Rural Urban Migrants and Metropolitan Development

Aprodicio A. Laquian
RURAL-URBAN MIGRANTS AND METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT
Rural-Urban Migrants and Metropolitan Development

Edited by
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This is the second publication in the INTERMET Metropolitan Studies Series. The first one is:

To F. Warren Hurst

— for his interest, support and encouragement.
I may be arrested
I may be hit
I may not even
Have something to eat
But I won't change my opinion
I won't ever move from this hill.

If there is no water
I'll dig myself a well
If there is no meat
I'll buy a bone
And put it in the soup —
I'll get on, I'll get on.

They can say what they like
Here, I don't have to pay rent
If I die tomorrow morning
I'm very near the sky!

From Opiniao
a favela song from Brazil
by Zé Keti and sung by
Nara Leao
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Foreword

If today was a typical day in Seoul, the population probably jumped another one thousand persons. That doesn't sound too much until one starts calculating yearly increases. And similar rates are being experienced in many of the world's major cities. Much of this increase is from the apparently never-ending influx of migrants from the countryside. Unfortunately, despite the enormity of the increase and the problems it brings, we know all too little of its dimensions and the nature of the migrant, his wants and what he has to offer.

The problem of the migrant, already much discussed, was one of many issues highlighted in 1967 when the Centennial Study and Training Programme on Metropolitan Problems was organized to enable the world's major metropolitan areas to exchange experiences in a search for solutions to their problems.

One of the more important conclusions of the Centennial Programme was that we are going about solving our problems in a way that is often irrelevant and not leading to action. It was in response to this need that INTERMET emerged.

INTERMET is a world-wide network linking more than 40 study groups in major metropolitan areas. In turn, each study group brings together elected and appointed officials from all of government, professionals, academics, businessmen, civic leaders, and other concerned citizens, all sharing a belief in the multi-interest approach to urban problems. INTERMET is policy oriented, focusing upon research-action projects. Throughout any one project, the emphasis is upon the sharing in a continuing process, that takes the group, as a group, through the research phases, to policy development and implementation and back to further adjustment following evaluation. This sharing is carried out both within the group and between groups.

The project on Rural-Urban Migrants is the first to be developed by INTERMET and has served as a model for the development of other projects that have followed. It owes much to the leadership, sensitivity and experience of Dr. Aprodicio A. Laquian, INTERMET's
Director of Research. In keeping with the INTERMET approach, the research design was developed through correspondence with the group leadership and finalized at a meeting of the group leaders in Manila in June 1970. For this meeting, a set of monographs was prepared, by the groups, on the current migrant situation in their respective cities. The monographs were later revised and extended and are now presented here with further analytical materials by Dr. Laquian, as the first written contribution of this project for a further understanding of the migrant.

Other documents will follow as the project proceeds. However, while in no way down playing these publications, it must be said that a far greater contribution is being made to the resolution of the problem at hand. This involves the build-up of a wealth of understanding on the part of the policy-makers, a sharing of this policy making process with others, and a greater commitment to action, with continuing involvement throughout the project, on the part of both the public and private sectors.

It is on behalf of all involved in this project that I express our hope that this approach will help alleviate the plight of the migrant and contribute to a greater understanding as to how all may help improve his way of life.

Simon Miles

Toronto, 1971
Acknowledgment

A study such as this which covers eight metropolitan areas all over the world and spans a couple of years can only be the result of the combined efforts of many people. To all those who are, or have been involved in this INTERMET Study of "Rural Urban Migrants and Metropolitan Development," go our heartfelt thanks.

The Study Groups in the metropolitan areas included in this study are the main sources of ideas, support and information. Without them, it would be impossible to do this study. Special mention, however, must be made of the heads of the Study Groups, who are: Purnaman Natakusumah, Director, Perwakilan Jawa Barat, Lembaga Administrasi Negara, Bandung; Pedro Sosa Franco, Jefe, Division Planes Sectoriales y Zonales, Oficina Municipal de Planeamiento Urbano, and Professor, Faculty of Architecture and Town Planning, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas; Adebayo Adedeji, Director, Institute of Administration, University of Ife, Ibadan; Kemal Ahmet Aru, Dean, Faculty of Architecture and Chairman, Department and Institute of Town Planning, Technical University of Istanbul, Istanbul; Agoes Salim, Director, Department of National Unity, Government of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur; Julio Cotler, Professor, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima; Leandro A. Viloria, Director, Institute of Planning, University of the Philippines, Manila; and Chung-Hyun Ro, Director, Institute of Urban Studies and Development, Yonsei University, Seoul.

Most of the papers included here were presented at the Manila Seminar-Meeting held in June 1970. The Manila Study Group is to be thanked for hosting the meeting and making arrangements for the seminar. Aside from Dr. Viloria, others who helped make the seminar-meeting possible are: Dean Carlos P. Ramos, Vice President, University of the Philippines; Dr. Raul P. de Guzman, Director, Local Government Center, University of the Philippines; and the following staff members of the University: Lita Velmonte, Esmeraldo Canonizado, Dolores Endriga, Fred Silao, Tito Firmalino, Gerry Calabia, Jose Valdecanas and others.

Senator Helena Z. Benitez, Chairman of the Committee on Housing, Urban Development and Resettlement of the Senate of the Philippines opened the Manila Seminar with a thought-provoking keynote speech on the role of technocrats in national urban policy making. For this, and other support she gave the Seminar, we are extremely grateful.
During the Manila meeting, the participants had an opportunity to visit the community of Slip-Zero, in Tondo. We are sure that the participants as well as INTERMET and the Council for Regional Development Studies of the University of the Philippines, share our gratitude to the people of Slip-Zero for their hospitality in accepting us into their community. Thanks are also due to Richard Poethig, for arranging the visit.

A seminar-meeting involving people from foreign and Philippine cities entailed a great deal of expense. We acknowledge with thanks, therefore, the assistance of The Asia Foundation, in funding some of the seminar expenses. Special thanks are due to Mr. Louis Lazaroff, Programmes Officer, in the San Francisco office; Mr. William Evans, representative in Manila; Mr. John Bannigan, representative in Seoul; and Mr. John Sutter, representative, Kuala Lumpur.

In the difficult task of editing, rewriting and rechecking of facts contained in the metropolitan area papers, several colleagues have been most helpful. Professor John F. C. Turner of Massachusetts Institute of Technology proposed major revisions in some sections of the manuscript and provided recent survey data on Lima. Professor William A. Withington of the University of Kentucky read the chapter on Bandung and kindly suggested specific changes. Mr. Solomon O. Tokun, Chief Town Planning Officer of the Ministry of Lands and Housing in Nigeria, read the draft on the Ibadan chapter and made some suggestions on how it can be improved. Mr. Gregory Pai of the Institute of Urban Studies and Development at Yonsei University made data available and read the draft chapter on Seoul. To the persons mentioned above and others who have helped in putting the manuscripts in order, the Editor is eternally grateful.

Additional digging for data, organization of the bibliography, proof-reading, and translating are only some of the tasks taken on by Miss Penny Dutton in the course of preparing this work. Without her dedicated assistance, cheery disposition and hard work, the job of publishing this monograph would have been much more difficult. Miss Linda S. Pabellano, who did the backbreaking job of typing, stencilling, mimeographing and near endless retyping of the manuscript is to be commended for an excellent job. Thanks are also due to Mrs. Geraldine Sharpe, who pulled strings and performed near magical feats in making sure that this work got done.

The persons mentioned above, as well as many others, have contributed to the final shape of this monograph. Responsibility for errors of fact and interpretation, however, are mainly those of individual authors and the Editor.
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Editor’s Preface

THIS monograph is the initial result of an ongoing research project on rural-urban migrants and metropolitan development launched by the International Association for Metropolitan Research and Development (INTERMET) in November 1969. As conceived, the project is a comparative action-research venture designed to understand the problems associated with rural-urban migration and to seek ways and means of coping with these problems.

The papers included in this work were written for the First Seminar-Meeting on Rural-Urban Migrants and Metropolitan Development held in Manila, Philippines on 22 to 26 June 1970. They portray the situation in eight metropolitan areas participating in this study in so far as internal migration and resulting slum and squatter conditions are concerned. These metropolitan areas are: Bandung, Indonesia; Caracas, Venezuela; Ibadan, Nigeria; Istanbul, Turkey; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; Lima, Peru; Manila, Philippines; and Seoul, Korea.

The Manila Seminar-Meeting was convened by INTERMET and COREDES (the Council on Regional Development Studies, University of the Philippines) with the following purpose in mind: “To exchange information, ideas and experiences on the nature and extent of rural-urban migration and how the problems posed by rural-urban migrants are met in the participating countries.” The papers presented in this Seminar-Meeting were written as “baseline studies” designed to give an initial description of the migrant situation in the cooperating cities. Since they were prepared before the making of primary surveys (which is going on at this time of writing), the papers had to rely on secondary data from sources such as the census, previous surveys, academic studies, government reports, official metropolitan plans, etc. The goal in writing the papers was to present a comprehensive picture of the past and present situations in the participating cities, including such things as the historical background of the city, the process of internal migration, factors that have influenced migration, the geographical and political distribution of migrants in the urban landscape, the problems posed by migrants, governmental and non-governmental solutions to problems, etc.
To allow for some comparability in the papers presented, a common outline was used by the authors. As much as possible, the authors were also asked to stick to common concepts, approaches and terminologies which were included in a research design for the larger project sent to them in advance. Because of the variety and richness of the experiences in the cooperating metropolitan areas, however, it is only natural that some aspects of the common outline were emphasized in some cities and not in others. In some cases, also, lack of data made it difficult to pursue certain subjects which would have added more substance to the present work.

The INTERMET Study

Previous studies of urbanization indicate that a large part of the rapid growth of metropolitan areas in developing countries seems to be due to internal migration. Migrants provide much of the energy and many of the problems that confront large cities in the developing countries. It is known, for example, that one of the most serious results of rural-urban migration is the growth of squatter and slum communities. It is on this basis that INTERMET has decided to initiate a study focused on such communities. Of course, not all squatters and slum dwellers are migrants and not all migrants become squatters and slum dwellers. This study, therefore, is concerned with a narrower sample of people who are migrants and at the same time squatters and slum dwellers.

The key question to which the INTERMET study addresses itself is the developmental role of slum and squatter communities occupied mainly by migrants to the metropolis. Development, in this sense, is thought of in terms of economic and social components. As far as economic development is concerned, the study takes the conventional meaning of increase in goods and services produced and their just allocation among the members of a community. Social development, on the other hand, may be defined in terms of (a) social stability or the absence of disruptive events such as revolutions, riots and other disturbances in the metropolitan area; (b) social and political participation in community, city and national affairs; (c) integration of new members of the society to the social body; and (d) openness of the society to new ideas and influences and its capacity to adapt to new things.

By developmental role of migrants, especially those who live as squatters and slum dwellers, is meant the extent to which they contribute to the achievement of the economic and social conditions mentioned above. In effect, therefore, a measure of whether migrants are developmental or not is the difference between their contributions to development and the weight of their non-developmental activities. Migrants may contribute something to develop-
ment but they may also block it. They represent resources but they also bring about many problems that the urban community has to solve if it is to develop and grow.

The literature on migrants, squatters and slum dwellers is full of generalizations related to the extent to which such people contribute or do not contribute to the development of the metropolitan area and the country as a whole. The INTERMET study tries to re-examine most of these generalizations in the light of conditions in eight metropolitan areas. Specific questions with which the project is concerned include:

a. **Reasons behind rural-urban migration.** It is commonly assumed that migrants are usually "pushed" from the countryside because of difficulties of life there, or "pulled" by the city because of promises of employment, education, amenities, or a better life. How true is this assumption in the light of the complex of motivations, kinship ties, economic opportunities, social pressures, wars and catastrophes, etc., which may enter into the making of a decision to migrate?

b. **Nature of the slum or squatter community.** Much of the literature on slums and squatters is coloured by the Western bias which sees them as disorganized, conflict ridden, anti-social and characterized by alienation and anomie. On the other hand, some studies in developing countries are finding exactly opposite traits. It is important to know the nature of these communities because the effectiveness of measures to improve them depends on this knowledge.

c. **Functions served by the slum or squatter community.** Closely related to the nature of the slum or squatter community is the question of what functions it performs. Is it a socialization agent that breeds criminals, juvenile delinquents, deviates and anti-social individuals or does it perform social and psychological control functions as well as act as an intermediary in a person's process of becoming urban? What economic functions does squatting and slum dwelling perform? How about social and political functions?

d. **Problems associated with slums or squatter communities.** What problems are attributed to slums and squatters? How are these problems perceived by the government sector, private citizens, and the squatters and slum dwellers themselves? What is the complex of factors that account for these problems?

e. **Solutions to problems.** What have the government, the private sector, citizens and squatters and slum dwellers themselves done to solve problems arising from squatting and slum dwelling? What solutions are planned? What accounts for the success or failure of solutions? What can be done to optimize the chances of success in coping with such problems?
In general, the questions raised above point to one of the main hypotheses of the study, which is that measures designed to improve conditions in the slums and squatter areas will be effective only if they are derived from the true characteristics of such areas. This highlights the role of research in the project. Research must reveal the true nature of internal migration, squatting and slum dwelling. It must guide policy, in this way, in the same instance that the policy making and implementing processes contribute to it by making information available to researchers.

As an action-research project, the INTERMET venture consists of several stages. The first of these is information gathering, where research plays a very large role. The INTERMET study groups in the participating cities are expected to collate and analyze data regarding the migrants, slum and squatter situation in their communities. This involves the writing of baseline studies, making of intensive surveys and the writing up of such researches so as to make them available to policy makers.

The second stage of the project is the translation of the study findings to specific policy proposals. In this regard, the composition of the INTERMET Study Groups in the cities is especially meaningful. Each Study Group is made up of government officials, private citizens, professionals, academics, civic leaders and other persons concerned with metropolitan problems. Many of these Study Group members are personally involved in the formulation and implementation of policies and measures for improving the conditions of rural-urban migrants. This personal and even institutional involvement fits beautifully into the "action-research" scheme. It assures the Study Group's access to information which feeds into research. It also makes it possible for research findings to be taken into consideration in the policy formulation and implementation processes. Finally, the Study Group may serve as an informal point of policy coordination where information on programmes is exchanged, the roles of governmental and non-governmental entities are clarified, and where the formal lines of authority involved in the coordination process are supplemented and some of the red tape inherent in prescribed procedures and methods is avoided.

The division of the project activities into research and action components, however, is only meant for theoretical neatness. In reality, action and research are hopelessly intertwined and it would be extremely difficult to determine where one component begins and where another ends. This is, of course, due to the fact that we are dealing here with an ongoing process, which, hopefully, will lead to the improvement of conditions in communities occupied primarily by rural-urban migrants.

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Participating Metropolitan Areas

In accordance with the methodology used by INTERMET in all its study programmes, the inclusion of any one city in a programme depends on what the Study Group in that city chooses to participate in. This decision is based on what the Study Group thinks is the most important problem in its metropolitan area. Most of the time, the decision is also strongly influenced by the subject matter interest of a number of Study Group members. Such interest may be along research or action lines or both. The Study Group may be eager to learn more about a particular metropolitan problem in order to do something about it. (For more on INTERMET and its programmes, see page 214).

The metropolitan areas included in this study were chosen because of the expressed interest of Study Groups located in them in the problems arising from rural-urban migration, especially problems related to slums and squatters. First of all, the problem of migrants was of special concern to these Study Groups because their metropolitan areas were all confronted with it. In all of the metropolitan areas cooperating in this study, squatters and slum dwellers make up no less than a quarter of the metropolitan population. Though these people were the most obvious manifestations of the migrants' problem, there were also other problems that the Study Groups were interested in.

As previously mentioned, the metropolitan areas cooperating in this study are Bandung, Caracas, Ibadan, Istanbul, Kuala Lumpur, Lima, Manila and Seoul. Though more is discussed about these cities in the chapters that follow, it may be useful at this point to describe them briefly.

**BANDUNG.** The city of Bandung, with a population of 1.2 million and an area of 8,098 hectares, is the third largest urban centre in Indonesia. It was founded in 1811 and incorporated as a municipality in 1906. It is primarily an administrative and political centre, being the capital of the Province of West Java, although it is also widely known as an educational centre and a tourist resort. This latter trait is due to Bandung's relatively mild climate, a result of its high elevation. As a regional centre, Bandung attracts many migrants most of whom settle in rural-like kampongs or move on to the national capital of Djakarta, 185 kilometers away. The latest estimate sets the slum and squatter population of Bandung at 27 per cent of the urban population.

**CARACAS.** Venezuela's national capital was founded in 1567. The Caracas metropolitan area of 11,572 hectares is divided into the Distrito Federal and Distrito Sucre. It has a population of 2.1 million which makes up 22.6 per cent of the total population of
Venezuela. As the country's largest metropolitan area, as well as its primary economic, social and political centre, Caracas has become the goal of many migrants. Many of these former campesinos (farmers) have found themselves in the communities of ranchos (makeshift dwellings) that cluster on the valleys and hillsides of Caracas. Some 19.7 per cent of the total urbanized area in Caracas is occupied by ranchos and about a third of the population is made up of squatters and slum dwellers.

IBADAN. The Municipality of Metropolitan Ibadan is the second largest city in Nigeria, with an area of 2,298.5 square miles and a population of 1.2 million. In contrast with Lagos, the national capital, it is more of a traditional African city. It was formally founded in 1800 and incorporated in 1961. As in other African cities, the population of Ibadan has also been swelled by rural-urban migrants who live in slum and squatter communities. Metropolitan Ibadan is divided into the city of Ibadan itself and six districts. The city itself, with a population of 627,178 covers an area of only 40 square miles.

ISTANBUL. The oldest city in this study, Istanbul, was founded in 685 B.C., almost simultaneously with the city of Troy. At present, it has a population of 2.3 million and an area of 1,131 square kilometers. It is divided into the central city and 25 districts. The population of the city proper makes up about 80 per cent of the total metropolitan population. Slums and squatters, called gece-kondus, are one of Istanbul's most serious problems, comprising 33.9 per cent of the metropolitan population.

KUALA LUMPUR. Kuala Lumpur is the capital of Malaysia. It has traditionally been a Chinese-dominated city. It was founded in 1859 and incorporated in 1896. Within its 355 square miles live some 782,824 people, about 8 per cent of the country's total population. The racial and ethnic mix of Kuala Lumpur's population (Malay, 26.6 per cent; Chinese, 58.1; Indians, 11.5; and others, 3.8), is an indicator of the problems and prospects of Malaysia's development. In many ways, what happens in the federal capital of Kuala Lumpur may determine what will happen in the nation as a whole.

LIMA. Metropolitan Lima typifies the primacy so common among Latin American cities, with 20 per cent of Peruvians residing within it. It was founded in 1535 and has rapidly grown from the migration of people from the interior, many of whom populate the barriadas (shantytowns). As the country's capital and main seaport, Lima's attractive power is considerable, with the result that although it already has 2.5 million people, it still continues to grow. One problem arising from this massive growth is the political fragmentation of the Lima-Callao metropolitan area, which makes the provision of urban services quite difficult.
MANILA. Manila is a curious example of an Asian city with Latin American characteristics. It shares common traits of primacy, fragmentation and overpopulation with Latin American cities. Metropolitan Manila's 3.2 million people make up about nine per cent of the Philippine population. The city was founded in 1571 and got its present city charter in 1901. Being an old city and the most important political and economic centre in the country (Quezon City, the national capital is within the Manila metropolitan area), Manila has attracted many migrants, with the result that about a third of its population is now made up of squatters and slum dwellers.

SEOUL. The Seoul Metropolitan Area, with its population of 4.2 million is the largest city in this study. It ranks 22nd in a list of the largest metropolises in the world, although the central city of Seoul itself ranks 11th among large cities. The population of the Seoul metropolis constitutes close to 14 per cent of the national population. As an urban centre, Seoul City is old, having been founded in 304 A.D. It was the Korean War, however, which really caused the rapid expansion of the metropolitan area, a growth which has resulted in many problems, the most serious of which are squatting and slum dwelling.

Comparing the eight metropolitan areas in this study, one need not go too far beyond the easily measurable aspects of population, land area, formal boundaries, etc., to consider some of the functions and roles that they play in their national settings. It is easily seen that all the metropolitan areas involved in this study are important national and/or regional centres. Five of the eight are national capitals while three are regionally important. It is interesting, therefore, to explore the particular roles of these urban centres in the economic, social and political development of the countries they are in.

The phenomenon of primacy, so characteristic of cities in developing countries, is exemplified by the roles played by the metropolitan areas in this study. Within the Caracas metropolitan area resides 22.6 per cent of Venezuela’s population. The proportion is 20.0 per cent for Lima, 13.8 per cent for Seoul, 9.0 for Manila, 7.7 for Istanbul, and 7.6 per cent for Kuala Lumpur. All but two of the cities are the largest urban areas in their countries: Ibadan, which has 1.8 per cent of Nigeria’s population, is second only to the capital, Lagos, and Bandung, with 1.09 per cent of Indonesia’s population is the third largest city in the country.

The primacy of most of the cities included in this study is shown further by comparing them to the second largest urban areas. The Lima-Callao metropolis is 2.5 million, while the next
largest city, Arequipa is only 180,366. Caracas has 1.8 million people while Maracaibo, the second largest city, has only 589,103. Seoul, Manila, Istanbul and Kuala Lumpur are also dominant urban areas. The second largest cities to these centres are Pusan, with 1,425,703 as against Seoul's 4.1 million; Cebu, with 310,000 as against Manila's 3.2 million; Ankara with 905,660 as against Istanbul's 1.7 million, and Penang (Georgetown) with 234,930 as against Kuala Lumpur's 782,824.

Administratively and politically, all the metropolitan areas included in this study are “regionally unorganized.” No one single governmental body has jurisdiction over the whole urbanized area, although certain area-wide authorities for specific services do exist. In fact, in some of the areas (Lima and Manila are notable examples), there is a tendency toward fragmentation of authority over urban government. In Lima, no less than 17 local government units exist in the metropolitan area while in Manila, 21 such local units provide all sorts of competing urban services.

Typically, most of the metropolitan areas in this study have densely populated urban cores where urban growth first began. In some instances, as in Seoul, the formal boundaries of the core city have been expanded as the population grew and moved to the peripheral areas. To date, 94.6 per cent of the population of metropolitan Seoul is living within the jurisdiction of the City of Seoul. Similarly, the boundaries of Bandung have been expanded, including more areas within the city's jurisdiction so that now, some 93.8 per cent of the metropolitan population resides within the city limits.

In contrast, however, is the situation in Lima, Kuala Lumpur and Manila, where the city proper doesn't have as large a share of the metropolitan population and where the tendency for people to move to the periphery may actually be resulting in a slower growth rate for the city proper. The city of Lima only accounts for 13.1 per cent of the metropolitan population. Kuala Lumpur and Manila's shares are 40.4 and 43.7 per cent respectively. In Manila, the city proper is now growing at only 1.8 per cent per year while the metropolitan area is growing at more than 4 per cent.

The factors mentioned above: primacy, lack of regional organization, and slackening of growth in the city proper, are all somehow related to the problem of internal migration which is the main concern of this work. The effect of the dominance over national economic, social, political and administrative life played by the urban centres studied here is obvious: the cities serve as powerful magnets that draw people from the villages and lesser cities.
Anybody who has an ambition and a dream has to go to the great city to find his fortune. It matters little that the city, with its slums and squatters, offers misfortune as well. People just come, anyway.

The rapidity of population growth is seen in the failure to adjust administrative and political structures to the realities of metropolitan life. Local government units suited for smaller populations still persist in areas where problems have multiplied and now call for joint and area-wide action. With jurisdictional conflicts and confusions, local units find it extremely difficult to provide necessary urban services. Service deterioration, on the other hand, attracts less desirable members of the population. Slums attract more slum dwellers, and the poorer the conditions in the slums, the poorer the people attracted there.

A corollary of jurisdictional fragmentation is usually the deterioration of the city core. People who can afford to live in the suburbs usually move out of the city centre, especially if a good transportation system is available. Offices and entertainment places may continue to locate in the central city. However, residences in the central city become primarily occupied by the poor. The lowering of the tax base in the central city may result in poorer services, driving better people to the suburbs further. The deterioration of conditions in the city core, of course, attracts poorer people and the cycle gets tighter. With the city center denied the resources that go to the suburbs due to jurisdictional fragmentation, the result is only further deterioration.

**Metropolitan Development: a Problem and a Solution**

The continued influx of people to already large urban centres results in metropolitanization. The deterioration of the central city drives people, commerce and industry out to the periphery. At the same time, the high cost of lands in the city centre as well as the difficulties of transportation to and from the downtown area may contribute to this centripetal tendency. Finally, new migrants who became squatters and slum dwellers may temporarily or permanently occupy lands in the periphery. All these factors lead to the phenomenon of “urban sprawl,” or the uncontrolled expansion of the urban conurbation.

The problems arising from this urban sprawl are obvious. The cost of extending services to all parts of the urban area goes up because of the wider territory covered. Transportation and communication costs also rise. Finally, as peoples’ activities involve the criss-crossing of political and administrative boundary lines, the responsibility for regulation and control of these activities gets diluted and becomes unclear, resulting in overlapping of governmental activities, confusion and general maladministration.
As urban problems reach a metropolitan level, traditional ways and means of coping with them become increasingly inadequate. For example, the employment of land use controls, regulations and by-laws becomes difficult with the blurring of territorial boundaries. In some rapidly growing metropolitan areas, attempts have been made to put peripheral squatter areas under control by expanding formal city boundary lines. The squatters, of course, merely uproot their shacks and locate once more in an area just outside the new boundary lines. Since the revision of formal boundaries is always a thorny political problem in most countries, the cities cannot resort to this too often. Besides, extension of formal boundaries to far flung areas increases the costs of services and strains the capacities of urban government.

Even as metropolitanization poses many problems, however, it is also viewed as a possible way out of the dilemma that most urban areas are confronted with. In urban centres where people increasingly work in one place, live in another and pursue their leisure in still another, the formal political boundaries that used to divide the urban area into local government jurisdictions are becoming less and less meaningful. The expansion of urban life now means that activities carried out in one sector of the urban area will have repercussions in another, no matter how definitely drawn the boundary lines are. The need for area-wide solutions, therefore, of a metropolitan or even a region-wide character, is becoming more and more apparent. Such programmes as transportation (especially traffic control, rapid transit, multi-media transportation mixes, etc.), housing (including regulation and control of squatters and slum dwellers), education and welfare, and other services are proving more and more efficient and effective if handled on a region-wide scale. In this sense, therefore, metropolitan action is seen as a solution to urban problems.

The INTERMET study, focusing as it does on rural-urban migration and its effects on metropolitan development, explores the advantages and disadvantages of metropolitan action in the programmes that hope to improve the situation in slum and squatter communities occupied primarily by migrants. It looks at the resources and problems that the migrants bring with them to the metropolitan area and tries to find out how they fit into the overall urban picture. From the other end, the study also looks at the resources and problems emanating from metropolitan action and tries to find out how they are integrated into the whole urban process. From these combinations, it is hoped that a truer picture of the relationships between internal migration, metropolitan action and the solving of urban problems would emerge.

This study is planned to be completed in another two years. Within that period, intensive surveys in selected slums and squatter
communities in the participating cities will be conducted, a typology of slum and squatter communities world-wide will be worked out, specific case studies of how government and non-government entities cope with the migrants' problem will be written, and an international comparative study embodying all findings in the study will be prepared. This monograph, therefore, is only the first in a series of works which are expected to come out of the study. As an initial attempt, however, it is very important in that it provides the seeds for the larger things to come.

Aprodicio A. Laquian

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INTRODUCTION

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INTOLERABLE congestion, widespread famine and imminent environmental catastrophe are the frightening elements of the models frequently projected by planners, political leaders and scholars for the near and the more distant future of both the developing and the affluent nations. Governments and international bodies, therefore, are acting to "stop" the trend of what is often called the "population explosion". This is true, particularly in the developing countries where people are aspiring to achieve the better life now possible while low national productivity is hardly able to sustain the lives that better health and sanitation are saving. The city offers the fulfillment of aspirations. Consequently, waves of redundant rural populations migrate to the cities and metropolitan areas in both worlds; and this universal migration affects decisively the settlement patterns of production and people and releases a chain of drastic social changes.

Spontaneous Urbanization

In the 1950's, 50 million people were being added to the world's total every year. At present, this rate of accumulation is 70 million a year. It was in the 1930's, about 30 million a year but is expected to reach an annual rate of 125 million by the year 2000. At that time, our planet may be inhabited by more than 6 billion people. Two out of every three persons will most probably be urban dwellers. Thus a socially tolerable and economically

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Notes start on page 185.
viable urban environment will have to be erected in the next three decades for 13 times as many people as in the previous 150 years; and the rate of construction would have to average at least 40 times that of the recent past—a task difficult to accomplish even for the highly industrialized countries but inconceivable with the resources and technology of the developing countries. As a result, conditions are rapidly declining in town and village in the developing countries as the gap between population growth and economic growth widens.

The gross national product of some Latin American nations, for example, averages an increase of less than 2 per cent annually, and is greatly exceeded by the rate of urbanization and still more by the rate of growth of shanty towns. Similar conditions exist in the other developing continents. The resulting urbanization is always characterized by chronic underemployment, inadequate shelter and communal facilities, absence of safe water and sanitation, increasing blight, and a growing rate of disease and mortality. The rural migrant has in fact exchanged a marginal subsistence and the relative security of an extended rural family for urban living, defying the humblest concept of "decency". Seldom does his chosen community welcome him; nor do its institutions serve him willingly or well.

The plight of the newcomer emerges clearly from this tersely worded news item from Mexico: "Seven thousand 'paratroopers' [squatters in the vernacular] occupied half-a-dozen tracts of land south of the harbour. The owners sought the help of federal troops to evict the invaders, but the authorities seem unable to act. Violence is feared—the 'paratroopers' are armed... the news has reached neighbouring shops and communities that home sites can be acquired for 125 pesos. An 'office' was set up, funds collected from interested families and plots of 100 to 150 square meters staked out... An avalanche of buyers appeared and overnight innumerable shacks and shanties sprang up where the earth was barren for many years."

A growing number of cities in the developing world now have squatter towns and shanties which already contain one quarter to one half of the population. Their existence is generally deplored but it is accepted as an inevitable corollary of development. Nevertheless, it demonstrates the determination of the migrant to claim for his family the "right to shelter" and shows his ability to build with little help. But this dynamic force has only infrequently been applied in partnership with government to promote orderly growth. Instead the "marginal man" has no choice but to squat and live without basic amenities because he cannot afford the "minimum standards" established by law and his adopted community cannot provide even the most elementary services to
settlements he is obliged to build illegally. He who needs it most is excluded by the law from aid by government.

This, then, is the physical and social environment of the rural migrant’s new settlement. Often, he is propelled out of a stone-age technology or feudal land tenure into an urban environment shaken by explosive transformation. He is truly the unsung hero of urbanization. But let us not accept his condition as the penalty to be paid for changing from underdevelopment to sustained national economic growth. Our society’s economic, technological and human resources have reached such levels that no human being on earth should have to be ignorant and hungry, or live in blight and squalor. However, the millions of poor—black, old or white—found even in the most affluent countries underline the truth that human progress is not an automatic consequence of economic growth. To obtain it, a nation must allocate to human development an appropriate share of the wealth it produces, and plan for equitable distribution of the social benefits it can offer. But narrow economic considerations continue to withhold resources from being used for human development. Abstractions, such as “Gross National Product,” “Per Capita Income”, or “Per Capita Consumption”, useful as they may be for certain international (or regional) comparisons, are meaningless in terms of the problems of given places and problems of given individuals, families and communities.

The legitimate desire of the developing countries to improve conditions of life cannot be arrested. Consequently rural/urban migration cannot be turned off, or even less reversed. The question, then, is: How can national planning acknowledge this rapid transformation from agricultural rural to urban industrial societies, so that it should aid development, rather than impede it? The 1968 issue of the International Social Development Review3 surveyed the world urbanization process, the socio-economic conditions it creates, and the policies and plans devised by governments to cope with its consequences and causes. The survey shows that at the close of the first United Nations Development Decade (1970) the gravity and urgency of the urban crisis continues to receive secondary attention, and that preoccupation with the means of economic growth most probably will continue also during the second Development Decade. Nevertheless, recently, development economics has begun to change: improving the human condition is more widely believed to be necessary for an adequately balanced and rapid economic growth. But the crucial importance of the city as the essential environment in which economic capacities are created or impeded and human qualities of life are enlarged or frustrated is not yet fully realized. The attitude of administrators and planners tends to remain complacent in spite of the fact
that most developing countries already appear to be “over-urbanized”, since their industries and related activities fail to employ productively the men and women who migrate to cities or the young people who reach the working age; and in some areas, conditions have reached levels which are bound to distort the course of projected development, delay economic growth and sometimes even reverse hard-earned economic and social gains. At the same time, less than tolerable urban conditions tend to aggravate racial and other social tensions causing violence, riots and “insurrection” in the slums of certain affluent countries.

The fallacy of “laissez-faire” in urban affairs

Most nations use 15 to 25 per cent of their resources invested in fixed capital formation for residential construction (not counting most of the building in squatter towns). Another 15 to 20 per cent goes into essential urban services. Thus, while a third to a half of these resources go into environmental development, no measurable impact is made on the urban crisis. Most development planners tend to neglect this huge investment area owing to the fact that, historically, it was only exceptionally that cities were planned. Their development just seemed to “happen” as the economy grew. The “laissez-faire” attitude in this vital area now persists in many countries only because a chronic shortage of housing has in turn diverted an unduly large share of family incomes into rents or the purchase of dwellings built wastefully and sited on “expensive” land “developed” through highly speculative land operations.

Urbanization, whether spontaneous or planned, is a phenomenon of national development. In either case its effect on human and economic progress is profound. Economic and social factors have motivated rural/urban shifts in the past and they motivate them now. There are, however, fundamental differences between the two situations. The nineteenth century industrial revolution in Europe and North America, for example, proceeded at a relatively moderate pace. In the main, the market mechanism regulated economic growth. As cities expanded a new social structure emerged gradually, to be sure not without hardship and shock for the migrating peasant become industrial worker. People and factories were settling in the developed areas of the most advanced nations and world trade favoured their industries. Now, the rush to the capitals and metropolises of Africa, Asia and Latin America is most intensive, massive and rapid in countries whose natural resources remain underdeveloped and their man-made counterparts — the economic and technological resources and skills — are insufficient. Now, the terms of trade are highly adverse to the developing nations: an ever increasing quantity of their
primary products buy now a diminishing volume of capital, equipment and other essential imports. These differences are increasing. In the highly developed countries, industrialization and general economic development in the main continue to match the rate of urbanization. Indeed, many industrial countries now “import” foreign labour to satisfy growing manpower needs. But in the countries developing now, imbalances and problems multiply under the impact of rapid urbanization resulting in massive concentrations of uprooted and “foot loose” unemployable labourers in shanty towns and slums in growing physical squalor and social tension.

Available evidence indicates that, generally, metropolitan regions will continue to grow and the difficulties so far connected with them will become progressively more acute in the immediate and near future. Urbanization will inevitably continue at varying rates, until the urban/rural ratios reach about four to one. Then the process will most probably assume slower rates, until land, employment and mechanization reach ratios capable of creating high productivity in agriculture, providing to rural families incomes similar to those already attained in the city. In this context the long-term total impact of urbanization is highly positive. The city leads in industry, incomes and culture. If planned for comprehensively on the regional scale it could also become an effective means of eliminating existing disparities between town and country. Instead of spending scarce resources on attempts of only a temporary value to contain rural people in their marginal subsistence condition practical measures should be devised to facilitate urbanization in selected locations designated within the framework of national development goals. The rising tide of migration should persuade planners and governments of the futility of trying to “prepare” the potential migrant for “living in the city” which rejects him by definition, and of the need rather to focus attention on the city’s ability to accept the new citizen (often the country’s most progressive rural man) to accept urbanization as a positive manifestation of development and a factor potentially useful for development. Society must fear less the much maligned “population explosion” and start devising instead an explosion of development and productivity which in turn could enable the people to assume their appropriate role of productive resource and not be considered a calamity. Family planning is of course a desirable choice. But the current emphasis on birth control as the cure-all for the ills of underdevelopment seems overstated. Also, it tends to shift world attention from cause to consequence — from the dangerously low rates of economic growth the developing nations are able to attain (without massive external aid) to their current high rates of population growth, a result of effective external aid in food, health and sanitation.
The United Nations set a realistic goal for the first Development Decade (1961-1970), namely a rate of economic growth of at least 5 per cent per annum. The developing nations failed to attain it—on their own. Higher rates have been achieved and sustained by a number of countries both with socialist and with "free enterprise" economies; and the corresponding rapid rise in levels of living together with intensive general education have sharply reduced their national birth rates (and consequently their population growth) by individual choice in dignity and freedom. More adequate rates of economic growth must somehow be achieved in the future. It seems unlikely that the same "marginal people" in the developing countries, illiterate and allegedly apathetic in matters of development, could now conveniently be assumed to understand a highly sophisticated and complex relationship between their national economies and the size of their own families. Or is it implied that family planning and birth control might be enforced as an alternative to stepped up economic growth and education? The answer to this dilemma depends on the society's ability to organize a workable world economy in the interest of peace and survival.

Elements of a viable urbanization policy and strategy in developing countries

The current urban crisis is complex and is deeply rooted in the growing inter-dependence of national economies which, in turn, are increasingly becoming integral parts of the world economy and world trade. It has already unleashed a complex of interacting socio-economic and environmental problems insoluble in terms of national economies and national planning alone. Every nation must use its own resources as effectively as possible, or face degradation. But the size and urgency of the job at hand demands that the efforts of the developing nations be supplemented by intensive international technical and capital aid. While there is a free flow of data and strictly technical advice from developed to the developing countries, adaptations of their experience to the sobering conditions of underdevelopment are yet to be made. Worst of all, one of the most important ingredients of development, namely, investment capital, remains extremely scarce in the developing countries.

The reciprocal relationship of population, urbanization, the human condition and economic growth is obvious. However, the location of vital economic activities will probably continue to follow the path of least resistance. As nations continue advancing and adopt advanced technologies and management methods, and as new sources of energy (including atomic power) and new means of livelihood and modes of transportation appear, the process of urbanization could reach a highly explosive stage. In these circum-
stances, comprehensive regional planning combined with adequate investment in the physical and social infrastructure and in productivity could be expected to guide the development of urban and industrial agglomerations (both existing and nascent). Such patterns may suitably distribute settlements and people so that they are linked together in territorial entities that are cities in the socioeconomic sense and regions in the geographic and political-administrative sense (city-regions). Unless the present trend of excessive concentration can be changed, the already overcrowded metropolitan agglomerations will become less and less efficient in their role of agent of development and less and less suitable as places to live in.

Two separate but exceedingly loosely connected development processes occur in most countries simultaneously. The first consists of a set of large “productive” projects involving few persons and benefiting in the short run only a small part of the nation. They are meant to build the country’s infrastructure and industry and make available more equally in the long run the benefits of the wealth so created.

The second process is in fact a struggle for survival until large scale development matures and becomes operative and adequately productive. It consists of a variety of programmes mostly social in nature. For instance, “community development” has been combined in some cases with agricultural demonstration services to increase food production for the growing urban consumption. Some rural people have thus been started on the way of participation in the national development effort as producers and as consumers. In other cases, handicrafts and cottage and small-scale industries have been regrouped in villages and towns, and organized as partly mechanized undertakings. They are able to produce for the growing urban market the badly needed consumer goods for which no modern large scale industry existed. Rural and small communities become considerably more attractive and hitherto dormant resources begin to contribute substantially to general development.

Programmes such as these are obviously useful, but their effectiveness is limited in the long run. Consequently rural masses migrate to the cities where development goes on with more certainty for the future. Urbanization is indeed the principal means by which the benefits of development reach increasingly larger sections of a country’s population. Under conditions of under-development, urbanization often takes the form of “invasion” and squatting on vacant land and of illegal construction of shantytowns. This “spontaneous” form of urbanization is now accepted in many areas as being unavoidable. A whole new doctrine of
“moral justification” and “legality” of squatting and of “borrowing” utilities is beginning to emerge. New zoning practices and dwelling standards are being formulated and enacted, bringing housing costs closer into line with the economic capacity of “marginal citizens”. In itself, therefore, the phenomenon of squatting is a very progressive step. The provisional community (barriada) surely is not a slum in any strict sense of the term. A high degree of co-operation and planning goes into the preparation of an “invasion” and building a squatter town. Political action and a great deal of collective bargaining and negotiation go into securing and “legalizing” land tenure and obtaining communal services and employment. “Marginal man” really cares for his community and participates in its affairs most actively. Yesterday’s “ignorant” peasants are learning quickly how to manage their community democratically with their own and their families’ shelter and livelihood as incentives. The possibilities of a nascent squatter town becoming a stable community are all there. Decline and decay, however, are equally possible: owing to a lack of positive and constructive support by public authorities, local and central, the barriadas begin to change from “incipient” communities to slums.

Wherever the marginal migrant settles, whether as transient or as permanent settler, he has undergone a radical change. Modern science and technology applied in health, agriculture and industry have profoundly altered conditions in country and town and the “push” away from a declining rural life combines with the “pull” of the city to change his outlook and aspirations. As “urban man” he has moved (often with the help of relatives, friends or tribal connections in the city slums) from the traditional landlord-peasant relationship to a new, as yet uncharted, social environment of the squatter town. He now joins with others to promote his and his family’s interest collectively. This new social structure, co-operative in nature, with its strong reliance on self-help, self-management and direct action is a new condition in urban affairs. It should now be used also by urban and public authorities as a new development tool, particularly for tackling the many problems of “marginality” by means of community and collective action. Instead, futile aspirations are being promoted, for example: individual home “ownership” via “savings and loan” institutions at the cost of one quarter or more of the family budget, a device conceivably viable when family incomes are more or less adequate to meet other essential needs after paying these high housing costs, but economically or socially inapplicable and therefore meaningless in most developing countries. Much could be learned, in this connection, concerning workable approaches, methods and techniques, through pilot projects sufficiently large in scale to realize economies and to test the feasibility of adapting
practical experience from one particular situation to another or to demonstrate the viability of new approaches.

The reports from eight metropolitan areas reproduced in this volume project a clear picture of the complexity, the magnitude and the world-wide impact of the accelerating pace of urbanization. They also show that to date development theory and practice has failed to recognize the city's role as the long-neglected link among the many interacting processes and activities of an expanding industrialization. The metropolitan region (the city-region) emerges from these studies as the level at which action designed to facilitate the change from the traditional rural-agricultural to an urban-industrial society can be meaningfully planned and organized. This realization is true for both the rich and for the developing countries, but it is particularly important for the latter where capital resources are scarce but where the rural-urban migration is a dynamic force which could be used in partnership with government to transform "spontaneous urbanization" from "cancerous growth" into a positive development factor.
Bandung

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National Institute of Administration
Indonesia

BANDUNG is the third largest metropolitan area in Indonesia, after Djakarta, the national capital, and Surabaja, the main urban centre in East Java. It is the capital of West Java, a populous governmental unit that surrounds Djakarta Raya or the capital region. Aside from being an administrative and political centre, Bandung is widely known as a tourist resort mainly because of its mild and pleasant climate. It is also an educational centre, with six universities, a technological institute, a teacher training centre, and various research institutes located in the metropolitan area.

The city of Bandung lies 12 kilometers from north to south and nine kilometers from east to west. It is situated on a plateau and is surrounded by small towns: Padalarang and Tjimahi on the west, Lembang and Tjisarua on the north, Udjingberung on the east and Dajeuhkolot and Buahbatu on the south. The plateau inclines in a north-south direction, with the highest point, 1,050 meters above sea level located in the north and the lowest point, about 675 meters above sea level in the south. Because of its elevation, the city is pleasantly cool all year round, with an average temperature of 24°C throughout the year.

As a provincial capital, Bandung plays an important role in national affairs. This role is considerably enhanced by its proximity to Djakarta, only 185 kilometers away. Through the years, Djakarta has grown and expanded pushing its boundaries into the province of West Java. As a natural consequence of this growth, the province, as well as its capital, Bandung, has also progressed. The fact that Bandung is an educational and military centre also enhances its growth. Aside from the six universities located in the city, there are 34 other colleges and institutes as well as military schools. Bandung has an estimated student population of 34,814. The Army General Staff College is located
in the city, while the Air Force General Staff College and the Police General Staff College are situated in Lembang, a small town 12 kilometers north of Bandung.

**Historical Background**

In 1811, Bandung, which at that time had a population of 1,800 inhabitants, was the capital of the *kabupaten* (regency) of Bandung. The regency became a *gewest* (residency) in 1864, when the capital had a population of 11,052. The Dutch, who liked the climate of Bandung which contrasted so much with the humidity of Djakarta (known then as Batavia), also found that the place was excellent for growing crops such as tea, coffee, quinine and rubber. The plantations in and around Bandung attracted many people to locate there, so that by 1906, the authorities decided to grant the settlement autonomous status. Under the 1903 Decentralization Law, Bandung became a *gemeente* or municipality and was given a limited degree of autonomy.¹

In 1906, when Bandung was given municipal status, it had a population of 38,403 and a total land area of 900 hectares. About a quarter of the land area had already been built up at the time. The increase of the population to 48,980 in 1911 necessitated boundary adjustments and the city area was expanded to 2,150 hectares. For five years, the city's boundary remained the same in spite of the fact that by 1916, the population had increased to 70,000 or just a little bit less than double the population in 1911. In 1921, Bandung's boundaries were expanded by 703 hectares but by that time, the population had risen to 114,311. The city's land area remained the same for a decade, though the population had reached 161,569 in 1931.

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<th>Area (Has.)</th>
<th>Density (per Ha.)</th>
<th>Built-up Area (Has.)</th>
<th>% Built-up Area to Total Area</th>
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¹ In 1903, the Decentralization Law was passed by the Dutch colonial government, granting limited autonomy to the municipalities. ² The data presented in Table 1 is based on historical records and may not reflect the exact figures due to discrepancies in the data sources.
Colonial status for Indonesia effectively ended in 1942 with the Japanese occupation of the country, despite the fact that the Dutch tried to impose their sovereignty over the country even after the Second World War. Colonial life, however, was most marked in the urban centres of Indonesia and persists up to the present. For example, much of the current difficulty in providing services and amenities to urban centres in Indonesia may be traced to the governmental structures that were formed during the colonial period.

Like other urban centres in Indonesia, Bandung developed primarily because of European influence. In fact, the grant of municipal status to Bandung was dictated more by the presence of Europeans in the place than by the size of its population. Governmental structures during the Dutch regime were divided into those that served the Europeans and those that ruled the native Indonesians. Autonomous municipal status was given to areas which could be governed by the Dutch. The central government had jurisdiction over all native Indonesians, even those that lived in areas which were within the boundaries of municipalities. Hence, two sets of government officials grew up under these circumstances: local government officials who were mostly Europeans and central government officials who were also Europeans but who had to deal with the influential Indonesian traditional leaders.

Because the municipalities, such as Bandung, could raise their own resources to meet the needs of their primarily European populations, they were able to provide urban services. The kampongs and desas (communities and villages) which were composed mainly of Indonesians, however, could not get enough from the central government to afford these services. In 1918, therefore, municipalities were given the authority to annex Indonesian communities within their framework, in view of health and other problems which came from them and affected the Europeans as well. In the mid-1920’s, a policy of “Indonesianization” of the civil service was launched by the Dutch. Many Indonesians took over civil service positions formerly held by their colonizers. To some extent, this move assured Indonesian cultural content (which tended to emphasize the value of the local community) in colonial administration.

To sum up, urbanization and colonization were strongly linked together in the history of Indonesia. The nature of this linkage was described by Milone in the following manner:

Urbanization in colonial times was, then, related both to the formation of capitals or seats for administrative divisions and to European commercial development. It was
also related to the processing of plantation crops: to the sustaining of Christian centres; to the exploitation of resources such as coal, oil, tin, and timber; to the creation of military cantonment centers; to port functions and the sitting of railroad termini and highway junctions; to the provision of public services and secondary and university level education (principally for the Europeans but also for a relatively small number of Indonesians and Chinese); to the location of higher courts and hospitals; and to the desire of Europeans to spend their free time away from the plantations in shopping and in being together in exclusive urban social clubs, and to enjoying holidays and retirement in a pleasant upland climate.3

Administrative and Political Structures

Indonesia's present local government system reflects the combination of native institutions as well as governmental forms introduced by the Dutch. Generally, a distinction is made between central government structures that operate at the local level and which are answerable to the Ministry of the Interior, and local autonomous regions granted decentralized powers. These two types of institutions interact at about three different levels: the province or autonomous region, the municipality, and levels lower than the municipality such as the ketjamatan, kelurahan, etc. Formerly, the heads of autonomous units were elected but after the take-over of the military, they also became appointed, as are the central government unit heads. There is hope that with increased stability in Indonesia, the structure and functions of the local government will return to their former state.

The city of Bandung is a local autonomous entity. As previously mentioned, this status was attained in 1906 when it became a gemeenten or municipality with its own Gemeente-Raad or City Council. The Council was headed by the head of the administrative region as chairman. It had eleven members: eight Europeans, two Indonesians and one representative of the Chinese and Arabian community.

On 1 July 1917, the first City Mayor (Burgemeester) of Bandung was appointed by the central government. In 1926, under Government Act No. 369, the Gemeente Raad became the Stads Gemeente Raad, a council with greater powers and autonomy. The council's membership was increased to 27 in view of these changes: 15 Europeans, 9 Indonesians, and 3 Chinese and/or Arabians.

During the Japanese occupation of Indonesia (1941-1945), the council was abolished and city administration became a one-man rule affair. Dutch officials were interned and Indonesians
took over the civil service jobs. The Dutch language was outlawed and Bahasa Indonesia became widely used. The Mayor of Djakarta was placed directly under the jurisdiction of the Resident, who was in turn answerable to the Japanese Sixteenth Army. One important change introduced during this period was the formation of the lowest level of municipal territorial unit, the neighbourhood association, which became the forerunner of the present rukun tetangga and rukun kampong.

Immediately after the war, the Indonesians revolted against the Dutch. Bandung became a part of the area ruled by the Dutch, and was liberated from the former colonizers only in 1949. The 1945 constitution which guided Indonesian rule until independence stipulated that pre-World War II structures were to be used until new forms could be created. After August 1950, when the unitary state of Indonesia was formed, the status of Bandung as an autonomous municipality was assured. The structure of Bandung's city government has changed little since independence in 1950: the executive is the Mayor, who is appointed by the Minister of Home Affairs (now Interior) upon nomination of the city council. The Council is composed of 35 members, and it serves as the local legislative body. Serving as an advisory group to the Mayor and assisting him in the administration of city affairs is the Badan Pemerintah Harian (The Body for Daily Government).

From 1950 to 1956, Bandung enjoyed the autonomous status of kota besar. As such, it was regarded as a middle level autonomous region with right of government with the central authorities. Since 1956, however, Bandung has been made a kotapradja, the second highest level of local government in Indonesia.

Population Migration and Metropolitan Growth

Changes in the organizational structure of Bandung through the years have primarily been caused by the rapid growth of the city and its growing importance in regional and national affairs. Compared to the other large urban centres in Java, Bandung has the highest rate of population growth.

The average annual rate of growth of Bandung's population has been estimated at 3.63 per cent. If the average rate of natural increase in the city is 2.07 per cent (Census figure), then the average rate of growth due to migration may be set at 1.5 per cent. This means that 43 per cent of the increase of the population of Bandung is due to migration.

A closer study of the population growth in Bandung reveals an increasing rate of growth since 1950. In this decade, the rate of growth was set at 4.44 per cent per year. This means that the
Table 2

Indonesia's Six Largest Cities
[by Percentage of Increase]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Number of Inhabitants 1930</th>
<th>Number of Inhabitants 1961</th>
<th>Percentage of Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bandung</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>972,566</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djakarta</td>
<td>533,000</td>
<td>2,973,100</td>
<td>558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malang</td>
<td>86,000</td>
<td>341,400</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surabaja</td>
<td>341,000</td>
<td>1,007,900</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogor</td>
<td>65,400</td>
<td>154,100</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semarang</td>
<td>217,800</td>
<td>503,100</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

annual rate of growth due to migration was 2.37 per cent or that 53 per cent of the population increase in Bandung has been due to rural-urban migrants.

Table 3

Population Growth in Bandung 1950-60*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Inhabitants</th>
<th>Increase in Population</th>
<th>Percentage of Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>644,475</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>668,149</td>
<td>23,674</td>
<td>3.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>689,779</td>
<td>21,630</td>
<td>3.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>757,825</td>
<td>68,046</td>
<td>9.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>802,104</td>
<td>44,279</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>839,155</td>
<td>37,051</td>
<td>4.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>870,346</td>
<td>31,191</td>
<td>3.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>913,528</td>
<td>43,182</td>
<td>4.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>951,828</td>
<td>38,300</td>
<td>4.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>986,880</td>
<td>35,052</td>
<td>3.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1,028,245</td>
<td>41,365</td>
<td>4.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As seen in Table 3 and the graph on page 17, population growth in Bandung has been most rapid in the decade 1950 to 1960. Two specific reasons may be given for this. In 1950, the

*These figures are from the Five Year Development Plan for the City of Bandung, 1969-1973. They seem to be estimates that tend to be on the high side. Other sources set the population of Bandung in 1961 at 972,566.
city was made the capital of West Java, thus increasing rapidly the number of civil servants living within its boundaries. The jump of the percentage of increase from 3.24 to 9.86 may be directly linked to the transfer of many civil servants to Bandung, as well as the other jobs, services and other occupations that they generated. The increase in 1957-1958, on the other hand, was due to disturbance in the countryside created by the Darul Islam (Islamic World) rebellion in West Java. The unstable conditions in the villages forced many of the people to move to Bandung and other urban areas. Even after the rebellion many of the migrants to Bandung did not return to their places of origin, thus swelling the city's population further.

As for personal and other motives for migration to urban centres like Bandung, one can only deduce these from studies made in other cities as no such survey has been made in Bandung. In a study made by the School of Economics of the University of Indonesia, for example, it was found that in Djakarta, 34.3 per cent of rural-urban migration was due to financial and economic reasons. Other reasons included: to raise one's level of income, 17.3 per cent; unsatisfactory position in place of origin, 12.0 per cent; unsafe conditions in the rural areas, 2.1 per cent; to join relatives in the city, 9.2 per cent; to continue studies in the city, 6.6 per cent; and job transfers, 10.1 per cent. When the analysts made a distinction between migrants into Djakarta from urban centres and those directly moving from rural areas, they found the economic and financial motive stronger for the already urbanized migrants.
It is difficult to pinpoint the places of origin of migrants to Bandung in the light of insufficient data. However, based on observations and general knowledge of the community, the largest group of migrants in Bandung seemed to come from other parts of West Java, Central and East Java or the regions closest to the city. The second largest group comes from Sumatra. Of this latter group, the migrants from West Sumatra and Tapanuli are most visible because they traditionally run restaurants or engage in small retail trade. Other groups do not have such marked characteristics.

Patterns of Settlement

Like most old cities that grew rapidly in population, Bandung has an old section which is the city centre, a largely residential zone around it, and a peripheral area which is heavily populated by low-income people. It can be seen from the map on page 19 that the city centre corresponds closely with the city’s core which dates from the developed area in 1906. Subsequent developments are reflected in the built up area in 1931, which shows a close correspondence with the zone of first class homes shown in the map on page 21. These homes were the residences of the Dutch colonial officials, which were later transformed into governmental residences and homes of the Indonesian elite. In contrast with the physical layout, housing, size of lots and other characteristics of the old city centre, the residences of the Europeans tended to be better planned, featuring larger houses and lots, better services and other amenities, etc. Up to the present, this difference is still visible. The most expensive and beautiful residential sections in Bandung are still in the northern parts of town.

According to a survey made by the Planning Office of the City of Bandung, slum settlements characterized by deteriorated housing are found in the city centre, especially in areas which are on district boundaries (See map on page 22). Most squatting, however, occurs in the peripheral areas, where the high densities and dilapidated housing which occurs in the city centres are not found. The squatter communities in the periphery have all the characteristics of rural kampungs, with houses usually having their own vegetable plots, fruit orchards, and even rice paddies.

In the sectors within the ketjamatan (sub-districts) of Lengkong, Andir, Sukadjadi and Tjibeunjing, squatter settlements have grown rapidly. The population of these areas has grown fast due to migration of squatters. Sukadjadi’s population increased from 56,556 in 1954 to 93,715 in 1961, an increase of 65.70 per cent in six years. The increase in population is shown in the rapid rise of densities in the area. While in 1954, there were 70.82
Fig. 2. PATTERN OF DEVELOPMENT OF BANDUNG'S BUILT-UP AREA, 1906-1954
persons per hectare in the place, this rose to 117.3 persons per hectare in 1961. The same pressure of people on the land is seen in the ketjamatan of Andir, which had a density of 155.1 persons per hectare in 1961. Already, the settlements mentioned above have inadequate facilities as far as water, electricity, health and other services are concerned. They are still growing, however, especially in the light of industrialization in the area. Government authorities in Bandung have planned these areas as industrial zones thus enhancing the migration of people who seek jobs and who offer services to those employed in industries.

In other parts of Bandung there are lands which are occupied by relatively well to do squatters, and this shows in the types of housing erected by these people. They are squatters in the legal sense only, but their living style and other characteristics do not brand them as slum dwellers. Many such squatters are living on government property. Some of them are government officials or people in high places. Many students also live in such squatter areas, because rents are not too expensive there.

In terms of squatting and slum dwelling which causes social problems, this often occurs close to the city centre, especially in areas close to the markets and other places where cheap employment can be obtained. In these areas, there are slum dwellers which are not technically squatters because they own the residences they occupy or are renting rooms and bed spaces in private homes. Here, however, the high density, lack of sanitation, lack of services and other evils of urban living in such deteriorated conditions are readily apparent.

**Characteristics of Squatters and Slum Dwellers**

In view of the lack of social surveys among Bandung’s squatters and slum dwellers, the characteristics of these segments of the population have to be deduced from other sources. The most obvious index to the economic situation in the slum and squatter areas is the type of housing occupied by the people. As in other countries, the shanties of squatters and slum dwellers tend to be small, dilapidated, made of light materials, and often badly congested. The jobs of squatters and slum dwellers are mostly those not requiring special skills or training. Incomes are low, though needs are simple. It is usual for several members of the family to be partially employed, so as to add something to the total family income.

A typical example of a squatter or slum dweller is a person whose main source of income is the earnings from his betjak, a foot-pedaled tricycle which is the most common means of short-range transportation in Bandung and in other cities of Indonesia. Some betjak drivers own their vehicles but many just rent them
KOTAMADYA BANDUNG

LEGEND
•••••••• RESIDENTIAL AREAS

DISTRICT LINES

SUB DISTRICT LINES

Fig. 5. SLUM AND SQUATTER AREAS IN BANDUNG
from owners, who exact a fixed fee. A **betjak** driver starts earning only after he has earned the fee due the owner. Earnings are usually very low in relation to the physical exertion involved.

Community life in the slum and squatter areas is heavily reminiscent of rural life. The houses of squatters and slum dwellers are usually built in clusters and are huddled very close together. This is due to the natural factor of space limitation and possibly to a psychological need to cling together for security. Indonesian life, according to sociologists, displays three main characteristics: **gotong rojong** (mutual help), tolerance, and **musjawarah** (peaceful consultation). Basically, the Indonesian is not individualistic though his relationship with other people is usually on a highly personalized plane. He has a very strong sense of communal solidarity, featuring a pattern of mutual assistance in such activities as building a house, planting and harvesting of crops, etc. The value of helping the weak and the needy without expecting any reward is ingrained in the socialization process.

The trait of tolerance is shown in the refusal of people to engage in direct conflicts. Social relationships are usually conducted on a highly symbolic plane. Because of the personalized approach to things, the errors of others are easily forgiven. The value of friendship and of maintaining a good social relationship are often held higher than values measured in terms of work results.

As a consequence of **gotong rojong** and tolerance, the Indonesian dislikes open disagreements. Hence, problems are usually solved through peaceful consultation and face to face talks, often involving intricate ceremonies and rituals. The imposition of the will of one person over another is not liked by Indonesians, especially in the light of their colonial experience. People will go to extreme efforts to keep discussions going because they feel that this is the way in which rational and acceptable solutions are arrived at.

Taking these social characteristics of Indonesians into consideration, the Government of Indonesia has created government organizations at the community level to help in solving common problems. Such community organizations are the **Rekun Tetangga** (RT), **Rukun Kampong** (RK) and the **Rukun Warga** (RW). The RT's and RK's are at the neighbourhood level. RW's, on the other hand, are usually composed of several neighbourhoods and an RW may be thought of as a "Larger Neighbourhood Association."

In many countries, especially in Latin America, the potential for violent political action in slum and squatter areas has been re-
peatedly voiced in the literature. In Bandung, residents of squatter and slum areas seem to have participated actively in actions against the government. While the evidence points to the youth and the intelligentsia as the instigators of revolutionary action, these active elements have also been able to gain the support of the squatters and slum dwellers. In the abortive coup attempt in 1965, for example, many of the residents of slums and squatter areas participated actively, succeeding in holding the reins of government in Bandung for a few hours. However, the political participation of squatters and slum dwellers does not seem to be sustained over a long period. It occurs in bursts of frenetic activities and then dies down.

![LEGEND](Fig 6. Housing Need And Supply in Bandung)

All in all, people who live in the slums and squatter areas of Bandung seem to possess the characteristics of individuals transplanted from the rural kampons. This is especially true of those who live on the city's periphery, where many still rely on the products of the soil (farming, horticulture, handicrafts), supplemented by periodic employment in non-farm pursuits. This transplanting of rural traits to an urban milieu is often the cause of many problems. As seen in the country's "self-help" efforts, however, it may also be the basis for cooperative solutions.

**Problems Arising from Rapid Migration**

The most serious problem that arises from the influx of migrants to Bandung is housing. As shown in Table 3 on page 16, the annual rate of population growth in Bandung has ranged from 2.30 per cent to 9.86 per cent from 1950 to 1960. Within that time, however,
the supply of housing has hardly kept up with this rapid rate of population growth. As shown in the chart on page 24, the gap between total housing need and housing supply in Bandung has been widening since after the Second World War and there seems to be no ready solution in sight. Since 1951, squatting and slum dwelling, as seen in the gap between total housing supply and the number of registered houses, has been meeting part of the housing need. However, since most squatter and slum homes are sub-standard, this sector of housing supply is only a short-term solution, if it is one at all. Some authorities think squatting and slum dwelling is a symptom of the housing crisis instead of a solution.

Table 4
Number of Registered Houses in Bandung

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>46,928</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>51,458</td>
<td>4,530</td>
<td>9.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>55,184</td>
<td>3,726</td>
<td>7.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>57,878</td>
<td>2,694</td>
<td>4.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>61,688</td>
<td>3,810</td>
<td>6.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>65,168</td>
<td>3,480</td>
<td>5.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>67,030</td>
<td>1,862</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>70,680</td>
<td>3,650</td>
<td>5.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>72,997</td>
<td>2,317</td>
<td>3.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>75,311</td>
<td>2,314</td>
<td>3.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>77,995</td>
<td>2,684</td>
<td>3.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>81,053</td>
<td>3,058</td>
<td>3.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>83,001</td>
<td>1,948</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>84,464</td>
<td>1,463</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>85,596</td>
<td>1,132</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>86,544</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>87,450</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>87,849</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the absence of official figures on the housing shortage in Bandung, one can only estimate it from the figures currently available. In 1966, the city of Bandung had a population of 1,116,387. In that same year, the number of registered houses was 87,849 (see Table 4). According to the studies made by housing authorities in the city, each house in Bandung had 10 people living in it on the average, which is an index of doubling up in most houses. If we assume that this average holds true for all types of housing in the city, the inhabitants of registered houses will be 878,490 (10 x 87,849). Subtracting this figure from the total city population, we get the figure of 237,897, which represents the number of
people occupying houses that are not registered. Assuming the same average of 10 persons per house, this sets the housing lack at 23,789.

Since the registration of houses in Bandung is an imperfect administrative process, we can only assume that a large part of the 23,789 houses not registered in the city are squatter shanties. Some people included in the figure as occupying unregistered houses may also be doubling up with relatives or friends, paying rents, or not permanently occupying any kind of dwelling at all. No matter how imperfect the statistics, the difficult situation in Bandung as far as housing is concerned is readily discernible. This is so, especially in the light of the figures in Table 4 above, which show a steady decline in the percentage of registered houses since 1962.

Aside from the housing shortage, of course, the rapid migration of people to Bandung has created other problems. For example, the present capacity of the water supply system in Bandung is 976 liters per second. The supply needed by the consuming public is set at a minimum level of 2,265 liters per second. All hospitals in Bandung have a bed capacity of 2,671 while the minimum required for Bandung's total population is 4,500 beds. The public markets in Bandung have a total area of only 25.38 hectares while the demand is for 40 hectares.

In short, water shortage, sanitation problems, crime and juvenile delinquency may be directly traced mainly to the increase in the population of Bandung due to migration. As Bandung has become important in regional and national affairs, it has served to attract many people. The pressure of these people on the city's already limited services has brought about a near critical situation. As in other parts of Indonesia, however, official efforts to solve Bandung's problems are slow in coming for the country seems to be preoccupied with other larger problems.

**Past, Present and Proposed Solutions**

In Bandung, as in other cities of Indonesia, there has been relatively little concrete effort in the past to improve the facilities for city living. During the fight for independence, in the period between 1945-1950, most efforts were directed towards the fight for freedom, international recognition and the achievement of political unity. During the 1950-1960 decade, governmental action was mostly aimed towards quelling regional conflicts, pacifying opposing political groups and achieving national peace and security. In the years 1961-1966 political and economic turbulence reached its peak. It was in this period that the Communist Party of Indonesia tried to seize power from the government and that inflation reached dangerous heights.
Preoccupation with national problems has had a strong impact on the regions, provinces, and cities of Indonesia. Practical and urgent measures necessary to improve local conditions were put aside in the period of nation-building. Local development was de-emphasized in favour of problems of national concern. The result was that the bulk of government expenditures in the central and regional level was channeled to political and security purposes.

With the central government so dominant, there was a marked decline in local government administration in Indonesia after independence. Administrative practices were impaired by political pre-occupation and power struggles which had deeply penetrated the governmental apparatus. The standards of performance efficiency in the public service degenerated due to instability of the economic and political situation.

Under these circumstances that beset Indonesia, the role and function of the central government became extremely important. New leadership was asserted when the central government attempted to take a new direction and translate its policy into more concrete and realistic terms. Some changes in the general situation have been evident since 1967. This was seen in the manifestation of administrative action towards the improvement of governmental affairs. Indonesia's earnest desire to rehabilitate and stabilize the economy and the political situation became apparent in 1968-1969. Hyper-inflation which had previously been raging all over the country started to disappear and economic stability began to emerge. The impact was strongly felt also at the regional level. The local governments, like the city, have discovered a favourable climate for administrative adjustment and reform.

The City of Bandung, within its resource limitations, has not been indifferent to the problems generated by rural-urban migration. One specific action was initiated in 1968 when the city government required the registration of squatter and slum dwelling units. The government also exacted charges from the illegal occupants of government lots and out of the proceeds, it planned to purchase sites for the relocation of squatters and slum settlers. One repercussion of this action, however, has been the belief of the people that the imposition and collection of fees legalized their occupancy of the lots and implicitly established their titles of ownership. Thus, they have started selling the lots or their "rights" of occupancy. The city government had to come out with an ordinance prohibiting such sale. At the time of writing the registration of houses continues while the ordinance on house construction is being enforced more vigorously.
There have also been attempts of the city government, with the aid of a city special police force, to eject the squatters from certain localities. In fact some houses were actually demolished but no sooner had the "demolition squads" left than squatter houses started to sprout again. Because of these counteractions to thwart the city government measures, the problem of rural-urban migration becomes even more formidable. The city government has taken other steps. It has required the erection of houses reasonably far from public roads. Buildings on certain areas which should not be there have been torn down. Negotiations for a resettlement site located in the southern part of the city are being made by the Regional Housing Center with the assistance of the Institute of Technology of Bandung.

Focus on Local Development

General observations indicate that natural attachment to each other prevails among the rural folks generally and a spontaneous bond keeps them in their towns and communities. However, as the conditions in the cities improve and those in the rural areas deteriorate, the economic and social gap between the urban and rural areas widens. In the former it is believed that there are more job opportunities and greater economic security; higher and better education can be obtained; more convenient public utilities are provided; places of entertainment and recreation centres abound and are more varied, etc. All these upset the balance of habitation in the region, especially between the urban and rural communities. City life becomes more attractive, the forces which bind people in the rural areas loosen, the exodus to the city starts and consequently, the problems of rural migration and urbanization emerge and become a menace.

In answer to the complaint of the local units about the loss of their best people to the capital, it must be pointed out that the only way for them to keep their good people from migrating is to provide incentives and favourable conditions that may approximate urban living, measures that give recognition to what capable citizens can do for their localities.

A long-term positive approach to the migrants situation would be the uplifting of the socio-economic conditions of the entire region of West Java, with emphasis on the development of the rural communities: increased agricultural production in the West Java Region; establishment of cottage industries outside the city, (such as the creation of spinning mills in Tjipadung and Bandjaran) and providing out-of-town opportunities and other projects to absorb manpower, thus minimizing the flow of labor force into the city.
This local development approach is consistent with the policy of the national government on the deconcentration and decentralization of governmental functions, thus promoting the cause of local autonomy. The crucial thing is how to carry out this policy to full realization, such that it becomes the central force to stimulate and achieve improved living conditions in the local area, around Bandung. Toward this end, steps are being carried out gradually. The regions, provinces, and towns have undertaken local development projects, with the support of the central government. More schemes seem to be needed to provide more opportunities for local development.

The Regional Approach

There is some evidence that Bandung has failed to tap and make full use of its potential resources. This may be one reason for its inability to undertake long-range development programmes. Of course, one must not fail to mention political and administrative difficulties which have also gotten in the way of development.

One effective approach to the migrants situation in Bandung would be planning and action on a regional basis in which both the city and provincial governments work hand in hand. The new Governor of West Java who realizes the strategic importance of Bandung, politically and socially, has expressed his desire to affirm the right place of Bandung as the center of the Region of West Java. He has made available the facilities of the Provincial Government to help the city in some of its projects, such as the repair of the main roads in the city and the conduct of the areal survey, which is now in full swing. The regional military authority in West Java has improved the peace and order situation in West Java and with this improvement there has been a decrease in the rate of migration from 2.3% to 1.5%.

Bandung's development can further be accelerated by assistance from the Province. Solutions to the problems of the city must, therefore, be considered within the framework of the regional development strategy described above and not independently or isolatedly, as has been done in the past. On the other hand, plans should be formulated in consideration of the segmental plans of kabupatens (towns), kotamadyas (cities), and desas (villages).

Social Involvement

Since it is almost impossible to eject the slum dwellers and squatters from the city outright without a favourable and attractive resettlement site, the City Government might just as well learn to live with them—for the meantime, at least. One effective means to do this, which does not require a huge outlay, is to exploit possibilities for involving them in city government affairs and
community development activities. Their spirit of cooperation and sense of participation can be stimulated to the full through urban community development programmes.

On certain occasions the city government has been successful on this score. It is encouraging to note the cooperation that the people have demonstrated where it has been sought and enjoined in some projects of the City. The spirit of community organization and community development consciousness based on the Indonesian tradition of gotong-rojong (or mutual cooperation) is ever alive in slum and squatter areas. All that is needed is to ignite it to productive flame. What is remarkable is that where the need for social improvement is deeply felt, the spirit of mutual cooperation is strongest. The government often sponsors contests among neighbourhood associations as a stimulus to the beautification and maintenance of cleanliness in cities and towns. Bandung was the winner in this contest for the year 1969.

Relocation and Resettlement

The urban migrants problem, which is steadily growing worse, should be one of the most urgent in the City Government's order of priorities. The resettlement of squatters and slum dwellers and the expansion of the city government's housing programme should be given top consideration in the city government capital budget. It has been established that there is a logical connection between deficient housing and the rise of slums and squatters; and it has been shown that the government has to expand its housing programme. Perhaps the most effective and feasible course of action that the city government should take under the circumstances, would be to choose a suitable area for these slum and squatter inhabitants and to construct tenement houses which they can rent at minimal cost. It is then proposed that the city government should not relent in pursuing the implementation of its plan to relocate the squatters and slum dwellers.

The successful and effective approach of the city government in coping with the problems caused by rural-urban migrants would be a positive step in community development and in the establishment of the social infrastructure of wholesome living in the city. It is the responsibility of the government to create this social climate which allows the dynamic elements of society to expand, grow, and evolve in a positive way.

Conclusion

Indonesia has experienced political and economic upheavals since it gained full independence in 1950. Ironically, while the resources of the country were devoted to solving the problems
arising from these, the instabilities they created have accelerated the migration of people to the country’s main urban areas. Since inadequate resources were committed to solving urban problems, Indonesia now finds itself faced with one of the most serious situations in Southeast Asia as far as urban affairs are concerned.

One of the critical indices to the seriousness of Indonesia’s urban problems is the lack of information regarding the most basic aspects of urban life. Population figures, data on economic activities, demographic data and other bits of information taken for granted in other countries are either not available or only partially available in Indonesia. One result of this lack of information is planning on the basis of lacking or even inaccurate data. The plan for Bandung is one example of such an effort. Obviously, the rationality of a plan is only as good as the data it is based on. Where figures are lacking or inaccurate, one cannot expect the plan to be fully workable.

The picture in Bandung since 1967, however, seems to have considerably brightened. In the first place, political and economic stability in the whole country now makes it possible to devote official energies to coping with urban problems. The example of the authorities in Djakarta is not lost on the officials in Bandung. Many of the approaches and techniques being tried in the capital are also being introduced in the capital of West Java.

One important factor in Bandung’s efforts to cope with its internal problems is the relative flexibility of governmental structures in the Indonesian system. In their efforts to take advantage of the merits of Dutch, Indonesian and other institutions, the authorities in Indonesia have not been shy in creating new structures. The regional “two-tiered” governmental units now used in Djakarta and Jogjakarta are examples of such innovations. One hopes that in the case of Bandung, an appropriate structure will also be found to solve its many problems.
Caracas

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VENEZUELA is located in the northern part of South America and is bounded by the Caribbean Sea in the north, the Atlantic in the east, Brazil and a disputed zone, in the south, and Colombia and Brazil in the west. It occupies a territory of 912,050 square kilometers. Caracas, the capital of the republic, is linked to the Caribbean by its main port, La Guaira, 17 miles away. The distance of Caracas from other major capitals of the world is not too much: Lisbon is 6,500 kilometers away, New York, 3,500 and Rio de Janeiro, 4,250.

Caracas is situated in the north-central part of Venezuela, very close to the coast. It has facilities to communicate with the rest of the country by means of an infrastructure that has been greatly developed in the last ten years. The city spreads out in a narrow valley 25 kilometers long and four kilometers wide. The mountain range which surrounds the city (the Cordillera de la Costa) has traditionally made communication with the neighbouring places difficult but the development of a transport and communication network in recent years has changed the situation immensely.

Caracas is blessed by a benevolent climate, despite its distance from the coast and its altitude of 920 meters above sea level. Of late, however, the city's temperature seems to be changing. People complain that Caracas is now warmer, and blame the rapid progress of urbanization and the cutting of the surrounding forests for this. Many of the surrounding areas have been denuded of vegetation. Some of them have been occupied by squatters who live in the outskirts of the city.

This chapter is based on a paper written originally in Spanish.
Demographic Aspects

The city of Caracas was founded in 1567. During the first 233 years after founding, it reached a population of 40,000 inhabitants. In the 140 years that followed (between 1800 and 1940) the population increased to 293,000 inhabitants. In the last twenty years (1940 to 1960), the official population of Caracas was as high as 982,000 people. It is estimated that Caracas, by 1970, has reached a population of two million. From these figures, it may be seen that Caracas doubles its population about every 20 years.

In 1966, the population of Caracas was estimated at 1,797,162, which made up about one-fifth (19.3 per cent) of the entire population of Venezuela (about 8,985,000). Of Venezuela's total population, two-thirds (67.9 per cent) lived in urban centres of over 100,000 inhabitants. Most of these lived in the Greater Caracas area.

The population of Caracas has grown steadily since 1936 when it had 259,000 people. The average annual increase in the city's population has risen from 19,000 persons in the 1936-1941 period to 58,000 in the 1950-1961 period. The volume of population growth in Caracas is shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inter-censal Periods</th>
<th>Total Population Increase</th>
<th>Average Annual Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1936-1941</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-1950</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1961</td>
<td>642,000</td>
<td>58,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The growth of the Caracas population may be equally attributed to natural population increase and internal migration to Venezuela's primary urban centre. The migration from the country's interior, which mainly consists of people coming from rural areas or from urban places in the vicinity of the capital, is going on at an increasing rate. In many ways, this migration is responsible for some of the economic and social problems currently encountered in the city of Caracas.

One of the serious problems faced by the Caracas metropolitan area is the fact that basic public services in the city have not kept pace with the fast growth and expansion of its popu-
lotion. For example, though Venezuelan law makes elementary schooling compulsory, only 71 per cent of the youth population of Caracas (ages 7 to 14) were registered in schools in 1966. This left about 100,000 children, which comprised 29 per cent of young people within that age group, out of school. Furthermore, of the students in school, about 40 per cent attended school in buildings that were not designed for educational purposes.

The problem of Caracas, in the final analysis, cannot be separated from the problems of Venezuela. Basically, they are rooted in the maldistribution of the country's population, marked by concentration in the coastal areas, with Caracas as the primary centre. Factors internal to the Caracas urban area, however, also contribute to the problems. Important among these are political and administrative structures that do not lend themselves to effective coordination and cooperation.

**Political and Administrative Structures**

The urbanized area of Caracas belongs to the Department of Libertador, part of the **Distrito Federal** (Federal District) and **Distrito Sucre** (District of Sucre) which is in the State of Miranda. Though one general plan exists for the whole urban area, the implementation of this plan often suffers from lack of coordination because of the political and administrative division mentioned above.

Coordination of activities in Caracas is further confused by the fact that the national ministries also conduct operations in the urban area by virtue of its being the national capital. Thus, with three governmental levels (national, departmental or state, and municipal) and two areal divisions, operations in Caracas sometimes gain a bewildering aspect. At present, for example, there are two municipal entities governing municipal zoning in the urban area and a builder must go to both of them to get a construction permit. Furthermore, the national ministries in charge of road construction, housing, sewerage, waterworks and gas conduct their operations in the urban area independently, with little or no coordination, not only among themselves but with the state, departmental or municipal entities as well. Thus, incidents such as the following are not uncommon: two months after the public works department finishes an important road, the waterworks department tears it up to put in new pipes. The damage is repaired, but after six months the telephone company tears up the road again to put in its cables. The result of all this, of course, is not only waste of effort and resources, it also inconveniences the travelling public which has to use the road.

It is obvious that if the Greater Caracas area is to effectively cope with the urban problems confronting it, there is a need for
some political and administrative re-structuring. The preparation of one general plan for the metropolitan area,¹ and the attempts to integrate the plan with the national development plan prepared by the central government are laudable. However, in view of the fact that problems arising from rapid migration of people to the Caracas area are expected to become worse in the future, much more is needed to increase the capacity of the whole urban area to face the critical years ahead.

Population Migration and Urban Problems

The maldistribution of Venezuela’s population which is shown in the high concentration in the coastal areas and lack of people in the interior is rooted in economic conditions that have shaped the country’s history. In the 1920’s, old farmlands along the shores of Lake Maracaibo yielded oil. Since that time, the whole country has undergone a drastic transformation which influenced population distribution. The oil industry changed an economy formerly based almost completely on agriculture. With the development of the oil industry came the exodus of the peasants from their farms and the appearance of the first true urban centres in Venezuela.

The economic and social development of Venezuela since the 1920’s has been almost dominated by the oil industry. Industries of a different type, such as light manufacturing and agricultural processing were also started in the country but they did not flourish too much. Partly, the failure of these industries may be attributed to the competition from foreign industries which were attracted by the huge profits being obtained from “black gold.” High wage rates, expensive production, and lack of technical skill also worked against the other industries. Since Venezuela did not have a protective economic policy at that time, harmful competition worked against its own industries.

Of the few industries that were started and survived, some, such as food production and construction stand out. The same may also be said of the cigar and cigarette industry, the production of food from animals and the shoe industry. However, the dominance of the oil industry in the country’s economy prevented other industries from fully developing because of reasons previously mentioned. Since the oil industry was concentrated in specific parts of the country, population growth in these parts became very rapid also.

At present, the Government of Venezuela is attempting a policy of economic development which will correct the imbalances that occurred in its early period of growth. Industrialization is still seen as the key to national development, however. Certain areas of the country have been designated as zones of future industrial power and their development is being planned. These
include the area of Moron for the petrochemical industry, the central area of Maracay-Valencia as a centre for manufacturing, and the zone of Guayana as a centre of enormous possibilities arising from its vast mining potential, especially iron.²

Alongside this industrialization policy, however, the Government is also pursuing an agricultural policy based on the Agricultural Reform Law put into effect since 1960. This policy is concerned with the redistribution of land, the provision of credit to farmers and the improvement of technical skills of people through state organizations. The implementation of this agricultural policy has shown some excellent results after a decade of hard effort. It is hoped that with agricultural successes, the migration of people from the rural areas may slow down in the future.

Up to the present, however, the migration of the campesinos (peasants) to the urban areas of Venezuela continues unabated. Much of this migration ends in the Caracas metropolitan area. Caracas as the capital of the country, has been a major attraction for migrants since the beginning. This attraction has become stronger with time and is closely related to the rising mobility of the country’s population and the improved communication and transport system throughout the country.

According to the Census of 1920, 12.2 per cent of the population residing in the Federal District of Caracas was born in other parts of the country. Another 5.5 per cent of the district's population was born in foreign lands. With the growing importance of Caracas in the nation's life, more and more people have migrated to it ever since. Thus, the percentage of residents born outside the Federal district has gradually increased through the years, reaching 44.9 per cent in 1941. Since that time, however, the proportion of migrants to the total population seems to have stabilized.

According to the censuses, from 1951 to 1961, the percentage of migrants to total population has slightly decreased from 48.6 per cent to 44.7 per cent. This decrease may have been due to the fact that in this period, the Federal District lost some people to the rapidly developing District of Sucre. As a whole, therefore, migration to Caracas from other places may not have been decreasing — the variations may have been due to movements within the metropolis itself.

If one adds the population coming from foreign countries to the growth of the Caracas population, the increase is even bigger. In 1920, the proportion of migrants and foreigners in the Caracas population amounted to 17.7 per cent. This went up to 55 per cent in 1951 and 54.2 per cent in 1962. Though in 1920, for-
eigners coming to the capital represented only 5.5 per cent of the total population, in 1950 they represented 12.5 per cent and in 1961, 17.1 per cent.

The factors that influence the migration of people to Caracas, of course, are not confined to the urban area alone. Ray has pointed out that the growth of the barrios in Caracas is somehow linked to political developments that have occurred at the national government level in Venezuela. In The Politics of the Barrios in Venezuela, Ray states that three fairly well-defined stages in the country’s history have direct links to the rural-urban migration to Caracas. These are: (1) the coup of October 1945 that brought down the regime of General Isaías Medina Angarita; (2) the rapid economic growth from 1950 to 1957 which also roughly coincided with the dictatorship of President Marcos Perez Jimenez; and (3) the overthrow of the Perez Jimenez regime in January 1958.3

According to Ray, the rural to urban migration from the 1920's to 1945 was at a relatively high rate but it was really the 1945 coup that triggered off large scale migration because it established an administration which for the first time in Venezuela’s history sought the support of the populace. The authoritarianism of the Perez Jimenez regime which started in 1950 was not strong enough to counter the pull exercised by Caracas and more people moved to the capital. During this regime, the GNP of Venezuela went up 95 per cent, oil production doubled, and the construction industry as well as other industries boomed. These developments, of course, attracted a lot of campesinos to Caracas. Finally, the revolution of 1958 which turned over power to a popularly-oriented military-civilian junta, also invited many rural people to come to Caracas. Ray contends that more barrios in Caracas trace their origin to the first 24 months following the revolution than to any other period.4

Paths of Migration

It is interesting to analyze the paths taken by the movement of native Venezuelans into the Federal District of Caracas but lack of data makes such a study difficult. Census data provide information on the states where the migrants come from but they do not indicate the specific location of places of origin within the state’s boundaries. Hence, the more detailed path of migration is impossible to obtain from the data currently available. One cannot find out, for example, whether the flow of migrants is from rural villages to large cities, from villages to small towns and then to cities, or it is primarily from city to city.

From data currently available, it is known that from 1920 to 1936, almost every state in Venezuela has contributed to the flow
of migrants to the Federal District of Caracas. Studies also reveal that two factors seem to be generally influential in this migration: the distance of the state of origin from the Federal District, and the population size of the state sending migrants to Caracas.

Historically, it is known that initially, much of the migration to the Federal District of Caracas came from neighbouring states: especially the states of Miranda and Aragua which share a border with the Federal District, and the state of Carabobo, which is also close to Caracas. With time, however, people from states farther from Caracas joined the migration streams. In the 1920 to 1936 intercensal period, people from the state of Apure, Barinas, Cojedes, Monagas and Portuguesa were represented in the Caracas population.

In terms of population size, it is observed that states with a larger population tend to send more people to Caracas. Thus, the migration between the state of Miranda and the Federal District has been the largest population shift in the country. These two places have the highest rate of population growth in Venezuela, although the Federal District grows faster than the state of Miranda, indicating that on balance, the migration tends to be in favor of the capital.

If one looks at a political map of Venezuela, it is seen that the states on the northern side of the country tend to be more highly populated than the southern states. The northern coastal states serve as attraction points for people who live inland. Thus, on the map on page 40, it is seen that the strip corresponding to the Andean states is the country’s most densely populated area. The zones not so marked in the southern part of the country have low population densities, about .5 inhabitants per square kilometer. On the other hand, the mountainous area along the coast which covers approximately 177,000 square kilometers is inhabited by 80 per cent of the country’s total population. The central plains, with 300,000 square kilometers has barely half a million inhabitants while the region of Guayana, with 413,000 square kilometers (about 47 per cent of the total national territory) only has a population of 200,000.

A closer look at the region around the national capital of Caracas reveals that migration is also hastened by the availability of the means of transportation around the place. On the map on page 40, for example, it is interesting how the major thoroughfares all lead to the Caracas metropolitan area. In fact, the map also shows how the settlements tend to be clustered very closely together in this part of the country. The road network may also be responsible for the fact that population concentrations are already spilling into the state of Miranda and other nearby states sharing a border with Caracas.
Fig. 7. MAPA POLÍTICO de VENEZUELA

Fig. 8. MAPA de la PARTE CENTRAL del NORTE de VENEZUELA
Location of Ranchos in the Urban Area

As previously mentioned, the Caracas metropolitan area is divided into two districts. Distrito Sucre, which occupies the western part of the city, is the older area and is more densely populated than Distrito Federal, which is mainly composed of new developments on the eastern side of the city. Generally, there are more ranchos in Distrito Federal than in the Distrito Sucre. In fact, the higher class residential places, new business zones and some new government offices are now found in the Distrito Sucre.

The location of the ranchos in Caracas is shown on the map on page 42 which was prepared by the Oficina Municipal de Planeamiento Urbano. As is readily apparent from the map, the ranchos are located on the western part of the city, especially close to, and even inside the area of downtown Caracas. The ranchos have also proliferated on the south-western portions of the city, following the road network and the ravines and hills that ring the city.

The map showing the location of ranchos also shows the spatial distribution of people in Caracas according to income. As the map on page 42 shows, people of higher income (those receiving from $711 to $888 per month) are mostly found in the eastern portion of the city especially in the high-class residential sections in Distrito Sucre. Middle income people ($356 to $710 per month) are mostly found near the city centre and low-income people ($355 per month or less) are found in the areas which are identified in the map as occupied by ranchos.

The extent of the city's urbanized area occupied by ranchos has grown steadily through the years. A series of maps prepared by the OMPU for its Caracas 1990 Plan of Urban Development reveals the extent of land areas occupied by ranchos (See Table 2).

Table 2
Land Area Occupied by Ranchos
(1930-1966)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total Urbanized Area in (Has.)</th>
<th>Area Occupied by Ranchos (Has.)</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930-38</td>
<td>1,885</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938-41</td>
<td>3,344</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-51</td>
<td>5,411</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-54</td>
<td>6,155</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-57*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-59</td>
<td>8,089</td>
<td>1,192</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-66</td>
<td>11,572</td>
<td>2,280</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*No data
LEGEND

TOTAL INCOME PER MONTH

HIGH INCOME (711 - 888 per month)
MIDDLE INCOME (356 - 710 per month)
LOW INCOME (0 - 355 per month)
RANCHOS

Fig. 9 LOCATION OF RANCHOS IN CARACAS
In 1966, some 570,000 people lived in the 2,280 hectares occupied by ranchos in Caracas. These made up a little less than a third of the metropolitan area’s population. The plan for Caracas estimates that by 1990, the city would have a population of 5,100,000, if the rate of growth of six per cent per year remains unchanged. Of these more than five million people, about 1,650,000 would be rancho dwellers.

In a study of marginal areas carried out by the Comite de Remodelacion de Barrios started in 1962 with assistance from the Alliance for Progress, the ranchos were classified according to their location. The study found that a greater number of ranchos are increasingly located in the peripheral areas of the city as against the inner city. Furthermore, of the peripheral area rancho dwellers, there were those who lived on the hillside, in the ravines, and on level ground.

Generally speaking, most ranchos are located very close to the access roads to the city because people tend to work in the centre. The ranchos in the peripheral city areas are following the road network and thus forming what people have sometimes called the “belt of misery” of Caracas. There are also ranchos located in dry river beds, in deep ravines where development is limited by the difficult terrain, which also inhibits the extension of services. Studies have found that of people who live on the hill­sides, some 70 per cent have constructed their dwellings on slopes of 40 degrees or less. The remaining rancho dwellers, however, occupy hill­sides with a 60 degrees or less incline (but exceeding 40 degrees). The difficulties involved in living in houses located at such a steep incline are obvious. During the rainy season, many of the hill­sides get eroded so badly that landslides sometimes take some of the houses along. Water and other amenities are also extremely difficult to get on the hillside. Still, a steadily growing number of people are preferring to stay in these high places (ranchos reach an altitude of 1,050 meters above sea level in Caracas) because of the pressures of the population on the land.

In sum, we find that in Caracas, ranchos usually occupy specific types of land. These are:

(a) Zones adjacent to the main access roads of the city;

(b) Zones surrounding working centres or places of employ­ment such as those found in the extreme eastern and western parts of the city;

(c) In the neighbourhood of low income housing projects which have been developed or subsidized by the Banco Obrero (Workers’ Bank);
In zones adjacent to ranchos which are undergoing a process of expansion;

In zones adjacent to areas where high income people live, where those who provide them with many services usually locate;

In vacant and uncontrolled areas; and

In territories allocated or donated by the proper municipal authorities which are designed to relieve the pressure on the land caused by the rancho dwellers.

It is generally known that the ranchos are a consequence of certain socio-economic processes at work in most of the countries of Latin America. The phenomenon of squatting and slum dwelling is also found in the cities of Bogota with its tugurios, Rio de Janeiro with its favelas, Lima with its barriadas, etc. The ranchos of Caracas, like the favelas of Rio, are especially difficult to develop, however, because of the nature of the terrain that they occupy. As already mentioned, not only are the ranchos located on the periphery of the city, they are also perched on very steep slopes which add more expenses for development.

Some people advocate that low cost housing be provided to rancho dwellers and that the cost of such housing should be passed on to them over a long period of time. A survey of 18 rancho communities conducted by the Comite de Remodelacion de Barrios in 1964 found that average annual income per family in these places was Bolivares 7,023.00 (about US $1,500). Considering the cost of other things basic to human life, most of these families would not be able to exist on this income if 20 per cent or so of their income will go to housing costs. So long as they live in the ranchos, they may be able to avoid paying for housing, which, in effect augments their income. In public housing, however, unless the government is willing to provide very heavy subsidies, the rancho dwellers may find it very difficult to make both ends meet.

Public Utilities and Services

As is to be expected, many public utilities and services which are taken for granted as available to citizens in other urban centres as big as Caracas, are not within the reach of the rancho dwellers surveyed by the Comite de Remodelacion de Barrios. Two factors contribute to this lack of service: the distance of the peripheral area ranchos from the centre of town and the difficult hilly terrain which they occupy.

The surveys found that eighty per cent of the families living in the ranchos do not have a ready access to water and that a much higher percentage does not have toilet facilities. These facts,
of course, contribute to a serious sanitation problem in these communities. In most instances, drinking water is available only on the lower parts of the slopes and people have to descend down the steep hillsides to get it. The same difficulties are encountered in disposing of dirty water and sewerage.

In certain places, the government provides free water to rancho dwellers. Usually, drinking water is available only in a central point. The people can get the water by asking for it from somebody in charge, who is holding the key to the water distribution system. Even this type of service, however, is only available to people at certain times of the day and the rancho dwellers spend considerable time in getting their water supply as everyone congregates at the water distribution point when it is time for the water to be opened.

Electricity is also provided free in most ranchos in Caracas, although in certain places, a minimum fee is charged. No electric meters are used in the ranchos. There is no telephone service in these areas either.

For cooking, many people in the ranchos use bottled gas. However, in places where it is difficult to take the gas, kerosene is used. This combustible fluid has caused several accidents and fires in the ranchos.

Garbage disposal in the ranchos is rarely available and people usually throw their garbage in vacant lots, ravines, open streams and nearby surroundings. The garbage trucks of the municipality get the garbage only on the lower and more accessible portions of the terrain. Since it is easier for the people to just dump their garbage elsewhere, the municipal services are often not used.

To sum up, the general condition of public services in the ranchos is inadequate and appallingly ineffective. People in these densely populated areas have little recreational, educational and other facilities. In most instances, because the government considers their tenure illegal, it is powerless to extend services to their areas. Some rancho communities organize and get together to make services available to them but with their low income and their attitude towards the government, such efforts are often also inadequate.

Social and Economic Characteristics of Ranchos

As previously stated in Table 2 above, the land area in Caracas occupied by ranchos has increased from 5.3 per cent of the total in 1930-1938 to 19.7 per cent at present. It is estimated that the number of people living in the ranchos has grown from 30,000 (17 per cent of the total population) in 1930-1938, to
570,000 (31 per cent of the total population) in 1959-1966. Studies have been conducted on how this portion of the Caracas population lives. Such studies invariably reveal that while the economic conditions in the ranchos are deplorable, social relationships seem to be healthy and not conducive to personal and social disorganization.

In describing the social and economic conditions existing in ranchos, it is helpful to make a distinction between the dwelling itself and the people who live in it. One should also make a distinction between the early stages of a rancho and its more developed stage. The typical rancho dwelling in an area which is newly settled consists of a house with cardboard walls or other discarded materials, a zinc roof and earth flooring. Hanging sheets serve at times as partitions and divisions within the house. Sanitary conveniences rarely exist. There may be a small space outside the house where animals are bred and where garbage is collected.

The occupant of an early rancho dwelling is usually a family of more than six people. The head of the family did not have formal education, though some of the children may have reached the primary grades. Total family income may be around Bolivares 600.00 or less, with not much chance of increasing it in the near future.

One noticeable fact about rancho dwellings and the people who live in them is the tendency of conditions to improve over a period of time. In time, the cardboard walls are replaced with stone walls, which may not be finished and polished but which nevertheless serve their purpose of protecting the tenants against the elements and providing them with privacy. The floor gets covered with concrete. Toilet facilities are added. More rooms are made as the house is expanded. The partitions inside the dwelling now become wood or concrete.

In the case of ranchos in good condition, the roof is usually made of concrete, walls are of brick or of hollow blocks. The total environment is marked by bricks — especially when the house is composed of two or more storeys. Toilets are common. The rancho owner even constructs a terrace for the restful hours, which, combined with the excellent view provided by living on the hillside, becomes a bit of luxury. Many such ranchos in good condition are located in the areas that were settled earlier, usually those closer to the city and located in less steep inclines.

In most cases, the rancho dweller in the improved settlements has steady employment, usually as a skilled laborer. There may also be several people working and contributing to the total family income — the wife, older children, even extended family members.
The younger children usually attend school and are likely to go beyond the educational attainment of their parents. The outlook of the family is optimistic, with, perhaps, a dream of owning their middle class home later in another part of town.

The improvement in the rancho dwelling and the people is recognized by the National Census organization in Venezuela. Generally, the census definition for a rancho includes "all housing in a surrounding predominated by ranchos, marked by the characteristic construction of the dwellings." However, the census also states that a rancho which is improved by substituting its original materials into a house is qualified as a house and its inhabitants are called houseowners.

In a survey made in 1968 in a squatter area close to the centre of town the economic and social characteristics of rancho dwellers in a relatively old area were revealed. In this community of some 500 families, there were about 577 men of employable age (15 years and above) who were surveyed. The study showed that 72.5 per cent of these were gainfully employed. Of those not included in this figure, 14.5 per cent did not specify their means of employment, 14.3 per cent were unemployed, and 2.7 per cent were students. All in all, a little less than half of the men had temporary employment while the rest had steady jobs.

Of the men as a whole, 20.5 per cent were unskilled labourers, 16.5 per cent were skilled laborers, 15.3 per cent were drivers (cars, taxis and trucks), 6.4 per cent were office workers, 4.5 per cent were civil servants, 2.4 per cent were peddlers, 1.8 per cent were small businessmen and 1.8 per cent were in the military service. As previously mentioned, the remaining 27.5 per cent of the men were unemployed, students, or they did not specify their sources of income.

It is noticeable from the jobs of rancho dwellers mentioned above that a great majority of them had wage-earning jobs instead of being in business for themselves. Ray, in his study of life in Venezuela's barrios also pointed out the fact that in contrast with squatters in other Latin American cities, those in Caracas do not seem to have a strong entrepreneurial inclination. Thus, many squatters are truly economically "marginal," in the sense that they do not seem to be fully participating in the city's economic system.5

As far as education is concerned, the study showed that a quarter of the adult males in this community were illiterate. Sixty per cent of them had taken some courses at the elementary school level. This low level of education and type of jobs correlate significantly. They are, in turn, related to the income levels of the families in the area: 35 per cent earned Bolivares 600.00 or less per month, 30 per cent earned between Bolivares 600.00 and
1,000.00 per month, and the rest earned more than Bolivares 1,000.00. Among the families, a full 40 per cent stated that their income is earned by two or more persons and not just by the head of the family.

As far as social life is concerned, some of the patterns which have been found in rancho areas in Caracas by Roy were as follows: (1) the social assimilation of rancho dwellers into the city seems to be more successful than their economic assimilation, mainly because of an attitude of egalitarianism among the barrio residents; (2) women in the ranchos participate in social and political life actively; (3) rancho dwellers do not seem to maintain close ties with their places of origin; (4) rancho dwellers do not seem to have close community sociability and cohesion.

In his studies, Roy found that the average rancho dweller is not awed by people in authority or those who are supposed to have wealth and status. He tends to be self-assured, aware of his rights, and able to think for himself. This spirit of egalitarianism, according to Roy, makes it easier for the rancho dweller to find his place in the urban society. Women share this egalitarianism too. They participate actively in community affairs. Many of them also refuse to accept jobs as maids and domestics because they feel that it is degrading. Roy explains the lack of close ties with the place of origin of the average rancho dweller to the fact that most of them have been conuqueros or landless tenants, who did not have a rich community-centered culture and who felt that they did not have much which was left behind. Finally, though there are exceptions, most communities do not seem to have the cohesion and spirit which are so true in Asian, African and other Latin American low income settlements. Roy attributes this lack of sociability to the heterogeneous character of the ranchos, the lack of community-centered culture in the rural areas mentioned above, and the need to constantly eke out a living. However, involvement in community projects seems to be generating a sense of community in certain barrios and community development programmes are slowly having results.

Past, Present and Proposed Solutions

Solutions to the problem posed by squatters and slum dwellers in Caracas have basically been of two types: the provision of low cost housing and the improvement of conditions of the people in the ranchos themselves. Various types of low cost houses have been constructed or subsidized by the government for the rancho dwellers. These ranged all the way from single-family detached homes to superbloques or big apartment complexes which were constructed in great numbers during the regime of Marcos Perez Jimenez who ruled Venezuela in the 1950’s. Improvement of con-
ditions in the ranchos has taken the form of community development and community organization, with emphasis on the involvement and cooperation of the people themselves.

The national organization charged with solving the housing problem in Venezuela is the Banco Obrero (Workers' Bank), an institution founded in 1928. The bank builds low cost housing and extends loans to people who want to build low cost housing. As early as 1943, Banco Obrero already had a full-scale housing programme, a notable project of which included Urbanizacion El Silencio, an effort to provide houses to families living in Caracas. At present, Banco Obrero has expanded its work beyond provision of housing and credit to include social work and community organization, especially through one of its units, the so-called "Departamento de Urbanizacion y Equipamiento de Barrios," which attempts to cope with problems of slums and squatters with the help of the people living in such low income areas.

Banco Obrero is concerned with the construction of housing in cities with more than 25,000 inhabitants. Credit is extended to families who own a piece of land, composed of not less than three persons, and who have a combined income of not more than Bolivares 1,200.00 a month. For families with incomes higher than this, the limit is a per-capita income not exceeding Bolivares 250.00 per month.

The maximum amount for low cost housing that a family can get from the Banco Obrero is Bolivares 30,000.00 ($6,500.00). Terms of the loan are for 30 years at 4 per cent interest per year. The family applying for a loan must already have a piece of land worth not more than Bolivares 40,000.00. When a person borrows from the Banco Obrero, the legal contract in favour of the municipality where the house and lot are located should be registered. The construction plans have to be approved by the municipal authorities. Finally, a budget of the total work to be done must be included with the application for a housing loan.

Aside from single-family houses, such as the ones mentioned above, the Banco Obrero also enters into multiple family housing. The bank itself constructs the apartment complexes and sells them as condominiums. Each apartment should not cost more than Bolivares 20,000.00. They are payable within a period of 30 years, at an annual interest rate of 4 per cent. People who purchase the apartments are usually asked to give an advance equivalent to 10 per cent of the value of the apartment.

Since 1928, Banco Obrero has built a total of 75,658 apartments with 36,636 units of these located in the Caracas metropolitan area. Obviously, this answers only a small portion of the housing market. One great limitation is the fact that the Banco
Obrero provides loans to people who have an income of at least Bolivares 1,200.00 a month. Since most rancho dwellers have much less than this income level, they usually cannot be helped by this organization directly.

For people whose income is too low for extending credit to them, the Departamento de Urbanizacion y Equipamiento de Barrios of the Banco Obrero has developed specific approaches. Housing for families with incomes between Bolivares 200 to 600 per month, for example, is carried out through a "self-construction" system, involving the efforts of the rancho dweller himself. This process is still experimental up to now but it promises to make low cost housing assistance to people who would not ordinarily be reached by the bank's programmes.

For communities with a population of less than 25,000, the national organization charged with housing is the Vivienda Rural. This organization provides housing construction to people in the rural areas, especially those covered by land reform programmes. It is not too active in the Caracas metropolitan area, however, although conceivably, if it does its job in the rural areas well, there is a possibility that people will not leave the rural areas too much and the problems of Caracas will be lessened.

Another organization which provides low cost housing is the Foundation for Community Development and Municipal Improvement (Fundacomun), a semi-public organization which constructs houses in communities with 10,000 to 25,000 inhabitants. A more important task of Fundacomun, however, is community development, which forms part of the national plan for "Desarrollo de la Comunidad" developed by the Oficina Central de Coordinacion y Planificacion (Cordiplan) since 1959. The plan coordinates national, state and community plans for community development and makes sure that the administrative machinery for this purpose is well integrated. Special attention has been given in this regard in coordinating programmes of rural housing with community development.

The main efforts in the national community development plan are covered in four important problem areas: (1) environmental sanitation; (2) education and recreation; (3) transport and communication; and (4) economic development and improvement of human resources. Experience in conducting these programmes has shown that their success depends not only on the size and types of communities covered but also on the degree of urbanization, the capacity of the leaders of the community and the cooperative spirit among the people.
In this type of programme, the contribution of the community is always important. It may take the form of labor, money, or other economic resources. In the development of projects, the particular resource of the community and of the government organization have to be well considered. Thus, sharing of efforts may take the form of the government agency contributing the financial means to construct a community centre, while the community's contributions take the form of free labor. Such cooperation may also be found in the construction and repair of roads, waterworks systems, control of erosion of slopes during times of strong rains, etc.

In the urban programmes of community development, three types of programmes have been introduced. First, there are programmes to rezone the urban areas so as to put the marginal and uncontrolled settlements under the control of the authorities and to prevent their invasion by ranchos. Second, there are programmes of relocation of rancho inhabitants to the superblockes, back to the provinces, or to new squatter developments within the city. Finally, there are programmes to renew the surroundings of the ranchos in such a way that their physical and social environments are improved.

So far, these types of programmes have contributed a great deal to alleviating the conditions in the ranchos of Caracas. However, they are only palliatives and do not really provide lasting solutions. The improvement of life in the ranchos is closely dependent on the improvement of life in the whole city and the country. In the final analysis, also, it is dependent on the improvement of the life of the rancho dwellers themselves.

In general, therefore, there are three phases which are involved in evolving a solution to the problems of migrants, squatters and slum dwellers. The first phase is promotional and it involves the motivation of the people living in the ranchos to attempt to improve their own lot. The government can achieve success in this phase without too many problems by extending services to those who initially need them, such as to people requiring medical attention, family support, etc. The government enlists the cooperation of the people at this stage and kindles their enthusiasm for programmes of training, skill improvement and employment, designed to improve their economic capabilities in the long run.

The second phase of the process of improvement is skill development, which may be done by the government by combining entertainment and training programmes in such a way that they do not appear like separate stages. The training should be done under real working conditions as much as possible. Technical competence in the job is not the only aspect in this training phase. Motivation and interest in the job are equally as important.
The third phase in the process is actual employment, which involves providing the opportunity for the skills to be applied. In this regard, jobs that command fair wages need not be held as more important than those where entrepreneurial ability is required. In fact, the latter types of occupations may be better for community improvement in the long run because they contribute to the rapid development of the individual. In the skill development phase, therefore, attention must be given to such things as administration of small enterprises, financial management, production, simple bookkeeping and other skills.

More specifically, as far as conditions in Caracas are concerned, there is a need for a number of actions which the government has to take so as to cope effectively with the problems posed by rapid migration, squatting and the growth of slums. These actions require the participation of the national, state and municipal levels of government. They also must be based on full cooperation of the citizenry because without this, the government's programmes will most likely fail.

Some of these actions which have to be taken are:

1. The government must adopt a land policy which will determine what uses are to be allocated to all land in the Caracas urban area. Such a policy must be geared to present land uses and future developments. It must also be translated into specific control measures such as zoning codes, subdivision regulations, etc., which will contribute to rational use of land.

2. A policy of urban renewal in the city is needed. This policy should specify what to do with large areas currently undergoing a process of deterioration and which are characterized by very high densities. Sparsely populated areas should also be considered in this renewal programme. In general, the scarcity of the land and the high costs involved should be considered side by side with human effects and aesthetics in an urban renewal programme.

3. The private sector must be encouraged to invest in urban amenities, especially housing. In particular, private banks should be able to increase their investments in housing. Business organizations must also contribute to the urban services needed by their employees. The private sector, in general, should find low cost housing profitable enough to invest in it.

4. Research and development must be encouraged so as to find out more about conditions in the urban environment and to develop new methods and techniques in construction, new materials, new urban concepts, etc.
5. Housing efforts of the government should be coordinated. There is a need, for example, for a National Housing Institute which would have the responsibility for the development of housing plans, especially for the rancho dwellers.

6. There is a need for increased investment in public services. The transport system in Caracas, for example, is fast becoming inadequate. Schools are not meeting the demand. Communal services which do not only extend the service but develop community unity and cooperation are also not provided widely enough. More important, the provision of such services should be done in a coordinated and rational manner, following a set of priorities which are determined on the basis of need and the meagre resources available to the metropolis.

7. Finally, there is a need for a full regional viewpoint in the efforts to solve the problems of Caracas. The division of the area into two districts does not contribute to coordination. The presence of overlapping layers of authority also adds to confusion. If the problems of Caracas are to be effectively solved, a regional development policy must be evolved. This should be supported by the necessary administrative machinery that would make sure that implementation would be in the most rational manner.
CONTRARY to the views sometimes put forward by European and American writers, urbanism in Nigeria (and indeed in some other parts of Africa) is not a recent phenomenon. It did not owe its origin to pax Britannia. Some Nigerian cities are as old as some of the ancient cities of Europe. Northern Nigerian cities such as Kano, Katsina and Sokoto participated vigorously in the worldwide commercial activities that characterized the medieval period. Although the Fulani Jihad of 1804 to 1810 resulted in the destruction of a number of Northern towns, several survived and even thrived while new ones like Gwandu, Gombe and Katagum were founded.

According to the estimates of population of cities of Northern Nigeria during the first half of the nineteenth century, Sokoto had an average annual population of about 120,000 (1825-27). There were four cities—Argonou, Deegoa, Kano and Zaria—which had estimated populations of between 30,000 and 50,000 each. There were at least twelve other towns whose populations ranged from 10,000 to 25,000 during the same period.

The pre-European urbanization of Western Nigeria was even in some cases more developed than that of the North. Although it is definitely an exaggeration to claim that in pre-British days, "every Yoruba (i.e., Western Nigerian) was a town dweller whatever his calling" the Yorubas were by and large town-dwellers. Towns such as Ibadan, Ilorin, Iwo, Abeokuta, Oshogbo and Ede had estimated populations which ranged from 50,000 to over 100,000 by the middle of the nineteenth century. Next came Lagos, Oyo, Ijaiye, Epe, Ijebu-Ode, Ogbomosho, Iseyin, Oke Oden and Addo with populations ranging from 20,000 to 50,000. In
addition, there was a large number of towns with populations of between 5,000 and 20,000.

Unlike the Northern towns which were major trade centres closely linked with the trans-Sahara trade route and producing craft goods for the international market, Yoruba (Western Nigerian) towns were basically administrative centres. Economically, however, Yoruba towns were and, to a large extent, still are ‘agricultural towns’ in the sense that they are agriculturally based and the product of intimate links between town and country. “The Yoruba living in the country traditionally looks upon the town as his real home and owes direct social allegiance to it.” His farm is within walking distance from the town. He may stay on his farm for a while during periods of intensive work, but he will return to the town for all important events as well as do his shopping there.

Thus most Nigerian cities of today, particularly those of the North and the West, have been in existence for a very long time. These urban centres are “an amalgamation of two contrasting levels of urbanization; a traditional, almost medieval, pre-industrial urbanization and an advanced, industrial urbanization.”

Origins and Growth of Ibadan

As far as Nigerian cities are concerned, Ibadan is a city of relatively recent origin. It was formerly a small Egba village which later became a military camp in the nineteenth century. Ibadan grew because an effective power-class was able to guarantee internal peace and security to its inhabitants. Immigrants from many other parts of Yorubaland were accordingly attracted to it. Ibadan soon developed into a refuge camp for “fugitives from justice, wild and wicked men expelled from adjacent towns, rebels and robbers”.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, Ibadan had grown remarkably. This was confirmed by the first European ever to set foot in the city, the Rev. David Hinderer of the Church Missionary Society who arrived there in 1857. At that time, he wrote that “Ibadan is a large Yoruba town (with a population of about 100,000). Though Ibadan is professedly a town of warriors, or as they say, ‘a war encampment’, yet there is a good deal of industry to be seen in and about the town”.

Right from the beginning, Ibadan attracted migrants from various parts of the Yoruba country and later from various parts of Nigeria. As a result of its location, it grew very rapidly during the second half of the nineteenth century and became the emporium for trade in Yorubaland. In 1893, the British influence spread
to the city and Ibadan became part of the British protectorate. This development created conditions for peace and security and thus opened the way for more development. The construction of a railway system in 1901 ushered in new opportunities for the further development of the city.

Ibadan is different from other traditional Yoruba towns in two respects. First, the layout of the city is not like those of other Yoruba towns because the head of the city is not an Oba (King). Since it is the presence of an Oba that gives town status to any settlement in Yoruba land, the Oba's palace is usually placed in the centre of the town. In front of an Oba's palace is usually found a market place for the town. Both the palace and the market form the hub from which all roads leading to various parts of the town and the neighbouring towns radiate. In Ibadan there is no such palace because the village head is not an Oba. He was regarded as a Bale and later, an Olubadan.

Secondly, in a traditional Yoruba town, succession to chieftaincy titles is hereditary. Again this is not so in Ibadan where there is an absence of hereditary rights to chieftaincy titles. A unique system whereby any member of the established families could, by promotion, rise to become the village head was adopted right from Ibadan's inception.

According to the 1963 census, Ibadan had a population of 627,379 as compared with an estimated population of 100,000 inhabitants in 1857. There have been rapid and significant increases in the population between these two periods as seen in Table I.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>No. of Increase</th>
<th>Average Annual Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>283,094</td>
<td>63,094</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>387,133</td>
<td>149,039</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>459,196</td>
<td>72,063</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>627,379</td>
<td>168,183</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is seen in the figures in Table I that Ibadan's growth has not been particularly rapid, compared to the average rate of growth
of Lagos, the capital city. The rate of growth was relatively rapid in Ibadan, however, immediately before the Second World War. Unfortunately, relatively little information is available on whether Ibadan's population growth is primarily due to internal migration or natural population increase. Certainly, the growth in the 1921-1931 decade is too fast to be accounted for by natural increase, however, indicating that internal migration played a significant part during this period.

**Government of the City**

In the early days of its existence, Ibadan was governed by the Olubadan (formerly Bale) and his chiefs. As already pointed out, the history of the founding of Ibadan did not recognize "the constitutional pattern based on a sacred hereditary monarch, but gave political authority to men who showed the qualities of bravery, wealth, leadership, youthful vigour and experience which the city needed in the early difficult years." Junior chiefs were recruited from among the ranks of compound heads known as mogaji. These junior chiefs in turn could become senior chiefs in both the Olubadan (civil) chieftaincy line and in the Balogun (military) chieftaincy line by promotion in the event of vacancies occurring. Any senior chief could by this process become the Olubadan.

By the treaty of 1893, the city of Ibadan came under the protection of the Queen of England. This protection did not come as a result of any negotiation, but as a result of the coercion by the British representatives in Lagos. The British had direct dealings with the chiefs in whose hands they were content to leave the government of the city, subject, of course, to the pleasure of the Alaafin (King) of Oyo and the British officials. The Alaafin of Oyo was an Oba with a crown and since Ibadan had no crowned head, Ibadan was placed under the suzerainty of the Alaafin of Oyo. The then Alaafin of Oyo and the British Resident stationed at Oyo ruled the city with an iron hand. The situation was however reversed between 1931-1936 when a more sympathetic and understanding British Resident replaced the autocratic and extremely brutal one. He changed the name Bale of Ibadan to Olubadan (owner of Ibadan) and gave the Ibadans almost complete control over their own affairs. This, of course, annoyed the Alaafin of Oyo, but he could do nothing.

During the colonial period, the city was governed through a system of indirect rule. A Native Authority was established by the colonial administration and the Olubadan, his chiefs and some other important persons in the community were constituted into this body. Their function was subject to the supervision and control of the British Resident and his officials, the District Officers.
In 1952, democratic local government was introduced in Western Nigeria. The people had opposed the Native Authority system for years as it was contrary to their custom of mass participation in governing the city. Besides, the Native Authorities were very autocratic. It was therefore not surprising that as soon as Nigerians became Ministers of State in Western Nigeria they scrapped the Native Authority system. A local government law empowering the regional government to establish local authorities all over the region was enacted.

In accordance with this law, Ibadan and its environs (a sort of metropolitan area) were constituted into a District Council. The Olubadan of Ibadan became the President of the Council while a third of the members were traditional chiefs who by virtue of their positions were made *ex-officio* members. The remaining two-thirds were directly elected members by universal adult suffrage from the various wards into which the District had been delimited.

In this democratically constituted Council, the real power was vested in the elected members. It is from among this group that the Chairman was elected and all the functional committees with the exception of the chieftaincy committee were dominated by elected members. This change brushed aside the power and influence of the chiefs. The Olubadan however remained the constitutional head of the council and as such he performed only ceremonial functions such as declaring open the annual general meeting of the council.

In 1961 the Ibadan District Council area (metropolitan area) was considered too large to be effectively administered as a local government unit. It was therefore decided that the outlying districts should be constituted into local government units and the city of Ibadan should constitute a separate unit. In order to keep the affinity of the people together a Divisional Council was also established — thus creating a two-tier system of local government in Ibadan.

With time, however, the Divisional Council proved rather ineffective. It constituted itself into a stumbling block and its relationship with the district councils became far from being harmonious. The Council was subsequently abolished and the Ibadan City Council and the other Councils in the Ibadan area were given separate and autonomous existence.

The Ibadan City Council has the powers to make by-laws regulating certain social behaviours in the city. Among its functions are the provision of amenities in the fields of health, education (at the primary school level), works, transportation and administration.
Since the military authorities assumed political control in Nigeria in 1966, elected councils have been dissolved. In their place government officers were appointed sole administrators to manage the affairs of the Councils. Consequently, Ibadan City is at the time of writing, being ruled by a Sole Administrator without any committee to advise him.

Problems of Migration

Ibadan, like the other towns in Western Nigeria, is basically still an “agricultural town”. By this, we mean that it is an agriculturally-based town. Its dominance and its size are not necessarily the functions of an emerging modern economy. A large number of Ibadan’s inhabitants still own their farms, living on them during the week and returning to the city on weekends and festival days. In such a situation, therefore, the problem of rural-urban migration is quite different from what exists in a modern metropolis such as Lagos.

One interesting trait of internal migration to and from Ibadan is that within the lifetime of an individual, he may reside in the country or the city several times, depending on many circumstances. Some authors have cited this phenomenon, which is found in other African cities, as proof that the process of urbanization is not “irreversible,” as has too often been thought.

Two main factors have been proposed to account for this type of internal migration: the family, tribal and community ties of the African migrant and the land tenure system prevailing in most African countries. In the case of the primarily agricultural Yoruba, of course, these two variables are closely related.

Influenced by the rural-urban dichotomy concept, many theorists have seen the process of urbanization as the eroding of family, tribal and community ties and their replacement with associational and functional bonds. In the case of African urbanization, however, we find that the erosion of such ties is very slow, that many of the traditional structures, in fact, are carried to the city by migrants. Ethnic ties are strong determinants of where a migrant will live in the city. The voluntary associations and wards he joins are mostly determined by his own ethnic identification. 10 In fact, Cohen has even proposed that in the case of the Hausa in Ibadan, a process of “retribalization” occurs, by which the ethnic identity of the migrant is strongly emphasized and that values, myths, symbols and ceremonies from the traditional culture are consciously manipulated “in order to develop an informal political organization which they (the Hausa) use as a weapon in their struggle for power and privilege within contemporary political situations.” 11 Since the ethnic ties remain intact even in the urban area, the migrant African can return to his rural community with ease.
Several studies of lower income Nigerians reveal that the migrant does return to his "home town" quite often. This tendency is explained by one author in the following manner:

Within the Yoruba culture, identification with one's home town/city is very strong. When a Yoruba man migrates to any other place, however successful he may become, he still maintains a link with his home town, identifies himself with that town, and in most cases, joins an ethnic association formed by other citizens of his home town residing with him in the new working place. To him, the new place, whether a large city or a metropolitan center, is a "farm", and his original home town whether it is a village or a hamlet, is "home". If he is successful, this identification is expressed by setting up a house in his home town, building a show-piece mansion there, or, in rare cases, investing in economic enterprises in his town.12

Another reason for the migrant's return to his place of origin is the African land tenure system. According to Oluwasanmi, "The peasant cultivator is a sort of tenant at will who has possessory rights in land which he enjoys in perpetuity and as long as he uses the land in a manner beneficial both to himself and to society."13 While the Nigerian farmer has undisputed right to the produce from the land, however, he has no power to sell the land to anyone. As such, to maintain control over it, he has to work it, usually with the help of his family, relatives and friends. Hence, the African migrant has to periodically return to his place of origin to work the farm, if he is not to lose it.

Today, the dominance of Ibadan is perpetuated by its being the seat of the government of Western Nigeria. It has also attracted Nigeria's premier institution of higher learning—the University of Ibadan with its large University College Teaching Hospital and several other educational institutions. Ibadan is Nigeria's major cocoa market. On the whole its large population or size cannot be explained in terms of modern industry which it lacks. Ibadan's petty traders far outnumber persons engaged in any other economic activity. It is no doubt due to the lack of the development of modern industrial activities in Ibadan that there has been little metropolitan development around the city. Until it undertakes in sufficient degree those economic functions which promote and sustain metropolitan growth such a development cannot take place.

Partly because of the industrial limitations, the growth of Ibadan has not been phenomenal. The population increased at an average annual rate of less than 2.0 per cent between 1857 and 1911;
by 3.6 per cent between 1911 and 1921; 6.2 per cent between 1921 and 1931; 0.8 per cent between 1931 and 1952; and 3.3 per cent between 1952 and 1963. During the past half century, the cumulative rate of growth of Ibadan has been a little over 3.0 per cent per annum, which is only a little over the natural rate of growth of the total population.

In spite of what has been said above, there is no doubt that there is quite a sizeable net inmigration to the city every year—the migrants being principally school leavers seeking jobs in government departments, commercial houses, and the few industrial concerns in the city. The city’s flourishing trade also attracts an increasing number of traders seeking profitable outlets for their wares.

Although these migrants come from far and wide in the federation of Nigeria, they are predominantly drawn from the other Yoruba towns of the West. As the table below shows, Ibadan is overwhelmingly a Yoruba town. According to the 1952 Census, only 5.3 per cent of its residents are not Yoruba. Although this ratio could have increased since 1952, the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of Ibadan (about 85 to 90 per cent) are still Yoruba.

Table 2
Ethnic Composition of Ibadan, 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Groups</th>
<th>Ibadan</th>
<th>Western Nigeria</th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hausa/Fulani</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibo</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Northern Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Southern Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Nigerians</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: A. L. Mabogunje, Urbanization in Nigeria, op. cit., Table 27, p. 217.

Unemployment and Underemployment

The annual migration of school leavers to Ibadan (principally from the different parts of Western Nigeria) has inevitably created problems of unemployment since available employment opportunities in the city are not adequate to cope with the demand.
Some of the immigrants lack any basic skills or sound general education, making them unemployable.

Unemployment brings in its trail all sorts of social problems but the extended family system does make it possible for the immigrants to stay with some relatives however distant, so that the problem of squatting for purposes of habitation rarely arises. The problem of overcrowding persists, however. The houses, particularly in the older parts of the city, are clustered together without proper ventilation. The migrants who stay in these houses contribute to this problem and to slum creation in the city.

In addition to problems of unemployment, there are those of underemployment. Economists have for years assumed that underemployment is a rural phenomenon. However, in urban centres in developing countries, underemployment is also a big problem. In Ibadan, underemployment is readily apparent among people who earn their living by small trading. A majority of petty traders are usually underemployed. The attraction of petty trading lies primarily in the fact that one can start with little or no capital. The result is that there are too many people engaged in the activity compared to what is economically justified. They remain in it, even though they are making rather meagre profits, simply because there is an almost complete lack of alternatives and more profitable opportunities.

**Slums in Ibadan**

Ibadan is an old native city. Although it has grown considerably in size, its physical development has been haphazard. The older parts of the inner city have not been renewed. Town planning is far from being effective and there are no minimum standards laid down for housing. The city centre is therefore full of substandard housing, which can be called slums while the outskirts have most of the modern buildings.

Squatting for trade and commerce is also quite common. There is a tendency for traders to put up sheds ('shanties') anywhere in the city without the prior permission of the City Council. This accentuates the problem of slums.

It has been estimated that about 50 per cent of the city area is occupied by slum dwellings. Mabogunje states that "these are dwellings usually built of mud, having no identifiable sanitation facilities, and generally in conditions of physical deterioration." Slums are concentrated in the inner core of the city and the older suburbs. In the newer suburbs, mainly in the east and north-west sectors of Ibadan, considerable jerry-building has also occurred. It is estimated, therefore, that combining the new and old slum developments, some 70 to 80 per cent of the population of Ibadan live in slum conditions.
LEGEND

BAD SLUM UNPLANNED: 70 PERCENT OF BLDGS. DETERIORATED STRUCTURE.

SLUM: STRUCTURES DETERIORATING RAPIDLY. 10-20 YEARS USEFUL LIFE.

WELL PLANNED.

FLOOD PLAINS.

LAND NOT YET DEVELOPED.

SITE OF OLD TOWN WALL.

Fig. 10. HOUSING CONDITIONS IN IBADAN

Ibadan being the capital city of Western Nigeria, the responsibility for ensuring that it is a worthy capital is jointly shared between the state government and the city council with the latter being a prime mover. Unfortunately this has not been so in practice. In spite of internal migration to the city, the indigenous population still predominates. This indigenous population lives in the older parts of the city where the problems of slums are particularly serious. Unfortunately because of their large population, the indigenous people dominate the Council and thwart any attempt to undertake slum clearance. As a matter of fact, they even refuse to accept that slums constitute a problem.

The State Government on its part appears to have recognized several years ago that the older parts of the City need to be rebuilt. In the 1962-68 Development Plan of the Government a paragraph headed ‘Ibadan Slum Clearance’ reads as follows:

“It has been pointed out . . . that Ibadan is one of the fastest growing cities in the Region. In addition, not only is it the Regional Capital, it is also one of the main cultural centres in the country. If Ibadan is to continue to play its role in the economic and cultural development of Nigeria it is essential that it should cease to be two cities in one — a modern well planned suburban and an old unplanned centre full of slums. Preparatory to the launching of a slum clearance scheme, it is necessary to undertake detailed investigations into the economic, social and cultural problems involved”.

Although the government earmarked some funds in the Plan for the slum clearance project, no positive action appears to have been taken since 1962. Ibadan still remains very much two cities in one. The recently published 1970/74 Development Plan even makes no reference to the need for a slum clearance scheme in Ibadan. Has the government quietly dropped the project in the face of the opposition from the city fathers? Or is it overawed by the enormous financial and social costs which the project will eventually involve that it has developed cold feet?

It must be pointed out that the government has during the past twelve to fifteen years taken a number of measures designed to ameliorate the situation. In 1958, it set up a housing estate in the outskirts of Ibadan. This experiment has proved very successful. The Bodija Housing Estate now provides dwelling houses for hundreds of upper and middle class families in Ibadan. Between 1959 and 1966, the Western Nigeria Housing Corporation (WNHC) which is responsible for developing the estate had built 322 houses of varying standards. Seven different house-types have been built.
to date to cater to differences in incomes and tastes. These range from a small detached two-bedroom bungalow costing between £N1,000 and £N1,100 to a detached house in two self-contained three-bedroom flats costing a little over £N4,000. (£N1 = US $2.80).

In addition, the WNHC provided mortgages to those who wish to build their own houses either on the Estate or elsewhere in the City. These mortgages are however not confined to Ibadan although about 60 per cent are on houses in the city. Between 1958 and 1966, the Corporation spent £N2.00 million on mortgages.

As already pointed out the development of the Bodija housing estate (and, indeed, of the other housing estates in the West) has benefitted the upper and middle classes. Practically nothing has been done for the low-income groups that constitute the masses and for whom scarcity of accommodation is most acute. Low cost housing is still in the realm of ideas rather than of possibilities in Nigeria. The cheapest house in the Bodija Estate is £N1,000. The high cost of building materials and labour and the reluctance of the Corporation to use local building materials are two major factors responsible for the high cost of constructing the houses. However the estate has continued to have a demonstration effect on the private construction industry in Ibadan. Private developers have emulated the high standards of the estate. But in order to meet the specific needs of the low income people majority of whom are slum dwellers, there is an urgent need for the City Council to build Council flats which will be rented to low income people at subsidized rates.

One other way in which the decongestion of the heavily populated parts of the city can be achieved is through town planning. Although there is a town planning authority for Ibadan which is charged with the responsibility of ensuring the orderly development of the city, its impact has not been particularly felt because it has no overriding powers over land development in the City. There is no "master plan" for the development of the City. All the town planning authority does is to approve layouts for individual developers. It also approves building plans in order to ensure that basic standards of sanitation, ventilation and construction are maintained. But this activity of the authority is confined to the newly developing areas within the City and excludes the older parts where most of the slums are situated.

**Wastes Disposal and Drainage Project**

In addition to the problems of slums, there is the menace of frequent and disastrous flooding of the city's two rivers. There are also the problems of drainage and solid waste disposal which have for years remained unsolved. The government has in the
1970-74 Development Plan decided to embark on flood control, sewerage, and the construction of solid waste collection and disposal facilities. These schemes which are expected to cost £N4.045M are made up as follows:

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£N</td>
<td>£N</td>
<td>£N</td>
<td>£N</td>
<td>£N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewerage</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drainage</td>
<td>395,000</td>
<td>412,500</td>
<td>412,500</td>
<td>425,000</td>
<td>1,645,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid Wastes</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>595,000</td>
<td>812,500</td>
<td>1,312,000</td>
<td>1,325,000</td>
<td>4,045,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Western State Development Plan 1970-74. Table xxv.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that Ibadan's dualistic nature will sooner or later have to give way to modern industrialism. The infra-structures for this are already being provided; viz., a £10,000,000 water project, the establishment of an industrial estate and improved transport system. Once Ibadan begins to attract industries the net migration will increase thus accentuating the social and economic problems of the City. The problem of slum clearance will then have to be faced squarely. Indeed the longer it is delayed the more expensive it will be. The government should insure that the City Council does not continue to preserve the dualistic personality of the City. In order to force the issue, it may be necessary to inject into the Council a large number of enlightened and imaginative leaders who can share the power now concentrated in the hands of the traditional urbanites.

With regard to inmigration to the city particularly by job-seeking school leavers, the time has no doubt come for the Government to have a clear cut policy on rural-urban migration. Such a policy will not be a negative one of discouraging people from migrating from the rural areas but a positive one of ameliorating the conditions of living in the rural areas, of making them comparable to what obtains in the urban centres, and of providing economic and employment opportunities in the rural areas. In 1962, an integrated rural development programme was launched
in Western Nigeria. This programme was aimed at achieving "a general development and awakening of rural areas by a planned attack on all factors which at present tend to inhibit the rapid economic and social development of the villages". The programmes consisted of five main elements:

(a) an aided self-help low-cost rural housing programme;
(b) an environmental sanitation scheme;
(c) an agricultural improvement programme;
(d) a rural industries programme; and,
(e) the planning and reconstruction of villages.

Had this programme of integrated rural development been successfully implemented throughout Western Nigeria some of the pressures on the large cities would have been reduced. It would not however completely stop rural-urban migration. This policy of improving the conditions in the rural areas would have to be supplemented with an equally positive policy of improving the conditions of living of the masses in the urban areas.

What is urgently required for the orderly development of Nigeria's cities, of which Ibadan is one of the most important, is for the Governments of the Federation to work out a comprehensive national policy on urbanization which would include, inter alia, a plan for the transformation of the nation's traditional administrative towns into modern cities with a transportation network to support industrial and commercial development.

The sharply rising urban demands for social services and social overhead capital which are at present outstripping the financial resources of Nigeria's cities with the consequent deterioration in the quality of urban life make the formulation of a comprehensive national urban policy extremely urgent. Such a policy should ensure the allocation of the much needed resources to the cities, otherwise industrialization will be retarded and the growth of the national economy inhibited. The policy should also provide for the cultural integration of the inhabitants of Nigerian cities and for the preparation of inmigrants for productive economic activity.

Unfortunately the very rapid rates at which Nigerian cities have been growing during the past twenty years has not yet dawned on policy makers. Indeed there has been an urban revolution in Nigeria during the past two decades. As the table below shows, some of the country's cities have been growing at an average annual rate of 8.0 to 11.0 per cent in some areas.
### Table 4

**The Growth of Towns in Nigeria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibadan</td>
<td>459,960</td>
<td>627,379</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>720,000</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>267,407</td>
<td>665,246</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>931,039</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>131,316</td>
<td>295,432</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>415,210</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>92,434</td>
<td>166,170</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>211,740</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilorin</td>
<td>71,296</td>
<td>106,692</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>127,465</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>42,647</td>
<td>129,133</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>197,631</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jos</td>
<td>39,050</td>
<td>94,451</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>120,641</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port-Harcourt</td>
<td>59,548</td>
<td>179,563</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>..............</td>
<td>..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onitsha</td>
<td>77,087</td>
<td>163,032</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>..............</td>
<td>..........</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These figures of growth show a massive movement of people from rural areas to the towns—a fact which underlines the need for immediate action by the federal government in collaboration with the state governments. It can of course be argued that a rapid rate of urbanization is not confined to Nigeria and that it has now become a typical feature of developing countries particularly those in Africa. But this does not in any way absolve governments from having a comprehensive urbanization programme. Otherwise, a growing proportion of the urban population will continue to live at the margin of subsistence.
Istanbul

Kemal Ahmet Aru

Dean, Faculty of Architecture and
Chairman, Department of City Planning
Technical University of Istanbul

The first settlement around Istanbul was set up near a little stream called Kurbagalidere at Kadikoy district, almost simultaneously with the foundation of Troy. The first settlement on the proper Istanbul peninsula was founded at a site called Sarayburnu today. It belonged to a Thracian tribe named Lygos.

Subsequently, Greek colons (the Megareans) set up their colonies, first at Chalcedon (Kadikoy) and later-on at Byzantion (685 B.C.). The first city was a fairly rich Greek City possessing wholly traditional urban elements. The city flourished until Emperor Constantine decided to make Istanbul the capital of his empire. Between 324-336 A.D., a new city was constructed under the name of “Second Rome” and retained this name till the mid-VIIIth century. The new imperial city was made up of fourteen regions and prospered with time. It did not follow the style of the old Greek city Byzantion. As a new settlement, it possessed the architectural spirit of the new Roman world. The Theodosyus walls fixed the limits of the city within the peninsula till the twentieth century. Developments through the end of the Justinian period established the general structure of the city. The slopes on the littoral of the Marmara Sea and along the coast of the Golden Horn contained the housing areas. The spaces remaining between the Golden Horn and the Marmara littoral formed the axes of concentration of monuments. This was especially true of the road which inter-connects the hills parallel to the Golden Horn and the Via Thriomphalis which goes from the present Beyazid to Aksaray and then to Cerrahpasa stretching from Altimermer to Yedikule. It is widely accepted that, before 1453 the population of Istanbul increased to 40,000-50,000. This population increased further on during the conquest. We can assume that, after the conquest, this population reached approximately 120,000 through immigration and compulsory settlements.
Arnold Von Harff acknowledges that Istanbul was a big city in 1496-97. In this period, the population should have been close to 200,000. It is estimated that more than one third of this population settled on the hillslopes overlooking the Golden Horn which constituted the living quarters of the city, while it is generally accepted that the other third was settled on the Aksaray, Topkapi and Kocamustafapasa regions which were entirely evacuated during the last days of Byzance.

It is estimated that during the last years of the reign of Suleiman The Magnificent, the population of Istanbul drew close to half a million. Parallel to the development in the old city, new settlements began to appear on the villages along the coast of the Bosphorus. The population of the city reached 900,000 inhabitants at the end of the nineteenth century. The population census was the most reliable one made until this time and it was found that the city population had reached 741,148 inhabitants. In the same way, the demographic picture shows that the population reached 793,749 in 1940; 860,558 in 1945; 1,003,000 in 1950, and 2,123,000 in 1965.

Geographically, Istanbul is situated in the Marmara Region of Turkey. This region is a transition area between various continents, seas, climates and vegetal formations. The city boundaries of Istanbul are limited naturally by the Black Sea in the north and by the Marmara Sea in the south. The city is divided into two parts, an Anatolian side and European side, by the Bosphorus stretching from north-east to south-west.

The Golden Horn separates the Istanbul peninsula where the old historical city is situated from the new development areas. These new developments have formed, on the European shore of the Bosphorus and begin at a locality called Tophane.

The metropolitan area of Istanbul is divided into three sections: the Catalca peninsula, the Kocaeli peninsula, and the Bosphorus area. It covers 5,712 sq. km. or .7 per cent of Turkey’s territory (774,810 sq. km.). The Marmara region where Istanbul is located includes 10 cities (provinces) in an area of 72,579 sq. km.

The climate of Istanbul is affected by its location in an area of transition between the Mediterranean Sea and central European climatic conditions. The northern part of Istanbul possesses the characteristics of the Black Sea coast climate, while its southern part has a resemblance to the Etesian climate of the Mediterranean region. The weather conditions of Istanbul are under the influence of air currents between anti-cyclone and cyclone regions and ambulatory depressions which change seasonally. The former ones produce dry and stable weather conditions in the region while the depressions cause abundant rains and atmospheric variations.
Political and Administrative Characteristics

In general, there are four political and administrative levels of authority in the Istanbul urban area. There is, first of all, the City of Istanbul itself, settled in 685 B.C., incorporated in 1855, and currently having a land area of 277 square kilometers. Around the city is the Metropolitan Area of Istanbul, which has an area of 1,131 square kilometers. The next level, which may be referred to as Greater Istanbul, is under the jurisdiction of the Bureau for the General Plan of Greater Istanbul attached to the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement of the central government. Finally, there is the Istanbul Region wherein the Istanbul urban area is located, which is planned by the Regional Planning Directorate of Istanbul created in 1958. This regional body is responsible for an area of 72,481 square kilometers.

Within Greater Istanbul, the central government of Turkey is represented by an appointed Governor. Until the end of 1958, the Governor also acted as Mayor of Istanbul city. After 1958 the City Mayor began to be elected by local citizens as in other cities in Turkey.

Presently, there are 26 municipalities within the boundaries of Greater Istanbul, one being the central city and the remaining 25 being administratively independent. The metropolitan area of Istanbul is smaller. Its boundaries comprise the central city and 18 independent municipalities, including the district of Gebze on Kocaeli peninsula.

In Greater Istanbul, construction, reconstruction and planning activities are conducted by various institutions. The most important of these is the Bureau for the "General Plan of Greater Istanbul" attached to the Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement. The Directorate of Construction of the city, also attached to the same Ministry, concerns itself with problems of the gecekondu (slums and squatter communities) as well as the local plans of some of the municipalities. In spite of their autonomous positions, the city's Directorate of Engineering and Directorate of Reconstruction work with the Bureau for "General Plan of Greater Istanbul" on planning matters. Administrative agencies on the metropolitan level are charged with issuing construction permits. They also prepare detailed local plans for specific projects.

At the city level, central government agencies are represented by their proper directorates (e.g. the Directorate of Health, Directorate of National Education, etc.) Although a major part of urban services in Istanbul are performed under the responsibility of the municipality, the State takes on itself the implementation of some services such as education, health, etc., as a consequence of economic insufficiencies of local administrative bodies. The financing
of the services are provided by the State, city, local administrative bodies and municipalities, either separately or collectively. In general, private institutions do not add too much to the performance or maintenance of city services. There are associations for the beautification of districts, prevention of traffic accidents, and the prevention of noise but they are not too effective.

The Problem

The average annual growth of Turkey's population has increased between 1945-1955 and decreased, relatively, between 1955-1965. There is evidence that low fertility is responsible for the decrease in population growth in the period 1960-1965. This lower rate may be accounted for by the introduction of family planning at this time.

The population of the East Marmara region, which can be defined as a socio-economic spatial level between Istanbul Metropolis and the entire country, has increased 11.7 per cent in 1960, and 12.1 per cent in 1965. This region which is already the most developed and urbanized region of the country is roughly four times more dense (at 160 persons per sq. km.) than the rest of Turkey (which averages 40.5 persons per sq. km.). The greatest urbanized section of this area is, of course, Metropolitan Istanbul.

Table 1
Population of Greater Istanbul in Relation to Other Parts of Turkey
(In thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>18,860</td>
<td>20,935</td>
<td>24,131</td>
<td>27,810</td>
<td>31,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Marmara</td>
<td>1,986</td>
<td>2,187</td>
<td>2,683</td>
<td>3,235</td>
<td>3,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolis</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>1,321</td>
<td>1,675</td>
<td>2,123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While Istanbul Metropolis had 4.6 per cent of the country's population and 44.3 per cent of the population of Marmara region in 1945, these ratios increased to 6.7 per cent and 55.5 per cent, respectively in 1965.

Urbanization

If we take into account the extent of the global population increase, urbanization in Turkey can be considered quite rapid. In
Fig. II. LOCATION OF GECEKONDUS IN ISTANBUL
a period of fifteen years (between 1950-1965) the ratio of the urban population growth, as compared with the totality of population in Turkey has increased from 18.8 per cent to 29.5 per cent. Furthermore, 3.5 per cent to 4 per cent of the total population are added to cities, every year. As a whole, the urbanizing population in Turkey is increasing approximately between the ratios of 6 and 8 per cent per year. In reality, the urbanization of East Marmara and the increase of population in Metropolitan Istanbul are not above this ratio, but a little lower, averaging yearly 5.5-6.5 per cent. However, in 1965, the Istanbul metropolitan area already comprised as much as 23 per cent of the whole urban population of Turkey, and 80 per cent of the urban population of East Marmara.

From the point of view of administrative boundaries, only 6.5 per cent of Turkey’s population was living in settlements of 100,000 to 500,000 and 8.5 per cent in agglomerations of 500,000 inhabitants and over in 1965. The greatest portion of the urban population in this last level lives in the Istanbul metropolitan area. In addition to the central city, there are six settlements of 10,000 to 15,000 inhabitants in the urbanized section of Istanbul Metropolis.

In the Greater Istanbul area, rural-urban differentiations are diminishing gradually. In 1945, 80 per cent of the total population was living in the city. This ratio grew to 92 per cent in 1965. Of the people in the metropolitan area but outside the city, 93 per cent are considered urban (i.e., they live in sectors which possess the characteristics of a continual urban organism where daily labour-housing relations are maintained).

Urban Development and Migration

Urban development, considered from the point of view of population only, depends on the natural increase of the population and migrations. The annual ratio of natural population increase in Istanbul is low, in comparison with Turkey. However, it is rather high for a city already as big as Istanbul, for it amounted to 19.3 in 1955-1960 and 16.4 in 1960-1965.

One reason for the high rate of natural population growth in Istanbul may be the fact that migrants who come to Istanbul preserve their rural characteristics, especially their high birth rate for a certain period of time. The natural increase in population reached 135,000 in the 1955-60 period and 200,000 between 1960-1965. On account of this, a natural increase of 30 to 40,000 people can be estimated annually.

Since 1950, the increase in the Istanbul population has been caused by the great flow of migrants who came to the Metropolis.
Net migration figures are as follows: 1945-50, 74,000; 1950-55, 235,000; 1955-60, 221,000; and 1960-65, 277,000.3 During the last fifteen years, a flow of migration amounting to 40,000-50,000 persons annually has contributed largely to this urban growth.

The migration coming to the Istanbul metropolis derives from various levels and sectors of the population. The greatest portion of the migration which took place in the periods of 1950-1960 and 1960-1965, and which could be investigated substantially, originated from other regions of Turkey rather than from Marmara and sub-regions of East Marmara. The total migration to Istanbul amounted to 145,000 persons in 1955-1960, and 230,000 persons in 1960-1965. This made up 61 per cent and 83 per cent of the total migration in the country respectively. Migration originating from the Marmara region and the sub-region of East Marmara amounted to 33,000 persons in 1950-1960 and 55,000 in 1960-1965. Apart from this, the number of migrants born in foreign lands4 came close to 60,000 persons in the first period.

Table 2

The Distribution of Incoming and Outgoing Migrations During 1955-1960 and 1960-1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. From outside of Marmara Reg.</td>
<td>145,300</td>
<td>230,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. From East Marmara Reg.</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>6,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. From other Marmara provinces</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>48,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Migrants of foreign birth</td>
<td>56,300</td>
<td>3,898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>235,000</td>
<td>298,328</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### OUTGOING MIGRATION

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Category</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To outside of Marmara Reg.</td>
<td>5,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. To outside of Marmara Reg.</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To East Marmara provinces</td>
<td>2,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To East Marmara provinces</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To other Marmara provinces</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To other Marmara provinces</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Migrants of foreign birth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Migrants of foreign birth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Unknown outgoing migrants</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Unknown outgoing migrants</td>
<td>1,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,900</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,378</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

### NET MIGRATION

<table>
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<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>139,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>222,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>5,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>4,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>22,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>46,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>56,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>3,898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>1,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>22,100</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>276,970</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is interesting to note that migration in 1960-1965 reached a greater volume compared to 1950-1960. Migrants coming from other parts of Turkey increased by 60 per cent in the 1960-65 period, as compared to the migration in the previous period. The migration originating from the region itself showed also a similar increase in the second period.

**The Origins of Migration**

We can divide the origins of migration into Istanbul into two parts: (a) that coming from the sub-region of East Marmara, and
(b) migration from other regions, i.e., Eastern and Western regions of the Black Sea, Central Anatolia and the Northeastern provinces, Thrace and the Aegean region. An analysis of the origin of migrants made between 1950 and 1965 revealed a more or less changing migration pattern. In general, the analysis shows that migration happens in regions where the rural density is above a definite saturation level; where the rural-urban balance is unfavourable to rural sectors, and where the increase in agricultural incomes cannot keep pace with population increase. Apart from this, ease of transportation and existence of migration paths must be counted on as important factors. Short-term economic changes also have an effect on migration. During economically lean periods, migration from the provinces into Istanbul may increase significantly.

An analysis made according to administrative districts in the Eastern Marmara region gives the features of the migration typology for this area. In brief, migration seems to be insignificant from administrative districts where the rural population density is high but the productivity is also high. It is excessive from rural areas where the density is high but productivity is lower. It is also high from rural sectors where the density is low, and where these sectors are situated near a rapidly urbanizing area or have easy access to transportation facilities. Administrative districts where there is a lower rural density and scarce migration can be divided generally, into two parts: One part possesses traditional urban structures and the other has entirely rural characteristics and is remote from migration paths. But here, we should point out that the migration from the rural areas of Eastern Marmara where the urban structure is clearly determined, seems to flow toward urban cores within the region rather than the area of the Istanbul Metropolis. In other words, in a developed region, migrants from the rural areas can choose their own urban centres. This determines the degree of urbanization of the region as a whole over a definite period of time.

Population Increase and the Development of Economic Sectors

As previously mentioned, the population increase in Istanbul has been relatively high, especially during the 1960-1965 period. One of the fears of economic planners is that rapid population growth may increase unemployment because economic sectors such as manufacturing, services, etc., may not be able to absorb the economically active segments of the population. The situation in Istanbul as far as the relationship between increase in population and the increase in employment rates in manufacturing and services are shown in Table 3.
Table 3

Population of the Urban Area and Number of People Employed in Economic Sectors

(In Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>1,321</td>
<td>1,675</td>
<td>2,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population of the</td>
<td>1,166</td>
<td>1,534</td>
<td>1,882</td>
<td>2,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>city of Istanbul</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed in</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>industries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed in</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>industries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed in</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in Table 3, employment rates in Istanbul seem to have kept pace with population growth, at least in the past fifteen years. The difference between the metropolitan population and the city population has remained quite unchanged in spite of a great population increase between 1955-1965 roughly on the scale of 160-170,000 persons in the metropolitan area. This increase may be due to migration showing that the rural population which has migrated to Istanbul has somehow incorporated itself easily to the urban organism.

The manufacturing industry shows a higher growth rate in 1960-1965, compared to the period between 1950-1955. The ratio of people working in the manufacturing industry, which was between 10 to 11 per cent during the 1950-1960 period, increased to 12 per cent in 1965, in proportion to the city's population.

The service sector reached an even higher growth rate compared to the manufacturing industry in 1955-1960, though it had a lower rate between 1960-1965. This correlation shows in some ways that, in Istanbul, urbanization is rather much more connected with the growth of the manufacturing industry and also, that there is a periodic relation between services and the manufacturing industry.
It is interesting to note that in Istanbul, the organized manufacturing industry\textsuperscript{6} shows a regular and high growth rate. In the manufacturing industry a growth rate of 50 per cent was possible between the years of 1960-1965. The tendency of the industry to get organized is becoming an influential factor for its capacity to absorb more people and this fact shows a more structural growth in the future.

On the other hand, two important indicators relative to the connection between urbanization and the economically active population are: firstly, the rapid growth of the building sector which, by surpassing the urbanization speed, reached a ratio of 1.50 in the period 1960-1965; and secondly, the stationary state of the unclearly defined (activities) group in this last period. It is possible that the rapidly growing organized manufacturing industry will create a large service sector in the forthcoming periods, and that this will lead urbanization, and directly migration, to new patterns.

**Housing**

The housing problem of the Istanbul metropolitan area has become worse since 1950, because of rapid population growth in the urban area due to migration. Since the city was not prepared to meet a migration on such a scale, the gecekondu building activities started and, by expanding rapidly, became what they are today.

In Istanbul, where the population increases on an average of 100,000 people every year, only 70,000 persons can be settled in normal standard dwellings and the remaining 30,000 are, by necessity, directed towards the gecekondus or low standard houses. In a census made in Istanbul in 1966, the number of gecekondus was found to be 120,000 and people living in these gecekondus numbered 600,000. At the growth rate mentioned above, we can estimate at the time of writing that these numbers reached 140,000 and 720,000, respectively. As a result of this, we can assume that, 33.9 per cent of the city population (presently 2,123,000) lives today in gecekondus.

These gecekondus are concentrated in 194 distinct settlements. The planners of Istanbul have decided that 79 of these gecekondu regions, being structurally defective as settlements, must be liquidated. The remaining 115 regions are considered "improvement areas", which can be developed as settlements with some governmental assistance.

Assuming that the population growth and house construction in Istanbul will maintain present trends and rates, new housing
requirements in the forthcoming five years, are estimated to be around 70,523 units until 1972. Therefore, it becomes necessary to build in the forthcoming two years, at least 13,500 to 14,000 houses. If we add to these figures, the number of houses which, for various reasons have not been constructed since 1966 (about 43,500 units), it is clear that Istanbul is confronted with a difficult situation. Owing to this situation, new gecekondu regions are expected to spread all over the city every year and the old ones may continue to expand rapidly in the Istanbul metropolitan area.

Gecekondu (Slums)

As previously explained, 33.9 per cent of the Istanbul population resides in gecekondu areas. A majority of the population living in these areas are migrants from villages. As such, they have been used to living in more spacious settlements and have worked closer to nature. They have also come from environments where social control and restraints were more powerful.

Research made in gecekondu areas shows that, due to the different nature of the urban environment, gecekondu dwellers are often faced with certain problems. These problems arise from living in jammed and crowded quarters under unhealthy physical conditions and, from difficulties encountered in adapting to the social life of the city.

In most of the gecekondu areas, educational opportunities, even the learning of the three R’s, are much lower as compared to other parts of the city. These areas are heterogeneous and dynamic. Some people in these sectors act as receivers and accomplices of criminals and contribute to crimes committed in the city. In gecekondu areas unemployed and destitute persons are numerous. The number of consumptives, persons having contagious diseases and others suffering from various illnesses is also high. Due to the low standard of water supply networks and especially of drainage, sewage lines and pits (in some cases the total lack of these services) contagious diseases originating from the gecekondu areas frequently threaten the whole city. On the other hand, these areas possess a high rate of fertility, in spite of the inadequacy of economic means. They have an excess of male population. At the same time, the ratio of younger people in these areas, is higher, as compared to other parts of the city. It is a fact that, although the incomes of people residing in gecekondu are higher than the incomes of people living in the villages, their income, compared with those of people living in normal urban dwellings, are much lower.

Gecekondu regions are often deficient in services and suffer great privations in matters of road, water supply, sewage, open
spaces, public parks, playgrounds and recreational centres, sanitary and municipal services, etc. In researches made by the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement in Ankara and Izmir, and by Charles W. M. Hart in Istanbul, it was concluded that deficiencies of municipal services in gecekondu areas have clearly reached their limits. The studies also showed that gecekondu dwellers have a low level of understanding, comprehension and appreciation of the requirements of urban living, especially in sanitary matters which are very important. The studies did find that gecekondu dwellers can contribute in some ways, to the solution of their problems, though there is a limit to this.

Gecekondu

Gecekondu is dwellings built by citizens on pieces of land they do not own and where they do not have any construction permit. They are built in a very short time and in haste, with mutual help in most cases, in order to escape the provisions of laws and regulations concerning “instant demolition during the construction” and/or, in order to gain time until the obtaining of a court writ or a municipal committee decision and their execution, in cases of “being occupied and settled”. In some parts of Istanbul, however, the nature of gecekondu buildings has changed and, in most places they have begun to develop into 2-3 storeyed flats constructed with a concrete shell. This aspect can be very clearly seen, for example, in the Gultepe gecekondu region which is built on parcelled lots in accordance with the law. However, in other parts of Istanbul, hundreds and thousands of gecekondu are built incessantly, entirely in illegal ways, in a single night, especially on eves of elections or during political upheavals when social control is weakened. The gathering and organizing by the gecekondu dweller into his gecekondu area, of other new gecekondu citizens, his fellow-country-men, peasants from his own village, his relatives, in order to get organized against the police forces or to become a local political power or to gain ascendency socially and morally, have turned these gecekondu sectors into strongholds in which it is impossible to enter for demolition purposes.

It is clear that the fact of the construction of these gecekondu which are expanding in or around the city, and the differentiation in the living conditions between average citizens and these new residents will create certain negative effects and social frictions by reason of great psychological pressure exercised on persons living in these areas. Due to the insufficient capacities of local administrative bodies and municipalities, the efforts spent for the betterment of the conditions of this kind of settled and unremovable sittings cause delays in providing services and utilities. Specifically, difficulties in educational possibilities and opportunities hinder the growing up of new generations.
Recognizing the need for providing urban services in the gecekondu areas, the national government, the city and the municipalities around Istanbul have tried to provide at least the basic services in these localities. Three priority areas have received the attention of these levels of government: roads and sewage, drinking water and electric power. The investments in these areas up to 1969 amounted to 117,083,000 Turkish liras for roads and sewage; 44,915,765 liras for drinking water and 41,920,437 liras for electric power. The distribution of these investments among the governmental levels is shown in Tables 4, 5 and 6.

Table 4

Expenditures for Roads and Sewage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Roads (in km.)</th>
<th>By The Ministry (in thousand Turkish liras)</th>
<th>By The City (in thousand T.L.)</th>
<th>By The Municipality (in thousand T.L.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946-65</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>10,230.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7,654.</td>
<td>300.</td>
<td>3,214.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>11,454.</td>
<td>13,801.</td>
<td>6,333.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>13,734.</td>
<td>19,305.</td>
<td>4,715.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>17,941.</td>
<td>2,898.</td>
<td>5,504.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>591</td>
<td>61,013.</td>
<td>36,304.</td>
<td>19,766-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(52.00)</td>
<td>(31.00)</td>
<td>(17.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: 117,083,000 T.L.

It is readily seen in Table 4 that a big part of the expenses for roads and sewage comes from the national government of Turkey, through the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement. The share of the city of Istanbul in this expense was considerable in 1967 and 1968, though it decreased dramatically in 1969. According to the Greater Istanbul Plan, an estimated 1,200 kilometers of road are needed to properly service 3,800 hectares in the metropolitan area. This means that the construction of an additional 604 kilometers of road with an estimated cost of 155,671,350 Turkish liras is needed in the immediate future.
The share of the national government in providing drinking water to the gecekondu areas is considerably greater than the efforts of the city and the municipality combined. About 73.63 per cent of investments in drinking water facilities since 1963 have been from national government sources. In fact, from 1963 to 1965, only the national government invested in providing drinking water to gecekondu areas, with the municipality alloting funds for this purpose only in 1966 and the city government in 1967.

Table 5
Expenditures for Drinking Water
(Investments)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>By The Ministry</th>
<th>By The City</th>
<th>By The Municipality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963-1965</td>
<td>8,966,237</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>4,894,172</td>
<td></td>
<td>756,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>7,441,789</td>
<td>3,274,000</td>
<td>1,370,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>8,917,056</td>
<td>4,426,500</td>
<td>434,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2,855,680</td>
<td>959,210</td>
<td>620,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33,074,934</td>
<td>8,659,710</td>
<td>3,181,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(73.63)</td>
<td>(19.27)</td>
<td>(7.10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: 44,915,765.-TL.

With the expenditure of 44.9 million Turkish lira, water was brought to 76,644 gecekondu areas, extending this service to 64 per cent of the whole gecekondu areas in Istanbul. As instituted by the Ministry concerned, the Kartal Water Association provides water on the Anatolian side, while the Mahmutbey Water Association satisfies the water needs of the European side of the city.

Because of the construction materials used in the gecekondu areas and the fact that many of the dwellings are on marginal places, it has been difficult in the past to extend electrical services to them. In 1963, however, the national government started providing electricity to some areas. The municipality followed suit in 1966 and the city in 1967. Up to 1969, more than 41 million Turkish lira had been invested in electricity, with the largest portion of this (93.43 per cent) being spent by the national government. By the end of 1970, the plans for Istanbul project that all of the gecekondu areas shall have electricity.
Past and Present Proposals and Solutions

For some time now, Turkey has recognized that something must be done to correct the imbalances created by the migration of people to its urban centres. The desire to control and regulate the flow of migrants to metropolitan areas, has been embodied in the principles and priorities in the Second Five Year Plan, especially in the sections on "Regional Planning" and "Housing".

In order to minimize the development differentiation between various regions in Turkey, the Plan provides for balanced distribution of investments within the country. The Plan calls for regulating growth in developing areas, the evaluation of the development possibilities and opportunities of various regions and the analysis of relationships between various economic and social activities over the national landscape. Through regional planning studies the development capacities of Turkey will be assessed according to the Plan and priority will be given to underdeveloped regions in investment programmes.

The determination of growth points where the rate of urbanization will be high, will be supported as the propelling force of regional development according to the Plan. Regional plans guiding the sectoral activities and regulating the urban settlements will be prepared. It is hoped that these plans will be helpful in assisting the regulated development of economic and social activities of the regions, and specifically, for securing savings in infra-

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Table 6
Expenditures for Electric Power
(Investments)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>By The Ministry</th>
<th>By The City</th>
<th>By The Municipality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963-1965</td>
<td>2,126,399</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>375,673</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>9,355,246</td>
<td>521,931</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>11,008,117</td>
<td>647,484</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>6,679,187</td>
<td>314,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39,168,949</td>
<td>892,500</td>
<td>1,858,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(93.43)</td>
<td>(2.13)</td>
<td>(4.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>41,920,437 — TL.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
structural investments. It is also hoped that they will be of help in the distribution of services and in order to arrange opportunities for the development of regional industries.

By taking into consideration the rapid growth of the city population, the allotment of the scarce resources primarily to cities showing a tendency for development is supported by the Plan. From this point of view of either financing or house building, the State will take its necessary place in the housing construction market as a regulator and a supporter of “people who build their own houses”. The efforts of people who build or improve their own houses will be supported by giving limited credits, large scale technical assistance and, if possible, by providing materials and inexpensive lands.

The gecekondu problem is taken into consideration in the housing sector of the Plan. The concerned authorities will try to solve this problem by giving priority to the prevention of new gecekondu building and by utilizing, in this instance, the abilities of the “people who build their own houses”. The problem of land ownership of gecekondu, it is hoped, will be solved without creating any difficulty in the future development of the city.

The Five Year Plan provides that in order to minimize the effects of land cost increases and to prevent speculation, public controls on lands will be enforced in development areas. Public lands will be offered to the benefit and for the use of the community from a single source and as a means of supporting the construction of inexpensive houses. If necessary, a low renting system will be used.

To summarize, the principles to be followed in the Plan for solving the housing problem are as follows:

a. To secure, by taking necessary measures, the construction of as many houses as possible without exceeding the 20 per cent ratio of the total investments according to principles set up by the First and Second Five Year Development Plans.

b. To secure the construction of a greater number of dwellings and thus, the settlement of a larger group of people, by restricting the building of luxury houses and choosing the least expensive type of public housing which will have no inconvenience as far as sanitary conditions are concerned.

c. To lessen, especially, the straining negative effects of rentals on low income families by constructing low rental public housing.
d. To provide suitably priced lands to people willing to construct their own houses.

e. To solve the land ownership problems of people residing in gecekondu improvement areas and better their living conditions by providing public utilities and services.

f. To get rid of the low standard gecekondus and slums which should be eliminated as settlements, by providing proper houses to people residing in these areas.

g. To prevent the building of new gecekondus.

**Implementation of Housing Plans**

In order to restrict the construction of luxury houses in Istanbul, "public housing standards" were established and relative tax exemptions were instituted according to principles set up in the Development Plans. The main purpose of the "Gecekondu Law" (Law No. 775) which became executory on 30 July 1967, is to secure the improvement of gecekondus that can be improved, the elimination of dwellings that cannot be tolerated, and the prevention of new gecekondu buildings. To achieve these goals, in the shortest possible time, the powers of the State, city governments and municipalities have been unified with the capacities of the citizens of Istanbul.

To meet the requirements of the growing city population for housing, it has been decided that some lands owned by the Treasury and municipalities are to be made into "gecekondu prevention areas," or places where suitable land is provided to low income homeless and landless families. In this instance, two gecekondu prevention areas on the European side of the city and four areas, on the Anatolian side, were allotted by the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement. The sum of 10,888,675 T. Liras was spent for the expropriation of personal properties situated in those areas. The other "prevention areas" were provided by Istanbul municipality and Kartal municipality. Both municipalities allotted 113 hectares, which can accommodate 4,144 units to the gecekondu prevention scheme.

It is estimated that the gecekondu prevention areas thus established have enough capacities to entirely meet necessary requirements until the end of 1971. For these 46,224 units, however, 3,626 km. of road and sewage canals must be laid and their water and electric power supplies must be provided. To accomplish this, a sum of 75 millions T. Liras, each year, must be allocated during the 1970-1975 period.
Table 7
Gecekondu Prevention Areas in Istanbul

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Area (in Ha.)</th>
<th>Capacity (number of units)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Osmaniye</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Küçükkoşy</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okmeydani</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sineklitepe</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gülşuyu</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maltepe 2</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kartal</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Icerenköy</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagithane</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,087.0</td>
<td>46,224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aside from places designated as "gecekondu improvement areas," the authorities in Istanbul have also planned certain places which are to be cleared of gecekondu dwellers. The destitute and low income families evicted from the "elimination areas" were settled, in the first place, in 1,659 units out of 3,732 planned units. The remaining 2,073 houses were distributed among needy and low income families. The levels of poverty and low income were determined by a scoring system worked out by the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement. An income of 800 T.L. for two person families was used as a base. To this amount was added an extra 200 T.L. for each additional member of the family. The completed dwellings and prepared lots were distributed by giving priority to families having the highest points in this scoring system.

For lots situated in "gecekondu prevention areas" three systems determined by the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement are used. These are:

a. The Ministry provides the land;

b. The Ministry provides the 5,000 T.L. credit (without personal contribution); and

c. The Ministry provides the 5,000 to 10,000 T.L. credit (with 25 per cent participation of the person or family concerned).

As can be observed here, the purpose of this land contribution is to complement the limited saving capacities of needy and low income families with the technical assistance and financial support of the State.
One of the methods established by the Development Plan, for the purpose of controlling and regulating the gecekondu areas is providing assistance to "people who build their own houses". In Turkey, there is a tradition of working collectively through mutual help, called "imece". Thus, the method of assisting "people who build their own houses" can be seen as the bringing up of this tradition to a formal level, a kind of "supported imece".

The contribution of the State in the implementation of this method is directed mainly towards these goals:

a. The acquisition of land;
b. Training of people before and during the implementation;
c. The procurement of building materials and technological assistance;
d. The construction of infrastructural installations and equipment; and
e. The procurement of technical guidance.

Up to now, the method of providing assistance to "people who build their own houses" in Turkey has been mainly used in villages requiring new settlements, regions that have suffered from national disasters or are susceptible to future damages due to disasters, and to gecekondu areas in urban centres. Several reasons account for the choice of these areas for assistance. In the first place, people who live in these places have inadequate financing capacities to enable them to buy or construct their own houses under normal market conditions. Land in these places is usually scarce and high priced, thus making it difficult for the people to afford it. Finally, these areas usually have a tradition of doing work collectively through mutual help. An atmosphere of cordiality and cooperation between government and citizens has a great chance of meeting with success in these places.

**Conclusion**

To sum up, although the problems arising from migration to Greater Istanbul of masses of people from rural and other urban areas are serious, the prospects that they can be adequately met in the future are good. Much of this prospect depends on the continued cooperation among the various levels of government in the Istanbul urban area. An important determinant, too, is the implementation of long term plans of the national government that cover the whole national landscape.

Obviously, the problems of Istanbul have to be seen in the national context. The plan for regional balance throughout Turkey,
embodied in the Second Five Year Plan, if implemented, may result in developing other areas which will attract people who are now currently migrating to Istanbul. The more specific plans for the Istanbul urban area must also be implemented, if the problems are not to become worse.

The current programmes for differentiating between “gecekondu improvement areas,” and “elimination areas” in Istanbul are worth noting. Obviously, there is a need for low income settlements in some parts of the metropolitan area and in the absence of governmental resources to build tenements and other forms of low cost housing, it makes good sense to take advantage of the skills and resources of gecekondu dwellers who are perfectly capable of building their own dwellings. In areas that can be put to more productive uses, however, eviction of gecekondu dwellers and their transfer to improvement areas may be called for. It is noteworthy in the Istanbul case that provisions for new lands are made when people are evicted from gecekondu areas.

The governmental efforts to provide basic services to gecekondu areas in Istanbul is another interesting case of realistic planning. All levels of government are involved in providing roads and sewage, drinking water, and electricity to gecekondu dwellers. Though there may be some fear that provision of such services is a tacit admission of the legitimacy of gecekondu rights over the land they are occupying, the government’s desire to extend services overrides it. After all, epidemics and other things that happen in the gecekondu may affect other parts of the city and providing the means to stop them there adds to the public good in the long run.

Finally, the government’s efforts to cooperate with “people who build their own houses” and to capitalize on the spirit of cooperation among these people is a noteworthy approach. All over the world, one of the strengths of low income communities in urban areas is a spirit of mutual help and cooperation. That the Government of Turkey has tapped this reservoir of potential resources speaks well of the quality of the planning for improvement of urban life in that country.
Kuala Lumpur

Enche Ali Bin Esa
Research Officer, Department of National Unity
Government of Malaysia

KUALA LUMPUR, the capital of Malaysia, is situated strategically in the Klang Valley, the fastest-growing and most important industrial complex in the country. Kuala Lumpur is composed of the Federal Capital with an area of about 36 square miles and the District of Kuala Lumpur which is approximately 355 square miles. The former is administered by the Commissioner of the Federal Capital and the latter by a District Officer.

The city, founded in 1859, has since that date, developed from an essentially Chinese-dominated city, to become the colonial administrative centre of the Federated Malay States in 1896. From the early 1900s, with the growth of European-owned tin mines and rubber estates, the city became the centre of economic and political activities. By 1948, this immigrant-dominated city had become the capital of the Federation of Malaya. In 1957, with the independence of Malaysia, it became the political as well as the unifying centre where attempts were made to integrate the various cultures and diverse ethnic elements of the society.

There has been a phenomenal rate of increase in the population of Kuala Lumpur since its foundation and especially after the post-war years. In 1947, the population of the Federal Capital stood at 176,000, while the whole Kuala Lumpur district totalled 291,000 persons. This figure had by the 1957 population census risen by approximately 80 per cent — that of the Federal Capital totalled 316,239 persons, while that of the Kuala Lumpur district totalled 477,238 persons. The breakdown in ethnic composition for the Federal Capital in 1957 was: Malays 47,615; Chinese 195,832; Indians 53,506; and others 19,286, and that of the Kuala Lumpur district was: Malays 75,667; Chinese 299,825; Indians 76,106 and others 25,640. The most recent figure obtained by the Police for the Kuala Lumpur district (excluding Petaling Jaya district) in April 1970 was 782,824 persons with the breakdown in ethnic composition being: Malays 207,548; Chinese 455,093; Indians 90,710 and others 29,473.
It can be seen that in 1957, of all the main racial groups, the Chinese community predominated in Kuala Lumpur, followed by the Indians and then the Malays. This was mainly due to the fact that it was only in the 1930s that migration of Chinese and Indian labourers to Kuala Lumpur and the other major towns and ports of Malaysia was restricted. Since that time, the portion of locally-born citizens has slowly increased so that ethnic distribution is becoming gradually stabilized.

The phenomenal rate of increase in the population of Kuala Lumpur is, not surprisingly, correlated to the rapid industrialization of the city. The demand for labour has attracted people, not only from the countryside in the outlying districts of Kuala Lumpur but also from all over West Malaysia, to migrate to the city in search of better prospects. Hence, the present high rate of increase in population, at an annual rate of 4 per cent leading to the rapid urbanization of Kuala Lumpur, is attributed to both natural increase in population, as well as the intense migration of people from the rural areas. Of the total increase between 1947-1957 almost 50 per cent is attributed to in-migration.²

Analysing the reasons for the migration of many people to Kuala Lumpur, Lam Thim-Fook concluded that "the main attractions to Kuala Lumpur of the large and rapid movement of population from elsewhere in the country are generally due to governmental actions; to its higher per capita income than elsewhere; and to the opportunities that virtually anyone can get money, status, fame or whatever they want here if they are prepared to work." More specifically, he mentions the following reasons:

a. The making of Kuala Lumpur as the nation’s capital in 1957;

b. The concentration of governmental projects — political, cultural and sports facilities — such as Parliament House, museums, and sports stadiums;

c. The concentration of tertiary training institutions, such as the University of Malaya, the Language Institute, as well as international training institutions;

d. The concentration of commercial activities and their institutions; and

e. The concentration of new industrial activities and the expansion of existing ones.³

Rural-urban migration in Kuala Lumpur, as in other large urban areas, has brought in its wake various economic and social problems such as unemployment and underemployment, shortage of housing leading to squatting and slums, traffic congestion, racial
strife, increase in crimes and health and sanitary problems. In 1962, the Kuala Lumpur/Petaling Jaya area had 7.1 per cent of the males in the working force unemployed and 15.2 per cent of the females also unemployed. Since studies have shown that immigrants from the countryside tend to be less educated and untrained, most of those who find employment receive relatively less in pay than older residents.

With less income, migrants also find it difficult to afford better housing. Many of them live in slum and squatter areas. Transportation is also hampered by population congestion arising from migration: it was estimated in 1968 that more than 150,000 vehicles of all types are on Kuala Lumpur's streets, which were meant for only 80,000 vehicles. Congestion in Kuala Lumpur has also had the effect of pushing desirable developments (especially for residential purposes) farther away from the centre. As a result of this urban sprawl, it is costing the city more to extend services to all its parts. All in all, the rapid expansion of the Kuala Lumpur conurbation due to internal migration has had a tremendous impact on the quality of life in the city, some of it, of a negative character.

As a whole, the considerably high rate of in-migration from the rural areas to the cities, especially to Kuala Lumpur, from 1947 onwards is largely the result of both socio-economic and political factors. The fact that the urban areas had better social and economic facilities — adequate lighting, water supply, health and medical services, educational facilities, etc. — accounts greatly for their attraction. Politically, the rural-urban migration was height­ened during the 1948-1960 Communist uprising (the Emergency) when towns were found to be safer places than the rural areas. The government also found it of the utmost political necessity to remove the Chinese squatters living on the fringes of the jungle, some of whom were known to be supplying the Communist insur­gents with food and information, to new settlement areas or new villages where they could come under government surveil­lance. The success of the government in making the Chinese squatters (who were at first suspicious and hostile of government intentions) adjust to their new way of life under the direct super­vision of government authorities, was largely attributed to the various social and economic amenities that were introduced to these new villages. Thus, the creation of these new villages, accommodating a population of some 500,000 (80 per cent of whom were made up of the Chinese squatters while the rest Malays in the remote districts) had further accelerated the rate of urbanization in West Malaysia. This further explains the large number of Chinese in Kuala Lumpur from 1957 onwards when the bound­aries of the town were extended to include the new villages around it.
Administrative Changes

With the rapid urbanization of Kuala Lumpur, the administration of the town which had been under the Town Board, was replaced by a Municipal Commission in 1948. Under this system, the town was administered by 15 Municipal Commissioners, two-thirds of whom were elected and the remaining one-third appointed by the Resident Commissioner. The Municipality was responsible for the maintenance of sanitary and health services – general health measures, night soil removal, anti-malaria control, markets, street lighting, fire services, repairs and maintenance of roads and bridges and buildings. The Municipality was a financially autonomous body with revenue collected mainly from government and quasi-government authorities from their properties in Kuala Lumpur.

In 1952, the Municipal Commission became known as the Municipal Council with a Constitution providing for the presence of 12 elected members and six nominated members to be presided over by a President. The Constitution of the Federation of Malaya provided that the Municipality of Kuala Lumpur was also to be the Federal Capital. However, Parliament was not to have exclusive powers within the boundaries of the Federal Capital unless such arrangements were made with the Selangor State government. Thus, the municipality remained an autonomous body responsible for the various services, social, health and economic, without the added responsibility of looking after the water and electricity services. These were to be run by the State and the Central Electricity Board respectively, while public transport was to be run by a public company.

The next important change in local government of Kuala Lumpur was in 1961 when the Federal Government assumed administrative control of Kuala Lumpur. The Municipal Council was dissolved and the affairs of the Kuala Lumpur Municipality were administered by a Commissioner, assisted by the Advisory Board consisting of six official and five unofficial members. The office of the Commissioner was composed of seven departments — the secretariat, health, engineers, treasurer, valuation, town planning and architect. Each had its own allocated responsibilities — the Secretariat was in charge of administration as well as the fire brigade, the health department for sanitation among the hawkers and in the markets; the engineer’s department had charge of the maintenance of roads, drains, bridges, street lighting, traffic signs, sewers, central depots and the open spaces; the valuation department was in charge of the assessment of property in the municipality, from which the main sources of revenue (amounting to almost 80 per cent of the municipality) came from. The town planning department took care of the planning of housing projects,
Fig. 12. Kuala Lumpur Municipal Area
the clearance of slums and squatter areas, etc.; and the treasurer's department was in charge of finance and accounting, weights and measures, and from funds allocated from this department, the running of the municipality was carried out. On the whole, there was little conflict in the allocation of responsibilities of the various departments as their boundaries were all well defined.

The Squatting Problem

The rapid population growth of Kuala Lumpur from 291,000 in 1947 to 782,824 in 1970 has resulted in many problems. These problems are made more serious by the fact that about 50 per cent of the population growth cited above was the result of internal migration. As previously mentioned, the growth of Kuala Lumpur as an administrative and commercial centre, the Emergency or Communist uprising, and the separation of Singapore from the federation have all somehow resulted in the increased importance of the Federal Capital and the movement of people to it. It is true that national development planning, with its emphasis on balancing development throughout the country may act as a countervailing force to the tendency of growth to be centered in Kuala Lumpur. However, if the historical trends in other countries are followed in Malaysia, the "creeping urbanism" which is being brought about by such government programmes as the Federal Land Development Authority (FLDA) resettlement schemes may eventually result in increased growth of the central city. As rural areas become towns and urban places, the tendency for people to migrate from these places to larger urban centres generally becomes more marked. At least, this has been observed in many other developing countries.

One of the most serious problems in Kuala Lumpur at present, a problem which directly arises from internal migration, is squatting. A squatter shall be defined here as a person who settles on land without a legal title or right to it. Surveys conducted by the Office of the Commissioner of the Federal Capital in 1966 and 1968 showed that about 37 per cent of the population in the Federal Capital are squatters. Some 26,500 families (185,000 persons) in Kuala Lumpur are squatters. In addition, many squatters also live in Selangor State, on the periphery of the Federal Capital. These people increasingly move into the central city with every opportunity they get.

In the Federal Capital, there are about 20,000 dwellings classified as squatters. They represent some 25 per cent of the total number of dwellings in the area. The total land area occupied by squatters, taking only large concentrations of squatter settlements into consideration, is about 3,000 acres, which is about 13
LEGEND

SQUATTER AREA

Fig. 13. DISTRIBUTION OF SQUATTERS IN KUALA LUMPUR
per cent of the total Federal Capital area. Of the land squatted upon, 2,350 acres or 78 per cent is State land, while the rest is private land.

One of the problems of a multi-racial country like Malaysia, of course, is cultural harmony and the development of national unity. Malaysia is the most urbanized country in Southeast Asia, with the exception of Singapore, with 21 per cent of her population living in settlements of 20,000 and above. The cities of Malaysia, however, are largely non-Malay. The Chinese, who comprise less than 40 per cent of the total population outnumber Malays by more than three to one in cities of 20,000 and above.8

In Kuala Lumpur, the Chinese make up more than 60 per cent of the total population. The proportion of Chinese among squatters, however, is a bit higher—a 1966 survey by the Office of the Commissioner of the Federal Capital in conjunction with the Ministry of Local Government and Housing revealed that 67.2 per cent of 20,611 families living as squatters were Chinese. (See Table 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State Land</th>
<th>Private Land</th>
<th>Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malay</td>
<td>3,722</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>8,451</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>5,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians/Pakistanis</td>
<td>1,373</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,565</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>7,046</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 indicates that in Kuala Lumpur, Malays tend to squat on public lands while the Chinese squat on private lands. Since most private lands are near the centre of the city and public lands tend to be in the periphery, this means that most Chinese are living in the central business district, often at very high densities. Squatting by Chinese is also extremely difficult to control because much of the initiative for regulation has to rely on the private landowner, who may be receiving some rent from the squatter.

Rents on houses located in private lands tend to be higher than those in state lands. In a study of 3,187 rent paying families living in state lands, it was found that 14.1 per cent paid $10 and below; 49.9 paid $11 to $20; 29.0 paid $21 to $40; and 7.0 per cent paid more than $40 per month.
The capacity to pay rent, of course, is related to family income. The survey conducted in 1966 showed that squatters on private lands tend to have higher income than those on state lands. While only 11.3 per cent of families living in public lands had incomes of more than $200 a month, 17.0 per cent of those who live in private lands were earning this much. For those at the income bracket $201 to $300, the proportions were 21.1 per cent for those who live in state lands and 30.1 per cent for private land squatters.

The most serious problem with squatters on public lands is the fact that it is extremely difficult to extend urban services to them because this would be tantamount to recognizing their tenure on the land. Thus, while 58.0 per cent of households living on private lands had electricity, only 3.7 per cent of those living on state lands had this service. Water from the tap inside the house is available to 66.0 per cent of private land squatters and only to 7.4 per cent of state land squatters. Finally, 96.9 per cent of private land squatters had some means of waste disposal (bucket system or better), while only 52.3 per cent of those who squat on state lands had this system of waste disposal.

The Kampong as Squatter Community

Large scale surveys such as the ones made by the Federal Capital of Kuala Lumpur tend to give the impression that squatters are scattered all over the city at random. Actually, they live in small communities, often distinct from each other because of ethnic origins. The Chinese, aside from those resettled near the periphery during the Emergency, tend to live close to the city centre. The Malays tend to live in settlements very much reminiscent of their rural kampons, with attendance at the surau or mosque providing an index to the boundaries of the community. Malay settlements tend to merge into each other. Hence, in Kampong Setor, a Malay community studied by McGee in 1962, the people had no mosque of their own but they attended meetings at Kampong Bharu, a larger legal Malay settlement. The community also merged with Kampong Maxwell on the northern side.

Physically, Kampong Setor closely resembles a rural Malay village: the houses were all built in Malay style, elevated on stilts with wood walls and in most cases tin roofs. All the household heads interviewed in Kampong Setor were born in rural areas: Selangor, Malacca and Negri Sembilan. The majority were single when they moved to Kuala Lumpur, and five out of 23 household heads who were married came first without their families. Most of the respondents had previously lived in other parts of Kuala Lumpur, mainly in Kampong Bharu, where they boarded as single persons. Eighteen of the 23 respondents had rural employment
before. The rest were also mainly unskilled, entering jobs with low status and low pay.

Not surprisingly, most of the families in Kampong Setor maintained close links with their home villages. Many of the men who had come to Kuala Lumpur had gone back to arrange marriage with village girls and then returned with their wives to the city. Most of them returned at least once or twice to their home village and many sent money home to their parents.

McGee found in his study that the majority of the household heads were very religious, attended mosque once a week and were attached to surau praying groups. Some grew a few vegetable and fruit crops in their compounds. Finally, the sense of community was also strengthened by the common fear of eviction from the area. The kampong residents had elected a *Ketua Kampong* (head of the kampong) who was responsible for contacting the authorities if the city government threatened eviction.

All in all, McGee found many social elements in Kampong Setor that tended to make life almost as pleasant as in a typical rural community. He also concluded that:

The problems of this kampong were remarkably few, even though its levels of income were low, an average of $100 Malayan per month; job stability was high, unemployment low; and in general, the squatter kampong gave every impression of rapid adaptation and assimilation to the problems of the urban environment. It could by no means be labelled a ‘settlement of misery’, but rather a ‘settlement of necessity’—a necessity brought about by the lack of adequate city housing.\(^{10}\)

**Squatting as a Housing Problem**

The extent of squatting in Kuala Lumpur is an index to its housing problem. The First Malaysian Plan estimates that from 30,000 to 35,000 low cost houses have to be constructed in Malaysia from 1966 to 1970. The bulk of the low cost housing programme is centered in the Federal Capital in view of the large squatter and slum population there. In 1967, the Ministry of Local Government and Housing launched the "first pilot industrialized low cost housing scheme" at Jalan Pekeliling in Kuala Lumpur. This project, which provides 3,009 dwelling units, uses pre-cast concrete elements developed by the Gammon-Larsen and Nielsen firm from Denmark. It is made up of four blocks of four-storey flats and shops and seven blocks of 17-storey flats, constructed at a total cost of $24.5 million.\(^{11}\)
Aside from high-rise low cost housing, the Ministry of Local Government and Housing also engages in other types of housing schemes. Between 1961 and 1965, the Ministry and its predecessor, the Ministry of the Interior, built 7,569 low cost dwellings throughout Malaysia. A total of 1,174 units were built in 1966 and 1,697 were built in 1967. It was expected that in 1968, housing output would be 10,156 units; 10,534 were scheduled to be finished in 1969 and 7,895 were expected in 1970. The types of dwellings constructed and planned were of many varieties, ranging from Malay-type detached timber houses in the rural and coastal areas to terrace houses in semi-urban areas as well as multi-storey flats in urban areas.12

A “Crash Programme” in Housing was also planned by the Ministry of Local Government and Housing in 1967. Under the programme, small schemes of 50 or 32 low hollow-block terrace houses on lands of 2.3 or 1.66 acres in the smaller towns which had no low cost housing projects in the past would be constructed. Some 200 schemes consisting of over 8,110 houses have been provisionally approved and an estimated 5,000 units were scheduled for completion in 1968. Under the programme, it was estimated that the value of the house plus land and infrastructure works comes to about $4,000. For the potential owner, the monthly installment would have to be from $30 to $35 a month over an extended period.13

One of the primary considerations in any housing scheme, of course, is the ability of the tenants to purchase the dwelling or at least, pay economical rent. In the survey of squatters previously mentioned, 37.3 per cent of the sample said they could pay $21 to $40; and 10.2 per cent could afford more than $40. Considering that the high-rise flats will cost more to construct than the houses envisioned in the Crash Programme, it seems difficult to afford the houses meant for them. This is especially so, since aside from the monthly rents, down-payments are expected by the Government. The survey showed that 85.1 per cent of the people surveyed could afford $1,000 or less for down-payment while 14.9 per cent could pay more than $1,000. As for monthly installments for ownership of the dwelling, 79.9 per cent of the sample said they could pay $40 and below 20.1 could pay more than $40 per month.

Aside from monetary considerations, other factors contribute to difficulties as far as housing is concerned. Foremost among these is the large size of most urban families in Kuala Lumpur. The survey revealed that 21.8 per cent of squatters in the sample were composed of 1 to 4 persons; 78.1 per cent had more than five members while .1 per cent gave no data. Minimum standards
of housing in Malaysia have been worked out so that family size can be taken into consideration. Obviously, however, it costs more to provide housing for larger families.

Doubling up in dwellings seems to be a problem in Malaysia, too. In the survey, while 78.8 per cent of the squatter families lived in one house, 19.5 per cent of the families were doubling up (two to four families in a house); 1.6 per cent had from five to eight families per house; and .1 per cent even had nine families and above living in one house. While doubling up may not lead to too much discomfort in the relative airiness of the kampong squatter area, it may lead to sanitation and other problems in the glass and concrete flats planned by the Housing agency.

The location of the housing projects within the city of Kuala Lumpur seems to have been primarily decided by the cost of land. In other words, the decision to set up multi-storey flats where they are now is related to the high cost of land in other parts of the city. In addition to costs, however, another thing to consider is the relationship between the place of work of squatters and the place where they live. In most studies, it has been found that there is a logic in the location of squatter settlements: most of them are close to the squatters’ place of work.

In the survey of Kuala Lumpur squatters, it was discovered that the proximity of residence to work place was also true. As seen in Table 2, 7.9 per cent of squatters worked where they lived while 47.5 per cent lived less than three miles from where they worked. The distances seem to be shorter for squatters on private lands, where 12.8 per cent worked where they lived and 58.9 per cent lived less than three miles from where they worked.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance Between Residence and Work Place</th>
<th>State Land</th>
<th>Private Land</th>
<th>Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On site</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 3 miles</td>
<td>5,635</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>4,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 3 miles</td>
<td>6,197</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>1,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No data</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,565</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>7,046</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aside from the fact that proximity of place of work to residence is of considerable value to the squatter, whose income is small enough to feel the pinch of transportation costs, there are other
advantages of a societal nature which arise from such proximity. There will be less traffic jams, less smog, less time wasted in journey to work, and probably healthier walkers when the place of work is close enough to the residence. The logic of the selection of housing sites by squatters is seen in their mode of travel. The survey showed that 52.8 per cent used motorcycles or cars. About a quarter (24.6 per cent) used the bus, train, etc., while 7.5 per cent gave no information. These figures are arguments that low cost housing should be set up as close as possible to the original squatter settlements. On-site housing should be preferred to relocation. Aside from the fact that people find it easier to live in new types of housing if their commuting patterns are not disturbed too much, on-site housing may also contribute to peace and stability especially when the community structure prevailing in the old area is not disturbed too much by changes in the housing situation.

Another problem which the housing designers has to take into consideration is the fact that for many Chinese people, the home is also the place of employment. In the survey of squatters, it was found that 69.9 per cent of the sample were “hawkers, small traders, skilled workers, clerks, drivers, etc.” About 24.4 per cent were “unskilled labourers, part-time labourers, and unemployed.” Only 4.5 per cent were “shopkeepers, professionals, executives, landed proprietors, etc.” The designs of the low cost multi-storey flats, were primarily for residential purposes, unlike those in Hong Kong, where the mixture of residential and employment functions is recognized. To be more effective, there may be a need for redesigning some of the flats in the future.

One of the most difficult problems linked to racial characteristics, of course, is how Chinese, Malays and Indians as well as other ethnic groups can live together in harmony within the crowded tenements. Experience, so far, has indicated that because of cultural differences, the goal of integrating the low cost housing schemes is extremely difficult to attain. The Chinese, because of their residence in the central business district, can adjust relatively well to high-rise housing. Many Malays, however, with their attachment to the soil, find it difficult to adjust to concrete and glass.

Mixing Chinese and Malays within the crowded tenements also heightens tensions and frictions that may remain latent without the phenomenon of proximity. The life styles of Chinese and Malays clash in some instances within the confines of the crowded flats. The smell of Chinese cooking, reeking heavily of pork, is irritating to many Malays. So are the many Chinese celebrations such as wakes, characterized by feasting and gambling. Little things like these become magnified because of propinquity. Solving the
problems arising from them require a great deal of expense because of design, training and other aids to adjustment to a more urbanized way of life.

Other Problems

Squatters and slums, of course, are not just parts of the housing problem alone. They also result in a host of other problems that are extremely difficult to solve. For example, the report of the Sub-Committee on Squatter Rehousing and Resettlement submitted to the National Operations Council in 1969 enumerated the following as problems created by squatters:

(a) squatters challenge the status of governments as agencies for maintaining law and order;

(b) the predominance of squatting in Kuala Lumpur as the capital city reduces its image both at home and overseas and increases the sensitivity of the population;

(c) squatting results in an increase in crime, juvenile delinquency and a wide variety of social problems;

(d) squatter areas are also the seedbeds for thugs, secret societies and other racketeers to operate their activities;

(e) squatting results in the loss of substantial revenue in the form of assessment rates, taxes, etc. to the government;

(f) as the number of squatters increases, their influence and resistance to eviction grows and as officials demonstrate their inability to grapple with the issues, still more brazen squatting occurs taking advantages of official helplessness or acquiescence;

(g) squatting not only affects the physical development of Kuala Lumpur, but also its economic, social and political stability;

(h) squatting huts are generally fire hazards as well as a menace to public health.

A study of crimes in the state of Selangor since Independence shows a definite increase in murder, robbery, gang robbery and burglary between the years 1957-1968. (See table below). The most significant increase had been crimes normally associated with urbanization, viz. robbery, gang robbery and burglary. The figures, except for murder, went down considerably in 1969. This is mainly due to the racial disturbances in May of that year. Other possible reasons can be attributed to the emergency and curfew rules, increased police vigilance and the fact that a large number of secret society members have been rounded up since May, 1969.
It is difficult to establish the origin of criminals involved in the city's crimes. Police Headquarter's reports do not indicate their address but only age, sex, racial group and sentence passed. The study shows more Chinese than Malays or Indians are convicted for robbery and gang robbery. More Indians than either Malays or Chinese are convicted for crimes of violence like murder and assault. For thefts and burglary, an almost equal number of Chinese and Indians, and a slightly smaller number of Malays are convicted.

Another feature of squatting in the Federal Capital, which lends to racial instigation and political exploitation, is its non-integrated character. For instance, a census of Kampong Kenanga\(^\text{16}\) shows not a single Malay living in the area. Of the 838 families with a total of 4,547 persons recorded, 796 are Chinese families, and there are only 177 Indians. This fact is mainly due to the multifarious and sometimes conflicting social, cultural and religious habits and practices of the different ethnic groups. Given a properly planned rehousing and resettlement scheme it may be possible to integrate the squatters under the same roof, but it will take some doing.

**Solutions**

The authorities currently dealing with squatters include: (a) the Federal Government, through the National Operations Council, The Ministry of Local Government and Housing and the Commissioner of Federal Capital; and (b) the State Government, through the District Office, Kuala Lumpur, and the State Development Corporation. The basic policies of both agencies are similar and are as follows:

(a) that the problems of squatters be continually studied and that surveys be undertaken as and when necessary to formulate programmes to alleviate squatting;

---

### Table 3

**Crime Rates in Selangor**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang Robbery</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1,041</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>2,799</td>
<td>2,238</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(b) that priority be accorded to all squatters in the allocation of low-cost housing units;

(c) that where land is available, multi-storey low-cost flats and resettlement schemes are built and squatters in the surrounding areas are rehoused in these flats and schemes;

(d) that cognizance of the squatter problem is taken in the development plans of the State Government.

To date the Ministry of Local Government and Housing and the Pesurohjaya Ibu Kota Kuala Lumpur have built a total of 8,165 multi-storeyed flatted units for rehousing of squatters and low income wage earners at a cost of about $49 million (Malaysian). Currently, the Pesurohjaya Ibu Kota Kuala Lumpur has six schemes designed mainly to cater to squatters. These schemes will cost approximately $11 million and provide accommodation for 2,358 families in multi-storeyed flats.

To date the Selangor State Government has constructed 7,546 dwelling units for squatters and low-income groups at a cost of about $40 million, both within and outside of the Federal Capital limits. The Selangor State Government is at present undertaking eight schemes which are meant to cater to squatters. Of these, two schemes will consist of multi-storeyed flats providing a total of 826 units, which are expected to be completed by the end of 1972. The remaining six schemes are resettlement programmes designed to meet the needs of squatters with a preference for a plot of land. There will eventually be 2,635 plots, of an average size of 3,000-4,000 square feet in these schemes.

Financial limitations have restricted the amount of work that could be undertaken to rehouse and resettle squatters. It is envisaged that the cost of rehousing the entire squatter population of Kuala Lumpur will be about $150-$180 million.

The experience of the Pesurohjaya Ibu Kota is that very few of the squatters for whom low-cost flats are built really move into these units. One reason is due to the high rentals. Every effort is being made to reduce costs, but in the absence of cheap land, the need to repay loans at an interest rate of 6 per cent over 30 years, the high cost of site development and the absence of a long-term housing programme (for say 20 years), the rentals will continue to be at the present high levels.

The non-availability of land remains the single most important problem, particularly to the Pesurohjaya Ibu Kota, in tackling the squatter problems. There are no sizeable areas for development within the Federal Capital as the majority of land is either owned
privately, or owned by the State Government. Much of the land belonging to the State Government is under mining lease. Land available after mining usually needs considerable treatment before it can be built on. Added to this, wherever land is available, including mining land, they are usually choked with squatters.

**Prospects**

A policy of dynamism is required in tackling the squatters' problem — one which deals with the real aspects of the problem. Essentially, this calls for a two-fold policy: one dealing with squatters who are predominantly urban and the other with those who are agriculturally oriented.

In so far as the urban squatters are concerned, improvements must be made in the industrial and commercial sector to absorb as many of them as possible into gainfully occupied employment opportunities. Coupled with this, a practical and realistic long term housing programme, which not only meets with the basic requirements but is able to cope with the future demand for such units well before the problems arise, is needed.

Improvements in the rural economic sector will certainly serve to cushion some of the impact of urbanization and its by-product of squatting. Squatters who are classified as agricultural must be resettled in agricultural colonies, either in the periphery of the city, or in other areas where land for such purpose is available.

Some degree of influx of agricultural or rural people into urban areas will always remain so long as the rate of population growth continues to increase, the differentials in income between rural and urban workers remain and industry's need for labour and the attractions of city life continue.

The building of new towns or the expansion of existing towns can help to divert settlements from the central area of Kuala Lumpur. A sound land settlement policy in the new areas can, in fact, be a means of redistributing populations to desired places.

A comprehensive approach to the squatting problem in Kuala Lumpur requires consideration of at least eight specific aspects of programme and policy which are interdependent. These include: (a) a comprehensive survey, (b) general policy, (c) land policy, (d) housing policy, (e) legislation, (f) planning, (g) administration, and (h) financing.

As Charles Abrams stated, squatter policies call for firmness with understanding. Squatters will settle where they can if they are not told where they may. They will build what they can afford if they are not helped to build where and what they should. There
should be less concern about what squatters will build than where they will build it, how the land is planned and whether essential utilities and services are available. Initial layout is more important than initial standards of the construction. Squatter houses will tend to improve with time and with better economic conditions, particularly if the squatters are given a stake in the society and the incentive of ownership.
Lima

Julio Cotler
Sociologist, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos

and A. A. Laquian
Director of Research, Intermet

SINCE its founding in 1535, Lima has been the capital of one of the most important countries in Hispanic America. With the achievement of Peruvian independence in 1821, Lima became the capital city of the emerging republic. Due to its political importance, the city always enjoyed special status for it was not only the centre of bureaucratic and governmental services but also the place of residence for Peru's ruling classes and the point of concentration for the country's wealth.

The Lima metropolitan area contains about 20 per cent of the population of Peru. It accounts for 60 per cent of industrial production, 97 per cent of financial activities, 50 per cent of the economically active population, 49 per cent of internal commerce, and 82 per cent of the production of consumption goods. It is also the seat of institutions that influence Peruvian national development such as the Army, the Church and universities.

The city of Lima itself, which forms the core of this agglomeration of some three million people, has only 18.4 per cent of the metropolitan population. The other people reside in 22 distritos (districts), three of these in the provincia (special province) of Callao and 19 in the province of Lima. The districts within Lima province which form a contiguous densely settled area, are: Brena, Chorrillos, La Victoria, Lince, Magdalena del Mar, Miraflores, Rimac, San Isidro, San Jose de Surco, San Martin de Porres, San Miguel, Santiago de Surco, Surquillo, Comas, Independencia, Jesus Maria, La Molina and Villa Maria del Triunfo.

This paper was translated from the original Spanish.
The population growth of Metropolitan Lima has been extremely rapid. During the period 1940-1961, the yearly rate of population increase in Lima was 5.2 per cent, as against 2.2 per cent for the whole country and 4.5 per cent for all other urban areas. While the national population increased by 6.1 million from 1940 to 1968, Lima’s population increased five times, from 0.5 million in 1940 to 2.5 million in 1968. It is projected that by 1975, Lima would have a population of 3.3 million and that by 1990, a population of 7 million is not inconceivable.

Internal Migration

Much of the rapid growth of the Lima metropolis has been due to internal migration. It was estimated by the National Planning Institute of Peru that between 1940 and 1961, one million people migrated from the internal regions of Peru to the coastal areas. To understand this massive movement of people, one must consider the peculiar geographic and regional divisions within Peru.

Broadly, one can divide Peru’s 485,000 square mile territory into three regions: the desert coastal strip along the Pacific Ocean which makes up 10 per cent of the country’s land area and contains 30 per cent of the population; the sierra or mountain region of the Andes, covering about 30 per cent of the land area where 60 per cent of the population live; and the montana or jungle region which covers 60 per cent of the land area but is inhabited by only 10 per cent of the total population.3

In the sierra region where most of the people live, tillable land is extremely limited, mainly concentrated in river valleys and gorges. The pressure of population on the land is so strong that people tend to leave the sierras. They generally gravitate toward the densely populated areas along the coast.

The 1961 census in Peru noted that out of the 24 departments in the country, 16 were losing population (net outmigrants exceeded net immigrants). This trend is most badly felt in certain regions such as Ancash, Apurimac, Ayacucho, Cajamarca, Huancavelica, Piura, and Puno departments. On the other hand, only two departments, Lima and Callao, serve as the destination points of these internal migrants. There is incipient migration toward the Amazonas and Tacna departments but this is almost insignificant compared to the immigration to Lima and Callao.4

About 45 per cent of the residents of Lima are migrants, according to the 1961 census. These migrants come from places of varying sizes as seen in Table I.
Table 1

Size of Original Place of Residence of Migrants to Lima
(1961 Census)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Size</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100,000 or over</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 to 99,999</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000 to 19,999</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 to 4,999</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>999 or less</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the census figures, it is clear that the internal migration in Peru contradicts the common assumption that it is the residents of poor and isolated places which migrate to large cities. The figures show that the great majority of migrants come from provinces which contain important urban centres in different parts of the country. One index to the urban characteristics of the migrants when they reach Lima is their major occupation. The 1961 census showed that only 39.5 per cent of men worked in agriculture before migrating to Lima, while only 16.6 per cent of women were similarly engaged.\(^5\)

A survey of residents of three barriadas in Lima made in 1965 revealed that a person’s migration to Lima tended to occur between the ages of 11 to 21. This survey, involving residents of Cuevas, El Agustino and San Martin de Porres, showed that 22.9 per cent migrated to Lima before the age of ten; 58.7 per cent migrated between 11 to 21; and 7.2 per cent migrated after 31.\(^6\)

The same survey also revealed that adjustment to life in Lima was eased considerably by the fact that about 60 per cent of the migrants lived with relatives upon first arriving in the city. Of these people who lived with relatives, about 85 per cent, in turn, did so for a year or more.\(^7\)

The flow of migration to Lima does not seem to come directly from the sierra to the \textit{pueblos jóvenes} on the outskirts of the city. This is shown in the 1965 survey which indicated that only 2.8 per cent of the residents of the three areas surveyed came directly from the sierra. The pattern seems to be that migrants come from their hometowns to the inner sections of Lima, and then move to the new settlements on the outskirts. About 77 per cent of the respondents in this survey showed this pattern.\(^8\) The findings of a survey conducted by Mangin in 1967 in a community called Mariscal Castilla also follow this trend, as shown in Table 2.\(^9\)
Table 2

Migration Pattern of Adults in Mariscal Castilla

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hometown—other town—Lima—Mariscal Castilla</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hometown to Mariscal Castilla</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hometown—Lima—Mariscal Castilla</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>76.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No information</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Census figures, there seems to be no appreciable difference in the proportion of males and females among people who decide to migrate to urban areas. The reasons for migration, however, usually differ in relation to sex. A study which probed into the reasons for migration found that while 54 per cent of males considered "employment opportunity" as the main reason for migrating to the city, only 34 per cent of females gave this reason. On the other hand, 47 per cent of females said that "family ties" motivated them to move to the city, as against 18 per cent of the males who gave this answer. About 17 per cent of males considered "educational opportunities" important in their decision to migrate, 11 per cent of females shared this view. Some 12 per cent of males gave other answers while 8 per cent of the females did so. These figures show that the men usually come to the city to look for work while the women, because of their roles, are drawn by family ties. These usually mean that they come as wives of migrant husbands or as the parents of younger migrants.

Migration to the city is usually due to reasons which are different from those that influence migration to the pueblos jovenes on the outskirts of cities. The Turner-Paredes survey cited above asked the residents of El Agustino, Cuevas and San Martin de Porres why they moved to these settlements. In general, the opportunity to own land seems to have been the strongest motivation for moving, followed closely by the desire to maintain family ties. The importance of different reasons for moving is shown in Table 3.10

The Problem

As in other countries, the main problems arising from the rapid migration of people from the countryside to the primate city are rooted not only in the possible frustration of aspirations held by the migrant before his coming to the city but in the actual pressure on facilities and services of necessity offered by the city to make life viable for migrants and residents alike. The service that usually feels this strain the most is housing. In Lima, the
Table 3

Reasons for Moving to Pueblos Jovenes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>El Agustino</th>
<th>Cuevas</th>
<th>San Martin de Porres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic, desire to work</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High rents in the city</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family reasons</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land acquisition</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better housing</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

communities of dilapidated dwellings and poorly serviced communities variously called corralones, barriadas or pueblos jovenes dramatically illustrate this problem.

In 1968, it was estimated that about half of the population of Lima lived in tenements and subdivided older houses (corralones) in the centre of the city. Another 25 per cent lived in suburban communities (barriadas or pueblos jovenes) which were usually located on vacant hillsides, sand dunes, river banks or barren flats not being used for productive purposes. These latter communities have been defined in the Barriada Law as follows:

. . . the territorial zone of fiscal, municipal, communal or private property that is found on the outskirts of the populated centres of political-administrative capitals or in their surrounding suburban areas, in which by invasion and in spite of legal dispositions on property, with municipal authorization or without it, on lots distributed without regard to officially approved plans, have been constituted groupings of dwellings of haphazard construction, lacking one or more of the following services: drinking water, sewage, public lighting, sidewalks, vehicle routes, etc.11

The definition of barriadas cited above clearly shows the problems that they create. These are: (1) lack of legal status of the settlements; (2) lack of governmental planning in setting up the settlements; and (3) the lack of urban services, at least initially. The fact that these settlements do not conform to governmental plans, of course, does not mean that there is no planning in their creation. Turner, Mangin and others have documented the way in which the invasions resulting in the creation of settlements have been carefully carried out. There are also increasingly effective attempts on the part of the settlement residents and the government to extend urban services to these places. In fact, Turner has
Fig. 14. "PUEBLOS JOVENES" IN METROPOLITAN LIMA, 1966
(FROM MATOS MAR, ESTUDIO DE LAS BARRIADAS LIMENAS, 1966).
argued that on balance, the activities of pueblos jóvenes residents to improve their lot constitute one of the most developmental aspects of Latin American urbanization.\textsuperscript{12}

According to the results of a study of Lima migrants in 1967, a great majority of the respondents felt that they were "better off" in Lima than in their original place of residence. Only four per cent of the sample considered themselves adversely affected by the move to the city. The others attributed the gain in personal satisfaction to the fact that they got a better job, higher income, better education and improved medical attention in Lima. In fact, over 75 per cent of the sample stated that they found employment in Lima within three months after arriving in the city.

In spite of this positive picture, the fact must be admitted that rapid internal migration is creating tremendous problems not only in Lima but in other cities of Peru as well. Table 4 shows that barriada dwellers made up from 6.2 per cent of the population of Cuzco in 1961 while they accounted for 67.5 per cent of Chimbote's population that same year. Considering that the growth rate of the barriada population is almost twice the growth rate of urban area populations in Peru, the proportion of barriada residents in the cities mentioned below would be considerably higher at present.\textsuperscript{13}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Population in Squatter Settlements in Peruvian Cities, 1961}
\begin{tabular}{lrr}
\hline
City & Population & In Settlements & Per Cent \\
\hline
Chimbote & 66,783 & 45,065 & 67.5 \\
Iquitos & 58,110 & 36,000 & 61.9 \\
Arequipa & 162,195 & 63,200 & 39.0 \\
Sullana & 28,709 & 10,200 & 35.5 \\
Chiclayo & 90,726 & 31,500 & 34.7 \\
Piura & 81,405 & 28,200 & 34.6 \\
Trujillo & 104,198 & 34,500 & 33.1 \\
Lima (Metro) & 1,640,000 & 404,225 & 24.6 \\
Pucallpa & 27,238 & 6,000 & 22.0 \\
Tacna & 27,139 & 4,000 & 14.7 \\
Cuzco & 81,057 & 5,010 & 6.2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Some of the problems found in the pueblos jóvenes of Lima may be directly traced to the illegality of these settlements, at least, in their early stages. The Turner-Paredes survey shows that 54.8 per cent of the people interviewed in Cuevas obtained their land by being a member of an invasion group. About 8.3 per cent were invasion members in El Agustino and 2.8 per cent in San
Martin de Porres. Of the Mariscal Castilla residents studied by Mangin, 49.9 per cent were invasion group members.

Though the Peruvian Government has been one of the earliest administrations in the world to recognize and legalize squatter settlements, the legal question still hindered the provision of urban services in many settlements. Thus, a survey of Comas, a settlement of some 30,000 people located seven miles north of Lima's centre, revealed that there were practically no public hydrants in the area and people had to buy their drinking water from peddlers. Electricity was available, though at higher rates than in other parts of the city. A city-wide survey made in 1962 showed that 56 per cent of 317 barriadas lacked water services of any type. It was estimated that 67 per cent of 320 barriadas were entirely without electricity while 24 per cent had some form of public lighting.

A survey of 154 barriadas conducted for the Fondo Nacional de Salud y Bienestar Social in 1960 showed that 89 of these communities lacked public sources of water and 151 lacked private sources; 126 lacked any means of public sewerage; 136 lacked public health facilities; 150 lacked electricity; while only 5 communities had access to streetcar service, 3 could use the railroads and 94 could use the city's bus system.

Since one of the main motivations for moving to urban centres seems to be that of finding employment, it must be mentioned that this objective is often the most serious source of frustration for people moving to the city. True, migrants do not usually have too much difficulty in finding work in Lima. The Fondo Nacional survey showed that only 4.7 per cent of the economically active members of the population in 154 barriadas were unemployed. However, this high rate of employment hides the fact that many of those who claim to be employed are actually seriously underemployed. Governmental figures estimate that 31 per cent of the labor force engaged in industry, 25 per cent of those in commerce, and 44 per cent of those in services were underemployed in 1967. Underemployment is specially critical among women, where the unemployment rate is 6 per cent and the underemployment figure 42 per cent.

The high underemployment rate among migrants who live in low income settlements becomes more readily apparent when their occupations are analyzed. The Fondo Nacional survey showed that only 1.2 per cent of male heads of families had professional and technical occupations, 10.0 per cent were artisans, 12.5 per cent were mechanics or transportation workers, while the majority were unskilled workers (construction labourers, 18.6 per cent;
services and domestics, 12.8; peddlers and stallholders, 14.0; independent workers, 15.7, etc.). Of the women, about 89.7 per cent were "economically inactive." It is interesting to note that according to official government figures, the unemployment rate among migrants is less than half of the rate for non-migrants (3 per cent and 7 per cent respectively). As mentioned previously, however, the underemployment among migrants is higher (28 per cent) compared to non-migrants (22 per cent). Primarily because of difference in jobs and the tendency of migrants to be underemployed, the monthly incomes for migrant and non-migrant groups are not the same. While migrants receive the equivalent of about $85 a month, non-migrants, who know the city job situation more and have had longer urban work experiences receive about $132.00 a month.

From the factors mentioned above, it is clear that while to many individual migrants, the move to Lima has been beneficial, internal migration has also created many serious problems for the quality of life in Peru's capital. To understand these problems more clearly, and to seek ways and means of coping with them, it is necessary to look into the various types of low income settlements that have grown in the Lima metropolis.

Types of Settlements

Because of commonly held characteristics, such as dilapidation, high densities and general poverty, the ordinary viewer of the low income settlements in Lima may be tempted to think that they are all the same. As pointed out by Turner, however, there are major differences between a tugurio (slum) and a barriada (squatter colony). Delgado also raises this distinction. Moreover, he goes to submit that any attempt to offer solutions to the slum and squatter problem in Lima must be based on a clear understanding of this distinction. To this end, he comes up with an "operational typology," which divides the settlements in eight categories, as follows: (1) high density internal barriadas (slums); (2) high density peripheral barriadas (slums); (3) internal settlements in incipient consolidation; (4) internal settlements in advanced consolidation; (5) recent peripheral settlements; (6) peripheral settlements in incipient consolidation; (7) peripheral settlements in advanced consolidation; and (8) peripheral settlements in rural areas.

In describing the high density internal slums, Delgado calls them "true enclaves of underdevelopment inside the urban context," which are "characterized by manifestations of decadence." Densities in these areas fluctuate between 500 to 2,000 per
hectare. The character of these slums is shaped largely by this high density living.

The degree of congestion is impressive; the absence of hygienic services is generalized ... the organization of the inhabitants with respect to local centres is very weak or non-existent; tenancy is by rent and, more frequently, by illegal possession; localization is next to working centres and nuclear zones within the urban area; and the possibilities of local development are virtually nil. Examples of slums that fall under this category are: Huerta and Chacra Rios in El Cercado; Concentracion Ruggia and Ciudadela Chalaca in Callao; Leoncio Prado and Jardin Britania in Rimac; and Mendocita in La Victoria. Delgado estimates that there are about 60 internal slums in the Lima metropolitan area, representing about 15 per cent of the total population of the low income settlements. (See map on page 116).

The same high density and dilapidation characterizes the peripheral area slums, with the major difference that they are not located in the central city. They tend to be fewer and smaller in size. Often, they are concentrated in places where land available for housing is limited by topography and other factors. Examples of these settlements are found in Puente Nuevo in Callao and Flor de Amancaes in Rimac.

Squatter settlements just starting to consolidate are usually invasion areas that originally have high densities (around 400 inhabitants per hectare). Usually, they have not been recognized by the government or have just been recently recognized, so that the processes of planning, lot distribution and other activities related to legal distribution of urban services have not yet resulted in thinning of dwelling units. Examples of these types of settlements are Mirones in El Cercado, Huascaran in Rimac, Villa Victoria in Surquillo, Ancienta Alta in El Agustino, and Santa Rosa de Lima in San Martin de Porres.

Squatter settlements characterized by advanced consolidation have usually reached the last stages of redevelopment, so much so that densities often thin to 350 inhabitants per hectare or lower. In these areas, there is residential planning, streets are wider, and basic services and infrastructures generally become available.

Recent peripheral settlements are usually less than three years old. They are formed by people who come from the inner city slums, joined, perhaps, by more recent migrants from the provinces. Essentially, they are “towns in formation.” An example of a recent peripheral settlement is Ano Nuevo, resulting from an invasion in 1967, which saw more than 1,000 families settle in
private property located in the peripheral area. The success of the invasion was greatly due to the aid given by municipal authorities residing in the Comas district.

Peripheral settlements in incipient consolidation are relatively hard to find in Metropolitan Lima, though El Progreso in Carabayllo and Acapulco in Callao may be considered as examples. Generally, such settlements are the results of experimentation in consolidation of recent peripheral settlement dwellers.

Some of the most studied settlements in Lima are the peripheral settlements in advanced consolidation, mainly because they show what can be done when people organize to do things for themselves. Densities in these settlements remain under 300 inhabitants per hectare. The settlements themselves are usually located on the perimeter of the metropolitan area, in places with access to main roads. Examples of such settlements which started as invasions but which developed to communities surpassing 100,000 are Nueva Esperanza in Villa María del Triunfo, Pampa de Comas in Comas, and Santa Teresa de Villa in Chorrillos.

Finally, settlements within the metropolitan area may be considered as qualitatively different from the others mentioned above. They are similar to small settlements that appear along coastal roads in the rural areas. Still, because they will be enveloped in the growing urban conurbation in the future, they present an interesting phenomenon. Among the few cases of this type of settlement are El Carmen de Monterrico and Matazango in the Ate district near Lima.

An important aspect of the typology presented by Delgado is the fact that a developmental progression is implied in the eight categories he proposed. By correlating the physical and social aspects of the settlements and their location within the metropolitan area, he suggests the existence of a process of consolidation which occurs in all settlements in the urban place. This method of analysis, essentially an optimistic one regarding the future of low income settlements, serves as a guide to the land use and land allocation policies of the government and suggests approaches for agencies that seek the improvement of the tugurios and barriadas.

Even without the typologies presented by Delgado, however, it is still quite easy to grasp the picture of low income settlements in Lima by just looking at their location in the metropolitan space. This approach, which was used by Matos Mar and John P. Cole as early as 1955, becomes much more interesting when seen in the proper historical contexts of development.
In 1955, Matos Mar made a comprehensive survey of barriadas in Lima and found that there were 39 settlements at that time, with a total population of 119,140 and occupying some 512.44 hectares of the city's land area. Only nine of the 39 settlements were founded before the Second World War (the oldest barriada, Armatambo, was founded in 1924). Five barriadas were founded during the war years. The formation of barriadas seems to have accelerated only after the Second World War, with 12 being founded between 1947-1950. This was followed by six in 1951 and seven in 1954.

Updating his data in 1966, Matos Mar found that in eleven years, the number of barriadas in Lima had increased to 181 and that the area occupied by such settlements had increased to 1,644.30 hectares. Furthermore, the percentage of barriada dwellers to the total Lima population had increased from 10 per cent in 1955 to 19 per cent in 1966.

As seen on the map on page 116, barriadas in Lima are located in various parts of the urban area. In 1955, Matos Mar defined these areas as: (1) the bed of the Rimac River; (2) the hillsides on the northeastern parts of the city; (3) inside the urbanized area of the city and (4) outside the urbanized area of the city. As Table 5 indicates, the growth of barriada settlements has been fastest in the third and fourth areas. In the future, growth outside the urbanized area will surely expand more vigorously.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number 1955</th>
<th>Number 1966</th>
<th>Number of Persons 1955</th>
<th>Number of Families 1955</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bed of Rimac River</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>68,400</td>
<td>23,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the hillside</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26,980</td>
<td>23,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside urban area</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>18,800</td>
<td>20,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside urban area</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4,960</td>
<td>17,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>119,140</td>
<td>84,431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are three specific reasons why barriadas in Lima have tended to concentrate in the four types of areas mentioned above. First, invaders tend to choose marginal lands for barriada sites because they feel that there will be less public opposition to this move. After all, unused lands near river banks or those located on steep hills have low value. Another reason for the pattern of settlement in Lima is related to the government's ownership of the
lands occupied. Many invaders believe that there will be less opposition to their moves if they occupy government land, especially public land which is not being used. Finally, as far as inner city settlements are concerned, choice of location is related to place of work. Most tertiary and service occupations are located in the central city. However, the central city slums and squatter areas in Lima are already saturated with low income people. Settlements outside the urban area are growing — mainly lured by the availability of land there, but also limited by transport costs and the longer travel time to place of work involved. Initially, at least in the construction stages, a few of the squatters find employment right in the settlements — as construction workers, carpenters, masons, plumbers, etc. Other squatters may earn something opening up little stores or extending some services to the people in the community (dressmakers, shoemakers, beauticians, etc.). However, the viability of these low income communities will depend on the job opportunities available close by. Either that, or good low price transportation facilities must be introduced to link these communities with the central city where jobs are.

In 1961, the Peruvian Government passed the Marginal Settlements Law (Ley Organica de Barrios Marginales) which is more popularly known as the Barriada Law. This law marks a change in the philosophy and approach of the government towards the barriadas. It implicitly recognizes the nature and magnitude of the problem. The law seeks to transform existing barriadas into organized suburban towns and to prevent the formation of new barriadas through carefully planned urbanization.

The passage of the Barriada Law also recognizes the inability of the government, alone, to solve the problem posed by slums and squatters. The investments necessary for coping with these problems are much higher than what the government can afford. For example, between 1949 to 1956, the Peruvian Government was able to construct only 5,476 houses for low income people. This was less than 1 per cent of the housing need for those years. It is no wonder, therefore, that within the same period, some 50,000 families in urban parts of the country took matters into their own hands and invaded public and private lands, setting up their barriadas.

Characteristics of Migrants

Most studies that provide some information on the characteristics of migrants to Lima have been done in the barriadas, though the inner city slums of Lima are much larger and the problems they represent are graver. Perhaps this is because the barriadas are, in the words of Solnit, "visually dramatic". Slum
formation is part of a natural process of urban aging and decay. The barriadas, set up by invasions which have sometimes resulted in riots and killings, attracted more attention.

The barriadas of Lima, however, are only extensions of the slum problem in the city. As previously mentioned, most of the barriada residents have usually been slum residents. They might have been renters who got tired of the cramped rooms in slum adobe houses for which they were paying so much, or even slum home owners who were evicted from their inner city sites. In most instances, as exemplified in the story of Blas and Carmen told by Mangin, the barriada invaders are simple folks with positive aspirations who want a home of their own and a piece of land in the city and who band with other people of similar goals to take over a certain area. A survey of Pampa de Comas in 1956 showed that more than half of the people had come to the barriada to be property owners and live in their own houses. A third had moved because they could not afford to live in Lima. Six per cent had been evicted from their rental quarters and saw the invasion as an opportunity to get what they wanted.

What they want, most of all is of course, land. Table 6 shows how the residents in four different low-income settlements were able to obtain land in the outskirts of the city.

Table 6
How Residents Obtained Land in the Settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>El Agustino</th>
<th>Cuevas</th>
<th>San Martin</th>
<th>Mariscal Castilla</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Invasion group member</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permission from Ass’n</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bought permission</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved individually</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bought from someone</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership transfer</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Got from government</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renting</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demographic Aspects. Generally, residents of pueblos jovenes tend to be young. The Pampa de Comas Survey (1956) found that 35 per cent of the settlement’s population were under 10 years of age. The study of Ciudad de Dios made by Matos Mar revealed that 55.3 per cent of the people were minors (below 18). Turner noted that “the barriada is established by young families with a
high proportion of very young children," although he proposed
that after passing through certain stages, the ratio of infants to
adults drop, the average age of the adults rises, making the age
structure in the barriada more or less similar to that of the city
as a whole.\(^{28}\)

Studies of people in Lima's pueblos jovenes show a high rate
of literacy and relatively good education. The Matos Mar study
showed that barriada residents who were seven years old or above
had almost 90 per cent literacy. This is not so surprising in a culture
that sees education as the key to economic and social mobility.
However, though primary education is available to most Peruvians,
only a few people are able to go on to higher education.

Generally, migrants to Lima tend to have lower education than
non-migrants. According to a Census study, while 69.1 per cent of
male and 61.0 per cent of female non-migrants who are 15 years
old or over had finished at least one year of secondary school or
higher, a relatively lower percentage of migrants were able to
achieve this level. For males who were 15 years or under when
they arrived in Lima, 58.1 per cent were able to finish one or more
years of secondary school (the corresponding figure for females
was 38.6 per cent). For migrants who were 15 years or older
when they arrived in Lima, the percentage of those who finished at
least one year of secondary school was much lower (43.1 per cent
for males and 27.5 per cent for females).\(^{29}\)

### Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>El Agustino</th>
<th>Cuevas</th>
<th>San Martin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No education</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One to two years</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three to four years</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary, complete</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary, incomplete</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary, complete</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University, incomplete</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University, complete</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other studies have shown that one of the benefits of migrating
to Lima is the opening up of educational opportunities, especially
for younger people. Comparatively speaking, a greater propor­
tion of people in Lima achieve higher levels of education than those
in other parts of the country. Statistics show that 75 per cent of
all Lima residents who completed the first year of secondary school
in 1962 also completed their fifth year in 1966; in the country as a whole, however, less than one half of those enrolled in the same secondary school level in the same year were able to finish the fifth year in 1966.

Children in the primary schools in Lima have a much better chance of going on to secondary schools. About three-quarters of primary school children in the city complete the primary school curriculum, compared to only one-third for the rest of the country.

Economic Characteristics. With low education and few skills, most migrants to Lima find employment in secondary or tertiary sector activities. As mentioned previously, unemployment and underemployment among migrants are high. A study in 1956 showed that only about a quarter of the total barriadas' population in Lima was employed. Of the economically active population, however, some 92 per cent were employed and 71 per cent had steady employment. Of the remainder, 27 per cent had occasional or seasonal employment. Most people worked outside the barriadas. Those who found employment within the barriadas were shopkeepers or artisans and specialists of various kinds who helped their neighbors with construction and other jobs. The total labor force in the barriadas was divided into the following categories: labourers and artisans, 58 per cent; domestics, caretakers and gardeners, 16 per cent; peddlers or shopkeepers, 14 per cent; and public transport workers, 5 per cent. Some 8 per cent were unemployed.

There is some evidence that the employment patterns of migrants change dramatically once they move to the urban centres. For one, people who formerly earned their livelihood from agricultural pursuits usually have to shift to other callings. This is shown in Table 8 where it is shown that while 39.5 of male

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>Before Migration Men</th>
<th>Before Migration Women</th>
<th>After Migration Men</th>
<th>After Migration Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, managerial</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office workers, salesmen</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculturists</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisans, skilled workers</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
migrants were engaged in agriculture before migration, there were only 1.2 per cent still working in this area afterwards. In most part, this shift is absorbed by employment in jobs that call for either skilled or unskilled work, which together accounted for more than half of the employment figures after migration.32

The change of employment characteristics as migrants become more stabilized in the urban setting is shown further by Census figures which make a distinction between manual, non-manual, agricultural and other types of employment. The figures in Table 9 reveal that the percentage of people employed in manual occupations tends to decrease with length of stay in the city while the percentage of people working in non-manual occupations tends to increase with length of stay. This is especially true among women, where 72.1 per cent of recent migrants as against 42.3 per cent of older migrants were employed in manual occupations in 1966.33

Table 9
Types of Employment of Migrants to Lima by Date of Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex and Date of Migration</th>
<th>Non-manual</th>
<th>Manual</th>
<th>Agricultural</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inmigrated after 1956</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inmigrated before 1956</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native to Lima</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inmigrated after 1956</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inmigrated before 1956</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native to Lima</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the type of occupation available to migrants usually dictates the level of pay and income derived by them, it is only logical to conclude that the shift in employment through time also means a change in the level of income received. A study of economically active males conducted by the Census Department showed that time spent in the city is directly related to level of income. Thus, Table 10 shows that 30 per cent of native Lima residents as against 22 per cent of older migrants and 12.4 per cent of recent migrants received Soles 4,000 or more per month. The percentages for these groups is reversed when one considers people receiving Soles 1,000 or less.34

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Table 10

Monthly Income of Migrants by Date of Migration to Lima

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Levels</th>
<th>Migrated after 1956</th>
<th>Migrated before 1956</th>
<th>Native to Lima</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than Soles 1,000</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 to 1,499</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500 to 2,999</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000 to 3,999</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000 and above</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One interesting fact about the economic life of squatters in Lima is the existence of many small activities having to do with the buying and selling of goods, the presence of small stores, ambulatory peddlers, little restaurants and artisan shops that cater to the need of the barriada residents but which also link the settlement to the outside economy. Mangin observed, for example, that in the barriadas he studied, "Many families obtain some income by operating stores, bars or shops in their homes; in the barriada I have studied most closely about a third of the households offer some kind of goods for sale."

In his study of Ciudad de Dios, Matos Mar did an intensive analysis of the 94 tiendas or small businesses in the barriada. Looking into their capitalization, he found 28 such places having an initial cost ranging from 1,000 to 8,000 Soles. Another 66 tiendas had initial costs ranging from 190 to 980 Soles. As for the things they sold, the small businesses generally dealt in soft drinks, liquor, fruits and vegetables, other foods and various little things needed by the people in the barriada. Most of the stores were small encomenderias, retail stores that sold diverse products and food items. Among the 94 tiendas studied by Matos Mar, there were 13 restaurants which were sometimes attached to boarding houses, four bakery shops, two sellers of ice, two butcher shops and other small businesses.

All the economic aspects mentioned above highlight the fact that employment is still the most important problem in the barriadas. It is true that a few jobs may be found in the barriadas themselves and that many of the residents possess certain skills that enable them to find jobs in the city. However, most employment opportunities are found in the centre of the city and living in pueblos jovenes in the peripheral areas entails additional transportation costs to and from these jobs. One good thing about living in the settlements, though, is the presence of small businesses and stores that cater to the peoples’ needs. Aside from performing this much needed function, the tiendas also provide some income to many squatters.
Community organization. As communities that are set up by cooperative efforts, the barriadas are usually tightly knit organizations with leadership structures and well understood procedures that create social cohesion. Settlements originating from invasions—"often carried out with as much advance planning and organization as a Marine amphibious assault"—usually maintain the strong community structure that made them possible in the first place. Such unity is often demanded by the fact that once set up, the barriada has to defend itself against property owners, governmental agents, the police, and even other invaders. In Pampa de Comas, for example, some 200 diehard squatters formed an association for the defense of their property as early as 1945, when an influential landowner whose adjoining lands were squatted upon had the squatters evicted. From this association sprouted the "Confederated Government of Comas," which was composed of representatives popularly elected each July from each of ten zones of the community.37

Describing the typical association in a barriada, Solnit points out the various functions of such an association through time:

The typical barriada association acts as a semi-govern­mental unit whose basic function, at first, is the protection of property and the development of the community. As such, it tries to obtain basic urban services and outside assistance from the national government. The associations are financed by assessments paid by barriada residents. An elected directors committee usually runs the internal affairs of the barriada, passing on applications to settle there by cutting out new lots out of vacant areas, on requests to sell, etc.38

In Ciudad de Dios, Matos Mar divided the 18 associations existing in the place into four types: (a) associations to seek solutions to the housing problem, 3; (b) sports and athletic associations, 8; (c) religious organizations, 4; and (d) organizations to further certain activities, 3. The first types of associations, which were the oldest in the community, were mainly composed of original invaders. They represented the local and communal governmental authority in the area. Usually composed of male adults (they were known as Asociaciones de Padres de Familia), they were mutual aid associations that continued to make decisions for the community even when formal bureaucratic governmental services were introduced.39

For all intents and purposes, therefore, the barriada associations are the effective governmental units in Lima's low income settlements. They elect their own leaders once a year; collect
taxes (in the form of dues) from members; screen new applicants for lots; resolve land disputes; try to prevent land speculation; and organize co-operative projects. Their effectiveness, however, does not mean that they become isolated from the other organizations (especially governmental institutions) in the city. In fact, much of their use depends on how well they are able to link up with the whole governmental system. For official papers such as voting registration, certificates of marriage, birth and death and other needs, they go to city hall. They approach the police in cases of crimes and misdemeanors. They depend on the public schools for the education of their children. Health and sanitation services are extended to them by the proper government authorities. In these links with the government, the barriada associations have taken care that the welfare of the whole community is looked after. Most of the association members, aware that the government is sensitive to the fact that the barriadas were initially set up against the law, take special pains to prove their law-abiding nature and loyalty to the government. In this sense, the barriada associations do not conform to the common fear that they are revolutionary groups just waiting for an opportunity to topple the government.

**Governmental Assistance Programmes**

When the first barriada invasions occurred in Lima, the Government's immediate response was one of harsh retaliation. Most of the barriada residences were torn down soon after they were built, people were beaten up, and some even killed. However, the success of some squatters in forcing the government to at least pretend not to see the invasion served to encourage others. Mangin has estimated that more than 100 invasions have occurred in the Lima area in the past 20 years.40

The Government's hard stand against the barriadas changed around the early 1960's, partly because of popular sympathy for the squatters and also because of the adverse reaction of people to the violence done by the police. The 1961 Barriada Law recognized the problem posed by these settlements. The Corporacion Nacional de Vivienda (National Housing Corporation) implemented its provisions. In 1963, the Junta Nacional de Vivienda or JNV (National Housing Board) was created to coordinate activities of agencies implementing the provisions of the Barriada Law. This new agency was the result of combining three units which were all related to the problem of housing development: the National Housing Corporation, the National Housing Institute, and the Housing Division of the National Health and Social Welfare Fund.
Formally, the JNV is charged with studying the housing problem in Peru, formulating a general housing plan, and planning and implementing the provisions of such a plan. The Board was assigned "to bring about the remodeling, sanitation, legalization and eradication of the barriadas in the urban and suburban areas of the national territory, in accordance with Law No. 13517" (Barriada Law).

For every squatter settlement, the improvement programme of the JNV usually involves four specific steps. First, a complete survey of the barriada is made, so as to find out the best way of developing it. Second, a basic development plan (remodelacion) is prepared for the barriada. Third, with the completion of the plan, the JNV extends legal land titles to the residents in the barriada. Finally, with the resident already owning a piece of land, he becomes entitled to improvement loans extended by the JNV for housing purposes.

In its activities, the JNV usually works through the formal barriada associations mentioned above. In fact, the legality of such an association is based on its recognition by the National Housing Board. Each barriada association has a president, a vice president, and 20 members of the directing board. These officers are elected yearly by the people. Barriada associations are organized on a city-wide scale through the Central Barriada Association, usually made up of five delegates from each of the Barriada Associations in the city.

The National Housing Board has been quite innovative in the pursuit of its task of improving not only the housing but the living conditions of the barriada people as well. Within a couple of years of its founding, it managed to make a survey of some 100,000 families throughout the country that lived in barriadas. It brought basic services, such as water and drainage to some 123,000 people by mid-1963. It also hastened the organization of formal barriada associations, which brought electoral participation in local affairs in Peru for the first time since 1922. Finally, the JNV launched a programme designed to help people to finish their houses by giving them loans. Initially, the loans were made in kind (roofing materials, lumber, adobe walls, etc.) but administrative problems dealing with such minute details forced the agency to give cash loans.

Though the JNV could help the new barriadas growing up in the suburbs, it was extremely difficult to extend the resources of the agency to old slum areas in the central city, slums that are so deteriorated that there is no other alternative but to tear them down. To cope with his problem, the National Housing Board offered land and "core housing" to slum dwellers who would
agree to move to suburban barriadas. A plot of land, some 1,600 feet square, was offered to each family. A provisional dwelling constructed by the agency, a drinking water stand pipe and a few other amenities were given by the JNV, within the context of a "planned squatter settlement." With this initial help, many of the former slum dwellers found better homes and a better way of life in the areas around Lima.

However well intentioned the Barriada Law was, it did have a basic defect. Those who formulated the law optimistically thought that after its promulgation there would be no more invasions and new barriada developments. Hence, the law applied to all existing barriadas in 1961, but treated all subsequent settlements as illegal and not entitled to its provisions. Unfortunately, the expectations of those who made the law were not met. Other barriadas sprouted after 1961 for which new programmes must be formulated if the government is not to lose the benefits already gained from the existing programmes.

Though the National Housing Board is the agency named by the Barriada Law to coordinate programmes for developing squatters and slum settlements, the Peruvian Government also has other agencies with activities that directly or indirectly affect such settlements. For some time, the need for a coordinating machinery, especially at the top levels, has been felt. In December 1968, therefore, a staff agency in the office of the First Minister (President), was created. The Oficina Nacional de Desarrollo de Pueblos Jovenes (National Office for the Development of Pueblos Jovenes) is charged with "studying, planning, proposing and coordinating the necessary solutions at the national level, in order to intensify the real and effective integration of the population of those areas into the social-economic development of the country."43

Prospects and Problems

Peru’s approach to the slum and squatter problem is a happy mixture of realism and foresight. It takes advantage of the resources that the barriada dwellers have, tries to channel the efforts of squatters towards constructive ends, offers encouragement to individual and group efforts at self-betterment and recognizes the potentials for development of organized individuals. The programme is national in scope, and sees the problems of the Lima metropolis within a national development context.

The problems of the barriada programme in Peru arise from the basic problems of the country itself. The political and economic instability in recent years has not helped matters any. Calamities in the countryside have added new flows to the migration to the
coast and the Lima area. Finally, the financial difficulties of the government arising from foreign exchange problems, which are in turn due to the political instability mentioned above, may greatly limit the scope of urban development activities in the future.

The programmes of the National Housing Board, economically sound as they are, benefit mainly squatters and slum dwellers who have some income and other resources to begin with. The "planned squatter settlements" with their pre-built houses cost about as cheaply as any other public housing programme in the world. However, they are still beyond the ability to pay of the low income barriada dweller, who, ironically, is the one most needing assistance.

Perhaps in the future a fully subsidized low cost housing programme for Peru will become possible. Such a programme, however, will demand financial, land and other resources which currently seem beyond the capacity of government. When such capacity is achieved, however, it is good to know that the pioneering programmes of the Peruvian Government have provided the models which other developing countries can use in coping with their own urban problems.
LIKE other developing countries, the Philippines is faced with the twin problems of rapid population growth and the mal-distribution of the existing population over the landscape. There are, at present, some 37 million Filipinos, and their number is growing at about 3.5 per cent per year. The urban population of the country, however, is growing at a much faster rate (in excess of four per cent per year). Furthermore, this urban growth is occurring in areas that are already highly urbanized. The Metropolitan Manila area, already holding some ten per cent of the national population, also has one of the highest population growth rates in the country. In some portions of the metropolitan area, as in the national capital, Quezon City, the population is growing in excess of twelve per cent per year.  

Table 1
Annual Rate of Growth for Metropolitan Manila, 1903-1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>219,928</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1,138,611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caloocan</td>
<td>6,660</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>8.39</td>
<td>145,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makati</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>10.23</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>9.38</td>
<td>114,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandaluyong</td>
<td>4,349</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>9.20</td>
<td>71,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paranaque</td>
<td>6,507</td>
<td>8.04</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>61,898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasay City</td>
<td>8,201</td>
<td>5.34</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>132,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quezon City</td>
<td>3,062</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>12.15</td>
<td>397,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Juan del Monte</td>
<td>1,431</td>
<td>8.89</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>56,861</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rapid growth of the Metropolitan Manila population is mainly due to migration from other places in the Philippines. As in other developing countries, natural increase of population in the Philippines seems to be higher in rural areas. This may be due to such factors as the rising age of marriage in urban areas which reduces total fertility somewhat, and the spread of family planning methods in urban areas at a relatively faster rate. One factor contributing to rapid urban growth, however, is the generally lower mortality rate in urban areas.2

As of 1960, there were 32 cities, 55 provinces and 1,322 municipalities in the Philippines. Studies of the internal movements among these politico-administrative units in the country show that the direction and rates of migration have changed somewhat since the 1930’s. In 1966, a study by Pascual showed that the relative “gains” and “losses” of population among provinces were as follows:3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gained Population</th>
<th>Lost Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bukidnon</td>
<td>Batanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davao</td>
<td>Antique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotabato</td>
<td>Misamis Oriental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rizal</td>
<td>Leyte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agusan</td>
<td>Bohol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamboanga del Sur</td>
<td>Iloilo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanao del Norte</td>
<td>Cebu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occidental Mindoro</td>
<td>Ilocos Norte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriental Mindoro</td>
<td>Samar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camarines Norte</td>
<td>Aklan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanao del Sur</td>
<td>Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamboanga del Norte</td>
<td>Sorsogon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isabela</td>
<td>Misamis Occidental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nueva Vizcaya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compared to a study made by Nava for the 1939-48 period, Pascual’s findings reveal that “in general, provinces that showed a gain in people by migration in the 1948-1960 period show a gain, also, for the 1939-1948 period.” However, there were some notable exceptions. While the city of Manila and Samar gained population in 1939-1948, they were losing population in 1948-1960. Camarines Norte and Nueva Vizcaya, on the other hand, had ceased to lose population and were already gaining migrants in the second period.4

These trends in the 1960’s make up the latest patterns in the population distribution process in the Philippines. Early in its history, population growth in the Philippines centered around Manila and its surrounding provinces in the island of Luzon. Lesser
centres, such as Cebu and Iloilo in the Visayas also grew fast but the colonial economic and political patterns of these early days stimulated the growth of Manila. In the first days of American occupation at the turn of the century, the tendency for growth to be centralized in Manila continued. However, a conscious policy of opening up new lands, a road-building and transportation programme, as well as a campaign praising the prospects of Mindanao as the "land of promise" combined to generate more migration to Mindanao.5

In the 1948-60 period, the movement to Mindanao has continued. At the same time, the attraction to the Manila area has not abated. In actuality, the city of Manila proper has not been gaining population. However, the whole Manila metropolitan area serves as a powerful magnet for migrants, as evidenced by the rapid growth of Rizal province, especially those portions that are adjacent to Manila. What we are witnessing in Greater Manila, therefore, is a process of metropolitanization. The already congested city has burst its seams, and its continued growth has sprawled over to its surrounding areas.

Metropolitan Manila: a Primate City

The position of Metropolitan Manila as the primate city in the Philippines is shown in the fact that it is nine times larger than the next largest city, Cebu. The city's primacy is bolstered further by its continued growth of metropolitanization. The Philippine Bureau of the Census and Statistics still defines Metropolitan Manila as being composed of four cities and four towns in the province of Rizal (the chartered cities of Manila, Caloocan, Quezon and Pasay and the towns of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Makati and Paranaque). Other studies, however, have argued for a wider and more realistic delimitation of the Manila metropolitan area. Laquian has argued for the inclusion of six other towns in the definition: Navotas, Malabon, Marikina, Pasig, Pateros, and Las Pinas, making up a total of 14 local units in the metropolitan area.6 The National Planning Commission expands the definition further by adding five more towns to Laquian's definition (Obando, Valenzuela and Meycauayan in the province of Bulacan, as well as San Mateo, and Taguig in the province of Rizal). Manahan, in a study of flooding in Metropolitan Manila, has suggested that two more towns in Rizal (Cainta and Taytay) have to be added to the NPC definition of the metropolitan area.7 Finally, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) excludes Obando and Meycauayan in its Metropolitan Manila definition for purposes of water distribution although it includes the town of Antipolo, Rizal. The widest area definition of Metropolitan Manila that has been proposed, therefore, includes 21 local units (four cities and 17 towns).
II. ILOCOS & MT. PROVINCE
III. CAGAYAN VALLEY & BATANES
IV. CENTRAL LUZON
V. SOUTHERN LUZON & ISLANDS
VI. BICOL PROVINCES
VII. WESTERN VISAYAS
VIII. EASTERN VISAYAS
IX. SOUTHWESTERN MINDANAO & SULU
X. NORTHEASTERN MINDANAO

WIDTH OF BAND INDICATES NUMBER OF MIGRANTS

--- THOUSANDS

--- LESS THAN 5.0 THOUSANDS

Fig. 15. MIGRATION STREAMS TO AND FROM METROPOLITAN MANILA (1948 - 1960)

SOURCE: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES BY MENDOZA - PASCUAL
Fig. 16. LOCATION OF SQUATTERS and SLUMS IN METROPOLITAN MANILA (1968)
Even if the more restricted definition of the Bureau of the Census and Statistics is used, the process of metropolitanization in Greater Manila may be discerned in the changing patterns of population distribution. Comparing the 1948 and 1960 censuses, one notices that some districts of Manila proper (Binondo, Port Area, Quiapo, San Miguel, San Nicolas and Sta. Cruz) have had population decreases in the period while all the suburban towns and cities have increased their population. Quezon City, in fact, grew by 268.6 per cent within the period.8

Table 2
Population of Metropolitan Manila by District, City, and Town 1948-1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>Number Increase (+) or Decrease (—)</th>
<th>Percentage Increase (+) or Decrease (—)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City of Manila</td>
<td>983,906</td>
<td>1,138,611</td>
<td>+154,705</td>
<td>+ 15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binondo</td>
<td>21,935</td>
<td>16,384</td>
<td>— 5,551</td>
<td>— 25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ermita</td>
<td>14,922</td>
<td>18,092</td>
<td>+ 3,170</td>
<td>+ 21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intramuros</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>13,243</td>
<td>+ 12,256</td>
<td>+1,241.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malate</td>
<td>66,540</td>
<td>69,720</td>
<td>+ 3,180</td>
<td>+ 4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paco</td>
<td>44,224</td>
<td>49,779</td>
<td>+ 5,555</td>
<td>+ 12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pandacan</td>
<td>23,250</td>
<td>45,800</td>
<td>+ 22,550</td>
<td>+ 97.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Area</td>
<td>7,702</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>— 7,505</td>
<td>— 97.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quiapo</td>
<td>27,428</td>
<td>24,251</td>
<td>— 3,177</td>
<td>— 11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampaloc</td>
<td>233,779</td>
<td>287,686</td>
<td>+ 53,907</td>
<td>+ 23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>19,301</td>
<td>16,450</td>
<td>— 2,851</td>
<td>— 14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Nicolas</td>
<td>40,953</td>
<td>33,022</td>
<td>— 7,931</td>
<td>— 19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sta. Ana</td>
<td>59,618</td>
<td>84,330</td>
<td>+ 24,712</td>
<td>+ 41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sta. Cruz</td>
<td>139,883</td>
<td>127,708</td>
<td>— 12,175</td>
<td>— 8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tondo</td>
<td>283,384</td>
<td>351,949</td>
<td>+ 68,565</td>
<td>+ 24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caloocan City</td>
<td>58,208</td>
<td>145,523</td>
<td>+ 87,315</td>
<td>+ 150.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasay City</td>
<td>88,728</td>
<td>182,673</td>
<td>+ 93,945</td>
<td>+ 49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quezon City</td>
<td>107,977</td>
<td>397,990</td>
<td>+ 290,013</td>
<td>+ 268.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makati</td>
<td>41,335</td>
<td>114,540</td>
<td>+ 73,205</td>
<td>+ 177.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandaluyong</td>
<td>26,309</td>
<td>71,619</td>
<td>+ 45,310</td>
<td>+ 172.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paranaque</td>
<td>28,884</td>
<td>61,898</td>
<td>+ 33,014</td>
<td>+ 114.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Juan</td>
<td>31,493</td>
<td>56,861</td>
<td>+ 25,368</td>
<td>+ 80.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As implied by the lack of a generally accepted definition of what constitutes Metropolitan Manila, there is no one administrative nor political entity that encompasses the whole metropolitan area. The lack of formal regional organization may be traced to such factors as the rapid growth of the area and the resulting blurring of boundaries, the strongly held commitment to local government autonomy among local units in the Philippines, or the primarily political basis for the creation of cities and other
local government entities in the country. The Philippines is one of many countries that still fails to take economic, demographic and other factors in its creation of cities. As a result, places that are still predominantly rural have been given city status while a metropolitan area like Greater Manila still suffers from fragmentation.

There is no set pattern of administration of urban services in Metropolitan Manila and other urban areas in the Philippines. There are certain services that are mainly the responsibility of the national government, the city or province or the towns while there are some which are shared among these various levels. However, many variations in arrangements exist, depending on political factors, the financial and technical resources available or historical precedents. For example, while the City of Manila provides free education from first grade to high school (and to a limited extent up to college) in other local units of the metropolitan area, much greater reliance on the central government is seen.

The Problem

As previously mentioned, the City of Manila experienced immigration in the 1939-1948 period and out-migration in the 1948-1960 period. The rate of growth for the city has declined from 4.80 in the first period to 1.38 for the second. A similar trend is seen for Pasay City. The outward movement from Manila and Pasay has been toward the adjacent towns and cities in Rizal Province.

Since 1948, about two-fifths of the people who moved to Manila have come from the Visayan area. Another fifth came from provinces in Central Luzon. On the other hand, the process of metropolitanization may be seen by the fact that about one-half of the people who moved to Rizal province came from Manila. Of the remainder, about two-fifths of Rizal in-migrants came directly from the Visayas.9

Generally, migration studies have shown that a process of positive selection is involved in the decision to move. Thus, migrants tend to be better educated than people in their place of destination. They also appear to be more ambitious, resourceful, adventurous and more flexible and modern in their attitudes than the people of the places they migrate to.

In the migration to Metropolitan Manila, however, this does not seem to be the case. Pascual's study showed that while in general, "the migrants on the whole were better educated than the total population," for the Philippines, the situation is reversed in Manila where the migrants contained a smaller proportion of
college educated than the population to which they migrated. Of course, this trend may be due to the fact that Manila already has the highest concentration of highly educated persons in the country.

Compared to migrants to other regions, more people who move to Manila tend to be single. While in all regions, about 60-75 per cent of migrants were married, only 54 per cent of Manila migrants were married. The bulk of migrants attracted to Manila are non-white collar types.

These characteristics of migrants to Metropolitan Manila reveal the problem which the largest urban area of the Philippines faces. As a whole, while migrants to the city may be driven by greater ambition, their lack of education and skills does not enable them to readily succeed in the highly competitive job markets existing in the city. Lacking funds and other resources, the migrants have to make do with what marginal services are available. Since the migrants themselves find it difficult to be integrated into the economic, political and social system of the metropolis, they constitute an additional burden on the urban service system that exists.

**Squatting and Slum Dwelling**

One of the most serious manifestations of problems arising from rural-urban migration is squatting and slum dwelling. Based on the most recent data available, there are about 127,852 squatter families (769,112 persons) and 55,907 families (335,442 persons) living in slum conditions in Metropolitan Manila, a total of 183,759 families or 1,102,554 persons. Some 43.8 per cent of these squatters and slum dwellers live in the City of Manila proper. Another 17.8 per cent are in Quezon City and 13.1 per cent in Caloocan City.

Surveys of squatters and slum dwellers have shown that about 93 per cent of these people are migrants to Metropolitan Manila. The volume of migrants to the primary urban centre of the Philippines seems to have been increasing through the years. Of the squatters and slum dwellers surveyed in 1968, about 16 per cent moved to the city from 1946-1955; 14 per cent moved from 1956 to 1960 and 28 per cent arrived from 1961 to 1965. The accelerating rate of migration may be seen in the fact that 9 per cent of the people surveyed migrated to Manila in the two years of 1966 and 1967.

The pattern of migration to Manila indicates that squatters and slum dwellers did not move directly from their villages to the metropolitan area. Rather, the migration seems to have been multi-stage: first passing through a smaller urban centre or centres and then to Manila. Once in the metropolitan area, too, squatters
and slum dwellers seem to have moved around a lot. In the new
slum and squatter areas, most of the people studied had moved
from another community in the urban area before.

As the map on page 139 shows, the heaviest concentration of
slum dwellers in Metropolitan Manila is in Tondo, where an esti­
mated 46,297 of the city of Manila’s 80,436 households are found.
The location of Tondo close to the piers and open markets encour­
ges the location of low-income people because these are the
places where unskilled laborers find employment. As for squatters,
ye are mostly found in the peripheral areas outside Manila
proper, as in Quezon City, Caloocan, and along the railroad tracks
leading to Makati and other Rizal towns. In the past two years,
many squatters have been evicted from the Quezon City park site
and transferred to relocation sites in Carmona, Sapang Palay and
San Pedro Tunasan. Of late, however, there are reports that the
squatters are staging a comeback.

The economic, social and political problems arising from squat­
ting and slum dwelling are well known. Unemployment and under­
employment among these segments of the population are very
high — studies have shown that the average family income among

143
squatters and slum dwellers is between 100 to 149 pesos per month, which is much below the minimum wage law rates. Family sizes and dependency ratios among squatters and slum dwellers are also high—the average household has six members and some 70 per cent of family members are dependents.

Much of the blame for health and sanitation problems in Manila is heaped on squatters and slum dwellers. A recent report on Solid Waste Management for the Manila Metropolitan area prepared by a WHO expert concluded that "Solid wastes storage, collection and disposal practices in the Manila Metropolitan area are in general well below any standards recognized as acceptable by public health authorities." While the report put much of the blame for this on faulty organization, lack of financing, obsolete techniques and lack of public cooperation, the pictures accompanying the report which showed the disposal of solid wastes in esteros, streets, vacant lots and open spaces near squatter and slum areas spoke fluently about the real situation.

As in other metropolitan areas all over the world, the presence of squatters and slum dwellers in Manila is associated with high incidence of crime and juvenile delinquency, social and personal disorganization, and breakdown in morals and socially accepted behaviour. Thus, the district of Tondo, which has more than half of Manila's squatters and slum dwellers, accounted for 35.8 per cent of reported crime victims in 1965. Tondo, also, has the highest percentage of "crimes against persons" among the districts of Manila.

Finally, there are also fears that squatting as an illegal act, if allowed and condoned by the authorities, may encourage further violation of other laws. For a long time, the revolutionary potential implied by the poverty and misery of slum life has been discussed in many studies, especially those dealing with Latin America. The efforts of radicals to recruit followers among squatters and slum dwellers have been mentioned by the authorities in the Philippines. Certainly, if nothing is done to alleviate the problem of squatting and slum dwelling in the Philippines, there is a possibility for fears to become reality.

Characteristics of Migrants

Many studies have been done in specific slum and squatter communities in Metropolitan Manila. Such studies provide ample data on the characteristics of people who live in these communities. In general, the main motivation for moving to Manila seems to be economic. Instability in the countryside (in Central Luzon) due to the Huk rebellion in 1949-1953 contributed some migrants but in general, people seem to have migrated to Manila by choice, in the hope of finding something better there.
Once in Manila, most migrants live in slum and squatter areas. Specific reasons given for choosing particular areas include:

1. **Proximity to sources of employment.** Since employment is usually in jobs requiring little or no skills, pay is low and migrants elect to walk to and from their place of work to save money.

2. **Availability of undeveloped or unused public lands or large private estates.** A sense of social justice among most poor Filipinos is given as justification for occupying land which is not used by the government or rich people. Speculation in land is common in the Philippines and the idle land resulting from it attracts squatters. Leniency of legal authorities, abetted by political support, gives encouragement to squatting.

3. **Availability of poor or marginal lands.** There are many areas in Metropolitan Manila which are not readily suitable for development. These include swampy areas, reclaimed land, river banks, places near noisy or smelly factories, the railroad tracks, roads rights of way, etc. Since most of these lands are not properly guarded, squatters find it relatively easy to occupy them. It is also argued that since these lands are not being used, the squatters can at least use them.

4. **Private lands owned by slumlords.** In the case of slum dwellers, they are usually attracted to private lands where owners are willing to receive low rent payments, either because the land is marginal or because they cannot find other more fruitful uses for the land. Many such slum areas are close to the centre of the city where people are packed in hovels under most unsanitary conditions.

As for the squatter and slum dwellers themselves, the surveys have revealed economic, demographic, social and psychological data about them. These findings are also summarized in a recent report as follows:16

1. The average family income of squatters and slum-dwellers is between P100 to P149 per month. About 51.3 per cent of squatter and slum families earn less than P150 and about 14.8 per cent claim having no income or income that is so variable one cannot depend on it.

2. The average size of squatters and slum-dwelling households is between five and six members. The degree
of dependency is high, with 70 per cent of household members below 18 years of age. About 32 per cent of dependent members are below school age, while 11 per cent of those of school age are out of school.

3. Doubling up in squatter and slum houses is quite frequent. More than 30 per cent of houses in squatter and slum areas have more than one family residing in them. Home ownership, however, is quite high, with 67 per cent of families owning their houses and only about 26 per cent renting (others are even rent free).

4. Utilities are greatly lacking with water and roads being the most serious problems, followed closely by police and fire-fighting facilities. Barely a quarter of squatter and slum-dweller households have toilets and garbage collection is almost non-existent. Only electricity is adequately provided, with about 70 per cent of households using electric lights and 42 per cent using radios.

5. Squatters and slum-dwellers are very organized, with more than 65 per cent of household heads being members of at least one organization. Membership provides not only a sense of community identity but political power as well.

6. Most of the squatter and slum-dwelling families are migrants from the rural areas, with only about 7 per cent being originally from Metropolitan Manila. About a quarter of squatters and slum-dwellers are from Central Luzon, 20 per cent from Western Visayas and 17 per cent from Eastern Visayas. Other regions where they come from are Northern Luzon, 14 per cent, and the Bicol region, 13 per cent.

7. The most important reason given for going to Metropolitan Manila was to improve means of livelihood. Most important reason for staying in the squatter area was "no other place to go to" and "closeness to job." More than three-fourths of squatters and slum-dwellers are unwilling to leave their area. They are almost unanimous in looking up to the government for help.

**Solutions**

Up to now, efforts to cope with the problems posed by squatting and slum dwelling in Metropolitan Manila have concentrated on one approach — relocation. Squatters from Intramuros, F. B. Harrison, Malate and Ermita as well as those formerly occupying the Quezon City Park area have been relocated to Bago Bantay,
Novaliches, Sapang Palay, Carmona and San Pedro Tunasan. For most of these squatters, the government has provided free transportation and rights to purchase the land at easy installment terms. In Carmona and San Pedro Tunasan, “core housing” has also been introduced, with the government providing the basic parts of the house (roof, posts, toilet and compacted flooring) and the relocated family adding the rest from its own resources.

In most of the relocation projects, there are indications that relocation as an approach has not been overwhelmingly successful. Close to three-fourths of the original people relocated to Sapang Palay, for example, have abandoned the place and returned to the urban centre once more. The main complaints of relocated people have been distance from the place of work, lack of work, amenities and services in the new area, and high transportation costs to and from work. In many instances, land speculation in the new areas has also been widely practised, with sales of “rights” providing additional income to enterprising individuals.

Low cost housing in tenements has also been tried in Metropolitan Manila. The People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation manages the Bagong Barangay Housing Project, the Macapagal Tenements and various middle-income housing projects in Quezon City. The four-storey row houses in Bagong Barangay have been praised by those who live in them though complaints have been heard about the seven-storey tenements built in Vitas, Punta and South Super Highway. In almost all these projects, however, there have been charges that people with relatively higher incomes have managed to occupy the dwelling units, mainly by purchasing "rights" of occupancy and tenancy. Thus, low cost homes designed for former squatters and slum dwellers have fallen into the hands of people who can afford more expensive commercial housing but who welcome the savings made possible by the cheap rents.

The Department of Social Welfare (formerly Social Welfare Administration) has for some time conducted as one of its many programmes designed to help poor people a project to encourage squatters and slum dwellers who find life in the city too difficult to return to their rural places of origin. This has been a small project, however, and it has not really attracted too many people. Even when transportation is provided, many squatters and slum dwellers seem to prefer staying under difficult circumstances in Metropolitan Manila to accepting defeat and admitting failure by going home.

Other approaches for solving the slum and squatter problem have been proposed and tried, sometimes on a pilot project basis. An urban community development programme has been introduced in Barrio Magsaysay involving such approaches as community organization, self-help, leadership training, etc. Since the pilot
project was primarily meant as a research venture, it resulted in useful information about the community and in indicating useful approaches but has lacked continuity as an action programme.\textsuperscript{17}

While the solutions mentioned above and others have been tried in Metropolitan Manila, the slum and squatter problem has not shown any signs of being abated. For one, all the efforts so far tried have been piecemeal, uncoordinated, sporadic and lacking in financial and technical support. The government machinery for coping with the slum and squatter problem has also been inadequate. As a frank report in 1968 stated:

The government’s efforts to solve the problem of squatting and slum dwelling have been characterized by sporadic campaigns and programs more or less related to specific crises situations . . . The result has been organizational confusion marked by overlapping of functions, repetition of efforts, passing the buck and other undesirable bureaucratic practices including corruption.\textsuperscript{18}

Problems and Prospects

The population of Metropolitan Manila is projected to reach 11 million by the year 2000 if present trends continue. If no solid programmes for solving the problems arising from rural-urban migration are introduced soon, the primary city of the Philippines might very well become a colossal slum before that time. There is evidence that most of the solutions proposed and used up to now have failed to stem the problem. What, then, can be done to make the prospects for Metropolitan Manila brighter?

In terms of evolving a useful approach, there are certain basic things that have to be done first. Foremost among these is the formulation and adoption of a definite national policy and programme which will embrace such aspects as the government’s official stand on squatting and slum dwelling, the desirable allocation of people and investment resources over the national landscape, a national housing programme, credit facilities for low cost housing and the governmental machinery to coordinate all those efforts. To solve the problems of Metropolitan Manila, they should be placed in their proper national context. Focusing on rural-urban migration as a phenomenon accentuates this basic premise. It is sad but true that the problems of the primate city of the Philippines affect and are affected by the problems of other places — and a solution to these problems demand a nation-wide approach.

An effective way of making this national policy and programme manageable is by dividing the Philippines into well-defined regions and making a distinction between inter-regional and intra-regional solutions. The Manila urban region, for example, may be planned
in terms of what can be done to develop it. At the same time, the regional plan must jive with other regional plans prepared for the areas around Manila. In this way, solutions can both be comprehensive and intensive, and coordination can be facilitated.

Finally, of course, a regional approach calls attention to the governmental forms currently used in the Philippines. While the regional concept is generally acceptable to most people, considerable opposition is encountered when reorganizations in the structure of government are proposed. Many studies both in the Philippines and abroad have shown the evils of governmental fragmentation—both functional and areal. And yet, Philippine policy makers are engaged in this very process by dividing up provinces into smaller segments for political reasons. To solve area-wide problems, as is the case with those arising from rural-urban migration, area-wide solutions are needed. This is the main rational approach proposed here—and possibly the only hope for dealing with worsening urban problems in the future.

As for specific approaches and programmes that have been used in Metropolitan Manila to cope with problems generated by squatters and slum dwellers, a close re-examination is in order. In the first place, the relocation scheme of the government which has resulted in the transfer of inner city and park land squatters to relocation sites in the peripheral areas does not seem to have fully succeeded. Many of the relocated squatters have trickled back into the city, setting up new communities in marginal lands, railroad tracks, roads rights of way, and unguarded private lands.

There is an economic logic in the location of slums and squatter areas close to the city centre, where the jobs for unskilled and service people are usually more available. Low cost housing closer to the places of employment, therefore, should be considered by the authorities. However, land close to the centre of the city is very expensive. Even if high-rise tenements are constructed, the cheapest building methods will price these housing units way above the paying capacity of squatters and slum dwellers.

Of late, the Philippine government has given in to the demands of squatters on reclaimed land in Manila and has started distributing small parcels of land to bona fide tenants actually occupying the pieces of land. The population densities in these communities of squatters are very high—higher even than what can be achieved by high-rise housing. However, distribution of land to squatters alone will not solve the problem. When services, amenities and community organization are not introduced as part of the land ownership scheme, there is a high possibility that conditions in such areas will deteriorate and they will become worse slums.
One serious shortcoming in public efforts to cope with the slum and squatter problem in Metropolitan Manila is the lack of credit facilities which land and homeowners can turn to either to acquire or improve their properties. Private banks rarely offer housing loans because they can get more from commercial and other investments. The government insurance system and the social security system do offer housing loans but these are mainly for middle income to high income customers with assured capacity to repay. The so-called low-cost housing schemes that have been launched by semi-private and private companies are also priced higher than what the average squatter or slum dweller can afford. All these, of course, call for subsidized housing by the government.

The low cost housing currently being undertaken by the Philippine Government, aside from being too limited (the Peoples Home-site and Housing Corporation has built only a little more than 12,000 housing units since its founding), has also been criticized for design, administration and maintenance aspects in housing projects. The seven-storey tenements using access ramps instead of elevators, for example, have been hit by architects and engineers. The community projects located in the suburbs have also been criticized for being too expensive and too far from the place of work. Finally, complaints have also been aired that in the allocation of low cost houses, people who have enough income to afford commercial housing have been awarded units while true squatters and slum dwellers have been bypassed.

The grievances and complaints will continue to be heard for as long as the approach of the government to solving the slum and squatter problem is characterized by piecemeal attempts that emphasize only a single approach such as relocation, low cost housing, etc. What is needed, most of all, is a comprehensive approach made up of complementary programmes that respond to the housing problem. For housing encompasses economic, social, political and other aspects of urban life which should all be taken into consideration in solving the problem.
SEOUL has been the capital city of Korea for over five hundred years. It has traditionally been the political, economic and social capital of the country, at least, since the founding of the Yi Dynasty by King Tae-jo in 1392. The city's importance, however, has been greatly enhanced since the Second World War and the Korean War, especially after 1945. The destruction of the country because of the Korean War as well as its division into a northern and a southern sector have unsettled the lives of many people. Many of these uprooted people have migrated to the urban areas of Korea, especially to Seoul.

As of the census of 1966, it was known that Korea had a population of 29,170,000. Of these, 9,780,000 (or 33.2 per cent) were living in cities, 3.8 million in the city of Seoul alone. Already accounting for about 13 per cent of the total national population in 1966, Metropolitan Seoul was projected to have a population of 4.3 million by 1968 and 5 million at the time of writing.¹

The dominance of Seoul over the whole of South Korea is beyond question. As one of the world's largest cities (the city of Seoul proper ranks 11th in size among the world’s cities while the metropolitan area ranks 22nd), it cannot help but dominate the whole nation. All of the central government headquarters and facilities are concentrated in the country's capital. Practically all large industries, manufacturing and cultural institutions are also in Seoul. About 61.9 per cent of all colleges and universities in Korea are in the Seoul area. So are 65.4 per cent of all the nation's college and university students.

The dominance of Seoul is seen when its population is compared to the population of Korea's other cities. As Table 1 shows, Seoul is almost three times as large as the next ranking city, Pusan. The three remaining urban centres are all less than a
million. In fact, in 1967, Korea had only two cities over a million, two from 500,000 to 999,999; 13 from 100,000 to 499,999; and 15 from 50,000 to 99,999. The relative rankings of these urban centres is readily seen, however, when it is known that 53.5 per cent of the country's urban population is concentrated in the two million and above population cities (Seoul and Pusan).²

Table 1

Population of Korea's Five Largest Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>1,568,746</td>
<td>2,412,808</td>
<td>3,805,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pusan</td>
<td>1,045,183</td>
<td>1,180,076</td>
<td>1,429,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taegu</td>
<td>487,252</td>
<td>675,644</td>
<td>847,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangju</td>
<td>233,043</td>
<td>328,256</td>
<td>404,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chonju</td>
<td>124,116</td>
<td>186,930</td>
<td>220,344</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The growth of Seoul in relation to other urban places in Korea is best understood when seen in historical perspective. For this purpose, it is useful to divide the period since the Korean War into three historically distinct stages. The first stage (roughly between 1956 and 1960), saw heavy investments in rehabilitation and reconstruction of the damages wrought by the war. Infrastructure projects, especially transportation and power lines were constructed during this time. As the nation’s capital, and a city that was heavily damaged, Seoul also got the heaviest investments. Of course, jobs and other opportunities generated by these investments attracted people from all over. As such, Seoul grew by 9.6 per cent per year and gained some 940,000 people during this period.³

The second stage in Seoul’s post-war development is covered by the First National Economic Development Plan period (1961-1965). During this stage, there were attempts to develop the industrialization of the country systematically. Spatial considerations were included in the planning and programming of the country’s development. As such, cities other than Seoul also benefitted from national government investments. Pusan, for example, received considerable investments within this period. An entirely new industrial town, Ulsan, was also set up, resulting in a 6.7 per cent annual rate of population growth in the area. Some planners still believe that the decentralized investments during the first plan period were not in accordance with rational investment criteria. Nevertheless, the investment in social overhead projects (railroads, ports, power) to areas other than Seoul had the effect of somewhat lessening the central city’s primacy. Within this period, Seoul's
population growth rate went down to 7.3 per cent per year though even this resulted in an additional one million people to the city.

Finally, the third stage in Seoul's development is the Second Five Year Economic Development Plan period (1966-1970). As the period draws to a close, there are already certain perceptible trends. During this time, Seoul's population growth rate has stabilized to a little above 7 per cent per year. The tendency to invest in areas other than Seoul has also continued. The spectacular growth in other urban areas begun during the second period are already bearing results. In fact, there is a possibility that with decentralized development in the whole of Korea, the population of Seoul may stabilize in its growth rate at a level quite close to the national growth rate of 5.2 per year. However, even at that level, the fact that the absolute number of Seoul's population is already about five million will still add a large number of people to the city's population. This absolute growth will naturally strain the city's services further.

Internal Migration

The population of Seoul was estimated at 200,000 at the end of the 19th century. It was set at 350,000 by 1930 and 900,000 by the time of the Liberation in 1945. In a little less than half a century, therefore, the city's population increased about four and a half times.4

However, in less than 25 years, Seoul's population since World War II has increased to a little less than five million! A great portion of this increase is definitely due to migration (migrants to Seoul made up about 70 per cent of all migrants to cities, large and small). The city's rate of growth, which has averaged about 8 per cent per year, is too high to be explained by natural increase alone.

A study of migration in Korea has revealed the major tendencies in this phenomenon.5 In the first place, population movement in urban areas in the period 1960-1966 accounted for 60 per cent of the national population increase, according to this study. Of these urban population movements, some 40 per cent involved rural to urban movements; 34 per cent included movements between cities; 15.5 per cent involved movements from urban to rural areas; and the rest included other types of migration patterns.

Population flow into the Seoul metropolitan area is the most dominant of the migration patterns. There are three main components of this flow. First, there is a movement into Seoul from rural areas of Chung Nam and Gyeonggi provinces, which are close to the capital. Second, there is another flow into Seoul originating from the same provinces but which passes through smaller
Table 2

Population Growth in Seoul

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1,503,865</td>
<td>-71,003</td>
<td>-4.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1,666,005</td>
<td>162,140</td>
<td>10.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1,756,406</td>
<td>90,401</td>
<td>5.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2,093,060</td>
<td>337,563</td>
<td>19.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2,577,018</td>
<td>131,616</td>
<td>5.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>2,983,324</td>
<td>406,306</td>
<td>15.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>3,254,630</td>
<td>271,306</td>
<td>9.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>3,424,385</td>
<td>169,755</td>
<td>5.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>3,640,880</td>
<td>46,495</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3,805,261</td>
<td>334,381</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3,969,218</td>
<td>163,957</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>4,134,285</td>
<td>169,755</td>
<td>5.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>4,330,000</td>
<td>360,782</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:

Regional urban centres, such as the capital cities of these provinces. Finally, there is an urban to urban flow into Seoul from the second largest city, Pusan, which first attracts people from the provinces and smaller cities but then loses them to Seoul.6

Fig. 17 INTER-PROVINCIAL NET MIGRATION FROM CITIES TO CITIES
The study cited above has concluded that migration movements in the urban areas of Korea are largely determined by the size of the urban area, the functions that it serves, and the opportunities that it offers. Generally, smaller cities have higher out-migrants than in-migrants. However, cities performing specialized functions, such as Taejeon (a transportation hub) and Ulsan (a manufacturing centre) tend to absorb more in-migrants though they are relatively small. In fact, these smaller centres are even getting migrants from the larger cities, because they offer more opportunities for certain people.7

Internal migration in Korea also varies according to the distance travelled by migrants. Generally, it is known that long distance out-migration ends in dominant national centres, such as Seoul. It tends to originate from poorer areas, such as Gyeongsang and Jeonra provinces, widely known as double-cropping regions. Areas within these provinces that do not have too many services and facilities or which are economically depressed, generally contribute to the number of long distance migrants. Medium or short distance migrations, on the other hand, tend to be terminated in smaller or medium-size cities. Some of this migration is bound for specialized centres, such as the army base area, mining and manufacturing area, etc. Most of it, however, is movement within the province.

Reasons for Migration

Studies on the reasons behind massive migration to the cities of Korea have emphasized a differentiation between “push” and “pull” factors. Two studies have tended to show that the bulk of migrants to the Seoul metropolitan area give “economic” reasons for their movement. The first of these studies was conducted by the Seoul municipal government. It dealt with 67,860 in-migrants who entered Seoul from January to June 1965. Of this number, 28 per cent said that their main reason for going to Seoul was “to get or look for jobs.” Another 6 per cent came because of transfer in their means of employment and 5 per cent migrated because of transfer of schools. The question on how their economic situation was prior to arrival in Seoul revealed very interesting answers. About 43 per cent said that their living conditions were “difficult” or “very difficult” in their places of origin. Only 8 per cent said their conditions were “sufficient”, while the rest said they were not too bad or gave ambiguous answers. Generally, therefore, most of the migrants to Seoul came with expectations that their life in the metropolis would be better.8

A more intensive study by Man Gap Lee used a set of 23 factors that could be roughly divided into “push” and “pull” factors to explain the reasons for the migration of people to Seoul. The first nine “pushing” factors were: poverty, war and social turmoil,
escape from traditional life, family bankruptcy, social class distinction, difficulty with employer, natural disasters, spread of epidemic, and land reform. The other nine “pulling” factors were: to find a job, to establish a private business, employment opportunities, education, cultural resources, desire for urban life, personal relationships, marriage, and anonymous refuge. In addition to these 18 factors, five other factors which were neither pushing nor pulling but which depended on circumstances were also used: disease, to show skill or talent, change of office or occupation, skills learned in military service, and superstitious prophecy.9

Studying a sample of 505 households randomly selected from families registered with the administrative offices (dongs) in Seoul, Man Gap Lee came up with most interesting findings. Out of the sample, 118 persons or 29.2 per cent did not indicate the reasons for their movement. The remaining 323 respondents, however, gave specific reasons, as shown in Table 3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Occupational matters (includes looking for a job, taking a new job assignment, etc.)</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Education, for migrants and for their children</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Oppression under the Communist regime</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Poverty in place of origin</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Korean War</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Private business affairs</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Desire for an urban life</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Miscellaneous reasons</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. No response</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the findings mentioned above, as well as on other patterns revealed by the study, Man Gap Lee concluded that “pulling” rather than “pushing” factors were generally responsible for the movement of people to Seoul. In this, he tended to contradict previous studies made by others.10 In another study of Taegu City conducted by the same author, however, he concluded that the predominance of the “pushing” factor may be found in the case of other cities in Korea.

The Seoul study by Lee also pointed out that the reasons for migration may vary in their “pulling” or “pushing” character in accordance with the periods when they occurred. For example, for respondents who moved to Seoul after the Korean War and the
return of normalcy, job-related reasons were most important. On the other hand, people who migrated because of poverty tended to be those who migrated during the unstable periods after the liberation of Korea and the chaotic period of the War itself. Of course, most of the respondents who said that Communist oppression was responsible for their migration came to Seoul between 1945 and 1949.

Finally, the intensity of the reason added to the frequency of response also provides some variations. Professor Lee asked his respondents whether the factors they mentioned as influencing their decision to migrate were responsible “greatly”, or only “to some extent”, in the making of such decisions. He found that high-intensity factors included “social turmoil”, and “family bankruptcy”, on the pushing category but the pulling factors were also strongly felt. These included “looking for a job”, “education”, “establishing a private business” or “changes in the office or occupation of the respondent”. Some factors, such as “escaping from traditional life”, “personal relationships in the city”, and “to show talent or skill”, were rated as influential “to some extent” by most respondents. On this basis, Professor Lee concluded that these factors may not be strong enough to immediately trigger off migration but that they build up through time and eventually cause the person to migrate.

Patterns of Settlement

The influx of people from rural and lesser urban areas into Seoul has had a most dramatic effect on the character of the urban landscape. One of the more immediate effects of rapid migration, of course, is higher population densities. In Seoul, this fact has been countered by expansion of the metropolitan unit’s boundaries. In 1963, the administrative boundary of the city of Seoul was expanded so that it now reaches an approximate 15 km. radius from the city centre, compared to 10 km. before.

A study by Tai-joon Kwon indicates that most migrants into Seoul agglomerate along the major transit lines directly connected to the city’s Central Business District (CBD). Kwon cites three major factors that influence the pattern of land development in Seoul. Foremost among these is the tendency of most settlers to consider transportation cost and time spent in journey to work. Since most jobs are in the Central Business District, most migrants want to live close to the city centre. Other factors, such as availability of water and other city services, distance to schools, fire protection or availability of cultural facilities may also enter the decision to locate but the transportation factor seems to be dominant.11

Since the transportation cost and time factor is important, the physical network of the public transport system in Seoul also
affects the pattern of settlements strongly. Most of the city's major road building projects have been done to extend the mass transportation lines radially from the existing CBD. In addition, the city government's "Housing Site Development Projects" have also served to emphasize radial road developments.

Finally, Kwon notes that the bulk of Seoul's economic activities are tertiary in nature (estimates for population engaged in tertiary activities range from 88.5 per cent in 1959 to 76.4 per cent in 1965). Tertiary activities, by their very nature, demand "intensive interpersonal transactions", which encourage high densities in specific places. Hence, the decision of people to stick to the centre of the city may be mainly due to the predominance of tertiary activities. There is a possibility that when primary or secondary economic activities become more important, the pattern of settlements in Seoul would also change. In fact, by mapping residential uses in the city through time, Kwon already sees a tendency for the CBD to "purify" its functions, pushing residential uses farther away from it.

One important factor in settlement patterns, especially for residential purposes, is the availability of relatively cheap land on which to set up housing for low income people who tend to predominate among the new settlers in Seoul. Increasingly, with new developments, such lands are getting harder and harder to find in the CBD. As such, many low income settlements, which may be classified as slums or squatters, are increasingly being found in other parts of the city. Favorite places for such settlements are marginally used lands, such as those near streams and rivers, on steep slopes near hillsides, or in areas that are close to places considered as nuisances (noisy or smelly places, garbage dumps, etc.)

For example, such low-income settlements as Don Am Dong, Myung Yun Dong, Hyun Jeo Dong, Hong Eun Dong, Su Saik Dong, Ha Wang Sip Ri Dong, Ok Su Dong and Sung In Dong A are on the mountainside; Chaong Wha Dong, Tab Sib Ri Dong and Yong Du 2 Dong are on stream sides; and Song Jeong Dong is on the riverside. These places have tended to attract low income migrants because property values there are low enough for the new settlers to afford them.12

In the final analysis, it is the capacity to pay of migrants (which in turn depends upon what economic activities they are engaged in) which is the main determinant of where they will locate. If they can afford more transportation money and more time in their travel to work, people will be willing to locate farther away from the centre of the city. Unfortunately, the per capita income of people in Seoul is rather low — ranging from U.S. $157.3 in 1965 to U.S. $281.2 in 1968. At this income level, the factors
we mentioned above are strong influences on the decision of where to settle. Already, the expansion of the metropolitan area is resulting in longer and more expensive trips. The busy tempo of life is also increasing the number of trips a person has to make—the average trip per person per day has increased from .6 in 1964 to .95 in 1968. With Seoul bursting at the seams and expanding some more, all these relationships between income, movement and settlement activities are likely to change the face of the city in the near future. And such changes may not necessarily be in accordance with the wishes of the planners and officials of Seoul.

Problems of Rapid Growth

The rapid growth of Seoul from a city of barely 100,000 after the Second World War to a city of 5 million at present has, naturally, resulted in a host of serious problems which include housing, security, water, sewerage, transportation and other aspects demanded of a good urban way of life. These problems have been growing through the years, in spite of the efforts of the national and local governments to solve them. Of late, metropolitan-wide approaches are starting to be used in Seoul. These reflect an increasing understanding that "... Population explosion, ramifying differentiation of urban functions, traffic jams, housing and water shortage, flood, air and water pollution, garbage piled up, and noise ... all these problems augment the citizen's dependency on the metropolitan administration for solution."\(^{13}\)

Housing. One of the immediate effects of rapid migration to Seoul is an acute shortage in housing. The shortage has also been gravely aggravated by the fact that the Korean War destroyed an estimated 600,000 houses or one fourth of the total housing supply at the time. Combined action by the government and the private sector has tried to cope with the housing problem but as of the end of 1965, it was estimated that the total number of houses in Seoul was no more than 345,657, which was barely 51 per cent of the housing need. By 1970, it was estimated that some 798,000 households would be living in Seoul. With the housing supply only amounting to an estimated 453,000, the shortage and the other problems that come with it are obvious.\(^{14}\)

The components of the housing need are well known. First of all, there is population growth due to natural increase (the difference between births and deaths), which is set at about 2.3 per cent per year. To this rate must be added the population growth due to migration, which accounts for another 7 per cent per year. From 1962 to 1966, it was estimated that the housing need created by these twin factors contributing to population increase amounted to 165,000 new housing units annually.
Table 4
The Housing Situation in Korea, 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Rural Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>29,752,791</td>
<td>10,152,899</td>
<td>19,599,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households</td>
<td>5,210,420</td>
<td>1,866,187</td>
<td>3,324,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Units</td>
<td>3,885,996</td>
<td>982,507</td>
<td>2,903,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortage of Housing Units</td>
<td>1,324,424</td>
<td>903,680</td>
<td>420,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortage</td>
<td>25.41%</td>
<td>47.91%</td>
<td>12.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Annual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Increase</td>
<td>2.84%</td>
<td>6.61%</td>
<td>1.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space per Household</td>
<td>7.5 Pyung</td>
<td>7.1 Pyung</td>
<td>7.7 Pyung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space per Person</td>
<td>1.3 Pyung</td>
<td>1.2 Pyung</td>
<td>1.3 Pyung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Persons per</td>
<td>5.7 Persons</td>
<td>5.5 Persons</td>
<td>5.8 Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Construction 1968

Aside from housing needs due to population increase, there are also needs arising from the deterioration and depreciation of the existing stock of housing. Many of the houses in Korea, even in the cities, are made of wood and other materials which are susceptible to the elements. Korea's wet summers and cold winters contribute greatly to housing deterioration. Finally, one contributor to housing need is the desire of most people for better quality housing. As the income and living styles of people go up, they aspire to better housing. This qualitative need must also be answered for better urban development.

All in all, it has been estimated that up to the late 1960's, Korea needed some 205,000 houses every year. During this same period, construction averaged only 73,413 units per year, fulfilling only about a third of the housing demand. Of course, with this much of a housing deficit, conditions could only become worse without governmental programmes in support of housing. This is especially so in the cities where a shortage of 47.91 per cent existed in December 1967.

Happily, the government has recognized the housing need and has planned for the construction of new housing. In the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan, the government planned to build 60,000 units of housing. It also planned to acquire 2.7 million pyung (one pyung equals 36 square feet) of land for housing estates. However, by the time the plan period ended, the government actually built only 40,000 units and invested only 80 per cent of the targeted amount for the plan period.

In the Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan, the government planned the construction of some 500,000 housing units,
470,000 to be constructed by the private sector and 30,000 by the central government. The plan envisions the massive participation of the private sector in housing. However, with foreign exchange and other financial difficulties, it is now becoming apparent that this anticipation may not be fulfilled and that the government must take a more active role in the housing field if it is to solve the problem.

Since the early 1960's Korea has been devoting a slightly increasing proportion of its Gross National Product (GNP) to housing. The proportion has risen from 1.2 per cent of GNP in 1964, to 1.6 per cent in 1965. Compared to countries under similar stages of development, this percentage of resources earmarked for housing is quite low. More has to be done in the future not only to keep up with the housing deficit but to provide adequate housing for future generations of Koreans.

Protective Services. The concentration of people in urban areas is generally associated with a rise in deviant behavior which includes crime, juvenile delinquency, vice, drug addiction, etc. Government must provide a system by which the common citizen is protected from his fellow citizens who violate the laws or the rules of the society. In addition, concentration brings with it such hazards as fires, floods, and other disasters and calamities. Protective services should cover these dangers too.

In Korea, as in other developing countries, crime rates in urban areas tend to be much higher than in other parts of the country. In 1965, for example, the cities of Seoul, Taichun, Taegu, Inchon, Kwangju and Pusan accounted for 51.1 per cent of all the crimes committed in the nation. The city of Seoul alone, which had 62,860 crimes committed during the year, accounted for 45 per cent of the grand total of 139,665 for the whole country.15

When it is considered that the police force in Seoul and other cities have to be faced with other duties aside from crime detection and control, the inadequacy of protective services in the city becomes readily apparent. It must be remembered, too, that the troubles with North Korea also occupy the time of the local police. Rumors and actual cases of infiltrators coming in from the North become the concern of the police. At the same time, the police also have to undertake traffic planning and control, and other traditional services. With their outmoded equipment, limited transport capabilities and general lack of training and support, it is a wonder that the police forces in Seoul and other cities in Korea are doing as good a job as they are performing at present.

Unemployment and Underemployment. The migration of so many former peasants to the city is one of the main causes for
unemployment and underemployment in Seoul and other urban centres in Korea. As already mentioned, seeking jobs and economic betterment is one of the main motivations for migration. The result of the influx of untrained and unskilled people to Seoul in 1965 was an unemployment rate of 23.5 per cent. Out of the total labor force of 1,012,600 in Seoul, some 238,200 were unemployed. In 1966, the number of unemployed went down to 188,098 but this is still very high compared to the national unemployment figure of 7.4 per cent.16

Aside from the high unemployment rate mentioned above, there is also considerable underemployment in the Seoul metropolitan area. Unskilled people find it very difficult to find regular full-time employment. Many of them make do with occasional jobs which do not require special skills or training. Many of these jobs are in the tertiary job sector such as personal services, domestic jobs, etc. Since 1956, tertiary industries in Seoul have gone down from 87.2 per cent of the total industry employment figures to 76.4 per cent in 1965. This seems to be an appreciable decrease. However, primary industries have only risen from 4.4 per cent of the total employment in 1956 to 5.8 per cent in 1965. The bulk of the increase in employment was in secondary industries, which rose from 8.4 per cent in 1956 to 17.8 per cent in 1965.17 These employment figures show that the shifts in industrial employment has been rather gradual while the population growth in Seoul has been dramatically and drastically changing. If the main industrial sectors of the metropolitan area do not show a higher rate of increase in the future and the current population trends remain the same, unemployment and underemployment problems in Seoul will be compounded.

Planning and Administration. The Seoul metropolitan area has expanded four fold since 1936— from 133.94 square kilometers at that time to 613.04 square kilometers in 1967. The influx of population, however, is resulting in more urban sprawl and there is a need for a more effective planning and administrative machinery to keep this growth under control and to channel it to desirable growth patterns. In general, there is a need to redevelop the central section of the city, where structures hastily set up after the Korean War are now in critical stages of deterioration. At the same time, there is a need to control the sprawling growth of the fringe areas of the city because continued growth will tax urban services seriously and make administration more difficult.

An index to the difficulties involved in planning Seoul rationally is the amount spent for land readjustment. In 1966, 4.684 billion won was spent for this purpose. As more infrastructures are built by the city, more and more privately owned land will be used and this commands a high price in the market.
Until lately, city administration in the city of Seoul tended to be negative. Administrators seemed to be reacting mainly to problems, rather than actively using the limited resources of the administration to plan and effectively marshal urban growth for developmental purposes. Recent administrators, however, seem to have taken a more positive and long range perspective: with long term plans for the metropolis and serious attempts to live up to Seoul’s role as an international city. In spite of some problems with the housing schemes and other cases of administrative failures, the general picture seems to warrant more optimism. At least, moves toward unified city administration as well as attempts to decentralize activities to other local government units within the Seoul metropolitan region have been taken. More and more, a regional focus is being used in Seoul, a focus which seeks to allocate the proper activities to the governmental levels that can do them best. If these approaches are followed through, some positive developments in the future can be expected.

Solutions, Problems and Prospects

As mentioned above, in spite of the many serious problems faced by Seoul, there are certain activities being carried out or planned by the proper authorities that make for a more positive prospect. Some of these approaches are: the trend toward more coordinated regional development; more comprehensive planning for the metropolitan area; and improved investment in specific services, such as in housing. All these activities are geared to fulfilling the developmental potentials of Korea’s main city and designed to making the quality of life in Seoul much better.

Planners at the national and local levels have recognized for some time that if the problems of Seoul City are to be solved, they have to use a framework which also considers the areas around the city itself. Administrative and political officials have responded positively to this suggestion. In December 1967, the Mayor of Seoul took the initiative in forming the “Metropolitan Regional Council for Administrative Coordination.” This body was composed of the mayors of Seoul, Inchon, Soowon, and Euichung-bu as well as the administrators of seven other neighbouring counties located within a 50 kilometer radius from the centre of Seoul. A regional development plan encompassing the local areas mentioned above has also been prepared.18

The regional plan recognizes the dominance of the central city and allots three specific land uses for it: the central sector, the inner circle and the external circle sectors. Around these sectors will be a green belt area, which is then followed by a peripheral area and environs sector. Areas beyond the green belt will be set aside for the construction of satellite towns which are designed
to absorb industry and working populations which will otherwise flock to the central sectors. Growth will be in the form of a concentric circle centered on Seoul.

A network of varied transportation means will connect the various sectors laid out in the plan. High speed railways are planned, which will link the five sectors of the regional area together. A canal is also proposed to be dug between the cities of Seoul and Incheon. The capacity of Kimpo International Airport is to be doubled. Finally, expressways and lesser highways will stitch all important points of the region together. All in all, the regional plan for the metropolitan area hopes to place specialized land uses in a concentric circle around the city and to connect these areas by a rapid transportation and communication system.

In addition to this plan for the development of Seoul metropolitan region, another plan has also been proposed. This other plan suggests a linear-axis development corridor as the developmental framework for future growth. This corridor will extend between Seoul and Incheon for 25 kilometers and between Seoul and Soowon for another 30 kilometers. Some central business district functions formerly concentrated in the Seoul city area will be dispersed to "developmental nodes" in this corridor. Business activities will be moved out to areas along the linear-axis, away from the present area which is currently limited by mountain walls. Residential and other uses will then be located close to these business and other high activity areas, so as to minimize transport time and costs. The spider-net transportation system currently available in Seoul is expected to be overloaded in the very near future. The proponents of the linear-axis regional plan argue that locating high-activity uses within the corridor will solve the present transportation problems.19

Whether the first or the second scheme will be adopted and implemented in the development of the Seoul metropolitan region, there will still be many problems to be solved if the area is to achieve rational growth. The main question, of course, is related to financing. The realization of the bold schemes outlined above will require vast sums of money. What level of government should be primarily responsible for the raising of this money? How are the expenses to be shared so that other sectors of the Korean economy will not be jeopardized?

One thing stands out in debates on the development of the Seoul metropolitan area, and this is the fact that Seoul, as an urban entity, already dominates the whole of Korea. Will the improvement of conditions in this premier city be good in the long run for the rest of the country? The central government has only limited resources for development. If most of these are invested
in the Seoul metropolitan area to solve its problems, what will be the effects of these on other parts of the country?

Questions of national policy, therefore, are involved in considering the problem of the Seoul metropolis. The Republic of Korea would do well to formulate such a policy and to make sure that the regional and local plans for all urban places in the country are integrated into a national plan that pursues the guidelines set down in the policy. Otherwise, rural-urban migration to developing urban centres will only accelerate and negate the good that is done in planning and developing urban centres.
Solutions

Summary of Discussions in the Manila Seminar on Solving the Slum and Squatter Problem

The format followed in the Manila Seminar had the authors delivering their papers, followed immediately by an Open Forum where the participants and members of the audience were able to ask questions, volunteer information, seek clarification or express opinions. What follows is an abridged and edited version of the most important points taken up in these discussions. Only those portions relevant to the subject of how the slum and squatter problem is being solved in various countries are included in this chapter. Broadly, these solutions may be divided into: (1) efforts to limit, deflect or influence migration patterns; (2) use of a national urban policy; (3) area-wide organization of urban regions; (4) low cost housing schemes; (5) private sector efforts; (6) site and service approaches; (7) finance; (8) land policies; and (9) slum clearance.

Limiting Migration

FLOOR: It is obvious that squatting and slum dwelling are caused by the massive migration of people from the countryside to the cities. What ways and means have been used to stem the flow of migrants to the city and how successful have these been? Which of these would you suggest to ease the problem in our own countries?

SPEAKER: I am sorry to say that based on reports from Study Groups cooperating in INTERMET projects, there has been very little success in limiting migration to cities. This is true, especially, in large metropolitan areas. Even in socialist countries where more direct control measures have been used, they have not been too successful. Under "personal identification systems", for example, a person is given the right to housing, stores, and access to jobs,
only in the area where he is registered as a resident. If you are a resident of City A, for example, and you migrate to City B, you will have a hard time there because you will not be allotted a house, you cannot find a job, and you may not even be allowed to buy things from the government store. It is one thing to make such rules, however, and quite another thing to implement them. Somehow, people are very ingenious when it comes to finding loopholes in rules.

In Mainland China, it was known that there were large-scale attempts to make urban people move to the countryside during the Great Cultural Revolution. Young people, especially, were told to return to the countryside and work there. However, as far as we know, this and other attempts have not been too successful. The cities in Mainland China are as densely populated and troubled as those in other countries.

FLOOR: What about “counter magnets”, and other approaches?

SPEAKER: I am glad you mentioned those. More and more, planners are learning that indirect influences rather than control measures may have greater success in solving this problem. In India, for example, planners are setting up industrial estates at some distance from the city to encourage people to move there. Such estates are conceived of as more or less self-contained units, with employment, residences and services for people who live in them. The same approach is being used in Malaysia and in Singapore. An industrial town is being built six miles from Kuala Lumpur, for example, and another one is expected to be finished by 1972. In some ways, the channeling of investments to the Iligan area in the Philippines, may be seen as an attempt to convince people to move to Mindanao instead of flocking to Greater Manila. The main problem with a “counter magnet” approach is that people generally will invest in places where markets, labor, services and other amenities are already existing. This means in the big cities. It takes a lot to convince investors to locate in other urban places.

FLOOR: You mentioned location in other urban places. Why do people have to be urbanized? Can’t the government carry out programmes that will keep the people on the farm? Many countries have agricultural development schemes that improve the lot of farmers. The rural community development programmes in India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Taiwan and the Philippines extol the merits of the local community, popular participation, and basic democracies. The cities are already very crowded and full of slums and squatters. The rural people have to be told that they are better off with their fresh air and healthy environment. If
they learn how miserable life in the urban slums is, maybe, they will not migrate.

SPEAKER: That is a very big "maybe". Unfortunately, experience shows that people will migrate to cities when they want to, regardless of what they are told. And once they get to the city, they rarely return to the country. Sociologists tell us that the process of urbanization is irreversible. The ironical thing about the point you raised is that governmental and popular efforts to improve the lot of farmers usually have the effect of hastening migration to cities. In the first place, the rationalization of agriculture reduces the number of people needed on the land. Under conditions of underemployment, which are prevalent in most underdeveloped countries, better agricultural techniques bring about rural unemployment, which may then push people to the cities. Also, frequent contacts with "change agents" who usually come from urban areas make people curious and whet their appetite for city living. When combined with mass media messages and other appeals, this curiosity results in migration.

But this need not necessarily be the case. People can be influenced to stay in the rural areas if these places are "urbanized" to such an extent that their lives become better. A policy of "creeping urbanism" can be pursued whereby agro-industrial estates, commercial farming, and other agricultural ventures that use modern methods result in an improvement in the farmers' lives. These may be the forerunners of your industrial estates and new towns which act as "counter magnets". In fact, if these urbanizing centres become prosperous enough, they may even attract entrepreneurs and other innovators from the city who have found life there too burdensome and are looking for new challenges. In this way, you get the "spread effect" from urbanization that Myrdal has been talking about.

FLOOR: Speaking of urban to rural migration, what do you think of the proposal to "decongest" the city by moving people to rural areas? You mentioned that this was not successful in Mainland China. How about in other countries?

SPEAKER: Well, as I mentioned, urbanization seems to be an irreversible process. We have heard reports of the Philippine experience where a programme to pay for the transportation of people returning to their provinces has not been overly successful. The results of homestead or agricultural colonization schemes have been sad, too, when they involved former urban people.

FLOOR: I agree that people who have failed in the city will not return to their hometowns even if you pay their transportation. Nobody wants to admit that he failed to find his fortune in the city. But this is not the same as saying that people will not return
to the rural areas once they have seen the city. That may be true if you send them to rural areas where life is so different that their life is endangered. However, if you send them to agro-industrial estates, commercial farms or other places where they are assured a decent way of life, I am sure they will agree. Especially slum dwellers who are down and out. They will take the chance if the prospects seem good enough.

SPEAKER: But would you want the "down and out" people to be your workers in these developmental schemes? I am afraid that as far as the cities in the developing countries are concerned, the policy makers must face up to the fact that people want to move to the cities. Others may be pushed by the difficulties of rural life — and we don't want those "down and out" people in the cities, either — but generally, at least, from all the surveys I have seen in many countries, the main motivation for cityward migration seems to be the search for economic betterment. This is a very positive motivation and it should be used for all its worth.

Instead of worrying about decongesting our cities, it may be more realistic to think about rechanneling and rationally influencing the migration going into the cities. In most Latin American cities, for example, and to a limited extent, in Africa, they have used the idea of "reception areas", which are planned for the housing of newly arrived migrants. These dwellings are usually located on the outskirts of the city. They give the migrants some temporary shelter with sanitation services. Sometimes, as in the Moroccan scheme, a minimal amount is asked as rent. In all instances, the reception areas are also staging areas. Once the migrant family finds a job, a home nearer the city, or a better place, he moves out of the reception centre. Government workers staffing the centre help the recent migrant with his needs. In this way, squatting does not get out of hand and the allocation of people over the urban area is done with some planning.

FLOOR: The reception centre idea is good when migration is coming in trickles and does not reach critical levels. What happens, though, when the city gets inundated with migrants, as in the case of natural disasters and calamities or political upheavals, etc? I am afraid that much more than planned reception is called for, even in the best of circumstances. The problem, really, is much larger than a city or even a city region can handle. It is a national problem. This is why all levels of government must be involved in finding solutions to it.

A National Urban Policy

SPEAKER: I agree. What is really needed is an urban policy that the government can follow in improving urban development
nationally. Such a policy, of course, should not be seen as a negative tool. Its main purpose will not be to limit urban growth in certain areas but to encourage it in others. The Chief Executive or the Legislature in a country, or both, should adopt such a policy and incorporate it into the country's long range economic and social development plan. This long range plan (perhaps, a five year plan), should then be divided sectorally and territorially, so that regional and metropolitan-wide plans become integral parts of it. Lack of integration between long term, medium term and short term plans is a common fault in most developing countries. Most plans also do not have a spatial component. Ideally, the plans of the cities should fit into regions, and regional plans should fit into the national plan. All these, in turn, should be geared to the achievement of the national policy I was talking about before.

FLOOR: That is all very good. However, in most countries, various types of plans are the responsibility of different levels of government or types of government agencies. Even if the central government comes up with an urban policy, there is no guarantee that it will be followed. What can be done about this?

SPEAKER: Many ways have already been tried in various countries to bring about the coordination needed to implement a national policy. The power to coordinate may be lodged in a national ministry, say the Ministry of the Interior. An inter-governmental coordinating committee for urban affairs may be created, with central and local governments represented in it. Informal contacts may also be used, with various heads of local governments, for example, entering into an informal agreement to check with each other every time they do something that may have repercussions in other areas.

FLOOR: How about local politicians? Usually, they do not want the central government or political leaders of other local governments to be meddling in their affairs. Central city politicians, for example, may not want to surrender some of their powers to suburban or national politicians. In the face of this, how can various types of local government get together?

Area-Wide Organization

SPEAKER: I am personally convinced that we often make politicians the scapegoats for urban problems. We accuse them and attribute our failures to their sins. Certainly, there are some bad politicians but there are also many who want to see cities develop. As for bringing local governments together, it is obvious that more and more, metropolitan problems are becoming too big for any one local government to solve. Automobiles and rapid
transit are making traditional political boundaries obsolete. More and more, people are living, working and doing things in various parts of the city. It is very difficult to ask them to pay for the services they consume in each of these various places for they move around too much. So, some form of area-wide action is called for. Since people are acting area-wide, local governments must also adjust to the scope of their activities.

I think this observation is certainly relevant in the case of fully developed countries. Local autonomy is good and local officials are right in insisting on it as they do here in the Philippines. However, autonomy should be granted to the correct level of local government. If the problem to be solved demands region-wide action, autonomy should be devolved at the regional level. In fact, in some countries, regional governments have already been introduced to make for more efficient metropolitan government. In Toronto, for example, the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto has been created and has jurisdiction over many services in the metropolitan area such as transportation, police and others. In some countries, “multi-tiered” governments are being introduced too. Thus, aside from local units such as towns and cities, a regional government encompassing the whole area may also be used. In this way, area-wide coordination is achieved.

FLOOR: Area-wide governments may be more efficient but don’t they also entail the risk of becoming “super-governments” that get out of control? Even when the heads and officials of regional governments are elected by the people, they generally become too engrossed in larger things and become inaccessible. Besides, central governments usually impose regional governments on local units. In Manila, for example, there is a current debate now on whether there should be a Metropolitan Police Command. The central government is in favor of this move because it will then be able to take power from local units. I think this is wrong. It is a violation of the principle of local autonomy which is guaranteed in Philippine law.

SPEAKER: As I said, I am for local autonomy. But it is the level that counts — at what level is power to be delegated and/or devolved? If the police problem in Manila demands metropolitan-wide action, then, perhaps, there should be a unified command. I don’t know the exact situation. All I am saying is that the matter should be studied, and proper action should be guided by research, not by doctrine.

Low Cost Housing

FLOOR: In the paper on Malaysia, it was mentioned that the Malaysian Government has built high-rise tenements near the
centre of Kuala Lumpur. May we know why this was done? Were the tenements successful or unsuccessful? What problems have been encountered in constructing and running them?

SPEAKER: The Malaysian Government has constructed high-rise tenements near the centre of Kuala Lumpur because people with low income want to live near the centre of the city where their jobs are. When the tenements were constructed, the squatters who used to occupy the area were moved to temporary tents. Then, they were assisted in moving to the tenements when they were finished. It is only to be expected, of course, that there will be some problems in an undertaking as large as this. For one thing, the tenements, even when the most efficient methods of construction were used, were still quite expensive. Many former squatters could not meet the down payment nor the monthly amortization for the units. Many Malays, also, were not used to living many stories above the ground. They have been rural people and want to be close to the earth. Thus, they preferred to live in the kampongs, in their little shacks, rather than in the concrete tenements.

FLOOR: How about racial integration in the tenements?

SPEAKER: This is a serious problem, and a national agency has been created, to find some solutions. As you know, Kuala Lumpur is 58 per cent Chinese, 26 per cent Malay, 11 per cent Indian and 4 per cent others. All these groups have their own culture and lifestyle. When you bring them together at very high densities, which is the case in the tenements, some problems are sure to arise.

At present, most of the people living in the tenements are Chinese. They are usually the ones who can afford the down payment and monthly payments. Also, they are more used to apartment living, having had a great deal of experience in this by living in the centre of the city. The Malays want to live in houses that are airy and close to the ground. They prefer to be closer to nature.

There have been cases of Chinese and Malays living close together and they have resulted in complaints and trouble. Malays object to the smell of Chinese cooking, for example, especially pork smell. Being Muslims, they do not want to smell pork, especially when they are praying in the evening. Other Chinese customs also disturb the Malays — such as their long wakes when somebody dies, their gambling sessions that last long into the night, etc. These may be small things, but they are very irritating to Malays who are not used to them. I don’t know how we can provide solutions to all these problems. In the design of the buildings, maybe. Make them soundproof and smellproof. In later
buildings, separate social halls and parlours for various groups have been included in the design. But all this will be very costly. Besides, the very idea of high density living requires interaction among the people, which, hopefully, then develops into a sense of community. If the people go their own separate ways, there will be little sense of community and the housing projects may deteriorate. Perhaps, if we introduce the innovations gradually, there will be greater success.

FLOOR: As mentioned by a previous speaker, one of the main problems in low cost housing is how can cost really be made low enough for squatters and slum dwellers to be able to afford them. Can you tell us what is being done to solve this problem?

SPEAKER: Yes, well, one of the most commonly used methods for minimizing housing costs is the pre-fabrication of housing components and their assembly in prepared housing sites. This works well if the housing programme is big enough so that economies of scale can be used. It also helps if local materials such as sand, gravel, cement, local iron bars, wood, etc. are used in the process. Standardized procedures for manufacture of housing components, transportation to construction sites and actual erection of buildings are also most helpful. In other words, there are many technological innovations in construction now available and they should be applied to the housing problem.

FLOOR: Isn’t pre-fabrication and mass production a bit ill-conceived in that it neglects to use the resource which is most abundant in the slum and squatter communities? I am referring to the men and women living in these communities. They have lots of skills, as shown in the fact that they construct their own dwellings. Their main problem is employment. And yet, employment opportunities are taken away from them because pre-fabrication methods are used.

SPEAKER: You are talking about a different thing, then. The participation of the squatters and slum dwellers in the construction of housing is a very good idea but it does not necessarily cut down costs. It may redistribute the costs, with some of it being shouldered by the people and the bulk of it by the housing agency, but the total costs themselves may or may not be reduced. In some countries, such as in the Philippines, Korea and certain countries of Latin America, the people themselves have been involved in housing construction through what is called “core housing”. In some resettlement areas outside Manila, the housing agency provides the relocated squatter with a half-finished house—with a roof, four posts, a hardened floor and a toilet. The squatter or slum dweller finishes the house with whatever materials he can afford, gradually improving it as his economic status improves.
This approach, however, is not used just to cut costs. The greater motivation is to help the relocated squatter develop an identity with the house, to make him really committed to its improvement because he has already invested in it. This is especially important in the case of squatters relocated to areas which are often not too close to the squatter's place of work, or which do not have services and other amenities. If the squatters do not become attached to their new houses, they may abandon them. This just results in total waste.

In Seoul, the concept of core housing has been used in the construction of what are called "citizen apartments". Unlike in Manila, these are high-rise apartments located close to the city centre. However, the apartment units are also unfinished—they have no partitions, paint and other finishing touches, though water and heat are provided. People who buy the apartments are bound to improve them—and most of them do so, as their economic means make it possible. Unfortunately, in the case of some apartments, the building contractors have cut too many corners. As a result some of them have collapsed, killing some occupants. However, the concept itself is good. As I mentioned, it may or may not cut down costs but by distributing the costs between the government and the people, things become a bit easier.

FLOOR: May I mention, also, that in the Philippines, we have tried the scheme of "aided self-help" in the construction of low income houses, in the Sapang Palay relocation area. Squatters, we have found, usually have some construction skills, such as carpentry, hollow block making, masonry, etc. These skilled people are employed by the government in construction, and they earn points for their work. Aside from their pay, which is quite low, the people are able to get lumber, hardware fixtures, cement, and other things they need for their own homes. In this way, the housing agency and the squatters themselves benefit from the use of the squatters' skills.

Private Sector Efforts

FLOOR: I think that the private sector, too, has a lot to do and say about low cost housing. We have been talking here as if it were primarily a governmental responsibility. In the community where I live (a city in the Philippines) a group of school teachers got together and set up a housing cooperative. They got some housing loans through this cooperative, purchased a piece of land, and are now in the process of setting up their own homes. The main role of the government here has been providing credit and also technical advice. I think if we want commitment, this is about the best way of bringing it about.
SPEAKER: Yes, that's an excellent point. I also want to add that in the case of big businesses that set up their factories on the city's periphery, it may be a wise idea for them to provide low cost housing for their employees. They can certainly get loans from the government for this purpose. And even if they have to take this service from their own investments, I think it will still be worth it. The proximity of the employee's residence to his place of work may cut down on tardiness, absenteeism and other problems. Employees may also regard the housing as a fringe benefit, that creates strong loyalty to the company.

FLOOR: May I say, at this point, that in many countries, private organizations often recognize the slum and squatter problem much earlier than the government and that they usually do something about it. I represent a Church organization, for example, and our Industrial Mission has been working in many parts of the world, trying to improve the lot of low income people. We engage in vocational training programmes, to give the migrants much needed skills, because we see employment as the key problem. The people in the slums are not lazy and they do not want to depend on others, least of all the government. If you give them a chance to help themselves, they really accomplish miraculous results.

SPEAKER: I agree with the previous speaker when he stressed the role of private organizations. However, I have often wondered what the net impact has been of these efforts. I am not talking about the programmes run by the organization of the previous speaker but in my observation, some of the private efforts are doing more harm than good. For one thing, they tend to be paternalistic—with the private organizer leading the slum and squatter people, organizing them, and encouraging them to speak out for their rights. Often, this type of activity results in troubles such as riots and demonstrations. I realize that the actions are motivated by the idea that those in power are either too thick-headed or too preoccupied to listen to the normal complaints of the underprivileged. But, in many cases, the organizers do not even try to use the normal channels. They assume they will not be listened to, and they make trouble right away. I think this is very disruptive and does not accomplish anything so far as rational efforts are concerned.

FLOOR: Mr. Chairman. I am also not talking about the government programme that the previous speaker is working in. Generally, however, the feeling on the part of squatters that government officials will not listen to them is true. It certainly has been the case in the communities I have been working in. When we first went into this community, we made a survey and asked the people what government agencies have been doing in the
place, what sort of programmes exist, etc. The overwhelming response was nothing. The people said they were aware that there were social workers assigned to the community but they have not seen them yet. In fact, they don't want to see them because they are sure that once the social workers start making surveys, this would be a sure sign that relocation is being planned by the government. The squatters want government to leave them alone. This is why the efforts of private organizations are needed because, somehow, services must be extended to these people.

SPEAKER: I agree with the previous speaker that squatters and slum dwellers must have access to urban services. Such services, however, are usually governmental. Therefore, while private organizations may supplement public efforts, we have no choice but to seek ways of making such public services available to begin with. One of the main problems when dealing with squatters is that they don't have a legal existence. They reside on lands illegally, and the government, if it is to strictly implement the law, should not tolerate this violation of the law — least of all, provide services to those who have broken the law. However, I think this legalistic reasoning is obsolete. The fact is that the squatters are there. Even if you evict them, they will come back. You can arrest all of the squatters in Metropolitan Manila but how do you jail more than a million people? So, governmental programmes must be created to cope with this problem in a new way.

Sites and Service Approaches

FLOOR: Somebody has suggested “planned slums” for solving the squatter and slum problem. What do you think of this idea?

SPEAKER: I won't use that term, but I think it is a good idea. We in the planning field call it less colorfully as a “sites and service approach”. Basically, the proposals are the same. The government earmarks certain areas in the metropolis as slum or squatter relocation sites. These sites are parcelled out into house plots, services such as roads, water, toilets, school, firefighting and police are assured, and then the plots are allocated to former squatters or slum dwellers, who build their own homes. Government workers assist the people and they insist on certain very minimal standards of construction to minimize dangers from fire, epidemics, etc. The land may be sold to the squatters at very low prices and with long term payment arrangements. Or the government simply assures land tenure through long term leases. Studies have shown that people are more generally interested in security of tenure, anyway. If they feel secure, they will most likely do more to improve their houses.
FLOOR: Isn't this a very expensive programme? Suppose the land is close to the centre of the city and has a very high market value? Isn't it more rational to build high-rise houses so you can have higher densities?

SPEAKER: I agree that it is expensive but it is certainly not as expensive as high rise buildings. And studies show that densities in high rise dwellings are usually lower than in slums and squatter areas. In fact, in Singapore, when slum dwellers are transferred to high rise units, they say that about a third to a half of the former slum dwellers cannot be accommodated in the new units. Also, my advocacy of sites and service schemes does not mean that the government should not go into other types of housing schemes. Sites and service should be seen as only one of a varied set of approaches. Certainly, for people who can afford to pay higher rents or who have a life style more suited to apartment dwelling, high rise buildings should be constructed. However, for people who are too poor or who do not want to live in apartments, sites and service or other schemes should be used.

May I add that another good thing about a site and service approach is that it combines the efforts and resources of the people themselves with the efforts of the government. This makes for a fruitful partnership. To make such a scheme work, the people usually have to organize and govern themselves. Surely, in an urban environment where there is a great danger of becoming apathetic, this is very important. In other words, we are interested not only in providing services but in the manner in which such services motivate people to do things for themselves.

Finance

FLOOR: Almost by definition, the underdeveloped countries who have the worst housing problems, are also the ones who can least afford expensive programmes. How do you propose to finance high rise tenements, sites and service schemes and other approaches proposed here? Economists have shown that investments in housing is highly inflationary. They have argued that developing countries should invest in sectors with much higher returns to capital than housing. Since the stability of the currency of developing countries is always a problem, how do you find enough funds for housing without causing a problem, how do you find enough for housing without causing inflation?

SPEAKER: I admit that finance is a limiting factor but the problem is not as serious as many economists will make us think. Right now, most developing countries devote less than three per cent of their Gross National Product for housing. I think this is too low. Many of these economies can devote more to housing.
Also, considerable debate has raged regarding the question of whether investment in housing is inflationary or not. I happen to believe that it is not. Economists have a way of setting up their accounts in such a way that they measure output in financial cost terms. I think this is a mistake. Housing is a social investment. It has products which are not only measurable in financial terms.

Take a newly married man, for example. Let us say he pays the down payment on a house and lot. Knowing that he has his obligation to pay, he is most likely to exert more effort — work longer hours, maybe, take on another job — so he can meet his obligations. Having a home to go home to, a palace he is proud of, he has higher morale, greater stability, and because of this, higher productivity. Surely, all these things are important to development. Yet, economists measure only the money invested in the house in their national accounts. That is why they say the investment is not productive. Not directly, maybe, but in the long run home ownership, because of the factors I mentioned above, is developmental.

FLOOR: I am afraid that if we discuss housing finance in these grand theoretical terms, we will get nowhere. Will somebody please tell me how housing is financed in various countries?

SPEAKER: Sorry about the theoretical discussions. This is what you get with a bunch of professors on the panel. Anyway, the most common method of financing housing is to use the capital funds which are readily available to the government through its financial institutions. Some countries, such as Japan and Korea, have National Housing Banks, with capital stocks provided by the central government or borrowed from international lending agencies such as the World Bank. Other countries, like the Philippines, use some of the funds of the Government Service Insurance System and the Social Security System for housing loans. Resorting to the open market for capital funds is rarely done, mainly because of the economists' argument that investing such “expensive funds” in housing is not very developmental. You see, there is no escaping that line of thinking because it is still a major influence on financial policy.

In some countries, funds for housing are taken directly from the proceeds of specific taxes. In many Latin American countries it is said that the housing industry is paid for by drunkards because a percentage of tax on alcoholic beverages is usually allotted for housing. In other countries, a percentage of the net income of local governments is earmarked for capitalization of the housing bank. In these countries, the central government sets up a credit institution for local authorities with shared funds, and the local units then pursue housing programmes with borrowings from this
institution. Of course, the capital funds are not used for housing alone. Long term capital investments are also financed through loans from such institutions.

FLOOR: How about savings and loans associations? Housing cooperatives? Do you think these will work in the developing countries?

SPEAKER: I am sorry to say that although these schemes have worked well in the technologically advanced countries, they do not seem to have been too successful in developing countries. Perhaps, a certain cultural atmosphere is needed to make them work. The habit of saving must be inculcated into the minds of people first. Also, there seems to be a need for trust in financial institutions and in cooperative efforts. Strangely enough, in almost all developing countries, there are traditions of cooperation such as the Philippine bayanihan, the Indonesian gotong rojong, the Turkish imece, etc. Yet, when these traditions are used for financial cooperatives, they do not thrive as easily. Perhaps, when money comes into consideration, when people are talking hard cash, it is hard to be positively emotional and warm and cooperative. I don’t know. All I know is that for small activities, cooperative traditional institutions work fine. But when they are used for large housing schemes, they somehow break down.

Land Policies

FLOOR: Speaking of traditional values, what do you think of the belief that people in developing countries love land so much that they are willing to pay high prices? In most developing countries, speculation has driven the price of urban land so high that it adds to costs. Would you advocate a policy of taxing idle lands?

SPEAKER: Yes, I would, but not mainly for financial reasons. The real reason for taxing unused land is to penalize speculation and to reward land use. In too many countries, tax rates are based on improvements on the land. This may have an inhibiting effect on the developer. But I would go further than just taxing land—I think that a more comprehensive policy is needed. Certainly, urban land reform is as important, if not more important, than rural land reform.

In many developing countries, huge tracts of land in the urban area are often owned by single individuals, institutions or business people. Considering the high value of such land, there should be a conscious government policy to break up such monopolies. In fact, urban development has been rational where the government has owned more land in urban areas. Stockholm is an excellent example of this. I doubt if the city would have
been able to cope with its problems as rationally as it has, if the city fathers had lacked the foresight to buy up as much land as possible when this land was still cheap.

FLOOR: Isn't this problem only true in the case of market economies, though? This doesn't seem to be a problem at all in socialist countries where the government owns all the land to begin with. Yet, a previous speaker has said that the problems in these countries are just as serious.

SPEAKER: From the planners' viewpoint, I would say that, yes, the socialist countries do have less of a problem when it comes to the rational use of land. However, this is not to say they do not have urban problems. Essentially, whether the land is owned by the government or by private individuals, there must be some way of putting some value on it—and admittedly, it is often a very inaccurate device. In planned economies, there are other devices being developed and used such as scarcity factors, type of land use, etc. But there must be a way of measuring the value of the land in the total context or it will be impossible to allocate land use rationally.

FLOOR: In some developing countries, the question has been raised that land in urban areas is so valuable that it is almost criminal to have certain sectors controlling it. Land is a public resource. It should belong to the people. There is no justice when a rich man uses more land than he needs while others live in conditions of misery. What do you think of these arguments?

SPEAKER: I agree that in many developing countries, the concept of private ownership of land should be reconsidered. But I would not go to the extent of nationalizing land or confiscating it from private owners. I believe that the government should try to buy the lands in whatever manner possible. Through expropriation, perhaps, using fair market value, assessed value, or some such formula which is fair and just. Then, the government should rationally plan the use of land to achieve its development goals.

Slum Clearance

FLOOR: I have been listening to all the discussions since the start of this Open Forum and frankly, I am disturbed. Everybody speaks of fairness and justice and how we should help the squatter and slum dweller. Has anybody thought of fairness and justice to the landowner? There is this person, he has worked very hard, and he has done quite well. He buys himself some land, hoping to save enough later to build his own home. What happens? When he is ready to do so, he finds that somebody else has squatted on it. He goes to the police, they cannot do anything.
They will not do anything. The politician supports the squatters—he has their votes. So, what is this person to do?

I believe in justice, and justice says that if some people are occupying somebody else's land illegally, the government must protect the owner's rights. The late Mayor Lacson of Manila and the present Mayor have done the right thing. They have evicted the squatters from city lands with court orders behind them. I think there should be more of this. Perhaps, when squatters know that the government can deal with them in a tough and firm manner, they will be less aggressive in grabbing what is not rightfully theirs.

SPEAKER: I sympathize with the previous speaker. He has hit upon a very sensitive aspect of the question we are all discussing now. I must say, at the outset, that I agree with his idea that justice must be upheld. But the process used to do this must be a well thought-out one, so that it does not result in more injustice. For example, when the Mayors of Manila evicted squatters from the central city, what happened? We all know that it did not solve the problem. It just transferred it somewhere else. The squatters were relocated to Sapang Palay, Carmona and other relocation sites that are far from the central city. So, they just drifted back to the city. Instead of solving the problem, the slum clearance scheme only spread it. Now, we don't have slums and squatters in Manila alone—they are in Quezon City, Caloocan City, Makati, and all over the metropolitan area.

In Taiwan, the government has a slogan: “Build First, Demolish Later.” If we had something like this, if we had planned the relocation process properly, provided land or housing where the evicted squatters could have been placed first, then, perhaps, we would not have had the confusion in Metropolitan Manila. This is the problem. We tend to think of the problem in bits and pieces. There are squatters in one area, evict them. That solves one problem. But it leads to other problems, and we don't have solutions that anticipate those.

I am not against slum clearance as a matter of principle. There are many areas in the central city which are too valuable to be devoted to housing, any type of housing. It is more rational to devote them to commercial or other uses where they will be more productive. However, before this is done, before the squatters on these lands are removed, there must be provisions for housing which they will like, or at least find tolerable, so that the solution used will have lasting results. If we only disperse the squatters so that we can use the land, then this does not solve the problem.
As for the question of justice, I doubt if we will ever really have justice in a society where a large segment of the population is living at sub-human conditions. It is no solution to appeal to laissez faire and say that I worked hard for my land, I have a right to use and enjoy it. If you work hard enough, then you can get your land too, and I will not interfere with you if you don't meddle with my business. It is too late for that. In a very real sense, every man is his brother's keeper now. Desperate people will resort to desperate means, and some squatters are desperate. So, the total resources of the society must be used to solve its total problems. There seems to be no other way.
Notes

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION


4. Together with other construction connected with development, the share of the resources absorbed by the building industry rises to between two-thirds and three-quarters of all investment in fixed capital formation. A small percentage reduction in construction costs is, therefore, a potential source of large total economies in carrying out development generally, and urban development programmes more particularly.

5. The United Nations established the Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in recognition of this "constraint" to the development of a viable world economy. One of UNCTAD's aims is to secure a fair share of benefits derived from the exploitation of the developing nations' resources for their own progress. Recent long-term commodity arrangements reflect similar trends.

6. While international concern is frequently voiced over the "brain drain" of professional skills from the developing to the affluent countries, less attention seems to be given to this manifestation of adverse terms of trade favouring the highly developed areas of the world.

7. About 3 per cent of the population of Holland depends on agriculture which is highly efficient and productive. By the end of the century this figure may drop to be as low as 1 per cent. In the United States of America, the current figure is about 8 per cent and it is also decreasing.
Chapter 2. BANDUNG

1. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of local governments in Indonesia, see Pauline Dublin Milone, Urban Areas in Indonesia: Administrative and Census Concepts. (Berkeley: University of California, 1966).

2. This table, as well as the others in this chapter, are from the Five Year Development Plan, City of Bandung, 1969-1973. In view of the difficulties involved in data collection, figures should be interpreted carefully when dealing with Indonesian urbanization.


Chapter 3. CARACAS


2. For some of the social implications of the industrialization scheme as far as squatting and slum dwelling is concerned, see Lisa Redfield Peattie, The View from the Barrio. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1968). For more information on the planning of the Guayana region, see Lloyd Rodwin, Nations and Cities, a Comparison of Strategies for Urban Growth, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), ch. III.


4. Ibid., p. 6.

5. Ibid., pp. 14-17.

6. Ibid., chapters 1, 2 and 3.

7. Ibid., chapter 2.
Chapter 4. IBADAN


4. Egba is one of the ethnic sub-groups of the Yoruba people who now number about ten million. The other sub-groups are the Oyo, Ijebu, Ekiti, Ondo, Owo, Akoko, Owu, Ijesha and Ikale.

5. Quote is attributed to Akinyele, the local historian of Ibadan. See Mabogunje, op. cit., p. 187.

6. Ibid., p. 190.

7. Ibid., p. 186.


15. Ibid., p. 235.


17. Ibid., p. 42.

Chapter 5. ISTANBUL
1. This region contains, as to its administrative limits, 4 cities (provinces), namely, Bursa, Kavaeli, Sakarya, Istanbul.
2. The total population of units over 10,000 inhabitants.
3. Difference between incoming and outgoing migrants.
4. Immigrants of Yugoslavian origin.
5. Building, extraction, gas-electric water supplies, etc., and indefinite activities and services which cannot be properly defined are left outside this classification.
6. Manufacturing industries employing 10 or more than 10 workers.

Chapter 6. KUALA LUMPUR
1. Population Census Report, 1957. In this context, "Malays" include all persons of Malay, Indonesian or Aborigine races while "Others" include Pakistanis and Ceylonese.
4. In 1950, there were estimated to be around 500,000 to 600,000 Chinese squatters living on the fringes of the jungle. They constituted about one fifth of the entire Chinese population in the country.
5. This set-up continues up to the time of writing.
7. Data for this section are from surveys of the Federal Capital of Kuala Lumpur alone, unless otherwise specified.
10. Ibid., p. 165.
Chapter 7. LIMA


6. Survey done by John Turner and Marcia Koth de Paredes of three barriadas (Cuevas, El Agustino and San Martin de Porres). I am grateful to Professor Turner and to Sra. Paredes for making the results of these survey available for this paper. Hereafter, this survey will be referred to as the Turner-Paredes Survey, 1965.

7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.


11. *Ley Organica de Barrios Marginales, Articulo 4*.


19. "Underemployment" is used here to describe a worker who does not complete a minimum of 35 work hours per week or who receives less than the minimum salary, calculated to be around US $50 per month.


23. Jose Matos Mar, Estudio de las Barriadas Limenas. (Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Departamento de Antropologia, Facultad de Letras y Ciencias Humanas, 1967). This work was first submitted to the United Nations in 1955 but Matos Mar includes an Appendix in 1967 which updates the survey results up to 1966.

24. Ibid., pp. 89-93.

25. William Mangin, “Urbanisation Case History in Peru,” Architectural Design, Vol. 33, No. 8, August 1963, pp. 366-370. As a general pattern, according to Mangin, “the majority of residents of a settlement have been born in the provinces and have migrated from farms or small towns. They have also come largely from tenements, alleys, and other slums within city limits, where they settled upon arrival. According to a census of a typical Lima barriada in 1959, the average time of residence in Lima for heads of families originally from the provinces was nine years, and practically none of them had been in Lima less than three years.” See also, “Latin American Squatter Settlements: A Problem and a Solution,” Latin American Research Review, Vol. II, No. 3, Summer 1967, p. 68.


32. Census figures, as quoted in Frawley, op. cit. —

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.


37. Solnit, op. cit., p. 25.

38. Ibid., p. 25.


41. Ley Organica de Barrios Marginales, Articulo 1.

Chapter 8. MANILA


4. Ibid, p. 25, The 1939-48 study referred to is Nava, op. cit.


8. Holnsteiner, op. cit., p. 158.


10. Ibid., p. 72.

11. Ibid.

12. “Squatting and Slum Dwelling in Metropolitan Manila,” Impact, October 1968. This comprehensive report was submitted by a Special Committee of the National Housing Council to the Office of the President in 1968.


16. Ibid.

17. For full information on this research project, see A. A. Laquian, Slums are for People. (Manila: Local Government Center, CPA-UP, 1969).

Chapter 9. SEOUL


2. Ibid. Figures are from Urban Problems, published by the Korean Federation of Urban Administration, June 1967.


7. Ibid., p. 139.


12. The Institute of Urban Studies and Development, Yonsei University, is currently conducting a complete survey in the areas mentioned here.


14. Chung-Hyun Ro, "Housing Problems in Urban Korea," Koreana Quarterly, 1970. A similar paper was also read at the Conference on the City as a Centre of Change in Asia, Centre of Asian Studies, Hong Kong, June 23-28, 1969.


17. Ibid.


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This selected bibliography was prepared by the INTERMET Research Staff for the study on "Rural-Urban Migrants and Metropolitan Development". It was a working bibliography primarily designed for the use of INTERMET Study Group members in the metropolitan areas participating in the study. As such, it has been changed several times as additional books, articles and documents have become available.

This bibliography is divided into three major parts—a General section, a section on Migration and Migrants, another section on Slums and Squatters, and a section on Special Development Programmes. Each major section except the last, is in turn divided into entries for Books, Articles and Papers and Documents and Pamphlets.

I — General

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3. DOCUMENTS AND PAMPHLETS


II. MIGRATION AND MIGRANTS

1. BOOKS


2. ARTICLES AND PAPERS


3. DOCUMENTS AND PAMPHLETS


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III — SLUMS AND SQUATTERS

1. BOOKS


2. ARTICLES AND PAPERS


3. DOCUMENTS AND PAMPHLETS

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3. HOUSING

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4. PLANNING AND FINANCE


The International Association for Metropolitan Research and Development (INTERMET) is a network of Study Groups all over the world bound by a common interest in the development of the Metropolis, a belief in the effectiveness of multi-interest groups in coping with urban problems and in cross-cultural exchanges of ideas and information in the field of urban affairs. There are about 40 Study Groups which are members of the association. They are served by a Secretariat located in Toronto, Canada.

The Study Groups that make up the association are composed of individuals who are interested in the Metropolis — its problems and potentials for development. Study Group members are government officials, professionals, academics, businessmen, civic leaders and other concerned citizens. They are interested in research on metropolitan affairs, the translation of information to policy, and the pursuit of action programmes that improve conditions in the Metropolis. The multi-interest nature of the Study Groups is uniquely suited for combining these efforts into a concerted programme of activities.

INTERMET conducts research projects on problems common to metropolitan areas, acts as an information network for the exchange of ideas, approaches, methods and techniques for solving metropolitan problems, performs advisory and consultation services for member Study Groups, and disseminates information about the state of metropolitan affairs. These functions are oriented to the major metropolitan areas of the world. The Association serves as a link among these metropolitan areas, which share common problems as well as similar developmental prospects.

Origin

To commemorate Canada’s Centennial in 1967, the Bureau of Municipal Research of Toronto decided to hold an international programme that would bring together the largest metropolitan areas in the world in a discussion of common problems and solu-
tions. The "Centennial Study and Training Programme on Metropolitan Problems" brought to Toronto some 40 Groups from as many metropolitan areas. After the international conference which climaxed the programme, there was unanimous agreement that a continuing organization is needed so that the work started in the programme may be pursued further. This organization, formally established in 1969, is the International Association for Metropolitan Research and Development.

**Structure**

The basic unit of INTERMET is the Study Group which is composed of persons representing various disciplines and who are all concerned about the problems and future of the Metropolis. The groups are formed on a metropolitan basis. Metropolitan areas that they represent are generally those that have a population of a million or more.

A central Secretariat located in Toronto serves the Study Groups that make up the association. For the initial period of developing the international organization, the Secretariat was located within the Toronto Bureau of Municipal Research. However, since the granting of a charter to INTERMET in 1970, the Secretariat is now independent of the Bureau.

The highest deliberative body of INTERMET is the General Council, which is composed of the chairmen of the Study Groups from all over the world. The Council lays down the basic policies of INTERMET, makes sure that such policies are properly implemented, and reviews the programmes of the organization from time to time.

Directly responsible to the General Council and acting for and on its behalf is the Executive Committee composed of about 14 persons drawn from member Study Groups, representatives of major financial sponsors and authorities on metropolitan affairs. The Executive Committee is responsible for the continuous operation of the association and has direct supervision and control over the central Secretariat. Representation in the Executive Committee is both world-wide and inter-disciplinary.

Associate Membership in INTERMET is granted to international organizations, universities, research institutions and other entities interested in metropolitan affairs. Acceptability of such organizations as associate members rests with the Executive Committee.

**Functions**

To achieve its general objective of finding ways and means of coping with metropolitan problems, INTERMET conducts joint
research projects, acts as a network for information exchange and makes available consultation and advice to member Study Groups on metropolitan affairs. In the performance of these functions, the organization is supported by the central Secretariat which is composed of professional and technical persons from various cultural and academic backgrounds.

Research-Action Projects

In its research projects, INTERMET believes in a methodology that combines research and action. Such projects are almost always focused on key policy issues. The data gathered from them are immediately translated into policy proposals and action programmes, for the adoption and implementation of public bodies that can help improve metropolitan conditions. The fact that the INTERMET Study Groups are composed of persons from academic and governmental sectors makes them uniquely suited for this function. The research findings are immediately made available to public officials who are in the Study Groups, for possible action. In this manner, the Study Group acts as an informal coordination point for governmental actions affecting the Metropolis.

Some of the research-action projects currently being, or about to be undertaken by INTERMET are:

Project A. Rural-Urban Migrants and Metropolitan Development. A comparative study of eight metropolitan areas that have migrants who live in slums and squatter settlements. Some of the issues being studied in this project are: reasons behind rural-urban migration, the nature of the slum or squatter community, functions served by the slum or squatrer community, problems posed by rapid migration, etc. Metropolitan areas participating in this project are: Bandung, Indonesia; Caracas, Venezuela; Ibadan, Nigeria; Istanbul, Turkey; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; Lima, Peru; Manila, Philippines; and Seoul, Korea.

Project B. The Quality of Life in the Urban Environment. A comparative study to find out how the quality of life may be improved in metropolitan areas by looking at a broad framework which includes man and his relations with his environment, technology, institutions, society, etc. Some of the issues to be studied are: pollution of water, air, soil and other segments of the urban environment; inequalities in the level of urban living; crime, vice, drug addiction and juvenile delinquency; planning and urban design; education, training and reshaping of human values; and man and his institutional environment. Metropolitan areas invited to participate in this project are: Belgrade, Yugoslavia; Buenos Aires, Argentina; Leningrad, USSR; Madrid, Spain; Philadelphia, USA; Prague, Czechoslovakia; and Toronto, Canada.
Project C. Improving Decision-Making in the Metropolitan Region. A comparative study that attempts to improve decision-making capabilities in urban regions by looking into the relative effectiveness of certain management approaches. The study seeks to develop a suitable approach for top executives and decision-makers that will enable them to assess the options available to them as well as the costs and benefits entailed in each choice. Some of the management approaches to be studied are: information technology, social accounting, systems analysis approaches and operations research techniques. Metropolitan areas participating in this project are: Athens, Greece; Budapest, Hungary; Detroit, USA; Glasgow, UK; Naples, Italy; Nagoya, Japan; and Vancouver, Canada.

Project D. Problems of Megalopolis. A comparative study of the prospects and problems of administering very large urban areas, especially in regard to providing amenities and services coping with area-wide problems such as pollution and transportation, and making effective decisions under conditions of political and administrative fragmentation. Some of the issues to be studied include: the effects of scale on programmes for providing amenities and services; implications of large and complex institutions on citizen participation, community identity and access to decision-making centres; and the place of the metropolis in comprehensive regional and national development plans. Metropolitan areas invited to participate in this study are London, UK; Moscow, USSR; New York, USA; Paris, France; and Tokyo, Japan.

Project E. The Implementation of Plans and Policies in Metropolitan Regions. A comparative study of the factors that affect the process of implementing plans and policies designed to improve conditions in Metropolitan regions. Some of the issues to be studied in this project include: the role of social and political factors in plan and policy implementation; administrative tools and techniques that facilitate implementation; the value of participation in plan formulation and implementation; and inter-governmental relations in plan and policy implementation. Metropolitan areas invited to participate in this project are: Boston, USA; Karachi, Pakistan; Milan, Italy; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and Singapore.

Information Services

To serve the Study Groups and to maintain communication with other entities involved in metropolitan affairs, INTERMET provides two broad types of information services. The first type extends secondary information services to groups and other INTERMET associates and the second type involves INTERMET publications.
Both types of services are designed to inform the association and its clientele on what, where and how information on metropolitan development is made available around the world.

Secondary Information System. Four basic areas of services are included in INTERMET's secondary information system. First, in INTERMET's specialized Library in the Toronto Secretariat, collections are being set up on the specific projects and research programmes that INTERMET is engaged in. Such holdings are available to INTERMET Study Groups and other interested parties. Second, INTERMET maintains a working file on institutions that provide information on metropolitan affairs. A questionnaire is regularly sent by INTERMET to such institutions to keep an up to date listing which is periodically evaluated and revised to enter the latest information on such information centres. INTERMET also keeps a working file on individuals who are engaged in research, consultation and other types of activities related to metropolitan affairs. The interest, competence and availability of such individuals for various tasks is evaluated and such information is made available to Study Groups. Finally, INTERMET keeps abreast of special events such as conferences, training programmes, lecture series, and other activities related to metropolitan affairs to make sure that the association's members are well informed on the type, quality, timing and other aspects of such special events.

Publications. As a regular channel for getting in touch with INTERMET members and associates, the organization publishes the Communique, a quarterly newsletter. This organ provides information on what is happening in the different metropolitan areas linked with INTERMET, Secretariat doings, and special events of importance to people interested in metropolitan affairs.

INTERMET also publishes the INTERMET Metropolitan Studies Series, a series on serious works on metropolitan affairs.
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