General Information
1. Project name. Financing of Education in Guatemala: Research, Proposal and Advocacy
2. Project Number: 100437
3. Amount: CQ123,400
4. Date of project start-up: February 2000
5. Duration of project until legal closing date: 15 months
6. Recipient institution:
   - Standing National Commission on Education Reform (CNPRE) (Comisión Nacional Permanente de Reforma Educativa)
   - Coordination Office for Mayan Organizations in Guatemala (COPMAGUA) (Coordinación de Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala)
7. CAP portion
   RAP portion
8. Explicit intent to influence policy formulation in accordance with the project’s title, objectives and activities.
9. Type of recipient institution: Non-governmental organization (NGO)
10. Type of use of research: identified for the research
11. Policy sphere: fiscal and financial policy; education policy
Executive Summary

This case study evaluates the project on "Financing of education in Guatemala: research, purpose and advocacy", executed by the Standing National Commission on Education Reform (CNPRE) of the Coordination Office of Mayan Organizations in Guatemala (COPMAGUA), supported by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). The Project was conducted in the context of the Peace Accords, specifically the commitments relating to educational reform and increasing the education budget contained in the Accords on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Socioeconomic Accord. This case study looks at experience with this research project and its impact on public policies in Guatemala.

The qualitative methodology used made it possible to integrate the different sources consulted, and the analytical categories were taken from available documentation and speeches. The work included reviewing project documents and reports, research papers and publications relating to the issues and the dynamics involved in education funding in Guatemala, and interviews with key players involved in the project. The interviews were conducted using a set of questions that were provided by the IDRC Evaluation Unit and were discussed with a group of experts and with evaluators in several developing countries. The interviews included project leaders, the research team, IDRC’s program officers, officials and staff of the Education Ministry, representatives of various Guatemalan indigenous organizations, research centres, members of the Peace Commission dealing with education, and other representatives of Guatemalan civil society.

This case study is presented in five sections. The first section covers the main components of the project and its context. The second describes the conditions that gave rise to the project. The third section presents the main findings concerning the proceedings and results of the project. The fourth section presents the principal developments subsequent to the project's completion. The last section presents the conclusions.

The findings point to the following conclusions:

1. It was an explicit and fundamental objective of the design of the education funding project that the research should have a direct impact on public policies. This objective was shared by the IDRC program officers and by the CNPRE-COPMAGUA research team and leadership. Yet for IDRC program officers there is still no institutional vision of the meaning and the scope of the influence of research processes and programs on public policies. As the CNPRE-COPMAGUA project team sees it, policy influence constitutes learning from the many factors involved in a project of this kind: conducting research that demands a constant updating of results, forming strategic alliances, negotiating and communicating ideas, producing "influence maps" of and with political players in constantly changing contexts, and having to do all this within extremely tight deadlines.
2. In the case of the education funding project, the issues selected were generally relevant to the government and to civil society as a whole, especially as they related to combating ethnic and gender discrimination. These issues were also part of the Peace Accords agenda. Yet analytical difficulties arose, essentially because of two conditions. In the first place, conditions of inequity, discrimination and marginalization on ethnic and gender grounds also make themselves felt in the ways in which information on education and budgetary statistics is gathered, processed, disseminated and made available. Information policies also tend to render invisible the groups that suffer discrimination. In the second place, the innovative approach of combining fields such as budgetary and social investment policies, the education sector and ethnic and gender issues pose conceptual and methodological difficulties for researchers and decision makers.

3. The results to date offer some answers about the types of research and researchers that are selected for carrying out research projects designed to influence public policies. The CNPRE-COPMAGUA is an organization that combines the functions of a grass-roots body with those of a technical organization. It is not a social research centre in the conventional sense. The CNPRE-COPMAGUA has been a counterpart of the government in the Peace Commissions for the discussion and negotiation of issues such as constitutional reforms, land policies, education, indigenous women's rights, and sacred Mayan sites. Its selection as the counterpart was important also in supporting new kinds of interrelations between research and social action. In fact, research centres such as the Social Research and Studies Association and the University of San Carlos de Guatemala have been turning to the research results in order to justify and substantiate their proposals to increase the education budget. These dynamics can also be observed in the case of civil society bodies such as the Grand National Campaign for Education or the Advisory Commission on Education Reform, and other educational and indigenous organizations that have taken the results, and a portion of the proposals, as their own in making demands to the government.

4. There were a number of factors that influenced the course of the project, but perhaps the most complex ones were political instability and the constantly shifting operational conditions of the project. As in other countries of Latin America, Guatemala has suffered political instability sparked by the clash of interests between the government, the private sector and civil society. This phenomenon could be seen in a constant turnover of decision-makers and in the shift in the correlation of forces represented by transferring decision-making from the executive branch of government to the legislature. At the same time, deadlocks and setbacks under the Fiscal Pact altered the conditions and the prospects for increasing the education budget and titling it towards the elimination of gender and ethnic inequalities. In both cases, the project required deeper and more precise efforts at policy analysis in order to reposition its planned activities in a flexible and comprehensive manner.

5. The findings concerning the results and evolution of the project also pose questions about the timeframe within which research can be expected to have a concrete impact on policies. In the first phase of the education funding project, the execution period was approximately one year. In addition to conducting research and preparing a proposal in
consultation with key stakeholders, the timing has to be adapted to the horizon over which the contents of the policy, in this case the budget, are prepared, discussed and approved. Even more important, though, is the fact that there can be very abrupt shifts in the dynamics and direction of public policy.

6. The gender issue, of course, was explicit in the proposal, yet there were evident conceptual and methodological difficulties. The team leading the project attempted to prepare relevant analyses and proposals, but they recognize that there were shortcomings in this regard. It was complicated enough to address the gender issue alone, and it was even more complex to combine it with issues relating to culture and ethnicity. The conceptual and methodological difficulties also complicated efforts to build alliances between groups representing the Mayan people and women.

7. Communication between researchers and decision makers proved to be a weak point. The same is true of the approach that was taken to disseminating the research results and proposals, which requires differentiation and segmentation of groups and players with whom it is hoped to interact, negotiate and exert influence. For research to have a policy influence there must be strategies for coordinating activities and targeting them at achieving concrete results: haphazard and unarticulated efforts will have no influence. Such problems of informing and shaping public opinion today fall under the concept of social communication, which is recognized as a specific field of expertise. Yet problems in putting together a communication strategy made it difficult to establish platforms for negotiation and to generate a common language among researchers, dialogue facilitators, and decision makers.

8. The education funding project seems to have had more impact in terms of the institutional strengthening of CNPRE-COPMAGUA, which has developed new capacities for conducting research and preparing proposals. Yet there were some gaps in the knowledge transferred from the research group to technical staff of the CNPRE-COPMAGUA. The project also broadened the debate and the agenda on Education Reform and on the priority of investing in education to eliminate disparities and marginalization among women and indigenous people in Guatemala. Progress of this kind, however, has not been reflected in the amendment or redesign of programs and policies.

9. It is clear that, thanks to the research project, Guatemala's indigenous people are in a better position to secure future changes in the structure of the country's budget for education policies, programs and projects. It is hoped that the second phase, now underway, will also strengthen the organized women's group in its alliances and its positioning. Yet such an outcome will demand IDRC support over a longer time horizon in order to have any concrete effect on national policy.
1. The national context and the education funding project

a) Demands for education budget increases from the ethnic and gender perspective

After 30 years of domestic armed conflict in Guatemala, a series of Peace Accords were finally signed, in which the Guatemalan government committed itself to reforms that would lay the basis for a solid and lasting peace. The Accords signed by the government and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (URNG) dealt with cease-fire rules, the disbanding of guerrilla groups, constitutional and electoral reforms, the resettlement of populations who had been uprooted by the conflict, efforts to clear the record on human rights violations and acts of violence, the identity and rights of indigenous peoples, socioeconomic aspects and the agrarian situation, together with a timetable for implementation, fulfillment and verification of the Peace Accords. One of the most important commitments was to transform fiscal, budgetary and taxation policy as a fundamental element in the sustainable development of Guatemala and the modernization of the State.

The Fiscal Pact represented a significant forward step as a process of negotiating and building consensus on the amount, source and destination of financing that the State would need to carry out its constitutional responsibilities and those in the Peace Accords. The Fiscal Pact had two aims: to achieve macroeconomic stability, by maintaining balance between government revenues and expenditures, and a long-term fiscal policy that would allow the State to "promote, guide and protect national production, foster equitable distribution of income, and contribute through social spending to alleviating the situation of the most impoverished sectors". It was hoped that fiscal policy would have a direct bearing on investment in human development in order to reduce social divides, and to overcome the marginalization and discrimination suffered by indigenous people.

The principal areas of the national accord on fiscal issues, which involved the government, the business sector, the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), the network of research centres, the Commission for Follow-up to the Peace Accords (CAAP) and the Federation of Social Organizations (COS), were: fiscal balance, government revenues, tax administration, public spending, the public debt, public property, and fiscal evaluation, control and decentralization. One of the most important issues was to raise the very low level of yields from the Guatemalan taxation system, “in which average collections over the previous 35 years were 8 percent, reaching a low point in 1984, at 5.3 percent, and a high point in 1999, at 10 percent, which was still two percentage points below the 12 percent target called for in the Peace

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The average tax burden during that time was the lowest in Latin America. This situation meant that revenues were inadequate to finance social expenditure, and they provoked a fiscal deficit that averaged 1.1 percent of GDP between 1990 and 1998, rising for the years 1998, 1999 and 2000 to 2.2, 3.0 and 2.1 percent respectively. The Fiscal Pact therefore sought to create conditions for fulfilling the Peace Accords by promoting a social policy that would give priority to health, nutrition, education, training and productive employment opportunities.

In fact, investment in education was considered a basic condition for improving living standards and enhancing the country's productivity and its economic development. The government's commitment under the Peace Accords was to increase public spending on education for the year 2000 by 50 percent over the level of 1995, in terms of GDP. Real spending on education in 1995 had amounted to 1.66 percent of GDP.

The precedent for increasing the education budget derived from the National Education Act, promulgated in 1991, which established the rule that the education budget should gradually rise to 7 percent of GDP. Under the Peace Accords, however, a different percentage was established as the budgetary goal for education spending. As can be seen in Table No. 1, the education budget has the highest spending share of any social sector, including health.

In general, then, it can be said that the goals established in the Peace Accords were met, but not in a manner sufficient to fulfill the commitments under the Education Reform. In fact, there was an increase from 1.66 percent of GDP in 1995 to 2.71 percent in 2001, thereby meeting one of the commitments. The figures in Table No. 1 can be compared with the performance of real spending in the education sector which, in general terms, was fairly close to the planned targets, and in the years 1999 and 2001 actually exceeded the targets. For the years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001, public spending on education was 1.77 percent, 2.11 percent, 2.43 percent, 2.45 percent and 2.71 percent, respectively.

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6 Schneider, Pablo (1999) Guatemala, in Enrique Ganuza et al. (Editors) Public Spending on Basic Social Services in Latin America and the Caribbean: Analysis from the perspective of the 20/20 Initiative.
8 Accords on Socioeconomic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation.
9 Peace Accords URL.
### Table No. 1

#### Budget Targets under the Peace Accords (% of GDP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Education Year</th>
<th>Real</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Health Year</th>
<th>Real</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The need for more funds to meet the educational needs of the Guatemalan people was confirmed by the Peace Commission and the Parity Commission which, in the Design for Educational Reform, called for increasing the education budget as a condition for transforming the education system. For the first time, it was publicly stated that the budget must reflect recognition of cultural differences in education\(^\text{13}\). To press this demand, 77 civil society organizations, international agencies, research centres, universities, religious groups, indigenous organizations and communications media launched a movement that collected 150,000 signatures from Guatemalan citizens on a petition requesting Congress to increase the education budget to Q4.5 billion by the year 2000\(^\text{14}\). In contrast to the figure in that petition, the actual education budget approved for 2002 was Q2.880 billion. The petition calling for the budget increase was circulated during the election campaign between the months of October and December 1999. The petition by the Gran Campaña Nacional por la Educación (Grand National Campaign for Education) was delivered to the national Congress in November 1999, when it was dominated by the National Progress Party (PAN); the PAN was defeated in the election by the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), the party that is now in power. In real terms, the petition had absolutely no effect on the national budget, although it had an impact on public opinion, and concerns over education policy were for a time front and centre in the public eye.

The concern among civil society to increase the education budget was reflected in the Government Education Plan 2000-2004, which declared an explicit policy of increasing the budget of the Ministry of Education until it reached three percent of GDP\(^\text{16}\). This policy was adopted by the Advisory Commission on Educational Reform (CCRE), consisting of 17 institutions of civil society, including representatives of various Mayan organizations. The Standing National Commission on Education Reform (CNPRE) and the Coordination Office of Mayan Organizations in Guatemala (COPMAGUA) showed special leadership: members representing this organization (i.e. COPMAGUA) served on the Executive Council (the governing body of the CCRE), they are members of the Gran

\(^{13}\) CPRE (1998), Diseño de Reforma Educativa (Design for Education Reform), Guatemala.


Campaña and, in turn, they represent CNPRE-COPMAGUA to IDRC as proponents of the project on Financing of Education in Guatemala.

In addition, as part of the current government's education policy, steps were taken to establish mechanisms for participation by Guatemalan society at the municipal, departmental and national levels, and for a broad process of participation, dialogue and consensus building on the central themes of the Education Reform as set forth in the Peace Accords. This process served to legitimize the Education Reform, and above all to empower the role of civil society throughout the Republic in the development of social policies, and specifically in the debate over the educational strategies and programs in which the increased education budget should be invested\textsuperscript{17}. The MINUGUA, in its 2001 Progress Report on the Peace Accords in Guatemala, reported that the Dialogue and Consultation on Education Reform constituted one of the most important examples of progress under the Peace Accords\textsuperscript{18}. Thus, together with the social momentum to discuss fiscal policy and increase the education budget, there was significant progress in the conception and scope of the Education Reform, especially in terms of the demands of indigenous people to insert recognition of cultural differences and the legacy of the Mayan peoples into an education system that had been characterized by racism, discrimination and a homogenizing spirit\textsuperscript{19}. Both of these dynamics generated favourable conditions for supporting a research project on the issue of increasing the education budget, and for facilitating an educational reform consistent with the country's socioeconomic development and cultural differences. The conditions for pursuing a research project on education funding proposals were: (1) pertinent if we look at the progress that was made until the year 2000 under the Fiscal Pact; and (2) relevant, considering that, on the one hand, demands for increasing the education budget were not based on studies and research on the behaviour of the education budget (and on the national budget); and on the other hand, that the specific items to which the budgetary increases might be allocated had not yet been discussed or analyzed.

b) The project on financing of education

It was in this context that CNPRE-COPMAGUA requested IDRC support for a Project on the Financing of Education in Guatemala that would be pursued from the perspective of indigenous peoples, considering the exclusion, poverty and discrimination that the Mayan people of Guatemala has historically suffered. The research was to consist of "analyzing, from the indigenous perspective, the planning and execution of the education budget in Guatemala, to help CNPRE-COPMAGUA formulate proposals in connection with the Education Reform."\textsuperscript{20} The fundamental objective of the research was to influence educational policy in Guatemala, specifically by formulating "a proposal from

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
an indigenous perspective that could influence the planning and execution of the education budget in the context of the Education Reform and the National Education Plan (2000-2020).\textsuperscript{21}

The project was to run for 15 months, beginning in February 2000 and finishing in June 2001. The project was to be conducted on a straight time-line model of three phases: research, a proposal, and advocacy and presentation of the proposal. The first phase consisted of research and included, among other processes: documentary research, interviews, field research, processing and analysis of results, formulation of conclusions. The second phase consisted in formulating a proposal based on the following components: the research report, the Fiscal Pact framework, the "town hall meeting" with the CCRE, the Ministry of Education and the National Congress, the political and cultural propositions of CNPRE-COPMAGUA, and the Conclusions from the Dialogue and Consensus on Education Reform. The third phase, on advocacy and presentation of the proposal, would be conducted through an impact campaign targeted at the CCRE and the Fiscal Pact authorities, as well as the Ministry of Education, the Central Government and the National Congress.\textsuperscript{22}

The research and the proposal for the financing of education had two fundamental aspects, which consisted of analyzing ethnic and gender equity. For these purposes, two reports were presented. The research report was presented in October 2000, and the proposal was presented in March 2001.\textsuperscript{23}

2. Principal findings about the origin of the project

The involvement of players can be classified in four categories. The first category covers members of the project who participated in formulating the original idea. These participants pursued discussions within CNPRE-COPMAGUA and subsequently with IDRC; specifically these persons were Professor Francisco Cabrera, Project Coordinator, and Professor Domingo Sanchez Brito, representing CNPRE-COPMAGUA. The other members of the project participated actively as researchers and leaders of the process to promote the proposal on the financing of education. Their principal functions involved coordination, generation, development and dissemination of the research and the proposal, as well as negotiating with the Minister of Education.

The second category of participants covered those involved through interviews intended to establish priorities and validate the funding proposal, based on results of the Dialogue and Consensus for Education Reform. Within this group we may note the participation of CCRE and ANM and the principal civil society bodies involved in negotiating with and putting pressure on the government, at both the executive and legislative levels, so that the proposal would be taken into account in the budget of the Ministry of Education.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
This group was involved in the dynamics of determining the priorities for investing the expected increase in education funds, but they had little possibility of exerting budgetary or financial influence because they lacked experience in those fields. The Minister of Education can be considered part of this group, because he was constantly kept informed of the research results and it was he who officially received the proposal on May 2, 2001.  

The third group covers all those who merely received information, as in the case of institutions such as the Gran Campaña, the universities and the research centres, the Commission for Monitoring the Fiscal Pact, international agencies, other indigenous organizations and support offices of the Ministry of Education. Although these players were passive subjects during the process of researching and developing the proposal, they were subsequently able to take the reports and use them in the effort to influence national policy on education financing. In this respect, some institutions used the information to give continuity to their proposals, or took them as a point of reference for their position on national education policy. As noted earlier, the involvement of the Gran Campaña was fundamental in terms of using the information to advocate an increase in the education budget.

The fourth group consists of all those who, because of changes in the leadership of public and private institutions or the turnover of leadership in civil society, simply found themselves faced with a report, but were unfamiliar with its basic contents and its negotiation processes, as in the case of institutions such as the Education Planning Unit (UPE), the UDAF, the ALMG, the CNEM, the CIEN and other key players in civil society and national politics. These players reported that they played no part in the process.

The research and the proposal contained essentially three thematic components: a) an increase in financing for education; b) ethnic inequity; and c) gender inequity. On this basis, the intention was to give public policy a fundamentally new perspective in order to eliminate the educational disparity faced by indigenous peoples and women. Those issues were not systematically considered in the past. Generally, disparities were addressed in a reductionist way, through programs such as intercultural bilingual education or special scholarships for girls. Yet the issue of equity in both cases requires a broader approach that goes beyond special programs that are targeted at specific population groups but that do not require the education system as a whole to respond to the differences present in a democratic society. The degree of gender inequity in the Guatemalan education system can be seen in the education indicators. The gross enrolment rate for boys from 1995 to 1997 was 93 percent, while the rate for girls was 82 percent. From 1993 to 1998, 54 percent of registered students were boys, and only 46 percent were girls. This means that the composition of the schooling gap is for the most part female, and one of the priority problems for the Guatemalan education system to

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address, therefore, is to offer equitable conditions so that girls and boys can enjoy their fundamental right to education\textsuperscript{25}.

Ethnic discrimination can likewise be observed through various educational indicators. The illiteracy rate for the Guatemalan population is 31.3 percent, yet for the non-indigenous population it is 21.4 percent, while for the indigenous population it is 42.5 percent. Similarly, of the 806,695 boys and girls enrolled in the national education system in 2001, only 25 percent received intercultural bilingual education. Statistics on academic failure (a particular problem in rural areas), calculated in terms of dropout and repetition rates, show the highest incidence in departments (the geographic administrative divisions of Guatemala) with the greatest percentages of indigenous people.

There were some difficulties with the focus of the study and with the financing proposals, reflecting the fact that the people drafting these proposals had trouble overcoming their reductionist approach, particularly to the issue of gender. Even the professional researcher responsible for the gender topic made this point.

In terms of the relevance of the topics of ethnic and gender equity in the education budget, there are differing reactions on the part of government, NGOs and other members of civil society. Some say that they agree fully with the relevance of these issues, while for others they are unnecessary in the Guatemalan context, where the approach should instead be directed at the extremely poor population, without ethnic or gender distinction. On the other hand, some players, especially indigenous people, feel it is more relevant to generate strategies and actions that will eliminate ethnic discrimination than to worry about the gender issue. The position of the government and of the research centres supported by the Guatemalan private sector holds that both these issues should be subordinated to the traditional categories of the budget and to a more global poverty reduction strategy. According to this argument, since the budget is limited, any special treatment for one group must come at the expense of some other group, and would be tantamount to discriminating against the rest of the population. Another viewpoint holds that these issues are at least for the time being important, given that poverty is concentrated in rural areas where most of the indigenous population lives, and that it has its most direct impact on women, including attention by the education services for these populations. Yet another position defended by some indigenous organizations argues that the ethnic issue is more relevant than the gender issue. According to this position, discrimination in the education system reflects ethnic more than gender motives. Finally, NGOs and international agencies defend the relevance of the topics of the study and the proposal, stressing that the approach to these topics must be broad-based.

Considering the process of the research, the proposal and communication with the government and civil society in general, we may say that the lead players in this effort were the leaders of the CNPRE-COPMAGUA and the research team. There are other

players who were consulted as part of the study, but who in fact never did anything more afterwards. It was CNPRE-COPMAGUA that was the driving force during the research, proposal and dissemination phases, while the research group played a relevant role only in preparing the research and the proposal. This means that communication between the research group, the decision makers and key actors of Guatemalan society during this process was scanty and inadequate. This resulted in a dissociation of functions that affected communication and dissemination efforts, and in lower levels of impact for the study and the proposal in terms of their policy influence. This situation also coincided with timing gaps in the hiring of researchers. It is also important to note that the delivery of the proposals was out of phase with the preparation of the national budget, which was done earlier than expected by CNPRE-COPMAGUA. Finally, it must be recognized that the mechanisms of communication between researchers and decision makers take so long that immediate actions will already have been decided.

Some indigenous organizations say that they were unaware of the research and of their potential involvement. They knew about the report but they were not part of any partnership, which, according to them, could have had a greater impact. These indigenous organizations belong to the Gran Campaña, and they say they are aware that the proposals put forward by that body included some information from the CNPRE-COPMAGUA study and proposal, but the political impact was very limited. In some cases, it was noted that the researchers were non-indigenous experts, and it was hoped that these experts had passed on their skills to indigenous professionals. Similarly, the second phase of the project included 15 workshops to establish grass-roots links with CNPRE-COPMAGUA, women's groups and indigenous experts.

The IDRC team was conscious of the need to influence public policy through research on education funding, but it recognizes that there is no institutional vision for influencing public policy, in contrast with other areas of work that do have an institutional vision, such as peace-building. When it came to the education funding project, it was planned that phase I would begin the institutional strengthening of CNPRE-COPMAGUA, in the following aspects: a) the processes of research and knowledge production; b) increasing the capacity for dialogue and negotiations; and c) advocacy and impact on public policy. The IDRC team is aware that, in the wake of the first phase, the expected changes in public policies have not occurred, although capacity building in COPMAGUA was one of the positive results of IDRC. On this point, IDRC officers say that researchers tend not to influence decision-making directly in most countries. This depends on the context and on macro-political factors. In Guatemala the context is less predictable than they expected. Their analysis was based on the assumption that there would be progress with the Fiscal Pact, and that it would have the backing of the majority of political and social players. In this respect, one of the lessons is that there are factors beyond control that can affect the success of a research project that attempts to influence public policy. Nevertheless, it is felt that progress has been made in giving civil society groups the capacity to use research for influencing public policies.

Moreover, another topic that emerges from the lessons learned is the debate as to which are the best approaches for influencing public policy through research. One current of
thought favours supporting serious researchers who have sophisticated methodologies and who can dialogue with decision makers. The other current, by contrast, gives priority to those research communities that have grass-roots organizations, and argues that their success depends on their ability to create spaces for dialogue. The answer to this debate will in large measure determine how disadvantaged groups or grass-roots organizations will have an influence on government decisions.

For the research team, the objective of influencing policy was clearly stated. Yet there were problems of know-how. The team distinguished between the different stages of the process of research, proposal generation, and policy advocacy. The first activities constitute a technical and scientific dimension, while the last one constitutes a political dimension. The fact of having good research does not mean that the proposals derived from the findings can be implemented with the same results. In negotiations there are different players that must be taken into account: civil society organizations, the government in its various embodiments and geographic levels, as well as international agencies. Each one of these players will generally demand differentiated strategies, depending on the degree of openness, receptivity and flexibility of the counterparts.

The main obstacles that appeared in the research can be summarized under three aspects. The first obstacle has to do with access to reliable sources of information. Databases, education statistics and budget figures generally take no consideration of ethnic and gender issues. Processed information usually makes no distinction between education indicators for men and women and it is only this year that education statistics will begin to describe the ethnic origin of the student population. This same situation applies to information on the national budget. Budgetary categories are too general for purposes of a specific analysis of education investment in terms of gender or programs for indigenous people.

The second obstacle has to do with the tight deadlines for completing the study and the proposal and for having an impact on the education budget in the two desired aspects: increasing the education budget as a percentage of GDP, and restructuring the budget internally in favour of indigenous people and women. On this point, the project team insists that it takes more time to present proposals properly, to build strategic alliances, to inform and mobilize key sectors of the population, and to negotiate with the government through the Executive Organ (Ministry of Education, SEGEPLAN and the Ministry of Finance) and the Legislature, for purposes of influencing policy.

In the third place, there was some difficulty in identifying decision makers in the field of education finance policy, because of the dynamics of national politics in recent years, with the constant turnover in senior government positions and a steady shift of power from the executive to the legislative branch. When it comes to the Ministry of Education, there were changes in the policymaking and middle management levels, which saw the appointment of four directors of the Education Planning Unit in less than 18 months, and changes in other key directors of the ministry. Moreover, the draft budget prepared in the Ministry of Education was not only scrutinized and cut by the Ministry of Finance, but was completely overhauled by the Finance Committee of Congress. In some cases the
Congress cut financing for programs that were priorities for the previous government, such as the National Program for Educational Self-management (PRONADE) or the literacy program. Amendments to the National Budget Act had a real influence on the content of educational policy. Both the research team and CNPRE-COPMAGUA were too weak in their efforts to lobby and communicate with the Congress.

In a similar vein, there was a lack of communication and negotiation with international agencies, which to some extent can have an influence on educational policy and on the direction of funding for priority education programs and projects. For example, the technical team responsible for the 2001 United Nations Human Development Report focused its research on the financing of human development, but it was unaware of the work done by CNPRE-COPMAGUA. Another example can be found in the relations with international agencies supporting the peace process in the context of the Advisory Group, which submitted a proposal of financial support for education programs that were not covered in the CNPRE-COPMAGUA proposal. This statement can be corroborated with the case of the PRONADE expansion project as proposed by the World Bank.

Perceptions as to who makes policy in Guatemala vary greatly: for some this depends on the content and the sector in question, and the historical timing. As well, responses depend on the experience, gender, ethnic group and sectoral positioning of the respondent. When it comes to the perception of who makes policy in the field of education finance, four key players are cited constantly. The first is the Government of Guatemala. The executive exerts influence through the Ministries of Finance and Education, as well as through SEGEPLAN. In these cases, ministers and senior officials are mentioned, together with advisers and technocrats. To a lesser degree, influence is ascribed to certain technical institutions that concern themselves with qualitative aspects, such as SIMAC, DICADE and DIGEBI. But currently, it is the legislative branch that is identified as having the greatest policy clout, primarily because of the pressure exerted by the majority party, the FRG. In contrast to previous years, the executive branch carries less weight on issues relating to education and its financing.

A constant observation is that government influence in education policy generally betrays inconsistency and that it changes every time a new party comes to power. The impression is that every four years there will be a change in priorities, and in the case of education this is serious because educational activities take a long time to achieve their desired effect.

The second group of players identified as having influence in policy formulation is the business sector, represented by the CACIF and the Armed Forces. While the private sector is considered to have greater influence in economic policy, it is argued that in recent years the elites in the economic sectors have shown more interest in education issues, and especially in policies tending toward the privatization of education. As to the Armed Forces, there is concern over their growing intrusion in areas such as school breakfast and lunch programs, in the distribution of books to school libraries, and in other forms of supplementary assistance.
The third player identified is the international community and agencies. The international community can have a positive influence on policy, particularly in cases such as Guatemala where the dynamics of confrontation demanded outside players to realign the conditions that generated the domestic armed conflict. In this same context, the Interagency Group on Education was enlisted to unite the various donors interested in education, in order to build strategic alliances and support for the Education Reform as part of the Peace Accords. Frequent mention was made of bodies such as the UNDP, UNICEF, USAID and PREAL.

Some people have the perception that, in the absence of any strong counterpart in the Ministry of Education, international agencies such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank are imposing global agendas that do not coincide with the needs of the Guatemalan people or with the agendas of indigenous peoples and women's groups in Guatemala. In some cases, it has been found that educational policies and their financing are no longer defined in the country itself. National governments generally have very little manoeuvring room, and generally the actions they undertake at the educational level are superficial, which renders them almost irrelevant. This is very important if we consider that most of the capital funding for education comes from loans and donations. By contrast, as IDRC officials see it, the World Bank has been supporting the keystones of educational reform through the PRONADE program. Nevertheless, they recognize that there is a discrepancy between the line taken by civil society and the United Nations and that of the international development banks.

The fourth player is Guatemalan civil society, which channels all the pressures coming from universities, research centres, women's groups, ethnic organizations, environmentalists and other development NGOs. Within civil society there are two research centres that are regarded as having considerable influence on policy, and whose interests coincide with those of the private sector: these are CIEN and ASIES. These groups have broad experience in research and policy advocacy. On the other hand, people speak of the CCRE as uniting several sectors, although it is recognized as weak because it reports directly to the Minister of Education. Similarly, there is recognition of the potential of the municipal education councils, which provide a link between civil society and local governments, as described earlier in this report. Women's organizations are said to have gained political ground. Indigenous leaders have said that there is now a greater awareness of discrimination against women, even suggesting that women now enjoy greater participation and political influence than do indigenous people. Within civil society there are indigenous pressure groups, but they are weak in comparison to other groups, and are therefore most vulnerable to discrimination.

It should be noted that these players maintain a dynamic system of interrelationships. Some have struck alliances with the government and the private sector in issues relating to ethnic and gender discrimination. These alliances, however, do not hold up when it comes to other policy issues such as economic and fiscal affairs. In other cases, people point to alliances that certain conservative players in civil society have developed with the private sector and with international agencies like the World Bank and the IDB. The union movement and the political parties are said to have little influence in determining
and negotiating public policies. It is said that there are great distances between players with respect to some issues, particularly those relating to intercultural bilingual education. In any case, we may say that the perception of who influences policy depends on the economic, political, national and international context.

On the other hand, some of the people interviewed insist that the formulation of sound public policy is generally associated with three basic characteristics: (a) the level of participation among the different players referred to above. Important here is the emerging concept of civil society, which evokes different interpretations on the part of those interviewed. There are differences over the incorporation of the private sector and business, and of the churches in their various denominations. There is also a difference in terms of the level of geographic participation. For some, decentralization and participation by rural communities are essential, while for others policy is basically an urban and technocratic affair. (b) the processes entailed in policy formulation. People describe these actions to include research and diagnosis, preparation of proposals, negotiation and consensus, formulation and dissemination of policies and laws, provision and evaluation of financing. (c) Reference is also made to the time horizon of public policies, to eliminate what has been called the "temporal inconsistency" of policies. In this respect, a sound public policy must be State policy and it must be long-term. According to the interviewees, policies formulated in this way would be able to give direction to short and medium-term actions.

3. Principal findings about the results and developments during the project

The project on financing of education in Guatemala had three general objectives. The first was to conduct an analysis from the indigenous and gender perspective of the planning and execution of the education budget, in order to formulate proposals for the Education Reform. To meet this objective, the project called for a research report. The specific objectives were to gather documentary and field data on the education budget, to identify weaknesses in the education budget structure, and to pinpoint target population sectors and geographic areas for educational investment. The second general objective was to formulate a proposal, from the indigenous perspective, to influence budgetary planning and execution in the context of the Education Reform and the long-term National Education Plan. The specific objectives were to identify concrete mechanisms for education financing in the context of the Fiscal Pact and the Peace Accords, to serve as the foundation for the financing proposal. Finally, the project was to influence policy by enhancing the quality of the proposals submitted by delegates of the CNPRE-COPMAGUA, by reinforcing indigenous participation in the Education Reform forums. It is important to note that public policy advocacy was restricted to publicizing the proposal to civil society.

As can be seen, the original emphasis was on the ethnic theme, but during the course of the project its themes and perspectives were broadened to include gender equity as another component of analysis. This constituted a fundamental amendment to the concept and design of the project.
The outputs expected from the project were produced. A report was published, entitled "Financing of Education in Guatemala", with several analyses of education budget planning and execution, and projections containing a disaggregation (to the extent possible) of investment by gender and ethnic group. A proposal, entitled "Proposal for the financing of education in Guatemala with an emphasis on ethnic and gender equity", was also published. Finally, the research results and the proposal were delivered at a public event in the presence of the Minister of Education and the CCRE.

According to the IDRC reports consulted, the quality of the project's outputs exceeded expectations. They recognize, however, that the study did not have much analytical depth, but was primarily descriptive in nature. The proposal itself also lacked depth, and had difficulty in casting some of its recommendations in terms of macroeconomic categories. According to members of CNPRE-COPMAGUA the objectives were achieved satisfactorily, despite certain limitations that they themselves recognize.

The CNPRE-COPMAGUA team, like the other players interviewed, recognize that the dissemination strategy was very weak and that they did not have a proper plan to forge broader partnerships with the various indigenous groups in Guatemala. The partnerships were very specific and their context was highly focused. This was true of the alliances in the CCRE and in the Gran Campaña, where the proposals were more easily negotiated with the teachers' union and the University of San Carlos of Guatemala (USAC). This situation was due, among other things, to the lack of experience and the technical and financial limitations of CNPRE-COPMAGUA. The research team itself did not feel that it was involved in the dissemination strategies.

The weaknesses in terms of outreach and dissemination were further highlighted by the fact that there was no specific strategy targeted at women's groups, or any attempt to build a broader alliance on gender and ethnic equity. The communications strategy placed no particular emphasis on women's groups. In general, the absence of strategies for reaching women's groups was repeated with respect to men's groups.

It was towards the technical staff of the CNPRE-COPMAGUA, ANM and the Ministry of Education that the influence was directed. At the same time, people who bring pressure on government through civil society organizations, such as members of the CCRE and the Gran Campaña, were made more aware of the need to incorporate ethnic and gender issues into the education budget. The CNPRE-COPMAGUA believes that having more influence does not necessarily mean an immediate budgetary increase, but rather a gradual process of generating awareness and having an impact over the medium and longer terms. It is obvious that there was no proper approach made to the Congress, or to officials of SEGEPLAN and the Ministry of Finance.

In terms of the lessons learned by the research team, they point in the first place to a growing understanding of the rationale underlying financial programs and qualitative programming in education. The qualitative analysis of the education sector required the establishment of goals and effective financial programming, which in turn demanded new concepts and new approaches. In addition, with respect to education funding, there was a
favourable environment for communication and negotiation with various players in civil society. The research group also noted that it was very difficult, but at the same time very instructive, to address financial analysis from the gender perspective. There is a methodological vacuum when it comes to evaluating the budget from this viewpoint.

One of the fundamental lessons has to do with the process of giving legitimacy to policy by making it responsive to the national interest and not only to sectoral and party groups. This requires skills of a different kind in order to have political influence. In turn, this involves a process of learning how to simplify the communication of complex qualitative analyses and hard data taken from the budget and education statistics.

The team also learned to prioritize issues, to identify the "who, what and how" of preparing and executing the budget. They also deepened their skills in preparing "power maps" for influencing policy, although these still have to be refined.

But the greatest learning was represented by the acquisition and strengthening of the capacities of CNPRE-COPMAGUA and the research group, for justifying and preparing antidiscrimination policies. They were thereby able to generate information and produce knowledge, both in the research and in the proposal. They learned to introduce new concepts and issues on the agenda for debate by players who had previously little to say about the issue. In this respect, they were even able to influence other research centres, which in general housed most of the capacity to do research and to propose courses of action to the government relating to public policy.

IDRC program officers say they learned some fundamental lessons especially about working with the grass-roots indigenous organizations. The research that IDRC supports is generally done in research centres with individuals who have high levels of academic qualifications and who are not accustomed to working with grass-roots groups. The vision of IDRC officers regarding research influencing policy has been strengthened through the process of the Education Reform in the context of the Peace Accords. They have also learned about the implications that the social and political complexities of Guatemala can have in terms of the institutional debate within IDRC.

The major changes during the project were of a technical nature, especially in the institutional strengthening of CNPRE-COPMAGUA. The study and the proposal took about one year, which means that the political, economic and social impact was not evident in the short run. Nevertheless, the fact that marginalized sectors are participating more actively in the public policy debate is recognized as a step forward for Guatemalan democracy. Civil society in Guatemala is thereby building a basis for legitimizing the conduct of government with the opening of negotiation to the indigenous movement and the women's sector, breaking down the monopoly of power groups and of technical and scientific analysis by traditional sectors.

4. Principal developments subsequent to completion of the project
Immediately after the project was concluded, with the public delivery of the research results and the financing proposal, there was a six-month period (June – December 2001) in which there was no IDRC financial support. This project-less period ran from June to December 2001. IDRC cooperation then recommenced for the period between January and December 2002. During the intervening time, CNPRE-COPMAGUA continued its work on key activities, keeping up the dialogue with the Ministry of Finance, the CCRE and other sectors in civil society to influence social spending policy and to secure an increase in the education budget. The main activities that were conducted can be grouped in five areas:

a) The proposal prepared by civil society groups in the *Gran Campaña* was given content. This effort resulted in a proposal for "Education, a challenge for Guatemala: proposal for increasing the amount and quality of spending by the Ministry of Education in 2002 with a long-term vision", which was publicly released in August 2001. The importance of this effort can be seen in several aspects. In the first place, the petitions for increasing the education budget, which were drawn up in 1999 with no rationale or indication as to where investment should go, now became a formal proposal based on the research and proposal of CNPRE-COPMAGUA. This meant that the *Gran Campaña* found in the study a way to substantiate the proposal with hard data, and a means to facilitate political dialogue by setting out precise budgetary allocations, programs and investment projects, as well as budgetary decentralization proposals. The document published by the *Gran Campaña* repeats verbatim some key sections of the CNPRE-COPMAGUA research and proposal. In the second place, the research results would be channelled through other, unexplored mechanisms which, in terms of public opinion, carry more weight than the positions of groups such as the teachers’ unions and the CCRE with which alliances were traditionally constructed. In this respect, the *Gran Campaña* was led by the Social Research and Studies Association, ASIES, which embraces organizations with great influence in the private sector, the principal communications media, international agencies, NGOs and research centres that are not part of the Peace Commission, responsible for monitoring the Education Reform. In the third place, they were able to overcome the limitation inherent in attempting to disseminate the results of the research to a broader national audience, in the face of other viewpoints that do not necessarily recognize with the same intensity the need to analyze the national budget from an ethnic and gender viewpoint and to propose increases that imply redirecting much of education spending towards equity.

b) In the second place, in November 2001 the CNPRE-COPMAGUA and the National Teachers’ Assembly, ANM, held a public demonstration demanding that Congress assign funds to the Ministry of Education to provide for greater coverage, better quality and stronger public education. They asked that the ministry's budget should be no less than Q4 billion in support of the Education Reform and the Intercultural Bilingual

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Education Program. They also called for cuts in the Defence Ministry budget\textsuperscript{27}. This petition was consistent with the CNPRE-COPMAGUA proposal, which estimated the budget for 2002 at Q4.072 billion\textsuperscript{28}. The influence of the CNPRE-COPMAGUA was such that the national teachers’ association, with 32 departmental and national organizations, recognized for the first time that the education budget must be increased in order to invest in the Intercultural Bilingual Education Program and to improve the quality of education. Traditionally, since the mid-1980s, the teachers’ unions had conditioned their support for larger education budgets on an increase in their salaries. In political terms, the capacity generated by the CNPRE-COPMAGUA research provided support for grass-roots organizations that lacked the capacity to put forward an agenda for debate on education policy.

c) The alliance between CNPRE-COPMAGUA and the CCRE was strengthened. The CCRE agreed in November 2001 to call on the Congress to approve a budget for 2002 consistent with the CNPRE-COPMAGUA proposals, and it urged that the budgetary increase must emphasize priority programs under the Education Reform, especially those for human resource development, curriculum and textbook reform, citizen participation through the Education Councils, scholarships for girls, and strengthening of Intercultural Bilingual Education\textsuperscript{29}. The CCRE manifesto also stressed the need for equity in education, and asked that Congress should earmark at least Q4 billion for this purpose in the year 2002. This proposal was also based on the CNPRE-COPMAGUA research\textsuperscript{30}.

d) During this time progress was made in specifying, negotiating and approving the project on "Financing of Education Reform in the Short and Medium Term", which CNPRE-COPMAGUA submitted to IDRC as the second phase. The proposed objectives were aimed at following up the research and the proposal, updating the analysis on research funding, preparing recommendations on the Education Reform, lobbying government to influence policy and strengthening the capacity of CNPRE-COPMAGUA, in terms of education financing\textsuperscript{31}. This second phase drew upon the lessons learned in the first project, adapting them to the shifting context\textsuperscript{32}. It was recognized that the strategy for carrying out the second phase would require that CNPRE-COPMAGUA develop links not only with the Ministry of Education but also with the Technical Directorate of the Budget, and that it would have to develop closer relations with the Congress, in light of the fact that, under the FRG administration, political power had shifted from the Executive to the Legislature, and that it was the Congress, not the President, that would decide any increase in education funding. The CNPRE-COPMAGUA showed particular interest in training for indigenous, female and male leaders of grass-roots organizations.

\textsuperscript{27} See articles in \textit{El Periódico} and \textit{Prensa Libre} on CNPRE-COPMAGUA and ANM campaigns, November 15, 2001.

\textsuperscript{28} CNPRE-COPMAGUA (2001), Proposal for financing education in Guatemala with the emphasis on ethnic and gender equity, Guatemala, Page 31.

\textsuperscript{29} See Minutes of the CCRE Special Session, Wednesday, November 14, 2001.

\textsuperscript{30} CCRE, Manifesto on Increasing the Education Budget, Nov. 23, 2001, in \textit{La Hora, Prensa Libre} and \textit{El Periódico}.


\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, page 7.
By July of this year (2002), five of the 15 scheduled workshops for training civil society had been held.\textsuperscript{33}

Negotiations with the education ministry were conducted directly with the Minister, who on two occasions declared his willingness to create a bipartite commission to discuss the CNPRE-COPMAGUA proposal. From the Ministry’s side, the commission members would be the Senior Adviser on finance and the Director of the Financial Administration Unit of the Ministry of Education (UDAF). This offer was made first in May 2001, and a second time in March 2002. However, in the interview with the ministry’s financial adviser, at the end of June, he was unaware of the commission, nor did he know anything about the CNPRE-COPMAGUA research and proposal. The director of the UDAF said the same thing. In March 2002, an agreement was struck with the lawyers Raxché Demetrio Rodríguez Guaján and Edgar Barillas to coordinate work on the funding proposal by the General Directorate for Bilingual Education (DIGEBI) and the Education Quality and Development Division (DICADE)\textsuperscript{34}. In fact, professional development started on June 3, 2002, involving 61,160 teachers. The training program began in May, with 323 facilitators, and 428 centres were opened in all municipalities of the country, with the support and recognition of the University of San Carlos (USAC), the Mariano Gálvez University (UMG) and the Universidad Panamericana\textsuperscript{35}. As well, thought was given to coordinating work on the curriculum reform, which involves changing the structure, responsibilities and contents of education to meet the demands of cultural diversity in Guatemala, and to foster science and technology, productivity, gender equity and environmental protection\textsuperscript{36}. The proposal\textsuperscript{37} was put to consultation with indigenous organizations, NGOs, research centres, international organizations, universities, experts from the education development units of the departmental education divisions (UDEs), administrative coordinators, teaching coordinators, supervisors and 331 municipal education councils, during the months of July and August 2002\textsuperscript{38}.

One of the constant difficulties in the Education Reform is the financing and the decision-making process required to carry it out. The negotiation and planning of funding for Education Reform activities are especially strategic when it comes to implementing programs that will guarantee ethnic and gender equity in terms of access, retaining students in school, and quality improvement. It must be recognized that, generally speaking, the directors of DICADE and DIGEBI have limited room for participation in programming the budget for the Ministry of Education. The budget approved for 2002 contained no funding for professional development, and so transfers between budget


\textsuperscript{34} CNPRE-COPMAGUA (2002). Summary of Main Interviews and Agreements. Guatemala.

\textsuperscript{35} Education Quality and Development Division, DICADE (2002). Report on Follow-up and Facilitation Workshops at the Departmental Level of the Professional Development Program, Guatemala.


items amounting to Q21.5 million were requested for this purpose. Decisions on such transfers are made by the Minister himself, and his financial team. As well, the funds remaining in the World Bank project (Support for Educational Reform) have been reviewed and extended for one more year. The amount invested is Q1.4 million.

e) One of the factors that presented some difficulty during the time between completion of the first project and commencement of the second was that the research team was disbanded, as a result of lack of funds for continuing the research. This meant that CNPRE-COPMAGUA members who were trying to win public support for ethnic and gender equity in the national budget were limited to working with research results distilled in documents, and were unable to use ongoing research as a way of constantly updating knowledge and arguments for amending education financing policy. Consequently, the research team showed itself unfamiliar with strategy for communicating and disseminating research, and the social division of labour in the first project therefore betrayed a divorce between the research and the processes of political information and negotiation.

While it is true that the research results and the proposal have made it possible to reach out to sectors of civil society, the CCRE and the Ministry of Education, and to provide support to key players on education finance issues, dissemination has been weak. The outreach strategy focused on three aspects. The first was to invite key players who were consulted during the research and the preparation of the proposal, delegates to the Dialog and Consensus on Education Reform and members of the municipal and departmental Provisional Education Councils, members of the CCRE, research centres, international agencies and international community. In addition to personal invitations, public announcements were issued through the newspapers[^39], inviting people to attend the ceremony on May 2, 2001, at which COPMAGUA was to hand over the report to the Minister of Education and the CCRE. The third outreach strategy was to send the research reports and the proposal to various institutions and members of Guatemalan society[^40].

Various leaders of indigenous research and development organizations said they were unaware of efforts to publicize the research. In some cases, the information was sent to leaders who had already completed their mandate in organizations such as the National Council on Mayan Education (CNEM) and the Association of Mayan Languages of Guatemalan (ALMG). It is clear that the strategy failed to take account of changes in indigenous organizations and in civil society in general resulting from the play of democratic procedures in governmental and nongovernmental institutions. International agencies also seemed to be unaware. For example, the coordinating body for international agencies and organizations involved in education, which includes

[^39]: There were six such publications, one on April 27, two on April 28, and three on April 30, 2001, in mass circulation newspapers: *Prensa Libre, Nuestro Diario* and *El Periódico*.
[^40]: After reviewing the mailing list for the reports, it was found that the documents were distributed in the following manner: 29 individuals in research centres and technical offices of the Ministry of Education, 20 communications media, 11 embassies, 14 members of the CNPRE, 5 university rectors, 43 members of the CCRE, 35 international agencies, and 50 documentation centres: *Red de Centros de Documentación* (public documentation centres network).
UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, MINUGUA, USAID, OAS, IDB, World Bank, GTZ, and the European Union, known as the "Interagency Group on Education", declared that they had not discussed "a proposal and a study so relevant for the country". Similarly, the proposal for funding education programs under the Advisory Group, which was made in 2002 in Washington, bears no direct relation to the COPMAGUA proposal. The same can be said of bodies such as the CAAP and the Fiscal Pact Monitoring Commission, which reported that they had received the document, but had never been approached to discuss the education funding proposal. The same situation applies with the same players in terms of what happened after the project was concluded. This tendency was also observed in some government entities, such as DIGEBI, UPE, the financial adviser to the Minister of Education and the Director of the UDAF.

In comparison with other research initiatives, such as the Gran Campaña, the studies in which the CIEN was involved, such as "Private Education and Public Policy in Latin America" and "Report on Educational Progress in Guatemala", under the Program to Promote Educational Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean (PREAL) or the Guatemala Te Quiero Feliz ("Guatemala I want you to be happy") campaign, sponsored by the National Advertising Council (CNP), it is clear that, although these research processes did not have the same degree of seriousness and depth, they did have an impact on public opinion, as can be seen in the publicity carried in the communications media: the press, radio, television and Internet. These results reflect the strategic approach of institutions such as ASIES, CIEN and the CNP, and the building of partnerships with sectors that have real power in Guatemalan society.

Thus, various key players, both those who are aware of the research and the proposal and those who are not, feel that one of the lessons learned from this research is the need to develop information, dissemination and communication strategies. On this point, COPMAGUA has established partnerships with the Washington Office for Latin America (WOLA), which has expertise in social communication. Yet in practice, the experiment fell short in terms of the quality of the research and the effects that it might have on Guatemalan policy. The leaders of the Gran Campaña point out that in building their partnerships they included the media among the seventy-seven organizations in their umbrella organization, something that CNPRE-COPMAGUA did not do.

A working meeting was held with the Mesoamerican Regional Research Centre (CIRMA), specifically on the project Porqué estamos como estamos? ("Why are we as we are?") , which IDRC is supporting. That meeting was called by IDRC program officers for Guatemala in an effort to coordinate ongoing research efforts and generate partnerships for achieving the objectives of both projects. As a result of this meeting, the research reports and the proposal of CNPRE-COPMAGUA were discussed in the "Educational Convergence" group that brings together the country's principal research centres involved in Education Reform projects, and also includes the Ministry of Education, ex officio. On this account, the research was discussed by delegates of the following institutions: Asociación para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales (AVANCSO), ASIES, CIRMA, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), Universidad Rafael Landívar URL-EDUMAYA, Fundación Rigoberta Menchú Tum, the
Organismo Naleb’ and the Centro de Documentación e Investigación Maya (CEDIM). This laid the ground for including a portion of the research in the materials and statements of *Gran Campaña*, given that most of these institutions are members of that movement. Finally, the CNPRE-COPMAGUA study was referred to in the presentation and publication of the CIRMA project.

In terms of the way the research results were used, many institutions took advantage of the findings. In the first place, CNPRE-COPMAGUA used the results of the research to prepare a proposal for increasing the budget in order to support ethnic and gender equity. As well, the results constituted the central thrust of the training that COPMAGUA provides for grassroots organizations in the interior of the country. That training included women's organizations. On the other hand, the revision of the proposal of the *Gran Campaña*, prepared by a group of experts from the Universidad del Valle de Guatemala (UVG), the UMG, ASIES, URL, CNEM and FUNRURAL, relied heavily on the CNPRE-COPMAGUA results and the proposal for education financing. That proposal reproduces exactly the investment priorities and suggestions of specific amounts for the year 2004, to reach 3.13 percent of GDP.\(^{41}\)

Another body that used the results was the CCRE. This commission is responsible for promoting, legitimizing and validating the process of Education Reform, and providing support to the Ministry of Education, according to the commitment on education and training in the Accord on Socioeconomic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation, under the Peace Accords. As well, this commission has a mandate to provide follow-up to the National, Departmental and Municipal Dialogue and Consensus, the conclusions of which repeatedly requested annual increases in the budget for the Ministry of Education. Yet this body does not have the capacity to undertake studies itself, but must resort to consulting services, using whatever scarce funds may be allocated to it in the national budget, and donations from international agencies. In recent years it has been allocated Q500,000 for its operations. Thanks to consulting services, the CCRE has produced proposals on human resources, intercultural education, curriculum reform, and preparation of the long-term plans. The latter constituted one of the commission's priorities. This project is being supported primarily by the Spanish government, and by the inputs that the research and proposal on education funding by CNPRE-COPMAGUA might contribute. A preliminary version of the long-term plans was prepared in 1999 during the PAN government. Yet the plan has a number of technical weaknesses and problems with determining priorities for the next 20 years. The main shortcoming of the preliminary long-term plan is that it has no proposals for increasing the education budget, and no estimates of specific costs for carrying out the policies advocated in it\(^ {42}\). The support that CNPRE-COPMAGUA research has given the CCRE, then, offers the conditions for consolidating civil society's participation in determining long-term education policies, and especially in meeting the demand of civil society groups, particularly women and indigenous peoples, for increasing the education budget and

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steering the Education Reform toward groups that are regularly marginalized by the national education system.

The research results and the proposal have been used as reference materials in courses at several universities in the country. For example, at the UVG, the findings have been part of the program for three courses (education administration, the economics of education, legislation and educational policy) leading to a degree in education. In the URL, the research results were presented at the Eighth Meeting of Education Researchers of Guatemala, held on July 11, 2002. In cases where the universities used the research results, there was a keen interest to learn more details about the report and the proposal for education financing. Immediate thought should be given to a special communication targeted at the universities, on the findings and the importance of the issue.

Although the Minister of Education recognized the CNPRE-COPMAGUA research results and its proposal, and although there was some coincidence between that proposal and the items in the draft budget for 2002 that the Ministry of Education sent to the Ministry of Finance, there is evidence to show that the Financial Adviser to the Minister of Education, the Director of the UPE and the Director of UDAF made no use of the study in preparing the draft budget. This is consistent with the failure of the Minister of Education to fulfill his commitment to CNPRE-COPMAGUA, mentioned earlier, to establish a bipartite technical commission.

A number of NGOs consulted, including Mayan organizations, research centres and international agencies, indicated that they had not used the results of the research. They pointed out, however, that these results were used in the Gran Campaña. On this point, the Mayan organizations cited the need for building closer partnerships for generating, preparing and publicizing the proposal, given that CNPRE-COPMAGUA essentially had the lead. Other agencies such as MINUGUA made no use of the study, considering that progress reports on the Peace Accords should refer to primary sources. In fact, there is a discrepancy between the data reported by MINUGUA and those in the CNPRE-COPMAGUA report, especially with respect to the military budget. CNPRE-COPMAGUA reports Q28 million, while the MINUGUA figure is Q1 billion. This approved budget does not consider other transfers that have been made, amounting to Q1.020 billion. As well, there are corrections that must be made to the calculations in the CNPRE-COPMAGUA research report, particularly at pp. 21 and 27. Nevertheless, MINUGUA recognizes the importance of the CNPRE-COPMAGUA study and the proposal.

Of the four members of the research team - Francisco Cabrera Romero, Project Director; Miguel Angel Barrios, Senior Consultant; Susanne Gauster, researcher; and Luisa Maria Salas Bedoya, a member of the technical team - the last two are no longer working on the project in its second phase. In the case of Susanne, she is now working on another IDRC research project in support of the National Coordination Office of Peasants’ Federations (CENOC) on land ownership problems. The other person gave up her research work when it was 70 percent completed. The project coordinator has remained as a managing

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member of CNPRE-COPMAGUA. Miguel Angel Barrios came back to the project after an absence between the first and second phases. During this time, he worked in the Ministry of Finance and the Integrated Financial Administration System office (SIAF).

The main players who are still involved in the research work and in preparing the proposal are Francisco Cabrera, who is serving as project coordinator, and Miguel Angel Barrios, who serves as senior consultant on education financing. Francisco Cabrera's function is to link the technical and the policy aspects of the research. As project coordinator, his task is to facilitate the work of the researchers, through a process of participation and interchange with civil society organizations. Because of his lead position in the CCRE, where he chairs the plenary and the executive council, he is responsible for coordinating discussion and negotiation of the research and the reform proposals with various organizations, universities and indigenous peoples groups. He is also responsible for negotiating the proposal with the Ministry of Education and for establishing relations with members of Congress, and for communication with IDRC in Canada. While it is true that Francisco Cabrera has a leadership position in COPMAGUA, the umbrella organization for the CNPRE, he is accountable to the CNPRE for progress with the project, and for the strategies to be developed. In this respect, he takes decisions in the context of a collegial body and through a discussion process that is directly supervised by Prof. Domingo Sanchez Brito, the head of CNPRE.

Miguel Angel Barrios is the senior consultant on education finance, and his function has been essentially in research and in updating the education finance proposals, maintaining communication with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance to obtain information and discuss the education financing proposals. His participation in both phases guarantees continuity in the development of the research and the education financing proposal. In addition, he has in the past held key positions in the Ministry of Education and in the Ministry of Finance.

The impact of the research and the proposal for financing education from an ethnic and gender viewpoint, prepared by CNPRE-COPMAGUA, was affected by a series of events in the realms of politics, economics and education. There is no doubt that the most negative factor affecting the influence of the research conducted by CNPRE-COPMAGUA was the failure on the part of the Guatemalan government (both the executive and the legislature) to fulfill the political commitments under the Fiscal Pact. Immediately after the various sectors of Guatemalan civil society had accepted the terms, principles and commitments of the Fiscal Pact, serious tensions erupted in May 2000 and the pact broke down. The divisions that appeared among the social sectors and groups organized in the COS and the differences between the Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations (CACIF) and the FRG government, which claimed that it had been excluded from the negotiation process, led to the breakdown of the Fiscal Pact, culminating in the issuance of Government Decree 44-
2000, imposing an increase in the Value Added Tax (VAT, Spanish IVA), eliminating privileges and exemptions for the private sector, and making tax fraud a crime.\(^{44}\)

Immediate efforts were made to rescue the political accords of the Fiscal Pact, and in June 2000 the Vice President of the Republic, in the presence and with the support of the CAAP and the MINUGUA, convened the CACIF and the COS. In the end, the civil society representation in the COS split apart, and the clash between the CACIF and the government reached the boiling point. The government was fixated on fulfilling the agreement with the International Monetary Fund, which called for maintaining macroeconomic stability and disciplines to control the fiscal deficit, meaning that the government's interest in the Fiscal Pact shifted towards tax collection. Yet to date it has failed to achieve the goals of raising tax revenues to 12 percent and increasing social expenditure, particularly on health and education.

The deadlock in the Fiscal Pact had a negative impact on the research work and the proposal for financing education from a gender and ethnic perspective. The investment funds that the Guatemalan government puts into education did not increase in terms of GDP, nor was there any change in the funds invested in projects and programs targeted at indigenous peoples or promoting gender equity. The failure to meet the target of increasing government revenues, and the persistent inefficiency in terms of tax collection and optimizing budgetary expenditure, meant that debate now focused on distributing scarce resources among a multitude of educational needs, which required setting priorities for social spending. Unfortunately the issue was resolved by maintaining the budgetary structure unchanged from previous years. In addition, funds were transferred in favour of spending by the Ministry of Defence. Budgetary transfers sapped the education sector's funding by Q94 million.\(^{45}\)

Another factor that impacted the project negatively was the reluctance of the Ministry of Education and the Government of Guatemala to continue with the process of dialogue and public negotiation on educational policy through the Municipal, Departmental and National Education Councils\(^{46}\). In fact, the Dialogue and Consensus efforts produced recognition that multicultural education and reflecting cultural differences and gender equity were two priorities for the education system. In this sense, the project hoped to base itself on reinforcing efforts to decentralize education and to strengthen participation by civil society, especially grassroots organizations representing women and indigenous people.

Despite the difficulties encountered in reactivating the Municipal, Departmental and National Councils under the Dialogue and Consensus for Education Reform, closer relations have been established by CNPRE-COPMAGUA and the CCRE with the

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national leadership of groups representing women, such as the Women's Forum, the Ombudsperson (Defensoría) for Mayan Women, and the Women's Secretariat. As can be seen in the list of women’s groups and in the training program for incorporating a gender perspective, the building of partnerships with women's groups is established as an action strategy.47

The third event that affected the CNPRE-COPMAGUA proposal was the national economic crisis sparked by the collapse of coffee prices. Following the addition in the 1990s of Vietnam to the group of coffee producing countries, overproduction reached a peak in 2001. According to the National Coffee Producers' Association (ANACAFE), exports from the 2001-2002 harvest will fall to 1.45 million quintals, representing a loss of $166.7 million with respect to the previous harvest. On top of this economic loss, jobs have also disappeared, and Guatemalan peasants are demanding land to supplement the incomes they used to earn through temporary work on the coffee plantations. It is expected that more than 100,000 jobs will be lost for this reason.

The CNPRE-COPMAGUA proposal for 2002 amounted to Q4.071 billion. This amount represents Q529 million more than the budget as projected in the CNPRE-COPMAGUA study, yet the amount actually approved by Congress for the Ministry of Education was Q2.881 billion. This means that the budget was short by Q1.190 billion, and is 30 percent less than expected. The contrast can be appreciated by the fact that total education spending in 2001 amounted to Q3.126 billion48. Comparing the 2001 budget with the 2002 budget, the decrease is Q245 million.

The problem of education financing is a cumulative one. The number of people, primarily indigenous and female, who are not being served by the primary education system is growing with the country’s natural population increase. The estimated annual rate of population increase for 2002 is 2.58 percent, and the overall fertility rate is 4.449. In 2001, the Guatemalan education system recorded a net enrolment rate of 41.3 percent at the pre-primary level, 85.1 percent at the primary level, 28.4 percent in the basic cycle of intermediate education, and 15.8 percent for the diversified cycle of intermediate education.50

As to the direction of education spending, it is very difficult to determine the impact of proposals for education financing in support of programs for promoting equity, since the budgetary categories themselves do not identify programs of this kind. In fact, the education ministry's budget uses such reference categories as: ordinary service programs, innovative modalities programs, supplementary assistance programs, and physical

47 CNPRE-COPMAGUA (2002). Training Program on Financing of Education; Guidelines for Incorporating the Gender Perspective in the Financing of the Education Reform: Short and Medium-term Possibilities; and Summary of Principal Interviews and Agreements. Guatemala.
49 National Statistics Institute (INE) and Latin American Centre for Demographics, CELADE (2002). Population Estimates and Projections, Guatemala
education programs. The "ordinary services" include bilingual programs at the pre-
primary and primary levels. "Supplementary assistance" includes such programs as
scholarships for girls. These categories however limit the possibilities of in-depth
analysis with respect to gender equity, since obviously a comprehensive education
proposal goes far beyond offering scholarships for girls. The situation is the same when
it comes to ethnic equity: again, bilingual education is not the only program that the
education system could offer to rebalance the situation of indigenous peoples in the
system.

As can be seen from Table No. 2, bilingual education had a budget of Q162 million in
2002. This represents 6 percent of the approved budget. It is interesting to note that
there was an increase over the year 2000, but a decrease of Q695,600 with respect to the
2001 level. The one item that continues to grow has to do with running the bureaucracy
of the DIGEBI: it is Q3 million higher than the year before.
Table No. 2
General Directorate of Bilingual Education
Budget Performance 2000-2002
Figures in Quetzals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Executed 2000</th>
<th>Executed 2001*</th>
<th>Approved 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>121,683,538</td>
<td>163,550,873</td>
<td>162,855,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-primary</td>
<td>22,167,684</td>
<td>34,208,267</td>
<td>34,541,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>96,494,990</td>
<td>125,249,911</td>
<td>120,442,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>3,020,864</td>
<td>4,092,695</td>
<td>7,872,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Preliminary figures

In the case of scholarships for girls, Table No. 3 shows that spending has risen significantly. Comparing the investment reported in relation to scholarships granted, it can be seen that investment nearly tripled in 2001. In 1999, there were 48,089 scholarships granted, while the figure for 2001 was 71,386. There are few studies demonstrating the impact of these programs on education for girls, but one of the best studies (covering the municipality of San Martin Jilotepeque in the Department of Chimaltenango, where 80 percent of the population is indigenous, according to the 1989 census) found that with the scholarship program for girls, 76.7 percent of recipients went on to higher grades in subsequent years, while the percentage of unassisted girls continuing their studies was only 56 percent.\textsuperscript{51}

Table No. 3
Scholarships for Rural Girls Program
Grants awarded and investment 1999-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grants awarded</td>
<td>48,089</td>
<td>58,089</td>
<td>71,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment (Q millions)</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5. Conclusions

1. It was an explicit and fundamental objective of the design of the education funding project that the research should have a direct impact on public policies. This objective was shared by the IDRC program officers and by the CNPRE-COPMAGUA research team and leadership. Yet for IDRC program officers there is still no institutional vision of the meaning and the scope of the influence of research processes and programs on public policies. As the CNPRE-COPMAGUA project team sees it, policy influence constitutes learning from the many factors involved in a project of this kind: conducting research that demands a constant updating of results, forming strategic alliances,

negotiating and communicating ideas, producing "influence maps" of and with political players in constantly changing contexts, and having to do all this within extremely tight deadlines.

2. In the case of the education funding project, the issues selected were generally relevant to the government and to civil society as a whole, especially as they related to combating ethnic and gender discrimination. These issues were also part of the Peace Accords agenda. Yet analytical difficulties arose, essentially because of two conditions. In the first place, conditions of inequity, discrimination and marginalization on ethnic and gender grounds also make themselves felt in the ways in which information on education and budgetary statistics is gathered, processed, disseminated and made available. Information policies also tend to render invisible the groups that suffer discrimination. In the second place, the innovative approach of combining fields such as budgetary and social investment policies, the education sector and ethnic and gender issues pose conceptual and methodological difficulties for researchers and decision makers.

3. The results to date offer some answers about the types of research and researchers that are selected for carrying out research projects designed to influence public policies. The CNPRE-COPMAGUA is an organization that combines the functions of a grass-roots body with those of a technical organization. It is not a social research centre in the conventional sense. The CNPRE-COPMAGUA has been a counterpart of the government in the Peace Commissions for the discussion and negotiation of issues such as constitutional reforms, land policies, education, indigenous women's rights, and sacred Mayan sites. Its selection as the counterpart was important also in supporting new kinds of interrelations between research and social action. In fact, research centres such as the Social Research and Studies Association and the University of San Carlos de Guatemala have been turning to the research results in order to justify and substantiate their proposals to increase the education budget. These dynamics can also be observed in the case of civil society bodies such as the Grand National Campaign for Education or the Advisory Commission on Education Reform, and other educational and indigenous organizations that have taken the results, and a portion of the proposals, as their own in making demands to the government.

4. There were a number of factors that influenced the course of the project, but perhaps the most complex ones were political instability and the constantly shifting operational conditions of the project. As in other countries of Latin America, Guatemala has suffered political instability sparked by the clash of interests between the government, the private sector and civil society. This phenomenon could be seen in a constant turnover of decision-makers and in the shift in the correlation of forces represented by transferring decision-making from the executive branch of government to the legislature. At the same time, deadlocks and setbacks under the Fiscal Pact altered the conditions and the prospects for increasing the education budget and titling it towards the elimination of gender and ethnic inequalities. In both cases, the project required deeper and more precise efforts at policy analysis in order to reposition its planned activities in a flexible and comprehensive manner.
5. The findings concerning the results and evolution of the project also pose questions about the timeframe within which research can be expected to have a concrete impact on policies. In the first phase of the education funding project, the execution period was approximately one year. In addition to conducting research and preparing a proposal in consultation with key stakeholders, the timing has to be adapted to the horizon over which the contents of the policy, in this case the budget, are prepared, discussed and approved. Even more important, though, is the fact that there can be very abrupt shifts in the dynamics and direction of public policy.

6. The gender issue, of course, was explicit in the proposal, yet there were evident conceptual and methodological difficulties. The team leading the project attempted to prepare relevant analyses and proposals, but they recognize that there were shortcomings in this regard. It was complicated enough to address the gender issue alone, and it was even more complex to combine it with issues relating to culture and ethnicity. The conceptual and methodological difficulties also complicated efforts to build alliances between groups representing the Mayan people and women.

7. Communication between researchers and decision makers proved to be a weak point. The same is true of the approach that was taken to disseminating the research results and proposals, which requires differentiation and segmentation of groups and players with whom it is hoped to interact, negotiate and exert influence. For research to have a policy influence there must be strategies for coordinating activities and targeting them at achieving concrete results: haphazard and unarticulated efforts will have no influence. Such problems of informing and shaping public opinion today fall under the concept of social communication, which is recognized as a specific field of expertise. Yet problems in putting together a communication strategy made it difficult to establish platforms for negotiation and to generate a common language among researchers, dialogue facilitators, and decision makers.

8. The education funding project seems to have had more impact in terms of the institutional strengthening of CNPRE-COPMAGUA, which has developed new capacities for conducting research and preparing proposals. Yet there were some gaps in the knowledge transferred from the research group to technical staff of the CNPRE-COPMAGUA. The project also broadened the debate and the agenda on Education Reform and on the priority of investing in education to eliminate disparities and marginalization among women and indigenous people in Guatemala. Progress of this kind, however, has not been reflected in the amendment or redesign of programs and policies.

9. It is clear that, thanks to the research project, Guatemala's indigenous people are in a better position to secure future changes in the structure of the country's budget for education policies, programs and projects. It is hoped that the second phase, now underway, will also strengthen the organized women's group in its alliances and its positioning. Yet such an outcome will demand IDRC support over a longer time horizon in order to have any concrete effect on national policy.
Persons interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Carlos Alfredo Escobar Armas</td>
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<td></td>
<td>President of ASIES</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Regina Cafaro de Moreno</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Coordinator of the ASIES Education team</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Marco Antonio de Paz</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Coordinator of the CNEM Executive Council</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Francisco Garrido</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Financial Adviser MI NEDUC</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Jacqueline de De León</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dean of the Faculty of Education, UVG</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Juan Alberto Fuentes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Coordinator, UNDP Human Development Program</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Thierry del Rue</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Coordinator of the economic and social area, MI NUGUA</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Domingo Sánchez Brito</td>
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<td></td>
<td>General Coordinator for COPMAGUA</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Carlos Ávalos</td>
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<td>CIDA in Guatemala</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Francisco Cabrera</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Project Director</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>Julia Richards</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Education Program Officer, USAID</td>
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<td>Víctor Manuel Cardona Molina</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Director of the UPE</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>Alvaro Pop</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Coordinator of the Project “¿Por qué estamos cómo estamos?” CIRMA</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Miguel Ángel Barrios</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Senior Adviser CNPRE/ COPMAGUA</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>Susanne Gauster</td>
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<td>Researcher, CNPRE-COPMAGUA</td>
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<td>16.</td>
<td>Jaime Roquel Chávez</td>
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<td>Deputy Director of DI GEBI</td>
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<td>Mayra Palencia</td>
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<td>Coordinator, Alianza por la Transparencia AI D</td>
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<td>18.</td>
<td>Juan Antonio Morán</td>
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<td>President ALMG</td>
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<td>19.</td>
<td>Colleen Duggan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>IDRC Program Officer</td>
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</table>
20. Stephen Baranyi  
   IDRC Program Officer

21. María del Carmen Aceña  
   Director of CIEN
Acronyms and Abbreviations

CIDA
Canadian International Development Agency
ALMG
Academia de Lenguas Mayas de Guatemala
Guatemalan Academy of Mayan Languages
ANACAFE
Asociación Nacional del Café
National Coffee Association
ANM
Asamblea Nacional del Magisterio
National Assembly of Teachers
ASIES
Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales
Social Research and Studies Association
ASIMAM
Asociación de Mujeres Mam Quetzaltenango
Mam Quetzaltenango Women’s Association
AVANCSO
Asociación para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales
Association for the Advancement of Social Sciences
IDB
Inter-American Development Bank
CAAP
Comisión de Acompañamiento de los Acuerdos de Paz
Commission for Follow-up to the Peace Accords
CACIF
Comité Coordinador de asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras
Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations
CCRE
Comisión Consultiva para la Reforma Educativa
Advisory Commission on Education Reform
CEDIM
Centro de Documentación e Investigación Maya
Mayan Documentation and Research Centre
CEG
Conferencia Episcopal de Guatemala
Conference of Bishops of Guatemala
CIEN
Centro de Investigaciones Económicas Nacionales
National Economic Research Centre
CIRMA
Centro de Investigaciones Regionales de Mesoamérica
Mesoamerican Regional Research Centre
CNEM
Consejo Nacional de Educación Maya
National Council on Mayan Education
CNP
Consejo Nacional de la Publicidad
National Advertising Council
CNPRE
Comisión Nacional Permanente de la Reforma Educativa
Standing National Commission on Education Reform
COPMAGUA
Coordinación de Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala
Coordinating Office for Mayan Organizations in Guatemala
COS
Colectivo de Organizaciones Sociales
Federation of Social Organizations
DICADE  Dirección de Calidad y Desarrollo Educativo
Education Quality and Development Division

DIGEBI  Dirección General de Educación Bilingüe Intercultural
Directorate of Intercultural Bilingual Education

FLACSO  Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales
Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences

FRG  Frente Republicano Guatamalteco
"Guatemalan Republican Front" (political party)

VAT  Value Added Tax

MINEDUC  Ministerio de Educación de Guatemala
Ministry of Education of Guatemala

MINUGUA  Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala
United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala

OAS  Organization of American States

NGO  Nongovernmental organization

PAN  Partido de Avanzada Nacional
“National Progress Party” [political party]

GDP  Gross Domestic Product

UNDP  United Nations Development Program

PREAL  Programa de Promoción de la Reforma Educativa en América Latina y el Caribe
Program for the Promotion of Educational Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean

PRODESSA  Proyecto de Desarrollo Santiago
Santiago Development Project

PRONADE  Programa Nacional de Autogestión Educativa
National Program for Educational Self-management

SEGEPLAN  Secretaría de Planificación y Programación de la Presidencia
Presidential Office for Planning and Programming

STEG  Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Educación de Guatemala
Guatemalan Union of Education Workers

UDE  Unidades de Desarrollo Educativo de las Direcciones Departamentales de Educación
Education Development Units of the Departmental Education Directorates

UMG  Universidad Mariano Gálvez

UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNFPA  United Nations Fund for Population Activities

UNICEF  United Nations Children's Emergency Fund

UPE  Unidad de Planificación Educativa del Ministerio de Educación de Guatemala, Education Planning Unit of the Ministry of Education