CASE STUDY OF IDRC-SUPPORTED RESEARCH ON SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN KENYA, SOUTH AFRICA, GHANA AND NIGERIA
Project No. 109781

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## ABBREVIATIONS

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASDR</td>
<td>African Security Dialogue and Research</td>
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<td>ASSN</td>
<td>African Security Sector Network</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CDD</td>
<td>Centre for Democracy and Development (Nigeria)</td>
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<td>CDSM</td>
<td>Centre for Defence and Security Management</td>
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<td>CECORE</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>IDRC</td>
<td>International Development Research Centre</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental authority for Development</td>
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<td>IRG</td>
<td>International Research Group (for the Horn of Africa)</td>
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<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPDSC</td>
<td>Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (of SADC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PENHA</td>
<td>Pastoral and Environmental Network for the Horn of Africa</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council (of the AU)</td>
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<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordinating Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADSEM</td>
<td>Southern African Defence and Security Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

Whether in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau or Cote d’Ivoire, the ultimate signpost of looming state disintegration and humanitarian crisis, and the trigger for conflict has invariably come from systematic abuse of human rights by security institutions. Law and order are consistently flouted by those mandated to uphold them; and police, army and other security units turn into brigands on rampage. This is the result of the misgovernance of such security institutions. Good governance of the security sector – and thus security sector reform (SSR) – is therefore a critical component of conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and democratic consolidation. The inability of African security organisations to provide safe and secure environment for economic and political development arises, to a large degree, out of poor governance – both of the state in general and of the security sector in particular.

SSR is also the common thread in creating the environment for successful democratic governance: rule of law, human rights and human security, and the assurance of conditions of both security and development. SSR can thus provide a framework for partnership for critical stakeholders: African institutions like the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (norm-setting in the area of security sector governance), national governments (policy formulation and implementation), legislators, civil society and the media (oversight) and development partners (support).

The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is one of the development partners supporting projects on justice and security sector reform in Sub-Sahara Africa. Specifically, IDRC in recent years has supported research projects on various aspects of security sector reform by African research institutions based in Kenya, South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria.

This report is the result of a case study essentially in the medium of evaluation of the four IDRC-supported projects in Africa. The case study takes stock of these research projects in terms of: (i) the results achieved in influencing dialogue/policy discussions or actual policy making processes on issues of SSR in the countries in question; and (ii) if and/or how (through the projects) IDRC has helped to build or support research capacity for influencing policy or democratic auditing capacities in SSR. The case study is also to assist IDRC to develop a more nuanced understanding of the particular prospects, challenges and requirements for carrying out research in SSR in Africa.

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1 Interview with Professor Eboe Hutchful, Accra, Ghana, September 2005
SSR Research in African Context: Challenges and Prospects for Policy Impact

In essence the primary requirement of this study is to assess the policy impact of IDRC-funded research projects in a number of African countries. This requirement immediately confronts some conceptual and contextual challenges. Even in the best of circumstances in developed countries with more established institutions and practices, evaluating the causal influence of research and analysis on policy dialogue and formulation could be problematic because the goal is to achieve influence in dynamic processes with a multiplicity of actors. In the developing South, and in Africa in particular, the research and policy nexus gets even more complicated because the contextual reality is fraught with challenges that are multifaceted, complex and, indeed, fluid: The political governance in most countries would be under debate as a concept and under construction as a system; democracy as a value, concept and practice would be contested; everywhere democratisation would still be in transition as military and other authoritarian regimes are being dismantled or dismantled but with a strong residue of influence for the security sector; civil society organisations would be weak, largely externally funded and suspect (by the authorities); and reform would not only be taking place in the security sector, but simultaneously across a spectrum of sectors including finance/economic, social and education among others.

Under such circumstances of a political landscape in turmoil with multifarious actors, one would not expect a linear progression from research output to policy influence. Indeed, the issue of SSR would be competing for policy attention and scarce resources with other equally crucial issues, not least being efforts to alleviate overwhelming, extensive poverty. It is therefore prudent to be guided by what Lindquist describes as “reasonable expectations about research and policy influence.” This evaluation thus broadens the framework for assessing the impact of research output on policy to encompass indirect and intermediate influence such as raising the profile of SSR in civil society and official discourses, contributing to enlightenment on various aspects of the issue, altering the language and perceptions of policy makers and their advisers, clarifying concepts and advocating good practices, and affording forums to facilitate debate and dissemination of ideas. With time, the indirect and intermediate influence would cumulatively produce concrete, positive impact. In this broad sense, the IDRC-supported research projects in Africa have made significant contributions in enhancing research capacity and advocacy skills that would, with time, influence policy in regard to security sector reform at continental, regional and local levels.


3 Professor Jenny Pearce also makes this observation in her draft report of the Case Study of IDRC-Supported Research on Security Sector Reform in Guatemala (Unpublished).

4 Lindquist, opus sit, p. 1.
RESEARCH PROJECTS

Project I

Project on Democratic Governance and Common Security in Southern Africa

The principal objective of the project is to examine national security practices and perceptions of Southern African states and the impact of democratisation on approaches to national and regional security. The project’s research problem opens a new pertinent issue for investigation: How and to what extent have democratisation and democratic processes influenced the national security perceptions and practises of (African) states, and what effect has this in turn had on approaches to national and regional security. At the core of the study, therefore, is the exploration of the interface between security at both the national and regional levels on the one hand and democracy and democratisation on the other.

Major findings included the following:

i. Much as progress has been registered in respect of the democratisation process in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), critical policy and capacity challenges still remained for democracy to be firmly entrenched. Democratisation has been uneven and partial, and in some states has barely begun, while in others there are signs of democratic reversals.

ii. The increasingly common analysis that seeks to counterpose state security and human security is a futile exercise. States that are weak in the sense that they lack coherence and legitimacy feel profoundly threatened and, hence, resort to repression and human rights abuses as principal instruments for regime survival. In developing contexts such as Africa, it is after all the state that is primarily responsible for providing core factors in human security and human development such as education, clean water and health. Research, development assistance and policy-makers should seek to enhance the legitimate democratic functions of states, including the governance and management of security, in order to promote human security and human development.

iii. The Southern Africa region (and much of Africa as a whole) has embraced regional integration since the end of the Cold War in a much more purposive manner than had hitherto been the case, as signified by the adoption of a number of protocols, particularly the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). It is unlikely that SADC as it is currently constituted, including the OPDSC, would have been possible without democratisation.

iv. Globalisation tends to influence national security perceptions from two rather contradictory dimensions. On the one hand, globalisation is an important driver of regional integration in that it further weakens marginalized states,
obliging them to club together to seek security and strength in numbers. On the other hand, it weakens already weak states, which in turn undermines regional integration as weak states cling to what little sovereignty they retain, particularly in the political and security domain.

Recommendations

Project management has indicated its desire for continued support for research work in areas of democratic transition and consolidation, SSR and governance, and conflict prevention and peace building in Southern Africa. The project’s final evaluation team endorsed this position, pointing out that “The IDRC Peace, Conflict and Development (PCD) initiative for 2005-2010 ideally fits with a project follow on … PCD wants researchers to generate evidence-based finding, build domestic ownership of peace processes, open spaces for dialogue, influence policies and practices and build capacity. The existing project has been doing just this and should be continued.”

A successor project would further want to consider the following:

i. Explore possibilities of building capacity (e.g. by using less senior researchers) while maintaining the high quality of the current project.

ii. Involve SADC Secretariat as a partner to benefit from its insight and as a means of building its capacity in areas concerned.

iii. Serious consideration must be given to replicating approaches, methods and/or content of the project in IGAD and ECOWAS regions. The programmes and activities of the newly formed African Security Sector Network (ASSN) could be supported to enhance such knowledge sharing processes.

Project II

Towards a Regional Security Architecture: Assessing Issues and Developing Capacity in The Horn Of Africa

The research project was the preparatory phase of a more extensive project that would examine the emergence and evolution of the regional and sub-regional institutions and the potential for these in cooperation with civil society to contribute to the development of cooperative regional security arrangements. The project thus aimed to support and foster indigenous research and civil society capacity related to developing regional approaches to cooperative and common security, including institution building, in the Horn of Africa. The findings of the preparatory phase would represent a framework for the subsequent phase, identify crucial issues and set out a path for further research.

The African Peace Forum (Kenya) was responsible for the management of the project with Project Ploughshares of Canada as principal partner. The project also worked with a group of organisations and individuals.
Observations/recommendations

i). It would be necessary to involve policy makers and practitioners (national and regional) in the research process. Their contribution would enhance the quality of research products; practical experience from institutional contexts and constraints could challenge deliberations and inject realism into choice of options.

ii). A definite linkage with developments in the articulation of regional and continental security architecture in the forums of the African Union (AU) and IGAD would be very useful in putting the research project in policy context. The research should contribute to informed policy debates in the region and Africa as a whole on directly relevant issues such as the AU Military Staff Committee, the African Standby Force and the Regional Brigades, and the continental and regional early warning systems.

iii). It would be necessary to consider core questions on regional security architecture: What institutions would one prescribe for regional security? How have regional institutions been structured to meet national security issues? What are the lessons from past experiments with regional problem-solving security mechanisms? What would be the relationships of future regional security arrangements to continental and global institutions and norms for security?

Project III

Good Governance and the Transformation of the Security Sector

The principal output of this project was the production of a handbook on security sector transformation in Africa, which would be an operational tool for the development of processes for greater democratic accountability, transparency and control over the armed forces and security bureaucracies. The project was a collaborative process involving researchers and practitioners across Africa and beyond. The project used a core research/writing team of experts and contributors with diverse but relevant expertise.

The project has been a good effort at research-policy linkage. It has not only helped to register security reform on the agenda of many African and inter-governmental organisations, it has also launched a dialogue process among diverse stakeholders through the various, well represented workshops that brought together government officials, practitioners, civil society workers and academics who worked on producing the handbook.

5 Members of the core team were: Nicole Ball, Kayode Fayemi (eds.), Funmi Olonisakin, and Rocklyn Williams.
The project underscores two crucial problems with the security sector reform agenda in Africa:

i). The relative lack of documentation on and analysis of how security reform process in Africa has been conceived and managed;

ii). Limited expertise and knowledge base in security sector issues. Human and institutional capacity in the civil and official sectors lack both depth and breadth in African countries. The capacity of civil authorities to both manage and oversee the security organisations is frequently limited.

Recommendations

i). *Study and documentation of security sector reform processes in Africa* - Research may be supported to explore the processes by which countries in Africa have tried to strengthen democratic security governance.

ii). *Research-policy interface* - The connection between research, policy formulation and implementation is not necessarily automatic. Research projects should be supplemented with special programmes and projects that should be designed, targeted and implemented to achieve desired policy outcomes and their implementation.

iii). *Development of indigenous expertise in security issues* – There is the need for capacity building initiatives in terms of training for civil authorities to both manage and oversee the security organisations. The handbook could be the training manual.

iv). *Production of manuals* - It would be advisable to develop more targeted manuals from the handbook that would be user-friendlier for particular target groups.

*Project IV*

**Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa: Process and Mechanisms of Control**

The project has been a collaborative North-South effort between the African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR, Ghana) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). ASDR had the responsibility for managing the project.

The goal of the project was to study the budgetary process that generated defence allocations. The focus on the process was to provide a comprehensive understanding of the circumstances surrounding the emergence of the budget allocation and the extent of its reliability. This broad goal posed a number of research questions: “Are all the sources of income to the military included in the process? Indeed, is there a process to begin with? To what extent is this in conformity with principles of sound public expenditure
management? Is defence in particular subject to the same public expenditure standards as other sectors? What are the mechanisms by which the military allocation is monitored and controlled?

The project examined the various institutionalised mechanisms of controlling, monitoring and auditing defence expenditure in eight African states. It also identified and analysed the various types of extra-budgetary and hidden channels of funding military activities.

Core Findings

i). Lack of an enabling environment for policy development in most countries in the study. Reasons included a lack of political commitment, absence of dialogue among various actors in the process, and an underdeveloped policy framework;

ii). Ambiguous laws and, in some respects, lack of laws and regulations and lack of proper delineation of roles and responsibilities among key actors in the process;

iii). Lack of transparency and accountability in the process because of over-concentration of power in a few hands or certain offices;

iv). Most legislators lack the requisite skills and knowledge to effectively exercise oversight on the process of military budgeting;

v). The processes of budgeting in most of the case studies are hardly participatory. Critically, civil society is left out of the process;

Project’s core recommendations

i). A proper development of the policy arena with active dialogue among the various actors in the different aspects of the public sector;

ii). An adoption of simple processes of budgeting easily understandable within the African context;

iii). For whatever changes introduced to take root, there has to be a high degree of local ownership, which can only result from a strong political commitment from the political leadership.

Observations

This has been a groundbreaking study in substance; it has dealt with crucial national issues, which have largely remained a “no-go” area in Africa but has always attracted presumptions and speculations. The findings and recommendations have been insightful with an immense potential for a long-term impact in Africa. The challenges and
recommendations constitute helpful variables that could provide an appropriate framework for an assessment of military expenditure of African countries. Oversight institutions, government sectors with decision-making roles in the process to determine military budgets, practitioners and the civil society will all benefit from the study.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Targeted Capacity Building

The common practice of bundling serious research, extensive dissemination and (expected) in-depth policy impact in one three-year project may not be the most efficient or effective way of implementing the security sector reform agenda in Africa. Impact on policy, at best, would be superficial. The challenge in Africa is not refreshing capacity; it is creating capacity. Appropriate African institutions should be given a long-term support (about five years) to develop manuals to run training courses with all stakeholders as beneficiaries.

II. Development of indigenous expertise in security issues

Efforts at security sector reform in Africa would only produce sustainable results when we ensure local ownership of the reform process in order to avoid the perception in the reforming state that the process is an external imposition. But the requisite capacity in most of Africa is very limited. Support for training projects would thus be necessary. Such training could be organised on regional basis with regional organisations as partners, and cover personnel from institutions such as parliaments, auditors-general, accountants-general, ministries of finance, defence and interior, the judiciary and the media. The donor community, individually or in a consortium, could support appropriate indigenous institutions to run training courses, seminars, workshops and symposia.

For the reform process in Africa to be sustained in the long-term, we must also place emphasis on enhancing the capacity of local researchers to analyse, understand and debate their own security problems, and find their own solutions in the reform process. We need special capacity building programmes to augment the limited and overstretched expertise of security analysts in Africa. Research projects may have capacity building components tagged along them, but this would not be an effective way to resolve the lack of expertise in security issues on the continent.

III. Study and documentation of security sector reform processes in Africa

Research may be supported to explore the processes by which countries in Africa have tried to strengthen democratic security governance. Many studies conclude with a spate of prescriptions for the African body politic without a thorough diagnosis of what is ailing the body. Research could achieve a most direct and tangible impact on policy if it would first be targeted to a more consistent investigation of reform and transformation

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6 Governments are less concerned when their own inter-governmental organisation is involved.
processes that are taking place in many countries in Africa. We need empirical evidence and documentation on how the process of change has been conceived and managed in specific African countries. These could be joint projects involving researchers and concerned security agencies.

IV. Production of manuals

It may be advisable to develop more targeted manuals that would be user-friendlier for particular target groups.

V. Research-policy interface: broadening dissemination for popular impact

To create a critical mass of consciousness and appreciation for SSR, we would have to move beyond the preoccupied emphasis on seminars, publications, reports and presentations among the same circumscribed band of analysts and bureaucrats. Invariably, about 98% of the (largely illiterate) population are left out of the loop in the debate on SSR; yet research outputs always come out with findings that ‘there is a general lack of transparency and accountability in the process because of over-concentration of power in a few hands’. Project managers should be challenged and encouraged to broaden the sphere of knowledge transfer and awareness raising.

VI. Linkage with African inter-governmental institutions

Research projects on regional architecture for peace and security should involve policy makers and practitioners in the process. They would be responsible for carrying forward and implementing ideas and options that would be generated by studies. Their contribution could enhance the quality of research products; practical experience from institutional contexts and constraints could challenge deliberations and inject realism into choice of options.

Research should relate to developments in the articulation of regional and continental security architecture in the forums of the African Union (AU) and regional organisations like ECOWAS and IGAD. This would be very useful in putting research projects in policy context, lest they become purely academic exercises. Research should contribute to policy debates in the sub-regions and AU on directly relevant issues such as the AU Military Staff Committee, the African Standby Force and the Regional Brigades, and the continental and regional early warning systems. The trend of deliberations and positions on issues of peace and security in Africa has changed significantly since 2000. The issue of national and RECs’ capacity, role, and contribution as provided by these documents is still under intense discussion. Research would be expected to be part of this discourse. Research targeting relevant activities of inter-governmental institutions (AU and RECs) would be useful.

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7 Regional Economic Communities.
VII. SSR in Post-conflict Situations

There is a common belief that transition regimes and post-conflict situations may offer policy windows that may be used by SSR researchers and analysts to influence policy and inculcate best practices in, for example, military budgeting practices because things are starting from the scratch.\(^8\) There is also increasing recognition that SSR has been given rather low priority in peace agreements that are meant to bring an end to hostilities. Invariably in post-conflict situations Africa, SSR provisions in peace agreement have not gone beyond disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, the creation of a new integrated defence forces and the reorganisation, training and strengthening of the police.\(^9\) In the circumstances, SSR in post-conflict situations is a crucial area for research. For, every African country has either been plagued by significant conflict or borders on another country that is (or has been) in significant conflict. Research, however, should account for the challenging environment of post-conflict situations and move beyond simplistic assumptions.

VIII. Bringing SSR Home

A critical weakness of the SSR agenda in Africa and, indeed much of the developing South, is its profound disconnect with the masses of the population.\(^10\) Research and advocacy programmes on SSR in Africa appear to have completely bypassed the needs of the marginalized and poor. As Professor Hutchful aptly articulated during our interviews, crucial issues of concern to the poor and rural communities have not attracted much research and policy attention, in spite of the well-founded perception that insecurity impacts disproportionately upon the poor. Thus, those that most negatively experience the weaknesses of both security and justice are left out of the equation; and these are by far the majority of the population with depressed livelihood choices and limited access to alternative security. Research outputs and their potential influence on policy remain ethereal and abstract to the majority of Africans. “Unimaginative dissemination strategies, which involve formal seminars and presentations, books, papers and reports that focus too much on influencing literate and urban sectors of the population”\(^11\) remain remote to the concerns of the majority. Consequently, research activities have woefully failed to build the groundswell for change in Africa.

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\(^9\) This could be a calculated hostilities-ending strategy where often, whether in Sarajevo or Sierra Leone, the concern is to craft a simple document of compromise to immediately save lives and livelihoods, while further negotiations could occur during the implementation of the original peace agreement.

\(^10\) This was also found to be the case in Central America, specifically Guatemala, by Professor Jenny Pearce, opus cit.

\(^11\) Professor Jenny Pearce, opus sit, p. 56.
In view of above, I share Professor Hutchful’s advocacy\(^\text{12}\) that future SSR research programmes should seek to empower the poor and improve their access to security by examining issues of concern to the poor including the following:

- The nature of interaction between the poor and justice and security institutions;
- The impact of security and justice institutions on the poor in terms of the provision of security and dispensation of justice;
- The nature of alternative (traditional) security and justice institutions at the local level, and the relationship and complementarity between them and formal institutions;
- Exploration of the relationship between SSR, poverty and poverty alleviation; and
- Processes to expand access of the poor to justice and security at both formal and informal levels

In this way, SSR in Africa may be brought home, meaningfully.

**CONCLUSION**

The IDRC-supported research projects on SSR in Africa continue to have indirect and intermediate influence on security sector governance in the continent. The implementation of these projects have raised the profile of SSR in both civil society and official discourses; they have discounted old notions; they have contributed to enlightenment on various aspects of the issue; language and perceptions of the issue are being changed; new concepts have been introduced, debated and subjected to continuing clarification; new ideas have been disseminated and good practices are being advocated; interest has been stirred among younger scholars and materials provided for them to pursue further research. These positive contributions will transcend the lives of the projects and, with time, percolate and have substantive impact on security sector governance (and political governance generally) in Africa.

The overemphasis on direct research-policy impact is not realistic in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, and does unfairly overshadow the achievements of the projects. In this regard, we would all benefit from the advice of Lindquist: “We build policy capacity not because we believe that there will be measurable and unambiguous impacts on government policy, but rather, because we believe that having more rather than less policy inquiry is better for furthering dialogue, debate, and the sharing of ideas …”\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{12}\) Professor Eboe Hutchful, Interview, Accra, September 2005.

\(^{13}\) Lindquist, opus cit, p. 23.
TERMS OF REFERENCE AND METHODOLOGY

The objectives of this study is to take stock of four IDRC-supported research projects in Africa in terms of:

- Results achieved in influencing dialogue/policy discussions or actual policymaking processes on issues of SSR in the countries in question;
- Gaining insights into if/how IDRC has helped to build or support research capacity for influencing policy or democratic auditing capacities in SSR;
- Helping IDRC to better understand current trends in the field of SSR in the concerned countries, specifically in terms of relevant policy developments since the projects were completed;
- Helping IDRC to develop a more nuanced understanding of the particular challenges and requirements for carrying out research in SSR; and
- Assisting IDRC in mapping out possible future programming directions, taking into account lessons learnt from past programming and country/regional trends and developments.

The study has essentially been produced from intensive study of the extensive research outputs provided by the project managers. The documentation made available to the consultant included project design documents, project evaluation reports where available, technical reports and project reports. The eight days allotted for field-work in four countries in East, Southern and West Africa (Kenya, South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria) were spent on intensive study of project documents and what amounted to mini workshops with project managers that focused on the broad spectrum of project management: project design, implementation, outputs and outcomes. The critical evaluation factors that informed the study and the mini workshops were project relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and external utility and replicability.

Time constraints (average of two days in each country), the volume of project documents to be absorbed for discussions with project managers and scheduling problems limited interviews with project partners and beneficiaries. Nonetheless, the consultant was able to interview some project partners in Kenya, Ghana, and Nigeria. By coincidence, the


16 Major General Cheick O. Diarra, at the time ECOWAS Deputy Executive Secretary, Political Affairs, Defence and Security, Abuja, Nigeria, September 2005.
consultant, in his former capacity as a UN staff, collaborated with the management of the project in Southern Africa, Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM) and the SADC Secretariat in a joint project with security chiefs in Southern Africa. This relationship afforded the consultant a direct opportunity to observe the practical implementation of the Southern Africa project. I would also add that the project reports of the four initiatives detailing the implementation activities of the projects provided ample and clear evidence of efforts at collaboration, capacity building and policy influence.

**THE SSR IN AFRICAN CONTEXT AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT**

The four IDRC-supported research projects in Africa have different foci: the impact of democratisation on approaches to national and regional security; the development of a regional security architecture; a handbook on security sector transformation in Africa, as a tool for greater democratic accountability, transparency and control over the security services; and a study of the budgetary process that generates defence allocations. What these projects share in common is the requirement that each should achieve a policy impact, or, at a minimum, influence policy dialogue and discussions.

In essence, the primary requirement of this study is to assess the policy impact of IDRC-funded research projects in a number of African countries. This requirement immediately confronts some conceptual and contextual challenges. Even in the best of circumstances in developed countries with more established institutions and practices, evaluating the causal influence of research and analysis on policy dialogue and formulation could be problematic because the goal is to achieve influence in dynamic processes with a multiplicity of actors. In Africa the research and policy nexus is rather complicated due to several factors. In spite of some commonalities, there are several regional differences and country particularities emanating from colonial and post-colonial experiences, political dispensations and practices, and conflict and post-conflict experiences. The context of SSR is thus rather varied in Africa.

Since the early 1990s, a variety of factors, trends and considerations have instigated some level of SSR in most African countries. Reforms have invariably been designed to achieve a combination of political, economic and social ends. African countries have also been subjected to external push for reforms of their security sectors. Such externally instigated reforms have often been part of fiscal restructuring and public expenditure management packages and conditionalities. Further, reconstruction of war-torn societies has included at least narrowly defined security sector reforms. Generally, then, one can identify four common drivers for security sector reform in Africa:

17 Lindquist, opus cit.

18 See framework paper by Kayode Fayemi and Eboe Hutchful, “Security System Reform in Africa” (Unpublished)
Post-conflict peace agreements that would invariably include DDR components and the creation of a new integrated defence forces and the reorganisation, training and strengthening of the police. Examples would include many sub-Saharan African countries that have been born out of nationalist agitations and liberation wars or resuscitating from a war-torn past;

Sharp regime or governance shifts have provided impetus for SSR. These would include the dismantling of authoritarian civilian or military political structures. Such shifts have often provided the opportunity and, indeed, the need for depoliticisation and reorganisation of the security institutions;

Fiscal restructuring and public expenditure management reforms, invariably under external “guidance”, that most times include review of military expenditure with a view to reducing it to benefit social programmes like health and education; and

The collapsed state syndrome: the disintegration of legitimate authority in the state. The restoration of the disintegrated state is when SSR becomes crucial. The collapse state syndrome is a grave condition when degeneration occurs in the political structure, ultimately resulting in what may be described as state collapse. This condition of collapse occurs when the state is no longer capable of performing three groups of critical, interrelated functions: (a) as the legitimate/accepted sovereign authority over a populated area; (b) as the tangible organisation of decision making; and (c) as the security guarantor for a populated area. There are significant signposts of the disintegration process: state power devolves to the peripheries and withers at the centre; effective governance breaks down as government malfunctions and the state becomes progressively paralysed and inoperative, with law and order, personal security and societal coherence seriously eroded; leadership treads without direction with government in the mode of defensive and survival politics; and, ultimately, the government loses control over its own agents – bureaucrats, the police, army and paramilitary units – who begin to operate on their own account: bureaucrats exact and keep payments; law and order are routinely flouted by those mandated to uphold them; and police and army units turn into brigands on rampage. Apart from the obvious cases of the Somalias, Liberias, Congos and the Sierras Leones, state disintegration and restoration have been more common in Africa than it is often realised. States like Ghana, Uganda, Ethiopia and Chad have gone through the process.\(^{19}\)

There is a common belief that transition regimes and post conflict situations may offer the most conducive policy windows that may be used by SSR researchers and analysts to influence policy and inculcate best practices in, for example, military budgeting practices because things are starting from the scratch.\(^{20}\)

\(^{19}\) For insightful analysis of the collapsed state syndrome, see I William Zartman (ed.), Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).

This increasingly common assertion is rather a simplification of the post-conflict environment in Africa and the challenges of reconstruction, including prospects for SSR. The post-conflict condition, whether in Burundi or Bosnia, is a scenario of total devastation across the whole spectrum of human security. Conflicts’ legacies include widespread population displacement; damaged infrastructure, including schools, health facilities and housing; reduced productive capacity; a shattered government revenue base; an erosion of human and social capital; greatly reduced security; and an increased proportion of people needing social assistance. Collectively, these legacies place a heavy burden on post-conflict societies. Furthermore, civil life is replaced by widespread adaptation to militarization that becomes an obstacle to a smooth return to normal societal life and productive activities. When conflicts go on for a long time (as in Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, Central African Republic) entire generations may mature under conflict conditions and leave the entire societal fabric fragile and prone to conflict.\textsuperscript{21} Hence, the best predictor of conflict is past conflict.

In contemporary Africa, therefore, the research and policy nexus gets even more complicated because the contextual reality is fraught with challenges that are multifaceted, complex and, indeed, fluid: The political governance in most countries would be under debate as a concept and under construction as a system; democracy as a value, concept and practice would be contested; everywhere democratisation would still be in transition as military and other authoritarian regimes are being dismantled or dismantled but with a strong residue of influence for the security sector; civil society organisations would be weak, largely externally funded and suspect (by the authorities); and reform would not only be taking place in the security sector, but simultaneously across a spectrum of sectors including finance/economic, social and education among others.

Under such circumstances of a political landscape in turmoil with multifarious actors, one would not expect a linear progression from research output to policy influence.\textsuperscript{22} Indeed, the issue of SSR would be competing for policy attention and scarce resources with other equally crucial issues, not least being efforts to alleviate overwhelming, extensive poverty. It is therefore prudent to be guided by what Lindquist describes as “reasonable expectations about research and policy influence.”\textsuperscript{23} This evaluation thus broadens the framework for assessing the impact of research output on policy to encompass indirect and intermediate influence such as raising the profile of SSR in civil society and official discourses, contributing to enlightenment on various aspects of the issue, altering the


\textsuperscript{22} Professor Jenny Pearce also makes this observation in her draft report of the Case Study of IDRC-Supported Research on Security Sector Reform in Guatemala (Unpublished).

\textsuperscript{23} Lindquist, opus sit, p. 1.
language and perceptions of policy makers and their advisers, clarifying concepts and advocating good practices, and affording forums to facilitate debate and dissemination of ideas. With time, the indirect and intermediate influence would cumulatively produce concrete, direct impact. In this broad sense, the IDRC-supported research projects in Africa have made significant contributions in enhancing research capacity and advocacy skills that would, with time, influence policy in regard to security sector reform at continental, regional and local levels.
INTRODUCTION

Like elsewhere in Africa, parts of Southern Africa have been bedevilled by violent intra-state conflicts, resulting from political, economic and ethnic exclusion. These intra-state conflicts have been accelerated by a vicious culture of violence, which is sustained by arms trafficking, trans-border organised crime, and economic and social deprivation presided over by weak and at times dysfunctional state institutions, or (in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo) collapsed states that are unable to manage and ensure the socio-economic, human and political security of their citizens.

While conflicts in most African countries may appear to be primarily internal in nature, the fact is that the various domestic political conflicts have not remained self-contained, nor have they been always self-generated. The stakes in African conflicts may indeed be internal, but their origins and ramifications have often involved the entire region. Invariably, the sources, the dynamics and the consequences of African conflicts are better appreciated in their regional and international contexts.

Conflicts in Africa have been more virulent and destructive, and less amenable to management, because their implications lie within both the state and the concerned region. Hence, internal conflict management processes, crucial though they may be, may not be adequate to produce durable solutions to individual baskets of conflicts and regional security. “Peace building and security sector transformation should not, indeed cannot, halt at national boundaries.”

A regional approach to the increasing regional dimension of conflicts offers a more viable option for the management of conflicts in Africa.

The states in the Southern Africa region, through several resolutions and instruments of the SADC, have committed themselves to the regional approach to conflict prevention, peace building and the maintenance of sustainable peace and stability for common development. The regional position and aspirations are consistent with the AU’s peace and security architecture, which is being designed with regional organisations as the building blocks of the continental structure. Despite formal commitments, however, structures and practices for political and security co-operation through SADC have been slow to develop; and the frameworks that have been formulated have been plagued by crises during attempts at operationalisation and implementation.

RESEARCH PROJECT

The research project on democratic governance and common security in Southern Africa aimed to assist in understanding the challenges that have plagued the Southern African regional security co-operation project. The perspective that informed the research project was based on two premises: (a) that regional security is best assured through a legitimate regional order based on shared democratic values, and (b) that national security and public order depend upon a democratic (and thus legitimate) framework of public authority. These premises find relevance in the fact that democratisation has now become a predominant tendency in Africa, with multi-party democracy becoming the official practice of virtually all countries in SADC. On the basis of these premises the project examined the relationship between national security, the regional security project, and the nature of democratic transitions and the practice of democracy in Southern Africa.

The research project’s principal assumption was that state behaviour in the regional security context could be in part understood by an analysis of domestic political processes and systems (including their deficiencies) in key SADC member states, and the approach of their governments to the common security project. In essence the research problem was: how and to what extent have democratisation and democratic processes influenced the national security perceptions and practices of Southern African states, and what effect has this in turn had on approaches to regional security. Through analysis, the project attempted to point to ways forward in addressing the organisational and other impasses that have characterised the regional project.

The project’s goal was to employ research, workshops and publications in an effort to contribute to knowledge in the field of social security studies, to assist policy-makers and practitioners in the defence sector to better understand the nature of the region’s security challenges, and to build research capacity among scholars in Africa so as to contribute to common security in the region. The specific objectives developed from the broad goal were:

- To examine national security practices and perceptions of Southern African states and the impact of democratisation, democratic practices and democratic deficits on approaches to security;

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26 The concept of democracy deficits has been introduced in analysing the quality of democracy in the ‘new democracies’. These may occur either in formal constitutional arrangements (democratic institutions) or in the substance and practices of power (democratic politics). Deficits may concern citizenship issues (e.g. exclusion of certain groups), issues of the vertical accountability of rulers to citizens or horizontal accountability within governance systems and practices, or issues of international accountability (e.g. policy strictures imposed by international financial institutions). See R Luckham, A. M. Goetz and M. Kaldor, “Democratic institutions and politics in contexts of inequality, poverty and conflict”, IDS Working Paper 104, (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2000).
To describe and analyse the regional security project essentially through SADC;

To build national research capacity in security issues; and

To utilise the research to enhance policy for common security in Southern Africa.

**Methodology**

The project utilized a networked modality as the principal aspect of its methodology, bringing together communities of institutions and individuals around a common enterprise. The principal, managing institution was the Centre for Defence and Security Management (CDSM) at the Graduate School of Public and Development Management, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. The research was, however, carried out in collaboration with the Centre’s six partners in the Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM) Network, which links together eight tertiary institutions in the region, mainly national universities, in collaborative activities around defence and security issues. The SADSEM participating organisations were:

- Centre for Defence Studies (CDS), University of Zimbabwe
- Instituto Sociedade e Administracao (ISA), Mozambique
- Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Namibia
- Centre for Foreign Relations, Tanzania
- Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana

Project collaboration was based on a detailed memorandum of agreement framework contracted between the managing partner, CDSM, and each of the partner organisations. Each of the six participating partners coordinated research in at least one other SADC country (usually based on geographic proximity and language). The research examined the linkages among democratisation, the character of democratisation and its deficits and national security practices and perceptions of all the fourteen SADC states: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.\(^\text{27}\)

The project’s methodology was structured as follows:

\(^{27}\) During the period of the research, Seychelles withdrew from SADC, while Madagascar was admitted as a provisional member.
The commissioning of three contextual papers: (i) a theoretical framework for security, (ii) a comparative analysis of regional security organisations; and (iii) an historical paper;

- The commissioning of 14 country papers, one for each SADC member state;

- The supplementing of the research process by limited capacity-building support for the six participating organisations comprising SADSEM, which involved the conducting of workshops for the researchers;

- The involvement of a supervisory core research team of senior academics, and the appointment of three international advisors.\(^{28}\)

The research project’s implementation framework incorporated an evaluation component: a mid-term review (May 2003) and a final, external evaluation at the end of the project. The detailed external evaluation was carried out by a team consisting of Professor Barry Munslow (University of Liverpool) and Professor Balefi Tsie (University of Botswana), who reviewed all the outputs, attended two dissemination seminars, interviewed key participants and held a focus group meeting with most of the researchers.

FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTION

At the present state of Africa’s political development and her quest for continental security and stability through the AU and regional arrangements, the project’s research problem opens a new pertinent issue for investigation: How and to what extent have democratisation and democratic processes influenced the national security perceptions and practises of (African) states, and what effect has this in turn had on approaches to national and regional security. The investigation of this research problem is used to enhance our understanding of democracy, democritisation and security. At the core of the study, therefore, is the exploration of the interface between security at both the national and regional levels on the one hand and democracy and democratisation on the other, on the assumption that security and democratic governance are inextricably intertwined and mutually reinforcing.

The state of democratisation in the region

The project’s findings provide useful empirical evidence to support the proposition that transitions to democracy are seldom linear, often fail and are accompanied by new insecurities. Further, it is worth noting that external pressures may compel regime change, democratic transitions and economic policy shifts from state-driven command led to neo-liberal economic policies and practices. But these, it has sadly been learnt, may not always be mutually compatible, and thus lead to further insecurity, both state and human.

\(^{28}\) The team consisted of Professor Eboe Hutchful (Ghana), Dr. Robin Luckham (UK) and Professor Bjoern Moeller (Denmark).
The project makes a valuable and bold contribution with its classification of different “democracies” within southern Africa: war-torn or authoritarian (Angola, DRC, Swaziland); established liberal democracies (Botswana, Mauritius); transitions from apartheid (Namibia, South Africa); transitions from military rule (Lesotho); and transitions from one-party rule (Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Seychelles, Mozambique). The research project ably demonstrates that, much as progress has been registered in respect of the democratisation process in the SADC region, critical policy and capacity challenges still remained for democracy to be firmly entrenched as a value, a process and a political practice. Indeed, democratisation has been uneven and partial, and in some states has barely begun, while in others there are signs of democratic reversals. Furthermore the process of democratisation itself has been accompanied in some cases by violent conflict, most notably in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The country studies of the research project affirmed a sad reality in Africa: the much-acclaimed dividends of democratisation have proved to be a bitter mirage so far as socio-economic development is concerned. As Cawthra and others assert in their concluding chapter, “indeed, most countries of the region have slipped down on the United Nations Development Programme Human Development Index since the onset of democratisation in the 1990s”. Even discounting for the role of HIV/AIDS in this decline, “it is nevertheless abundantly evident that there is little or no correlation between democratisation and human development, at least in the short to medium term”. The cases of Botswana and Mauritius, which are the richest countries per capita in SADC, however, give us hope that over a longer term a ‘virtuous circle’ is possible, where democracy may reinforce economic growth that would in turn sustain democracy. The realization of this hope, however, appears increasingly remote.

The increasingly common analysis emerging from civil society organizations that seeks to counterpose state security and human security, with a strong advocacy for the precedence of the latter, is challenged. The research project addresses the issue head on with a clear message that human security cannot be secured without state security. For, states that are weak in the sense that they lack coherence and legitimacy feel profoundly threatened and, hence, resort to repression and human rights abuses as principal instruments for regime survival. In developing contexts such as Southern Africa, it is after all the state that is primarily responsible for providing core factors in human security and human development such as education, clean water, health and so on. Research, development assistance and policy-makers should seek to enhance the legitimate democratic functions of states, including the governance and management of security, in order to promote human security and human development.

**Democracy-security interface**

The project contributes findings of relevance to other regions of Africa:

- The interface between democracy and security perceptions and practices of states seems to differ from one SADC country to the other depending on the
stability of each country, the nature of its democratic transition (or lack of it) and the degree of institutionalisation of its democratic governance.

- The Southern Africa region has embraced regional integration since the end of the Cold War in a much more forceful and purposive manner than had hitherto been the case. SADC has taken up a triple mantle of economic, political and security cooperation. On all the three fronts considerable progress has been made, signified by the signing of a number of protocols, particularly the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). It is unlikely that SADC as it is currently constituted, including the OPDSC, would have been possible without democratisation.

- Regional cooperation on security issues has evolved from an intergovernmental forum where defence, security and foreign policy issues were discussed, to a more institutionalised arrangement, with arguable benefits: some institutional memory concerning previous decisions is provided, states of the region can pursue their security and defence interests in a more organised fashion.

- SADC’s current key objectives and its vision, as a whole, resonate both with state and human security agendas. On the official policy level, there has been a move towards a human rather than a state or regime security approach; numerous references are made throughout SADC documents to what is in effect human security, even if the term is not used. The real test, however, comes when SADC is obliged to make hard choices between state and human security, for example, when confronting human rights abuses in a member state. The track record in this regard is not promising, as SADC institutions have seldom, if ever, criticised member states, even when human rights abuses have been manifest.

- Global dynamics tend to influence national security perceptions – from two rather contradictory dimensions. On the one hand, globalisation is an important driver of regional integration; it further weakens marginalized states, obliging them to club together to seek security and strength in numbers. On the other hand, it weakens already weak states, which in turn undermines regional integration as weak states cling to what little sovereignty they retain, particularly in the political and security domain.

- The project has not demonstrated any strong concern about the role of South Africa as potential regional hegemon. Rather it was expected that it should exercise greater leadership.
PROJECT RELEVANCE AND IMPACT

The research project fills a crucial gap in our quest for democratic governance of the security sector: the critical linkages between democratisation, democratic practices and democracy deficits, and their linkages to perspectives and approaches to national security and regional security collaborative projects.

The three policy/dissemination seminars organised during the life of the project, particularly those in Botswana and Mozambique, emphasized the research-policy nexus and laid the foundation for project impact. Participants at the Botswana policy seminar included representatives from the country’s President’s office, defence, police and other security institutions, parliamentarians from government and opposition parties, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the media and academics. Similarly, a mixture of government officials, senior military and police officers, academics and NGO representatives attended the seminar in Mozambique.

The external evaluation team, which attended the seminars, confirmed participants’ overwhelming acceptance of the policy relevance of the research project. “A keenness was expressed by all to pursue this initiative, acknowledging that it is breaking new ground and has an important role to play in redefining national and regional security in the new era. The policy relevance of the study was reiterated in plenary sessions and in interviews with participants”.29

The findings of the project also underpinned and informed papers presented by SADSEM at First SADC Defence and Security Cooperation Conference held in Maputo, Mozambique, in December 2004, which was attended by chiefs of defence staff and senior government officials from SADC countries. Some of the presentations generated considerable discussion and, in some cases, heated controversy.30 Further, some of the key ideas in the research are being taken forward in both national and multinational policy processes currently under way, for example the development of the SADC Brigade and the current revisions to the South African and Mozambican White Papers on Defence.31

OBSERVATIONS

The assessment of the research project is informed by critical evaluation factors:


30 By coincidence this consultant, in his former capacity as a UN staff, was closely involved in the organisation of this conference. In fact, his unit co-organised the conference with the Government of Mozambique, and co-funded it with the Danish government.

31 Interview with project leader, Prof. Cawthra, and Brigadier-General Paulino Macaringue, former Director for Defence Policy at the Ministry of Defence in Mozambique.
Relevance – Is the project still relevant to the problem(s) it was intended to address?

Effectiveness – Did the project meet its objectives and deliver expected outcomes?

Efficiency – Is the project delivered in a timely and cost effective manner?

Impact – What were the intended or unintended effects of the project?

Sustainability – To what extent can the project continue after IDRC (external) support?

External Utility and Replicability – To what extent might the approaches, methods and/or content of the project have potential value if applied to another context?

The IDRC Programme Framework 2005-2010 (in particular the Peace, Conflict and Development Initiative) identifies similar factors as core considerations for programme support. Such considerations emphasise regional specificity and context, while promoting comparative cross-country analysis on issues such as the political economy of peace building, and transitional and restorative justice as a means of building lasting peace. The Framework views as sound methodological quality “complete” projects that pay as much attention to the front end (project design) and back end (dissemination, communication, networking) as they are to the middle (monitoring of the progress of the project). It advocates the networked modality in project implementation. The network modality would link together communities of institutions or individuals around a common theme or purpose. In its programme choices, IDRC would be “guided by the extent to which research on a given issue or region can be replicated and/or scaled up.”

The project design, methodology, implementation and the quality of outputs are outstandingly positive. This may be attributable to the fact that the project met all the above mentioned critical evaluation factors, and also fulfilled IDRC’s principles and practice of project formulation and implementation as described in Programme Framework 2005-2010. The following examples may suffice:

- The project process was “complete.” In the first place the project design or proposal was of a high quality, and the methodology of implementation was clear and sound. Common guidelines for researchers were developed and a theoretical framework was established. These were “workshopped” with the partners/authors and the key research questions were agreed upon.

- The network modality was effectively used. The project involved six participating organisations (in six countries), a twelve-person multinational core research team, fourteen country researchers and three international

advisors. All these actors operated with common guidelines and within an established theoretical framework.

- The core research team played an active role in quality control of the project and took responsibility for overseeing the analysis, synthesis and presentation of results.

- Project relevance, focus, efficiency and quality control were further enhanced by the incorporation of evaluation and monitoring in project design and implementation. The three international advisors actively commented on the various drafts of the papers and attended the workshops. There was a mid-term project evaluation. A detailed end of project, external evaluation was carried out by a team, who reviewed all the outputs, attended two of the dissemination seminars, interviewed key participants and held focus group meeting with most of the country researchers.

- The project was regionally focused (SADC countries), while the country studies based on common guidelines effectively constituted comparative cross-country analysis on issues of democratisation and national and regional security.

- Project impact, as earlier discussed, is ongoing. Specifically, however, policy recommendations were drawn up as part of the analysis and these were produced in the form of a policy briefing paper, which was distributed through participating organisations. Participation in the policy/dissemination seminars involved a mixture of relevant, senior actors and policy makers. A manuscript for a book has been prepared for production; and abstracts of the papers posted on the website of the Global Facilitation Network for Security Reform.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The *Project Completion Report* (p. 9) indicates that the SADSEM Network would welcome continued support\(^{33}\) for research work in areas of democratic transitions/consolidation, security sector reform and governance and conflict prevention and peace building in the region. This research will continue to inform and underpin SADSEM’s capacity building initiatives in the region, both at national and multinational levels, and to contribute to peace and security in the region. SADSEM therefore intends to formulate a successor research project, in consultation with IDRC, using some of the organisation and research lessons learnt in this project.

The final evaluation team most aptly endorsed this position thus: “The IDRC Peace, Conflict and Development (PCD) initiative for 2005-2010 ideally fits with a project follow on, and this is recommended to be pursued … PCD wants researchers to generate

\(^{33}\) Such support can easily be raised from other sources. IDRC would want to continue to be associated with this quality process.
evidence-based finding, build domestic ownership of peace processes, open spaces for dialogue, influence policies and practices and build capacity. The existing project has been doing just this and should be continued.”

I fully associate myself with this endorsement and recommendation. I would, however, add a few challenges:

- A successor project would want to explore possibilities of building capacity (e.g. by using less senior researchers) while maintaining the high quality of the current project.

- A successor project may involve the appropriate department of SADC Secretariat as a partner as a means of building their capacity in areas concerned.

- Serious consideration must be given to replicating approaches, methods and/or content of the project in IGAD and ECOWAS regions. SADSEM Network, in particular the project leader, could be engaged to support/advise on project formulation and implementation.

PROJECT II

TOWARDS A REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: ASSESSING ISSUES AND DEVELOPING CAPACITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA (IDRC Grant No. 100913, September 2002-January 2005)

INTRODUCTION

For decades now the term “Horn of Africa” has always conjured up images of destruction and extraordinary human suffering. Since the independence period of the early 1960s, its constituent states have faced enormous challenges on their geographical, political, and economic viability. All countries in the Horn, including Kenya and Uganda, have endured some level of violence and armed conflict, although this varies in scope, intensity and nature. Challenges such as economic malaise, the implosion of political systems, civil wars, interstate conflicts, the proliferation of warlords and militias, and large-scale displacement of populations have been a constant feature of the regional landscape. In some parts of the Horn we have had egregious manifestations of communal violence and the breakdown of civic norms.

Some of the security issues in the Horn are unique to the region, but most of them reveal prevailing problems such as the lack of political and institutional maturity that still characterise some African states. Security, after all, is a dynamic concept connoting constant changes in actors, issues, resources, and roles within a set of enduring rules and structures. From this perspective, security reflects national and regional institution
building to meet threats that impede the attainment of political and economic viability. Thinking about the future dimensions of security in the Horn, therefore, is fundamentally about probing the relations among actors, issues, and roles against the backdrop of changing sub-national, regional, and global contexts. This is the challenge, which the project takes upon itself.

**RESEARCH PROJECT**

The research project was the preparatory phase of a more extensive project that would examine the emergence and evolution of the regional and sub-regional institutions and the potential for these in cooperation with civil society and the academic community to contribute to the development of cooperative regional security arrangements. The project was therefore to pave the way for a more robust research agenda. The findings of the preparatory phase would represent a framework for the subsequent phase, identify crucial issues and set out a path for further research.

The *rationale* for the project and “for approaching security from a regional perspective … is derived from the failure of the state, manifested in ongoing civil wars and violent conflict, to effectively manage conflict and maintain public order and public confidence in the national political process.”\(^{34}\) The project holds that in light of the failure of many states to manage conflicts and ensure security, new political entities have emerged to address insecurity, suggesting new opportunities and mechanisms for participatory dialogue in the context of an expanding political space for non-governmental elements and a more inter-connected understanding of regional security. In the circumstances, international civil society has necessarily become much more active in exploring avenues of constructive, non-formal intervention, and in addressing basic national and regional security issues and arrangements with a view to preventing escalation and to encouraging more effective management of political and conflict.

The project was therefore premised on “the conviction that it is only through the increased involvement of civil society that a security dialogue may provide the adequate political space, transparency and democratized debate for developing adequate regional security mechanisms.”\(^{35}\) The project consequently submits three important elements of civil society as the engine to move its agenda: (i) NGOs, notably development, human rights and conflict resolution agencies, as well as religious communities, which have long-standing and substantial links directly into many communities in conflict; (ii) scholarly and research communities in conflict regions that represent the primary means by which communities in conflict regions can gain access to the insights of and lessons learned in the emerging international peace building community; and (iii) the prominent community of senior, frequently newly-retired diplomats and public servants, with a wealth of experience, competence and access.

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\(^{34}\) Narrative Report presented to IDRC on 30 January 2004. See also project proposal of the Phase I.

\(^{35}\) Ibid.
Objectives

The focus of the project was on civil society role in designing regional security architecture. The project thus aimed to support and foster indigenous research and civil society capacity related to developing regional approaches to cooperative and common security, including institution building, in the Horn of Africa. Specific objectives were:

- To develop and foster an engaged security community;
- To increase the research and analysis capacity of the indigenous research community;
- To democratise the security debate and mobilise public discourse and participation in the development of policy options for cooperative security structures;
- To strengthen national government and inter-governmental readiness to explore, and seriously consider security policy alternatives.
- To learn from similar regional security research and policy in other sub-regions of Africa and beyond.

Methodology

The lead institution was supposed to be the International Resource Group for the Horn (IRG). This was a registered NGO based in Nairobi, Kenya. It was housed within the offices of the Africa Peace Forum and was operated as a joint programme by the Africa Peace Forum of Kenya and Project Ploughshares of Canada: “The management and implementation of the IRG programme (was) carried by the Africa Peace Forum.” It was often difficult to determine the difference between the IRG and the African Peace Forum. In any case, the registration of the IRG as an NGO in Kenya has been withdrawn. The African Peace Forum has effectively been responsible for the management of the project.

The principal partner was the Project Ploughshares of Canada, which was to provide technical and administrative assistance to the project. The project also worked with a group of organisations and individuals. Prominent among the organisations were:

- Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, Kenya;
- Inter-Africa Group, Ethiopia
- Pastoral and Environmental Network for the Horn of Africa (PENHA), Ethiopia

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36 Project proposal, p. 7.
Case Study of IDRC-supported Research on Security Sector Reform in Kenya, South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria  
Project No. 109781

- Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE), Uganda
- Human Rights Network (HURINET), Uganda
- African Dialogue Centre, Tanzania

Project methodology and activities essentially involved research and policy consultations in Kampala (February 2003) and Mombassa (September 2003), which were aimed at initiating and facilitating research and analysis on key issues related to the development of regional security architecture in the Horn of Africa. The papers presented highlighted some of the human security challenges faced by the countries in the region. These included the proliferation of small arms, external influences, hydro politics, the media, constitution-building and cross-border issues. The two consultations provided a forum for participants to discuss the prospects, issues and processes for developing a regional security architecture that would enhance the region’s capacity to manage security challenges.

**Project Outputs and Findings**

The preparatory project’s output included the following:

- Eight papers commissioned and presented at the roundtable discussions in Kampala, February 2003;
- Three papers presented and reviewed at the roundtable consultations in Mombassa, September 2003;
- One concept paper commissioned and reviewed, November/December 2003;
- The Kampala papers being edited for publication;

37 Kampala Consultations research papers were:

‘Small Arms Proliferation in Northern Uganda and South Sudan: A Regional Security Dilemma’, by Godber Tumushabe and Arthur Bainomugisha.
‘Extra-Regional Inputs in Promoting Regional Security in the Horn of Africa’, by Leenco Lata.
• Phase II of the initiative representing a detailed research agenda that would focus on strategic research and public dialogue to develop regional approaches to cooperative security in the Horn formulated.

The consultations further identified four thematic areas that would constitute the framework for future research:

• Physical Security cluster – inter- and intra-state armed conflict, military force questions, refugee flows, the proliferation and use of small arms and armed conflict;

• Governance cluster – large scale human rights violations, anti-democratic governance structures, nature and foundations of state;

• Resource cluster – management of renewable resources: water, wetlands, forests, wildlife and livestock, and mineral resources;

• Military cluster – excessive and destabilising accumulation of arms and resources diverted for military purposes.

Areas identified as additional concerns for research and policy dialogue in the development of regional security architecture were HIV/AIDS, terrorism and environment. The consultative process further suggested strategic interventions and policy mechanisms that would help in the regional security project. These included “the strengthening of early warning systems, increasing funding for Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), having a military wing for IGAD, making security policies more people centred, promoting democratisation, supporting peace processes in Sudan and Somalia, harmonising national policies on small arms, and mainstreaming civil society in relevant sectors.”

Lessons Learnt

Lessons learnt during project implementation could be instructive, particularly for future research and policy dialogue:

• Formal, direct interaction with national government and inter-governmental organisations has been somewhat limited;  

• The need to consider lessons from similar research and policy discourse in other sub-regions of Africa, and factor in external links related to security issues, both within Africa and globally;  


39 Ibid.
The commissioned papers were too broad for an in-depth study although they came up with a number of research themes;

- The broad scope and general themes of the papers made it difficult to make an express linkage with the regional security architecture as envisaged in the project’s conceptualisation;

- It is not possible to explore all the many issues that affect security in the Horn of Africa in a programme such as this and therefore there is a need to prioritise them, hence the ‘clusters’;

- Recent political agreements recognise that the participation of civil society actors in discussions related to peace and security issues will allow greater opportunities for civil society-government dialogue and needs to be encouraged.

**OBSERVATIONS**

This is a preparatory support project to lay the foundation for a more detailed research agenda that would inform policies on issues of grave importance to the Horn and Africa: the building of appropriate policies, mechanisms, structures and practices for conflict prevention, peace maintenance and peace building. For relevance and future impact, the lessons learned in the preparatory phase must inform and guide the next phase.

Currently, there is intensive search, programming and donor support ‘for African solutions to African problems’. This search points to the urgency of a more systematic and expanded deliberation about future trajectories of regional security buttressed in the architecture of continental security. We need to explore security problems and elaborate the contours of mid- and long-term scenarios and, over time, contribute to the articulation of security arrangements grounded in understandings of past practices and present possibilities. Sound prescriptions about security arrangements require comprehensive understanding of the actors and issues, plus the institutional contexts and constraints that shape the questions of national and regional security.

In this regard, it would be necessary to involve policy makers and practitioners in the process. They would be responsible to carry forward and implement ideas and options that would be generated by the research. The contribution of policy makers and practitioners could also enhance the quality of research products; practical experience from institutional contexts and constraints could challenge deliberations and inject realism into choice of options. National practitioners and the staff of regional organisation of the Horn, IGAD, could also be the immediate beneficiaries from the ideas they may garner from their strategic participation in the research project.

Further, a stronger linkage with pertinent developments in the articulation of regional and continental security architecture in the forums of the AU and IGAD would be very useful in putting the research project in policy context. The research could contribute to
informed policy debates in the region and Africa on directly relevant issues such as the AU Military Staff Committee, the African Standby Force and the Regional Brigades, and the continental and regional early warning systems. The trend of deliberations and positions on issues of peace and security in Africa has changed significantly since 2000, as relevant foundational documents like the Protocol on the Peace and Security Council (PSC) reveal. The issue of national and RECs' capacity, role, and contribution as provided by these documents is still under intense discussion. The research project on a region’s security architecture would be expected to be part of the discourse.

The commissioned papers, as indicated, were too broad, disparate and often their relationship to core issues appeared tangential. Hence, we would have to consider a preliminary phase that would entail the constitution of a core research group of experts to identify the crucial dimensions of security in the Horn from the sub-national, national, and regional perspectives. These experts would be required to write succinct conceptual papers that outline their views on salient security issues in the region. This phase of the project would be guided by a broad set of questions organized around specific themes by the core group. Such a process could produce the conceptual framework for the research and provide a much needed focus.

The working relationship between the managing organisation and core partners could be organised on a more structured basis through a memorandum of agreement and/or terms of reference. The process could be inclusive, but a core group of experts should provide intellectual guidance and ensure product quality. The group could be the engine of the process, which would seek to contribute to informed policy debates in the region and beyond, assisting those that are empowered with leadership roles to make decisions. A major contribution of the project would be the development of the core group into a network like SADSEM in Southern Africa and the African Security Sector Network (ASSN)

I am not sure the focus of the ‘Military Cluster’ of the project (excessive resources diverted for military purposes) would engender the interest and participation of policy makers and practitioners. The perspective is also a problematic simplification of a complex and sensitive issue. Rather, many African countries have been subjected to disarmament by default due to years of serious under-funding of their militaries. It would be advisable to reconsider the focus of this cluster, particularly since other IDRC projects are dealing with issues like military budgeting.42

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40 See, for example:
- Constitutive Act establishing the AU – 2000
- Protocol on the Peace and Security Council (PSC) 2002
- AU Non-Aggression and Common defence Pact – Abuja, January 2005
- Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) – Sirte, February 2004

41 Regional Economic Communities.

42 This cluster indeed provides a justification for IDRC support to projects that deal with matters of direct, non-operational concern to the security force.
Preliminary Themes and Working Questions

The following preliminary themes and working questions may be considered by the research project:

Sources and Dynamics of Conflicts

Where does one begin in looking for causes of conflicts - sub-national, national or regional levels? Are there overarching security questions that confront the region or does insecurity inhere in constituents parts of the region? How have these issues been dealt with before?

Regional Institutions for Security

What institutions would one prescribe for regional security? What are the options for institutional development at the regional level? Does the region need new institutions? What impairs regionalism? What are the consequences of institutional multiplication? How have regional institutions been structured to meet national security issues? What are the lessons from past experiments with regional problem-solving security mechanisms? What lessons can we learn from past efforts of regional conferences and meetings seeking to articulate security blueprints? What would be the relationships of future regional security arrangements to existing international institutions and norms for security?

Monitoring and Evaluation

The subsequent phase of the project (Phase II) could benefit from a more defined monitoring and evaluation regime. The internal monitoring and evaluation system employed for the one-year preparatory project phase may have been adequate, but a full-blown three-year project demands more than that. The new phase could be subjected to a monitoring and evaluation process involving an Advisory Group, an external mid-term evaluation and a final, end of project evaluation. Such a regime would ensure an on-going assessment of the project’s relevance, performance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact.
INTRODUCTION

Lack of development and poverty can be a cause and consequence of instability and conflict. While secure environment is a precondition for development, stability cannot be sustainable without development. Development and stability are mutually re-enforcing and share a common denominator: good governance. The project focuses on the security factor of the equation and emphasises on what it terms the peace building approach to human security, asserting that a safe and secure environment is a necessary condition for sustainable, poverty-reduction development. The project argues that the inability of African security organisations to provide the safe and secure environment for economic and political development arises to a large degree out of poor governance – both of the state in general and of the security sector in particular.43

RESEARCH PROJECT

Research Problem

The project’s basic assumption was that unreformed security sectors have a direct and negative impact on development. Excessive or inefficient spending on security pre-empts resources that could be used for development purposes and weakens the capacity of the security forces to undertake assigned tasks. This condition creates a challenge for the development of both a comprehensive security sector transformation framework for Africa and the tools for the implementation of this framework.

Goals and Objectives

The goal of the project was to facilitate the creation of an enabling environment for good governance in African security sectors, and to initiate a comprehensive approach to security sector transformation in which local ownership would be central. A corollary to this goal was a contribution to the evolution and consolidation of stable, secure and accountable governments through the building of the capacity in the security sector.

Specific objectives pursued to achieve this goal and to accomplish project outputs included:

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Case Study of IDRC-supported Research on Security Sector Reform in Kenya, South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria
Project No. 109781

- The production of a handbook on security sector transformation in Africa, which would be an operational tool for the development of procedures and processes for greater democratic accountability, transparency and control over the armed forces and security bureaucracies;

- Assistance to the defence and security sector review process in African countries on the basis of national consensus developed from the bottom up;

- Development of strategies to guide the activities of external actors, particularly the bilateral and multilateral development cooperation agencies, in transforming the security sector;

- Encouragement of a dialogue between African civil society, governments and security agencies on security sector reform.

**Methodology**

The principal output of the project (Handbook) was produced through a collaborative process involving researchers and practitioners across Africa. Collaborating institutions in the project were:

- Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), Nigeria
- Institute for Security Studies (ISS), South Africa
- Centre for International Cooperation, USA

The project used a core research/writing team of experts and contributors with diverse but relevant expertise. The research methods utilised were inter-disciplinary, and it combined desk-based research with empirical and interview based surveys with security practitioners, civil society actors and representatives of inter-governmental agencies.

The process for the production of the handbook included consultations at a series of regional meetings held by affiliated research networks in Western and Southern Africa, which brought together researchers, policy makers and practitioners. The series of workshops – five of which took place in Senegal, South Africa, Nigeria, Seychelles and Mozambique – provided diverse stakeholders the opportunity to review the draft of the handbook as prospective users and ultimate beneficiaries of the handbook. In addition, renowned experts in security sector issues subjected the draft of the handbook to further reviews. The consultations enabled the research project to garner input from a wide variety of local stakeholders and to field test the handbook. Information obtained through the consultations has been incorporated into ongoing research projects carried out by the collaborating institutions.

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44 Members of the core team were: Nicole Ball, Kayode Fayemi (eds.), Funmi Olonisakin, and Rocklyn Williams.
Outputs and Impact

The project set out to facilitate the creation of an enabling environment for good governance in African security sectors, and to initiate a comprehensive approach to security sector transformation in which local ownership would be central. In addition to this central objective, the general objectives of the project focused on the evolution and consolidation of stable, secure and accountable governments through the building of the capacity in the security. These are long-term outcomes, and the contribution of the activities of the project towards the achievement of these outcomes would require time to take hold. The project’s immediate outputs and impact, however, provide a strong indication of the project’s potential contribution to these long-term goals.

The principal output is the seminal handbook, which for the first time provides a definitive guidance on how best to approach security sector transformation in Africa. By documenting critical processes and institutional relationships, the handbook has already become a tool for dialogue promotion and a text in training institutions and academies focusing on concrete ways for security sector governance.46 The project has been a good example of research-policy linkage. It has not only helped to register security reform on the agenda of many African and inter-governmental organisations, it has also launched a dialogue process among diverse stakeholders through the various, well represented workshops that brought together government officials, practitioners, civil society workers and academics who worked on producing the handbook.

A point modestly but rightly made by the project leader was that a lot of the rising profile of security sector reform in development and government circles could be attributed to the work done mostly by the researchers involved in the production of the handbook. In this regard, it is interesting to note that since the project got completed, the main researchers have since gone ahead to help the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with its work on security sector governance and also led the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) study on security sector in 2004.47 The contribution to knowledge of the institutions and individuals involved in the production of the handbook is exemplified by their involvement in the establishment of the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform and the Africa wide Security Sector Network of academics, civil society actors and government officials. In the long run these networks, dedicated to promoting the values of good governance in the security sector would enhance the commitment to accountable and secure governments through capacity building in the sector.

The handbook has already received the endorsement of the African Union with the acceptance of the AU’s President, Alpha Oumar Konare, to write the Foreword to the

46 The Handbook is a training text at Ghana’s Defence and Staff College; interview with Major-General Coleman (Retired) and Professor Eboe Hutchful, August 2005.

Handbook. ECOWAS Secretariat has also expressed keen interest to encourage security sectors in member states to use the Handbook in their training institutions as a resource material.\(^{48}\)

**Dissemination and Information Sharing:** Dissemination has been treated as an on-going issue. The Framework Paper on Security Sector Reform that preceded the Handbook has already been published and put on CDD website. Copies of the operational tool, the Handbook, are being distributed to each African countries’ ministries of defence, interior and justice, and leading defence and security related institutions. Additionally, copies will be sent to universities on the continent, development agencies and research organisations.

### OBSERVATIONS

**Lack of documentation on extant security reform processes**

This work, good as it is, rather dramatically underscores the challenges that persist in the security sector reform agenda, particularly in the area of translating research into policy and influencing pertinent developments on the ground. Indeed, do we even know what is really happening on the ground? The authors of the handbook deplore in the concluding chapter that “there is very little information available on the processes by which countries in Africa have tried to strengthen democratic security governance.”\(^{49}\) Many studies conclude with a spate of prescriptions for the African body politic without a thorough a diagnosis of what is ailing the body. The handbook, in fact, underscores “the relative lack of documentation on and analysis of how the process of change has been conceived and managed.”\(^{50}\) Research could obtain a most direct and tangible impact on policy and development if it would first be targeted to “more consistent investigation of reform and transformation processes”\(^{51}\) that are taking place in many countries in Africa.

**Limited expertise and knowledge base**

The second challenge for security sector reform communities and external support partners is to use the results of the handbook, for example, to build the requisite knowledge base and a critical mass of actors to carry forward the reform agenda. Perhaps we may even have to begin with awareness raising on the existence of a problem and the need for transformation. This is because most of the countries on the continent do not have a long tradition of democracy; the form, process and practice of democracy may still be contested; and legacies of authoritarianism are strong in several places.

\(^{48}\) Interview with General Cheick Diarra, ECOWAS Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence and Security, 22 September 2005.

\(^{49}\) Security Sector Governance in Africa, opus cit. p. 129.

\(^{50}\) Ibid. p. 132.

\(^{51}\) Ibid. p. 133.
It is one thing talking about local ownership of the reform process; it is another thing finding actors and institutions with the appropriate knowledge base to own the process. As the authors insightfully point out, “human and institutional capacity in the civil sector lacks both depth and breadth in African countries. This means that the capacity of civil authorities to both manage and oversee the security organisations is frequently limited.”

This weakness spans across the board in the civil society and would include oversight actors such as parliaments, personnel of the auditors-general, accountants-general, ministries of finance, defence and interior, the judiciary and the media. The security agencies would have to be involved in any process of capacity building – as beneficiaries and implementing partners. Through discourse and information sharing, the security agencies should be made to appreciate the rationale, the process and the benefits of security sector reform. This would forestall the perception in the barracks that security sector reform is nothing more than an assault on the resources allotted to the security sector.

The issue of the need to build capacity in the oversight institutions and the security agencies raises a related issue: How will the indigenous capacity be built and who will do the building? The pool of security analysts in most of Africa appears limited. There is so much demand placed on the top calibre of experts that they have become overstretched, if not endangered, species.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Study and documentation of security sector reform processes in Africa

Research may be supported to explore the processes by which countries in Africa have tried to strengthen democratic security governance. We need empirical evidence and documentation on how the process of change has been conceived and managed in specific African countries. This could be a joint project involving researchers and concerned security agencies.

Research-policy interface

The connection between research, policy formulation and implementation is not necessarily automatic. Research projects should be supplemented with special programmes and projects that should be designed, targeted and implemented to achieve desired policy outcomes and their implementation. This would be a surer way to obtain concrete, long-term impact.

Development of indigenous expertise in security issues

Efforts at security sector reform would only produce sustainable results when we ensure local ownership of the reform process in order to avoid the perception in the reforming

52 Ibid. p. 130.
state that the process is an external imposition. But the requisite capacity in most of Africa is very limited. We need capacity building initiatives in terms of training for civil authorities to both manage and oversee the security organisations. Such training could be organised on regional basis with regional organisations as partners.53 The handbook could be used to build the requisite knowledge base and a critical mass of actors to carry forward the security reform agenda. The donor community, individually or in a consortium, could support appropriate indigenous institutions to run training courses, seminars, workshops and symposia utilising the handbook as a resource. IDRC is already working with reputable indigenous institutions that could be supported to undertake such training.

For the reform process in Africa to be sustained in the long-term, we must also place emphasis on enhancing the capacity of local researchers to analyse, understand and debate their own security problems, and find their own solutions in the reform process. We need special capacity building programmes to augment the pool and expertise of security analysts in Africa. Research projects may have capacity building components tagged along them, but this would not be an effective way to resolve the lack of expertise in security issues on the continent.

Production of manuals

It may also be advisable to develop more targeted manuals from the handbook that would be user-friendlier for particular target groups.

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53 Governments are less concerned when their own inter-governmental organisation is involved.
**PROJECT IV**

**BUDGETING FOR THE MILITARY SECTOR IN AFRICA: THE PROCESS AND MECHANISMS OF CONTROL (IDRC Grant No. 100870, June 2001-May 2004)**

**INTRODUCTION**

The presumed relative overspending in the military sector at the expense of the social sector, especially health and education is a proposition that is often propagated about many African countries by the media, most civil society organisations and some development partners. The basis for this presumption is rarely dispassionately debated. This is because there has not been much effort to access information, analyse and understand the process of military budgeting and place military expenditure in socio-economic and political contexts. This is the gap the project attempts to fill.

The rationale for the project is constituted by multifarious challenges. There is an acute lack of regular and sufficient information on African countries’ military expenditure. Such data may indeed be available in these countries but are given limited publicity primarily due to a lack of demand for the information rather than the desire of the countries to hide the data. There are often other sources of income (both hidden and open) to the military in African countries that are not included in the final figures for defence in annual budgets. “Sometimes these can amount to as much as the official figure for defence itself. In some instances military-related expenditure is deliberately included in non-military budget lines; in others due to lack of knowledge of the proper process. The implication is that the final figure is anything but a true reflection of the exact amount spent on the military.”

Another significant factor the project raises in the context of justification is that the standard sources on African countries’ military expenditures do not provide sufficient information about the socio-economic and political contexts of the countries’ military expenditures, thus rendering analysis difficult and sometimes divorced from the real situation. However, for a proper assessment and analysis of military expenditure data, there is a need for some knowledge of the circumstances in which levels of military expenditure are determined.

In an effort to place these challenges in the proper context, find solutions and enhance our understanding of the dynamics of military expenditures in Africa, the project focuses on the budgetary process that generates the defence figures rather than on just the final figure. The focus on the process is meant to provide a more comprehensive and definitive

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54 See project proposal, pp. 1-2.

55 Ibid. p. 1
understanding of the circumstances surrounding the emergence of the defence budget and the extent of its reliability.

**RESEARCH PROJECT**

The project has been a collaborative effort between the African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR, Ghana) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The project was jointly co-ordinated by the Executive Director of ASDR, Professor Eboe Hutchful, and a researcher at SIPRI, Wuyi Omitoogun, who was engaged in the SIPRI military expenditure project. ASDR had the responsibility for managing the project. The joint ASDR/SIPRI partnership was strategic. The two organisations shared overlapping interests. ASDR is a non-governmental organisation based in Accra, Ghana, and engaged in promoting dialogue and capacity building in defence and security analysis and oversight. In this regard, a number of related ASDR ongoing projects at the time were expected to support the new project, while SIPRI’s renowned expertise in the field of military expenditure would also benefit the project.

**Goal and Objectives**

The overall goal of the project was to study the budgetary process that generated defence allocations rather than on just the final figure. The focus on the process was to provide a comprehensive understanding of the circumstances surrounding the emergence of the budget allocation and the extent of its reliability. The broad goal posed a number of research questions: “Are all the sources of income to the military included in the process? Indeed, is there a process to begin with? To what extent is this in conformity with principles of sound public expenditure management? Is defence in particular subject to the same public expenditure standards as other sectors? What are the mechanisms by which the military allocation is monitored and controlled?”

These research questions were refined into the following objectives:

- To obtain as accurate a picture of the military expenditure of African states as possible through overt sources;
- To identify the various types of extra-budgetary and hidden channels of funding military activities;
- To obtain some insight into defence budgetary processes of African states, the premise being that an assessment of the reliability of data would require some knowledge about the process of budgeting that gave rise to defence expenditure in the states. Accordingly, the study was to examine the way in which defence budgets were prepared, implemented and monitored;
- To examine the various institutionalised mechanisms of controlling, monitoring and auditing defence expenditure in various African states and increase the

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capacity of some of those vested with the responsibility of management and control;

- To increase local research capacity and knowledge in Africa in the area of defence spending in particular and military affairs in general.

**Methodology**

The project’s methodology was structured as follows:

- A joint coordination team comprising ASDR and SIPRI with ASDR as the managing partner;

- An Advisory Group of international experts in security analysis\(^{57}\) supported the study. The group played an active role in quality control of the study, participated in the capacity building of the country researchers, and reviewed country reports;

- Eight studies were commissioned from researchers in Africa to examine the processes of budgeting for the military sector in eight African countries – Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and South Africa.

- In view of the sensitive nature of the study and the need to gain access to information, two researchers were commissioned for each case study, an academic researcher and a military practitioner, serving or retired.

- Two workshops were organised as part the study. The first, at the beginning of the study, was a preparatory meeting for the initiation of the case studies, a pre-writing brainstorming session where details of issues involved were deliberated and modalities for carrying out the research and study framework were worked out. The second workshop discussed the findings of the study at the completion of the research studies, and agreed on a structured outline for the reports;

**Summary Findings**

The main findings of the study are currently being collated for publication. Meanwhile the highlights of the study are as follows:\(^{58}\)

**Challenges**

- There is a general lack of an enabling environment for policy development in most countries in the study. Reasons included a lack of political commitment, absence of dialogue among various actors in the process, either an absence of

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\(^{57}\) See Annex … for the list and affiliation of members of the Advisory Group.

\(^{58}\) See Project Interim Report for the period August 2002-September 2003.
defence policy or, where there is a defence policy, an underdeveloped policy framework with little interaction between the defence policy process and other policy clusters that defence should relate to – e.g. internal affairs and foreign policy;

- Ambiguous laws and, in some respects, lack of laws and regulations and lack of proper delineation of roles and responsibilities among key actors in the process;

- There is a general lack of transparency and accountability in the process because of over-concentration of power in a few hands or certain offices;

- Most legislators lack the requisite skills and knowledge to effectively exercise their constitutional powers of oversight on the process of military budgeting;

- The informal processes of budgeting in most of the case studies tend to be very strong, in several states stronger than the formal processes with all the related implications of accountability;

- Post-conflict states have a better chance of instituting best practice principles in their military budgeting processes because they are starting from the scratch;

- The processes of budgeting in most of the case studies are hardly participatory. In particular there is little consultation outside government. Critically, civil society is left out of the process;

- The attempt to reform the military budgeting process is a recent one and is mainly donor driven.

**Recommendations**

The study recommended the following measures to deal with above challenges:

- A reconsideration of the security architecture of Africa. In particular, of the threats and the types of institutions that can best address them, especially at the regional level;

- A proper development of the policy arena with active dialogue among the various actors in the different aspects of the public sector;

- A further understanding of the informal processes especially the way they work and the best way to integrate these into formal processes;

- An adoption of simple processes of budgeting easily understandable within the African context;
For whatever changes introduced to take root, there has to be a high degree of local ownership, which can only result from a strong political commitment from the political leadership.

**OBSERVATIONS**

This has been a groundbreaking study in substance; it has dealt with crucial national issues, which have largely remained a “no-go” area in Africa but has always attracted presumptions and speculations. The findings and recommendations have been insightful with an immense potential for a long-term impact in Africa. The study raised an important issue, and dealt with the issue with the competence and professionalism that would elevate future discourse on military expenditure beyond the confrontational to a more objective and realistic level. The findings in the form of the challenges identified and the recommendations put forward as possible solutions constitute helpful variables that could provide context and framework for an assessment of military expenditure of African countries. Oversight institutions, government sectors with decision-making roles in the process to determine military budgets, practitioners and the civil society will all benefit from the study.

The project design, methodology, implementation and the quality of outputs are outstanding. This may be attributable to the fact that the project met the critical evaluation factors earlier discussed, and also fulfilled IDRC’s principles and practice of project formulation and implementation as described in Programme Framework 2005-2010.59 *I would underscore for emulation in security sector studies the scheme of commissioning two researchers for each case study, an academic researcher and a military practitioner, serving or retired.*

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The principal project coordinator has indicated that he planned a successor project in the form of developing a security sector budgeting handbook.60 *I would recommend support for such an initiative. But I would go beyond that. The practice of bundling serious research, extensive dissemination and (expected) in-depth policy impact in one three-year project may not be the most efficient or effective way of implementing the security sector reform agenda in Africa.*61 Impact on policy, at best, would be superficial. *The challenge in Africa is not refreshing capacity; it is creating capacity.* ASDR and other appropriate African institutions should be given a long-term support (about five years) to use the prospective manual to run training courses for all stakeholders as beneficiaries.


60 Interview with Professor Eboe Hutchful, Accra, August 2005.

61 The project found it necessary to request additional funding for the dissemination of findings.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Targeted Capacity Building

The common practice of bundling serious research, extensive dissemination and (expected) in-depth policy impact in one three-year project may not be the most efficient or effective way of implementing the security sector reform agenda in Africa. Impact on policy, at best, would be superficial. The challenge in Africa is not refreshing capacity; it is creating capacity. Appropriate African institutions should be given a long-term support (about five years) to develop manuals to run training courses with all stakeholders as beneficiaries. The security agencies would have to be involved in any process of capacity building – as beneficiaries and implementing partners. Through discourse and information sharing, the security agencies should be made to appreciate the rationale, the process and the benefits of security sector reform. This would forestall the perception in the barracks that security sector reform is nothing more than an assault on the resources allotted to the security sector.

II. Development of indigenous expertise in security issues

Efforts at security sector reform in Africa would only produce sustainable results when we ensure local ownership of the reform process in order to avoid the perception in the reforming state that the process is an external imposition. But the requisite capacity in most of Africa is very limited. Support for training projects would be necessary. Such training could be organised on regional basis with regional organisations as partners, and cover personnel from institutions such as parliaments, auditors-general, accountants-general, ministries of finance, defence and interior, the judiciary and the media. Materials and tools already produced from IDRC-supported studies could be used to build the requisite knowledge base and a critical mass of actors to carry forward the security reform agenda. The donor community, individually or in a consortium, could support appropriate indigenous institutions to run training courses, seminars, workshops and symposia. IDRC is already working with reputable indigenous institutions that could be supported to undertake such training.

For the reform process in Africa to be sustained in the long-term, we must also place emphasis on enhancing the capacity of local researchers to analyse, understand and debate their own security problems, and find their own solutions in the reform process. We need special capacity building programmes to augment the limited and overstretched expertise of security analysts in Africa. Research projects may have capacity building components tagged along them, but this would not be an effective way to resolve the lack of expertise in security issues on the continent.

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62 Governments are less concerned when their own inter-governmental organisation is involved.
III. Study and documentation of security sector reform processes in Africa

Research may be supported to explore the processes by which countries in Africa have tried to strengthen democratic security governance. Many studies conclude with a spate of prescriptions for the African body politic without a thorough diagnosis of what is ailing the body. Research could achieve a most direct and tangible impact on policy if it would first be targeted to a more consistent investigation of reform and transformation processes that are taking place in many countries in Africa. We need empirical evidence and documentation on how the process of change has been conceived and managed in specific African countries. These could be joint projects involving researchers and concerned security agencies.

IV. Production of manuals

It may be advisable to develop more targeted manuals that would be user-friendly for particular target groups.

V. Research-policy interface: broadening dissemination for popular impact

The connection between research, policy formulation and implementation is not necessarily automatic in Africa. Research projects should be supplemented with special programmes and projects designed, targeted and implemented to achieve desired policy outcomes and their implementation. Funding institutions and research analysts would be advised to be more imaginative and flexible in their expectations and requirements for research outputs and dissemination. To create a *critical mass of consciousness and appreciation for SSR*, we would have to move beyond the preoccupied emphasis on seminars, publications, reports and presentations among the same circumscribed band of analysts and bureaucrats. Invariably, about 98% of the (largely illiterate) population are left out of the loop in the debate on SSR; yet research outputs always come out with findings that ‘there is a general lack of transparency and accountability in the process because of over-concentration of power in a few hands’. Project managers should be challenged and encouraged to broaden the sphere of knowledge transfer and awareness raising.

VI. Linkage with African inter-governmental institutions

Research projects on regional architecture for peace and security should involve policy makers and practitioners in the process. They would be responsible for carrying forward and implement ideas and options that would be generated by studies. Their contribution could enhance the quality of research products; practical experience from institutional contexts and constraints could challenge deliberations and inject realism into choice of options.

Research should relate to developments in the articulation of regional and continental security architecture in the forums of the African Union (AU) and regional organisations like ECOWAS and IGAD. This would be very useful in putting research projects in
policy context, lest they become purely academic exercises. Research should contribute to policy debates in the sub-regions and AU on directly relevant issues such as the AU Military Staff Committee, the African Standby Force and the Regional Brigades, and the continental and regional early warning systems. The trend of deliberations and positions on issues of peace and security in Africa has changed significantly since 2000, as relevant foundational documents indicate. The issue of national and RECs’ capacity, role, and contribution as provided by these documents is still under intense discussion. Research would be expected to be part of this discourse. Research targeting relevant activities of inter-governmental institutions (AU and RECs) would be useful.

VII. SSR in Post-conflict Situations

There is a common belief that transition regimes and post conflict situations may offer the defining moments and policy windows that may be used by SSR researchers and analysts to influence policy and inculcate best practices in, for example, in military budgeting practices because things are starting from the scratch. There is also increasing recognition that SSR has been given rather low priority in peace agreements that are meant to bring an end to hostilities. Invariably in post-conflict situations Africa, SSR provisions in peace agreement have not gone beyond disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, the creation of a new integrated defence forces and the reorganisation, training and strengthening of the police. In the circumstances, SSR in post conflict situations is a crucial area for research. For, every African country has either been plagued by significant conflict or borders on another country that is (or has been) in significant conflict. Research, however, should account for the challenging environment of post-conflict situations and move beyond simplistic assumptions.

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63 See, for example:
- Constitutive Act establishing the AU – 2000
- Protocol on the Peace and Security Council (PSC) 2002
- AU Non-Aggression and Common defence Pact – Abuja, January 2005
- Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) – Sirte, February 2004

64 Regional Economic Communities.


66 This could be a calculated hostilities-ending strategy where often, whether in Sarajevo or Freetown, the concern is to craft a simple document of compromise to immediately save lives and livelihoods, while further negotiations could occur during the implementation of the original peace agreement.
VIII. Bringing SSR Home

A critical weakness of the SSR agenda in Africa and, indeed much of the developing South, is its profound disconnect with the masses of the population. Research and advocacy programmes on SSR in Africa appear to have completely bypassed the needs of the marginalized and poor. As Professor Hutchful aptly articulated during our interviews, crucial issues of concern to the poor and rural communities have not attracted much research and policy attention, in spite of the well-founded perception that insecurity impacts disproportionately upon the poor. This is the case whether security is defined in its narrow sense of physical safety and freedom from abuse of human rights, or its broader sense of human security. Thus, those that most negatively experience the weaknesses of both security and justice are left out SSR research in Africa. Even research outputs and their potential influence on policy remain ethereal and abstract to the majority of Africans. “Unimaginative dissemination strategies, which involve formal seminars and presentations, books, papers and reports that focus too much on influencing literate and urban sectors of the population” remain remote to the concerns of the majority. Consequently, research activities have woefully failed to build the groundswell for change in Africa.

In view of above, I share Professor Hutchful’s advocacy that future SSR research programmes should seek to empower the poor and improve their access to security by examining issues of concern to the poor including the following:

- The nature of interaction between the poor and justice and security institutions;
- The impact of security and justice institutions on the poor in terms of the provision of security and dispensation of justice;
- The nature of alternative (traditional) security and justice institutions at the local level, and the relationship and complementarity between them and formal institutions;
- Exploration of the relationship between SSR, poverty and poverty alleviation; and
- Processes to expand access of the poor to justice and security at both formal and informal levels

In this way, SSR in Africa may be brought home, meaningfully.

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67 This was also found to be the case in Central America, specifically Guatemala, by Professor Jenny Pearce, opus cit.

68 Professor Jenny Pearce, opus sit, p. 56.

69 Professor Eboe Hutchful, Interview, Accra, September 2005.
CONCLUSION

The IDRC-supported research projects on SSR in Africa continue to have indirect and intermediate influence on security sector governance in the continent. The implementation of these projects have raised the profile of SSR in both civil society and official discourses; they have discounted old unhelpful notions; they have contributed to enlightenment on various aspects of the issue; language and perceptions of the issue are being changed; new concepts have been introduced, debated and subjected to continuing clarification; new ideas have been disseminated and good practices are being advocated; interest has been stirred among younger scholars and materials provided for them to pursue further research. These positive contributions will transcend the lives of the projects and, with time, percolate and have substantive impact on security sector governance (and political governance generally) in Africa.

The overemphasis on direct, linear research-policy impact is not realistic in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, and does unfairly overshadow the achievements of the projects. In this regard, we would all benefit from the advice of Lindquist: “We build policy capacity not because we believe that there will be measurable and unambiguous impacts on government policy, but rather, because we believe that having more rather than less policy inquiry is better for furthering dialogue, debate, and the sharing of ideas …”\(^{70}\)

\(^{70}\) Lindquist, opus cit, p. 23.
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