutionalized political inequalities between or exclusion of groups (ethnic, national, racial, religious) in societies can frequently establish the tense or unstable conditions in which violence can erupt, be the spur to violent conflict within states or a stubborn obstacle to negotiating durable peace (Darby and MacGuinty 2003; Douma 2003; Marshall and Gurr 2003). Constitutional arrangements articulating power-sharing between social groups and centralization or devolution of power, legitimate use of force, rights guarantees, and opportunities structures all contribute to a strength of citizen loyalty, state legitimacy and consensus or social contract between the state and its citizens. To be meaningful, these provisions must be underpinned by institutional architecture and concrete implementation and protection, and guaranteed by appropriate incentives. When guarantees and mechanisms for meaningful citizen political
participation and inclusion are undermined or non-existent, and corollary indicators emerge such as closing space for open debate and ability to associate in peaceful or democratic opposition, violent opposition may seem to be the only alternative by excluded groups (Stewart 2003).

Peacebuilding represents an opportunity for marginalized groups and women to reshape power-sharing arrangements and institutions to better result in social, political and economic equity; however, this tendency must be seen as standing in tension with the conservative impulse to rebuild society in ways that are status quo ante or that protect vested powerful interests, especially after armed conflicts. The integration of displaced groups is a key challenge in building a coherent state, where on the one hand powerful vested interests are not unduly privileged, but on the other where critical socio-political concerns of the marginalized are effectively integrated into state policies and narratives. The test of any peace accord is its manifestation beyond the (re)building of central state institutions to actual implementation at the local level, where most peace accord provisions are focused (e.g. transfer or reintegration of assets, reintegration of armed combatants and resettlement of refugees and IDPs, etc.) (Manning 2003).

STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY-STATE DIALOGUE ON SECURITY AND DEFENSE

“Peacebuilding” in many contexts is not so much about avoiding a return to war as it is about ensuring justice. Only good institutions for law and order can do that, and the best research is that which provides civil society with the means to acquire and analyze the knowledge necessary to participate in the ongoing construction and reconstruction of the State’s institutions. The Guatemalan Peace Agreements recognize that profound reforms to military, police, intelligence and other institutions in the security sector are necessary to build lasting peace.

The Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) in Guatemala uncovered a critical knowledge gap: they understood that in order to engage in policy debates, members of Guatemalan civil society needed to have access to information on security sector reform in an understandable and user-friendly format. With support from PCD, FLACSO Guatemala produced five booklets on policy issues dealing with State responsibility for security, the role of citizens in security, and the functions and responsibilities of security and defense institutions such as the army, the police and intelligence services in a democracy. Thanks to these learning tools, Guatemalans have been better prepared to enter into informed discussion through a series of UN/OAS-lead dialogue processes. In its objective to engage civilians and civil society in the process and oversight of police, military and intelligence sectors, this initiative is a good example of how democratization processes intersect with security sector reform.

Discussions concerning security sector reform in Guatemala fit into a larger regional debate concerning emerging models of hemispheric security in the aftermath of the events of 11 September. Research of the type being supported by PCD is critical to ensuring that Latin Americans—particularly in countries which have only recently put behind them the trauma and destruction of internal wars—are able to build a solid base of knowledge to make informed decisions on options for their security and democratic well-being in the years to come.

Moreover, democratic deficits are emblematic of how many, if not most, peace accords are constituted, where elite groupings negotiate in secret or behind closed doors, with little public debate on their parameters. The South African and El Salvadorian peace processes—often quoted as two rare relative successes—are notable for their exception
to this rule of what sometimes amounts to little more than elite pact-making (Sisk 1995; Hartzell and Rothchild 1997). At its most extreme form is East Timor, where one analyst suggests that the “UN has given birth to a failed state” (Chopra 2000, 2002). Alternative, more inclusive, modes of negotiating peace and transition may have the effect of building popular stake and ownership in the process (Barnes 2002).

However, majoritarian democratic arrangements are not straightforward panaceas to societies fractured by violence, where populism can prevail and result in continued exclusionary policies and transitions in power pose explicit challenges. Indeed, political repression can suppress violent conflict, no matter how unsustainable in the long run (Paris 1997; Douma 2003). Nor is it clear that democracy results in durable peace (or whether democracy is the result of durable peace) (Marshall and Gurr 2003). Instead, more considered approaches to governance and democratization need to be taken on board which are grounded in local culture, traditions, relations and histories, as well as regional realities.

Programming entry points in this theme can include:

- governance/political approaches to conflict prevention
- examination of institutionalized political inequalities between groups, or exclusion of groups, in societies
- constitutional and other power-sharing arrangements
- institutional reform
- locally-grounded democratization and governance models
- justice and security sector reform (JSSR)
- freedom of expression and association, including the use of media and ICTs
- progressive reform towards socio-economic and political equity
- accountability mechanisms and processes
- alternative and inclusive models of negotiating peace accords and transition
- local level implementation.

Leading approach
An example of concrete programming on this theme in the prospectus period outlined is PCD’s “What Kind of Peace” follow-up project with North-South Institute (NSI). This project engages research teams from six different country contexts (Afghanistan, Guatemala, Haiti, Mozambique, Palestine, Sri Lanka) to compare experiences of, and influence policies at local and global levels on, the interface between internationally-supported peacebuilding initiatives and local politics, with an emphasis on the specific dynamics of local politics and how they contribute to or are undermined by peacebuilding trajectories. This project may form the basis of a developing network to facilitate south-south and north-south-south networking and will certainly support further research with select partners on democratization and governance in conflict and post-conflict contexts where deeper comparative research is possible and warranted.

2.5.2. Political economy of peace and conflict
Governance and democratization processes cannot be viewed entirely separately from political economic arrangements and relations in state and society. While it is impossible
to draw a direct relationship between poverty and violence,\textsuperscript{11} when exclusionary politics are combined with relative economic marginalization of specific identifiable social groups, armed conflict is the frequent result. Moreover, armed conflict has particular and unique developmental effects, which result from individual, family, community and national efforts at coping with violent and politically unstable conditions. State distributional capacity of goods and services plays an important role, both as a conflict driver and as a necessary component of durable peace. There is anecdotal (but not systematic) evidence supporting the claim that IMF and World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment programs and the effects of international economic liberalization oblige states to implement public sector cutbacks and impose limitations on public sector spending, undermining or limiting states’ capacity to deliver on their service obligations (or has served to justify state elites’ refusal to provide services to specific groups) or obligations negotiated in peace accords (Paris 1997; Douma 2003; Humphreys 2003; Stewart 2003). This can have deleterious effects in contexts where the state is already weakened as a result of ongoing conflict. It should be noted here that this area is under-researched, and that economic liberalization and globalization likely have mixed effects on peace durability and intractability of conflict.

Another strand of political economy of conflict analysis is the “greed or grievance” debate. One pole of the debate argues that conflicts are motivated by economic opportunity and legitimized by grievance arguments and ideologies (Collier 2000, 2001), while others analyze war as the creation of an alternative system of accumulation, power and protection (Keen 2000, Reno 2000), and that these alternative systems are situated within, and are a manifestation of, a globalized network of structures, relations and institutions (Duffield 2000, 2002). This analytical approach lends some much-needed nuance to popular or simple understandings of “greed” and “grievance” conflict motivators (Berdal and Malone 2000), where considerations of formal/informal and “white”/“black” economies and resource flows and political economic systems are critical to our understanding of peace, conflict, and what sustains them. In fact, later explorations on this theme underline case study findings indicating that combatants’ incentives for self-enrichment are not primary or original motives for political conflict. However, profit opportunities—particularly based in “lootable” resources—can sustain and prolong conflicts (Ballentine and Sherman 2003). More attention needs to be paid to how diaspora and migrant networks facilitate resource flows, which can be understood positively (in the form of remittances that sustain families through hardship in the absence of state provision and a functioning economy, and are an important source of investment) and negatively (in the form of transnational networks that facilitate the movement of resources, arms, human trafficking and communications) (see for an example, Hanafi forthcoming). Black and informal market economies and their relationship with armed political resistance are poorly researched for obvious reasons, given the often- inherent danger in this area of investigation.

\textsuperscript{11} Or between democracy and prosperity. Research has yet to demonstrate linear causality from democracy to wealth (Marshall and Gurr 2003; Stewart 2004).
Qalandiya checkpoint, guarding and controlling the entrance to Jerusalem from Ramallah and its environs, is a site dense with political, social and economic dynamics that reflect a myriad of processes and relations that have marked the second intifada. Along with studying the social, collective psychological and gendered aspects and implications of the checkpoints, this study by the Institute of Women’s Studies at Birzeit University examines the economics of checkpoints, including its linkages to kin-political party formations in Qalandiya Camp, adjacent to the checkpoint itself.

While Qalandiya is a site of exclusion and control, it also presents the possibility for new types of economic opportunities—for peddlers, transit drivers, cart pushers, and other people trying to eke out a living. A whole informal and semi-formal infrastructure of services and peddling has emerged at Qalandiya. Most obvious are the new transportation networks of transit and taxi drivers on both sides of the checkpoint, as well as the network of peddlers that congregate at the site. What are the rules and forms of negotiation that have developed in order to create a “system” in what is a context devoid of formal laws? Do these systems (of who is allowed to take passengers from each side of the checkpoint) take account of the social and economic circumstances of particular drivers, or does pure competition and power define the system? What, if any, forms of authority are brought in to create and stabilize the system of rules? Who makes money and loses money off the checkpoints?

The project utilizes a number of ethnographic methodologies, including economic and social mapping. Economic mapping covers the sites and locations of various economic activities at the site, and the way they change over time in relation to new spatialities of the occupation, as well as internal dynamics among economic actors at the checkpoint. Social mapping examines what underlies the appearance of chaos and a mass of undifferentiated humanity trying to cross or make a living at the checkpoint. There are a range of social and political bonds among various groups at the site. Kinship, as well as place of habitation or origin, and sometimes political affiliation, are at work in giving actors at the site access to work or forms of support and solidarity. How and to what extent do social networks exist at the location and what is their basis? To what extent, does the border create new forms of networks based on shared experience that go beyond older bases of social networks?

While the main aim of the project and its primary focus is to study the range of Palestinian social and psychological coping strategies in order to inform response programs, the economic dimensions of the project have come to the fore. This project contributes to a wider understanding of “greed and grievance” debates and war economies by shedding unique light on how informal “service economies” are articulated with a unique geography of conflict and socio-political collectivities, including militant groups.

Programming entry points in this theme can include:
- politico-economic conflict prevention research
- examination of “horizontal inequality”
- demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR)
- state distributional capacity of goods and services, including “peace budgetting”, and analyzing conflict-related impacts of economic liberalization policies
- diaspora and migrant network flows, including those of migration and remigration, remittances, resources, arms, human trafficking and communications
- war/black market economies.

Leading approach
PCD will lead its programming on this theme with a research competition on “Globalization, Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding”. The competition calls for proposals focusing on four themes: (1) Conflict-Related Impacts of Economic Liberalization, (2)
Methodologies for Conflict Impact Assessment, (3) Revisiting the Role of the Private Sector, and (4) The Role of Migration in Building Peace and Preventing Conflict. The competition will form the basis for the development of a new network of global Southern researchers generating political economic findings on peace and conflict contexts, for the purposes of capacity-building, knowledge exchange and generation.

2.5.3. Security and insecurity
Governance and political economy underpin issues of security and insecurity that frame the large terms of peace and violent conflict. There remain under-researched links between political and criminal violence, privation, black market economies, and insecurity (see CSVR 2001, 2002 for an elaboration of some of these issues). In certain cases, criminality and black market economies support and reinforce political violence and armed actors (as in Colombia, DRC and elsewhere), whereas in other cases political violence ceases but criminal violence rises or remains constant in the face of continued privation and unequal development, reflecting a key challenge of political transition (as in South Africa). In both types of cases, security is a central issue for local populations victimized by violent actors.

VIOLENCE AND TRANSITION 2: OBSTACLES TO AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEMOCRACY

South Africa’s negotiated transition and democratization have taken place within the broader context of multi-party democratization processes around the world, particularly in the last two decades of the 20th century. Though held out as a positive and exciting example in a beleaguered continent, South Africa remains excessively violent. Research by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) sheds light on six thematic indicators underpinning the relationship between violence, transition, and democratization: demilitarization; institutional transformation and policing; peacebuilding and reconciliation; justice and accountability; poverty, inequality and socio-economic factors; politics, crime and violence. Emphasizing trust and co-operation with the individuals and groups involved, the project aims to identify lessons from specific policy interventions as well as formulate practical recommendations, also with a view to future comparative work at sub-regional and international levels.

However, key security issues also sit at the intersection between the national and international. The much-hailed “peace dividend” promised by the conclusion of the Cold War never really came to fruition in the 1990s, and it seems ever remote in the current global context marked by the “war on terrorism”, privatization of security, the “securitization of aid”, and the consequent threats to multilateralism, international rule of law, and humanitarianism (Foxall 2003; Traynor 2003; Duffield 2004; Feinstein 2004; Human Rights Watch 2004; Jolly 2004). Debates on the rules of war and use of international criminal justice systems have emerged, as well as on the tensions between international public law (based on a foundation of state sovereignty and the state’s responsibility to protect its citizens) and international criminal justice (which supercedes sovereignty and may be more subjectively assessed) (Falk 2002; Herz 2003; Holbrook 2004; Roth 2004a; Roth 2004b; Wedgewood 2004).

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12 Marshall and Gurr (2003, 7, 14) also contend that 9/11 and its aftermath constitute a “new, post-Cold War, global security problematique” and assert that “[u]nderstanding the connections between poverty, development, governance and security is crucial to effective, global conflict management.”
The new context has challenged the human security paradigm in favour of harder-edged approaches to security, thus threatening the “virtuous cycle” of security and development that relies on inclusive growth and notions of security that include civic/social trust, subjective well-being, community security, and safety nets to deal with economic vicissitudes and health crises (Stewart 2003). Certainly, global military spending has risen steadily since 1998—well before the 9/11 crisis—but this trend has been exacerbated by the war in Iraq, and is mostly occurring in states engaged in war (Jolly 2004). Indeed, there is emerging concern that OECD aid monies may be re-directed to counter-terrorism efforts in poor countries rather than maintaining focus on poverty reduction. Concern is also emerging about the widespread use of counter-terrorism efforts that undermine, and are used to override, civil and political rights and liberties (Human Rights Watch 2004; Reality of Aid 2004; Social Watch 2004, especially essays by Reisen et al and Samad). Such use of security apparatuses will only lead to destabilization in the long-run, as state repression and violence breeds increased radicalism and closes off alternative avenues for dissent (democratic institutions and practices, rule of law, etc.).

Discussion of (in)security and international rule of law inevitably leads to the issue of protection and its paradoxes. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s “responsibility to protect” report (2001) is a strong entry point into some of the debates on the contradiction between state sovereignty and state and international obligation to uphold international human rights and humanitarian law by protecting vulnerable populations. It is grounded in three elements: the responsibility to prevent violent conflict, the responsibility to react to it, and the responsibility to rebuild, particularly after a military intervention. The principle of state sovereignty is rooted in state responsibility for protection of its people, and only in the case of “a population suffering serious harm”13 where the state is unable or unwilling to intervene does the “principle of non-intervention yield to the international responsibility to protect”. Nonetheless, international intervention must be taken with “right intention”, as a “last resort”, through “proportional means”, and with “reasonable prospects” for success in halting people’s suffering (ICISS 2001).14 In the case of a weak or predatory state, the responsibility to protect falls squarely on the shoulders of the international community. However, it remains unclear how local populations could mobilize the international political will required to prevent or intervene in a massive human rights emergency. The Darfur disaster unfolding during 2004 is a stark indicator of this problem.

In the first consultation with southern civil society actors on the ICISS report (in the African Great Lakes Region), several important issues were raised, including a discussion of civil society-promoted protection mechanisms (human rights training and paralegal provision, dialogues with local police, communications of abuses with/through international networks and within the local community) (Baines et al 2004). Nonetheless, the contents of the consultation report make clear that many challenges to local-level protection remain, including the use of communications media by militants and the state

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13 This is further defined as “large scale loss of life” or “large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’” (ICISS 2001).
14 All of these concepts are fully elaborated in the report.
to foster and facilitate an environment of insecurity and violence (Rwanda is one of the most well-known instances of this), the relative powerlessness of civil society against the abuses of a predatory state, and the interconnections between socio-economic deprivation and vulnerability to sexual exploitation at the hands of militias, peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers. Moreover, the experience of security and insecurity in Afghanistan demonstrates that international intervention can lead to, or certainly not prevent, fundamental insecurity of local populations, where “regions that show up as ‘Low Risk/Permissive Environment’ (i.e., areas considered secure for operations) on United Nations security maps are areas where local populations often report high levels of conflict and are experiencing insecurity at the hands of armed political groups, warlords, commanders and their associates, including district authorities and police forces….and the activities of the Coalition forces” (Mazurana et al 2004, 6). A recent panel on security sector reform at an experts’ meeting on democratic development in Iraq in Ottawa indicated that one cause of high levels of Iraqi insecurity is due to Coalition Forces’ “unorthodox” approach to building and reforming Iraq’s security sector that is reminiscent of approaches taken in Afghanistan. All of this suggests the need and importance of including civil society actors at peace negotiation tables, international mission planning, and intervention assessment, monitoring and evaluation fora. Indeed, other sources suggest the importance of building both state and civil society capacities in planning and monitoring international mission parameters (Chopra 2000, 2002). Moreover, civilian and civil society engagement and oversight of security policies is an important ingredient of security, democratic governance and indeed, conflict prevention (see Serbin 2003, Ball and Fayemi 2004).

Programming entry points in this theme can include:
- relationship between political and criminal violence
- rules of war and international law and justice
- DDR
- JSSR
- impact of re-emergence of traditional security paradigm, privatization of security and securitization of aid on human security
- “responsibility to protect” challenges and issues
- local-level and civil society capacities to deal with security and protection.

**Leading approach**

PCD will follow up with our portfolio of work in these issues to develop a JSSR platform that will include a comparative learning evaluation of the body of our total JSSR portfolio in Latin America and Africa, commission a forward-looking think piece that analyses latest learnings and approaches to JSSR, an international workshop convening PCD partners, Canadian and key international actors, and finally, an In Focus publication or synthetic scholarly report with policy brief derivations. This platform will assist PCD in establishing global and strengthening regional networks in JSSR as well as set the trajectory for new generation PCD programming for other policy and research activities on the issue, including possible expansion of JSSR initiatives in the Middle East and Asia. In addition, PCD will explore possibilities of building on modest investments in southern perspectives and initiatives on “responsibility to protect”.
2.5.4. Violence, trauma, justice and reconciliation

It is impossible to discuss security and insecurity without also analyzing the interrelationships between violence, trauma, justice and reconciliation. Like governance and the political economy, dealing with the past so that it does not undermine prospects for peaceful co-existence is critical to long-term durable peace. Organized political violence is experienced and directed at individual, community and national levels, and this violence can take many forms, including gender-based and sexual violence used as political weapons (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Strickland and Duvvury 2003; UN 2002).

Violence and the trauma victims suffer pose serious challenges to peacebuilding and peace durability. Trauma can be experienced and reproduced over generations. This can result in continued and periodically repeated violence, often in private spaces such as in the home. In public, it produces a dangerous and futile spiral that also shapes economic and political relations and institutions, which in turn condition and reshape identity and violent responses to injustice and unequal power-sharing (Marshall and Gurr 2003). Reforms aimed at achieving greater levels of political and economic justice can often circumvent violent responses, and are certainly necessary redress to violence and trauma. Reconciliation is a generations-long process. It emerges as a result of reforms and efforts at redress, and is not an achievable objective without accompanying structural and institutional changes and initiatives explicitly designed to bring justice to victims and perpetrators of organized political violence. However, intrinsic needs and responses of victims, perpetrators, communities and states are critical elements in understanding and responding to violence, as well as in moving beyond it. Recent efforts at truth and reconciliation processes, as well as other attempts at transitional and restorative justice, are positive developments about which little is yet understood in terms of their utility and effectiveness in preventing further conflict and repairing the past (Hastrup 2003; ICTJ forthcoming).

REPARATIONS AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

Dealing with past legacies of human rights abuses and promoting truth and justice are key aspects of democratic development and social recovery in post-conflict countries. With the operationalization of special criminal tribunals and International Criminal Court, over the past decade the international community has made significant progress defining processes for dealing with the perpetrators of abuse. Much less is known, however, about how transitional governments can help repair the harm suffered by victims.

With support from PCD, the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) undertook an ambitious research study on past and current reparations programs in 12 countries. Governments face many financial, political and logistical challenges as they attempt to structure policies and programs for reparations. Reparations are often considered a luxury for developing countries, too expensive for cash-strapped nations who must also re-build infrastructure, reform institutions and address poverty and inequity. National policies require political will and the construction of political coalitions in environments characterized by fractionalization. The ICTJ study has highlighted the diversity and complexity of reparations programs indicating that they are often required to include a variety of complementary material or symbolic mechanisms that address victims needs and may be administered individually, collectively, or both. These dilemmas and many others have been tackled by researchers participating in the “Repairing the Past” study.

Results of the study are now being fed into policymaking discussions at the national and global levels,
enabling governments, civil society organizations and multilateral institutions to identify best practices, avoid past mistakes, and anticipate difficulties. Through a series of in-country policy seminars and direct technical assistance to governments and victims groups, the ICTJ and its partners are influencing the development of national and international policies on cash or in-kind reparation schemes to victims of human rights abuses in a number of significant ways. Research findings are informing the debates taking place in Advisory Board of the Trust Fund for Victims of the International Criminal Court. Advisory services on reparations are helping shape the direction that reparations might take in countries such as Peru, Guatemala and East Timor.

Building on the strong partnership forged with IDRC, the ICTJ will soon be embarking upon a second phase of PCD-supported research which will focus upon the challenges and options for designing gender-sensitive policies and programs for reparations to victims who have suffered particular forms of gender-based violence such as rape, forced marriage and disproportionate internal displacement.

Programming entry points in this theme can include:
- impact of organized political violence on individuals, communities and states
- nature and implications of trauma and how to deal with it
- parameters and requirements of meaningful reconciliation
- intrinsic needs of victims
- utility and effectiveness of transitional and restorative justice.

Leading approach
PCD’s partnership with the ICTJ provides a platform for additional initiatives on gender and reparations (global-comparative research and a research competition in Latin America), networking researchers on TRJ in Africa with Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) and globally, and a “reconciliation” program initiative in the Middle East, in partnership with IDRC’s EASF, to explore the issues surrounding 1948 and what mechanisms and initiatives may be required to move beyond it.

2.6 Programming approach
PCD’s external review highlights and supports the PI’s mode of programming strategy as a combination of support to projects on issues of particular local/regional significance, and focussed on a few synergistic clusters around particular issues or contexts. This strategy has emerged both by design (based on the acceptance that conflict and peacebuilding contexts are highly fluid, if not volatile, with rapidly shifting priorities) and as a result of an iterative and responsive approach to programming that builds on southern-articulated priorities, emerging program strengths and advantages of concentration. This fits with our understanding of good country and regional programming aimed at achieving maximum policy or practical impact, i.e. that programming must be nimble and informed by the logic of the context. Our emphasis on country programming as a base upon which to make concrete country research-to-policy and practice interventions is vital to our ability to contribute in a legitimate and credible manner to larger global debates on peacebuilding. Thus, PCD will also take a thematic approach to global programming based on the entry-points articulated above, and give priority to regional and country projects that fit within these entry points. In doing so, PCD will build on already-established strengths and explorations in previous programming. As such, PCD will not focus programming in other areas of peacebuilding.
research, such as: “hardware” issues (landmines, arms development, etc.), human rights monitoring, peacemaking/peacekeeping (except for local capacity-building to engage with international intervention), community resource management conflicts, and alternative dispute or conflict resolution (especially when it occurs outside contexts where structural change/reform is being planned and implemented or in small community contexts).

Moreover, PCD closely defines the contexts within which it will program. PCD will limit itself to contexts that have suffered, or threaten to suffer, significant loss of human life due to armed political violence. PCD will also consider supporting programming in contexts currently suffering from violent conflict. This departure from our previous prospectus parameters is based in response to our external review’s encouragement of this work and recent explorations that emphasized the need to support research in contexts before the ink is dry on peace accords (in order to support provision of evidence-based inputs to accords and support more inclusive peace accord negotiation processes).

**PREPARING FOR THIRD PARTY INVOLVEMENT IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONTEXT**

With the breakdown of the Oslo peace process in 2000, Palestinians, Israelis and the international community have devised various initiatives and explored various mechanisms to return to the negotiation table. One of those mechanisms is third party involvement in the conflict. This idea has gained particular traction since PM Ariel Sharon announced his intention to redeploy the Israeli military and evacuate settlers from the Gaza Strip in December 2003. A key aspect of Sharon’s unilateral “Disengagement Plan” is third party involvement.

With PCD and Dutch Foreign Ministry support, Cambridge University convenes a discussion and problem-solving/planning forum for Palestinian, Israeli and international officials and experts to better understand and map possible parameters of any future mission, in particular appropriate third party roles. A defining feature of the project—and one that distinguishes it from other planning exercises in other contexts—is that the project, its substance and agenda, is led by Israeli and Palestinian actors. The main objective is to develop a knowledge-based community sharing a) common identification, understanding, and terminology relating to policy, planning, and operational issues, and b) awareness of political and security concerns of the principal parties, and of how these may affect policy and operational planning. The substantive planning reports and meetings are used to build Palestinian and Israeli capacity for working with potential international contributing nations, and to give shape to any future mission, with project outputs reaching high-level Palestinian decision-makers and the Israeli National Security Council.

Our own programming learning over the past prospectus period, where programming in Palestine continued despite the emergence of armed conflict there and PCD’s programming expansion into Colombia, also underpins this programming direction and reflects the reality of conflict and peacebuilding as a non-linear progression, where relapse is a frequent and common danger. Our work in Palestine and in Colombia, as well as ongoing work in South Africa, provides us with opportunities to make contributions to a deepened understanding of violence dynamics. Moreover, in this prospectus period PCD will launch an exploration into the inter-linkages between criminal and political violence, unequal development and political transition as one element of our efforts to arrive at a deepened understanding of violence dynamics.
Nonetheless, we have posited key criteria guiding our decisions for PCD entry into national and regional contexts in the midst of violent conflict, including: already-existing research capacity including an institutional base (and preferably, already-existing partnerships), connectivity, and researchers who can make a difference with sufficient links with policy-makers. See Annex 1 for a table detailing criteria for country programming selection in cases of states at risk of violent conflict, contexts of violent conflict, and post-conflict peacebuilding contexts. It should also be noted that these criteria are guidelines only, and contexts not meeting all criteria can be considered for programming, should political or other types of opportunities present themselves for meaningful engagement.

3. Implementation

3.1. Activities/programming modalities
PCD will continue to support a variety of activities and programming modalities that fall within two main categories: research programming and “knowledge conveying”. Together these two types of activities work to the fulfillment of our objectives of accountability, constructive engagement (or “deliberation and debate”), policy and practical influence, and Southern capacity and disciplinary field-building.

3.1.1. Research programming
PCD’s research programming will focus on the thematic entry points articulated above. Our programming approach is directed at Southern researcher, policy-maker and advocate needs and priorities, as well as at emerging debates and issues in the peacebuilding field. PCD takes a total research-to-policy and/or practice project approach at the project development stage whenever possible, funding dissemination costs within project budgets at first approval in order to maximize opportunities for policy and/or practical influence. Research competitions and small grants mechanisms will be used selectively, as a means to expanding or developing research networks and advance innovative research methodologies. From time to time, PCD will also depart from its usual approach of engaged project development with partners in instances where fast appropriation is required to meet short-term policy windows, especially at the country, and perhaps regional, level. This approach will be considered on a case-by-case basis, and will normally be reserved for high-capacity partners who have strong and direct links to policy makers and other actors poised to make a direct difference in peace negotiations and peacebuilding programming and policies.

Global comparative research
PCD will continue to develop its global programming to focus on cross-regional comparative work, networking (South-South, North-South, and North-South-South), capacity-building, and scaling up/synthesizing knowledge within PCD’s thematic entry points with the aim of influencing global debates. A variety of modalities will be used, including responsive proposal development, research competitions and small grant mechanisms. Examples of projects recently approved or currently developing are support to the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development; a follow up to our “What Kind of Peace?” exploration involving a network of six national research teams (in Afghanistan,
Guatemala, Haiti, Mozambique, Palestine, Sri Lanka); support to an emerging Transitional and Restorative Justice research network; and the CRIES/ECCP project on civil society participation in conflict prevention activities. Global programming will adhere to PCD’s articulated entry points, but may include partners outside of our selected country foci.

JOURNAL OF PEACEBUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT

The South-North Centre for Peacebuilding and Development in Zimbabwe, with the American University in Washington, are jointly producing a peer-reviewed international journal issued three times per year. The Journal provides a forum for the sharing of critical thinking and constructive action on issues at the intersections of conflict, development and peace, and puts special emphasis on publishing articles written by Southern scholars and practitioners. Moreover, the Journal will embark on a series of activities related to building the field of peacebuilding in the South, including training and capacity-building, network building, policy advocacy and advising, and university curriculum development.

Country and regional research

Country and regional research will be supported on a responsive basis, with a combination of long-term and new partners. This work is geared to building knowledge on specific peacebuilding problems and issues and/or influencing specific policy or practical areas within our thematic framework, as well as providing tools for accountability of state and international actors to civil society in peacebuilding contexts. Support will also be considered for projects that fit within the logic of specific contexts, especially where there is potential for policy knowledge, influence and debate.

Country focus in Guatemala and Colombia will continue, as well as selected sub-regional foci. Our country-level programming in Latin America allows PCD to span the “three environments approach” (as outlined in Annex 1), which includes states at risk/conflict prevention contexts, violent political conflict contexts, and post-conflict contexts. One country, Colombia, focusses on how to make peace and the other country, Guatemala, focusses on how to maintain it. As a region, PCD will continue to incrementally build comparative research (e.g. the CRIES framework Treaty on Democratic Security project, comparative peacebuilding for democratic transition in El Salvador and Guatemala, and our Gender Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies research competition) where opportunities arise.

Country level programming in Guatemala is guided by three goals: (1) research to support the irreversibility of progress made so far by consolidating key national institutions and ensuring the presence of a strong civil society capable of responsible oversight and constructive engagement with the state; (2) research to build conditions for the sustainability of progress made so far and the strengthening of national partners’ capacity as research institutions; (3) research that responds to emerging opportunities and shifting trends on the ground. Country level programming in Colombia supports research inside and outside the country that strengthens North-South and South collaboration for the following goals: (1) backstop policy discussions that aim to
mitigate the humanitarian consequences of the ongoing conflict; (2) assist Colombians to visualize scenarios and build models for reform and reconciliation in the post-conflict period. Thematic foci in Colombia and Guatemala will include justice and security sector reform, models of experiences in transitional and restorative justice, as well as explorations of issues in gender and peacebuilding more generally.

The Palestine portfolio will continue to develop, and regional focus in the Middle East will develop in coordination with Special Initiative’s new IDRC-CIDA-FAC program on Democratic Development in the Middle East. Foci of this programming will include: women’s, minority and human rights; freedom of expression and association (including media, civil society, political parties); decentralized decision-making in policy processes (including public sector reform, constitutional reform and development, strengthening local government); and promotion of a democratic political culture (including civic education, development of curricula). In addition, some focus on security sector reform and civilian oversight capacity may be explored. Programming modalities will rely heavily on intra-regional and global-Middle East networking and comparative research. Where possible, PCD will develop programming that builds on previous investments in Middle East regional gender (UNDP) and families in conflict research (Arab Families Working Group).

Aims of the Palestine programming are: (1) to contribute to creating conditions, knowledge and relations necessary for return to a peace process with Israel grounded in international law and consistent with best international practices and in approaches that can best guarantee a just and durable peace; (2) to contribute to laying the groundwork for Palestinian state and society-building. Thematic emphases will include: governance/JSSR reform and oversight, developing alternative negotiating and reconciliation scenarios and responses in Israel-Palestine, capacity-building for third party intervention, and understanding and responding to local coping strategies in dealing with conditions of the conflict. Where possible, networking with global and regional actors will be built into Palestine programming to build comparative strength into the portfolio.

New African programming will be informed by our explorations of West and East Africa, where West African programming will focus on the Mano River countries (Davies 2003) and the East African programming will focus in the Horn, Great Lakes region, and the Karamajong cluster, as well as continued development of programming in southern Africa that builds on previous investments in the region. Thematic foci will include: transitional and restorative justice, security and insecurity (including the exploration on the linkages between criminal and political violence and responsibility to protect issues), and political economy approaches to peace and conflict.

Finally, programming in Asia will continue to develop in an exploratory manner, building off our explorations and our initial foray into Sri Lanka and also investigating opportunities for regional foci in India’s north-east region, Nepal and Indonesia (Khan 2003; Pattugalan 2003). In particular, a new project with International Peace Academy that networks Indian, Pakistani and Kashmiri researchers to explore and develop different peace negotiation parameters for the Kashmir conflict holds the potential to lay the
foundation for continued engagement in Kashmir. Thematic foci will build off of approaches to political economy of peace and conflict, democratic processes in governance, and violence, trauma, justice and reconciliation.

3.1.2. “Knowledge conveying”
PCD’s external review highlights the role of IDRC as “knowledge conveyer”. In addition to the total research-to-policy and practice project approach articulated above, PCD will continue to convene international workshops on various aspects of our programming and explorations on emerging issues and debates. Our role as “knowledge conveyor” should attempt to re-shape northern debates according to southern analysis and priorities and encourage exchange on critical perspectives to peacebuilding debates and emerging issues in peacebuilding. Synthetic reports will scale up knowledge derived from collections of discrete projects as well as from research competitions or small grants mechanisms.

Explorations on emerging issues and problems
PCD will build on our successful past use of explorations to investigate new problems in peacebuilding or critical new perspectives on enduring issues. Explorations will be pitched at the regional or global level, and will be used to fine-tune our programming directions as well as a guide to developing new partnerships. Programming at the global, regional or country level, as well as small grants mechanisms or research competitions may result from some explorations. Upcoming explorations this prospectus period will be on research ethics in conflict contexts and the linkages between criminal and political violence.

Conferences and workshops
PCD will continue to use international conferences and workshops to introduce our partners and policy makers to our supported research and exploration issues. Workshops and conferences will also be used as component pieces of research competitions and small grants mechanisms to facilitate methodology training and networking.

Synthetic reports
PCD will begin to produce and publish synthetic reports based on our supported research as a means of scaling up and disseminating knowledge on selected research issues, especially to bridge or compare intra-regional and cross-regional research. Synthetic reports may also be used to scale up results from research competitions and small grants mechanisms. PCD will work with the Communications Division on a synthetic report on JSSR reflecting our programming experience in Latin America and Africa and implications for future trajectories in the sector. Additional topics for other synthetic report initiatives could include: TRJ, lessons learned from use of research as an accountability tool, peace budgeting or other political economy approaches to understanding conflict.

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15 Examples from recent years include conferences and workshops building on projects and explorations on “What Kind of Peace?”, gender and peacebuilding, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment, and transitional and restorative justice.
3.2. Partnership
A review of the major donors and foundations working in the peacebuilding field reveals that no other international grant-making organization has as its primary mandate the support of southern research and research capacity. This makes IDRC’s role in this area a unique contribution to development. Nonetheless, there are a variety of Canadian and international actors where PCD has developed synergy, or will do so in the next prospectus period.

PCD views partnering primarily in strategic terms. By “strategic partnering”, PCD means collaborating with other southern, Canadian, and international actors that can give “political legs” to research PCD has supported, or supported in coordination with other donors, in bilateral or multilateral fora where many peacebuilding policies and programs are decided and devised. As such, partnering can be an integral aspect of our programming, particularly when policy or programming influence is a priority. Parallel or co-funding often leverages or accompanies strategic investment in research projects, but it is not a necessary or sufficient condition. PCD will also explore developing or deepening collaborative relations with other research, programming or policy actors in the peacebuilding field in order to multiply our strengths and resources. Nonetheless, basic principles must frame PCD’s partnership strategy when assessing potential partners, including: (1) similar valuing of or approach to working with Southern partners, and (2) coherence or sharing of policy objectives.

At the current time, PCD partners, and is exploring or developing partnerships, with the following organizations, among others:

- Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC)
- CIDA
- Clingendael Institute
- DFID
- Dutch Foreign Ministry
- FAC
- Ford Foundation
- International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
- International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IIDEA)
- International Peace Academy (IPA)
- Journal of Peacebuilding and Development
- NORAD
- North-South Institute (NSI)
- Open Societies Institute
- Oxfam UK
- Rights and Democracy
- Rockefeller Foundation
- Swedish Foreign Ministry
- UNDP
- USAID
- War-torn Societies Project International (WSP-I).
These actors represent a combination of PCD recipients with strategic reach and parallel funders of PCD-supported projects. PCD has also supported a range of Canadian universities (including Queen’s University, Liu Centre-UBC, Carleton University)—often in north-south collaborative projects—and will continue to develop and expand these relations, with the specific aim of involving select Canadian partners in research capacity-building of Southern researchers.

In regard to partnership with Canadian officials, PCD participates in interdepartmental working groups (always involving FAC and CIDA, and frequently DND, RCMP, Justice, PCO and others as appropriate) on Peacebuilding, Gender and Peacebuilding, Middle East/Palestine, and Colombia. From time to time, PCD is also invited to participate in ad hoc committees, such as the current interdepartmental task force on Canada’s contribution to Gaza withdrawal and previously, on the Canadian committee on NEPAD leading up to the Kananaskis G8 Summit. These meetings serve as planning committees for Canada’s positions on various aspects of foreign policy and programming. In addition, PCD also sits on the planning committee for the annual Peacebuilding Consultations hosted by FAC and the Canadian interdepartmental working group on IIDEA. These meetings and committees—and the networks they build on and support—all provide opportunities to feed PCD-supported research findings directly into Canadian policy fora.

3.3. Communications

PCD will use, or support through project funding, a variety of tools to make more visible its supported research and partners. Communications strategies will be both partner and Centre-led (in cooperation with the Communications Unit). These can include co-publications, videos, policy briefs based on research findings, participation in or convening of international workshops and conferences, production of synthetic reports, and the PCD website.

As mentioned in the “Knowledge conveying” section, PCD aims to build on project and program investments thus far with continued convening of international workshops and conferences related to our supported research or new explorations (namely, ethics in peacebuilding research and the relationship between criminality and political violence). Previous investments in exploration workshops have given PCD profile, particularly in its “What Kind of Peace” initiative, which led to the theme being taken up in the 2003 Peacebuilding Consultations, hosted by FAC, CPCC and the CCHS.

There will also be new efforts at synthesizing our programming experience in a variety of reports. One such report, in an In Focus or other similar format, on justice and security sector reform in Latin America and Africa, is planned early in the prospectus period, with later possibilities for similar efforts in transitional and restorative justice and other issues flagged.

Through project funding, PCD will support IDRC co-publications, videos and partner participation in international fora, and other partner-led dissemination strategies.
4. Evaluation

PCD will continue with its learning/outcome mapping approach to evaluation, and will embed assessments of how individual and clusters of projects contribute to our program objectives.

We have articulated three evaluation areas for the next prospectus period (see Annex 2 for detailed information):

1. Learning value, utility and impact of peacebuilding research in conflict contexts;
2. Capacity-building in the field of Southern peacebuilding research;
3. Sector-specific impact of PCD research/researchers on regional/global debates, including JSSR, TRJ, and political economy.

These areas combine evaluation that allow us to assess progress towards our stated objectives along with our progress in developing capacity-building and substantive depth and policy impact in key areas or contexts. In certain cases, evaluations will also feed into the production of synthetic reports, as in the case of JSSR.

PCD also intends to issue annual reports of its programming in order to capture learning and policy successes that may not necessarily be captured by key evaluations.

5. Anticipated challenges/risks

All research and development programs carry challenges and risks. PCD shares many of these, as well as others that are unique to the operating environment within which peace and conflict research is situated. Although several of these have been iterated throughout the body of this prospectus document, they are worth re-articulating and evaluating separately as a focus here.

Conflict and post-conflict contexts are marked by challenges having to do with instability, poverty and inequities that deeply undermine institutional capacities in all sorts of ways, including planning, project implementation, human resources development, space for academic freedom and freedom of speech, and physical security of institutional personnel and material resources. Moreover, in general, the longer a conflict persists, the more likely a context is to experience educated middle class flight, including those in the intellectual, policy, NGO and public service communities. Once lost, it is difficult to rebuild these communities or attract them back for any sustained period of time. Finally, fractured polities also find a reflection in fractured research, advocacy and policy communities—both within and between each category—that makes supporting peacebuilding policy research a distinct challenge. All of this adds up to communities of actors who are primarily—and rightly—absorbed by the immediacy and importance of the challenges in their own communities rather than putting priority on global knowledge exchange. These constraints pose significant challenges to IDRC in implementing the PCD program.

PCD’s recent external review highlights some of the challenges facing PCD in fostering Southern networking and capacity-building—many of which are exacerbated by war and post-war contexts, and make global and comparative programming extraordinarily
difficult tasks. In addition to those risks the review highlights, additional challenges include high levels of suspicion and dislike between regional actors, and the deeply undermined intellectual capital and infrastructure resulting from war contexts and its often resultant grinding poverty. For these reasons, it should be emphasized that possible gains or achievements towards capacity-building and networking objectives are realistically modest and/or long-term in nature.

Nonetheless, several of IDRC’s and PCD’s forms of support and objectives are designed to address these issues, especially those aspects having to do with human resources development, and project design, development and implementation. Our approach relies on deep contextual knowledge and engagement of PCD program officers that constitutes active support of projects and partners. Moreover, this engagement and PCD projects can also play a limited role in relationship-building within and between communities of actors in war-torn contexts. Flexible project administration—including over timelines—also plays a significant role in the extent to which our partners feel and are supported in project implementation that is relevant to ground-level realities. Finally, PCD program staff have a role to play in identifying strategic opportunities for regional and global networking of researchers, advocates and/or policy-makers, and making the case for how global exchange brings added-value to finding solutions for national-level problems.

Other contextual risks involve an extremely fluid global context and its effect on international and Canadian foreign policy priorities, the phenomenon of donor saturation in newly opening peacebuilding contexts that results in over-extension of local partners, and the short attention span of international actors for specific peacebuilding contexts (for example, bilateral and multilateral planning in peacebuilding often spans periods of only a few years but experience tells us that decades-long engagements are more consistent with producing successful peacebuilding results).

Some of the answers to these issues are also embedded in PCD’s program plans and developing an analysis of the peacebuilding problematique. For instance, a solid and continually developing understanding of peacebuilding challenges and issues positions PCD to engage effectively with international and Canadian foreign policy actors on the problems of peacebuilding. PCD is open to engaging with contexts in violent conflict—providing enabling conditions are present—with the aim of supporting certain contexts towards peaceful resolution through relationship building and support of key actors in context. A side benefit of this approach can be strong partnerships with key actors, which will to some extent ensure our continued relevance and maintain our status as a priority donor. Finally, context fatigue on the part of other donors and international actors is a risk we can do little about. This has potential implications for financial and strategic partnerships, but we also can and do play a role in attracting donors to new aspects of peacebuilding issues and contexts, thus maintaining longer-term engagement. Involving actors in lower-priority contexts in regional and global projects and networks also contributes to their continued voice and visibility in international fora.

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16 Also see the discussion of networks and the challenges in developing and maintaining them in IDRC (2003, 5).
IDRC also has its own limitations that set parameters around extent of support possible through PCD programming. One main issue is workload and team resilience. Team size is one rectifying factor, as well as developing programmatic focus and complementary and overlapping areas of expertise between team members. While larger project size can be another approach to dealing with workload (the “less with more” mode of programming), large projects require careful and close monitoring for accountability reasons, where the stakes are higher with larger amounts of money granted to single partners. Moreover, in politically unstable contexts, large projects may be untenable because of partner planning limitations mentioned elsewhere in this document.

The nature of our business as a research donor also poses certain challenges when it comes to policy and practical influence. While evidence-based policy making is definitely a need when it comes to peacebuilding, policy windows often open quickly and unpredictably—and close just as quickly and unpredictably—and research is mostly a medium- to long-term exercise. Good intelligence and knowledge of context on the part of PCD program officers can assist them to some extent in anticipating or predicting policy openings—as will partnership with connected and knowledgeable partners—but willingness to take risks and support “cutting edge” or politically risky research can sometimes result in or imply the need for creating policy windows through support to particular projects. PCD is also open to short approval timelines for projects from high-capacity partners who are well connected to policy circles and when a quick research response can make a significant policy difference.

Finally, IDRC is a Crown corporation, and as such is not a formal bilateral actor but instead operates at “arm’s-length” from government. This is a drawback in a sector where bilateral and multilateral actors dominate issue-definition and policy-making, where foreign policy and its mechanisms are the primary responses to issues and where foreign policy formation is dominated by government departments and those with security clearances. PCD will continue to build its relationships with FAC, CIDA and DND through ongoing participation in interdepartmental working groups and committees where official responses are frequently discussed, as well as develop strategic partnerships with other international/multilateral actors that will use PCD-supported research in policy advocacy. Nonetheless, IDRC’s limitations as a “non-official” actor are more than outweighed by the advantages of such a status, namely that IDRC is not perceived as holding a specific foreign policy agenda, but is instead concerned about integrity of research and process. This gives us a certain amount of credibility amongst partners and other donors, and provides the foundation for the establishment of political trust between PCD and our substantive and strategic partners. Moreover, this status positions us strategically to take on cutting edge initiatives that can complement and lead thinking on official policies, which official agencies might themselves be otherwise unable or unwilling to support.
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Khan, Abdur Rob. 2003 (February). “IDRC-PBR Peacebuilding Scoping Study In South Asia”. Unpublished paper commissioned by PBR.


**Annex 1: Programming considerations in/indicators of pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict contexts**

The following criteria should serve as guidelines and issues to consider and evaluate program engagement in pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict contexts.

For any project that PBR considers supporting, the following criteria will be evaluated:

**In the field:**
- Are there researchers with reasonable training/advanced degrees, experience, and a credible track record of research?
- Is there a community of researchers? Are intellectuals an “endangered species”?
- Is there basic research-relevant infrastructure, i.e. connectivity, research institutions and research capacity?
- Is there space for research, i.e. is there research/academic freedom, freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association, etc.?
- Do researchers have reasonable access to policy makers and/or do reasonable policy openings exist?
- Is there mobility and safety for researchers? Are researchers able to access places relevant to the research for interviews, etc.?
- Do any domestic governance and conflict mediation/management mechanisms exist? If so, are conflicts mediated by these to some extent?

**Within PBR/IDRC and the wider donor community:**
- Does PCD/IDRC possess contextual expertise/knowledge/contacts?
- Are there sufficient resources in the PCD budget?
- Are there sufficient human resources within the PI?
- Is there senior management support/encouragement for programming in this context?
- Is there perceived or actual donor over-saturation in this context? Alternatively, is there any donor engagement in the context, and if so, to what extent and in what areas/issues?
- Does the proposed project provide potential for PBR-supported innovation, or synergy with other projects?
- Are there any Canadian foreign policy considerations?

While PCD’s bottom-line criteria of what constitutes a conflict situation is measured by 1,000 (battle-related) deaths involving combat between states or between state and non-state actors, various other factors underpin more complex decisions to program in particular contexts and at particular periods. These criteria and factors include the conflict indicators included in the three tables below.
Table 1: “State at Risk” (conflict prevention) contexts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Category</th>
<th>Sub-Category</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Political factors and Governance</td>
<td>a. state/regime legitimacy</td>
<td>a. legitimacy called into question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. regime type</td>
<td>b. regimes of short duration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. political stability, opposition and violence</td>
<td>c. sustained opposition/protests/demonstrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. corruption</td>
<td>-random attacks against civilian or state targets, or deliberate acts directed against a specific group or region or active discrimination/legislation that favours one group over another -destabilizing elections or referendums -government “clamp-downs” and/or prevention of civil society mobilization along identity/class/regional lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Socio-economic factors</td>
<td>a. social development and equality</td>
<td>a. severe socio-economic inequities between groups and/or regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. economic stability, wealth and performance</td>
<td>b. poor economic stability and/or unequal distribution of wealth, and/or economic shocks or financial crises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. demographics</td>
<td>-unusual or unequal deprivation brought on by periods of rapid political and economic transition, such as during liberalization or structural adjustment programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. large number of (educated) unemployed youth (particularly males)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-grievance-based mobilization of groups along socio-economic lines, leading to a legacy of vengeance and violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Socio-cultural factors</td>
<td>a. identity-based (i.e. racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, caste) tensions and divisions</td>
<td>a. political exploitation of identity-based tensions and divisions (which may be manifest in hate speech highlighting identity-based cleavages or desecration of religious monuments/sites, amongst others)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. structural and historical inequities/factors</td>
<td>-rise in societal intolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. changes in self-constructions and perceptions of communities</td>
<td>b. historical (which may include colonial) legacy of structural inequities (politico-economic and social)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-dominance of one community (based on some aspect of identity) over (an)other(s), economically and/or politically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. constructions of communities as warriors/militarized, using</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 4. Justice | a. rule of law  
b. human rights  
c. media | a. rule of law disintegrated/lacking  
and conflict mediation  
mechanisms under stress or  
lacking altogether  
b. human rights suppressed or  
violated with impunity  
c. media freedom repressed and/or  
media forced to act as mouthpiece  
for partisan politics  
-civil society seemingly  
passive/inactive in the face of  
injustice  
-resistance to outside interventions |
| 5. (Human) Security factors | a. demographic/population pressure  
b. non-economic social development and regional inequalities  
c. crime | a. massive, chronic or sustained human flight  
b. wide disparities between areas/regions of state and history of armed conflict and structural instability  
c. transition from criminal to large-scale political violence |
| 6. Military and Defence factors (this pre-supposes some prior history of armed conflict in the country) | a. arms, small arms  
b. military/rebel spending  
c. military/rebel forces and control | a. increasing arms flows  
b. rising military/rebel spending/procurement as ratio of GNI  
c. increasing recruitment and mobilization of forces (in the case of rebel groups–increasing levels of child recruitment)  
-increasing hostility between armed groups/state and non-state actors  
-public support for military resolution of the conflict  
-government legitimacy tied to conclusive military victory |
| 7. Geopolitical factors | a. regional and international setting  
b. external/international support/intervention/linkage  
c. external territorial disputes | a. importance of region for wider, international geopolitical scene  
b. external/international support for one of the fighting groups, possibilities for intervention or linkages with diaspora groups  
c. escalation of border dispute  
-influx of refugees from a neighbouring region  
-spill-over of ideologies or conflicts from a neighbouring region |
| 8. Environment and Natural Resources | a. resource management  
b. existence of “lootable”/non-“lootable” natural resources (e.g. diamonds, oil, gold, etc.) | a. unequal access to natural resources  
b. looting of natural resources a profitable endeavour in a weak state  
-high dependence on primary |
Some caveats:

- The existence of some or many of these conflict indicators may not lead to the eruption of large-scale violent conflict for years, or in some cases, at all. These indicators can in fact “brew” for many years. PCD’s programming decisions will therefore also be based on the potential of violent conflict erupting, amongst other factors.

- All the categories in the tables are interconnected and do not stand alone, but have been divided for analytical purposes (they include structural and proximate causes and signs and indicators).
Table 2: Violent political conflict contexts

PCD’s engagement in conflict areas would be assessed according to the possibilities of research and/or researchers encouraging/strengthening the emergence of peacebuilding processes in actively violent contexts. In particular, PCD would assess emerging openings that could lead to peace or sustain emergent peacebuilding, and/or other existing engagement that could usefully facilitate PCD work:

- Existence of a hurting stalemate
- Peace group mobilization
- Track 1 or 2 talks
- Economic flows financing the conflict drying up
- Sustained or increased international or regional pressure on the parties to resolve the conflict
- Other international organization engagement in the context that creates a potential opening/operational support for IDRC-supported work
- Prior existing IDRC contacts in the context that can enable/support/facilitate IDRC-supported work

*During violent political conflict, the indicators in the preceding table would apply, as well as the ones highlighted in the table below, under the same categories.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Category</th>
<th>Sub-Category</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Political factors and Governance</td>
<td>a. state/regime legitimacy</td>
<td>a. loss of government control in areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. regime type</td>
<td>b. state of emergency declared/imposition of curfews/internal security laws in minority areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. political stability, opposition and violence</td>
<td>-electoral fraud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-removal/dissolution of local or regional governments in minority areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-banning/arrests of political leaders, parties or associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within non-state actor groups:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. conflict as business/way of life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. extremists on one side or the other have silenced moderates in their own ranks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. regime leaders are “trapped” within their movement for fear of physical elimination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. growing popular support for warring party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. one side thinks it is close to victory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. social development and equality</td>
<td>a. no redress for severe socio-economic inequities between groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. economic stability, wealth and performance</td>
<td>b. poor economic stability and/or unequal distribution of wealth, and/or economic shocks or financial crises leading to capital flight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. demographics</td>
<td>-grievance-based mobilization of groups along socio-economic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 3. Socio-cultural factors | a. identity-based (i.e. racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, caste) tensions and divisions  
b. structural and historical inequities/factors  
c. changes in self-constructions and perceptions of communities | b. historical (which may include colonial) legacy of structural inequities (politicocommunicoeconomic and social), particularly evident in cleavages of wealth between groups  
c. constructions of communities as warriors/militarized, using historical interpretation and myth-making, to rationalize violence |
|---|---|---|
| 4. Justice | a. rule of law  
b. human rights  
c. media | a. rule of law disintegrated/lacking (kidnappings, extortion and disappearances common) and conflict mediation mechanisms under stress or lacking altogether  
b. human rights (to life, freedom from torture and extrajudicial execution, freedom from arbitrary arrest, freedom of expression and association, freedom of religion, freedom of movement) suppressed or violated with impunity (for instance, recent riots and massacres where perpetrators have gone unpunished, or where government inquiries were insincere)  
c. attacks on/arrests of press reporters  
-banning of NGOs |
| 5. (Human) Security factors | a. demographic/population pressure: IDPs and refugees  
b. non-economic social development and regional inequalities  
c. crime | -large scale loss of life (violence related)  
-refugee camps become the staging ground for militancy and extremism |
| 6. Military and Defence factors | a. arms, small arms  
b. military/rebel spending  
c. military/rebel forces and control | a. arms/drugs trafficking  
b. high levels of military/rebel spending/procurement as ratio of GNI  
c. sustained recruitment and mobilization of forces (in the case of rebel groups especially child recruitment) |
| 7. Geopolitical factors | a. regional and international setting  
b. external/international support/intervention/linkage  
c. external territorial disputes | a. importance of region for wider, international geopolitical scene/intra-state conflict with international/transboundary dimensions  
-proxy war |
| 8. Environment and Natural Resources | a. resource management  
b. existence of “lootable”/non- | a. deterioration of food security and food supply |
| “lootable” natural resources (e.g. diamonds, oil, gold, etc.) | imbalances/shortages b. looting of natural resources becomes a profitable business, outweighing price of war for certain groups |
Table 3: Post-conflict (or towards post-conflict) peacebuilding contexts

A post-conflict situation does not imply non-violent peace, but implies a commitment towards peace; that is, a commitment to channelling political opposition through appropriate and constructive, non-violent means. It also implies a commitment to work towards socio-economic equality and respect for human rights and equality before the law. As such, in a post-conflict situation it is presumed that the factors contained in the above two tables would be significantly mitigated and commitments to peace made on the part of and between the warring factions. In this context, the following would reflect “peace indicators”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Category</th>
<th>Sub-Category</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Political processes towards peace</td>
<td>a. peace agreement/accord in place, or on the negotiating table</td>
<td>a. cessation of hostilities and violence and some agreement on key issues between parties involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Agenda to (re) build/create democratic institutions and processes</td>
<td>a. commencement of DDR b. initiatives to address root causes of conflict (politico-economic) c. improvement in regional disparities and governance d. efforts to restore communication and trust between (previously) antagonistic groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Transitional and restorative justice mechanisms</td>
<td>a. mechanisms set up to deal with perpetrators of violence during conflict and healing of victimized groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Economic recovery/stability</td>
<td>a. employment opportunities b. mechanisms to create more equitable distribution c. rise in investor confidence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Donor roles</td>
<td>a. donor pledges to assist in peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Return of IDPs and refugees</td>
<td>a. repatriation/satisfactory resettlement of refugees and IDPs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Changes in attitudes/behaviours of people</td>
<td>a. this is of course very difficult to measure and quantify, but may be manifest in ways such as relations (whether in social or economic contexts) between previously hostile groups and activities that are multi-identity based in character b. commencement of “peace education” initiatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sources consulted and adapted:

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3. Conflict Diagnosis Handbook (FEWER for CIDA)
4. CIFP Methodology (David Carment for IDRC, May 2000)
5. SIPRI, “Early Warning Indicators for Preventive Policy”
   http://projects.sipri.org/ewi/working_papers/SIPRI_Early_Warning_WP1.pdf
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   http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cp/list.htm
11. A Review of Early Warning Projects/Models and Databases
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13. FEWER/International Alert/Saferworld/CECORE/CHA/Africa Peace Forum,
    Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding: A resource pack
### Annex 2: Evaluation plan, 2005-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation issue</th>
<th>Intended users and uses</th>
<th>Audience</th>
<th>Responsible officer</th>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Learning value and utility of peacebuilding research in conflict contexts (Palestine? Colombia?)</td>
<td>PCD team Participating project partners -To assess utility, uses and impact of research in conflict contexts, and to discern lessons learned, options for improvement</td>
<td>IDRC External actors</td>
<td>Pamela Scholey Colleen Duggan Emma Naughton</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity-building in the field of Southern peacebuilding research</td>
<td>PCD team Participating project partners -To assess progress made on capacity building, lessons learned, opportunities for improvement in approach</td>
<td>IDRC External actors</td>
<td>Gerd Schonwalder, Pamela Scholey</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector-specific impact of PBR research/researchers on JSSR in Africa and Latin America</td>
<td>PCD team Participating project partners -To assess value and impact of projects supported thus far, options for future programmatic development in this sector</td>
<td>IDRC External sector actors (other potential project partners, donors, bilaterals, multilaterals)</td>
<td>Colleen Duggan, Gerd Schonwalder</td>
<td>Q4/Q1 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector-specific impact of PBR research/researchers on TRJ</td>
<td>PCD team Participating project partners -To assess value and impact of projects supported thus far, options for future programmatic development in this sector</td>
<td>IDRC External sector actors (other potential project partners, donors, bilaterals, multilaterals)</td>
<td>Colleen Duggan, Navsharan Singh</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


| Sector-specific impact of PBR research/researchers on political economy programming | PCD team Participating project partners -To assess value and impact of projects supported thus far, options for future programmatic development in this sector | IDRC External sector actors (other potential project partners, donors, bilaterals, multilaterals) | Gerd Schonwalder, Navsharan Singh | TBD |
## Annex 3: Table of current and pipelined PCD projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project No.</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>New Prospectus Theme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Processes in Governance and Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102131</td>
<td>From War-Termination to Sustainable Peacebuilding? A Research and Policy Engagement Project</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101656</td>
<td>Biennial Report on the Implementation of the UN Program of Action on Small Arms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100226</td>
<td>Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102701</td>
<td>Gender and Reparation (ICTJ)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102767</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Forum (WSP)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102736</td>
<td>Globalization Grant Competition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100666</td>
<td>International Mediation in African Civil Wars</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101688</td>
<td>Violence and Transition II: Obstacles and Opportunities for Democracy</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100830</td>
<td>Southern African Reconciliation Study</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100870</td>
<td>Budgeting for Defense in Africa</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101125</td>
<td>Democratic Governance and Common Security in Southern Africa</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project No.</td>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>New Prospectus Theme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100877</td>
<td>Research and Development of a Culture of Peace Using Information and Communication Technologies</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100913</td>
<td>Towards a Regional Security Architecture: Assessing Issues and Developing Capacity in the Horn of Africa</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102365</td>
<td>10th Anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide</td>
<td>x x x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101125</td>
<td>Good Governance and Security Sector Reform</td>
<td>x x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100883</td>
<td>Southern Africa Regional Research Programme on Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102081</td>
<td>Cross-Regional Gender Analysis of Armed Conflict (Mazurana)</td>
<td>x x x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102011</td>
<td>Resolution of Conflicts in East Africa (DPMF)</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102419</td>
<td>Transitional Justice Researchers Network for Africa</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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**Latin America**
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## Annex 4: Indicative PCD pipeline, 2005-06

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## Annex 5: PCD PI Team

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<td>Research Officer, Ottawa</td>
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<td>-BA, English and French Literature</td>
<td>-Children in armed conflict -Middle East and Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colleen Duggan</td>
<td>Senior Program Specialist, Ottawa</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-MA, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law -Graduate Diploma, International Development and Cooperation</td>
<td>-Transitional and restorative justice -Reintegration of IDPs, refugees and former combatants -Gender, peace and conflict -Regional expertise in Africa</td>
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<td>Njeri Karuru</td>
<td>Senior Program Officer, Nairobi</td>
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<td>-MA, Anthropology -Post-Graduate Diploma, Women’s Law</td>
<td>-Conflict Management, -Gender -Human rights -Regional expertise in Africa</td>
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<td>Emma Naughton</td>
<td>Senior Program Officer, Cairo</td>
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<td>-MA, Sociology -MA, Arab Studies</td>
<td>-Sociology of Islamist movements -Regional expertise in Middle East and Africa</td>
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<td>Moussa Samb</td>
<td>Senior Program Specialist, Dakar</td>
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<td>-Governance -Judicial reform -Constitutional and legal reform -Regional expertise in Africa</td>
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<td>Pamela Scholey</td>
<td>Team Leader, Ottawa</td>
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<td>-Gender, peace and conflict -Politics and sociology of trauma and memory -Political economy of peace and conflict -Regional expertise in Middle East</td>
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<td>Gerd Schönwälder</td>
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<td>-Globalization and conflict -Democratization, governance -Civil society and regional integration -Regional expertise in Latin America and Africa</td>
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<td>Navsharan Singh</td>
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