DEMOCRATIZATION, ADJUSTMENT AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA
AN OVERVIEW

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Introduction

There has, of recent, emerged a growing concern among scholars and policy makers, including bilateral and multilateral donors, to capture the relationship between democratization, adjustment, and governance in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. As it pertains specifically to Africa, this concern is but the latest phase of the largely donor-driven quest to re-structure African economies and societies on the basis of a doctrinaire market philosophy. Prior to this phase, the overwhelming focus of attention was on strictly macro-economic issues related to the causes of the crises in African economies and how these crises might be tackled within the framework of structural adjustment programmes designed, almost without exception, by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. By the end of the 1980s however, as recognition grew of the importance of studying and coming to terms with the macro-political and macro-social questions associated with structural adjustment implementation, scholars and policy makers began to address more seriously, issues related to the political and administrative pre-requisites for economic reform as well as the political and social consequences of the reform process itself. This development was strengthened by the wave of "democratization" that was sweeping through the former Soviet bloc, including the defunct Soviet Union itself towards the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s as well as the evident resurgence of consciousness on a global scale with regard to questions of democracy, human rights, and popular participation however defined. The earlier experience of the countries of Latin America with transitions from military to civilian rule through elections also served to underline the urgent necessity to address issues of democratization, economic development and governance in Africa especially as countries such as Mexico, Argentina, even Chile where political
reforms were undertaken began to enjoy some modest economic growth.

Although, on the face of things, it would seem that much of the current interest in the issue of democratization, economic reform and governance emanates from the international donor agencies presently involved in Africa, especially the World Bank, it is important to emphasize at this stage that long before the donor community turned its attention to this question, numerous African groups and social forces had been involved in struggles for the expansion of the democratic space on the continent as well as for the institution of structures of governance that would permit the will of the majority of the people to prevail. This is evident from the entire history of the anti-colonial struggle which was as much about political reforms as about economic and social change with a view to enhancing individual liberties and popular participation. The post-colonial period, characterized by the abandonment in many cases of the African anti-colonialist nationalist project, has also witnessed, in practically every country, spirited struggles against the imposition of one party and military rule, the institution of personal rule with all of the clientelist networks woven around it, the proliferation of corruption and bureaucratic red-tape, and the de-politicisation of the people. These struggles continued with varying levels of intensity until the mid-1980s onwards when, with the rapidly changing international environment to which we drew attention earlier, the domestic social forces for change in the way Africa had been governed politically and economically were emboldened and re-asserted themselves to unleash popular pressures for democratic reform towards the end of the 1980s.

So strong were the domestic pressures for political and economic reforms in Africa towards the end of the 1980s, and so massive was the level of popular participation in the struggle for change that some commentations were to remark, rather hastily, that Africa was on the threshold of a "second liberation". Whereas the first liberation resulted from the historic defeat of the forces of colonialism, the second liberation would lead to greater democratization and economic rationality. Yet many of those who popularized this view, fascinated as they were by the images of tens of thousands of African men, women and children (hitherto considered as politically docile) actively demanding political reform, hardly bothered to examine the democratic content of the demands and the sustainability of democratic change in the context of deepening economic crises and competing ethnicities. Be that as it may, it was the confluence of domestic and external pressures for political and economic reform in Africa that provided the impetus for the donor community to develop a keen interest in the relationship between democratization, adjustment, and
A category of donors, namely Western governments and their official and agencies, went on to embrace a new "political conditionality" under which economic aid was tied to the progress of African governments with political reform and respect for human rights. Yet, as we shall see in greater detail later, the notions of political and economic reform which the donors have generally attempted to promote in Africa run counter to those held by the main bearers within the continent of the struggle for democratization and popular participation. Whereas, to cite one example, the donors see structural adjustment and what the World Bank describes as "good governance" as being compatible, many of the social forces in the vanguard of the struggle for democratization not only reject the structural adjustment programmes but also insist that they are incompatible with popular participation and responsive governance. At the root of these conflicting positions between the democratic forces pushing for change in Africa and the donors championing reforms are sharply differing perceptions of African problem. Let us now examine the theoretical sources of these differences.

ADJUSTMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION AND GOVERNANCE
SOME THEORETICAL ISSUES

Structural adjustment programmes were introduced into Africa on a massive scale from the early 1980s onward at a time when most African economies were already caught in deep crises of accumulation. These crises manifested themselves not only in terms of rapidly declining output and productivity in the industrial and agricultural sectors but also in terms of worsening payments and budget deficits, acute shortages of inputs and soaring inflation, growing domestic debt and a major problem of external debt management, decaying infrastructure, a massive flight of capital and declining per capital GDP and GNP among others. The reform programmes which were introduced under donor pressure and supervision were aimed at stabilizing the African economies, re-structuring the basis for accumulation, and permitting the resumption of growth. What the medium to long-term effects of the adjustment programmes would be not only on the economy but also on the practice of politics and the process of administration became the subject of a major theoretical debate involving two broad schools. The differing positions articulated by both schools, namely, the Neo-liberal and the Radical Political Economy schools, is, in many respects, a function of their understanding of the sources of the African economic crises and the role of the post-colonial state in the developmental process.

Championed largely by Africanists based in the United States but also drawing followers from within the African continent and elsewhere, the Neo-liberal school takes as its
starting point the view that the post-colonial African state has failed in its developmental mission because of its excessive and counterproductive intervention in domestic economic processes, its over-bureaucratization and excessive size, the domination of its apparatuses by clientelist networks and an urban coalition that orients it against the rural sector, its monopolization of the main economic levers of society with the resultant proliferation of rent-seeking activities, and its over-centralization which has discouraged local initiative. Given the domination of the economy by the state or by a statist logic, it is not surprising that the failure of the state easily translates into the failure of the economy. In the view of the Neo-liberals, structural adjustment which is aimed, inter alia, at rolling back the frontiers of the state, trimming its size, encouraging the emergence of economic rationality through the unfettered rule of the impersonal forces of the market, and promoting the growth of the private sector, should be beneficial for the emergence and sustenance of democracy and a better system of governance than the neo-patrimonial structures that pervade the continent and which underlie public policy. Elaborating the position of the Neo-liberals, Larry Diamond argues that part of the reason for the failure of democracy to sink roots in Africa has to do with the fact that the bourgeois class which could have championed it was either non-existent (because of state domination of the economy) or too heavily dependent on the state and immersed in compradorial, rent-seeking activities. Structural adjustment, in altering the basis for economic activity will encourage the formation a bourgeois more grounded in production and, therefore, autonomous of the state. It is this bourgeoisie that will, out of self-interest, seek to promote democratization and a more open system of government not based on clientelism, neo-patrimonialism, or prebendalism. For Diamond therefore, 

'... the increasing movement away from statist economic policies is among the most significant boosts to the democratic prospects in Africa'1.

In addition to the expectation that structural adjustment will lead to the creation of a non-parasitic African bourgeoisie that will then bear the flag of democracy and transparent governance, the Neo-liberals have also argued that the process of the retrenchment of the state should result in the strengthening of civil society and associational life which, in turn, should enhance Africa's democratic prospects. The adjustment programme, by emphasizing the role of the private sector and encouraging the channelling of resources to private, non-state groups will not only help to strengthen civil society, the bastion of democracy, but will also generate interest at the level of society on how the state is governed. Not a few studies
have been published within this framework celebrating the rise and activities of voluntary associations and non-governmental groups in civil society (Kasfir, 1984; Azarya, 1988; Bratton, 1990; Rothchild and Chazan, 1988). The vacation by the state of certain economic and social spheres as part of the process of structural adjustment helped to stimulate the rise of voluntary and non-governmental groups and thus promoted the pluralism essential for democracy and transparent governance. It is worth pointing out at this stage that for many of the Neo-liberals, civil society is treated uncritically as the arena of democracy and democracy itself is defined in terms of accountability. Furhtermore, governance is hardly discussed beyond openness in the governmental process and accountability; the centrality of democracy to meaningful governance is not adequately analyzed. Finally, the neo-liberals treat structural adjustment uncritically, accepting at face value the objectives which its authors attribute to it and ignoring the reality arising from its implementation, not least the continuing centrality of the state and the resilience of rent-seeking activities.

Against the Neo-liberals, the Radical Political Economists contend, with justification, that structural adjustment and democracy are incompatible. Given that structural adjustment demands the imposition of additional economic burden on the working people and the poor (for example the imposition of so-called cost recovery measures in the educational and health sectors; the elimination of subsidies, real and invented; the curtailment of the welfare and social expenditure of the state; and the high inflationary consequences of price deregulation and rapid devaluation, among others), it is to be expected that its implementation will be resisted. Resistance against structural adjustment is not limited just to the working class and the urban and rural poor. Significant sections of the middle class, especially the professionals and the manufacturing class whose interests are adversely affected by the programme also offer resistance to its implementation. Faced with the unpopularity of the adjustment programme but feeling compelled to implement it because of donor pressure and conditionality, African governments resort to repression and authoritarianism in order to push through the macro-economic reform package prescribed for them by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In the view of the Radical Political Economists therefore, authoritarianism rather than democracy and democratic governance is the flipside of structural adjustment implementation in Africa (Beckman 1990; Bangura 1991, Olukoshi 1991; 1993; Mkandawire, 1991; Mamdani, 1991; Gibbon et al, 1992).

Being economically repressive, structural adjustment requires a politically repressive framework for its
implementation. Regimes implementing the programme not only resort to undemocratic methods of pushing it through, they also make spirited efforts to control the flow of information and to undermine the opposition. According to the Radical Political Economists, it is the process of organization of resistance to the authoritarianism and repression associated with structural adjustment implementation that begins to open up democratic possibilities based on the self-organization of groups opposed to the programme and in spite of state repressiveness. If therefore the period of implementation of structural adjustment has witnessed a revival of the democratic consciousness of many of Africa's social groups as evidenced by the public demonstrations for political change in all the four corners of the continent, it is not because of structural adjustment but inspite of it. In their bid to protect themselves against the repressive economic content and political repercussions of structural adjustment, various groups adversely affected by the programme, and whose organized resistance at the trade union, students union and professional association level the state attempted to prevent, had no option than to bear the flag of democratization and the freedom of organization. This resistance was aided by the wave of "democratization" that swept through the former Soviet bloc and the extremely limited achievement of the adjustment programme itself. All over Africa, inspite of the authoritarianism of the structurally adjusting governments, few results were achieved, a fact which compelled a re-assessment among the intellectual advocates of the programme and the donors who pushed it into the African policy framework. It is to the credit of the Radical Political Economists that their conceptual insight was borne out by the concrete experiences of African countries implementing structural adjustment. The persistence of clientelism and rent-seeking activities, the collapse of productive activity, widespread corruption and authoritarian methods of resource allocation in the face of structural adjustment made the prospect of democratic governance in the context of market-based economic reforms seem a remote possibility in Africa. This seemed to be all the more so as the state has not as yet exhausted itself as a source of "primitive accumulation" for the emerging bourgeoisie.

THE DONOR PERSPECTIVE ON ADJUSTMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

Between the end of the 1970s and the end of the 1980s, virtually all African governments had been compelled to adopt and implement structural adjustment in order to avoid donor cross-conditionality. Yet, after over a decade of structural adjustment implementation in Africa, mostly in an authoritarian political framework, not much was achieved by way of concrete of results. On the contrary, living
conditions for the majority of Africans continued to deteriorate and the economies on the continent stagnated. It did not seem to matter whether the governments were strong, middle-of-the-road, or weak adjusters; their common denominator was economic decline. In the face of this, and in the context of the intensifying pressures for democratization on a global scale, several scholars, especially those American Africanists closely associated with multi-lateral donor agencies, began to push the case for the encouragement of "democratization" in Africa as a necessary framework for successful structural adjustment. From Richard Joseph to Richard Sklar, Goran Hyden and Naomi Chazan as well as several other participants in the work of the Carter Center of Emory University's "Governance in Africa" programme, one common theme ran through their analyses: there can be no "Perestroika" (structural adjustment) without "Glasnost" (democratization). In the view of these scholars, a central reason why structural adjustment had failed to achieve results was the absence of "glasnost". They advocated the simultaneous pursuit of economic and political reform if Africa was to move forward.

Although the view that structural adjustment will fare better under a "democratic" regime ran counter to some of the earlier thinking in certain donor circles on the regime type or structure of governance essential for the successful implementation of market-base economic reform, several donors were to jump on the international "democratic" Bandwagon and effect some changes to their strategy towards Africa. At the forefront of this new thinking among the donors was the World Bank which, from the end of the 1980s, especially after the publication of its report entitled Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth, came to champion the position that governance, defined as "... the use of political authority and exercise of control over a society and the management of its resources for development"2 was the missing link in Africa's developmental crisis. It is necessary to state that the Bank placed little emphasis on democracy - pleading its lack of a mandate to interfere in the domestic political arrangement of its members and issues of democratization were hardly analyzed in its reports except in the framework of governance. Furthermore, concern with issues of governance in the Bank is hardly with the objective of advancing the frontiers of democracy but more with achieving the successful implementation of the very structural adjustment programmes that have been so unpopular in Africa and which have been resisted by many groups. In other words, the World Bank's interest in governance issues is instrumentalist to the extent that governance is seen as an instrument for the successful implementation of structural adjustment.
Faced with the record of limited achievement of almost a decade of structural adjustment in Africa, the World Bank argued that part of the reason for this had to do with the nature of governance in Africa. Drawing heavily on the diagnosis of African governance offered by some of the Africanists associated with the Carter Centre's "Governance in Africa Programme", the World Bank blamed the continent's poor economic record on "bad" governance. Stating the Bank's case, its former President, Barber Conable, noted that

"... All too often, there is a lack of government accountability to the governed, a lack of encouragement that would liberate entrepreneurial instincts, and a general lack of fair competition between farmers and firms".3

According to Conable, at the heart of Africa's problem of "bad" governance is the fact that all over Africa,

"Open political participation has been restricted and even contemned, and those brave enough to speak their minds have too frequently taken grave personal risks. I fear that many of Africa's leaders have been more concerned about retaining power than about the long-term interests of their people".4

The political and other costs of Africa's record of poor governance are, according to the World Bank, legion. Conable, in taking stock of some of those costs, stated that

"... The political uncertainty and arbitrariness evident in so many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa are major constraints on the region's development. Investors will not take risks, entrepreneurs will not be creative, people will not participate if they feel they are facing capricious, unjust or hostile political environment".5

Elaborating further, Conable argued that

"... Patronage and negotiation have thwarted the formation of professional cadres. Investment in human resource development has lacked direction and commitment. Such practices are a direct cause of Africa's economic growth rate failing in the 1980s to keep pace with population growth, of the debilitating brain drain from the region, and of the extraordinary fact that there are more expatriate advisers in African today than there were at the end of the colonial period".6

For the World Bank therefore, the critical issue in ensuring the success of economic reform programmes such as
those represented by structural adjustment is the institution of a system of "good" governance. Indeed, for the Bank, structural adjustment and "good" governance is supposed to be essential for the success of structural adjustment, so also is structural adjustment beneficial to the development of "good governance". By encouraging the rule of the impersonal forces of the market and instituting economic rationality into the process of resource allocation, a system of open and accountable government would be encouraged. The nurturing of open and transparent governance will, in turn, make it difficult to justify irrational economic decisions.

Elaborating on the elements essential for the attainment of "good" governance in Africa, the World Bank identified the following principal parameters: the accountability of government officials, including politicians and civil servants; transparency in government procedures; predictability in government behaviour; rationality of governmental decisions; openness in governmental transactions; the free flow of information; the institution of a system of checks and balances within the governmental structure; judicial autonomy; and the rule of law. Bank officials also add the issue of capacity-building to enable African technocrats to initiate and implement market-based economic reforms as an essential element of the quest for 'good' governance in Africa. Regimes which display the aforementioned attributes are, on the Bank's criteria, adjudged to have achieved "good" governance.

The capacity building programme of the World Bank in Africa was introduced against the background of earlier but related attempts by the institution to encourage civil service reform on the continent. The objectives of the reforms include a desire to cut red-tape, streamline procedures and processes, strengthen technocrats and professionals, improve efficiency, and raise productivity. The civil service reforms formed an integral part of the Bank's strategy for rolling back the frontiers of the state and re-organizing whatever is left of its bureaucracy. Furthermore, as part and parcel of the adjustment programme of the Bank, school curricula at the tertiary level, were brought under scrutiny and recommendations made for course/departmental rationalization. As with the reforms of the civil service, the claim was that the educational sector reforms proposed by the Bank will make African tertiary education more 'relevant' and result-oriented, not to speak of cost-effective. Also, there is the claim that the reduction of the member of universities/polytechnics will help to channel resources to intermediate level technical manpower development which is lacking in large numbers in Africa. The re-organization of university curricula should also enable government to de-emphasize the liberal arts and
strengthen the technical and engineering services. A closer linkage between the educational sector and the private sector has also been promoted by the Bank as part of the reform agenda.

Other donors, particularly the Western governments and their aid agencies, in line with the position that there cannot be "perestroika" without "glasnost", have explicitly advocated and attempted to implement a new political conditionality linking aid and other resources flow to Africa to respect for human rights and implementation of "democratic" reforms by African governments. As stated by Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary,

"...the relief of poverty, hunger and disease is one of the main tasks of overseas aid. Aid must go where it can clearly do good. Countries tending towards pluralism, public accountability, respect for the rule of law, human rights and market principles should be encouraged. Those who persist with repressive policies, with corrupt management, or with wasteful and discredited economic systems should not expect us to support them fully with scarce aid resources which could be better used elsewhere."7

In essence, therefore, for the leading Western official and donors, democracy, defined in terms of multi-partyism and public accountability are essential to successful structural adjustment.

It is worth stressing at this stage that at the bottom of the concern in the donor community about questions of democratization and governance is the desire to promote the emergence of a conducive political climate for the successful implementation of structural adjustment. The view seems to have grown among the donors that a "democratic" political framework based on the consent of the people and on transparent governance will better enhance the prospects for successful structural adjustment than a dictatorial, unrepresentative regime benefit of credibility and legitimacy. In support of this perspective, the donors have strived to reach out directly to civil society groups, including community associations. Special effort has been made to encourage the formation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as part of the strategy for strengthening urban and rural civil society. Yet the basic difficulty with the donor perspective is that the main bearers of the struggle for democracy and democratic governance in Africa are also in the frontline of the struggle against structural adjustment. Many of them have sharpened their strategies for the democratization of their societies from their experience of resisting the authoritarian practices associated with the implementation of structural adjustment. Let us elaborate further on this
by way of a summary of the critique of the donor perspective on adjustment, democratization, and governance.

CRITIQUE OF THE DONORS PERSPECTIVE ON ADJUSTMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

The main issues which have been raised in the donor perspective on adjustment, democratization, and governance have been subjected to severe criticism by scholars and activists alike. The question of the compatibility of structural adjustment and democratization is one which we have addressed earlier and it has featured prominently in the critique of the donors. Attention has been drawn to the fact that the relationship between the donors and African governments is hardly a democratic one since the donors rely on a host of conditionalities in their dealings with the governments. Furthermore, it has been argued that the content of the adjustment programmes is itself anti-democratic as is the method of implementation of the reform packages which brooks no opposition in part because the donors strongly sanction governments that fail to meet agreed targets for performance. The undermining of productive activities by the adjustment policies of the World Bank and the IMF rules out the claim of the programme's advocates that it would result in the growth of a democratizing bourgeoisie. In fact many of the local groups that were involved in manufacturing production have been pushed back into rent-seeking and compradorial activities in response to the adverse effects on their productive operations of structural adjustment.

As to the question of governance, the various attributes of "good" governance identified by the World Bank have neither been encouraged by the implementation of structural adjustment nor reflected in the way the Bank and African governments have tried to push through the programme. Since the implementation of structural adjustment started, leaders have strived to limit the flow of information both on the reform programme and generally. The officials charged with implementing the unpopular reform programme have seen themselves as being more accountable to the donors who exercise direct leverage over them and not to their populace who bear the brunt of the market reform policies. After-all, almost without exception, negotiations between the IMF and the World Bank on the one hand and various African governments on the other, were held in secret and the decision to implement adjustment policies did not allow much room for consultation with the people or internal and open policy debates within the governmental system. Furthermore, transparency in governmental operations has hardly been enhanced by structural adjustment. In fact, the problem of corruption has been deepened by the programme in many cases. The sharp decline in living standards occasioned by structural adjustment has encouraged petty
corruption among some categories of workers. Among ruling class elements, new forms of adjustment policies introduced by various governments. The rule of law and the independence of the judiciary hardly have a place in a framework characterized by the forcible implementation by unpopular governments of unpopular adjustment policies.

Still on the question of governance, structural adjustment has had far-reaching adverse effects for the administrative structure and capacity of many African states. Many civil service organizations have been practically paralysed as civil servants, faced with diminishing real incomes and ever-rising costs of living, resort to moonlighting activities which erode their effectiveness. Also, the information of many state structures, especially those associated with the provision of social services, as a result diminishing resource flows for their sustenance, not only further weakens the legitimacy of the state but also the very structures of governance essential to the implementation of development programmes. The personalization of state office which has remained rampant coupled with widespread market failure has further compounded the problem of governance in Africa as has the deepening of uneven development in a continent characterized by competing ethnicities.

In order for democracy and democratic governance to prevail and become institutionalized, there must be social groups within various countries that have an interest in them. Yet, ironically, those very social groups that have pushed the case for the democratization of the African State, economy, governmental structure, and society and which are the ones capable of bearing the struggle for it are not only those most adversely affected by structural adjustment but are also rejected by the most influential donors as "parasites" to be undermined politically as part of the bid to dislodge the influence of the urban coalition of interests which make "rational" economic policy impossible. These social forces - students professionals, academics, etc and their organizations have been specifically targeted for destruction by the authors and implementers of adjustment programmes. Trade union, students organizations, professional associations and other organized groups opposed to structural adjustment have been smashed all over Africa or their organizational capacity severely weakened through constant official harrassment, arrest and imprisonments, and staged-managed divisions.

The notions of democracy and democratization which the students, workers, professionals and other groups with an interest in the reform of African politics carry run counter to those which the donors have tried to push. Quite apart from their instrumentalist approach to the democracy question in Africa, the overwhelmingly technicist approach
of the donors to the issue of governance also runs counter to the notions held by Africa's activists for democratic reform. Many of the activities emphasize in their articulation of the African democratic project a political as well as an economic and social content. Democracy for them is not just a question of multi-party politics and electioneering; it includes a vast array of social and economic reforms aimed at making for a more just social order. It is a definition which necessarily calls for an interventionist, developmentalist state; not for the unbridled retrenchment of the state. It calls for the thorough reforming of the state and its broad-ranging restructuring in order to tackle the problem of state failure but it also firmly rejects the World Bank/IMF programme for the re-definition of the role of the state. For these groups, there is a fundamental incompatibility between structural adjustment and democratization and this is brought out by the experiences at the various national conferences in parts of Francophone Africa.

From Benin Republic to the Congo, Niger and Mali to Chad and even Zaïre, the main issues which dominated the agenda of the national conferences not only relate to administrative and political reforms, the limiting of the powers of the executive, the strengthening of the judiciary and its independence, and the re-organization of the military under civilian governmental authority but also to far-reaching economic reforms based on a "developmentalist" state. Seething criticisms against IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes have been commonplace even as many of the conferences acknowledge the necessity for far-reaching economic reforms in order to stem the tide of African economic decline. There was a recognition too of the need to strengthen state capacity even as the democratization of state structures and procedures are undertaken. Quite clearly, popular perception within Africa on the reform of African economies and the democratization of the state and society run counter to the views held and pushed by the donors, especially the World Bank.

Finally, regarding the question of capacity-building which has featured in the discussion on governance and structural adjustment and in support of which the World Bank launched an African Capacity Building Initiative (ACBI), it is clear that donor-driven market reforms have contributed substantially to undermining indigenous capacity in Africa. While few will doubt that the availability in abundance of professionally competent economists, policy analysts, managers, auditors, jurists and other professionals is essential to the promotion of "good" governance, the experience of the last decade under the regime of structural adjustment and its associated authoritarianism has been an exacerbation of the brain drain from Africa. Hordes of highly qualified personnel, trained at great expense to
their countries, unable to cope with or accept the social, economic and political costs of adjustment have sought greener pastures in Europe, North America, and the Middle East. For some, frustration, arising out of the lack of basic equipment with which to perform their tasks and an anxiety to keep abreast of changes in their professional fields have been the factors motivating the decision to leave their countries. Those professionals who for whatever reason have stayed behind have either had to engage in moonlighting in order to earn extra money to supplement their diminishing real income or have opted for political appointments which are often unrelated to their professional training.

Without diminishing the importance of human resources development to the transformation of Africa, the politics of the World Bank's capacity building initiative for the continent ought to be exposed for what it is, namely that it is an initiative aimed at generating a ready intellectual and professional constituency for the Bank's adjustment programmes. In this regard, it would be correct to argue that the initiative continues the World Bank's practice of defining the competence of the African professional in terms of the professional's willingness to understand and follow the institution's current policy on macro-economic and other policy changes in Africa. Many an African professional who have refused to see the world through the Bank's lenses have been dismissed as lacking in skill. Given that a majority of African intellectuals are either hostile to or skeptical about the Bank's project in Africa, it is little wonder that the institution has strongly sought to push the view that Africa lacks a competence professional class. Clearly then, the Bank's capacity-building programme is an attempt to produce professionals who will support structural adjustment and extend its logic to their spheres of competence. This way, it should be possible to claim that adjustment measures are home-grown or that the adjusting governments are really the owners of the programmes. The issue of capacity building for strengthening democracy is not one that concerns the Bank. Indeed, in emphasizing the need for Africa's technocratic/professional class to be insulated from society, the Bank seeks to diminish accountability to the people by their governors. An insulated technocracy, unresponsive to democratic pressures and accounting only to donors is bound to a recipe for authoritarianism.

It is ironic that the very goal of increased efficiency and productivity which the World Bank claim its civil service reforms are meant to promote have been severely undermined by its structural adjustment programme. With extremely low wages and salaries, rising cost of living, spiralling inflation and diminishing career and livelihood prospects, many civil servants all over Africa have had to engage in moonlighting in order to supplement their incomes
and cope with rising costs. The civil service has also found it hard to attract high quality personnel and to retain them since it is unable to match private sector remuneration levels and career opportunities. Afflicted by critical shortages inspite of massive personnel retrenchment, the civil service has been reduced in many countries to a shadow of its former self. Corruption, rather than diminish, has become even more rampant. The paralysis which many an African civil service has suffered has also been the fate of the educational sector where, in the face of Bank - inspired reforms, academics, students, and university administrative staff have embarked upon struggles to protect their rights and interests. The authoritarian responses of the state to these struggles and the unwillingness of the Bank to yield ground has meant that many African institutions of higher learning have been paralysed by protest strikes with costly consequences for the economies of various countries.

BEYOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE: ALTERNATIVES TO THE DONOR PERSPECTIVE

Although the donor, especially World Bank perspective on adjustment and governance dominated debates on Africa's future for much of the 1980s, from the mid-1980s onward, in the face of the limited achievements of the adjustment measures, various organizations within and outside Africa began to make the case for alternatives to the dominant donor outlook. One of the earliest and most influential of the cases made for alternatives was the one championed by the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) under the banner of "adjustment with a human face". UNICEF argued, convincingly, that the macro-economic policies associated with structural adjustment as well as the social effects of the programme generally and on women and children in particular were creating serious setbacks which, if unchecked could strengthen the structures of underdevelopment and weaken the structures of governance. UNICEF noted that many social/welfare advances that had been recorded in education, health, nutrition, and the other areas were being systematically eroded by the structural adjustment programmes being pursued under the aegis of the World Bank and the IMF in Africa and the rest of the Third World. In order to prevent this, UNICEF made the case for adjustment with a human face in which the most vulnerable groups in society will be protected from harsh economic policies and the social/welfare gains of the pre-adjustment period will be advanced, not eroded. Adjustment with a human face will have to entail the strengthening of governmental and administrative ability and will especially through the promotion of community participation. In the view of UNICEF, community participation has the distinct advantage of providing strong political support for the state's programme of adjustment with a human face.
Shortly after the publications of UNICEF's *Adjustment with a Human Face*, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) announced its own *African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP)*. Highly critical of IMF and World Bank adjustment policies in Africa, the ECA argued forcefully that they negated the development objective of the continent and failed to underline the real roots of the African economic crisis. The adjustment policies of the Bretton Woods twins, not surprisingly, failed to achieve any significant results - in fact, in a lot of cases, the problems were compounded by their prescriptions. The ECA therefore made the case for an alternative adjustment framework which will be geared towards promoting sustainable development and socio-economic transformation. Whereas the Bretton Woods institutions opted for a doctrinaire market approach to solving Africa's economic problems, the ECA, citing the failure of that approach proposed a neo-structuralist framework. Whereas the IMF and the World Bank launched indiscriminate attacks on the state, the ECA was more positive about the effective role which the state could play in Africa's socio-economic transformation. Like UNICEF, the ECA made the case for the re-orientation and strengthening of existing administrative structures with a view to enhancing governmental ability to administer programmes efficiently. Such a re-orientation, according to the ECA, will entail greater accountability, the decentralization of centralized bureaucracies, the promotion of grassroots initiatives and community participation/self-management, and the promotion of indigenous non-governmental organizations at the community level if the goal of transforming Africa is to be achieved.

Both the UNICEF and ECA alternatives have been subjected to intense discussion and opinion is divided on the practicability of their programmes. There is however little doubt that their intervention in the debate on structural adjustment in Africa captured the popular mood of dissatisfaction on the continent and reflected the local quest for alternatives to the monetarist policies of the IMF and the World Bank. Against UNICEF however, it has been argued within Africa that what is needed after over a decade of experimentation with structural adjustment is not the addition of a human face to a discredited policy programme but its total replacement with a new policy package that is geared towards meeting the aspirations of the people for development and democracy. While the ECA's AAF-SAP may have attempted to transcend the policies and instruments of the IMF and the World Bank, like UNICEF's alternative framework, it failed to identify the social forces that are capable of bearing the struggle for the far-reaching policy changes it prescribes. Indeed, both UNICEF and the ECA trust a significant element of their programme - namely state reform for effective policy implementation - to political will and
the will itself begs too many questions. The ECA adds an appeal for "patriotic management" as a requirement for state re-orientation but does not explain why existing managerial attitudes are unpatriotic.

Within various African countries various social/interest groups, have in their response to the adjustment policies of the IMF and the World Bank, proposed alternatives which have sought to re-instate the state in its thoroughly reformed form as a central player in African economic development. Students, academic, trade unionists, even some professionals and business groups in their critique of structural adjustment have emphasized the necessity for the state to be reformed and strengthened to play an effective developmental role. The aversion for doctrinaire marketization of the type which the Bank and the Fund have attempted to push is unmistakable in the alternative programmes which African social/interest groups have sought to promote. However, many of these alternatives are short on detail particularly with regard to the kind of framework of governance which the continent of Africa ought to be working towards, a framework that will permit social contestation without leading to political chaos and systemic failure and which is capable of enhancing democratic interaction. It is of course clear, in the light of post-colonial African experience, that single party, military and diarchical forms of governance are fraught with numerous difficulties including their inability to promote democratic governance. What the democratic forces within Africa which are championing the campaign for alternatives now need to do is focus attention on the political framework within which the goal of socio-economic reconstruction can be effectively carried out. In other words, the challenge which the current African conjuncture poses to Africa's democratic forces is how a workable political framework can be arrived at which will permit economic rationality, effective state involvement in development, and popular democratic participation in decision-making.

NOTES


5. *Ibid*.


APPENDIX

TYPOLOGY OF EXISTING SYSTEMS OF GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA, AUGUST 1993

INTRODUCTION


TYPOLOGY OF GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

THERE ARE CURRENTLY IN AFRICA SEVEN BROAD GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS? NAMELY THE STRICTLY MILITARY, CIVILIAN/MILITARY DIARCHY, CIVILIAN PRESIDENTIAL, CIVILIAN PARLIAMENTARY, TRANSITIONAL/INTERIM GOVERNMENT, MONARCHICAL, AND RULE OF WARLORDS. LET US NOW ELABORATE ON EACH OF THESE.

(i) THE STRICTLY MILITARY: THIS SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE HAS BEEN ON THE DECLINE IN RECENT TIMES BUT IS STILL WELL IN PLACE IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES INCLUDING SIERRA LEONE AND THE SUDAN. ALTHOUGH CIVILIANS ARE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GOVERNMENTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES, THEY ARE APPOINTEES OF THE MILITARY AND THE ENTIRE LOGIC OF STATE ADMINISTRATION IS MILITARY INSPIRED. THE HEAD OF STATE IS ALSO IN BOTH CASES A MILITARY MAN.

(ii) CIVILIAN-MILITARY DIARCHY: THIS USED TO BE A SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE AND IT OFTEN INVOLVES REGIMES THAT CAME IN THROUGH MILITARY COUPS D'ETAT TAKING ON A CIVILIAN FACE BUT REMAINING STRICTLY UNDER THE GUARANTEE OF THE MILITARY WHILST HAVING THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVILIAN POLITICIANS AND THECHNOCRATS IN THE PROCESS OF ADMINISTRATION. MANY OF THE DIARCHICAL ARRANGEMENTS WERE EITHER BUILT ON ONE PARTY OR NO PARTY ARRANGEMENTS ALTHOUGH SINCE THE 1980s, MANY OF THEM HAVE ADOPTED A MULTI-PARTY FRAMEWORK. AMONG THE COUNTIRES THAT ARE CURRENTLY OPERATING A DIARCHICAL ARRANGEMENT INCLUDE GUINEA (CONAKRY), LIBYA, ALGERIA, MAURITANIA AND EGYPT.
(iii) CIVILIAN PRESIDENTIAL: PREVIOUSLY ONE PARTY OR MILITARY DOMINATED OR RUNNING A DIARCHY OF CIVILIAN POLITICIANS AND MILITARY OFFICERS, SINCE THE 1890s MANY OF THE COUNTRIES OF AFRICA HAVE ADOPTED CIVILIAN PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT WITHIN A FORMALLY MULTI-PARTY FRAMEWORK. SOME OF THEM HAVE ADOPTED THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM WITH AN ELECTED EXECUTIVE HEAD OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT. OTHERS HAVE ADOPTED THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM WHICH PROVIDES FOR AN ELECTED PRESIDENTIAL HEAD OF STATE AND AN APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER. A GOOD NUMBER OF THE CIVILIAN PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS, WHilst BEING DE JURE MULTI-PARTY ARE DE FACTO SINGLE PARTY. COUNTRIES PRESENTLY UNDER ONE FORM OR THE OTHER OF PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT INCLUDE ZIMBABWE, BOTSWANA, COTE D'IVOIRE, BURKINA FASO, GHANA AND THE GAMBIA, AMONG OTHERS. ZAMBIA, MALI, AND LESOTHO ARE ALSO IN THIS CATEGORY ON ACCOUNT OF RECENT ELECTORAL OUTCOMES THAT PRODUCED OUTCOMES IN WHICH ONE PARTY HAS EMERGED OVERWHELMINGLY DOMINANT THE POSITION ELECTORALLY HUMILIATED. SENEGAL, KENYA, AND TO SOME EXTENT NIGER, HOWEVER HAVE STRONG OPPOSITION PARTIES WITH CREDIBLE, IRRESISTIBLE CLAIMS ON POLITICAL POWER. ZAIRE AND TOGO ARE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM THAT ARE CURRENTLY BEDEVILED BY POLITICAL STALEMATE ON ACCOUNT OF UNYIELDING DICTATORSHIPS.


(v) TRANSITIONAL/INTERIM GOVERNMENTS: IN A FEW AFRICAN COUNTRIES SUCH AS NIGERIA, LIBERIA, ETHIOPIA, AND ERITREA, Owing TO DIFFERENT POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TRANSNATIONAL/INTERIM GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED AS STOP-GAP MEASURES PENDING THE ATTAINMENT OF POLITICAL NORMALCY. ERITREA HAS HAD AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT AS A STRATEGY FOR THE RUN-UP TO ITS INDEPENDENCE IN 1993 AND IS RETAINING IT FOR A FEW MORE YEARS. LIBERIA IS EMERGING FROM CIVIL WAR AND IS GEARING UP FOR MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS. ETHIOPIA ADOPTED A TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT AFTER THE DEFEAT OF THE MENGISTU MILITARY DICTATORSHIP WHILE IN THE CASE OF NIGERIA, AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WAS INSTALLED BY
THE DISCREDITED DISCATORSHIP OF THE MILITARY REGIME OF GENERAL BABANGIDA. IN ALL CASES, THE TRANSITIONAL OR INTERIM GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS ARE DOGGED BY CONTROVERSY AND OPPOSITION AND MAY YET BE UNDERMINED BY UNRESOLVED POLITICAL CONTRADICTIONS.

(vi) MONARCHICAL SYSTEM: THESE HAVE DECLINED IN NUMBER SINCE AFRICAN COUNTRIES ATTAINED INDEPENDENCE IN THE 1950s AND 1960s. IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES LIKE ETHIOPIA AND LESOTHO, ONCE POWERFUL MONARCHS WERE TOPPLED. IN SWAZILAND AND MOROCCO HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THE EXECUTIVE MONARCH SYSTEM BASED ON AN APPOINTED CABINET HEADED BY A PRIME MINISTER, IS STILL ENTRENCHED ALTHOUGH OPPOSITION IS GROWING. THE SWAZI AND MOROCCAN MONARCHS ARE OF COURSE THE HEADS OF THEIR STATES AND IN THIS EXECUTIVE CAPACITY CAN APPOINT AND DISMISS CABINETS.

(vii) RULE OF WARLORDS: IN COUNTRIES WHERE THAT STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL POWER HAS RESULTED IN SYSTEMIC BREAKDOWN, THE RULE OF WARLORDS HAS TAKEN SWAY. THE MOST PROMINENT OF THESE IS SOMALIA WHERE WAR CORDISM PAR EXCELLENCE RULES, A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TOTALLY NON-EXISTENT. TO SOME EXTENT, ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE ARE FACED WITH STRONG WAR LORDIST PRESSURES ALTHOUGH THEIR CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE MANAGED TO HOLD ON TO THE CENTRE AND RETAIN INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION. IN SOMALIA, THERE IS NO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO BE RECOGNIZED AND ALL STRUCTURES OF GOVERNANCE HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. LIBERIA WAS FOR A WHILE IN THE SOMILI SITUATION AS WAS CHAD. BOTH NOW HAVE CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS THAT ARE TRANSITIONAL ALTHOUGH WAR LORDIST PRESSURES ARE STILL STRONG. TRANSTATIONAL INTERVENTION, IN THE CASE OF SOMALIA UNDER THE FORMAL AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, HAS BEEN NECESSARY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF A SEMBLANCE OF ORDER.
1. INTRODUCTION

The deep-seated economic, political, and social crises which have enveloped virtually all African states for several years now have remained a main focus of policy and scholarly attention within and outside Africa. Among the issues which have been most widely discussed and debated are the impact on Africa's economic, political, and social processes of IMF/World Bank-style structural adjustment programmes (SAPS) which were introduced in most African states in the course of the 1980s as a strategy for checking economic decline on the continent. In the context of the debates on the impact of the SAPS, issues of democratization and governance have been brought to the fore.

As it regards democratization, discussion on the subject has been intensified by the open pressures for the pluralization of political life in many African countries with some scholars insisting, after several years of neo-liberal economic reform in Africa, that there can be no successful "perestroika" (i.e SAP) without a simultaneous programme of "glasnost" ("democracy" - often interpreted as multi-partyism and public accountability). In official Western and circles, anxiety to join the African "democratic" bandwagon has resulted in yet another conditionality clause, the so-called political conditionality which aims to link aid to respect for human rights and the institution of multi-party politics.

As to the issue of governance, recent interest in it in the context of structural adjustment has been most extensively expressed by the donor community led by the World Bank. The Bank has, in some of its publications, attempted to pin the poor achievement of several years of structural adjustment in Africa on the absence of "good governance". "Good governance, for the donors has to do primarily with accountability, the rule of law, free flow of information, transparency in governmental processes and procedures, and "responsible" management of public affairs, among others.
This select bibliography has been compiled with a view to assisting the participants in the CODESRIA Summer Institute on Adjustment, Democratization and Governance to identify easily some of the most important materials necessary for grasping the on-going debate on a subject which, in a sense, has dominated much of the recent analyses on Africa's problems and prospects. The select bibliography includes books and articles that are considered to be useful on structural adjustment in Africa, the question of democratization on the continent, and the issue of governance. More importantly, most of the published materials that have attempted one way or the other to establish a linkage between adjustment, democratization and governance are also included and are distinguished from the other recommended references by an asterisk.

2. Suggested Readings (Books and Articles)


*27. Larry Diamond *et al.* *Democracy in Developing Countries: Volume two, Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988).


51. Bjorn Beckman, "Comment's on Goran Hyden's State and Nation Under Stress", Swedish Ministry of Foreign


61. Peter Evans et al., (eds), Bringing the State Back in (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1985).


83. Naomi Chazan, "Ghana: Problems of Governance and the Emergence to Civil Society" in L. Diamond et al (eds), *Democracy in Developing Countries...op. cit*.


3. **SCHOLARLY JOURNALS RECOMMENDED FOR CLOSE ATTENTION FOR ESSAYS ON STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE.**
(i)  Africa Development, (CODESRIA, Dakar)
(ii) Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE)
(iii) World Development
(iv)  Development and Change
(v)  Journal of Modern African Studies
(vi) Canadian Journal of African Studies
(vii) IDS Bulletin
(viii) International Organization
(ix)  Africa Today
(x) African Studies Review
(xi) CODESRIA Bulletin
(xii) Third World Quarterly
(xiii) Finance and Development
(xiv) Journal of Democracy
(xv)  Monthly Review
(xvi) Southern African Political and Economic Monthly (SAPEM)
(xvii) African Journal of Political Economy

4. SOME CODESRIA WORKING GROUP/RESEARCH NETWORKS WHOSE WORKS ARE RELEVANT TO THE THEME OF THE SUMMER INSTITUTE

(i)  Social Movements and the Struggle for Democracy in Africa.
(ii) Legal Succession and Political Transition: Power Transfer Mechanisms in Africa.
(iii) The Military and Militarism in Africa.

5. RECENT CODESRIA CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS THAT SHOULD BE CONSULTED


INFORMATION ON ON-GOING RESEARCH ON ADJUSTMENT DEMOCRATIZATION AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

1. ON-GOING RESEARCH STUDY WITHIN AFRICA ON GOVERNANCE, ADJUSTMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION

A. THE COUNCIL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH (CODESRIA) SUMMER INSTITUTES 1992 AND 1993 ON ADJUSTMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION AND GOVERNANCE; RESEARCH NETWORKS ON LEGAL SUCCESSION AND POLITICAL TRANSITION, MILITARIANIZATION AND MILITARISM, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS.
ADDRESS: CODESRIA, BP 3304, DAKAR, SENEGAL;

B. THE SOUTHERN AFRICA POLITICAL ECONOMY SERIES (SAPES) RESEARCH PROGRAMME ON GOVERNANCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. ADDRESS: SAPES, P.O. Box MP 111, MOUNT PLEASANT, HARARE, ZIMBABWE;

C. THE NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (NIIA) RESEARCH PROJECT ON ADJUSTMENT AND POLITICS IN NIGERIA AND WEST AFRICA. ADDRESS: NIIA, G.P.O. BOX 1727, LAGOS, LAGOS STATE, NIGERIA;

D. THE AFRICA LEADERSHIP FORUM (ALF) PROGRAMMES ON LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA.
ADDRESS: ALF P.O. BOX ABEOKUTA, OGUN STATE, NIGERIA;

E. OBAFEMI AWOLOWO UNIVERSITY (OAU), NIGERIA/IDRC RESEARCH AND FELLOWSHIP PROGRAMME ON GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA.
ADDRESS: OBAFEMI AWOLOWO UNIVERSITY, ILE-IFE, OGUN STATE, NIGERIA;

F. THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL OF NIGERIA (SSCN) RESEARCH PROJECT ON UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA.
ADDRESS: SSCN, C/O A.J. GANA, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF JOS, JOS, PLATEAU STATE, NIGERIA;

G. COTE D'IVOIRE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH (CIRES) PROJECT ON GOVERNANCE AND ADJUSTMENT.
ADDRESS: CIRES, ABIDJAN, COTE D'IVOIRE.

H. GOREE INSTITUTE, DAKAR PROJECTS ON DEMOCRATIZATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN AFRICA.
ADDRESS: GOREE INSTITUTE, B.P. 6413, DAKAR-ETOILE, SENEGAL.

I. NIGERIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION (NPSA) PROJECT ON ADJUSTMENT AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN NIGERIA.
ADDRESS: NPSA, C/O PROF. LEO DARE, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, OBAFEMI AWOLOWO UNIVERSITY, ILE IFÉ, OGUN STATE, NIGERIA;

J. CENTRE FOR ADVANCED SOCIAL SCIENCE (CASS) RESEARCH NETWORKS ON SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN NIGERIA.
ADDRESS: CASS, P.M.B. 6225, PORT HARCOURT, RIVERS STATES, NIGERIA.

2. SPECIALIZED LIBRARIES WITH CAREFUL INFORMATION/RESEARCH RESOURCES ON GOVERNANCE, ADJUSTMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION.

A. CODESRIA LIBRARY IN DAKAR, SENEGAL.
CONTACT ADDRESS: CODESRIA, B.P. 3304, DAKAR, SENEGAL; FAX: 221 - 24 12 89;

B. NIGERIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LIBRARY IN LAGOS, NIGERIA.
CONTACT ADDRESS: NIIA, G.P.O. BOX 1727, LAGOS, NIGERIA; FAX: 01-616404;

C. SAPES LIBRARY IN HARARE, ZIMBABWE.
CONTACT ADDRESS: P.O. BOX MP111, MOUNT PLEASANT, HARARE, ZIMBABWE; FAX: 732735;

D. CENTRE FOR BASIC RESEARCH LIBRARY, KAMPALA, POLITICAL SCIENCE, MAKERERE UNIVERSITY, KAMPALA, UGANDA;

E. NIGERIAN INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH (NISER LIBRARY), IBADAN, NIGERIA.
CONTACT ADDRESS: OJOO ROAD, IBADAN, OYO STATE, NIGERIA;
F. **ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF COLLEGE OF NIGERIA (ASCON LIBRARY), BADAGRY, NIGERIA.**
CONTACT ADDRESS: ASCON, TOPO-BADAGRY, LAGOS STATE, NIGERIA.