Canadian Foreign Aid Objectives
Perceptions of Policy Makers

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Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, University of Toronto
June 3 - 6, 1974
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This paper will analyze the importance accorded to humanitarian, economic and political motivations by those actively involved in Canadian aid policy formulation and administration. It will test empirically certain widely held assumptions, for example, that foreign aid is basically a humanitarian inspired process whose intended and resulting effects are perceived as primarily of benefit to the recipient. The paper will in fact present evidence which suggests that aid perceptions form an integral part of Canadian foreign policy and are conceived with the benefits to the donor as foremost in mind, often to the detriment of the recipient. At the same time the paper will establish additional hypothesis concerning the objectives of Canadian foreign aid and nature of the perceptual framework within which they are conceived.

Data for this paper consists for the most part of the results of a series of 13 personal interviews of senior government policy-makers actively involved in both the formulation and administration of foreign aid programs. The interviews were conducted in February 1969. The officials represented the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Departments of Finance, Industry Trade and Commerce, External Affairs, and also included

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the Minister of External Affairs and the Chairman of the Parliamentary External Affairs Committee. By including the latter two officials, it was hoped to incorporate into the data some reflection of the interplay in the policy process existing between the "technocrat" and the "politician". Members of these various departments (including two from the Bank of Canada) comprise the International Development Board (IDB), the small, senior governmental committee which theoretically coordinates and formulates policies from among the various ministries concerned with foreign aid. Professor Keith Spicer in discussing the activities of this Board, noted that, "... in practice this includes receiving all major submissions to cabinet, on bilateral aid, country allocations, propositions of each aid type, and capital projects." 1

The primary data has been developed and analyzed against a fairly complete examination of existing secondary source material. These have consisted for the most part of statements taken from speeches, scholarly journalism, administrative policy guidelines and reports, and various kinds of agency memoranda. The general tenor of these sources varies from the moderately critical journalism of some of the operational aspects of Canada's aid programs 2, published by academics and those interested

1. Keith Spicer, A Samaritan State: External Aid in Canada's Foreign Policy, (University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1966) pp. 108-109. Professor Spicer's work constitutes one of the few attempts to deal extensively with Canadian foreign aid. Though analytical it remains nonetheless descriptive in nature.

in the aid process and international development, to the justifications for Canadian aid objectives which are published by the Canadian government in particular.

The interview technique was employed as this paper's primary source of data as it was felt that through it one can best identify the basic conceptual premises within which Canadian aid policy-makers operate. Such an approach enables one to determine if in fact Canadian aid policy and programmes are conceived within a conceptual framework based upon the kind of recipient beneficial concerns which Canada's official aid policy espouses. I would contend that policy and programs are to a great extent reflective of policy-maker's perceptions, although until more is known about the decision-making process in Ottawa this remains largely hypothetical.

An important example of government expression in the area of foreign aid policy was the 1970 publication of the series of booklets called Foreign Policy for Canadians. The booklet entitled International Development set forth, what nominally at least, constituted the objectives of Canadian development assistance and the justifications for such policy. "The government regards the economic and social development of the developing

3. This would include the Annual -DAC Review on Development Assistance, publicly accepted among the donors as the organization whose recommendations are to serve as the standards to which donors should aspire. The DAC is composed only of aid donors.

countries as the primary objective of the Canadian development assistance programme". Such development was to be brought about through efforts to "... support and foster the growth and evolution of the social, educational, industrial, commercial and administrative systems of the developing countries in such a way that their people can improve their own organization and capacity to produce, distribute and consume goods and services, and thereby improve the quality of life in their countries". Canadian assistance therefore is expressed officially as having its principle objectives embodied in a beneficial impact on the host countries to which it is given. Expressed as secondary or incidental in nature are the incumbent benefits of Canadian aid to Canadian trade, the national economy, Canada's international relations with the Third World, as well as aid's capacity to reflect "... the bilingual character of Canada ... which helps contribute to our sense of internal unity and purpose." Presented in a foreign policy context, this particular publication perhaps best expresses Canada's official foreign aid policy, as well as its justification.

Contrary to the policy outlined by the Canadian government publication International Development: Foreign Policy for Canadians, this paper argues that Canadian aid is perceived and undertaken in a conceptual framework which is basically self-serving. Such a framework views the principle objectives of Canadian aid as the creation of a stable, peaceful, and relatively homogenous world in which the potential for Canadian economic, commercial and political benefits is enhanced by Canadian foreign aid. Social and economic "development", or recipient-

5. Ibid. p. 12
6. Ibid. p. 10
beneficial concerns, are not considered significant to the same degree. Humanitarian concern as a policy determinant is perceived as of marginal consequence. Whether these kinds of self-serving perceptions are reflected in operational terms and programme criteria, remains a subject of contention and further study. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, would rank Canada highly as a beneficent donor whose relatively easy terms reflect a sincere concern for the plight of developing countries.7 Host nations such as India, Tanzania or Algeria however, might simply view Canada's approach as the least exploitive in what is basically a donor-beneficial game. 8 Whether Canada's aid programs have the desired results in achieving the objectives expressed by those officials interviewed, again is a subject of much controversy and would require extensive empirical study on the effects of aid as a tool of Canadian foreign and economic policy.

Canadian Perceptions

Canadian officials emphasized two basic objectives to their foreign aid program. First and foremost, the long range goals of a stable and relatively homogenous world, and secondly, Canadian commercial interests. Canadian aid was not viewed in an ideological or evangelical framework and the interviewers denied that Canadian foreign aid is used as a strategic "tool" in particular countries of the Third World. Strategic concerns were elicited in the form of concern with the attainment of a global long-run stability, and the short-run strategic objectives of alleviating


the potential for further Quebec discontent by increasing Canadian aid ties to Francophone Africa.

Aid as a Reflection of Humanitarianism

To begin with, the evidence presented shows that humanitarianism, as an operating premise in the formulation of Canadian aid policy is of minor significance. This is contrary to the justifications often evoked by both statesmen and even scholars (statesmen more often publicly than otherwise) who view the humanitarian prerogatives as foremost in the transfer of resources from Canada to the 'less-developed nations'. The rhetoric of humanitarian obligation for the alleviation of suffering and starvation is very often seen as the cradle in which aid programs should be developed. It is a motivation which if exercised in fact would more likely result in programs of a recipient-beneficial impact. Indeed, this is the motivating premise which the Canadian electorate most frequently seems to ascribe to Canadian external aid.

9. See for example Mitchell Sharp, speech to the Chartered Accountants Group, Toronto, 1966, in International Development (The Information Department of the External Aid Office, Ottawa, May 1968), page 7, Paul Martin Speaks for Canada (McClelland-Stewart Ltd., Toronto, Montreal, 1967) p. 132, Paul Gérin Lajoie, Focus on Man (Canadian International Development Agency, Ottawa, 1974). Possibly the outstanding academic proponent of this point of view is Barbara Ward, The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations (W.W. Norton and Co., New York, 1962) who has described her thesis as moral in that the poor nations are in part a product of our own making and that this assumes an acceptance of moral responsibilities in relation to their economic and social development.

10. The concept humanitarianism is significant only insofar as policy-makers express an awareness of it. To the extent they do however, it denotes the expression of a moral duty to give, deriving from the sentiment of fellow-feeling with others in their suffering. For a more profound discussion of this concept's relevance, see Joseph Cropsey, "The Right of Foreign Aid", ed. Robert Goldwin, Why Foreign Aid?, (Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, 1962).
To the question, "To what extent do you think that humanitarian considerations are an important factor in the objectives of aid?," only four officials expressed the view that Canadian foreign aid is motivated primarily by humanitarian considerations. The other nine, perceived it as relevant only to the extent that it provides the foreign aid program, with necessary public support and legitimacy. Typical were the following responses:

"When there is a famine, then it becomes important, almost as a direct proportion to the number of people starving. So with this emerging aid, the do-goodness etc. humanitarianism is a factor of consequence."

"... to the general public humanitarian motives are important but at the government level it's a little more cold-blooded."

This government view of humanitarianism as tantamount to the naive justification of an 'uneducated' public is further substantiated by the fact that eight of the officials concurred in the view that the general public did not understand the purposes of the foreign aid program. Only one official responded to the contrary. This tends to confirm the view that humanitarianism, as a motivating factor in the formulation of Canada's aid program, is relatively insignificant.

**Aid as a Commercial Benefit:**

One particular view of what motivates Canadian aid contends that it is primarily the prospect of enhancing Canada's economic and commercial position through the 'development' of resource-rich though capital-poor states. This is a view which is primarily rooted in a recipient-beneficial perception of the aid relationship. Another view however, would argue that
this could not be the case as these purported benefits to the Canadian economic and commercial position just do not exist. And yet despite this controversy (albeit largely academic) the interviewed officials were virtually unanimous in their perceptions of possible commercial and economic advantages. For example, in responding to the question, "Do you see aid as a direct stimulus to Canadian exports?", twelve of the respondents answered positively, though none viewed it as the leading justification for aid. Several of the CIDA and External Affairs officials did nonetheless identify these motives as the most important among Trade and Commerce (IT&C) people. As one of the IT&C officials observed:

"We try to see that aid is used for introducing products likely to have a continuing demand. Products with labels versus staples, which would continue after they reach the takeoff point. After all, we will provide a product only that we are competitive in."

This perception acquires even greater significance in light of Canadian 'tied aid' conditions. Canada makes available only up to twenty (20) per cent of total bilateral allocations on a completely untied basis for projects and programs, with a further sixty-five (65) per cent available on a restricted untied basis for procurement in Canada or the less developed countries (LDC's) designated by the United Nations.

Canadian officials were then asked if foreign aid affected world trade. Eleven of those interviewed agreed that it does. As one of them concluded: "To the extent you are successful in development, then you are creating world markets". Furthermore, the two officials who denied aid's contribution to world trade referred specifically to the marginal benefits of the Canadian aid program - citing it as too small - rather than the impotence of foreign assistance generally. It is evident therefore that the potential commercial benefits to Canada constitute an important part of the perceptual framework in which aid programs are conceived and administered.

Aid as an Economic Benefit:

Similarly, Canadian officials acknowledged a concern for aid's potential benefits to the Canadian economy with nine of the respondents identifying aid as an increasingly significant economic stimulus. Although not invoked as the most important consideration, precise benefits were nonetheless identified. "If for alleviating unemployment, yes ... its effects are the same as any other pump-priming tool ... it becomes an aspect of the inflationary process. Besides, between 80-90% is initially spent in Canada ... So this both stimulates the economy and ends up paying its full price with the achievement of full employment". Four of the respondents stated that no economic benefits were forthcoming from foreign aid. Thus, despite the real advantages which Canada does or does not procure from foreign aid, officials are cognizant of both the commercial and economic benefits which Canada can procure from aid.

Aid as a Strategic Tool:

In broadening the dimensions of the perceptual framework within which Canadian aid officials operate, the interview data provides further
evidence which suggests that aid is perceived primarily in donor-beneficial terms. One would logically expect that aid perceptions would place the greatest concern on the "development" of the recipient as an end in itself rather than as a means to the promotion of the donor's own national interests. This, after all is what foreign aid-development assistance is supposed to be all about.

Yet in response to the following question, "What do you feel are the primary objectives of Canadian external aid?" three basic themes emerged. (See Table I). Unlike the questions dealing with the economic and commercial dimension which actually suggested benefits, this particular question was posed prior to the others and was completely open-ended. Because several of the respondents designated more than one objective in each response, the significance accorded to each theme is determined according to the number of times each was cited. For this reason the total in Table I indicates 15 responses.

Two of the identifiable themes, together comprising a total of ten responses were what could be classified as "strategic", that is denoting a perception of aid in donor-beneficial terms, or as a means to achieving a precise end (precise in the mind of the policy-maker) other than "development" (as perceived and desired by the recipient.)

12. For a blatant example of where such a realignment of priorities has occurred see Krassowski's discussion of American aid to Tunisia, Andrzej Krassowski, The Aid Relationship (The Overseas Development Institute Ltd., London, 1968) p. 23
TABLE I
WHAT DO YOU FEEL ARE THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF CANADIAN EXTERNAL AID?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long-term Strategic</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term Strategic</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term Development</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The theme which emerged most frequently was that of Canadian aid as a **long-term strategic tool**. This was expressed on seven occasions in terms of achieving 'peace', 'stability', and a resolution of conflict'. As one official remarked:

"Basically the long-run political purpose is one of creating peace and stability in the world, again largely political and economic. There is some egalitarianism involved no doubt, in the sense that the gap between the poor and the rich is terribly wrong".

This long-term objective was further substantiated by responses to the question "Do you think that the objectives of aid are concerned with the preservation of world peace?". Nine of the officials concurred with the view that aid constitutes a deterrent to violence, while at the same time contributing to peace in the long run. In contrast the four remaining officials viewed aid as the very cause of violence in the short-run.

The perception of aid as a **short-term strategic tool**, was expressed on three occasions. **Short-term strategic** denotes a means to achieving
a short-run end conceived in terms of the donor-benefits. The short-term connotes a response to what is generally viewed as an unforeseen contingency, very likely an ad hoc policy concerned primarily with the alleviation of imminent or current problems.\textsuperscript{13} The long-term might be loosely defined as denoting goals already established, towards which an express policy is directed (likely to be in excess of ten years). In the course of their responses, officials did not convey any deep ideological prerogative, and in fact they appeared to be motivated by a very general concern for Canada's numerous internal problems. I employ the term 'general' with regard to this particular question, for it was obvious that at no time were these officials precise as to 'how' aid might in fact be employed as a short-term tool. The most explicit of the three respondents observed:

"We select areas of interest for domestic reasons. We keep the Caribbean because we don't wish to see American dominance in that area..." \textsuperscript{14}.

Apparently then, the operational 'hows' of the strategic perceptions, both short and long-term, remain obscure. The tendency was to express them

\textsuperscript{13} Joan Nelson refers to them as 'bail-out' actions, as one-time measures intended to achieve specific goals in the immediate future. J. Nelson, \textit{Aid Influence and Foreign Policy}, (MacMillan Co., New York, 1964)

\textsuperscript{14} In this regard, Clyde Sanger speculates that on the contrary, Canada emphasizes aid to the Caribbean because of the very fact that the United States would prefer to see Canada involved (for better or for worse) rather than herself. Whether by tacit or formal acquiescence, I would contend that this remains a safe assumption especially in light of the fact that the Canadian economy is composed largely of U.S.-owned subsidiaries and branch plants.
in general terms only, in the broader context of policy rather than program (an indication of 'how' Canadian policy employs aid as a short-run tool will be examined shortly).

The third theme with which Canadian policy-makers identified, was that of aid for the long-term development of the recipient society; an objective classified as non-strategic in that "development" was viewed as an end in itself, rather than in donor-beneficial terms. This theme was designated on five occasions. In combining this theme with the long-term strategic responses (total twelve times) it becomes apparent that despite the lack of operational precision in the long-term strategic responses, Canadian officials do not generally exhibit conscious perceptions of aid as a tool of short-term policy. Needless to say, they do tend to regard 'strategic' or donor-beneficial objectives as very important in aid deliberations.15

Yet what are the major components of these strategic motivations? Do they constitute more than the very general and universal goals denoted by "international stability" and "development"? Surely such catch-terms ultimately comprise the desires of all 'progressive' policy-makers? Wouldn't it perhaps be more appropriate to inquire as to what extent these general objectives are compatible with 'development' through for example, the application of state-controlled and highly centralized societies congruent with Marxist or Socialist models of change? Moreover, wouldn't the

15. Although the donor-benefit objectives of 'peace' and 'stability' etc. emerge as of greatest perceptual significance this does not exclude the possibility that these conditions might also include within their make-up elements conducive to the acquisition of Canadian commercial and economic benefits.
attainment of "international stability" and "development" tend to be impeded by perceptions dominated by 'East-West conflict' or ideological exigencies. Or is it in fact due to 'East-West conflict' that such general objectives are most important. One should recall that the circumstances which first impelled Canada into joining the Colombo Plan were perceived in a highly ideological and threat-conscious environment. 16

Aid as Foreign Policy

Having earlier concluded that Canadian foreign aid is conceived and formulated within a perceptual framework largely donor-beneficial in nature (that is 'strategically' determined as opposed to humanitarianism), one can then conclude that aid is a tool of Canadian foreign policy. When asked: "Should aid be a function of Canadian foreign policy?", eleven officials answered yes. As one put it: "It can't help but be; the two are synonymous". Only one official answered to the contrary. Assuming then that aid is perceived in a foreign-policy context, and that we can determine more precisely what those foreign policy perceptions are, how do aid perceptions specifically relate to the broader foreign policy dimension?

It is this paper's contention that if one begins with Canadian foreign policy as a basis for analysis, Canadian foreign aid logically provides a composite likeness of the basic principles of that foreign policy, though obviously in a third world context. In other words Canadian aid policy, which is not perceived as a means to explicitly exercising a particular type

16. This was the era of the Truman doctrine, George Kennan's 'containment' policies, the 'witch hunts' of Senator McCarthy and the phobias of John Foster Dulles; an era in which the Western world in general was 'aroused' to the dangers of a communist colossus, and an era in which Canadian forces helped counter the threat in Korea.
of change on the recipient (political - social as well as economic), is
reflective of a relatively detached foreign policy itself relatively uncon-
cerned with explicitly bringing about a desired political or social change in
developing countries. Canadian aid policy, as Canadian foreign policy, is
not for example explicitly attempting to elevate Canada to the level of
'world leader' or spreading the Canadian concepts of 'freedom' and 'democracy'.
These are objectives more readily attributable to the United States or the
Soviet Union. Rather, as Professor Thomas Hockin contends, policy becomes
a kind of "... rationalization of the Canadian experience" and is "... unlike the American in that it is less messianic, less impatient, more
sensitive to national differences, and more prone to the values of organization
maintenance". Canadian policy then, is not evangelical in nature and
is less precise and purposive than the policies of the major super-powers.
Nevertheless, the values inherent in the transfer of Canadian aid do reflect
an economic system and a view of "development" which derive fundamentally
from a scientifically inspired insight into the process of change. Such
an insight does tend to value and stress concepts such as 'efficiency',
'organization', 'management control' as well as change brought about within
a neo-classical, Keynesian view of economic development.

17. Hertzman, L., Warnock, J. and Hockin, T. Alliances and Illusions: Canada

18. For an excellent examination of the dominant cultural and ethical
components as they effect North American life generally see George Grant,
Technology and Empire (House of Anansi, Toronto, 1969), J.K. Galbraith,
Economics and the Public Purpose, (Houghton Mifflin Co. Ltd., Boston,
All of course, discuss at length, the extent and implications of the
scientific world entitled "The Myth of Objective Consciousness" view,
though Roszak's discussion provides perhaps the most lucid account of
it's pervasiveness.
In responding to the following question: "In terms of government goals, what do you perceive to be the most important feature of Canadian foreign policy?" (See TABLE II), five general themes were designated as most significant. The most frequently alluded to was that of "world stability" and a "world community", so as to "... ensure that Canadians won't become involved in armed conflicts". At no time did this theme reveal any overt hint of policy as a purposive response to any perceived ideological or national threats. Furthermore this theme is quite consistent with the responses to the question "What is the greatest threat to Canada's security at this time?" Ten respondents cited "Nuclear War", two cited "Loss of External Trade Markets" and a single respondent "International Depression". Again the absence of any ideological or national threat.

Secondly, Canadians referred to the objectives of national unity and national sovereignty on three occasions. This appears to reflect a concern for the possible secession of Quebec, as well as a concern with the presence of American economic interests. Similarly, three respondents identified 'universal economic and social development'. "Trade benefits" and "West-bloc membership should contribute to economic interests" were cited on one occasion only.

Significantly the response distribution to this particular question parallels the responses to the question: "What do you feel are the primary objectives of Canadian external aid?" (See Table I). This further substantiates the existence of an almost synonymous perception of aid with that of foreign policy. With the aid question the long-run strategic goals were 'peace', 'stability' and the 'reduction of conflict', while
the short-term strategic goal was that of placating Quebec. Both of these coincide with the two most frequently cited goals of Canadian foreign policy that is 'Community Stability', 'Dispute Avoidance' and 'National Unity and Sovereignty'.

TABLE II

IN TERMS OF GOVERNMENT GOALS, WHAT DO YOU CONSIDER TO BE THE MOST IMPORTANT FEATURE OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community - Stability, Dispute Avoidance</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Unity - National Sovereignty</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic - Social Development</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Benefits</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Bloc - Economic Interests</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Relevance of East-West Conflict:

With the thought of establishing whether contemporary policy-makers consider aid to be an important tool of East-West conflict, Canadian officials were asked: "To what extent do you think that the objectives of aid are concerned with a reasonably successful prosecution of the Cold War?" The responses emerged once again as virtually consistent with the aforementioned view that foreign aid constitutes a tool of foreign policy and is for the most part concerned with facilitating the evolution of a "world community" and a state of "conflict avoidance". Had the responses to this question been generally "yes, aid is a Cold War tool", it is conceivable
that precise reference to a Communist or Soviet threat would have been made in response to the question "What is the greatest threat to Canada's security at this time?" (to be dealt with shortly). Moreover, if aid had been viewed in a context of East-West conflict it is reasonable to assume that the primary perceptions of foreign policy would not very likely have been the concern for "stability" and universal "peace and development". Yet, eight officials declared that aid was not considered a means to furthering cold war objectives, with several adding that it was primarily such practices by the United States which have served to intensify and create anti-American feeling in the 'Third World'. As one official observed:

"I don't think that it has been. In fact, there are some notable cases which indicate that we haven't been doing this. In fact, in some instances we have been doing just the reverse. For example, Canada is the only Western bloc nation aiding the state of Kerala, a Communist government, to which we have provided several million dollars. In Vietnam, provinces known to be completely controlled and dominated by Communists and Viet Cong continue to receive Canadian aid".

In addition, of the five officials who did indicate a perception of aid as a "Cold War" tool, three did so only to the extent that aid was successful in 'winning friends', a far cry from the more conventional notions usually associated with the East-West conflict (for example, 'confrontation' and 'nuclear balances').

Moreover, the perceptions expressed as a response to the question dealing with "threats to national security" appear to parallel the 'stability' and non-cold-war' themes previously designated. Ten responses stressed concern for the likelihood of some form of nuclear war between the major powers, although no specific state was identified as a possible direct
threat to Canadian security. In addition, officials designated on two occasions the possible loss of external markets for trade, while depression on an international scale constituted the final 'threat'.

Yet despite the responses dismissing East-West conflict as a major aid factor, Canadian policy-makers did elicit an East-West conflict perception in a non-aid context. For example, one of the more interesting series of responses, were those dealing with the question of Canada's role in NATO. The question asked: "What is your feeling on Canada's present and future involvement in NATO?" Originally, it had been my intention to include this question so as to establish if the manner in which aid is perceived might vary according to an official expressing a 'hawkish' or 'dovish' response with regard to Canada's role in Europe. Considering that at the time these interviews were administered (February 1969), this question was one of the most controversial of the issues under scrutiny in Prime Minister Trudeau's foreign policy review, one would have expected at least some variation in the responses. Moreover, when we consider the consistency of the responses pertaining to the 'stability' and 'non-cold-war' dimensions, is it not conceivable to expect that the distribution of responses might favour some form of revision or withdrawal from Europe. For surely, the consolidation of such non-military objectives is limited by policies which initially serve to prolong and exacerbate East-West animosities. Remarkably however, all the Canadian respondents felt that Canada should continue to maintain her present commitment to Europe.19 This view was justified on two

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19. Note however, that these interviews were administered prior to Prime Minister Trudeau's disclosure that Canada's role in NATO warranted revision and a gradual military withdrawal.
grounds. Firstly, six officials asserted that "some sort of threat" continued to manifest itself and for that reason, the status quo should be prolonged. The six remaining officials expressed a concern for the 'cost-benefits' which Canada derives from continued membership and such close relations with the United States. As two of the respondents observed:

"Frankly, I don't think we should have defence forces at all. The United States is our umbrella ... for us it becomes largely a technical question. Besides spending on defence and aid is a bargaining point. The fact that we cooperate with the United States, and that we are spending in the interests of the American power bloc, we get consideration in Washington. For example, import and trade quotas, etc. It's like welfare to Canadian economics".

"... the exchange argument that through association we are provided with information that we on our own are just unable to carry out, finance and research, is really a plus-ten factor. It really is fantastic the technological and scientific benefits we are able to derive just through our association with the United States".

At first glance, these responses do not appear to be consistent with those which earlier showed that Canadian aid is not considered an instrument of the cold war, and that no single national or ideological force poses a threat to Canada's security. Moreover, it presents a posture contrary to more benign assumptions which one might generally attribute to officials and Canadian policy generally. How then can one explain this apparent inconsistency?

Accepting the reasonably wide variation in justifications (from a 'threat' to 'cost-benefit' motives) the responses might simply indicate that the interviewed officials, because their foremost official concern is with questions of aid, had not thought through the full implications of their
responses to this particular question, and as a result were expressing what was essentially an a priori reaction to a situation with which they were largely unfamiliar. Even more likely, (especially with those who did perceive a 'threat'), is a situation in which each official conceives of NATO as existing within a framework remote from the context in which he views the Third World. After all, Canadian aid concerns itself with the 'developing areas' only, not Europe. Assuming this to be the case, is it not reasonable to posit that the official -- necessarily compelled to focus his attention on the Third World -- might not perceive a Soviet or Communist threat (ideological) in this area? This would in part account for the absence of the perception of aid as a tool in any East-West conflict, and for the positive response concerning 'world stability' and 'dispute avoidance' (again the question was asked and perceived in a Third World context). At the same time this appears to be compatible with the perception of a national or ideological threat in Europe, where aid is not a factor. The question relating to the Cold War was asked with reference to aid, and would not therefore be related with Europe. Presumably, in a European framework, East-West power rivalries still continue to comprise a very real component of the perceptions of Canada's aid officials although few of them in the course of operational planning are ever confronted with these two questions and their potential inconsistency. The positive view therefore, supportive of Canada's presence in NATO, appears understandable. So also do the concepts of 'world stability' and 'dispute avoidance'. Moreover, if one accepts the assumption that NATO is implicitly perceived as facilitating the maintenance of a stable balance, and at the same time acting as an effective deterrent, the internal consistency of the various responses emerges.
more clearly.

**Aid Policy Operationalized:**

Although the evidence presented to this point indicates that Canadian aid is perceived in a 'national interest' or donor-benefit framework, the explicit 'hows' of the question generally tend to remain obscure in the minds of Canadian officials. The one clear indication of how aid is 'applied' at the operational level emerges if we examine the concentration of aid allocations by country, and the policy-maker's perceptions of this distribution. 'National unity' and 'national sovereignty' were designated on three occasions as primary objectives of Canadian foreign policy and therefore 'national interest'.

Perceptions of a major shift in aid flows to Francophone Africa, might indicate that aid is being employed to involve and satisfy that section of the population which 'threatens to destroy any hope of lasting unity'. Such a policy would serve to provide a response to the criticisms expressed by many of Quebec's leaders and intellectuals, who especially in the late sixties were highly critical and resentful of a foreign policy which purported to reflect the bilingual and bicultural nature of Canada.

In response, therefore, to a question concerning the desirable future shifts in area allocations, officials referred most frequently to Francophonie (on four occasions), followed by Latin America (three times) and the Caribbean (three times).

This received further support from references which were made during conversations following the structured part of the interviews. In these informal and more candid asides, officials readily discussed the reasons for this new emphasis. As one of the two External Affairs officers remarked:
"Political considerations depending on the situation will play a part, of course, for example in the Francophonie. There's no doubt about it, we are, in fact, attempting to project domestic problems, to give Quebec and French Canadians a sense of participation. Yet these areas still require aid nonetheless, as much as the Commonwealth countries".

This seems to acknowledge the view that in terms of Quebec, and the disturbing effect her separation would no doubt have on Canadian national unity, short-term strategic considerations, though not necessarily inspired by evangelical or ideological notions, are a factor at the more precise, allocative level of aid.20.

Nevertheless, we are still left without an answer to why officials, when asked to identify Canada's aid objectives (admittedly within a general context) failed to project even this particular issue to the level of aid as a short-term strategic tool. It is almost as if a conscious concern for such short-term 'political' factors was somehow unethical or Machiavellian, something unbefitting Canada's past 'enlightened' and ostensible posture as a 'neutral'. Yet needless to say the motivation quoted above is not inappropriately classified as short-term strategic in nature. 21

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20. Equally one could attribute Canada's inability to decide on aid for Liberation Groups in Africa as either typical of a non-Hobbesian 'neutral' approach to the situation, or as a means of preserving her own economic and political interests in a very slowly changing situation in southern Africa, or a combination of both.

21. A prevailing view among scholars who have dealt with Canadian foreign policy is that historically, Canada has consciously attempted to remain aloof from the 'Machiavellian intrigues' purportedly so much more prevalent in the history of European relations. This has resulted in the emergence of a Canadian 'voluntarist' tradition which today connotes our ostensible search for moral opportunity in international affairs. Witness our supposed "unnamilitary ethos". See Hertzman, Warnock, and Hockin, op. cit., pp. 97-110 and James Eayrs, op. cit. The Art of the Possible, (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1961).
A partial explanation for this absence of preoccupation with the short-term strategic uses of Canadian aid is provided by Professor James Eayrs, who contends that Canadian foreign policy is subject to an inherent partiality, historically maturated, which has tended to diminish the importance accorded precise planning. In other words the Canadian style tends to be responsive and without the more comprehensive planning, implementation and purpose of the United States or the Soviet Union. Unlike the United States for example, Canada has never established a specialized foreign policy making body comparable to the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Furthermore, unlike the U.S., Canada does not possess legislation comparable to Title IX of the United States Foreign Assistance Act which makes specific provision for 'political development'.

Aid as a Tool of Political-Social Change:

The absence of an overt expression (both in policy and program) to effect desired political and social changes on recipient societies is evident in the responses to the questions on the 'objectives of Canadian foreign aid' and 'foreign policy'. (See Table I and II). Though not questioned directly on the concept of 'development', officials did nonetheless convey themes which

22. See James Eayrs, Ibid.

23. Title IX purports to address itself to encouraging "... the growth of democratic private and local governmental institutions in carrying out its programs of assistance..." "Without broad popular participation and without the institutions which make it possible, the impact of aid will be sharply limited". William S. Gaud, Primer on Title IX (The Foreward, AID Washington, 1968). Even more purposive is the amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act known as the Hickenlooper Amendment which seeks both to protect existing American properties and in so doing "... encourage more private investment in underdeveloped areas", while at the same time providing penalties if that investment and the obvious principle inherent in it are not accepted.
indicated to what extent they perceived 'development' as either 'economic' or 'political-economic' (political is here employed synonymously with social). Of the thirteen interviewed, seven associated 'development' as synonymous with economic development in a long-term sense. More than likely the criteria for success inherent in such a perception would consist of quantitative economic indicators dealing for the most part with the measurement of output (for example GNP figures or favourable trade balances etc.) At the same time, six respondents revealed a perception which conveyed an awareness of both political and economic development. Presumably, the indicators used for evaluation by these officials would tend to be neither quantitative, nor exclusively economic. 'Development' would most likely encompass more than the tangibles one generally associates with industrial growth. For example, meeting expectations, a greater concern for income distribution, and a more generalized meeting of basic needs. And yet none of the interviewed officials even suggested 'how' aid might contribute to 'political-social development'. This apparent lack of operational sophistication, or what might merely be Canadian introspection was partially confirmed by the fact that of the seven officials who perceived only the economic component of 'development', five identified 'political' as synonymous with what was previously defined as 'strategic', that is with the primary intended result effecting Canada rather than the recipient (for example 'universal peace' or placating Quebec dissidence).

24 With the exception of two officials (whose perceptions were economic-political), all the Canadian officials interviewed were trained as economists. This raises the question of whether the perceptual framework of officials varies as a result of their academic training, a situation quite possibly due to an emphasis on the recruitment of economists. This would require extensive study of CIDA as well as an inquiry into the differing perceptions of 'development' exhibited by economists as distinct from political scientists or sociologists.
Yet despite the absence of legislation and program policy conceived within a more precise perceptual framework of international change and development (as in the United States), the evidence in this paper in no way presents Canadian officials as devoid of strategic, donor-benefit concerns. In fact one could interpret Canadian aid perceptions and policy as a reflection of Canada's image of herself as a 'trading nation' whose principal objectives are economic (rather than political-social) change in recipient countries conducive to the betterment of Canada's economic and commercial status with the developing countries. Moreover such a theory is quite compatible with the Trudeau cut-backs in the Department of External Affairs, accompanied at the same time by a new emphasis on greater Industry, Trade and Commerce participation in diplomacy and foreign policy. For example Prime Minister Trudeau has stated that the general bias against permitting Trade Commissioners to reach the rank of Ambassador or High Commissioner, must be done away with and I.T.&C. given greater attention. Again, the reasoning behind this revision stems possibly from the view that Canada herself is not politically consequential, that she is somehow above the Machiavellian dealings of U.S. - European diplomacy, and therefore can and should with a clear conscience pursue her more 'neutral, and 'sublime' economic role. The obvious danger however is the extent to which the ultimate result of such an explicitly 'detached' role can emerge as 'neutral' in its effects on the recipient. After all, the economic and administrative values being transferred through Canadian aid remain very much a product of the North American milieu, grounded in a basically neo-classical, neo-Keynesian view of economic change and development.
Conclusion: Neutral or Partners in 'Development'

Having suggested that the economic and cultural milieu of Canada and the United States exhibit relatively similar qualities, the premise put forward by John Holmes that a foreign policy of neutralism (like that of Sweden's) would be theoretically inconceivable seems ever more plausible. According to Holmes such a policy would be tantamount to a "verbal and artificial construct divorced from public sentiment and support". For Canadians are not 'neutral' people, and remain very much committed to certain Western values. 25 As one of the interviewed CIDA officials confessed:

"We are in the Western power bloc, we are there whether we like it or not... so we must carry out policies not too opposed to the interests of that group. Thus, the most dominant influence in foreign policy becomes the influence of the most dominant member of that group, in this case the United States".

To this extent then, the 'community' school of analysis, expressed most clearly by Henry Kissinger, 26 displays some insight. The difficulty for the Canadian policy-maker in perceiving the similarities between Canada and the United States is created by the fact that these similarities are internalized as part of the accepted value structure in North America. In other words, the differences between the Canadian and American perceptions of the development process and its impact would be considerably less profound than the differences existing between the Canadian, French or Chinese perceptions of the process. Yet Canadian policy-makers perceive their differences in relation to the United States, rather than China or France.


This paper suggests that it is at the conscious or operational level of 'national interest' and 'implementation' where minor, though rarely opposing differences in perception occur between Canada and the United States. As one of the CIDA officials concluded:

"We have basically two minor ways in which to play a positive role. We can play a military armed force role and contribute to the defence of the group or we can contribute to the economic interests of the group and by this, influence it's cohesion. Canada isn't interested in acquiring new lands or countries ... consequently Canada must adopt the latter. We haven't the strength and resources for the former as does the United States."

Needless to say, the results of these two options need not be opposed or anti-ethical. Henry Kissinger's assessment of a mere difference in the degree of Canada's "pragmatic conviction" à la the United States would appear to remain undisputed.

In conclusion then this paper suggests that the perceptual framework of Canadian aid officials is primarily donor-beneficial (strategic) in nature, with an explicit general concern for 'international stability', 'peace' and a relatively homogenous world. The more precise motivations consist of the potential for Canadian economic and commercial benefits. Canadian officials, though verbally skeptical of short-run strategic motives, are not above employing them, although admittedly (as in the case of Quebec and 'national unity') they remain relatively non-offensive, non-ideological and politically inconspicuous. The perceptual framework of Canadian officials, insofar as it expressed a concern for the 'development' of the recipient, did so in a relatively imprecise fashion, limiting itself
largely to a non-political perception of change in the developing countries. But for exceptional circumstances humanitarianism is not a significant component of the Canadian perceptual framework. What remains to determine is whether such perceptions are in fact reflected in Canadian aid policy and programing.

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27. In comparison to the U.S., U.S.S.R., China or France such a Canadian perception stands to reason. The American position as an overseer to 'change' in a vast portion of the world is to a great extent perceived as dependent upon how that change evolves, thus the greater U.S. concern with producing desired results in aid recipient countries.