Report on

Youth Livelihood Choices and Constraints in Sub-Saharan Africa:
A Gender Perspective

By

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CREDESA  Centre régional pour le développement et la santé  
(Regional centre for development and health)
GDP (GNP)  Gross Domestic (National) Product
SSA  Sub-Saharan Africa
UN  United Nations
UNFPA  United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
INTRODUCTION

The countries of sub-Saharan Africa have witnessed enormous changes in their economic, political and social environment over the past 10-15 years, perhaps none more dramatic than the end of apartheid in South Africa in the political arena, and the structural adjustment programs in many countries of the region in the economic arena. While both have opened up new opportunities, they have also created significant problems for poor women and men (including youth) in the wake of adjustments to new realities, difficulties that have been exacerbated in a number of countries by war, strife and drought, which have uprooted millions and eroded the quantity and quality of their resources and entitlements.

According to the World Bank (1992), the decade of structural adjustment polices in sub-Saharan Africa led to a 40% or more decline in GNP per-capita and per-capita consumption, a precipitous drop in investment rates and exports, and an increase in external debt by about 160%. It has been argued that, although those policies might have been gender neutral in intent, in fact women were the more adversely impacted because of inequalities in gender relations [UN (1995a), p. 6-7].

While attention has generally been focussed on gender aspects of those policies, few have addressed the gendered impacts on youth. Indeed, in general, most gendered studies have tended to implicitly ignore the differing needs and constraints of female youth. Thus, the existing literature on gender aspects of youth is quite sparse.

In the present decade, in the aftermath of structural adjustment, a rapidly growing youth population and the overall economic decline in the modern sector, has led to an enormous burden on the formal economy to provide livelihoods, and to a crowding of informal sector activities which have traditionally provided poor women with a buffer against dire poverty. That burden has intensified with increasing numbers of uprooted persons, especially women and youth, entering that sector as a means of coping with deprivation. The problem is further compounded since many youth, especially girls, lack the education or skills, as a result of which their opportunities are severely constricted. The need to develop interventions that foster the formation of skills that promote the development of dynamic livelihood skills, therefore, seems appropriate. It is also a challenging task, not least because of varying customs and socio-economic and cultural conditions in countries of the region, but also because those interventions must be grounded in gender, and must enable the transfer of an improved economic status across generations.

Women, in general, display behaviours and attitudes in important areas of their life (e.g. education, fertility, etc) that are shaped by the “social technology”, Sen (1990), which determines the opportunities and constraints they face, and within which they must make their choices. That “social technology”, irrespective of its within-country or cross-country variations, assigns very different rules and codes of conduct for women and men, and indeed for female and male youth.
The main purpose of this report is to give some direction to potential policies and programs directed towards developing dynamic youth-livelihoods by exposing the gender parameters that will likely determine whether such policies will be effective and equitable across gender. There is virtually no accurate, systematic data on youth, especially as it relates to gender and livelihoods. This report, therefore, draws upon a variety of sources upon which the analysis is based. In developing the report, our objective has been two-fold. First, we provide an account of the broad environment within which youth, especially females, make inter-related choices, what skill they posses, and the factors, both enabling and dis-enabling, that impinge on the potential for developing sustainable livelihoods. Second, we develop a logical framework that focuses attention on the gender dimensions of interventions targeted towards the development of youth livelihood skills.

A SNAPSHOT OF ECONOMIC AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Sub-Saharan Africa has a population in excess of 600 million [Goliber (1997)], and according to the World Bank (1997), a 1994 real GDP per capita that averages $1,377 in purchasing-power parity terms, a value that is less than half the average of developing countries as a whole. Of course, there are substantial differences between countries of the region, in terms of both size and the level of development. As Table 1 shows, countries belonging to the sub-region of southern Africa do significantly better. Thus, Botswana and South Africa both have per-capita real GDPs that are well above those of other countries in the region.

In addition to real GDP per-capita, there are several other measures that are broader indicators of a nation’s development. These are the human development index (HDI), the gender- development index (GDI), and the gender empowerment index (GEM), [see World Bank (1997), p. 122-24]. The HDI is a composite measure that comprises life expectancy and education variables, in addition to real GDP per-capita. The GDI incorporates gender gaps in these dimensions, while the GEM goes beyond and incorporates aspects that reflect the decision-making opportunities of women.

A look at these indices points to the diversity of achievement within SSA. Thus, southern Africa nations compare favourably to other countries in the region and especially to developing countries in general. For instance, South Africa earned a rank of 90 (out of 175) on the HDI, 71 (out of 146) on the GDI, and 22 out of 94 on the GEM, putting it ahead of all countries on the African continent, as well as many other developing countries. On the other hand, the lowest ranks also belong to SSA - Sierra Leone on the HDI and GDI, and Mauritania on the GEM. In fact, countries at the bottom end of the scale on each measure come from SSA, and it seems that many countries do poorly on the gender indicators. In order to better understand the nature of gender inequalities, especially as they relate to youth, we need to go beyond these broad indicators. We turn to a more wide-ranging discussion of gender in SSA, starting with a demographic profile, and then moving on to education and livelihood choices.
### DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

Birth and death rates in SSA are in the 43 per 1000 and 16 per 1000 range respectively. These combine to give the region a natural rate of population increase of 2.7% per year, a rate that is the fastest compared to other regions of the world. The region is also characterized by relatively high infant mortality rates (89 per 1000 births), and total fertility rates of 6 children per woman. A major consequence of this is that the demographic structure of the population represents a pyramid, with a sizable share of the population lying in the younger age brackets. For, SSA as a whole, about 45% of the population was under 15 years of age in 1997. The corresponding figures were 34% for Latin America and 32% for Asia. For countries such as the US this is just 22% [Goliber (1997)].

The demographic profile does not differ by sex. Both males and females account for similar share in the demographic profile, in contrast to parts of Asia, where strong societal preferences for male offspring has tipped the pyramid in this countries more in favour of males. The African case reflects a different attitude towards female offspring. Since females, from an
early age are expected to provide unpaid labour inputs within the household and outside of it (farming, trade etc.), working side-by-side with sisters, mothers, and grandmothers, female children are valued from an economic point of view. In many countries of the region, girls are also desired for the “bride wealth” or “bride service” they bring to their parents [Gordon (1996), p. 42; Obbo (1980), chapter 3].

Youth in the region are concentrated in rural areas, but countries of that region are the most rapidly urbanizing ones in the world. In 1996, nearly one-third of sub-Saharan Africans lived in urban areas, and this share is expected to grow sharply over the next decade as urbanization in many SSA countries is growing at a rapid annual pace of 6% [UN (1995b), p.41]. The forces driving urbanization are diverse, but two major elements to the story are migration from rural areas in search of better employment, and refugees who have been uprooted in large number in a number of Sub-Saharan countries from their rural homes and livelihoods.

In much of the world, the ratio of women to men is higher in urban areas than rural areas. The reverse is true in SSA, where in rural areas, there are about 106 women per 100 men, while the corresponding figure is 95 for urban areas[UN (1995b), p.42]. However, the aggregate picture masks substantial differences by age groups. Thus, if we look at Africa as a whole (for which statistics are available) there are more female youth (those in the 15-24 age group) per 100 male youth in the four largest cities of the region. The same general pattern exists for the elderly. For the middle age group, there are somewhat less than 90 women per 100 men in urban areas.

This pattern partly reflects the shifting pattern of female migration to urban areas. Typically, females migrate along with their husbands or to join them. Increasingly, rural women have been migrating as autonomous migrants. They tend to be young, and move in search of better opportunities, sometimes fleeing poverty and patriarchal oppression, and to strengthen their economic independence [Riley (1997), Adepoju (1994)]. Those most likely to migrate as autonomous agents are young females with some education, since the likelihood of improving one's lot in urban areas is closely tied to skills. The Findlay-Williams study mentioned above points out that over half of female rural-urban migrants to Juba City in Sudan and Monrovia in Liberia, have at least a primary education. Adepoju (1994) also finds that the increasing presence of young women in migratory flows (in the neighbourhood of 40% in Burkina Faso and Kenya) partly accounts for the higher observed level of education of newer female migrants. The prevalence of kinship and fosterage customs, where children reside with extended family members in urban areas, for education and work, also increases the flow of young people (male and female), into urban areas [Lloyd and Gage-Brandon (1994), p. 294-95]. It is also not uncommon to send young daughters for domestic service in the households of urban relatives in the event of economic hardship, a practice common in many parts of the developing world.

Political strife, civil violence and natural disasters have uprooted millions of Africans in the sub-Saharan region from their homes and countries. According to the UNCR (1994), African nations accounted for the largest absolute numbers refugees, with more than 2 million at the end of 1993, way ahead of significantly more populous Asia. The bulk of the refugee populations in
Africa originated in, and tend to be in Sub-Saharan African countries. Females outnumber males in refugee populations, with 102 females for every 100 males. In a number of countries such as Cameroon, Senegal and Benin, the preponderance of women can be even larger [UN (1995b), p. 46-47].

**Child-bearing and marriage**

In sub-Saharan African cultures, remaining single and/or childless is not viewed as an option. In fact, girls bear children when they are very young, and it is not uncommon for this to occur before marriage. Although early child-bearing is also common in South Asia, pre-marital child-bearing is not. A number of studies show that sexual activity in some countries starts even before menarche, and although the incidence of sexual activity before 15 has declined in countries such as Burundi, Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe, it has hardly changed in others such as Liberia, Malawi and Togo [UNFPA (1997), p. 37].

Polygyny, but not polyandry, is quite common in SSA. Estimates of women in polygynous unions indicate that although figures vary across countries in sub-Saharan Africa, they are still far greater than anything found elsewhere. As Table 2 shows, more than half the married women in Togo, and a third or more in Ghana, Cameroon and Senegal are in such unions. Of course, polygyny is less widespread in urban areas and is not legal in some countries. Also, women are increasingly rejecting it. Thus, a study of Kaguru women in Tanzania showed that the practice is rejected by a wide margin [Meekers and Franklin (1994)].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Currently Married Women in Polygynous Unions (%) (1986/92)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Early child-bearing and marriage remain the norm in large parts of SSA. As a consequence, the fertility rate in the 15-19 years age group is 156 per 1000 in that region, and this is twice the corresponding rates of 60-70 in northern Africa, South America, the Caribbean and South and West Asia. Table 3 shows that close to 30% of married women are in the 15-19 age group. This is well in excess of the percentage for most other regions (with the exception of South Asia), and is well above the less than 5% figure for men in SSA. Also, the average age at first marriage is about 20 years or less while it greater for males by an average of 5 years.

Over the past two decades or so, the fertility rate in most countries of SSA has gone up or at best remained unchanged. Surveys also report that adolescent fertility rates in SSA countries tends to be higher in rural areas than in urban areas, and generally higher than the corresponding rates in other regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean, northern Africa and Asia. Thus, as Table 3 shows, more than 60% of women aged 20-49 who had given birth by age 20 come from rural areas in countries such as Kenya, Cameroon, Mali, Niger and Zambia, and this is significantly higher than the corresponding numbers in any of the other countries in the surveys. On the other hand, urban rates are not much lower in some countries (Tanzania, Botswana and Mali), and could be higher (as in Namibia, Liberia, and Burundi).

Early child-bearing is also associated with severe health risks. For instance, the risk of maternal death in the 15-19 years age group is four times that in the 25-29 years age group [UNFPA (1997), p. 40]. Early child-bearing is also related to education. Studies indicate that the proportion of women giving birth at young ages tends to be lower for women with higher education. Muhuri, Blanc and Rutstein (1994) report that the fertility rate, the average number of births a women will have at current birth rates, is 7 for those with no schooling, but is only 5 for those with secondary (or higher) education in Kenya. Similar results are also reported for Zimbabwe and Botswana.
Table 3
Early Child-Bearing in Sub-Saharan Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Singulate mean marriage age</th>
<th>% currently married, age 15-19</th>
<th>Births per 1000 women aged 15-19</th>
<th>% women, aged 20-49 who have given birth by age 20 (1986/92)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


EDUCATION

As is the case in many developing nations in other regions of the world, SSA is characterized by high overall illiteracy rates, reflecting the generally low level of skills in that region. In all countries, the illiteracy rates are higher for females. According to UN (1995b), more than 70% of women 15 years of age and over in SSA are illiterate, while the corresponding percentage for men is almost 20 percentage points lower. The corresponding rates in northern Africa and West Asia are in the same range.

Table 4 shows the age profile of illiteracy. Older women experience much higher illiteracy than female youth. Thus, although female youth (aged 15-24 years) can experience illiteracy rates as high as 93.2% (Burkina Faso) or 90% (Niger), the corresponding rates for women aged 25 years and over is even higher at 98.3% and 97% respectively.

While the same general pattern of illiteracy can be found for males across countries of SSA, their rates are lower. Thus, in Burkina Faso, the male rate is 89% for those 25 years and older, and 77.5% for male youths - that is, those in the 15-24 age group.
For some countries in the region, both male and female rates are much lower. Even here there is a substantial advantage for male youth as well men. Thus, in countries such as Congo, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, illiteracy rates for male youth are under 10%, while the corresponding rates for female youth are in the 15% range. For, males and females 25 years and above, the illiteracy rates can be 2 to 4 times higher.

The illiteracy disadvantage is the strongest for rural women, where female youth rates are significantly greater than those of their urban sisters. For instance, although Cameroon compares well (relatively speaking) to other nations in the region, the rural illiteracy rate is almost four times the urban rate for this demographic group [UN (1995b), p. 91, Chart 4.4].

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Illiteracy rate (%) by age group</th>
<th>First/Second level</th>
<th>Females per 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15-24 years</td>
<td>24 years and above</td>
<td>Enrolment ratio (1990) males by level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>98.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>91.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>97.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>88.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Literacy rates in the context of countries such as those of the SSA are indicators of education at the primary level. Primary enrollment give a highly inflated picture of such education because of high drop out rates, absenteeism due to widespread child labour, lack of facilities, home responsibilities, and adolescent child-bearing.

To get a picture of educational attainment beyond the primary (first) level, we can also look at primary-secondary enrollment ratios. The need to combine the two is partly because of the age-range problem. The relevant cohort for either primary of secondary education is not clearly defined in SSA since schooling occurs over a much wider time period in these countries. This problem can be reduced by combining the two.
The data in Table 4 for primary-secondary (first and second level) school enrollment ratios show that they are under 45% for girls about 55% for boys in SSA as a whole in 1990. This ratio is 16% or less for girls in a number of countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. It is in the same range for a number of other countries such as Chad, Somalia and Ethiopia.

As is additionally clear from Table 4, with few exceptions, boys outnumber girls in secondary education, often by a wide margin. For the region as a whole, there only 68 girls for every 100 boys. But there are some market differences between countries. Thus, there are less than 50 girls per 100 boys in secondary education in a number of countries in the region - some examples are Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Only in countries of southern Africa does the pattern get reversed, with girls per 100 boys being in the 100-147 range.

Enrolment ratios for post-secondary (third level) education display the same pattern across countries of the SSA, but they are generally much lower for women than for men. The exception is Lesotho, where there are 135 women per 100 males in post-secondary education. [UN (1995b), Table 7]. At the secondary level itself, the enrollment ratios are highest for women in countries of southern Africa (79%), and lowest for eastern Africa (12%), and in the 15%-20% range in western and middle Africa [Haub and Yanagishita (1996)].

As is well known, enrollment ratios, especially at the primary and secondary levels, can be poor indicators of the educational training of youth given significant drop-out rates, especially in rural areas. Drop-out rates can also differ substantially between rural and urban areas, with those in urban areas sometimes being more than four times the urban rate as in the case of Mali [UN (1995b), p. 91].

In their study on Ghana, Lloyd and Gage-Brandon (1994) find that only 61% of children in the 6-17 years age group were attending school in 1987-88, and while this was roughly similar for children in the (6-11) and (11-17) age groups, the rates for girls were much lower, more so within the older age cohort. As expected, the ratio for those who ever enrolled are much higher. More significantly, of those who ever enrolled, the drop-outs rates for girls was 32% and 13% in the (6-11) and (12-17) age groups respectively. The corresponding rates for boys were 22% and 11%. Thus, although fewer females enrol in school, they begin to drop out at faster rates in their teens. This contributes to a level of educational attainment for female youth which is considerably less than that for males. On the other hand, Lloyd and Gage-Brandon find that the educational attainment of girls who stay in school is on par with that of boys.

Another study by Lloyd and Blanc (1996) shows that, after the age of 8 years, the percentage of children enrolled in school at the appropriate level in Cameroon, Kenya and Malawi, has witnessed a sharp decline. By the age of 14 years, those who are enrolled at a grade level appropriate to their age, has fallen to the 20% range. These trends point to a growing percentage of youth who have either dropped out or are enrolled below the grade level appropriate for their age.
Factors underlying existing educational patterns

Poverty forces youth to enter the labour market at an early age by dropping out of school. In the event resources are available, but scarce, parents often choose to educate sons to “buy” security in old age, because returns to male education are higher, and the prevalence of traditional views and custom in determining gender roles [see, for instance, Gage and Njogu (1994), p. 40, and Obrubuloye (1987), p. 87-89]. However, girls contribute significantly to unpaid domestic labour, to farming or informal sector activities. The opportunity cost of educating them is therefore high, and usually implicit, one reason why such activities erroneously continue to be undervalued.

In many sub-Saharan cultures, the father provides for education. In areas of heavy migration by males, there is little guarantee that funds for education are forthcoming on a regular basis, if at all. This impacts more adversely on the education of female youth. In addition, where adolescent child-bearing is high, where household tasks, such as looking after siblings, cooking, cleaning, fetching water and fuel, fall to girls, particularly in rural areas or urban areas where poor women are engaged in market activities in order to provide for family subsistence, female children drop out of school more frequently than boys, who do not face such demands on their time. The study by Lloyd and Gage-Brandon on Ghana mentioned earlier finds that although low fertility has a positive impact on the education of girls, that has to be weighed against the finding that girls with younger siblings are less likely than boys to be enrolled in school, and that they are also more likely to drop out. Thus, the costs of high fertility are borne by older girls rather than by their parents.

There is growing evidence that female headed households make stronger commitments to the education of children [see, for instance, Lloyd and Blanc (1994)]. The Lloyd-Gage-Brandon study found that teenage girls, but especially boys, are significantly more likely to enrol in school in households in which the head is the mother rather than the father. On the other hand, in a study of seven SSA countries, Lloyd and Blanc (1996) find that where female headship matters for schooling, the beneficial impacts on schooling are even greater for grade completion than they are for school enrolment, and that in most countries, girls’ grade completion rates are higher than those for boys in such households.

LIVELIHOOD ACTIVITIES AND CHOICES OF YOUTH

What is the status of youth ? what choices do they make regarding education, and livelihoods, and what factors shape those choices ? The answers to these questions are closely tied to gender - specifically, the views regarding the productive and reproductive roles of men and women within the households, and the interplay between those views and the underlying system of custom and obligation, and the political and legal framework within which decision-making takes place.

Gender exerts a significant influence on what choices youth make in regarding education, fertility, marriage and livelihoods. These choices are inter-related in a significant way for
females. Even in the absence of polygynous unions, there appears to be a strong demarcation in
household decision along gender lines. Unlike men, whose work is done mainly outside the
home, is distinct from it and is associated with cash income, for women, work is deeply
interwoven with her family and home. Women take up the responsibility of providing for the
basic sustenance needs of themselves and their families. In rural areas, this often results in
female-headed households, when husbands migrate to wage paying jobs in the urban sector. In
any event, their contribution to the household is to provide for the education of children and
major expenditures involving furniture rent etc, and such resources are not regular nor
guaranteed, especially if the husband has migrated.

Whether women grow only subsistence crops for their households, or also more
profitable cash crops (the domain of males), depends upon their access to productive resources,
especially land. In many cases, this access is very limited since the vast majority of women do
not own land. Women might then work on other farms as wage labourers, or engage in a wide
array of informal sector activities in order to earn cash income to support families. These
activities include petty trade, beer distilling, handicrafts, home-based services and prostitution.

Whatever else they might do outside the home, women (especially youth) are actively
engaged in a significant amount of unpaid, undervalued domestic labour - from hauling water
and fuel over long distances, to cleaning, cooking, and looking after children. We know little
about the time-use patterns of men and women, and less of youth in SSA because of the lack of
data. But evidence from other countries, and anecdotal evidence from countries of the SSA,
show clearly that women assume heavy workloads like their sisters in other parts of the world.
A study by CREDESA showed that the length of the workday of women engaged in the informal
sector in the Ouidah district in Benin, varies from about 9 hours to 15.5 hours, with the average
time being just under 12.5 hours, as women struggle to divide their time between economic and
home production [de Souza and Alihonou (1994), p. 32].

The heavy workload often extends to female youth under 16 years of age, as it is not uncommon
for female children to undertake unpaid domestic labour since mothers are engaged in market-
oriented activities. Abwunza [(1997, p. 45)] tells of 8 female youth from Maragoli, Kenya, aged
14-16 years, whose typical home day is described thus:

“We fetch water and firewood around six in the morning. We make tea and wash utensils.
If there are fees, we are in school from eight until four. Our work is fetching water and
firewood, digging, cooking, caring for the younger children, washing utensils and
clothes, cleaning and spreading cow-dung. Our main work is fetching water. Boy's work
(as they see it) is making fences, building, caring for cows and milking, digging and
going to market. Girls don't have time to go to market."

When asked who worked harder, they responded “Both work hard but girls work harder,” and
noted the injustice involved.

Thus, responsibility for home and family is sharply delineated along gender lines, with a
generally heavier burden upon women, including youth. For young women, both the high
opportunity cost of going to school and/or the high incidence of adolescent fertility, significantly reduce the chances that young women will be able to enhance both the quantity and quality of their human capital. Male youth are not similarly constrained, and they can get an education if resources permit, or they could migrate more easily in search of better prospects.

The gender dimensions of the labour force

As Table 5 shows, women accounted for 37% of the labour force (aged 15 years and over) in 1990 in SSA. In contrast, the share is almost half that in southern Asia, and one-fourth that in norther Africa. Women in SSA are thus not socially constrained in this respect as much

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Share in labour force(%)</th>
<th>Labour force participation(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Share in labour force(%)</th>
<th>Labour force participation(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Asia</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Africa</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


as women in northern Africa and South Asia. Social and cultural factors explain why women account for under 25% of the labour force in some SSA countries such as Mali, Chad and Sudan.

Table 5 also shows that labour force participation (LFP) rates are among the highest in the world, averaging 50% for women and more than 80% for men. These rates are lowest in countries such as Mali, Chad and Sudan, again because of societal attitudes towards women in the market place. Although the official statistics attempt to measure unpaid work, these measurements are likely to be biased downward given the nature of home-based activities, particularly in rural areas. Additional data also show that LFP rates rise quickly as one moves
through the 10-14 years cohort to the 25-30 years cohort. Estimates also show that the LFP rates for girls and boys in the 10-14 years cohort are the highest in the world, averaging about 30% for boys and 20% for girls. The corresponding rates are under 8 percent in northern Africa.

**Sectoral Distribution of the Labour Force**

Women in SSA are overwhelmingly engaged in agriculture - 75% of the female labour force (aged 15 years and over) and only 60% of the male labour force are engaged in that sector. A few countries depart quite significantly from these averages. Thus, in South Africa, only 13% of the female labour force and 11% of the male labour force can be found in agriculture, while the corresponding percentages are respectively 92% and 84% for Niger, and 98% and 87% for Burundi.

**Table 6**

**Sectoral Distribution of the Labour Force by Gender(%) -1994**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Agriculture Women</th>
<th>Agriculture Men</th>
<th>Industry Women</th>
<th>Industry Men</th>
<th>Services Women</th>
<th>Services Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Africa</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Much of women's work in agriculture is in subsistence crops instead of cash crops, the latter usually being the domain of men. This is reflective of the gender division that places the bulk of the responsibility for family subsistence on women, while males engage in market-oriented activity. It also reflects the fact that women rarely own land, but are given the right (after marriage) to cultivate a portion of the husband's land to maintain the family. Sometimes, women may provide their labour on their husband's land, but do not partake of any profits that may result from that activity. While there are few pure subsistence farmers, the extent of market-oriented activity varies significantly across countries, depending upon the availability of resources such as land, credit, improved technology to women, all of which can be critical in
determining their ability to engage in the market economy.

When land, resources and technology are not available to meet the needs of the household, women will offer their labour to other farms to bring in some extra income into the household. Alternatively, women may engage in informal activities such as selling beer, food, and other consumer items. Typically, poorer women are more likely to engage in such activities, especially those that head households. Estimates of female headed households vary considerably because, in some countries female headship is a tradition, while in others it may result from polygynous marriages and/or migration of the husbands.

Households can assume a number of different forms, around the basic extended-family unit. For example, in areas where male migration is heavy, the household could consist of three generations of a woman’s family, the grandmother looking after the young, while females (including daughters) might engage in a variety of informal activities on the fringes of the urban economy [Jiggins (1989)].

In contrast to agriculture, only 5% of the female labour force is in industry, as compared to 15% for men. However, in some countries, these proportions are higher, amounting to about 17% in Ghana and South Africa (Table 6). The small share of labour in industry points to the general lack of employment opportunities created by the formal manufacturing sector in SSA economies. The even lower percentages for women reflect the generally low education levels of women, as also the existing social structure.

Both women and men work in relatively similar proportions (20% for women and 23% for men) in services production. In some nations, the proportion of women is higher than that for men, no more significantly than in South Africa, where women account for 70% of the labour force in the services sector, as compared to the 40% share of men (Table 6).

**Occupational patterns**

As in other regions of the world, occupations are stratified along gender lines. Females account for more than 50% of workers in sales professions, 37% of workers in clerical and related professions, 36% of workers in technical and professional occupations, 20% of workers in production and transportation activities, and just 15% of workers in managerial and administrative positions [UN (1995b), p. 124]. In the formal economy, women outside of sales and clerical positions are either nurses or teachers, or are employed in low-paying public-sector jobs that offer job security and fringe benefits. In these jobs, women are concentrated in sub-ordinate positions, with limited opportunities for upward mobility, as noted in survey of women in Dakar, Senegal [Sy (1994), p.17].

This occupational pattern can be explained in terms of the relatively lower level of education and training achieved by women, but also by societal attitudes and norms that govern the nature of skills that females acquire - namely, training in secretaryship, catering, dress-making, hair-dressing, etc. Also, sometimes when opportunities arise to train for a non-
traditional occupation, women may opt to forego that training, as noted by Dolphyne (1991) for Kenyan women. A part of the problem is that working in non-traditional occupations can be difficult for many women who face the "double-day" syndrome. For instance, a survey of women traders in Zimbabwe showed that many had, on entry into the informal sector, been employed in a variety of other occupations, but had to give them up since they did not fit in with their home responsibilities [Horn (1995), chapter 8, p. 146].

Expectedly, women's occupational "choices" translate into lower earnings. Thus, average female wages in manufacturing in 1990 were only 75% of male wages in Zambia and Kenya, and only a little more than 50% of male wages in Swaziland [UN (1995b), p. 128].

Formal sector opportunities in industry and services are limited for youth, especially females and/or early school leavers, and formal sector jobs can also go unfilled because youth do not have the skills/training required, thus contributing to the unemployment of youth, as surveys in Dakar, Senegal, and Bamako, Mali, appear to suggest. In Senegal, some 25,000 youth leave the school system annually, while the formal economy absorbs at most 4000 [Thiam (1994), p. 16-17], leaving the remainder to their own devices. Thiam also notes how, a Dakar's weekly headline for an article on the dimensions of unemployment in the country had the headline: “Plutot homme que femme, adulte que jeune,” pointing to the attitudes towards female/youth seeking employment.

Self-employment and enterprising behaviour

A distinguishing feature of SSA countries is that, for women and youth, wage employment is not as important as self-employment, either in enterprises, trading or professions. According to UN(1995b), women employers and own-account workers are a greater proportion of the female labour force (35%) than do female wage earners (29%). The corresponding proportion for male are 41% and 37% respectively. This tendency towards self-employment is much greater in the SSA region as compared to other parts of the world.

That women in SSA countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya have along history of managing successful market trading enterprises, is well known. Most of these women started modestly and without education, and developed into a network that dominated the distribution system for agricultural goods. For a majority of women today, however, the reality is somewhat different. The extent of female enterprise in the formal sector is highly limited in all countries of the region, and when they exist, they are engaged primarily in the provision of some service instead of manufacturing. For instance, in the formal service sector, women may operate as owners of taxis, lorries or buses in the transportation, or in hotels, restaurants or dress shops [Simms (1981), p. 148-49].

The vast majority of women and youth, however, are engaged in enterprises in the informal sector. Data on the details of women in the informal sector are very scarce. That which are available, show that the informal sector is a major contributor to production an employment in the economies of SSA. As the data in Table 8 indicate, about 35%-45% of manufacturing output is produced in the informal sector, and on average, close to 50% of
the output in the services sectors originates in the informal sector. For the countries for which data are available, it can be seen that a third or more of total production can be attributed to the informal sector.

Turning to employment in the informal sector, it is evident from Table 9 that at least about a third of the economically active women outside of agriculture are employed in the informal sector. There are fairly significant inter-country variations with high proportions in Zambian (72%) and Gambia (62%), and relatively low portions proportions in Burundi (32%). In general, countries in which male migration to urban areas has been high, females participate more significantly in the informal sector, since such migration places a greater burden for caring for the extended family squarely on the shoulders of women and their female offspring. In contrast to females, the percentage of economically active males in the informal sector is between 20-30% for countries for which data are available, with Mali showing a considerably higher share of 45%.

The economically active women outside of agriculture are heavily concentrated in services and manufacturing units in the informal sector. For instance, in the Gambia, 60% are engaged in services and 100% in manufacturing activities. These proportions are generally less for men, who are also better represented in transportation within the informal sector. Mali is a special case, with almost 40% of the male labour force being in services, 31% in manufacturing and 50% in transportation.

### Table 8

**Informal Sector Production**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Manufact’g</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi(1990)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo(1984)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia(1983)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali(1990)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia(1986)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica(1988)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand(1990)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 9

**Distribution of Men and Women in the Informal Sector by Type pf Activity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manufacture</th>
<th>Transportation</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of labour force that is informal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The importance of informal sector activities to women is also seen by the fact that of all workers engaged in the informal sector, almost 60% in Zambia and generally above 40% in a number of other countries such as Gambia, Mali and Congo, are female workers [(UN (1995b), p. 136].

Informal sector enterprises in SSA are diverse, ranging from petty trade to wholesaling, export-import trading, and the provision of financial and non-financial services. These activities can be sedentary activities on fixed premises (kiosks), or semi-sedentary on fixed but not permanent premises, or itinerant activities such as street hawking. A study in four urban centres in Benin showed that women account for respectively 41.2%, 90% and 81.3% of entrepreneurs in these activities [de Souza and Alihonou (1994), p. 31].

The nature of enterprises in the informal sector is also gendered along a number of dimensions such as enterprise location, production sector, and growth [Downing (1995)]. Women's enterprises are more likely than men's to be home-based, given that they are responsible for domestic labour. Men's enterprises are more likely to be based in business districts or traditional markets. Female enterprises tend to concentrated in food, beverages, tobacco and garments production, and in retail trade. Men's enterprise are additionally involved in other manufacturing, metals, construction and transportation. As a result, women's manufacturing activities are likely to be in brewing beer, knitting, dressmaking, hairdressing, etc, while men engage in activities such construction, welding, electrical repair, etc.

A detailed study of entrepreneurs based on census-type surveys conducted in four southern African nations - South Africa, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Swaziland - highlights some of the major differences between male and female enterprises [Downing (1995)]. These countries are generally characterized by high rates of male migration (to the mines), and women engage substantially in the informal sector. The data showed that between 62% and 84% of small business and micro enterprises are female owned. While both women and men are involved heavily in services and manufacturing, the activities themselves are quite different. For instance, informal manufacturing activities that males engage in tend to involve non-traditional and dynamic products such as construction, welding, auto repair, radio and television repair, while women's manufacturing activities are concentrated in beer brewing, dressmaking, knitting, crocheting, etc. products. The data also show that women's enterprises are smaller than men's enterprises, and grow more slowly even in the face of increasing market size. This could suggest that women face different constraints [[Berger (1989) and Saito (1991)]] and/or that the business strategies and objectives of women and men differ [Grown and Sebstad (1989)]. In this context,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>W</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>W</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>W</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>W</th>
<th>M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi (1990)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (1984)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia (1983)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali (1990)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia (1986)</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

it is interesting to note that even where women farmers are able to engage in cash crop production, they cannot expand operations in response to market incentives since they cannot get access to additional land, and indeed, might have to plant less because their husbands increase the area planted to cash crops in response to better opportunities [UN (1995a), p. 63].

Other than manufacturing, women are also active in the service sector - namely, trading and domestic service. In many cases, women are engaged in both manufacturing and the sale of products (beer, food, knitted products, etc). Typically, these activities are small scale, and would likely be undertaken by the very poor in urban areas and rural areas. Women engaged in trading on a larger scale, are mainly involved in the distribution of goods, especially of food products. While the female market traders of West Africa are renowned, successful market traders in fresh produce and other products, exist in other parts of SSA as well. For instance, in Zimbabwe women are involved significantly in providing for the fresh produce needs of urban populations, and some have been engaged in their enterprise for many years [Horn (1995)]. In Benin, many women are engaged in selling crafts, and some have moved into areas that were previously the exclusive domain of men - carpentry, masonry [de Souza and Alihonou (1994), p. 31].

Women are also engaged more actively in domestic service. Domestic service is often the point of entry into the informal sector, because it requires no skills and capital. Domestic servants get food and shelter, and might even get a payment for their services. It is not uncommon for domestic servants to be the young. Often, the prevalence of fosterage, the domestic servant will be a female youth working in the home of a better-off relative, who may or may not undertake to provide some education. It is not uncommon for male youth to also get an education under this kind of fosterage, but without being domestic servants. Usually, those engaged in this activity are young females, often under 16 years of age. There are no clear estimates of the extent to which female youth are engaged in domestic service, but it is a cause for concern since domestic service provides few valuable skills and often involves significant physical and mental exploitation of youth. According to one source, about a quarter of formally employed women are in domestic service in Zimbabwe [(Mazur and Mhloyi, (1994), chapter 9, p. 138].

There are few systematic estimates of youth participation in informal enterprises, less so for youth. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that female youth are active in the informal sector, particularly in those sub-sectors in which women are dominant (for example, vending), and it seems that younger women in the sector are also now relatively better educated. It is also common practice for female youth, to engage in the enterprises as apprentices, often of their matrikin; that way they acquire some skills relating to the operation of enterprises. Female youth may grow up to assume control over enterprises of their relatives, or of new ones [Osirim (1995), chapter 9, p. 165]. According to one study of the informal sector in Benin, 80% of businesswomen had once been apprentices [quoted in De Souza and Alihonou (1994), p. 36].

The nature and success of women's enterprises (including those of female youth), whether in farming or in informal activities, depend upon the economic status of women, which in turn is conditioned by the degree of access to productive resources, credit, and the cultural
setting. To the extent that enterprises are a matter of survival, they are likely to be small with little scope for growth. Beyond basic survival, initially enterprises might be diversified to spread risks, but still small scale. Once security is assured, enterprises can become more specialized and investment in specific activities expanded to garner higher returns. Undoubtedly, women's enterprises are found at all levels in a cross section, and that over time female youth as well as women move between different levels [Jiggins (1989)]. In the existing economy situation in most of SSA, there are some significant barriers towards the development of sustainable livelihoods through enterprises for women, and especially female youth. In the next section, we provide a synopsis of factors that hinder (and those that foster) the development of enterprising skills among women in general, and female youth in particular.

LIVELIHOOD SKILLS DEVELOPMENT: THE GENDER CONSTRAINTS

With widespread literacy campaigns in SSA over the past quarter of a century, youth, especially those under the 25 years of age, are better educated than older women and men, and are potentially better able to integrate in the modern economy or to engage in informal production. Much of this population, however, constitutes the middle or upper classes. This section of youth can take a strategic view about developing sustainable livelihoods and, therefore, have the potential for forming dynamic livelihood capabilities that go beyond simple enterprising behaviour. However, even within this exclusive group, traditional views about the gender division of labour, condition female youth to develop attitudes and skills that are consistent with those views.

However, the primary target of youth livelihood development interventions are the vast majority of poor sub-Saharan Africans. These, as we have seen, are significantly self-employed own-account workers in agriculture, and in the informal sector in manufacturing and services. Most have demonstrated much adaptability in the face of severe hardship. This is particularly true for women who have had combine their productive role inside and outside their homes to provide for their families, in the face of entrenched gender inequalities. Some have been innovative and adapted their rural skills quite effectively to engage in trade on a long-term basis. From the point of view of promoting the development of dynamic livelihood capabilities among youth, with an eye to gender equality, an awareness is needed of existing enabling factors which can be harnessed, as well as of dis-enabling factors that constrain such development, as these are closely tied to the attitudes, objectives, and behaviours of women in the conduct of their economic activities in and outside the home.

Enabling factors

- Female youth are relatively better educated and more mobile than older women
- SSA women shoulder significant responsibilities, starting at an early age, given the tradition of women supporting families. They are, thus, independent and enterprising.
- Women develop time and resource-use management skills since they learn to work the "double day."
Women entrepreneurs are likely to have been apprentices in their mother's or other relatives' businesses and hence learn some skills relevant to their operations.

Networking with other women entrepreneurs has a long tradition in the region. This provides support to them in a variety of ways.

There have been greater government and non-governmental initiatives, reflecting the greater awareness of gender inequalities, in areas promoting women's interests, including entrepreneurship.

However, there are a number of economic, social, cultural and institutional factors that continue to significantly impede the development of dynamic livelihood skills needed for the formation of sustainable livelihoods over the long term. These manifest themselves in a number of dis-enabling factors.

**Gender constraints to developing dynamic livelihood capabilities**

*Women entrepreneurs, especially youth, lack equal access to economic resources, such as land, improved technology and government services (such as transportation)*

In many countries, women have no rights to land, or where such rights exist, they are not necessarily guaranteed by law, and inheritance practices are male-biased. This restricts access to credit for investment in productivity-enhancing investments as well as working capital for buying other inputs.

Women's farm enterprises are, thus, often confined to subsistence production or limited cash crop production.

Women's knowledge of, and access to new technology in farming is unequal since extension services provide information that is geared to male producers' cash cropping.

These constraints mean that women cannot respond to market incentives, or increase their productivity by adopting better technology.

*Women entrepreneurs have unequal access to credit*

Women's access to formal credit for enterprise growth or working capital is constricted by two main factors: the lack of collateral given the lack of asset ownership, and two, the lack of knowledge about formal financial markets, financial management, financial contracts, etc, because of their relatively poor education and training, biases in formal lending practices against women, especially the young who are starting out.

This constraint restricts enterprise growth by discouraging innovative behaviour,
diversification, and strategic planning for long term development of the enterprise.

- **Women’s unequal access to formal education**

Early marriage, high fertility, and limited education form a particularly “vicious’ circle that has severe consequences for women compared to men.

Early marriage and child-bearing means that young girls drop out of school early, and hence do not develop basic skills that are needed for developing any form of sustainable livelihood.

Early school leavers are also more likely to marry early and have high fertility.

This vicious circle is inter-generational in its effects, and is likely to pass on low socio-economic status across generations.

The cost of high fertility is ironically borne by female youth who are often entrusted to look after siblings. Indeed, young girls engage in a great deal of arduous labour in home production activities, and thereby acquire few skills.

- **Women lack inadequate training in management related and technical skills**

While women may possess enterprising skills learned through apprenticeships, their literacy and numeracy skills are generally low, and they do not acquire training in managing enterprises in a dynamic environment.

Managing enterprises for growth and sustainability over the long term, requires training in accounting, marketing and finance.

This would help women acquire and understand information about profitable avenues, negotiating skills and confidence in the market place.

- **Women bear the burden of the “double-day”**

The "double-day" syndrome is all to real for women, and has many far-reaching implications for skills development in general, as well as for entrepreneurship. Women are expected to engage in home production even after working in their enterprises.

This restricts women to low-productivity enterprises that are relatively simple, home-based, with limited potential for long-term growth.
It also restricts the time that can be devoted to enterprise management and development.

The fact that home and market-oriented production are inter-woven in women's lives, often means that revenues from market opportunities can and are siphoned towards meeting the need of the extended family, rather than ploughed back as investment in the enterprise. While males also often feel an obligation to provide some funds to the extended family they are less burdened by such obligations since family welfare id perceived to lie in the domain of women.

Women's lack of control over enterprises

Often women's enterprises are financed by funds provided by the husband, and women may have little control over its revenues and strategic management.

It is also not uncommon for women's enterprises that are productive and prosperous, with growth potential, to taken over by their husbands.

Objectives, attitudes and behaviours

- There are several, inter-related dimensions of the socio-economic and cultural setting that are closely tied to the objectives, attitudes and behaviours of women.

- The goals, attitudes and behaviours of women in enterprising activities differ in important ways from those men, and hence involve different priorities. These differences are predicated on two main, inter-related factors: the "social technology" and the economic status of women.

These govern the behaviours of women in significant ways.

- Women entrepreneurs have different objectives and attitudes than males in engaging in enterprises.

- Enterprises are seen as a means of investment in public goods such as security and children's' education, goods that are normally within the purview of the state. This follows from the responsibility that society puts on women.

- As a result, women do not necessarily view enterprise growth as an objective when it interferes with family obligations. Profits, where present, are used to ensure that children get an education, or are fed.

- Women's own perception of work and success are also shaped by societal views about women's role. Thus, society at large expects women to adhere to traditional gender roles, and female entrepreneurs often measure success in terms of their ability to care for their families.
› Also, women may engage in multiple enterprises in the informal sector as means of ensuring security in the event of abandonment, and no access to resources.

› If market-oriented activity is a response to poverty, the development of the enterprise is a survival strategy that meets existing practical needs of the family, but which involves no strategic planning. Thus, issues relating to long-term sustainability such as the appropriate choice of product, location, etc, need not be central.

Thus, interventions aimed at developing dynamic livelihoods for youth, need to understand these aforementioned factors to ensure that those interventions genuinely address gender inequalities.

Notes

1. Youth is a concept that is specific to the cultural context as well as gender. In SSA, where the education span exceeds that in industrial countries as youth drop in out and of the formal education system and are generally below the grade level appropriate to their age, the potential age when all schooling is complete is high. Therefore, we define youth as anyone 30 years of age or less. This also allow us to treat women equitably in terms of their relevance to youth livelihood programs, since they marry and bear children early, and might otherwise be excluded from the youth category.

2. The English translation is: “Rather men than women, adults than youth.”

3. The informal sector has been defined as comprising those units which are own-account enterprises in the household sector, operated by own-account workers, and which might involve employing family members and, only on an occasional basis, other workers. Subsistence and non-market production (including those in agricultural activities) are excluded [see UN (1995b), p. 166 for details and references]. This definition underlies the data presented in the tables, but does not necessarily conform to the definitions used by various authors cited in the text.

References


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A LOGICAL - FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH ON DYNAMIC LIVELIHOOD CREATION PROGRAMS FOR YOUTH IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA.

**Project, Goal/Impact:**

**Long-term:** Youth (males and females) with dynamic sustainable livelihood skills in Sub-Saharan Africa.

**Medium term:** A more coherent non-formal training system for building enterprising skills in early school leavers to help them form dynamic sustainable livelihoods.

**Short term:** Developed capacity and expertise in program assessment, planning and management; for young African researchers, planners and managers, to be able to design appropriate interventions necessary for creating skills learning venues for early school leavers.

**Immediate Objective:** Research in several countries

- to identify and describe the livelihood, enterprise and employment capabilities and activities of early school leavers, exemplifying the motivations, attitudes and skills implicit in these activities;
- to develop an inventory of the type and range of employment opportunities and demands for skills that exist in the market and identify the private sector’s perception of the inability non-formal training system to meet private sector skills needs;
- to document the range of non-formal livelihood, enterprise and employment skills training programs in existence and assess a sample (three to five per country) of these programs in terms of the factors and principles which contribute to their effectiveness (or ineffectiveness);
- to assess a sample of programs in terms of their link to existing skills development policy aimed at early school leavers, and their potential role as implementation vehicle for policy; and
- to identify the institutional interventions needed to build on successful programs, respond to the needs of youth and market demands and to establish appropriate links with policy.

The research will also help disseminate information with the setting up of a Youth Livelihood Knowledge Network on the web. There will be several outcomes at the institutional, national and international levels.

**Outcomes:**

1. Program assessments at the national level.

2. Guidelines for operational links between successful and relevant programs and national policy objectives as well as guidelines for government officials, program planners and managers to develop a youth-enterprise livelihoods capabilities development strategy.

3. At the institutional level the research will generate a state-of-the-art knowledge base that will have a direct impact on the direction of program development and policy implementation of various Youth Development Councils and agencies in respective countries.

4. At the International level a Youth Livelihoods Knowledge Network will provide a state-of-the-art knowledge base on effective programs and related policy objectives.
### Outcome

#1: Program assessments at the national level

- A gender disaggregated inventory of the type and range of non-formal training systems in place, and employment opportunities and skills requirements in the markets in a country.

- Knowledge of what and why programs are working

- A set of principles to guide the development of relevant and effective programs ;

- Identification of interventions which build on successful programs, eg pilot programs ;

- Guidelines on the strategic roles of government, NGOs, and the private sector in supporting the enterprise capabilities of youth.

- Ongoing monitoring and assessment of programs’ outreach to young women and men.

### Gendered Indicators:

- Gender disaggregated data collected on the education, livelihood activities and time-use of youth, by age and location, by the type of family they belong to (marriage type, both parents present or not, pooled income and joint expenditures or not, number of children in the family, income and education of parents) in each country, prior to participation in programs or non-formal training.

- Gender disaggregated data collected on the participation of youth in programs by location (rural or urban, proximity to home and markets), levels of formal education, age, marital status, fertility, and livelihood experiences.

- Number of new and/or non-traditional-skills acquired by young women, those who were able to get credit to start up traditional as well as non-traditional enterprises, and the number of successful ventures.

- Number of female participants who are satisfied with the gender-sensitiveness and the content of the programs for perceived improvements in employment and empowerment issues and would recommend the training programs to other young women.

- Number of young women participants who thought that they would be free to use the income from a new enterprise or employment after the training, according to own wishes and acquire property and/or resources.

- Surveys to capture changes in the attitudes of young men toward equality of women at home and in the marketplace, birth control, equal share of child-rearing responsibilities and income-pooling. Participatory method of survey.

- Frequency of consultation with the female/male target group regarding their expectations from governmental and non-governmental organizations in the provision of training, credit, support-facilities (housing, transport, food, and child care) and follow-ups. The degree of satisfaction with the private sector in supporting young women to acquire new skills by allowing internships and part-time work, and keeping successful women entrepreneurs visible and active in the training programs for poor females.

- Number of females who delayed marriage/fertility as a result of training, and wanted to further formal education.
#2: Guidelines for operational links between successful and relevant programs and national policy objectives as well as guidelines for government officials, program planners and managers to develop a youth-enterprise livelihoods capabilities development strategy.

**Outputs:**

- A reservoir of gendered definitions of entrepreneurship, enterprises and businesses in different country context
- Analysis of program-policy links
- Identification of human capital development of young women in national policies and a list of programs that conform to the national objectives
- Evaluation of sample programs in terms of their relevance for skills development of females.
- Collaborative research on livelihood creating training programs for poor young youth (males and females) by national governments, individual researchers and international donor agencies.
- A list of successful pilot programs in terms of number of female participants, number of those who complete the program, get financial help, are satisfied with the relevancy of the training in setting up an enterprise and have set up small but dynamic enterprises.
- A gendered database on livelihood activity choices of program participants in different countries.

**Gendered Indicators:**

- Number of programs and national policies for skills training of poor youth, assessed in terms of meeting the strategic and practical needs of women in the respective countries.
- Gender disaggregated data collected on levels of education, type of training, employment, marriage and family formation, of each of the program participants, before and after the completion of training.
- Extent of consultation with women’s associations and groups in each country to get their views on gender equality and feedback on the achievements of (pilot) programs in changing the perception and attitudes of society towards women in non-traditional work or business.
- Surveys of young women who have completed a program to measure the degree of ease/difficulty in entering the formal/informal sector for work, and attribute the results to the training they received. Participatory assessment method used.
- Number of research pieces completed (or in progress) by various researchers to study the impact of skills-training programs for youth on the empowerment of young women in a country context.
- Frequency of consultations with government departments, specially those associated with women’s welfare, in different countries, for co-ordinating and delivering programs to the target youth (male and female) in a cost-effective manner.
- Open forum discussions with male and female entrepreneurs in the private sector, relevant government departments and non-governmental organisations to assess the demand for skills in the market, the supply gaps, and perceived usefulness of contents of non-formal training programs, for the market.
- Number of women at all levels of programs, from planning to delivery and assessment.
#3: At the institutional level this research will generate a state-of-the-art knowledge base that will have a direct impact on the direction of program development and policy implementation of the Youth-Councils / Commissions in the respective countries and to the Director of the Youth Development Studies Centre, Venda University, in the design and ongoing development of the centre's program.

## Outputs:

- A reservoir of gendered definitions of entrepreneurship, enterprises and businesses in different country context.
- Gender disaggregated baseline data on age, education, marital status, family composition, mobility, livelihood choices, income and property ownership of youth in each of the countries under study.
- A complete list of best-practice programs for skills development of early school leaving youths in different countries with special reference to females in light of the severity of the consequences of lack of human capital for females in Africa.
- A cross-country comparison of various governmental and non-governmental youth-skills development programs with respect to their impact on the lives of poor young people (and empowerment of young females specifically).
- Gender-analysis framework for the assessment of programs that are aimed at capacity-building or human capital development of poor, less educated youths in developing countries for gender-equality in programs.
- A flexible and adaptable method of data collection to accommodate new requirements of information, as more is known about youth livelihoods and the constraints they face in creating dynamic and sustainable livelihoods.

## Gendered Indicators:

- Number of countries in which gender disaggregated baseline data was collected.
- Number of researchers who are females from African countries and were involved in forming country specific gender-analysis framework for assessment of skills training programs.
- Number of participatory assessment of livelihoods of poor young women in various countries to define gender equality, empowerment and dynamic livelihoods in a country context.
- Frequency of updates of the basic gender disaggregated data.
- Number of programs that were judged to be best-practices from the achievements of female participants in both employment and empowerment categories.
- Extent of consultation with each country’s target group, governmental and non-governmental organizations, and the private sector enterprises for their perception of success of programs for achievement of gender equality.

#4: At the International level, a Youth Livelihoods Knowledge Network will provide
a state-of-the-art knowledge base on effective programs and related policy objectives.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Outputs:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➢ Establishment of a website and internet services to serve project leaders and to provide access to the knowledge base.</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ Access to planning, assessment and management guidelines for enterprise training for self-employment, for program planners, managers, donor agencies and policy experts.</td>
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<td>➢ Number of countries for which there were complete gender disaggregated baseline data.</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ Number of non-formal programs that were designated as best practice from the gender equality perspective.</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ Number of blueprints for non-formal skills-training programs setting up, management and a process of continuous gender performance evaluation available on the net.</td>
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