the future of pastoral peoples
The International Development Research Centre is a public corporation created by the Parliament of Canada in 1970 to support research designed to adapt science and technology to the needs of developing countries. The Centre's activity is concentrated in five sectors: agriculture, food and nutrition sciences; health sciences; information sciences; social sciences; and communications. IDRC is financed solely by the Parliament of Canada; its policies, however, are set by an international Board of Governors. The Centre's headquarters are in Ottawa, Canada. Regional offices are located in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.

Galaty, J.G.
Aronson, D.
Salzman, P.C.
Chouinard, A.

Commission on Nomadic Peoples, Montreal CA
University of Nairobi, Institute for Development Studies, Nairobi KE


/IDRC publication/, /rural population/, /nomads/, /nomadism/, /development strategy/, /East Africa/, /West Africa/, /Middle East/ — /anthropology/, /rural development/, /development planning/, /livestock/, /agricultural economics/, /human settlements/, /women/, /ecological balance/, /animal production/, /conference report/, /list of participants/.

UDC: 397.7


Microfiche edition available
the future of pastoral peoples

proceedings of a conference held in nairobi, kenya,
4–8 august 1980

Edited by John G. Galaty, Dan Aronson, Philip Carl Salzman,
Commission on Nomadic Peoples, c/o Department of Anthropology,
McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal, Canada
and Amy Chouinard
Communications Division, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada

Sponsored by the Commission on Nomadic Peoples of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, in collaboration with the Institute for Development Studies of the University of Nairobi, with the assistance of the International Development Research Centre (Ottawa), the International Social Science Council (Paris), the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research (New York), and McGill University (Montreal)
foreword 7
research priorities and pastoralist development: what is to be done? 15
opening addresses 27
the future of pastoral peoples R.S. Musangi 30
some remarks on the roles of advisers and advocates Philip Carl
Salzman 32
the role of anthropology in pastoral development 39
development for nomadic pastoralists: who benefits? Dan R. Aronson 42
an anthropological approach to economic development Walter Goldschmidt 52
research priorities in pastoral studies: an agenda for the 1980s Michael M. Horowitz 61
livestock and livelihood: a handbook for the 1980s Daniel G. Bates and Francis Paine Conant 89
the failure of pastoral economic development programs in africa Walter Goldschmidt 101
the anthropologist as mediator Emanuel Marx 119
the political economy of pastoralism 127
political factors in the future of pastoral peoples Philip Carl Salzman 130
herds, trade, and grain: pastoralism in a regional perspective Anders Hjort 135
evolution of policy toward the development of pastoral areas in kenya S.E. Migot-Adholla and Peter D. Little 144
theoretical implications of pastoral development strategies in east africa Peter Rigby 157
pasture in the malian gourma: habitation by humans and animals André Bourgeot 165
education for nomadic pastoralists: development planning by trial and error John A. Nkinyangi 183
the economics of pastoralism 197
production in pastoral societies Gudrun Dahl 200
livestock as food and money H.K. Schneider 210
economic institutions and pastoral resources management: considerations for a development strategy Peter N. Hopcraft 224
consumption and marketing of pastoral products among the kal tamacheq in the niger bend, mali Ag Hama 244
women and pastoral development: some research priorities for the social sciences  
Vigdis Broch-Due, Elsie Garfield, and Patti Langton 251

recent changes in bedouin systems of livestock production in the syrian steppe  
Faik A. Bahhady 258

the role of government in pastoral development 267
organizing government's role in the pastoral sector  
Stephen Sandford 270
organizations for pastoral development: contexts of causality, change, and assessment  
John G. Galaty 284
bedouin settlement: organizational, legal, and administrative structure in jordan  
Kamel S. Abu Jaber and Fawzi A. Gharaibeh 294
sedentarization of the nomads: sudan  
Mustafa Mohamed Khogali 302
sedentarization of nomadic pastoralists and "pastoralization" of cultivators in mali  
Salmane Cissé 318
livestock development and range use in nigeria  
Moses O. Awogbade 325
planning policy and bedouin society in oman  
Mohsin Jum’a Mohammed 334

the research process: strategies, goals, and methods 337
a methodology for the inventory and monitoring of pastoral ecosystem processes  
H.J. Croze and M.D. Gwynne 340
indigenous models of time and space as a key to ecological and anthropological monitoring  
Rada Dyson-Hudson 353
the collection and interpretation of quantitative data on pastoral societies:  
reflections on case studies from ethiopia  
Ayele Gebre Mariam 359
relevance of the past in projections about pastoral peoples  
Daniel Stiles 370

references 379
political factors in the future of pastoral peoples

Philip Carl Salzman, Department of Anthropology, University of McGill, Montreal, Canada

The argument of this paper is that politics is a major determinant of social forms and social formations and a basic factor in societal maintenance or change and that consequently political processes and political structures must be given careful attention in research about the current situation and future possibilities of pastoral peoples.

This emphasis upon the importance of politics is not contradictory to, but an expression of, a pluralistic, or multicausal, view of societal process, in which there are a number of at least partially independent influences, psychological, demographic, ecological, organizational, economic, cultural, and political. I think it is doubtful, and hardly supported by historical and sociological analysis, that any one factor is an overall determinant, even in the long run or in the last analysis. Thus, although I emphasize in this paper the importance of the political factor, I do not mean to suggest that politics is the sole or even the primary influence in social life or that it is solely the generator of features in other spheres and not the recipient of influences from them.

One major basis of the import of politics is the fact, ignored and neglected though it be, that people have political concerns, objectives, goals that are ends in themselves, considered worth striving for on their own account. Examples of these are (1) order in social process, (2) peace in group relations, (3) security against incursion, (4) group autonomy, and (5) domination of others. These are objectives that can be, and are not infrequently, held worthwhile in themselves, that can guide collective action and define social strategies. They are not always mutually compatible and some form of priority ranking would often develop. Nor are they necessarily compatible with other goals of different types, ecological, economic, cultural, and so on, and here too priorities differ from person to person and group to group.

The second major basis of the import of politics is the use of political means, the use of influence, threat, and coercion, to achieve objectives and goals. Political means can be used to secure political goals. Political means can also be used to achieve other kinds of goals. It is an empirical question to what extent and under what circumstances and with what effects various political means are used in pursuit of individual and group goals.

The third major basis of the import of politics is the way in which power and coercion from external sources can influence, modify, transform, and even destroy a group, a society, a way of life. The terms of intersocietal
contact are substantially generated by nonpolitical factors, such as demography, technology, and culture, but the result of the confrontation is largely generated by the balance or imbalance of power. This is particularly important in the realm of relations between local and regional populations and representatives of supraregional, national, and supranational entities.

My position, in sum, is that how people act, what they think and say and do, and the circumstances in which, whether or not to their liking, they find themselves, the social processes in which they are involved, and the structures that to one degree or other enable and inhibit them can be understood as substantially the result of politics, of political concerns and objectives and goals, of political means used to achieve political and nonpolitical ends, of political power brought to bear from external sources.

politics among pastoral peoples

I would like to begin my discussion of politics among pastoral peoples with a simplistic distinction between indigenous pastoral politics and the politics of encapsulation. Indigenous pastoral politics is basically decentralized segmentary politics involving autonomous, contingent groupings. In contrast, the politics of encapsulation is a struggle for control, for domination on one side and autonomy on the other, between a vast, supraregional, centralized entity and smaller local and regional populations.

Although throughout history there have been many instances of the politics of encapsulation involving pastoral peoples, especially in Southwest Asia, North Africa, and East Asia, and although indigenous pastoral politics has far from disappeared, especially in remote areas, there has been a definite trend of ever-increasing strength, in the last hundred years, toward the politics of encapsulation. The simple fact is that state entities have gained tremendous strength in comparison with local populations, a fact attributable to technological developments in the realms of transportation, communication, and warfare, especially warfare. This is a result of the marriage between state development and advanced technology. It is not, in my view, a matter of the world capitalist system, or of socialist expansionism, or of neocolonialism. It is a matter of the use of military and other technology in state consolidation, a phenomenon characteristic of the last few hundred years, accelerated in more recent times in areas where substantial pastoral populations are present. Ottoman and republican Turkey, czarist and soviet Central Asia, colonial and postcolonial Morocco, imperial and Islamic Iran, socialist Mongolia, all share the encapsulation of local pastoral populations; whether the source is imperial or republican, colonial or independent, capitalist or socialist, modern firepower is uniformly devastating.

For pastoral peoples, then, the critical fact of recent and modern times is the rise of the state and its consolidation of control through military means. Consequently, in an understanding of the circumstances of pastoral peoples today, the political fact of encapsulation is foremost. Even before the full ascendency of the modern state and effective encapsulation of pastoral peoples, the impact of state entities was substantial even upon those pastoral peoples who avoided state control. An impressive example of this is the Yomut Turkmen, described by Irons (1975), whose nomadic and pastoral way of life was an adaptation primarily to the threat from the Iranian Imperial Army. As a result, the great agricultural potential of the region was not
exploited by the Yomut and remained untapped until recent times when the Yomut were conquered and encapsulated. They were, in fact, forceably settled by Reza Shah and remained so as long as he remained on the throne. A short return to autonomy for the Yomut following Reza Shah's abdication saw a resurgence of nomadism and pastoralism, but Iranian state consolidation since then has resulted in expropriation of local resources, decline of traditional political and social forms, and a major contraction in pastoralism.

Why should governments harass innocent pastoralists roaming the pastures with their herds; why should the state apparatus devote personnel, money, time, and energy, to encapsulate these poor, marginal peoples? The answer, of course, is that from a political point of view, these pastoralists were, and are, neither innocent nor marginal. The Turkmen are an exemplary specimen of predatory raiders, preying upon peasant and caravan alike, carrying off booty and slaves, and interfering with peasant life and commerce. In this, the Turkmen can stand for many Southwest Asian, North and West African, and East Asian pastoral peoples. In eastern and southern Africa, pastoral peoples satisfied themselves by expanding at the expense of their hunting and cultivating neighbours. Not only were pastoralists predatory raiders, but also they organized themselves into political entities, often with collective symbols and even officers that claimed autonomy and even regional ascendency. These local polities, often called tribes in the literature, were not just political rebukes to any aspiring central authority but often direct political threats, for many a state regime has been conquered by tribal peoples and replaced by tribally based dynasties. And if the political threat were not enough, there is the cultural conflict between the often different identities and traditions of state regimes and the pastoral peoples on their margins of control; once again the Turkmen at the margins of the Persian Iranian state are an exemplary case, being ethnically different and organizationally divergent, a tribal deviation from the urban and peasant civilization. This pattern is characteristic, from the Fulani in the West to the Mongols in the East. Consequently, there are several bases for serious concern on the part of state organizations about threats posed by pastoral peoples. In addition to these threats, pastoral populations, their animals, and the lands they control are potential resources for the state. There are clearly many good reasons for states to consolidate their control over pastoral peoples, and when they obtain the military means to do so economically and effectively, they do so, for example Reza Shah and later Mohammed Reza Shah with the Turkmen and also the Baluch, the Qashqai, the Bakhtiari, the Kurds, and so on.

The current situation of pastoral peoples is to a substantial degree a consequence of this state consolidation and imposition of control. The Yoruk of southern Turkey, described by Bates (1973), were able to move into the region they currently occupy because the national government forced the previous occupants, a Turkman group whom it found worrisome, to settle. Once in place, the Yoruk, with their traditional political organization and officials virtually lapsed, found themselves adjusting to the interests and convenience of the local agriculturalists who had the support of the government. For example, the timing and route of pastoral migrations were not so much determined by the ideal arrangements to fill the needs of the animals but by the agricultural cycle of surrounding peasants. And because rights over pasture were given to the peasants by the government, the Yoruk had to rent pasture for their animals. Just as badly off are the Maasai,
described by Galaty (1980); much of their territory — and good, seasonally important pasture it was — had been expropriated by the colonial regime. The willingness of the Maasai to agree to a recent ranching scheme not entirely suited to their needs was largely a result of concern that unwillingness to go along would result in further loss of land. A less usual, and more fortunate, situation for pastoralism developed when the Fulbe, described by Frantz (1980), moved into the Mambila district of Nigeria and found government officials supporting an expansion of pastoralism even in the face of restrictive claims by the indigenous agricultural population.

The consequences of effective state control go beyond effects on pastoralism per se. One quite usual result is increased centralization and differentiation within the local and regional group as relations with government put control of the administrative apparatus in the hands of local officials, often the traditional leaders. This is seen among the Kababish of the Sudan, described by Asad (1970) and the Baluch of southeastern Iran, which I described elsewhere (1973, 1974). Economic and political differentiation is reinforced as some individuals from pastoral groups become educated and move into other sectors while maintaining a foothold in the pastoral sector.

Now much that I have discussed here is already past. What, then, does the future hold? Certain features of these past processes remain — notably, full encapsulation and effective control by the state, and the lack of cultural affinity between the state and its agents, on one side, and pastoral peoples, on the other. Our research priorities should, then, take these political factors into account and examine the circumstances under which governments act sympathetically toward pastoral peoples and the pastoral enterprise and the circumstances under which they act unsympathetically as well as the underlying reasons for this, whether they be political, cultural, or economic and whether they seem to be based in observable interests or in ideological orientations. Particularly worthy of attention, I believe, is the impact of electoral politics, given the fact that pastoralists, although they may occupy a large proportion of the land and may account for a substantial portion of national wealth in the form of livestock, are likely to be a numerically small proportion of the voting population. To what extent is pastoralism, whatever its potential contribution to the nation as a whole, disadvantaged because of the electoral weakness of the pastoral population?

At the same time, we must investigate the response of pastoral peoples to these circumstances and to the way in which these circumstances affect their political goals and their intentions to use political means to achieve political, economic, and cultural ends. What situations lead to demands for greater autonomy, and what situations lead to demands for greater integration? In what circumstances do disparate groupings attempt to form ethnic blocs for political and other ends? What are the parameters that define degrees of success in these efforts?

Make no mistake: political factors will play a major role in the future of pastoral peoples. We will do no one good service if we neglect the importance of political process and political goals.

discussion

Goldschmidt: The introduction of politics into our discourse is long overdue. I think it important to recognize that an element in this is the recurrent
phenomenon of prejudice — prejudice that long outlives the actual physical threat that pastoralists often face. This prejudice is old and widespread — I have even heard a Pueblo Indian anthropologist express it against a Navaho! It is found wherever pastoralists are found.

There is another point. Pastoralists are difficult to tax, and, for this reason, governments don’t like them. Furthermore, inasmuch as they generally live near the borders of their countries, they are almost always engaged in smuggling — again undermining governmental control. Thus, political control of pastoralists has always been deleterious to their welfare.

**Hopcraft:** As political power is, on occasion, used to gain economic advantage, is there not an economic element in the political conflicts you describe?

**Salzman:** Political means are of course used to gain economic ends, as stated in the paper. But this does not mean that all conflicts are about economics. The political, cultural, and other concerns that people have are also sources of conflict.

**Marx:** The statement that nomads have been powerful opponents of the state does not appear to be justified by available information. Although pastoralists have carried out raids, which are a nuisance to the authorities, they have not concentrated their forces for an extended period. The so-called Bedouin States incorporated Bedouin but had a complex economic organization.

**Salzman:** There are many well-documented cases of opposition to the state by pastoral peoples. Of course, many so-called pastoral peoples did have complex economic bases. And opposition can take many forms, of which the strongest one is taking over the state. Perhaps, it would be useful to look at the different types of opposition by pastoral peoples and to spell out the association between the social and economic structures on the one hand and the type and degree of opposition on the other.

**Rigby:** The question is not whether the base or the superstructure is dominant. Salzman and Rigby both say politics is dominant. The issue in a mode of production is not that economics may dominate but whether we need to theorize about the relationships between institutions.