Pearsonian Internationalism in Practice:
The International Development Research Centre

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A Thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

The thesis concerns the origins, creation and progress of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). Most scholars believe that development assistance is largely motivated by self-interest. At first glance, the Centre appears to be an anomaly in Canadian foreign aid. The IDRC's disbursements are not formally tied; has an international board of governors; and its structure was specifically designed with autonomy in mind. This Canadian federal organisation has spent one and a half billion dollars and funded over 5,500 projects since its founding in 1970. During this time, the Centre has disbursed between 70-95% of its programme funds overseas, mostly to developing country university researchers. These researchers have designed and executed research intended to help developing countries alleviate poverty, social decay and more recently, environmental challenges.

A detailed archeology is conducted of Pearson's own internationalism regarding science and technology, foreign policy, development assistance, environment and culture. Our analysis shows how Pearson's thinking, and that of colleagues who were to have key influences on the Centre, Barbara Ward and Maurice Strong, were embedded in deeply held beliefs and values. We identify a tension between an internationalist impulses and Canadian-centred or parochial pre-occupations common in most of the federal public service, especially central agencies. Central agents, responding to pressures from academics, and the internal values and beliefs that tend to form in these secretaria, have sought to make the IDRC conform to their own expectations. The author concludes that the Centre has survived and prospered, despite these pressures, partly because of the skill of its top officers, but principally because of the IDRC's capacity to lay claim to being an expression of internationalism.
We also show how another dialectic, between more socially-oriented perspectives and more technical ones affected the development of the IDRC. The thesis suggests that the two dialectics, the internationalist and parochial, and the technical and social, are both synthesising into, respectively, interdependence and holism.
Resumé

La thèse traite des origines, de la création et du progrès du Centre de recherches pour le développement international (CRDI). La plupart des universitaires croient que l'assistance aux pays en voie de développement se fait dans un but intéressé. À première vue, le CRDI donne l'apparence d'être une anomalie dans le champ d'aide étrangère canadienne. Une grande partie des fonds déboursés par le CRDI n'est pas assujettie aux récipiendaires canadiens; le conseil des gouverneurs est international; et les initiateurs ont dessiné sa structure pour rehausser l'autonomie du Centre. Cette organisation canadienne et fédérale a dépensé 1,5 $G Can et a soutenu plus de 5 500 projets depuis ses débuts en 1970. Pendant cette période, le CRDI a déboursé entre 70 et 95% de ces fonds destinés pour les programmes outre-mer, soit la plus grande partie par des chercheurs universitaires aux pays en voie de développement. Ces derniers ont dessiné, et fait leurs recherches dans le but d'aider ces pays à soulager la pauvreté, la déchéance sociale et, plus récemment les défis environnementaux.

Les croyances et valeurs des initiateurs, Lester Pearson, Barbara Ward, et Maurice Strong, ont influencé le mode de fonctionnement du CRDI, selon notre recherche. Nous avons effectué une archéologie détaillée de l'internationalisme de Pearson (lui-même) concernant la science et la technologie, les politiques étrangères, l'aide pour le développement international, l'environnement et la culture. Une dialectique est révélée entre impulsions internationalistes et, ceux concentrés sur les intérêts canadiens ou préoccupations communales, dont les dernières sont typiques au cadre de la fonction publique fédérale, en particulier les agence centrales. La pression des universitaires et politiciens influencent les agents centraux à tenter dans l'implantation des politiques selon les croyances et les valeurs de ces derniers. Souvent on trouve à travers les agents centraux les croyances et valeurs et, ce en partie à cause de leurs rôles comme secrétariats. Malgré ces pressions, la survivance et la prospérité du CRDI peuvent être
expliquées partiellement par le talent de ses cadres supérieurs, mais en outre que le Centre soit perçu comme expression d'internationalisme.

Les effets d'une autre dialectique sur le progrès du Centre, entre perspectives techniques et sociales sont aussi révélés. Nous suggérons que les deux dialectiques, tendances internationales et communales et, perspectives sociales et techniques, sont en transformation, vers de nouvelles synthèses, respectivement à l'interdépendance et l'holisme.
Acknowledgements

Doctoral theses are known to be circuitous undertakings, with unexpected turnings, dead-ends and adventures. This has certainly been one such. Without the support and insight of three people the journey would not have been possible at all. I thank very humbly and profoundly Maria Eugenia Otárola-Martinez, Professor Samuel J. Noumoff, and Ravinder Singh Chimni. Professor Noumoff’s genuine compassion, real intellect and great diligence have deeply touched me. He will not know until he reads this that a course of his that I was lucky enough to attend during my first sojourn at McGill, 1978-80, had the effect of an epiphany as regards the nature of fact and value in history and politics. I would like to thank Professor Frank Kunz whose insight and kindness I have had the good fortune to experience. Professor Kunz was one of my first professors at McGill in 1978, and it is fitting that he should see me out by being generous enough to sit on my Thesis Committee with Warwick Armstrong, to whom I am also grateful. Enrico Del Castello must be acknowledged for his kind encouragement and advice. Hugh Nangle must be thanked for the same, but moreover for the vast amount of time he spent editing and data scanning. I very deeply appreciate those and other kindnesses, Hugh. Greg Donaghy was willing to have his ear bent by me and would comment on my periodic ahistorical neo-Pearsonian rantings. Bryan Hawley and I exchanged mutually therapeutic remedies to doctoral ills. Thank you all.

The scores of people in and around the International Development Research Centre that helped me gain some understanding of the Centre and its context are too numerous to mention. I shall name no favourites, they all helped in their own way. I will thank Geoff Oldham for his willingness to re-enact Bob and Ray's sketch "The Komodo Dragon." The many and varied present and former staff of CIDA, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Treasury Board, the Privy Council Office and the Office of the Auditor-General must also be congratulated for their forbearance of my queries. I am very grateful to Iain
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The staff of the National Archives were very helpful. I salute Brian Beaven, Paulette Dozois, Jaye Jarvis and David Smith in particular. Continuing in the vein of information location and retrieval, bouquets go to John Grace and his staff at the Office of the Information Commissioner for their hard work when reason did not prevail.

Mary and Edwin Stockdale must be thanked not merely for reviewing and reflecting on this text, but initiating the build-up to this thesis.
**Introduction**

Every hour that passes brings a supplement of ignition to the crucible in which the world is being fused. We have not had the same past, you and ourselves, but we shall have, strictly, the same future. The era of separate destinies has run its course. . ..

Knowledge and faith flowed from a common source and fed the same sea.

Former IDRC Vice-President Cheikh Hamidou Kane

Canadians are aware of the role of Lester Pearson in the creation of peacekeeping. They also know that Pearson was deeply concerned with diplomacy, and development assistance. Yet less than one percent of Canadians are aware of the existence, much less the significance of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). The Centre is highly thought of in the capitals of developing countries, but is little known in the capital of Canada, where it is headquartered. Although founded during the Trudeau government, the Centre is very much the fruit of Pearson's internationalist vision. It is fair to say that without Mike Pearson the Centre would never have been created. Yet IDRC was the product of many people, the motive forces of Maurice Strong and Barbara Ward being key. But what is it?

The first board meeting of IDRC was opened by Chairman Lester Pearson in the depths of the October Crisis of 1970, and guarded by the RCMP. Underway, the main

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activity of this Crown corporation-like organisation became the funding of research on the problems of developing countries. Since IDRC’s creation, a billion and a half dollars have been spent and over 5,500 projects funded. In structure and substance, the Centre broke new ground in a number of respects, becoming the boldest expression of internationalism in the field of development assistance. As regards substance, IDRC became the first development agency in the world to give unprecedented autonomy to researchers in developing countries to do the vast majority of selecting, designing and executing research projects themselves. Further, little money ended up in the hands of Canadians. The Centre was the first state-funded organisation to fund research about developing countries that was conducted in developing countries, by people from the region. IDRC was not transformed into a mere source of funding for Canadians interested in conducting research on developing areas. Regarding structure, just under half its governors are from overseas, most of these from developing countries. Although it is less so now since immigration rules have changed, the Centre’s staff remain international in nationality and orientation, especially in the now three Regional Offices and four Representative Offices based in developing countries. Non-Canadians are therefore able to have a great influence on the direction of the work of the Centre. Although the President has been a Canadian thus far, non-Canadians have regularly been considered. Of the top officers of IDRC, only the Chairman and Vice-Chairman must be Canadians. In short, the Centre has an international flavour and substance.

Statutes regulating the selection of governors specify that the majority must have "experience of international development or experience or training in the natural or social sciences or technology." This requirement, and the political agreement to generally adhere to it, has meant that most appointments are rarely the product of political favours.

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unlike many Governor-in-Council appointments by the federal government. As we have said, IDRC staff have an strongly international character. In short, IDRC is not a typical donor organisation funded by a national state, it is more like an independent international foundation. As such, the Centre was an expression of Pearsonian internationalism and the partnership that implied. Roughly equivalent or larger than most like-minded organisations in the research for development foundation niche, within the field of donors, IDRC has remained minute, accounting for less than five percent of Canada's own Official Development Assistance (ODA). Yet the Centre's influence, reputation, and reach is vastly out of proportion to its size. That IDRC has produced little direct benefit for Canadians, seems to be a genuine attempt at partnership between North and South, and has garnered considerable influence and reputation—despite its actual size—is an enigma that intrigued the author. This dissertation represents an attempt to understand why and how the Centre was created, and how it has managed to survive and prosper over the succeeding quarter century.

The assessment of this author is that IDRC has been highly regarded in development circles in Canada and abroad for two major reasons: 1) its funding is largely untied, and 2) it has established an erudite, responsive partnership with academics and other partners from developing countries it has funded. Many Canadian development assistance officials, recipients, and commentators believe that all development assistance should be untied. IDRC is for them a symbol of what most think development assistance should be like. Consequently, Clyde Sanger has called the Centre "a cheerful contrast" with Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA) tied aid policies. Cranford Pratt has associated "continued support for IDRC" as Canadian development assistance
"policies and activities that reflect humanitarian and developmental concerns". The Swedish Agency for Research Co-operation with Developing Countries (SAREC) was inspired by the model of IDRC, as were others. In their assessment of their first decade, SAREC stated that "IDRC can be regarded as the most significant initiative taken by any industrialized country to support research in developing countries." CIDA documents identify the Centre as the "jewel in the crown". This international legitimacy and the lustre it gives to Canadian foreign policy serves to protect IDRC within the Canadian federal government. Its ability to lay claim to moral legitimacy is its shield. The organisations surrounding the Centre are based on narrower foundations, and must at the very least justify their existence on their instrumental nature, and frequently and increasingly on their short-term and "measurable" benefits to Canadians. Even CIDA, which as we shall see had similar origins to IDRC, gradually became more an instrument of domestic pre-occupations than international concern. This is largely not the case at IDRC, although we shall trace out pressures to move in that direction. The discovery of how IDRC became a political possibility and how the aegis of legitimacy was fashioned around the new organization is therefore significant, given that other more parochial institutional norms surrounded it.

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This dissertation is a reply to two simple questions, "Why was the International Development Research Centre created?” and, “How have its policies changed over time?” The dissertation is divided into four chapters. The first part of the first chapter delves into the thought of Lester Pearson as regards development assistance, foreign policy, and science and technology. In the second part, the application of Pearsonian internationalism as applied in the field of development assistance is viewed by looking at the origins of development assistance, which we identify as being moulded by deeply held beliefs and values. We also look at the role of the different personalities involved in development assistance, such as Maurice Strong. In Chapter One, we identify a tension between the internationalist impulse and what we delineate as more narrow, Canadian-centred or parochial pre-occupations that were common in most of the federal public service.

Chapter Two consists of a detailed archaeology of the actual policy process that took place leading to the creation of the Centre in 1970. The analysis reveals the importance of the championing by Lester Pearson, Maurice Strong and Barbara Ward of the IDRC proposal and their particular intellectual contributions to it, but shows that the Centre was very much the product of a number of individuals. We show how internationalist and parochial viewpoints contended, and reveal the role of another dialectic, between more socially-oriented views and more technical ones.

Chapter Three looks at the relation between IDRC and its Canadian environment and shows how domestic pressures from different sources have made their expectations of the Centre felt. We analyse the composition and role of the Board of Governors and detail how central agents, responding to pressures from academics and their own value preferences, have sought to make IDRC conform to these expectations. Central agencies are commonly thought of within the Canadian context as policy direction, control and scrutiny secretariats such as the Privy Council Office (PCO), Treasury Board (TB), Finance and the Office of the Auditor General (OAG). Within the last fifteen years, External Affairs, (since 1993 Foreign Affairs and International Trade), has been included
in this magic circle. We identify CIDA as increasingly playing a role like a central agent in both function and values relative to the development assistance industry in Canada.

In the final chapter, we pass to the policy progress of the Centre since its establishment, delineating the internal discourse of the Centre and relate that conversation to the changing nature of development, science, and technology. The explanation of how IDRC came about, how the Centre was institutionalized, and endured, despite the lack of significant material benefits to Canadians, is the essential domain of the thesis.
Methodology

Approach

Cranford Pratt has identified the varying fortunes of humane internationalism in Canadian development assistance that emerged strongly during World War II. "At its core is an acceptance by the citizens of the industrialised states that they have ethical obligations towards those beyond their borders and that these in turn impose obligations upon their governments."⁹ Pratt goes on to delineate three common elements of variants of humane internationalism: 1) that a common humanity unites the global community, 2) that carrying out those obligations is in the long-term interests of the North so as to achieve stability, and 3) that internationalism is an extension of national and social welfare programs to the wider world.¹⁰ In this thesis, we will employ the term "internationalism" in a similar manner, but remove the word "humane" for two reasons. The first is that internationalism was the term used during much of the post-War period. The second is that, although humane is useful because it associates the idea with a notion of equity and compassion, internationalism must now include bundles of environmental beliefs which, while often rooted in humane concern, are not only focused on humanity.

Those interested in understanding and commenting on Canadian development assistance policy have for decades pointed to the parochial motivations of federal policy makers.¹¹ Most have noted that aid is tied, that is, that the majority of goods and services must be procured in Canada. Consequently, many have called for the untying of aid.

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¹⁰ Cranford Pratt, 14--15.

¹¹ For examples of this viewpoint from the 1960s see Clyde Sanger, Half a Loaf: Canada's Semi-Role Among Developing Countries, Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969 or Keith Spicer's A Samaritan State?, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966.
Some progress has been made in that direction, despite occasional reverses. In succeeding years, Canadian aid from CIDA has become half tied, half unbound. The IDRC has been an anomaly, its funds have been untied since its foundation, although funding to Canadians has increased over time. Yet the parochial impulse is evident in the files of federal departments and in those of IDRC. What we see then is a tug between the internationalist and the parochial. The author has pursued an historical method, rather than the testing of a theory or model. As we shall demonstrate, so much of the history of development assistance contains these divergent undercurrents that we have organised our discussion according to this and a second dialectic or polar set. To reiterate, our first dialectic is a discernible tension in Canadian post-War foreign and development assistance policy between internationalism and more narrowly conceived notions of Canadian interest, more harshly, parochialism. (See Figure 1).

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Figure 1

Principal Policy Dialectics or Polar Sets

Internationalist

Canadian-Centered

Technical

Social
The second tension, of especial relevance to IDRC, is between a technical orientation to development versus a social orientation. We identify the first Presidency of the Centre, under David Hopper, as broadly a technical one. The transformation of the South from societies based on lore and tradition to those based on applied scientific rationality to Southern circumstances was seen as the aim of the Centre. This view was balanced though with a social concern for equity in the research funded. The presidencies of Ivan Head and Keith Bezanson are associated with the rise of a more complex and holistic social orientation.13

The essential approach of the author is that this subject can be better grasped by having some understanding of the values that underlay the speech and action of the founders of Canadian foreign and development assistance policy, and IDRC in particular. Further, we will seek to track how those values and beliefs have affected the subsequent elaboration of those policies. From this perspective, values and beliefs serve as the means by which we see through a glass, darkly—our understanding of the material world is determined—opportunities are glimpsed and priorities derived. Put another way, these values and beliefs play a powerful role in filtering or shading motives and attempts at calculation by actors, individual or organisational, and limit the possible solutions perceived by actors. The epistemic underpinnings, or prior understandings of the shadows on the cave wall, as Socrates would have it, permit action be taken or stayed. What we have then at the more philosophical level is some combination of a phenomenological approach that notes the importance of perception, cognition, and symbol; and epistemology, where belief helps order understanding.

The values and beliefs we are most concerned with have a goodly part of their origins in cosmopolitan and Canadian values rooted in religious and welfarist notions.

13 To some extent, the difficulty of using the word "social" is as problematic as using the word, "humane" to the extent that neither of these ideas are entirely bound up in environmental holism.
We assert that the strong attachment of Lester Pearson and Maurice Strong to Christian belief and liberal social values had a major impact on the kind of policies they pursued. Likewise, Barbara Ward, who was a key actor in the creation of the Centre, was herself an active lay Catholic and Fabian. A belief in international partnership and equity were mixed with a belief in the inevitable release by science and technology of social and political forces to be reckoned with. Such notions were put into practice in the shape of IDRC by Pearson and the generations succeeding him.

The approach to Canadian foreign and development assistance that we take is, however, far from being unidimensional. Indeed, we have no doubt that a "mixed motives" viewpoint is correct. Kim Nossal has called this the orthodox view of Canadian aid, that it is a function of a "mix of motives"—philanthropic, economic and politico-strategic. His own search for explanations focuses on the interests of the foreign policy makers themselves. We find this approach helpful, but as in other analyses, the notion of interest insufficient to understand the origins and motivations for development assistance, and many of the issues that might explain IDRC. Nevertheless, the evidence we have gathered corroborates Nossal's belief that the Canadian state has an institutional interest in prestige and organizational maintenance. Nossal also "suggests that organizational inertia, born of organizational interests, is a major determinant of current tied-aid policies." As we shall see, these notions serve as useful engines of explanation. Taken as a whole, the approach taken in the thesis is sceptic and eclectic.

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15 Nossal, 53.
Related Literature

Over the decades, academic writing about Canadian development assistance has been sporadic. In the case of IDRC, scholarly reflection on the Centre has been virtually overlooked as a subject of analysis. Articles have rarely been penned about the Centre by independent or scholarly sources. Analysis has usually been focused on particular activities and written by either staff, or recipients of Centre grants. No doctoral dissertation has been produced about IDRC. We can say without fear of contradiction that this doctoral dissertation will certainly add to the fund of knowledge on the subject.

Two notable articles have been written. In 1975, A.F. Wynne Plumptre wrote "The International Development Research Centre and the Role of L.B. Pearson" in Freedom and Change: Essays in Honour of Lester B. Pearson. Plumptre wrote a key feasibility study that led to the establishment of the Centre, and was a member of its first Board. Our research reveals that Pearson's influence was considerably more extensive than Plumptre describes. Surprisingly, most of the chapter is about Maurice Strong's role. The fact that Maurice Strong had proposed the idea of IDRC to Pearson, and that subsequently Prime Minister Pearson took the critical step to announce the formation of IDRC deliberately to "short circuit" bureaucratic resistance is not mentioned. No independent scholarly assessment of the overall policy or origins of the Centre has been penned since 1982 when Grant Manuge wrote, as part of his B.A. requirements, what became an article for International Perspectives. It was quite critical and questioned the course of the Centre at the time. In our dissertation, we have excavated the deeper context in which the changes Manuge outlined took place.

Two outside researchers have written unpublished works. Both documents are

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16 Maurice Strong, Interview by author, 28 August 1987, Ottawa, Tape recording.
largely descriptions of IDRC policies and projects. In 1974, Melvin Weigel wrote "The International Development Research Centre: A Study" for an International Public Law course taught by Paul Gérin-Lajoie at the Université de Montréal. Weigel tried to come to grips with the essence of the Centre in an eloquent manner. In 1982, Kenneth Elliot wrote a Master's thesis in Education at McGill on "Educational Aid and Canada's International Development Research Centre". No academic thesis has been written that attempts to locate IDRC within Canadian foreign and development assistance policies.

A number of documents published or produced by IDRC staff are relevant to the present study. Shirley Seward's "The Evolution of the International Development Research Centre" is one such paper. Of writing about the origins of the Centre, it is the most comprehensive. For our purposes, its main virtue is the detailing of major parts of the policy process. Its deficiencies are the absence of many relevant details from the early part of the process, and lack of analysis. The latter is especially understandable since Seward was then an employee of the Centre. The Director of IDRC's Communications Division, David Spurgeon, edited Give Us the Tools in 1979. The introduction in this text places the creation of IDRC very well within the context of the time. What these documents could not have done, and did not, was to delve too deeply into the origins of the Centre, nor enquire into sensitive topics. Seward therefore misses the key role of Barbara Ward in the creation of the Centre. Spurgeon's text did not delve into the multiple strikes being made by various central agents at the Centre at the time of the production of his book.
Contribution to Knowledge

The contribution of the thesis is to give a more comprehensive view of the Centre, its origins, its course, its context, than has been available hitherto. The dissertation locates IDRC within the stream of internationalist thinking that emerged after World War II, and was personified in Canada by Lester Pearson. We delineate the shifting arguments that were used to legitimise Canadian development assistance as a whole, and specifically IDRC. We show how these arguments were based less on narrowly-focused Canadian interest in statecraft, and more on an essential moral vision, beliefs about the necessity of adapting society to scientific advance, and the importance of global social stability. These elements were transmuted in the International Development Research Centre. We conclude that far from being irrelevant because it does not function as a fashioned tool of state, the Centre and other such enterprises may help serve to anchor the better values that Canada represents in the uncertain seas of the present era. If we make a significant contribution to the discourse on Canadian foreign and development assistance policy it may be to shift the discussion from one where misdemeanour and interest figure prominently. To be sure, both conflicting and complementary interests, primarily organisational, are shown in relief in our explanation of IDRC and Canadian development assistance. Nevertheless, we place the evidence of tensions between different ethical stances at the core of our discourse. Consequently, neither blinkered optimism, nor a counsel of despair is embedded in this modest offering to the literature.
**Data Collection**

The two main sources of data were documents and interviews collected between 1986 and 1995. Documents from seven Canadian federal organisations, not least IDRC, provided the bulk of the data. The sensitivity of the material necessitated that some interviews remain anonymous for the security of the source. Over one hundred interviews were conducted with the present or former staff of IDRC, CIDA or other federal agencies, politicians, donors and recipients. Interview information was quoted when corroborating evidence multiple sources—often in different organisations—indicated that the general line taken bore credence. Many documents collected, such as Pearson's Prime Minister's Office (PMO) files, were available in the National Archives.
Chapter One:

Pearson, Science and Technology, Foreign Policy, and the Growth of Development Assistance

In this chapter we will very briefly review the growth of Canadian development assistance, especially Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), up until the early 1980s. The aim here is to lay part of the groundwork for comparison in later chapters with the focus of the thesis, IDRC. The chapter begins with a review of Lester Pearson's beliefs about science and development and its effects on politics and society. Pearson contended that the influence of science on development was bound to distribute itself unequally, and that efforts were therefore necessary to address those inequalities, nationally and internationally. Although these notions provided a basis for programmatic action, they seem to have been built on manse values abroad in the world, which were common among many in the burgeoning Canadian federal state, especially in External Affairs. The second part of the chapter begins with a brief graphical representation of how development assistance grew during the Pearson government. The chapter then shifts to review the relationship of development assistance, and CIDA, to External and other federal departments. We will also show graphically how foreign affairs and international assistance ebbed as a government priority in the late 1970s, leading to the Consolidation Exercise of that time. The first section of the chapter is therefore more a history of ideas relating to Pearson's understanding of science, development and development assistance, the second half, a review of what practices those ideas permitted as they were implemented by the new generations of officials following Pearson.

Pearson was both a creation and creator of his times. Our focus on him in this chapter is not simply because Pearson was the first Chair of IDRC, nor simply that he was Prime Minister when the proposal that became the Centre was first mooted, although some attention to Pearson would be due him for these reasons. By the time Pearson became Chairman in 1970, he was a dying man. One might conclude that the Chair could
have had but a passing influence on the Centre. But like much of Canada's post-war foreign and development assistance policy, IDRC can not be understood without reference to Lester Pearson. Pearson and those around him made IDRC possible because their world-view and historical circumstances permitted it. What we intend to do below is flesh out that world-view, those historical circumstances and the people vital to making it possible.

**Pearson's World-View in the Context of His Times**

Of the secular priests in Canada's mandarinate, Pearson had a remarkably complete *Weltanschauung*. He had a particular understanding of the technological forces present in global society and their political effects. Pearson also had an acute global geo-political sense. To be brief, Pearson argued that the inevitable march of scientific development would cause inequality. That inequality would undoubtedly cause instability. Development assistance was a means of bridging that gap, thereby ensuring global stability. Undergirding this rationale was a belief in moral and security imperatives to assist the needy, and thereby foster domestic and world order.\(^\text{17}\)

While Pearson's essential world-view and instincts were extremely stable, as we shall see, his preoccupations changed over the decades. In the 1920s and 1930s, Pearson focused on the waste of WWI and the expected waste of the one to come. In the late 1930s and early 1940s he became increasingly concerned with the danger of fascism; in the 1940s the interdependency of the emerging world order; during the 1950s, the spectre was communism. By the 1960s, in opposition and as Prime Minister he faced the daunting challenges of nuclear annihilation, Vietnam, and Quebec nationalism. Finally, in

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\(^{17}\) John English, interview by author, 3 February 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.
the early 1970s, while many of Pearson's preoccupations endured, at the end, the destruction of Southern cultural values and the environment loomed in his mind.

In many ways, Pearson was emblematic of a generation of Canadian civil servants. Like a number of other mandarins, he was the son of a preacher, and went to Oxford in the 1910s. Some of his colleagues in External Affairs, such as E.H. Norman and Escott Reid had roots in the left. What many of these officials had in common was a deep attachment to welfarist moral values. In the manner of a secular priesthood, they sought to use the state to address social inequality domestically, and in the case of some, support development assistance abroad to pursue the same end internationally. The apparent rationale for remarkably similar programmatic behaviour varied with time, temperament and background.

Pearson's generation was bound to be influential because they laid the foundations for what would eventually become Foreign Affairs. In 1924, most of Canada's foreign policy was still administered by London. In that year there were only three positions in External Affairs, and one was vacant. Pearson entered External during the crucial period 1927-28 together with many of the mandarins that would come to dominate the Canadian state for the next forty years, among them: Norman Robertson, Hugh Keenleyside, and Scott MacDonald.

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19 In the sense of the less developed nations of the southern hemisphere.


21 Granatstein, 41.
**Canute and the Imperative of the Development Gap**

According to an authority on the life and work of Pearson, John English, the real basis for the policy directions that Pearson took in the course of his life came from his moral values and beliefs.\(^{22}\) Pearson was born in Newtonbrook, Ontario on 23 April 1897. Jack Granatstein points out that at that time, "to be born in Ontario of British stock meant that one inherited a belief in God and the Empire and an obligation to do one's duty to both without question."\(^{23}\) His father and grandfather were Methodist Anglo-Irish preachers. Both of Pearson's parents singled him out from among the three sons to become a priest; the family made certain that he had a theological education up to college level.\(^{24}\) Certainly his internationalism, and humanism had deep roots. Geoffrey Pearson describes his father as a "son of the manse" and a social activist. His internationalism was obvious in many ways, not least his willingness to be Honorary President of the World Federalists, which is dedicated to the idea of world government.\(^{25}\)

His observances about the role of scientific development in society were partly formed by 1934 when he spoke to an Ottawa church group. What was Pearson's view of the relationship between society, science and development at that time?

Society is lopsided and our physical and scientific progress has been infinitely faster and further than our social, political, or spiritual advancement.\(^{26}\)

\(^{22}\) English, 3 February 1994.

\(^{23}\) Granatstein, 75-6.


A more complete statement of Pearson's view on the effects of scientific progress on international society was made in 1945 when he became chair of the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). For Pearson, science and technology were inevitable; countries that did not try to keep up would do so at their peril.

Present-day science confronts us with a categorical imperative. We must reduce and even eliminate the contemporary lag between science and technology on the one hand, and our political and social institutions on the other. We cannot ask scientific knowledge to conform to our wishful thinking any more than Canute could ask the wave to recede. Our only alternative to annihilation is to bring out political and social thinking abreast of the implications of science. . . If we let scientific progress outrun social order, we are doomed.27

Pearson's Kantian determinism was not unusual in the First and Second Worlds. Science was progress, and progress was inevitable and unidirectional.

Pearson's world-view was remarkably stable on this topic. Writing twenty-five years later, shortly after he was appointed Chair of IDRC in 1970 he wrote,

No country, not even the mightiest, can reverse certain forces of technological or scientific change and development with their inevitable social and political consequences, both national and international. Every political society has to adapt its life, its institutions, and its political and economic ideas, to these changes or be thrown into the dustbin of history.28


Disorder and Inequality Have the Same Roots

For Pearson, many of the roots of inequality in the world were based on the varying application of science to society, and the justification for Canadian involvement in developing countries followed on from a particular imperative of getting at the root of disorder in industrial societies.

We have learned in our national societies, or I hope we have, that residential suburbs surrounded by ghettos and slums are intolerable and can only lead to bitterness and violence. We should learn that lesson for the world before it is too late. But we will never learn it if our vision is obscured and distorted by national egoism and prejudice; if we are exclusively preoccupied with our domestic problems and interest; if we beggar our neighbours by short-sighted policies designed to enrich ourselves; in short, if we cling to old and traditional concepts of national policy, national interests, national sovereignty long after technological progress has made them almost meaningless.

If, as we have learned by now, national sovereignty is no guarantee of security or even adequate protection for national rights in a world of international anarchy, then there must be developed some better method for protecting those rights and guaranteeing security and progress. For this, international co-operation, international organization, and collective action is essential.

The imperative for global collective action towards lessening instability and inequality seems to have grown out of an understanding of the roots of inequality and instability at home. From the replication of peace, order and good government at home could grow world order abroad.

David Lumsdaine associates the Pearsonian view with a widespread post-war moral commitment to the distributive policies of the welfare state.

Notable international advocates of aid—Harry Truman, Harold Wilson, Lester Pearson, Willi Brandt—were not cold warriors or apologists of international capitalism but strong partisans of the domestic welfare state and, usually, of a pro-

peace, cooperative internationalism.\(^{30}\)

Pearson's view on scientific development coloured his approach to Canadian federalism and international relations, and seems remarkably contemporary although written in 1945. He believed that the scientific transformation of the world had profound effects on global patterns of inequality, but also implications for the nation-state. It is remarkably similar to the international relations interdependence literature that emerged twenty-five years later, and has many echoes in the language of globalisation which is common today.

[The effect of present-day science on society] means, among other things, that our concept of national sovereignty needs overhauling. Independence is a rightly cherished possession among nations and individuals alike, but even more important for the future well-being of civilizations is our steady evolution from independence to interdependence.

Naturally, nationalism will not be re-incarnated overnight as internationalism. But surely we can now take the transitory step by developing further what can perhaps be described as cooperative nationalism. The United Nations must not work separately, but together, at the worldwide tasks of relief and rehabilitation, economic reconstruction, and world security.\(^{31}\)

Pearson later enshrined a Canadian domestic version of his philosophy as cooperative federalism, the cornerstone of his thinking on relations between English and French Canada.


At the international level, Pearson saw international cooperation not as an option, but an imperative driven by scientifically-based development.

There will be no real peace and no real security for Canada or any other country in the post-industrial, technological world of the future, if this "gap" between the two worlds [rich and poor countries] continues to deepen and widen.  

Thus far, we have shown that Pearson believed that technological inequality between rich and poor nations causes international disorder. The absence of scientifically based development in the South resulted in poverty. For Pearson, that widening scientific "gap" had as much explosive significance as any missile "gap". The aim of world order and harmony could not be realised until that gap was bridged.

The Logic of Loss

Another motivation for Pearson's internationalism was rooted in the experience of many Canadian men at war overseas, and had a certain logic of loss. According to his family, Pearson's moral stance was formed by his experience in WWI. Pearson laid out that rationale to Americans at Columbia University in 1966,

My own country . . . is as deeply involved in world's affairs as any country of its size. We accept this because we have learned over 50 years that isolation from the policies that determine war does not give us immunity from the bloody, sacrificial consequences for their failure. We learned that in 1914 and again in 1939. It is somewhat controversial whether very many Canadians did learn this lesson.


Certainly two World Wars did not lead to the evaporation of isolationist tendencies among the francophone population of Québec. Nevertheless, this cruel knowledge of loss gave Pearson, either confirmation of his internationalist and humanitarian instincts, or perhaps planted their roots.

Post-War Possibilities of Internationalist Approaches to Foreign Policy

After Canada entered WWII, the type of isolationist tendencies which were more identified with Pearson's mentor, O.D. Skelton, were interpreted in the federal government as having been proved wrong by events. The general opinion in External Affairs and the Government shifted towards Pearson's stance on global collective security. Evidence of this is seen in an address by MacKenzie King in the House of Commons (which Pearson quoted in a speech of his own in January 1942).

I quote from a speech of the Prime Minister of Canada in the House of Commons in Ottawa on 3 November 1941:

"What we have still to learn is that today no nation is sufficient unto itself, no continent and no hemisphere great enough, in its own strength, to maintain its own freedom. A recognition of interdependence and combined action based thereon is necessary to the democracies of the world, if they are to maintain their freedom . . ."

If it is true, and I think it is profoundly true, then those political concepts "self-determination" and "sovereign rights," which were the guiding principles of the last peace, must be modified at the next peace conference in the light of this interdependence.  

Clearly, the predominance of the Pearsonian viewpoint in the upper reaches of the Canadian government would serve well in the post-war era when other great powers


The language is such that the speech may have been written by Pearson himself.
began to hold to the same opinion.

During the Second World War, Canada had close relations with its more powerful allies, Britain and America. Canada's closeness to both powers, the strong auxiliary roles that the country played for both during the war, and a new middle power status gave Canada an inordinate influence in both courts. In such circumstances, the formidable diplomatic skills of Pearson and his colleagues were put to work. He forced the narrower, traditional foreign policy concerns, which centre on the optimising of influence and order in spheres of influence, outward, to encompass the entire globe. As such, the more modest and conventional idea of "sphere of influence" was extended to world order. The defeat of the Axis by the Allies, and the immense power of the United States meant that the creation of such a global order seemed less preposterous than previously under the League of Nations. Preparations for the post-war era were spurred on with vigour by Pearson in the direction of a global vision internationally embodied in the UN, or more regionally in the Atlantic Charter. Plans for the division of the world into spheres of influence, as in Churchill's well-known division of Europe with Stalin were forced aside as far as the Iron Curtain.

The weakened condition of many of the former Great Powers in the post-war period provided a considerable opportunity for Canadian officials to add their voice to discussions in Britain and France over the possibilities of internationalism. However, old habits die hard. Suez was a victory in terms of the creation of peacekeeping, but caused

36 Gellman contends that Pearson's approach to foreign policy is an even more radical disjuncture from past practice. We agree that much of the substance was different, but much of the logic contained, or had to be placed in the halls of power according to the familiar assumption that "Canadian foreign policy was guided by the conscious evaluation of interest and power ... and the international distribution of power."

Britain and France to look suspiciously at the UN. Arnold Smith thought,

The analysis put forward in the Foreign Office to support a jaundiced view of the UN though by no means without substance, seems inadequate and in part superficial. It also seems coloured to a significant extent by nostalgia for a primacy of power and the lost freedom of action which great nations used to enjoy in a less interdependent and less organized world.\(^37\)

Despite the nostalgia for unrestrained sovereign power, the experience of Suez and the subsequent vote against the UK and France in the UN strengthened moves towards European Union, but shrivelled inclinations towards multilateral arrangements like the UN.

Canadian officials soldiered on with their internationalist agenda. In the case of the Commonwealth, the aim was to convince the British and other white Commonwealth governments to accept colour-blind viewpoints in international affairs. However, in 1957 the stream began to run in the opposite direction when the British attempted to make an inner cabinet of white mini-Commonwealth, following criticism of the British at the United Nations. Arnold Smith, in particular, endeavoured vigorously to re-educate the white or "Old Commonwealth" to drop racialist viewpoints. Their rationale was that only with a vigourous and complete Commonwealth would the newly independent states be educated into accepting international norms of conduct.

Smith argued for encouraging developing nations to become part of international society when the British were souring in their attitude towards the UN. He pointed out to the British that,

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\(^{37}\) Smith's goals and outlook were generally in tune with Pearson's. Both men led the Commonwealth nations and others towards an internationalist engagement.

It was not the United Nations, for example, which developed the nationalist movements in India, Burma, or Ghana. On the contrary, Canadians were inclined to see in the United Nations the possibility of gradually educating and harnessing nationalist movements to the responsibilities of interdependence in an international society.\textsuperscript{38}

Internationalist perspectives had to be posed in ways which appealed to themes which the monarchs of the sea and high ministers of the great powers could be warmed to, be they paternalism or a desire for influence. Other motivations were also evident for internationalist engagement, such as the moral threat of communism.

\textbf{Foreign Aid and the Colombo Plan}

In the late 1940s, independence in South Asia and liberation movements elsewhere forced the attention of the West towards the South and the East. The implantation of liberal democracy and stopping of communism became important priorities in Western capitals. The Marshall Plan had reinforced liberal democracies in Western Europe and was believed to be a model worth replicating. The liquidity starved British wanted cash to circulate within the boundaries of the collapsing Empire. The newly independent states of South Asia were also looking for new injections of dollars. Those were some of the \textit{realpolitik} reasons for the creation of the Colombo Plan, which laid the foundations for Commonwealth foreign aid.

Doug Lepan says that the origins of the Colombo Plan were not, primarily, the result of political calculation. He points out in his memoirs that there was no consensus going into the meeting that aid was a solution, or even an option to be considered. When

\textsuperscript{38} Foreign Affairs Records, Arnold Smith in "The United Nations, Informal Record of a Meeting held in the Commonwealth Relations Office on Friday, 26th April, 1957" TD, 24 April 1957, RG 25, 86-87/336 Vol. 118, 5475-7-40 pt 1., Public Archives of Canada, 1.
The fact that the US was not part of the discussions was seen as making the exercise ineffective. When the Marshall Plan for Asia was approved the eye of the delegates was very much towards getting the Americans involved.

Yet the Colombo Plan was come to reluctantly, because it was seen as an outflow of funds by cash short countries.  

The view of some of the Canadian delegation to Colombo regarding the link between science, development and developing countries is apparent in Lepan's conclusion to the Report on the Commonwealth Consultative Conference on South and South-East Asia at Colombo in his memoirs, Bright Glass of Memory. 

In an age when other countries are increasingly reaping the advantages of scientific and industrial advance, the hastening of a similar process in Asia cannot safely be delayed. ...
In a world racked by schism and confusion it is doubtful whether free men can long afford to leave undeveloped and imprisoned in poverty the human resources of the countries of South and South-East Asia which could help so greatly, not only to restore the world's prosperity, but also to redress its confusion and enrich the lives of all men everywhere.\textsuperscript{42}

In seeking to commit Canada to the Colombo Plan, a memorandum was sent by Lepan to Prime Minister St. Laurent via Pearson. It contains Lepan and Pearson's view of the importance of building peace, rather than containment by means of war. Lepan's comments on the text follow.

"In many areas of our foreign policy it is necessary to have faith; not a faith which blinds us to realities and, as in the case of the Colombo Plan, to the staggering difficulties and political tensions of the area, but, faith to keep on trying to build for peace rather than concentrating all our efforts on trying to contain Russia by force." I quote that here because, better than anything else I know, it suggests how I was thinking and feeling at the time and also, I believe, how Mr. Pearson was thinking and feeling as well.\textsuperscript{43}

For Pearson, communism was not a simple enemy. Revolution had its roots in poverty.

The solution was to plant other roots, democracy and a modern economy.

It is the myth of the omnipotence of communism which blinds us to the real meaning of the revolutionary tides now sweeping through Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and, in other forms, through Europe. As long as we continue to treat these movements as primarily the by-products of the activities of Kremlin-directed conspiratorial parties, we will never understand them. Communism cannot subvert the institutions of a country with deeply rooted democratic traditions and an expanding economy.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{42} Lepan, 213.

\textsuperscript{43} Lepan, 220.

Moral Threat of Communism

For Pearson, unequal development and global instability went hand in hand. Until the late 1950s, Pearson, kindred spirit Harold MacMillan,\(^45\) and many others saw communism as an important force to be reckoned with, as a moral as well as a political challenge. Communism could only be defeated by fighting it with both material development and moral values.

The most immediate danger to our way of life is communism - a false doctrine and as the spearhead of a brutal imperialism which threatens the existence of those countries which are heirs to the traditions of Christendom. There must be no reserve in our commitment, personal or national, to do our best to remove that danger. Yet it would be a mistake, I think, to believe that we can or should attempt to defeat communism as a doctrine by force. Among other things, it is an idea, and as an idea it must be resisted by intellectual and spiritual weapons and also removing the conditions of poverty and misery and injustice in which it grows.\(^46\)

Pearson's was fundamentally a moral position, based on practical philosophy, wrapped in instrumentalist language. This dualism is not particular to Pearson, rather this is deeply embedded in Canadian society.\(^47\)


\(^{46}\) Lester Pearson, Foreword to "The Best Years" St. Patrick's College, Echo Drive, Ottawa, Approximately January 1952, Pearson Subject Files Pre-1958 Series, Aid to Underdeveloped Areas 1945-57, MG 26 N 1, Vol. 18, Public Archives of Canada, 2.

\(^{47}\) Certainly, in part, that moral stance is something to do with the curriculum of Canadian universities, especially evident at University of Toronto in Pearson's day. While Pearson's family came from Ireland, his essential moral instincts were quite Scottish, and this may have something to do with the influence of Scottish education on Canada, which Bumsted contends were particularly applicable to understanding the poverty of developing countries.

Scottish education . . . emphasized the needs of contemporary society . . . The Scottish education system of education served as a model for colonial systems,
In the 1950s, the global battle against communism was a moral struggle, and for Pearson as he briefed PM St. Laurent, aid accomplished a number of diplomatic tasks. I am sure that you will agree with me that nothing is much more important in the fight against Communist penetration of Asia than assistance of the kind we have been giving under the Colombo Plan and the United Nations scheme. I think that Canada can play a more important part in the fight against Asian Communism by assistance of this kind than by joining organizations like SEATO. Also, increased assistance in this field would be a convincing answer to those who argue that we are not interested in Pacific or Asian affairs because of our reluctance to become associated with regional defence associations in that area.\footnote{L. B. Pearson, DEA, Memorandum to Prime Minister, Ottawa, "Contributions to the Colombo Plan and to the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance,}

including those of the various provinces of Canada. To some extent this transfer followed from the number of Scots involved in education, but to a greater degree it was because of Scottish educational philosophy—based as it was on talent and utility rather than class or tradition—was ideally suited to the needs of developing countries.


Social studies in Canadian universities has always stood on instrumentalism of writers like Bentham and Locke which served as the basis for the expansion of administrative forms of discourse in British colonies, and the second, Scottish practical moral philosophy.

Prior to the Pearsonian vision, the practical instrumentalism of Bentham and Locke held sway. That instrumentalism within the context of Canadian foreign policy was instrumental but not could never be narrowly parochial. Canadian foreign policy since the French Régime has always been somewhat removed from Canadian domestic interests. Alliance with others outside has always been an obligatory part of Canadian political practice. Canadians have always been grafted to great empires. And Canadian diplomats have always made use of temporary agreements with different countries on different issues. For the longest part of its history as an independent nation English Canadians have attached themselves to the idea of Empire and Commonwealth. In this respect, Pearsonian internationalism was simply an expansion of the multilateralism implicit in Empire and more broadly Commonwealth.
Pearson argued that development assistance was a more effective alternative to military aid. In reading Pearson's writing of 1960, six years later, one gets the impression that world order depends on the application of development and democracy for success. Technical assistance, engineers, lawyers are part of a framework of rules which should lead new nations to accept roles as willing partners in a peaceful world order. Scientific development seems to have been considered as important for world order as the creation of a UN police force. For Pearson, this institutional apparatus should favour the fostering of pro-Western governments.

Inclusionary Diplomacy

Pearson's approach to international diplomacy was always one which attempted to include other voices in discussions, despite his strong opposition to communism. Pearson and Escott Reid's unhappiness at the lack of enthusiasm by the USSR for the United Nations was deep, but the desire to bring all to the table was never stilled. According to Granatstein, Reid's views, which largely paralleled Pearson's were that,

The West must be clear about the moral nature of that split—Christian individualism versus the totalitarian heresy, and wage a war for men's minds. `In order to be successful,' he [Reid] said, `the faith of the Western world must show itself in good works'—a commitment to social justice, decolonization, and a genuine world government. That meant reconciliation of East and West that would enable the General Assembly to become a true world legislature and the International Court of Justice a true judicial body.

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Granatstein, 248.

While committed to defeat communism, Pearson did not want to put a *cordon sanitaire* around the other camp. He explicitly rejected this approach when Prime Minister.

Nous avons un double choix. L'un consiste à avoir recours à un ostracisme et à un isolement diplomatiques et économiques envers les États situés derrière le rideau de fer. Le Canada, il va de soi, rejette cette solution. L'autre, le seul qui soit raisonnable, aux yeux de Canada, consiste à entretenir des contacts aussi rapprochés que possible avec les chefs du bloc soviétique en vue de chercher pour les exploiter des ouvertures propices aux négociations sur les questions d'importance majeure entre l'Est et l'Ouest.[sic]  

Pearson redoubled his efforts to increase global diplomatic contacts between the US and USSR, in particular, and with developing countries after 1960. Pearson struggled to have representatives from socialist and developing countries become part of the Conference on World Tensions, a high-powered conference of statesmen and academics, dominated by American voices. Pearson said in the journal of the 1960 Conference on World Tensions of which he was chair,

> Would it not be desirable to hold a similar Conference with representation from Communist, uncommitted, and Western democratic countries in roughly equal proportions? We would then get a different and a broader perspective; especially if it were held, as it should be in an Asian or African country.

52 Pearson's interest in developing countries was renewed while in opposition when he attended conferences at Oxford and elsewhere. There he met Nknumah, Kaunda and others. He was highly impressed by these leaders of soon to be independent states. Later, Pearson's interest in the South was strengthened by: the presence of his son, Geoffrey, in the Canadian Embassy in Mexico City, and then at the High Commission in India; the involvement of his friends Escott Reid, also in India and Hugh Keenleyside's UN activities; and his intoxicating friendship with Lady Barbara Ward Jackson.


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Although the conference in Chicago in May 1960 had a distinctly American twang, the next conference took place in Kuala Lumpur and included representatives from developing countries. However, Pearson's wish to include participants from communist countries was not granted, a pattern that was to repeat itself in the case of the selection of members of the Board of Governors of IDRC a decade later.

When Pearson became Prime Minister he continued to carry the message of including communists in discussions overseas. His view was reflected in documents prepared for him for foreign trips, including trips to Washington. The inclusion of Communist states was justified on the same grounds that Arnold Smith used with regard to the New Commonwealth, the "civilising mission."

> It is surely in our interests to encourage the Communist nations to develop contacts and to get used to working more closely with us, to learn the habits and rules of co-operation which are those of the community of nations to which the U.S.S.R. hopes to gain respectable access.

However, as before, and would happen again later, Pearson's exertions to forge Western ties with representatives of Communist countries came to nought. He was more successful in creating a First World–Third World dialogue.

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Pearson's Last Decade — Partnership, Environment, Development and Retaining Cultural Values

In the last decade of his life, Pearson added three elements to his thinking as regards developing countries, partnership, environmental concerns and the loss of cultural values. From his time in Chicago as a young man, and later as Ambassador to Washington, Pearson feared the melting of Canadian values in the face of increasing contact with the USA. In his last years, perhaps partly influenced by his experience on the Pearson Commission, and on the Board of IDRC, he returned to this kind of concern as well as with the environment, but in the context of developing countries.

While so much of our co-operation for development is necessarily designed to help the poorer, developing countries enter the modern technological and scientific age, and while they have a right to share in the benefits of progress that has been made, we must also assist them to secure these benefits while avoiding the threats to their own tested values and traditions; to their own environment and culture, from uncontrolled technological progress.

Pearson's belief that developing countries should not be subject to, but partners in, development assistance activities went back at least to 1960.

The spirit in which help is offered and given is as important as the help itself. There should be a feeling of participation and achieving on the part of the receiving nation, which can not be expected to be grateful for crumbs or even a loaf from the rich man's table.

This may require taking certain risks, sacrificing certain efficiency, and sharing control and direction of the operation. It will be worth it. This is the way international aid programs should be administered. The maximum responsibility


should be placed in the hands of the receiving country.\textsuperscript{58}

It is perhaps not surprising that the Pearson Commission's report of nearly a decade later was entitled \textit{Partners in Development}.


John Holmes, then at the Canadian Institute for International Affairs (CIIA) appears to have ghost written some of the drafts for this unpublished text.
Figure 2

Patterns of Practice and Perception in Canadian Development Assistance

Pearson's actual performance as Prime Minister with respect to development assistance mirrored his uttered concern. Although the Progressive Conservatives created the External Aid Office (EAO) in 1960, the aid budget stagnated and dropped during their government. In contrast, Pearson as Prime Minister greatly expanded the size of development assistance disbursements. Total allocations, which reflect levels of Parliamentary appropriations of funds as amended by Cabinet, grew from $65.3 million in the allocations for 1964 to $253.2 million in 1968 (see Figure 2).  

Despite the fact that Pearson was under strong pressure in 1967 to cut foreign aid

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in order to finance Medicare, aid allocations for that year exceeded the actual total expenditures for both foreign policy and development assistance combined, (which at that time meant principally External Affairs and EAO). Although the curve of expenditure for foreign affairs and development assistance follows the total federal expenditure from 1968 to 1970, the sharp rise in 1966 meant that allocations had leapt above the federal average, even if the rate of increase was comparable. The chart shows that Pearson was consequent in his commitment to funding development assistance. Because the time lag between funding decisions and expenditures is over a year, Pearson set the pace for Pierre Trudeau. By 1970 allocations approached four times the 1964 figure. Although Trudeau refused to commit himself to holding to spending targets in order to reach the goal of 0.7\% of GNP, allocations rose at 15-20\% a year in the late 1960s and most of the 1970s.\textsuperscript{60} Rises continued, if erratically and less quickly than the general growth rate of expenditures, despite the limited absorptive capacity of CIDA to disburse, and domestic pressures.

**A New Generation of Officials**

The massive increase in funding permitted the development of a new sub-culture in the federal government, the developmentalist. About this time, a new generation of top civil servants who were to lead them began to emerge to take the reins from the fading mandarins. To some extent, they resembled a new stratum appearing across the world. In certain respects they resembled what Burnham described in *The Managerial Revolution*. They were less generalists than the preceding generation, more disciplinary and technically-minded. In Canada as elsewhere, the next generation were part of the post-war wave of economists, managers and lawyers. They were adherents to systems approaches

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\textsuperscript{60} Peyton V. Lyon and Tareq Ismael, *Canada and the Third World*, Toronto: Macmillan, 1976, xvi.
to problems, effectiveness, and had a belief in science and its works.\textsuperscript{61}

The new generation of foreign and development assistance officials included economists like Marcel Massé, Gordon Osbaldeston, and Michel Dupuy, and lawyers like Paul Gérin-Lajoie and Allan Gotlieb. Massé, Gérin-Lajoie, and Gotlieb were Rhodes Scholars. Like the mandarins, the majority had received university degrees in Europe, notably Oxford. But they were much more likely to be French Canadians and more secular than the generation they succeeded.

Their outlook accepted the main tenet of the Pearsonian vision, in the sense of having an internationalist perspective. But those in charge of implementing the Pearsonian vision were less homogeneous in their views as to what foreign policy and development assistance meant. They were not certain whether development assistance was simply a subset of foreign policy, usually interpreted to imply parochial concerns, or rooted in a humanitarian outlook. Their common focus was on economic development, Canadian and international, and less diplomacy. The new generation concentrated more on supporting Canadian unity via assistance directed towards Francophone countries.

In October 1966, Maurice Strong, the former President of Power Corporation, became Director General of EAO.\textsuperscript{62} Strong's business background gave him power in the land. The fact that the Minister for External Affairs, Paul Martin Sr.\textsuperscript{63}, had recruited Strong and given him the mandate to change the shape of Canada's aid effort made Strong powerful in Liberal and official circles.

\textsuperscript{61} John English, interview by author, 3 February 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

\textsuperscript{62} In 1968 under Strong's leadership, the EAO became CIDA and he became its President.

Strong was not a typical businessman. Strong was born in tiny Oak Lake, Manitoba. In common with many of the older mandarins, his background was shaped by moral values absorbed in his youth. Apparently, his outlook on the world was powerfully shaped by his encounters with missionaries in Sunday School. Strong was later involved with lay preaching. He was briefly employed for several months by the Hudson's Bay Company, working closely with Canadian Inuit. In 1947, while in his late teens he worked at the UN. In 1952 and 1953, he travelled the world (including one year in East Africa), and during this period participated in the international wing of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA).  

Upon returning to Canada, Strong had no intention of reasserting himself in the business world; rather his desire was to become involved in development. Accordingly, he presented himself at the External Aid Office, but, ironically, was turned away due to his lack of academic qualifications. Undaunted, he decided to return to business, using his success as a platform for eventual eligibility to enter the development field.  

In short, Maurice Strong may have become a businessman but his beliefs forced him outward towards international humanitarian activities. This is not to say that he ignored the role of business in development assistance. While he sought to include Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) like the YMCA, he also involved companies. Nevertheless, a number of factors conspired so that neither Strong, nor what would become CIDA, would be easily accommodated among the rest of the Federal Government.  

Strong was strong by name and by nature. Among the gentle folk of the civil service this would have made relations difficult alone. A sense of Strong's difficulties with External Affairs and the other parts of government are captured in the following  

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65 Seward, 21.
quote,

I do not wish to discuss the President [Strong] except to point out that he dominates the Agency and that with his background he does not fully appreciate or understand the reasons for some of the ritualistic procedures for inter-departmental behaviour.\textsuperscript{66}

In business there is much more room for manoeuvre is presumed for managers. Strong brought those expectations to government. Soon after his arrival at EAO, like business people before and after him, he came to the conclusion that the part of government under his authority should be removed as much as possible from bureaucratic influence, perhaps made a Crown corporation. However, he found that doing so would bring him away from committees of influence, arenas which he did not want to give up.\textsuperscript{67} Secondly, corporate influences were not sanguine about such a possibility.\textsuperscript{68} He abandoned the idea of making CIDA independent, but the idea re-emerged in the form of IDRC.

The different character of the burgeoning development assistance program and its relationship to the rest of the federal government caused great difficulty for Strong and his successors. The humanitarian beliefs of Strong and Pearson were replicated most powerfully in CIDA in the late 1960s. There was too a belief in External Affairs and central agencies that the American experiment in creating quasi-independent government agencies was very much a mixed blessing.\textsuperscript{69} Many officials in External and in other departments thought that CIDA had two main deficiencies: 1) officers there did not know what foreign policy was, (of which development assistance was considered a subset, and


\textsuperscript{67} Lewis Perinbam, interview by author, 22 September 1987, tape recording, Ottawa.

\textsuperscript{68} Tim Plumptre, interview by author, 20 January 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

\textsuperscript{69} Jon Church, interview by author, 15 December 1993, tape recording, Ottawa.
2) it was too autonomous.

The tension between narrow self-interest and humanitarian considerations has long been noted in foreign policy analysis. Canadian foreign, and, in particular, development assistance policy, is no exception. We have seen above how Pearson created the groundwork for development assistance in Canada in the 1960s by pushing outward the traditional "sphere of influence" view of foreign policy, making the entire world a matter of proper attention for all. We have looked a little at the "House that Lester built", with especial emphasis on scientific development. Below we will see how development assistance evolved from the 1960s to the 1980s to see if we can discern any emerging patterns which may be of relevance to IDRC. In particular, we will examine: a) the initial manner in which aid was set up in the 1960s, b) how different arms of government related to one another during this period and beyond and, c) how officials in External Affairs and other central agencies intermittently sought to centralise foreign policy.

Our general conclusion is that different historical circumstances conspire to aid or foil the centralising tendencies of bureaucracies which seem to be inherent to large organisations.\(^70\) In the context of Canadian development assistance during the 1960s to 1980s, these centralising tendencies have been able to emerge when the economy is perceived as weakening, but they do not determine the timing of such moves. Yet in periods of economic downturn, statist tendencies have often been allied to parochial concerns.

The chief instrument of foreign policy is the Department of Foreign Affairs. As such, the culture of that organisation and relation to central agencies has been vital to the

\(^70\) For a brief discussion of Weber's means for limiting the tendency to accumulate power see,

definition of the practice of foreign policy. Consequently, decisions about whether a

given policy is to be parochial or internationalist are powerfully influenced by Foreign
Affairs. Over decades, different initiatives have been taken to permit Foreign Affairs to
direct different facets of foreign policy. Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been
a large part of: a) the funding nominally coming under Foreign Affairs, and b) concerns
notionally part of foreign policy. Therefore, over decades ODA has been seen in the
Department as within its province, even if diplomacy, and, since the absorption of the
Trade Commissioner Service into Foreign in 1981, trade, have come to be seen as of
greater import.

External Affairs and the Utility of Aid

Despite the predominance of the Pearsonian vision as such, at the Cabinet table
and in the boardrooms of the central agencies, aid had always to be justified in terms of
mutual benefit. The key 1960 memorandum that served as the basic argument for much
subsequent development assistance, (under the Conservative government of Diefenbaker)
argued for development assistance in these terms. While Pearson remained the respected
leader of Canadian foreign policy, even in opposition in the late 1950s, the humanitarian
aspects of his views seem to have been less prevalent in External Affairs. The 15 August
1960 Cabinet Memorandum establishing the External Aid Office prescribed that "these
programmes are an integral part of Canada's foreign policy and . . . reflect and to an
important degree are moulded by the nature of the relationship between Canada and the
recipient country."71 Aid was seen as subordinate to Canadian parochial interests, and

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71 Cabinet Memorandum establishing the External Aid Office, 15 August 1960, in
Foreign Affairs Records, Aubrey Morantz, ECD to Malone, A. PDMI, "Director
General's Meeting January 17 1974 on relations with CIDA," TD, 16 January 1974,
"Working Paper," RG 25, 89-90/030, Box 8, Volume 1, 12-3-CIDA, Integration of the
Government External Operations - Planning - Coordinating and Integrating Services -
Canadian International Development Agency, Foreign Affairs, 1.
international relations. We must remember that this document was written during a Conservative government, but the Memorandum was returned to again and again by External Affairs officers, especially during times of restraint, as proving the contingent nature of development assistance. For example, in 1974, six years after the creation of CIDA, the working paper for an important meeting of External's Directors-General suggested that the 1960 Memorandum be used to persuade the leadership of CIDA of its functional place as a subset of foreign policy.

An effort should be made in high level bilateral discussions with CIDA to win recognition of the principle that aid is part of foreign policy and must be coordinated like all other government within a foreign policy framework.\footnote{72}

One of the main utilities of aid from the point of view of External was the gaining of political benefits. So formalised was this in minds of External Affairs' officials that by 1967 Doug Kirkwood, Director of the Economic Relations Division of External Affairs wrote to then Under-Secretary, Marcel Cadieux,

The essential steps in any aid programme are the allocation of funds, the identification of any suitable projects, the negotiation of appropriately detailed project agreements, the supervision of administration of the execution of the projects and finally (of great importance from the point of view of this Department) the exploitation of the political benefits which can be derived.\footnote{73}

Yet we should not view External Affairs as a monolith. Within the External Affairs of the 1950s and 1960s, opinion was by no means united as to the desirability or capacity of Canadians to use aid for gaining political objectives and export promotion. Development


assistance was always the result of a mix of motives.

The motives for development assistance were very unclear, even at the top. At the apex of discussions, the Interdepartmental Committee for External Relations' Secretariat prepared a paper on the integration of the foreign service in 1971, and reviewed the motivations for foreign aid. The display of uncertainty, perhaps even of the Deputy Ministers themselves may be guessed at from the following whose writer mused,

The Aid Programme

Here the problem is defining the objective. Is it the economic development of LDC's influence over local political situations in the developing world? Assistance to Canadian exporters? Satisfaction of a Canadian desire to do good abroad - of a sort of secularized missionary instinct? All these things seem to be involved one way or another.74

Among the External Affairs officers that disbursed development assistance, other than EAO, less instrumental views of aid were common. D.R. Taylor,75 head of Economic Division II at External in 1960 wrote to Ed Ritchie,

I would agree, provided this country had the financial resources and the government were willing, that Canada and the West generally would profit from well run programmes aimed primarily at political objectives and from effective trade promotion in certain parts of the world. But it is a serious mistake to mix either one or both of these with technical assistance that is directed at economic development.

It would be silly for us to expect Canadian experts to fulfil a political mission. In my view Canadians generally simply are not fitted through education, upbringing or social and political environment to spread a political gospel. If they were, except in unusual cases, they would probably be useless as technical experts. . .

It should be remembered also that programmes of technical assistance that have a political motive can easily backfire—and often do. The Americans have brought

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75 D.R. Taylor was later a Professor at Carleton and wrote in support of IDRC.
on themselves untold grief in many places because they are suspected of having a political motive. Cuba is not a bad example. For the USSR the withdrawal of UAR students by Nasser also illustrates the point.\textsuperscript{76}

The idea that development assistance, especially technical assistance, was somehow different from foreign policy, and should be seen as such, was strongest among those most concerned with aid activities. This view fit well within the more technocratic views of the new generation. Nevertheless, most arguments to provide development assistance usually had to be put according to the belief that development assistance was properly subordinate to traditional foreign policy concerns. The following is a typical plea,

> If Canada and other members of the Commonwealth are to influence the course of events in Africa in a direction favourable to our interests and those of the non-communist world generally, we should consider without further delay what we can do to assist the emergent African countries to make orderly progress in economic development.\textsuperscript{77}

The assumption behind this plea is that development assistance will create a pro-Western and stable order, much as Pearson did himself.\textsuperscript{78} Canada was to play the role of an auxiliary or refined tactician following the logic of the middle power.

Another example of early but enduring views of external aid within External Affairs can be gleaned from the Ambassador to Belgium in 1960.

> Congo because of its geographical position, its large population, plentiful resources and comparatively high level of economic development has a chance of


\textsuperscript{78} As pioneers of an indigenous rational scientific order in developing countries, IDRC and other technical assistance funding organizations could be seen as fostering "orderly progress in economic development."
becoming one of the most important countries in Africa, potentially more important politically, economically and in terms of trade than Ghana, Guinea and most of French Africa. Apart from other considerations it looks from here like good politics and good business to give them at least some token assistance soon after independence.\(^\text{79}\)

Distinct from the previous quotation, aid is distinctly parochial, for political advantage and domestic business.

To some extent, Pearson fought an uphill battle for the supremacy of his vision, even after becoming PM. His announcement in 1967 that Canadian development assistance should reach the UN target of one per cent of GNP was not accomplished without the considerable reluctance of senior officials. The committee of senior officials brought together to consider the announcement pointed out that the 14 November 1963 decision for foreign aid to reach levels equivalent to other donors was "subject to economic circumstances." They proposed to announce the one per cent aid target subject to Canadian economic conditions and the level and quality of aid provided by other donor countries."\(^\text{80}\) At the time, the level and quality of other states, particularly America, was dropping, which was exactly what Pearson sought consistently during the last decade of his life to reverse.


\(^{80}\) CIDA Records, "Memo to Cabinet, Proposal for Announcing a Foreign Aid Target", TM, 27 January 1966, RG 74, 80-81/102, Box 5, File 2-16, Pt. 1, Ad Hoc Senior Committee on External Aid, Public Archives of Canada, 1.
Marcel Cadieux and the Primacy of Foreign Policy

Just as Strong beliefs were fervently Christian, so were Marcel Cadieux's, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Strong was a member of the United Church. Cadieux was profoundly Catholic, committed to diplomacy as a calling, and believed in federalism.\footnote{English, 17 February 1994.} Both Cadieux and Pearson thought that for moral and practical political reasons External Affairs should be less dominated by English Canadians, and should reach out to francophones within Canada and in the rest of the Francophonie.\footnote{Some sense of this policy can be seen in this quotation from a Memorandum to Cabinet during the Pearson government, which followed the Chevrier mission that established aid policy as regards the francophonie.} Cadieux was concerned that with the increasing budgets of EAO, the general growth of other federal and provincial agencies whose tendrils were beginning to extend overseas, Canadian foreign policy was fracturing and ceasing to lose its coherence.\footnote{CIDA Records, "19 Sept 1968," "Memo to Cabinet," "Financing the Local Costs of Aid Projects in Francophone Africa approved by the Chevrier Mission," MS, 8 September 1967, RG 74, Acc. 80-81/102, Vol. 4, File, 2-12, pt. 4, Public Archives of Canada, 2.} One might guess that the expansion of External Aid must have been particularly worrying to Cadieux because although development assistance arms were retained within External Affairs proper for some time, the bulk of funding went to EAO. Consequently, Cadieux's principal foreign policy tool regarding the Francophonie, and to some extent for

It is the Government's policy to increase significantly and quickly Canada's assistance to Francophone Africa. This policy is a reflection of Canada's bilingual and bicultural character; in addition, it aims, and here the matter is a pressing one, at dissuading the francophone states of Africa from dealing directly with the Province of Quebec which is making continued attempts to establish its rights to conduct foreign relations independently of the Federal Government, particularly in the field of education.

\footnote{John English, 17 February 1994.}
recruitment of French Canadians within the Department of External Affairs, was in EAO, and therefore in practical terms outside his orbit.

For Cadieux and other External Affairs' officers, those in development assistance did not understand foreign policy, nor the proper role of government. The battle between competing visions of development assistance was laid out during a meeting of the External Aid Board\(^\text{84}\) The two protagonists were Cadieux and Strong themselves.

[Strong] believed that the "raison-d'être" of the External Aid Office as a separate entity within the Government was the recognition that international development assistance (for which the term "aid" will be used hereafter), was a function separate from, but closely related to, foreign policy, trade policy, finance and other elements of overall government policy and administration. . . . It may be defined as the science (or art) of applying external resources to the induction of economic and social development in lesser developed countries.\(^\text{85}\)

Strong's focus was on the development of developing countries, aid was not a mere subset of other more domestic concerns. For Cadieux, the opposite was true, "Mr. Cadieux said that it must be borne in mind that aid was an aspect of foreign policy." During the meeting, Strong emphasised that although they were related, they had "separate functional areas within the government. . . . [Strong said] it should be recognized that normally aid considerations would be the principal factor governing decisions on matters involving expenditure of aid funds."\(^\text{86}\) Strong thereby argued that in the final analysis his own bureaucratic authority was the source of his independence. Cadieux and many of his successors were ever more keen to take opportunities to domesticate, in every sense, development assistance. With the departure of Maurice Strong from what had become

\(^{\text{84}}\) The Committee included high-level representatives of the principal departments concerned with development assistance. It was chaired at the time by Maurice Strong.

\(^{\text{85}}\) CIDA Records, "Record of External Aid Board Meeting," TD, 8 February 1967, RG 74, Acc. 80-81/102, Volume 2, File, 2-12, pt.2, EAO Board Correspondence, Public Archives of Canada, 2.

\(^{\text{86}}\) "Record of External Aid Board Meeting," 3.
CIDA, External sought to convince Agency officials of the necessity of subsuming development assistance more decisively within Canadian domestic concerns. As Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ed Ritchie wrote to the new President of CIDA, Paul Gérin-Lajoie,

> Within the scenarios we have been creating, the developing world during the 1970's is not likely to have a great economic impact on Canada. It has, however, seemed to us that with a view to longer term objectives we should be building up economic relations with some of them for purposes of diversification and mutually beneficial trade. Additionally, the political influence of the developing world is not to be discounted and the weight of certain countries may again serve to help Canada to gain its broader objectives.\(^\text{87}\)

D.R. Taylor's response to Ritchie's memorandum of 1960 appear to show Ritchie was domestically oriented in nature. Ritchie's views do not seem to have changed in the interceding years. The Under-Secretary very clearly aimed to convince Gérin-Lajoie of the pre-eminence of domestic business or political interests in the use of "resources available." The Under-Secretary sought to show that the developing world was peripheral, in every sense, to Canadian foreign policy, but if it should be relevant, then the encouragement of trade should be the primary aim.

> While humanitarian motivations have certainly always been important in determining the pattern and character of the Canadian aid programme, and should, in my view, continue to be so, it seems to me we shall in coming years need to be increasingly careful that resources available under the aid programme also support other national interests as they have been or may be identified. This will be particularly relevant to the way we allocate our aid geographically and also in many instances to the types of programmes we undertake in recipient countries.\(^\text{88}\)

Ritchie appears to have been concerned that humanitarian motivations had played too

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\(^{87}\) Foreign Affairs Records, A.E. Ritchie, to Paul Gérin-Lajoie, "Geographic Allocation of Aid Funds," TLS, 19 September 1972, RG 25, 89-90/030, Box 8, Volume 1, 12-3-

\(^{88}\) A.E. Ritchie, 2.
much a role in that he exhorted the new President of CIDA to be "increasingly careful" that aid "also support other national interests."

While External Affairs' officers believed that their values were predicated on the calculation of national interest, many of CIDA's officers values were believed to have a different basis. In 1969, E.A.H. Smith outlined External's officers beliefs and those of its Under-Secretary of State relative to those of CIDA when he wrote that,

Our philosophic approach towards aid is not identical with that of CIDA. You outlined this aspect in your address to the Montebello Seminar last September. We naturally see aid as one element in the totality of our relationship with a country and as means of pursuing national objectives. It is a healthy influence to have CIDA stress the altruistic nature of aid and to be a restraining hand on those who might want to distort the Canadian programme for unrealistic political or commercial ends. Nevertheless there is a fundamental difference of approach with which we shall need to learn to live.89

Not only was there a clear difference perceived between the culture of CIDA and External, but CIDA was seen as having different approaches from the rest of government. As one officer of External, S.G. Harris wrote in 1972 after Maurice Strong had left the Agency,

CIDA generally takes the view that aid is good in itself and that development per se is an end in itself. Others see this aid as an extension of domestic programs for regional expansion, for industrial development, for fostering exports trade and for disbursing agricultural surpluses. One of the real problems in the CIDA case is that 50 per cent of their personnel have less than two years' experience with Government and the personnel turnover in the organization is very rapid. Furthermore, it is the habit of CIDA to bring in personnel from industry and outside the Government and most of these people are not familiar with the "rituals of Government's organization".90

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90 Foreign Affairs Records, S.G. Harris, ICER, to File, TMS, 25 September 1972, RG 25, 89-90/030, Box 8, Volume 1, 12-3-CIDA, Integration of the Government
Harris's comments show that CIDA officers were often sub-culturally at variance with other parts of government. Particular departments were unhappy with CIDA's policies. Harris goes on to say,

They [CIDA] feel it [programming] is a strictly internal matter for CIDA alone. However, other departments, particularly IT & C [Industry, Trade and Commerce] and Agriculture, feel very strongly that they would like to be involved with actual project selection in many countries as it has many implications for them. There is also the problem of whether aid for a particular project be tied or untied and here IT & C has a major interest.  

Clearly, if IT and C and Agriculture felt that CIDA was operating beyond the pale, this sentiment was even more keenly felt in External Affairs.

Preparation of the Siege of CIDA

External Affairs' personnel identified CIDA's autonomy as a great impediment to its enclosing within the Canadian government's foreign policy priorities. In 1973, this viewpoint was powerfully put by R.D. Jackson.

CIDA has constructed a largely autonomous agency, which brooks little input, let alone interference, from other government agencies with overlapping or overriding responsibilities, and whose objectives bear little relationship to those of these other agencies. CIDA makes no secret of its disinclination to be guided by the Government's approved foreign policy themes and objectives; apart from the commitment to assist the third world in its economic development, which of course is designed to be of indirect benefit to Canada in the longer term, CIDA often tends to dismiss other objectives as being irrelevant to its mandate. And as the only government agency specializing in development assistance, CIDA considers itself to be the only agency qualified to make considered judgements on development assistance policy and has certainly worked effectively to enhance its

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91 S.G. Harris, 2.
autonomy in this sphere. This is the nub of the problem, it must be clearly identified as such, and it must be the focus of measures to correct distortions which have been injected or have crept into structures and procedures designed to regulate and coordinate Canadian foreign policy.\footnote{Foreign Affairs Records, R.D. Jackson, ECD to PDA, "CIDA: Coordination," TM, 29 November 1973, RG 25, 89-90/030, Box 8, Volume 1, 12-3-CIDA, Integration of the Government External Operations - Planning - Coordinating and Integrating Services - Canadian International Development Agency, Public Archives of Canada, 2.}

Jackson went on to say that all of CIDA, "both senior management and the working bureaucracy share the conviction that autonomy is best suited to serve CIDA's interests."

Boldly, it was implied that the focus of rectification should be the CIDA leadership.

\begin{itemize}
\item Senior management in CIDA will have to be the point of departure for a change in approach and it is to that level that we must first address ourselves, or more correctly our senior management must address itself.\footnote{R.D. Jackson, 1.}
\end{itemize}

More extraordinary was that an assault on CIDA was suggested,

\begin{itemize}
\item The problem of coordination with CIDA having as many facets as it does, there is a danger that it will be tackled only partially or piecemeal or by more than one office in this Department. Since there is a common source to and manifestation of the problem in virtually all its ramifications, this Department must ensure a coordinated attack and follow-up.\footnote{R.D. Jackson, 2.}
\end{itemize}

One might conclude that this was one isolated memorandum out of step with other views in External Affairs. To the contrary, by 1974 concerns about CIDA provoked a meeting of External's Directors-General. The discussions that took place there are instructive as to the perception of CIDA within External Affairs, and show some evident consensus as to how to deal with the apparently autonomous Agency. Feeling within External that CIDA was not cognisant of foreign policy had reached such a state that at that meeting, Several Directors General remarked that there was a great deal of ignorance in CIDA as to what foreign policy was really all about. GAP [Francophone Africa Division] said that as a result of this lack of knowledge of foreign policy CIDA in
fact applied personal prejudices of their officers which often are not in line with the overall [sic] Canadian foreign policy interests.\(^95\)

Clearly CIDA was seen as outside the control of the traditional premises of Canadian foreign policy. From the point of view of the Division, which had most contact with CIDA, the Agency was not entirely to blame.

ECD [Aid and Development Division] argued that this Department has not clearly given CIDA foreign policy guidelines and thought that the Department should first draw up its foreign policy objectives.\(^96\)

The tactics to be used to enforce stated foreign policy objectives were to be higher levels of the government structure, which External believed would favour External.

Several Directors General remarked that once we were clear on exactly where this Department was going in terms of aid policy, we should insist strongly on the application of the ICER [Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations] seven principles and force the issue, if need be, to be resolved either by the SSEA [Secretary of State for External Affairs] or the PM.\(^97\)

The Jackson memorandum of 1973 implies that there was a hope on the part of some in External that with External personnel in CIDA, External Affairs views would prevail. CIDA's Presidency was seen as the top priority. The Directors-General also concluded that CIDA had minimised the influence of other departments on development assistance by rarely calling together interdepartmental committees which impinged on it. The Directors-General felt strongly that the Interdepartmental Committee on Development Assistance (ICDA) should be revitalised, saying that it had "atrophied in 1968," perhaps a reference to Maurice Strong's presidency of the new CIDA. Further seeking to tie

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development assistance to domestic policy, they maintained that ICDA should be regarded as a sub-committee of the Aid Board whose business often concerned the transfer of Canadian resources overseas.

External Affairs' officers appear to have sought to make CIDA officers aware of the broader foreign policy implications of aid activities by other administrative means. While Under-Secretary of State, Cadieux appears to have approved approaches by Hanley Bennett of Treasury Board to have CIDA involved in External Affairs' review of new departmental procedures for Programme Review and Financial Management and Budgeting. Since "within these new procedures we expect to set up area committees and controllers which will forecast and take decisions on the overall requirements of Canadian interests abroad."  

External Affairs' officers also aimed to influence CIDA's understanding of foreign policy by having personnel recruited from External to CIDA and placed in positions of prominence.

I would see some advantages in having a middle grade CIDA officer on loan to this Division. It would help to build up his and eventually CIDA's understanding on the way we look at aid questions and even as a "spy" he should be able to reassure people in CIDA that we are trying to promote the development of the aid programme along constructive lines.  

In the margins Marcel Cadieux wrote "Good!" The issue of personnel was returned to repeatedly over the years. In 1974, during the Directors General discussion mentioned above,

There were several references to the importance of personalities in the whole

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99 E.A.H. Smith, 6.
question and GAP [Francophone Africa] went so far as to suggest that we should give serious consideration to an External Affairs officer taking over CIDA after the departure of the current President.  

It is interesting to note that Michel Dupuy became CIDA's next President in 1977. He was the first CIDA President since the creation of the agency to be recruited from that department. Other subsequent presidents of CIDA have moved from External to the Agency. Whether Dupuy's or other Presidents' entrance dramatically changed the character of CIDA is in doubt. In fact, as we shall see, several former External employees have come to champion typically CIDA perspectives. Nevertheless, that this perception existed at all is indicative of a tendency within External that CIDA needed to be remoulded.

Preparatory material for the meeting of 1974 Directors-General suggested that clear and consistent signals were to be given to CIDA that its operations were part of Canadian foreign policy. Mechanisms were explored to bring CIDA within the foreign policy fold. Despite that, the Working Paper for the meeting recommended that,

Provided effective consultation can be assured in policy and general programme content, CIDA should be left a free hand to discharge its responsibilities in the operation and administration, as prescribed in the 1960 Cabinet memorandum.

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100 "Summary Record of the Directors General Meeting of January 17," 1.

Centralising Tendencies

Below we will show how various centralising tendencies on the part of External Affairs, the ones we show here, supported by PCO, served to bring the definition of foreign policy in line with those the prevailing views at External. We focus on two examples, the absorption within the bosom of External Affairs of: a) the Trade Commissioner Service and b) the rotational service of CIDA during the Consolidation exercise in the early 1980s.

The late 1970s was a period of global stagflation of dropping government revenues relative to expenditure, the emergence of more conservative tendencies in the Liberal government, and, indeed, the brief flicker of Joe Clark's Conservative government. (A desire to rationalise, focus and constrain a rapidly growing bureaucracy was evident across the Canadian government. Super Ministries Of State (MOS) were created. A financial Envelope System was developed to contain general categories of spending. Yet it is not clear from the evidence below whether foreign policy was centralised primarily for parochial reasons, so much as an emanation of bureaucratic centralising tendencies.\(^\text{102}\) External Affairs had good reason to attempt centralisation in the sense that its authority was rapidly slipping. The enemy of that authority was the electronic global village. Hitherto, the channelling of information between Canada and other countries was often via the External Affairs post. Easy long-distance calls, the fax and electronic media outflanked the senior External Affairs' official overseas as bearer or interpreter of news, sealer of deals, in a word, the plenipotentiary.

\(^\text{102}\) Nor should we forget that centralisation can often be part and parcel of growing conservatism. There is other such evidence, which we will present in succeeding chapters.
Federal Revenues, Expenditures and Development Assistance

By the late 1970s, federal expenditures on development assistance were equal or greater to the budget for External Affairs. Therefore, if we look at the general rate of growth of federal expenditure on foreign affairs and development assistance and compare it with total federal expenditures and revenues we can get a relatively accurate sense of spending federal priorities relative to foreign policy as a general category (which includes development assistance). A number of interesting patterns emerge. First, in Figure 3 reviewing spending over three decades, 1961-1991, the growth of spending on foreign policy does generally follow, but generally has not kept pace with total revenue, and especially expenditures.\footnote{The low base of expenditures during the 1960s does not show the rates of increase during the Pearson era in Figure 3.}

Figure 3

Beyond the Pearson bumps of 1965-7, rises in foreign policy spending took place in the 1970s and 1980s, one in 1977 (shown in Figure 4), and the other in 1985. Some stagnation of foreign policy budgets does appear to have taken place prior to and in the first year of Conservative governments (Clark and Mulroney). In Figure 4, we see that both the sharpest visible rise (surprisingly) and decline (less so) in foreign policy expenditures have taken place during Conservative governments, in 1986 and 1990 respectively. The charts included show that rising gaps between revenue and expenditure do not directly affect foreign policy expenditures. Although the decline in 1978 did occur during a period where there was a substantial gap between revenue and expenditure, neither the rise, decline nor the stagnation of foreign policy spending (1977-80) is explained by rising fiscal gaps between expenditures and revenues (See Figure 4).
In Figure 5, simply comparing federal revenue with foreign affairs expenditures we have a somewhat closer correlation in the period 1965-1991. This shows that revenue does seem to be fairly strong in influencing how much will be made available for foreign policy concerns. But as for the Consolidation Exercise in the late 1970s and early 1980s, this relationship is less strong. It is remarkable to note that the drop and stagnation of foreign policy expenditures (1978-80) occurs after the sharp rise in 1977. Looking over the thirty year period, a decline in foreign policy spending follows in the next year after a sharp rise (with the exception of 1985). A strong general correlation is clear over three decades between federal spending on foreign policy, and finances and government growth. Equally obvious, though, is that federal decision-making, as such, rather than accounting, is vital to the rise of foreign affairs and development assistance expenditures at critical junctures.
Central Agencies and the Definition of Foreign Policy

At External Affairs there was a gradual identification of the department with other central agencies. During the period of the mandarinate, External Affairs served as the core of the upper civil service. Former External staff were by far the most likely to find themselves Deputy Ministers. In 1970, one-third of all Deputy Ministers were former External Affairs officers. And this trend continued, but that experience outside the Department may have effected their views. One such example may be Allan Gotlieb, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs in the late 1970s and early 1980s; a member of the new generation of foreign policy officials.

Gotlieb had worked in External Affairs in the 1960s. From 1968-77 he was Deputy Minister of Communications, and also DM at Manpower and Immigration and related posts. Gotlieb was not a diplomat by calling, but an international lawyer. He had studied at Oxford like most of the mandarins, but also at the University of California and Harvard. He identified more with "Government of Canada" perspectives, than with the Pearsonian views at External Affairs or CIDA. Whatever the root of the belief, Gotlieb, certainly was convinced that External had a calling as a central agency. In a talk to staff he said in 1981. "When I returned to External Affairs in 1977, after an absence of some 7-8 years, I was already convinced that the Department of External Affairs was a central agency of Government."


talk he affirmed, "I am more convinced than ever that External Affairs must act as a central agency if it is to realize its full potential."  

Michael Pitfield and Gotlieb had similar desires to centralise foreign policy. Pitfield began his campaign to integrate the foreign service in 1970. According to a memorandum to External's Under-Secretary, "What he [Pitfield] has on his mind is the problem of developing senior executives [of Government] to serve national interests generally, both in Canada and abroad." A few weeks later, the first Cabinet discussions took place regarding the "inclusion or exclusion from the Foreign Service Group of rotational employees of the Departments of Industry, Trade and Commerce and Manpower and Immigration and of CIDA." However, this attempt at integration failed in 1972. The early sounds of its demise were heard as far away as London by High Commissioner A. de W. Mathewson,  

I confess to a certain puzzlement over sounds that are reaching London on the wind from the west. To the casual listener they sound very much like "integration is dead". They are intermingled with rumours of the Minister of IT & C saying "stop" in Cabinet and various deputy ministers in ICER muttering things like "cooperation ever - integration never".

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The Absorption of the Trade Commissioner Service

We have previously focused on Cadieux as a man concerned with the coherence of foreign policy, and the keeping of its instruments within the organisational structure of External Affairs. He was not, however, the first Under-Secretary to do so. External Affairs had a protracted history of attempting to centralise authority under it. One notable example was the Trade Commissioner Service which had long been coveted by External. How long is clear from a 1943 memorandum sent to a colleague by Mathewson during the 1970 integration effort. Mirroring arguments against incorporation of the Trade Commissioner Service in the 1970s and 1980s, the 1940s document stated,

Attached are copies of letters to Mr. Pierce from Mr. McAvity, President of the Canadian Exporters Association (February 13) and from Mr. Vardy, Manager of the Export Department, Canadian Manufacturers Association (March 31). . . Specifically they urge that the offices of TCS continue to have direct communication with Canadian manufacturers and exporters, that the TCS continue to be under the sole direction (control) of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, and the TCS direct its energies to trade promotion. (One might infer that marginal and esoteric activities such as economic analysis and reporting would be left to External Affairs).\(^\text{110}\)

Thirty-seven years later, the view of the business community remained hostile to the incorporation of the TCS within External. The Minister for Trade and Commerce, Herb Gray wrote PM Trudeau,

| The business community attaches much significance to the continued independent existence and strengthening of the TCS, and have consistently taken the view over the years that foreign service consolidation or integration would result in the deterioration in the quality of service and expertise offered by our trade |

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What these excerpts covering four decades show are repeated attempts by External Affairs to absorb the TCS, and the continued opposition of the business community. There seems little evidence that External Affairs was seen as working at the behest of business. Yet Trudeau's reply to Gray outlined that the Department was intended to evolve in this direction.

I very much hope that . . . the business community as a whole will come to understand that as a result of consolidation they will have the entire Foreign Service working for them and not just a segment of it.112

Part of that symbolic change was the modification of the name of the department to External Affairs and International Trade.

External's efforts regarding the consolidation of the TCS were just part of a general consolidation of foreign policy activities. Once the decision was taken, PCO hoped that External and the other departments concerned would resolve their differences themselves. But at External, at least, the differences were seen as irreconcilable. So although the decision to make CIDA's overseas staff into officers of External was made at the same time as the consolidation of the TCS, in External little effort was made by PCO to enforce either decision.113 In 1981, External Affairs officers made earnest and successful efforts towards the consolidation of foreign policy. For the sake of prose clarity we shall move to the case of CIDA's rotational staff.


Concerns about the relation of development assistance to foreign policy mounted in External Affairs and other central agencies, not least because of the increases in expenditures on it. For these government agencies, spending had to be defended in foreign policy terms. Attention remained focused on CIDA. As we shall see in later chapters, discussions of the autonomy of IDRC remain curiously silent until the late 1970s. External officers sought to contain the further dilution of their authority in the 1970's once again seeking to integrate TCS into the Department. With regard to CIDA, officers in External worried that the Agency would create a foreign service of its own. CIDA officials signalled to other departments their desire to create some sort of CIDA foreign service in 1971. CIDA Executive VP, D. Tansley wrote,

I would fully support the introduction of a rotational foreign service feature for CIDA field officers. This could be achieved through a CIDA-managed rotational service, by the establishment of a CIDA "stream" within an integrated foreign service, or perhaps in other ways.

Tansley noted that CIDA had been thwarted in attempts to strengthen this stream, "Our efforts to build up this group have hardly been helped by such practices as the application of the single assignment allowances practice."\(^{115}\) As early as 1973, the view among some in External was that it would be preferable that "CIDA operations at home and abroad are staffed mainly by rotational FS [External Affairs Foreign Service] personnel."\(^{116}\) In 1977,


\(^{115}\) Tansley, 2.

\(^{116}\) R.D. Jackson, 1.
under Michel Dupuy, the former External Affairs Assistant Under-Secretary, CIDA once again tried to make for itself a rotational foreign service.\footnote{117} Not surprisingly, after a meeting between the Under-Secretary of the time, Allan Gotlieb, and Michael Pitfield, CIDA's proposal to the Public Service Commission was shelved pending External developing an "alternative."\footnote{118} The long-running question of whether CIDA would have its own overseas officer cadre was decided in favour of External as part of the consolidation decision of 20 March 1980.\footnote{119} But as we have said, the implementation of that decision was left in mid-air for some time.

Marcel Massé became President of CIDA in 1980. Massé had spent six of the ten previous years in the Privy Council Office. The economist had also worked in the World Bank for four years. Once again, we see evidence of the recruitment of senior central agency officers to CIDA. Yet, when in CIDA President Massé fought the consolidation of CIDA's "foreign service". The sense that PCO camouflaged the enveloping of CIDA within one foreign policy, and that consolidation was what Massé feared it was, seems clear from the extract below.

There was also fundamental disagreement between Mr. Massé and the Under-Secretary as to the meaning of Consolidation, which has been artfully concealed by the principles of Consolidation devised by the PCO. In the simplest terms, CIDA's position, as expressed by Mr. Massé, is that consolidation confers only the power to manage the personnel in the Foreign Service, but not the power to manage programs they are implementing.\footnote{120}


\footnote{118} Hadwen, 1.


\footnote{120} Foreign Affairs Records, Marie-Andrée Beauchemin, Director, Personnel Operations Division, External Affairs, "Note to Mr. Marchand, Subject: Your lunch with
Under-Secretary Gotlieb confirmed that view with some finality in a margin note a few weeks later. "Remember CIDA is not responsible for development policy." Massé vainly fought to retain control of CIDA. Interestingly, after he became Under-Secretary of Secretary of State for External Affairs he altered the rules such that External rotational staff were not resident in his former headquarters with the agreement of de Montigny-Marchand.

So both Dupuy and Massé came to adopt policies which were more like CIDA, despite their previous positions in External and the Privy Council Office. Is this acculturation as such, or the inevitable switch of position according to jurisdictional position? The fact that Massé did not completely abandon his previous position, but when in External partly changed the rules in favour of CIDA, indicates that some enduring acculturation may have taken place. Unless, of course, once having entered CIDA, Marcel Massé and Michel Dupuy recognized that the lack of CIDA subordination served Canada's overall objectives (as opposed to External Affairs' officials) effectively.

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122 While President of CIDA, Massé was "adamantly opposed to allowing his headquarters to be staffed with FSO's [External Affairs' Foreign Service Officers] since they will necessarily be performing "core" functions of the Agency which he cannot relinquish to personnel he does not 'control'."
Conclusion

To sum up, the chapter has ranged over a large terrain. We began by reviewing Pearson's enduring analysis and changing preoccupations as regards the reasons for development assistance. He believed that scientific progress, and the pattern of development that it produced, cause unequal development. He saw scientific progress and unequal development as inevitable. Pearson assumed that societies that did not adapt to scientific advance did so at their peril. The question therefore was how to adapt. His answer was grounded in values of the manse and Canadian egalitarian notions of tolerance and generosity. Pearson felt that in Canada, as abroad, moral and security imperatives demanded that the misery that inequality bred be addressed by promoting scientific progress more widely. His arguments in favour of development assistance changed over time, as did his preoccupations, but the general line did not. We shall see that the early IDRC fit well into the Pearsonian perspective regarding the inevitability of scientific progress, and the necessity of societies to adapt to it. Also relevant to our later discussion is that the Pearsonian sense of mission to forge equitable development based on a genuine international partnership became an essential element of IDRC.

We then saw how Pearson as PM massively expanded the aid budget, despite the opposition of some of his erstwhile colleagues in the bureaucracy. The expansion of the aid and foreign policy budget coincided with the emergence of a new generation of more technocratic officials which implemented and reinterpreted the Pearsonian vision. As we shall see, IDRC was a manifestation of that more technical bent.

IDRC was an expression of Pearson's internationalist vision, a viewpoint made manifest in the new federal development assistance organisations founded by Maurice Strong. We have seen that that vision had to compete with more narrow notions of the functions of the Canadian state, most clearly seen in the central agencies. Most parts of the Canadian federal state could argue that they benefitted Canadians, and early
development assistance was strongly tied. Nevertheless, development assistance remained suspect because they were rooted in values and beliefs that conflicted with those tending to be held in central agencies. Central agency staff were often inclined, or were obliged to be inclined, towards control, centralisation and defining their value in terms of how much they benefitted Canadians directly. Michael Pitfield seems a perfect example of how values and policies pursued change as institutional values take root and economic circumstances change. Pitfield was content to see a massive proliferation of diverse agencies in the federal government when he first joined PCO in 1965. Further, he supported the untying of development assistance and lessening of restrictions on CIDA's operations in the late 1960s. By the early 1970s, he was one of the most enduring advocates of centralisation.

Based on his deeply held personal values, Pearson argued for development assistance, which reflected his own views about Canadian society, namely that the ghetto was not a desired way to deal with the unequal development that science produced. Pearson's credo was that international partnership with other societies was necessary to promote scientific and economic development to facilitate their own social order. This was an inclusionary and distributive vision. Its inclusionary nature could be seen in the desire to have representatives of all nations at conference tables. Its distributive vision was manifested in his increasing development assistance budgets abroad and Medicare


Pitfield wrote,

If . . . there is no increase of funds, Mr. Strong may feel that the purpose of his presence in Ottawa has been frustrated, and that his new organization has been built for no purpose. He has greatly increased the quality of our aid program, and if he is given ministerial support for an even greater increase in quality and the commensurate reduction in tying and restrictions, he should have enough to satisfy him for the next year or so.
and the Canada Assistance Programme at home.

Strong, as interpreter of Pearson's vision in development assistance, was clearly an internationalist himself, but also able and willing to harness the interests of parochial interests in that enterprise. Yet, his colleagues in other departments looked at development assistance activities during Strong's time and later as not cleaving closely enough to typical federal bureaucratic rituals or more parochial foreign policy concerns. Pressure grew for CIDA to follow Government of Canada norms, and despite the changes wrought on CIDA, the internationalist impulse remained in its staff. In following chapters, we will see how such pressures were applied to IDRC, but that the Centre's staff used various means to maintain its Pearsonian internationalism even as more parochial forces gathered strength. Reaction to the burgeoning federal bureaucracy and economic slowdowns brought about the strengthening of parochial forces in Ottawa and led to demands for the cohesion of foreign policy, hence the absorption of the Trade Commissioner Service into External Affairs in the early 1980s. Below we will chronicle how IDRC was likewise caught in previous and successive waves of Ottawa-bashing and global buffeting.

What we have collected in this chapter provides the basis for understanding the environment in which IDRC was created. The Centre germinated in the fertile soil of the Pearsonian internationalist vision. We move now to look at the actual policy process that led to the creation of IDRC. What was the spark of creation? What were the diverse notions afoot when the proposal was formulated in the last half of the 1960s? What were the critical interventions and influences that made it happen?
Chapter Two: From Impetus to Träger —

The Genesis of IDRC

Global Unity, Equity and Science

One of the fundamental moral insights of the Western culture which has now swept over the whole globe is that, against all historical evidence, mankind is not a group of warring tribes, but a single, equal and fraternal community. Hitherto, distances have held men apart. Scarcity has driven them to competition and enmity. It had required great vision, great holiness, great wisdom to keep alive and vivid the sense of the unity of man. It is precisely the saints, the poets, the philosophers and the great men of science who have borne witness to the underlying unity which daily life had denied. But now the distances are abolished. It is at least possible that through new technological resources, properly deployed, will conquer ancient shortage. Can we not at such a time realize the moral unity of our human experience and make it the basis of a patriotism for the world itself?¹²⁴

Barbara Ward — in Spaceship Earth

There is little prospect that civilized life can continue much beyond the end of this century if its benefits are not made available to the majority of mankind.¹²⁵

Maurice Strong

Maurice Strong and Lady Barbara Ward Jackson wrote the above in the mid-1960s. American development assistance was dropping. America was pulling inward. Science was still believed to be a cure for the world's ills, although increasingly the diagnosis and the cure were being viewed with suspicion and doubt. In Canada, the


economy was growing at an unexpected rate. EXPO '67 showed that Canadians were becoming ever more interested in the outside world. Canada's Prime Minister was the internationalist Lester Pearson. A vigourous businessman, Maurice Strong by name, was put in charge of the aid program. In such a crucible the proposal that would become IDRC was formed.

In this chapter, we will trace the policy process that led to the creation of IDRC in 1970. We will attempt to delineate the ebb and flow of the ideas involved, and the contributions of the personalities and institutions involved. In 1966, the ideas that became IDRC were formed. But why was IDRC created in the first place? What environment made IDRC attractive and possible? What factors led IDRC take the particular shape that it did?
Barbara Ward: Hope and Global Unity

By the 1960s, the West had gone through several bouts of aid weariness. Once again, America desired to turn away from the world, this time in the reaction to the melee that was the Vietnam War. Many in the West feared that a return to American isolationism would mean the collapse of the West in Vietnam, and elsewhere. But these people sought butter to replace guns. The American hegemon was becoming tired of free riders and wanted their allies to increase their ODA levels. Despite this instruction only in Canada did those levels rise in the following few years. By 1966, Pearson and other like-minded individuals were urging the Americans to increase their own slipping development assistance (See 1960s Canadian vs. American aid levels in Figure 6).

Figure 6

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The World Bank sponsored Pearson Commission was seen in this light. At the end of the decade, aid levels in countries with little direct interest in the maintenance of the southern marches of the Western imperium, such as the Scandinavian countries, started to pour billions into development assistance. Why so? David Lumsdaine has noted a high correlation between expenditures on development assistance and social values. Among other variables, Lumsdaine has examined the levels of national domestic social spending and private voluntary contributions. From the vantage point of the 1990s, Lumsdaine ranks Canada as a relatively low spender on welfare (at 0.23% of GNP compared to Sweden 0.36%). Yet Lumsdaine's conclusions continue to apply to Canada. Overall, Canadian spending still ranks relatively high in private voluntary contributions and foreign aid. Further, Lumsdaine's conclusions regarding the link between social values and aid spending is particularly apt during Pearson's government. We have seen that Pearson was driven by his perceptions and beliefs. The relative wealth of his times permitted Pearson to be more consequent in those beliefs. As we saw in the last chapter, his time in office saw a considerable expansion of the welfare state, and development assistance.

Pearson was not alone in his inclinations, in Canada, or in the world. With so much of his life spent in London, perhaps it is not surprising that he was most closely in tune with certain British commentators of the times, in particular, Barbara Ward. Pearson and Ward were of the same silk. Ward published Spaceship Earth in early 1966. She too was concerned about the slow decline of development assistance and therein

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128 Tom Kent asserts that it was he who introduced Ward to Pearson in 1966. However, Lord Jackson was a contemporary of Pearson's, and moved in the same circles. Ward and Jackson married in 1950.
wrote, "Western aid is on the decline. If America, in the late 1940s, with a GNP at least one-third smaller than it enjoys today, could put 2 percent of it into the Marshall Plan, the present percentage of roughly 0.5 percent of GNP for aid can hardly be called a burden." Yet she did not believe in the simple reproduction of the Marshall Plan in developing countries for she continued, "At this point we have to register the weakness of all analogies between the success of strategies for growth, stability, and greater distributive justice inside Western society and the possible application of similar policies in the world at large." While not convinced of the previously practised means, the ends were "growth, stability, and greater distributive justice." For this active lay Catholic, the people of the world were one people, but lacked the organisations and will to make the ends possible.

Our larger world society lacks the institutions of unity and it lacks the political will.

In our growing, increasingly interdependent international society, there is nothing beyond the level of the nation-state except the fluctuating activity derived from bargaining and treaty-making of powers which can and will withdraw what they have given and reverse their pledged undertaking... Everything above the national level, however necessary, however beneficial, can still be revoked, except, of course, reality itself... There is still no profound sense of emotional commitment or community in the larger society of man.

So by 1966, Ward saw that development assistance was declining, the result of the structure of the nation-state. Consequently, there was a lack of political will to demonstrate the unity of the people of the world through material betterment. For her, therefore, part of the solution to the lack of unity would be the building of institutions of unity. Although particular concern was focused on developing countries, the vision was

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129 Ward, 105.

130 Ward, 105.

131 Ward, 105-6.
For Ward, the modern solution to global fractiousness had to include science. At the outset of the chapter, we quoted from her concluding two pages in *Spaceship Earth*. Ward shows there a belief that the modern means to achieve the global unity in the form of meeting of material needs and social peace was "through new technological resources, properly deployed." As we have shown in the previous chapter, this line of analysis and general sentiment was remarkably in phase with Pearson's own thinking.

Pearson must have chosen Ward to be the key note speaker at the Liberal Party Conference on 10 October 1966. In this speech, she said,

> I would like to suggest that in the overwhelming importance of this search for peaceful machinery from settling disputes, a proper global system of economic welfare, a proper global system of economic welfare, and thirdly, minimum solidarity of the human race which recognizes itself as a human community, the country of Canada has an absolutely crucial role to play.

The speech was a wide-ranging plea for Canadian involvement in the global fostering of these three elements which Ward believed were essential to any local or global society. Its idealistic tone struck a chord with Liberal youth, and was seen as a "counter" capable of enticing those with New Democratic Party sympathies.

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132 Ward, 148.


John English was one of those youth in attendance at the conference.
In her speech Ward explained why she thought Canada had an opportunity to play a special role in the world. Her first point was that Canada is a "middle power. You are not mired in the deep, deep muds of great powerhood. You are not caught by sheer weight . . . You have manoeuvrability." Secondly, Ward noted that Canada in 1966 had "the second highest per capita income in the world, and this does give you a means of putting punch behind your policies, which you do not have if you were Chad O'Bungishari, or whatever. You have got the capacity to act." Thirdly, she said that Canada was based on "two great cultural traditions" "drawn from a great diversity of people". In this respect, Canada was "showing forth the kind of unity that mankind has got to find or founder". Lastly, she said that in the international arena, "there is hardly a problem in the last fifteen years in which your Prime Minister has not played the creative, reconciling part, which is essential if the world is to develop its own soul and its own personality." She also pointed out that with Canada's position in the Commonwealth, North America, NATO, the UN and cultural and linguistic links with Europe "no other nation has got this scope."\textsuperscript{136}

Ward moved to then put the question "What are you going to do about it? Because these are the crucial, critical problems of the end of this century, and on into the next."\textsuperscript{137} Perhaps it was quite proper for Ward not to give too specific answers but she drew the listeners to note that, "Canada at this moment is the only rich country that is increasing its commitment to foreign aid." She hoped that Canada would be a "torch" that would "lead the way" which would prove to be the "beginning of a real turnabout among our disgracefully unaware and socially completely unacceptable neighbours in the Atlantic world."\textsuperscript{138}


Putting these strands together, we see a hope on the part of Ward to entice the Liberal Party of Canada into building international institutions which would foster dispute settlement, economic welfare and the unity of, what was then still called, mankind. In *Spaceship Earth* she concluded that the proper deployment of technological resources would be crucial in at least two of these tasks.

Naturally, Paul Martin Sr., then Minister for External Affairs, and Maurice Strong, the former President of Power Corporation, listened to Ward's speech. Nine days before Strong had assumed the position of Director General of the External Aid Office (EAO).\(^\text{139}\) Paul Martin had brought in Strong to change the shape of Canada's aid effort.\(^\text{140}\) Strong had decided that he would like to build a new organisation prior to his appointment. Its particular mandate remained to be worked out, although he had been giving speeches around that the time about the gap between science in the First and Third Worlds.\(^\text{141}\) That Pearson chose Ward to make her plea centre-stage during creation of the political agenda of the Liberals, and just after the appointment of Maurice Strong, indicates how much Pearson wanted development assistance to become a focus for national aspirations.

We have already noted Strong's long-running belief in internationalism and humanitarian endeavours. In the months that followed the speech, Tom Kent introduced Ward to Strong during lunch at his home, probably some time before January 1967. According to Kent, both Ward and Strong were starting to see that the "big project

\(^{139}\) Under Strong, in 1968, the EAO became the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and he became its President.


\(^{141}\) Maurice Strong, interview by author, 23 November 1994, by telephone, notes, Ottawa-Toronto.
approach", and "trickle down assumptions" were not working. As with Pearson, Ward and Strong had much in common. Strong had not yet had much opportunity in his new position to demonstrate his conviction, but intended to. Ward, for her part, organised at Harvard some of the earliest meetings about the concept of appropriate technology.¹⁴²

The exact process of events from this point until February 1967 remains somewhat unclear. (See Figure 7). In the succeeding months, a number of different influences came to bear, which we shall delineate. What we can say is that Tom Kent is certain that "the originator of this idea [IDRC] was Barbara Ward." Moreover, most of the earliest evidence points in the direction of Ward. Ward was always closely associated with the project. She became a member of the Centre's first Board. Ward's was the first and at that point the only name mentioned as a potential candidate for first President.¹⁴³ Nevertheless, Maurice Strong's own inclinations regarding science and development and his desire to create a new organisation were obviously vital flavours to the base for the stock of the IDRC proposal.

¹⁴² Tom Kent, interview by author, 16 December 1994, Kingston, tape recording.

Figure 7
On the last day of the year 1966, Tom Kent wrote to Barbara Ward,

Since our meeting a month ago, I have had a good discussion with Maurice Strong. . . I feel confirmed in my optimism about his creativeness. We will soon be getting together a small, informal group of the key people who could not only engineer a major advance in Canadian involvement but could also be effective in making it pioneering in some of its forms.\textsuperscript{144}

Five and a half months later Strong more formally suggested the creation of that informal group which included Ward. Although it was never formed, regular consultation with Strong did. Ward kept in close touch with Strong and was reported "interested enough in the project to be in telephone contact with Ottawa almost every week".\textsuperscript{145} In sum, this letter and the other evidence indicates discussion with Maurice Strong took place in late 1966 to initiate an apparently undefined innovation in Canadian activity, presumably organisational in nature. The ideas appear to have still been embryonic. There was a desire for impetus, global unity, development and equity using appropriate scientific means, and convincing the Americans to increase development assistance funding levels. However, Ward does not appear to have tried to determine the institutional means to achieve her ends.

\textbf{Strong Raises the Torch and Beats the Drum}

Whatever is unclear about the origins of the IDRC proposal, Maurice Strong quickly became the torchbearer and champion of the ideas. Many of the individuals in Canada who witnessed or were concerned with the creation of IDRC have said that

\textsuperscript{144} Tom Kent to Barbara Ward, 31 December 1966, TLS, Tom Kent Papers, Archives, Queen's University, Kingston.

\textsuperscript{145} Peter C. Newman, 1.
without Maurice Strong IDRC would not have been created. Strong was and remains a
very vigorous individual. He describes himself as obsessive once he gets an idea in his
head.\textsuperscript{146} Strong's business background, especially as President of the vastly influential
Power Corporation and the strong support of the Minister for External Affairs, made the
possibility of implementing any proposal initiated by Strong quite likely of success. We
will subsequently show the techniques he used to bring his effort to fruition.

Strong described some of the reasons that he thought that IDRC was politically
possible in an interview with the author.

One, you had a receptive Prime Minister. Two, you had a kind of exciting interest
in what Canada can do in the world based on the Canadian Centennial and EXPO
etc. And, I guess you had, having brought a new person in from the outside
[Strong] who was not a product of the bureaucracy, sort of a loose cannon. On the
one hand, there was a disposition to be concerned about what he did, and an
awareness that, well, you got to permit him to do something. So that there's a you
know.[sic] And I think the mood generally in Canada in the science, in the
intellectual community, didn't think we were doing enough certainly.\textsuperscript{147}


Early Discussions

What were the expectations of Maurice Strong on the part of the mandarinate in the early days of Strong's leadership of EAO? An informal meeting to discuss External Aid Board took place at the exclusive Mme. Burger's Restaurant in Hull only weeks after he became President. Strong was not invited, those attending included a number of key mandarins including Bob Bryce, DM for Finance, Louis Rasminsky of the Bank of Canada, Marcel Cadieux, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Jake Warren of Trade and Commerce. For these gentlemen, "the principal priorities for the Office at the present time were the recruitment and development of personnel and the development of specific programs for increasing the involvement of the private sector in our aid programs."

According to minutes taken during his second meeting as Chair of the External Aid Board, which consisted of senior government officials involved in development, Strong reported that his own preference was to promote the involvement of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in development. By NGOs Strong meant the non-state sector, that is, both businesses and NGOs like the YMCA. To some extent, Strong's inclinations coincided with the mandarinate, even if his brush was more broad than theirs. We know little about Strong's thinking regarding what would become IDRC at this time. However, at the first meeting which he chaired of the Board in early December 1966, Strong mysteriously informed the assembled that there were, "several subjects under study [including] . . . the technical assistance program."

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149 Strong had been a member of the international wing of the YMCA and was a major fund-raiser for it.

150 CIDA Records, "Record of External Aid Board Meeting, December 1, 1966, Notes on Minutes of Proceedings, October - November 1967," TD, 6 December 1966,
Room to Manoeuvre

Early on in his stewardship of EAO, Strong "became quite preoccupied with all the bureaucratic constraints with being in government". Like many business people before him, and many after him, his solution was to make the state agency like a private organisation, as independent as possible from government.¹⁵¹

When he came into government it was his intention to make it [CIDA] into a Crown Corporation. And then he decided against it for a very practical reason. . . he suddenly realised that at the Cabinet table, the Secretary of State for External Affairs is the man who speaks for CIDA. He felt that a senior Cabinet Minister speaking for CIDA, this was very important, and he didn't want to give that up. . . So here he created another organization [IDRC] that he could control and he could shape and fashion and orchestrate.¹⁵²

There was another compelling reason that foreign aid would not become a Crown Corporation. "CIDA was a huge source of contracts to the private sector and it was very unlikely that a minister was going to let that kind of patronage move over to some sort of organisation that was arm's length from the government."¹⁵³ So this idea was abandoned until it resurfaced again in the shape of the IDRC proposal.

Maurice Strong hoped that the autonomy of the new organisation would be less affected by the policies of EAO/CIDA than the other way around. Strong had expectations that,

That IDRC would be a place of intellectual ferment and creativity. CIDA's got that too but it's primarily operational and administering the funds and that therefore IDRC's ideas would vary significantly. Well frankly, I thought that IDRC would lead Canadian policy. Not because it was an adjunct but partly


¹⁵² Lewis Perinbam, interview by author, 22 September 1987, tape recording, Ottawa.

¹⁵³ Tim Plumptre, interview by author.
because it wasn't.

It was close. There was a close interaction at the Board level but that by its character it would be up front on policy on intellectual activity and new initiatives; and that would influence Canadian foreign aid policy, both at the level of the ministers but also at the level of CIDA, because CIDA is the instrument for that policy.  

Strong wanted to distance IDRC bureaucratically from CIDA and other Canadian political structures so that IDRC might be more isolated from domestic political constraints. At the same time, however, he sought to have it serve as an example both in Canada and the world of the possibilities that political distance could achieve.

A World University?

In 1962, the idea of the creation of a world university leapt onto the world stage at a teacher's conference in Stockholm when former President Eisenhower called for one's establishment. Eisenhower was not the first to do so, but it was his plea that inspired one John Parker to further the proposal. Parker was Principal of Lorne School in Montreal, and also a Montreal City Councillor.  

EXPO '67 was only a few years away and people began to wonder what would be done with the site after the closing of the World's Fair. In the summer of 1964, Councillor John Parker requested that the City Council consider that the EXPO site be used as an international social science university, or United Nations post-graduate training centre for civil servants of all countries, devoted to the arts of peace, following the Fair. A motion to that effect was passed unanimously. In a meeting

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154 Maurice Strong, interview by author, 28 August 1987, tape recording, Ottawa.

155 Maurice Strong said in his 1987 interview with the author that he was aware of Eisenhower's proposal. But Strong was not sure if he was aware of it in 1967.

Maurice Strong, interview by author, 28 August 1987, tape recording, Ottawa.
between Pearson and the Canadian Home and School Federation (CHSF), also in 1964, Parker in his guise as Principal of Lorne School presented his idea to Pearson personally. Nothing appears to have resulted from the meeting with Pearson. Parker got little support for the idea from Jean Drapeau, his political leader. However, in 1965, Parker managed to help set up a Canadian World University Committee under the Chairmanship of Professor T.F. Domeradski of the Université de Montréal. Parker also spent a considerable amount of effort writing to various universities across Canada and different levels of government. This effort was later taken up by John Ricketts, a Public Relations man of the CHSF, who soldiered long and hard to get the idea taken up, but with little success.

The exact way that Parker's proposal first reached the ears of Strong's colleagues is still not known. But the two most likely sources seem to be Roy Matthews, then of the Private Planning Institute of Montreal, and Professor Irving Brecher of McGill who were in contact with Parker's group. Both approached Strong on the subject and were consulted regarding the creation of IDRC. Strong today, however, only vaguely recalls the proposal of a world university. Furthermore he says, "My commitment was to IDRC idea and I just thought that Montreal would be a very good place for it. And maybe we could harness some of these political energies in its favour."

Certainly Strong did harness those energies, but it is also true that the earliest proposals reaching Strong, and

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157 John Parker, interview by author, 22 October 1987, Montreal, tape recording.

158 Known for his invention of Elmer the Safety Elephant.


the initial proposals developed for Strong spoke of an internationally-oriented academic institution, thus resembling the original Parker proposal. Strong was also interested in improving technical assistance programmes. In other words, Strong was especially predisposed towards that part of the world university proposal which suggested the training of civil servants, especially if it more greatly involved those trained in the understanding of international development. In early 1967, Maurice Strong had Lewis Perinbam work part-time at EAO for a few months consultancy in Ottawa, (while Perinbam was also working part-time at the World Bank). Perinbam had previously worked for the World Bank as their liaison at UN Headquarters in New York immediately preceding this. Perinbam had a long history of working in NGOs and was instrumental in the setting up of the Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO), the strengthening of the World University Services of Canada (WUSC) and the Canadian Commission of the United Nations Economic Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).\footnote{He later founded CIDA's NGO Program, Institutional Cooperation and Development Services Programme, Industrial Cooperation Program, Public Participation Programme, International NGO Programme, Management for Change, and greatly expanded the Special Programs Branch.}

Perinbam's approach to development assistance was often labour intensive. Perinbam's WUSC experience and participation in setting up CUSO led him to have the, Belief in finding resources to enable people to do things, and, in particular, in cultivating and developing relationships. It was not an aid concept. It was a piece of building relationships, it might be through meetings or conferences, it might be through the CUSO kind of exchanges, exchanges of students and scholars.\footnote{Perinbam.}

Perinbam had been very impressed by the research accomplishments of the private US
foundations, namely Ford and Rockefeller.\textsuperscript{163} He favoured a Canadian version of these foundations, but one that would be government funded. Lewis Perinbam seems to have persuaded Maurice Strong as to the value of such an organisation in late 1966 or very early in 1967. Strong may have been warm to the general idea because it was similar in spirit to the kind of arm's length arrangement of the Crown Corporation, which Strong had wanted for EAO. In a sense, what indeed happened was that part of Perinbam's ideas were split in two. One part became CIDA's NGO Division, the second became IDRC. As Perinbam has put it, "Maurice got two things for the price of one. . . He saw that he could have both an NGO programme . . . and at the same time a Foundation."

\textsuperscript{163} Lewis Perinbam, interview by author, 22 September 1987, tape recording, Ottawa.

\textsuperscript{164} Perinbam.
The Canadian International Development Foundation (CIDF)

Let us now concentrate a little more on the organisation with which Perinbam was associated, the Centennial International Development Programme (CIDP), and the foundation proposal. In 1965, through the Centennial Commission run by Judy LaMarsh, CIDP was given $250,000 to set up eight projects overseas\footnote{It never did.} and so that Ottawa NGOs money would create programs that would, at once, commemorate the Centennial and EXPO '67, and create awareness about development.\footnote{Little was done until early 1967.} So little was going on that the CIDP was about to be dissolved. But Maurice Strong suggested that this not be done until the Executive Director spoke to the journalist, Wayne Kines. In January of 1967, J. Duncan Edmonds,\footnote{Edmonds had previously been Executive Assistant to Paul Martin, then Minister of External Affairs.} then Executive Director, recruited Kines.\footnote{Wayne Kines, interview by author, 14 August 1987, tape recording, Ottawa.} Using EXPO and Man and His World as the justification for their work, the CIDP was reactivated. Duncan Edmonds was Executive Director of CIDP by 31 January 1967, Wayne Kines, Director of Information and Tom Schatzky, (late of CIDA) Director of Youth and Information. Stewart Goodings, Executive Director of Company of Young Canadians, was then on Board of Directors of CIDP. A prominent CBC personality, Larry Henderson, was made head of CIDP's Speakers Bureau. Rev. Walter McLean became a CIDP Programme Officer.

"For Voluntary Organizations, Background Information," "Minutes of Board of Directors," 31 January 1967, TD, Organizations and Conferences, IDRC, CIDP, File 38-4-IDRC-10, Volume 1, Foreign Affairs Records, Aid and Export Finance.
activities, the Centennial International Development Programme launched a media campaign to conscientise Canada about development issues. Copying Oxfam, Tom Schatzky, then Director of Youth and Information produced Miles for Millions.\(^{169}\) This programme, where ordinary Canadians, especially children, would walk as much as twenty-five miles to collect money for development through pledges, was a partial product of CIDP. Although CIDP did not last long after the Centennial Year, Miles for Millions did. The tussle about what to do about CIDP after 1967 also led to the creation of the Canadian Centre for International Cooperation (CCIC)\(^{170}\) and some ideas that were proposed were included in IDRC.

On 13 February 1967, Edmonds and Perinbam,

Agreed that our objective was to work for the establishment of the Canadian International Development Foundation, a well financed, large, new foundation, based in Ottawa, having as its fundamental purpose to enable Canada to play a full and effective role in the process of international development.\(^{171}\)

In addition to giving to history two words that would become part of the name of the organisation, namely "International Development", the "Aide-Memoire" is the first example on paper that suggests that the Centre should be in Ottawa.\(^{172}\) Furthermore, the document includes the very novel idea, that became a reality in the shape of IDRC, to have an international board of directors. According to an aide-memoire of the meeting,

\(^{169}\) Tom Schatzky, interview by author, 18 April 1994, Ottawa, by telephone.

\(^{170}\) Championed by Kines. Kines and Schatzky interviews.


\(^{172}\) We can guess that Strong's new name for the EAO, CIDA, was a slightly modified version of CIDF.
The Board of Directors should consist of approximately fifteen people appointed by the Prime Minister (either by the Governor in Council or directly depending on the institutional status of the Foundation).

Up to one-third of the Board should be able to be selected from non-Canadians. Several Board members should be from the developing countries.\textsuperscript{173}

In the event, IDRC's Board of Governors came to be composed of 21 members, one-half minus one of which are non-Canadians. About seven of the Board come from developing countries. All Governors are appointed by the Governor-in-Council.

Perinbam and Edmonds believed that the Canadian International Development Foundation should pursue four themes.

1. The Foundation should provide financial and other support for Canadian individuals, organizations and groups to undertake development projects overseas. The Foundation should act as agent of the Government in providing financial assistance to support Voluntary Organizations engaged in international development and international organization work.

2. The Foundation should provide support for research into international development problems, especially as they relate to Canadian interests and opportunities. It should become a source of information and knowledge about international development and should have a well-equipped library and a good information service. . .

4. The Foundation should promote knowledge of the problems and opportunities of international development through various information and communication media. In particular, the Foundation ought to make a fundamental effort with the communication media to vastly improve and strengthen the amount of information Canadians receive about international development.\textsuperscript{174}

Cabinet papers and preparatory committee reports referring to IDRC before its creation

\textsuperscript{173} J. Duncan Edmonds, DS, "An Aide-Memoire," 2.

resemble point one quite closely. The genesis of CIDA's NGO Division is apparent. Point four was more an outgrowth of the successes of the CIDP, but development education also became a large part of NGO Division's funding priorities. Of most relevance to the creation of IDRC was point two because of its explicit focus on the funding of research in developing countries, which would have a good library and information service. Most importantly, regarding the later development of IDRC they appear to have carried over into the first formulations of the proposal in EAO. But one concept which was adopted by IDRC wasn't listed in the document, Perinbam's concept of the foundation as a labour-intensive organisation.175 Seemingly charged with Ward, Parker and Perinbam's ideas, Strong hired one of his innumerable consultants to weave these ideas, as well as his own, into a draft proposal.

175 Lewis Perinbam, interview by author.
Strong's new consultant seems to have been hired about 1 March 1967. His name was Matthew Gaasenbeek, a stockbroker by trade, whom Strong had known for many years in business. Gaasenbeek was, and remains today, a prodigious ideas man. He is presently Chair of the Ontario Development Corporation. The fact that Strong selected him to lead the elaboration of this proposal suggests that he wanted the organisation to be more like a business-like research organisation, than a bureaucracy or university. Most of all he wanted it to be innovative, rather than highly structured. On 2 March 1967, Strong sent a letter to Tom Kent, by then Deputy Minister of Manpower and Immigration. Cryptically, Strong wrote, "I remain convinced that Canada should be doing something significant in this field and I have a particular idea on this subject which I would like to discuss with you." We may conclude that the IDRC proposal that was to be developed was the subject to be discussed.

Matthew Gaasenbeek says that at the outset of the study only a few ideas were given to him elaborate upon. One of the people Strong asked him to consult was the Canadian, Burke A. Brown, another "excellent source of ideas," as Strong noted. Brown is a psychologist and corporate financier. Strong had discussed the idea of a Centre with Brown in the last week of February. Brown thought that a "New Manhattan Project" could be a model for Strong's new organisation. Brown believed that financial freedom, effective communication, and large amounts of money would be necessary in order to get the maximum number of creative minds free to "concentrate on the problem

\footnotesize{176} M. F. Strong to Tom Kent, 2 March 1967, TLS, Kent Papers, Archives, Queen's University, Kingston.

\footnotesize{177} Matthew Gaasenbeek, interview by author, 13 April 1994, Toronto, tape recording.

\footnotesize{178} M.F. Strong, to Mr. Gaasenbeek, ANS, in Burke A. Brown to Maurice F. Strong, TLS, 3 March 1967, Section A, File #000524, IDRC Records, 1.
of the world's survival." He hoped that Strong would be able to have sufficient freedom to pursue abstract, philosophical ideas, determining social laws from the observation of probability. Armed with these ideas the new Centre would subsequently establish public policy. Brown thought effective communications would be vital for such a Centre because he expected that the newly determined laws would be contrary to common sense, thereby requiring the re-education of both the public and government.

Gaasenbeek consulted widely. He spoke to various Canadians including McGill's Irving Brecher, Fernand Cadieux of Dynam Corporation, Roy Matthews at the Private Planning Institute, and Marc Lalonde at PCO. The Canadians he consulted were frequently not in favour. Many feared that money spent on the new organisation would be diverted from them. This was especially so in the educational field. Jean Boucher of the Canada Council said such activities "should be strenuously opposed." Brecher thought the "concept was great but was cold towards the idea of setting up a brand new Centre for it."

Roy Matthews also proposed the setting up of an international institute on the EXPO '67 site. His would be an international "Institute of Canadian and International Studies." His proposal was attached to Gaasenbeek's report to Strong. Matthews' proposal was to contribute to the language of the eventual Act establishing IDRC in that he mooted

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180 Burke A. Brown, interview by author, 26 April 1994, Toronto-Ottawa, by telephone, notes.


his institute would "initiate, coordinate, finance, direct, and publish studies." Further, the proposal established the limited nature of the engagement of Centre staff in actual research itself "the projects themselves being largely undertaken by outside experts." The work would be multidisciplinary studies of grand themes, for example, "the fundamental nature of nationalism." Matthews also proposed that the there be "Canadian International Centres" spread across Canada which would "bring the world to Canada and symbolize Canada's role in the world."  

Matt Gaasenbeek went to America and spoke to Glen Olds at the State University of New York, who was in favour of a world university. The visitor to State University apparently believed that Olds's school of International Studies and World Affairs "fulfils some of the functions which are being contemplated for the Canadian centre." He hinted at those functions when he mentioned that Olds' school contained graduate students in residence and had "recognized experts in residence." In addition to State University, Gaasenbeek also visited Carnegie, the Ford Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the United Nations and the Centre for the Study Democratic Institutions in California (at Olds's suggestion).

Strong himself believed that the problems of humanity could be solved by a NASA or Manhattan Project approach. For Strong, "The object [of the Centre] would be by using space age techniques to advance the welfare, health and happiness and humanity of man [sic]." The Centre would consist of "a world centre of learning and a place where


The term "think-tank" was rarely been used in the sense associated with the American notion when applied to the Canadian proposal. Rather the idea appears to have implied a sort of social and natural science institute, with major figures both part of and brought in to its meetings, as in Olds' school.  

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The Institute for the Advancement of Man (IAM)

By the end of March 1967, the name of the nascent institute was changed by Strong to the Institute for the Advancement of Man (IAM). The name reflects the global vision which included a sense of the progress of humankind as a whole, which Ward and Strong both championed. Gaasenbeek was given a further series of ideas to explore as to the possible shape of the IAM by Strong. Gaasenbeek compiled a list of subjects for study from Strong and others, ranging from studying the threat of nuclear proliferation, to the role of education, from the role of the family unit, to problems of race relationships. As is apparent above, the scope would have been vast. Strong thought that Canadians were "thinking big" because of EXPO '67 and the Centennial. For those reasons the Institute for the Advancement of Man would be equally grand. To this end, Strong wanted a world-class library for the IAM. In common with the Parker proposal, the IAM was not meant to be something that would deal only with the concerns of developing countries, unlike IDRC, which sprang from this proposal.

Developing countries were only a small part of the concerns of the proposed IAM. In fact, in the memorandum of Gaasenbeek to Strong in March, the only topic listed specific to the Third World was a "general study of the development and problems of the less-developed countries." It was ranked number thirteen of fifteen items. This item even

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189 Strong hoped that the acronym for the Institute for the Advancement of Man, IAM, would have a subliminal effect on English speakers. "I am" would be the subconscious message of the institute.


191 Maurice Strong, interview by author, 28 August 1987, tape recording, Ottawa.

appears to have been crossed out. Sea farming, and the population explosion were also suggested in the memorandum as possible topics. In a general way these two came to be included in IDRC’s set of interests. But very little of what came to be the main concerns of IDRC in the years ahead were part of the proposed IAM. The IAM was to be for the world, not just developing countries. Nevertheless, the elaboration of the proposal for the IAM led directly to creation of IDRC. What seems to have shifted the focus to developing countries was Strong's functional responsibility as Director-General for EAO.

Perinbam and Edmonds met with Gaasenbeek. According to a document signed by Edmonds following that meeting, the trio discussed the form of the IAM and agreed that it should more closely approximate Perinbam and Edmonds' proposed Canadian International Development Foundation. The very approach to take in Gaasenbeek's report to Strong was outlined,

We agreed that the report to Mr. Strong would take the following form.

After outlining the original terms of reference, the report would then stress the objectives which Strong had in mind. These objectives would be set out clearly.

Then the report would analyze the original concept of an Institute for the Advancement of Man, making reference to Mr. Gaasenbeek's various meetings and concluding that in its original form the Institute would not likely be practical, feasible, or politically possible.

This document appears to indicate a high degree of coordination between Gaasenbeek, Perinbam and Edmonds. However, by this time, much of Gaasenbeek's mind was made up, he wanted something that was research-based, small and innovative, and "may have

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194 Gaasenbeek, interview by author.

195 J. Duncan Edmonds, DS, "Substance of a Meeting Between Mr. M. Gaasenbeek, Mr. L. Perinbam, and Mr. J.D. Edmonds," File 70, Document #000946, March 29, 1967, IDRC Records, 1.
Two days later, on 31 March 1967, Lewis Perinbam produced his own proposal for a Canadian Foundation for International Development. This resembled what had been discussed by Edmonds and himself in February. The role of Canadians in the Foundation was still very greatly stressed. However, unlike the February proposal, the promotion of Canadian investment in developing countries was dropped. Perinbam also suggested that fellowships be created for Canadians studying international development. Like the Canadian International Development Foundation proposal, Perinbam's own proposal would be concerned only with developing countries. Research into development problems continued to feature prominently.

On 19 April 1967, Matthew Gaasenbeek produced an "Initial Report on the Proposed Institute for the Advancement of Man". In accordance with the apparent agreement made with Perinbam and Edmonds, the report stressed the difficulties of proposing the IAM as formulated by Strong. Gaasenbeek recorded that of the those interviewed,

> Many could foresee major political difficulties with Canadian universities if the Canadian universities were not to be an integral part of this project. First of all it was felt that the Canadian universities for years have been trying to set up or improve their post graduate programs in these fields. They would feel that the application of such magnitude to the new Institute would in fact be a diversion of resources which at least in part should have been diverted to them. To add insult to injury, the Institute would undoubtedly try to recruit some of the Universities' best personnel.

This was perfectly true. Gaasenbeek suggested that for these and other reasons the IAM

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196 Matthew Gaasenbeek, interview by author, 18 April 1994, Ottawa-Toronto, by telephone.

should first and foremost concentrate on basic research, by which he meant applied appropriate technology.\textsuperscript{198} The role of Canadian universities was emphasised by Gaasenbeek's report. Indeed, Parker's proposal for an international post-graduate university was included.\textsuperscript{199} Strong's consultant also recommended the funding of a UN Satellite.

The documents give the appearance that Gaasenbeek had apparently made some sort of an undertaking to Perinbam and Edmonds that his report would specifically call for efforts to be supported only in the field of international development. But instead, the document represents the same global focus that Strong had emphasised. Significantly, Gaasenbeek did not broaden the funding of activities beyond that of research. This was very definitely contrary to the tendencies of Perinbam and Edmonds. In other words, the strengthening of Canadian institutions was not stressed so much by Gaasenbeek and Strong as by Edmonds and Perinbam. However, Gaasenbeek did accept the necessity of an international board. In addition, "This Board should be drawn from the staffs of universities, research centres or other organizations who could be expected to make a contribution to the aims of the institute."\textsuperscript{200} This expectation has been partly come true in the present IDRC. In the end, the main effect of Gaasenbeek's report on the evolution of IDRC seems to have been to push the Centre towards funding research as such, and less towards a Centre for scholars of international repute to meet, or as a funding institution for Canadians.

\textsuperscript{198} Matthew Gaasenbeek, interview, Toronto.

\textsuperscript{199} With the exception of Brecher and Matthews, Parker and his colleagues never seem to have been contacted by those involved in the elaboration of IDRC proposal. Instead, Glen Olds, the Dean of International Studies and World Affairs of New York State University was consulted regarding the proposal.

\textsuperscript{200} Matthew Gaasenbeek, "Initial Report on the Proposed Institute for the Advancement of Man", 12.
Early 1967 was clearly a period which saw a proliferation of ideas in the policy environment. In many cases those ideas stuck to the expanding EAO, almost all were partly or completely funded by the Canadian state, and in the development assistance envelope. Among the proposals related to IDRC in the 1967 policy environment in Canada which actually became organisations later, only one escaped the Canadian net. The United Nations University (UNU). After conversations with Ricketts, and no doubt elsewhere, the idea was taken to Japan by Yasushi Akashi where with the sponsorship of a speedboat millionaire it became UNU. 201

201 Kines, interview by author.
By the end of April 1967, Matt Gaasenbeek had completed synthesising the contributions of others, and putting his stamp on the proposal. In May, Strong himself drafted the first official memorandum. This memorandum sets out not only his adjudication of the ideas which were being presented but also his own perspective. In this 16 May memorandum Strong laid out the context and the motivations behind the proposal for the creation of an "International Development Centre" (IDC) as he saw them.

The international assistance programs begun in the early post World War II period represent only the beginning of what will be a long and complex process of extending the benefits of modern life to the whole family of man. At the same time rapidly advancing technology and the complex interrelationships of today's world society require that more and more of the fundamental problems of man be dealt with on an international basis and interdisciplinary basis. This in turn requires the creation of new international and interdisciplinary institutions and processes for dealing with these problems. . .

In the broadest terms the need is to concentrate more attention and more resources on the application of the latest technology and techniques to the problems of man's economic and social development, particularly in the under-developed societies.\(^{202}\)

What is interesting is that as early as May 1967 Strong had almost decided on the final name, that the organisation should have an up-to-date applied scientific interdisciplinary basis, and be international but focusing especially on the economic and social problems of developing countries.

Much of Strong's own conceptual thinking seems to have been drawn from the World Institute's Julius Stulman.\(^{203}\)

What we must create is an instrument—a methodology of the creative process, if

\(^{202}\) M.F. Strong (attributed by M. Gaasenbeek) "International Development Centre, TM, 16 May 1967, Tom Kent Papers, Archives, Queen's University, Kingston.

\(^{203}\) Curiously, apparently no contact was made with Stulman subsequently.
you will—of continuing research and development based upon the most comprehensive concept of problem-oriented, international and interdisciplinary cooperation, consciously directed toward new processes for encouraging man's continued evolution. What is needed is a Center made up of scientists, philosophers, scholars and teachers, men and women drawn from every field of knowledge, representative of every race, culture, nationality and ideology, and united in one purpose to place all of their knowledge, skills and insights at the service of all mankind, and working together with imagination and common concern which can take them beyond the traditional claims of their individual disciplines, nations and cultures and, indeed, beyond the boundaries of their own time.  

This is a powerful statement, which clearly appears to have affected Strong because so much of it carried into the essence of IDRC.

Strong's inclination for creating an independent organisation re-emerged in the month of May. In the same manner as Perinbam, Edmonds and Brown, he argued for a kind of foundation to ensure "autonomy and integrity." According to Stuart Peters, who was subsequently charged by Strong with bringing the IDRC proposal to fruition, "CIDA is just another arm of bureaucracy." Peters reports that Strong said "Let's start afresh, a new name a new organisation." Strong proposed an endowment of $500 million possibly spread over five years. Its expected annual income would be $30 million.

Strong accepted the conclusions of Gaasenbeek, Edmonds and Irving Brecher who argued for funding to Canadian universities. The Director-General of EAO asserted that the federal government had a special interest in fostering a weak spot in Canadian

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204 Julius Stulman in M.F. Strong (attributed by M. Gaasenbeek) "International Development Centre, 16 May 1967, TM, Tom Kent Papers, Archives, Queen's University, Kingston.


universities, the study of international relations. At this point, Strong thought that perhaps the research might be done in Canada. Strong argued that IDRC was logically necessary, based on his experience as a businessman. Maurice Strong was astonished to find that EAO, Canada's main aid-giving organisation, had no research component. Strong believed that any successful business should have a research component of about 5% of gross revenue.\textsuperscript{207} Strong reportedly said that,

\begin{quote}
The companies that had made him his money spent 5 or 6% of sales on R&D. Here you had the biggest business on Earth, international development with a Canadian turnover of this being 300-600 million [CIDA], [he wondered whether] a case could be made for 5% of that [Canadian ODA] to go to support research into new technologies for the benefit of developing countries.\textsuperscript{208}
\end{quote}

Strong's May memorandum also named the "informal group" that Kent had mentioned in December. However, they were now to be consulted by a small, select Government task force composed of senior official and heads of certain unnamed Government agencies under the chairmanship of a "senior person." Those to be consulted, listed in order, were: Barbara Ward, William Clark of the Overseas Development Institute, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, John Kenneth Galbraith, Robert Hutchins, Marshall McLuhan, Claude Bissell and Dr. Wilder Penfield.\textsuperscript{209} The names selected convey the sense that Strong wanted to construct an organisation with a centre-left, somewhat scientific and communications bent. Cadieux's view from External of this group was,
"Pressure group is a more accurate definition of what is suggested."

The Director-General considered there to be particularly Canadian reasons why Canada should foster the IDC proposal.

From Canada's point of view we have an opportunity to find in this aspect of international development a role which can give us a significant sense of national purpose and national pride. The three principal areas in which the destiny of mankind is being shaped at this period of history are the nuclear arms race the space race, and the bridging of the gap between the rich and the poor nations. . . If Canada is to make a significant contribution to the world in our times it must be largely in the field of international development. Fortunately it is also in this field that our country's own qualifications and capacities are most applicable.

The stress on a Canadian national destiny in the shadow of the Bomb is very close to the spirit of Barbara Ward's October 1966 speech and a later letter she sent to Pearson. Her later letter makes apparent that Ward saw IDRC as a way of injecting new hope and interest into development activities, especially in the United States (see letter below in footnotes). Ward encouraged Strong to have joint discussions with Americans on the project. Pearson was particularly interested in this.

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211 M.F. Strong, "International Development Centre," 2.

Also repeated in Paul Martin to Lester B. Pearson, TLS, 1 June 1967, MG 26, N4, Pearson PMO, 1965-8 IDC, Volume 237, 800.4 - Personal and Confidential, Public Archives of Canada, 2.

212 Indeed, the vast majority of discussions were with Americans. Ironically, no representatives of developing countries were canvassed for their opinions.

M.F. Strong to Barbara Ward, TLS, 31 August 1967, Tom Kent Papers, Archives, Queen's University, Kingston.
Pearson was approached by Strong sometime earlier than the end of May. His response was not entirely favourable. Shirley Seward says that Pearson first said that he was spending too much on development assistance. But she notes that he was also concerned with the level of government expenditures. In early 1967 Pearson was bringing in the expensive and path-breaking Medicare and Canada Assistance Programme, the latter of which helps equalise service provision across provincial boundaries. However, Tom Kent believes that if there was wavering on the IDC proposal, it was not a matter of if, but when.

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214 Tom Kent, interview by author.
Questions Raised By the Mandarinate

Doubts about the International Development Centre proposal surfaced quickly in the bureaucracy, in several cases they could be termed resistance. Arrayed against the proposal were the top officials of four of the most powerful federal agencies: External Affairs, PCO, Treasury Board and Finance, apparently blocking all method of appeal for Strong. These agencies were, at the least, unconvinced of the value of the proposal.

The Reaction at External Affairs

The most vigorous and long-lasting questioning came from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (USSEA), Marcel Cadieux. Regarding the money to be spent on the proposed Centre, Cadieux's distaste for the idea is clear in a margin comment where he wrote "If we have $500 million to spare in the next five years, I have 5 million other ideas!" Cadieux's view was not unique and was partly a reaction to the situation that was perceived to be the case in the American capital. There, a plethora of semi-autonomous agencies had been created and purportedly had turned Washington into a policy Tower of Babel.

The Under-Secretary of State sought out allies in the shape of the Deputy Minister of Finance, R.B. Bryce. In the margins of a memorandum Strong sent to Cadieux is written,

USSEA is in touch with Mr. Bryce, He would like a brief acknowledgement for Mr. Strong saying tactfully that neither the idea not the procedure adopted so far

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to promote it commend themselves to him.  

Whether Bryce and his officials came to the conclusion by themselves, their disgruntlement with Strong's proposal was clear enough and lasted for at least a year. A subsequent version of the proposal asked for a $600 million endowment, Bryce appears to have written "Nuts" in the margins. A year later, only a few days before the new Prime Minister, Trudeau, announced his desire to establish the Centre, R.Y. Grey, Bryce's subordinate wrote Bryce,

I remain unconvinced that there is a need for this, that if there is a need we can fill it; that Canada is the right place; or that this should be given very high priority. Its like more than jobs for academics, and demonstrates the relevance of the comment that "there's money in poverty."

Constant jibes were made by Diefenbaker of centre-left Tom Kent about his then considerable $25,000 salary. The former PM often said, "He's won his war on poverty". It is unclear whether this is an oblique association of the proposal with Kent, and criticism from the more conservatively minded staff of Finance.

During lunch with Pearson on 29 May 1967, Ward argued persuasively for the setting up of IDRC (see letter by Ward below). Shortly after their lunch, he gave his public support to the idea. Ward also spoke to Paul Martin and the anglophone and francophone media about the proposed Centre. Strong wrote to Ward that "there is no

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doubt" that her "interest and support" was "one of the main reasons why the Prime
Minister and Mr. Martin have taken it up so enthusiastically."

Like Ward, Pearson was particularly concerned with the flagging fortunes of aid at the international level, particularly in the United States. The next year, Pearson headed the Commission on International Development whose main task was to promote foreign aid internationally. In letters to Kenneth Kaunda, Prime Minister of Zambia, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India and other Commonwealth leaders, Pearson says that the main purpose of the Commission is to regenerate the enthusiasm of Americans for international development assistance. For Pearson, Ward and Strong, Canada had a unique destiny to fulfil and an opportunity to take advantage of.

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220 Strong gave great succour to Pearson and the Pearson Commission.

I was even party to the process of getting him appointed as Chairman with William Clark and Bob McNamara. Bob McNamara wanted somebody else. William Clark and I kind of conspired to promote Pearson. They didn't have any money or anything like that so I provided facilities at CIDA.


222 In her letter to Pearson, Ward wrote,

After nearly twenty years of trial and error in the field of economic assistance, we have learnt a great deal about what can and cannot be done. Above all, the groundwork does exist for the first priority in development - the modernization of agriculture. But we are in a peculiar situation, all the same. In the eyes of many politicians and voters, the programs are supposed to have failed. Even with enthusiasts, some of the ideas seem old and tired. A lot of the excitement of using new techniques for new purposes is simply failing to get across. And a lot of excellent information is deeply buried in unread reports. If this slackening of tempo goes on, we could end with a vast increase in our Atlantic resources, a vast
The day after the Ward-Pearson lunch and Ward's television appearances, Cadieux's principal tactic seems to have been to slow down the process as much as possible.

I hope too, even at this stage and despite the interest on the part of Ministers to which you refer, the basic principles and priorities will be fully discussed before any recommendation is formulated or indeed before a task force of senior officials is appointed to explore the details of the proposal.²²³

Strong was not to be slowed down. Even as Cadieux's letter was being dated, Strong was sending a memorandum to the Minister, Paul Martin, via Cadieux, sketching out the outlines of an International Development Centre. Strong wrote to Martin, "As per your request, I am enclosing a letter to the Prime Minister for your signature concerning the

increase in human needs and a catastrophic slackening in Western effort.

I think a really large scale, up-to-date, technologically sophisticated centre of operational research into international development could help counter this daunting risk: . . .

There is a further argument for setting up the Centre in Montreal and doing so soon. The Americans are coming to the conclusion that they need such a centre and such a data bank. The U.N.D.P. is considering a comparable development. If Canada acts soon and acts on a sufficient scale, other nations and centres will use Montreal from the start and the wealthy nations will thus avoid yet another exercise in overlap and jealousy. Canada has the resources to make a really important contribution. But as a medium-power, its efforts will not be misinterpreted as neo-colonialism or whatever. Its bilingual character gives it access to all the developing areas and its position in the western hemisphere gives it a unique chance of influencing American policy. The Centre too, could be a symbol of the larger purposes of Canada as a bilingual nation with an international vocation.


²²³ Marcel Cadieux to Maurice Strong, TLS, 30 May 1967, 38-4-IDRC, Volume 1, Aid and Export Finance, Foreign Affairs Records, 1.
proposal for establishing a Centre for International Development.” The expected reaction of the leadership of parts of the mandarinate led one underling to write on Strong’s document, "You know what the establishment thinks of this!"
Pearson's Announcement

Pearson made public the proposal for the creation of IDRC in Halifax. But few people outside Ottawa took note of his announcement. The first time that the idea came to the attention of the greater Canadian public, and the bureaucracy as a whole, was on 7 June 1967 when Prime Minister Pearson announced the likelihood of the setting up of a Centre at a banquet given by the Canadian Political Science Association at Carleton University in Ottawa. Pearson said,

If free civilization is to survive and grow, we must very soon find vastly improved methods for extending the benefits of modern existence to the whole world community of man. The rapidly advancing technology and the complex interrelationships of today's global society demand that the fundamental problems of man be dealt with on an international and interprofessional basis. The challenge for international development is to find new instruments for concentrating more attention and resources on applying the latest technology to the solution of man's economic and social problems on a global basis. . .

A lot of excitement in using the new techniques for the purposes of peace and universal human progress, instead of for war and universal human destruction, is simply not getting across, either to world statesmen or to the people of the developed countries. So the Government is looking into the possibility of building on the inspiring theme of 'Man and His World' created by EXPO, a Centre for International Development that might perpetuate on a more permanent basis this heightened Canadian awareness of the problems and the challenges confronting all mankind at the present time.

We cannot and do not wish to become a great power from the defence point of view; but we have already proven in our peace-keeping efforts that we can make a good contribution to world order. Perhaps it will now prove possible for us to add a new dimension to our modest role in the world community by providing for a sharpened focus on the challenge of international development facing every country.

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227 L. B. Pearson, Speech given at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Carleton University, Ottawa, TD, 7 June 1967, Tom Kent Papers, Queen's University, Kingston, 6.
With Pearson's statement the proposal was firmly planted on the political map of 1967. Much of Pearson's announcement seems to come from Ward's letter. Two weeks before the Pearson statement Ward wrote, "A lot of the excitement for the new techniques for new purposes is simply failing to get across." (see footnote above). The statement seems too to harken back to Strong's "New Manhattan Project" as it emphasises the application of new techniques. So what we see with Pearson's announcement in June is a change in the proposal in the direction of international development, although recognising that the challenge faces "every country". The focus had moved away from the funding of university and scholarly activities per se, and towards a more technocratic solution to problems. Another aspect of Pearson's discourse is a clear extension of the logic that if Canada could have global influence as a middle-power involved in peace-keeping, it might do the same in this sphere. Finally, the speech fits very much with Pearson's general approach to development in Canada, extend its benefits as widely as possible, as he had earlier in the year with Medicare and the Canada Assistance Program.

After the announcement of the idea by Lester Pearson on the seventh of June at Carleton University, Marcel Cadieux, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs telephoned Strong, apparently quite angry. Cadieux chided Strong and said that, "As a new Deputy Minister [DM] around here, you don't put things to ministers, and certainly not to the Prime Minister, until they've been cleared by the official structure." Cadieux was especially unhappy with Strong because he did not follow government rituals at all. Strong has said that one of the Prime Minister's staff had brought the proposal to the

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228 As did Ward's letter.

229 At this time Strong only had the official rank of Director General, although in practical terms he had a DM's rank.

attention of Pearson, and that he had merely responded to a question from the Prime Minister. The fact that Ward had just been in Ottawa makes one think that perhaps the intermediary who led Pearson to ask the question was Tom Kent. As Kent says, Maurice . . . didn't have much use for conventional bureaucracy, if you wanted to something done you took the most direct route. This would happen only if Pearson really wanted it to happen and therefore the thing to do was to convince Pearson. And he knew damn well that Barbara and I and he were wanting to convince Pearson and everybody else and that was that.

According to Strong, Pearson purposely included the reference to the Centre to ensure that it would have some likelihood of being created. Strong recollected,

And he [Pearson] said, he laughed actually, "Look Maurice, I've been around here a long time" and he said," I specifically didn't tell you I was going to announce it, because you, the reason they're all upset is, they all understand very well that once the Prime Minister has announced it is going to be very difficult not to do it. I did it deliberately. So that's why they're upset, they wouldn't be upset if it was innocuous. They know that in some form or another it will happen.

But despite Pearson's announcement, resistance came from other quarters too.

**Inside EAO**

Peter Towe had been Acting Director General of EAO until Strong became Director General. Neither Towe, nor his deputy Denis Hudon, opposed Strong. But they did inform him of the concerns of the other officials of EAO. These revolved around similar concerns to many other officials and people outside government, namely, how the creation of IDRC was going to affect them. The reaction of EAO's employees to the

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231 David Spurgeon, (ed)., Give Us the Tools, 12.

232 Tom Kent, interview by author.

proposal for the creation of IDRC was one of jealousy. Officials in EAO were aware of the degree of autonomy that the organisation would have, compared to their own relative constraints; how free IDRC would be of budgetary constraints. Echoing the views of those under him rather than his own thoughts, Maurice Strong said to the Standing Committee of External Affairs and National Defence which considered Bill C-12 that IDRC was being given,

Many of the powers and flexibilities which we do not have in our own program which is going to operate with a budget that is coming out of our budget in the sense that it will not be available to us and therefore will be reducing in a sense the size of the CIDA effort and which will have lots of the powers and lots of the facilities that we wish we had, so that in that sense I might say that my colleagues and I in the CIDA organization have been very anxious to be convinced that it had this kind of value because if it did not, if it were not going to do this, then we would not want to see these expenditures flowing around through another institution.234

One anonymous CIDA informant likened the situation to a family where the eldest child sees the youngest being given all the attention and being pampered at the expense of the eldest. Consequently, there was opposition to IDRC within CIDA, although it never burst into the open. So despite these concerns, little open opposition articulated within EAO. Nevertheless, External Affairs wanted contacts in EAO to determine what other members of that Office though of the proposal. Cadieux appears to have written, "Would it be useful to ask Miss Szlazak for comments "from the inside, Pls [sic] treat as strictly private."235


Support for the general idea of assistance to institutions in the Third World did exist within the Canadian government. The External Aid Board consisted of senior officials with interests in the disbursements of the External Aid Office. In the 1960s, this meant that the Director General of the External Aid Organisation, the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance, and the Under-Secretary of External Affairs would meet occasionally to discuss matters of mutual concern. The minutes record that J.A. Roberts, then Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce said at the very first meeting of the External Aid Board in 1961,

That a very high priority should be attached to helping the economically under-developed nations to help themselves, rather than providing them with large capital projects. It was his view that colleges and teacher's institutions were frequently required more urgently than large capital projects, and that our aid funds could go much further promoting development of the former type.  

However, Roberts's was a minority opinion, most involved with external aid were concerned with capital projects which would have a high Canadian content.

PCO and the Universities

One of the main problems that the proposers of the Centre for International Development encountered was a result of the vagueness of the proposal, which could be saluted and cursed with the same ferocity. And this vagueness brought about a strong response from the then tiny Privy Council Office. On 4 July 1967, a Memorandum to Cabinet was submitted by Paul Martin, as Minister of External Affairs, which set out the proposal for a Centre for International Development. The July 4th Memorandum to Cabinet was remarkably nebulous. But the name of the organisation had changed once again (even that had still to be decided). The Centre is variously referred to as the

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"International Development Centre" and the "Centre for International Development" in the document. This simple change and the content of the document strengthened the trend towards the Centre becoming something much more in line with Perinbam's preferences. Like Strong's earlier memorandum, the new organisation became a centre not an institute. This document confirms the shifts in direction seen in Pearson's statement which indicates a movement towards the study of international development. In accordance with Pearson's statement of June, the memorandum contains less reference to global problems and more to those of developing countries. Further, in line with Perinbam and Edmonds' viewpoint, the memorandum emphasises the benefits and involvement of Canadians, especially the university community. The memorandum was not officially discussed until August but the ideas included in it were responded to before the original submission to Cabinet.

Resistance to the idea of a Centre for International Development came from the Clerk of the Privy Council, R. Gordon Robertson on 24 May in a letter to Strong. Perhaps the word resistance is too strong. Robertson perceived his role as one who raised questions as to the viability of proposals, rather than oppose. Strong, and Robertson's subordinate, C.R. "Buzz" Nixon agrees with Robertson's self-perception. Nixon, on his own initiative, wrote to his superiors. Nixon's reservations were passed on to Robertson and then to Pearson, Strong, and Martin. Robertson's assistant believed that, "None of these problems are items which should not be, and could not be handled by Canadian

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Robertson's own memorandum to Prime Minister Pearson on 20 July 1967 was strongly worded, less a question than a judgement. He wrote, "I am convinced that a "Center" as such is a dubious proposition." Robertson's reservation was "that the funnelling of expenditure, effort and intelligence into a special center will have adverse effects on Canadian Universities." Robertson wrote to Marcel Cadieux,

In the margins of that text Marcel Cadieux wrote "Agreed".

Although the comments of Robertson and Nixon focus on the difficulties of the universities that the creation of IDRC might create, Robertson and Nixon have said that neither actually contacted universities regarding the proposal, or had very close relations with them in general. A contemporary in the university community, D.R.F. Taylor


244 Robertson; Nixon.
believes quite the contrary.\footnote{D.R.F. Taylor, interview by author, 30 March 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.} Whatever the case, their criticisms were to some extent valid. The Center was vague on the degree and nature of Canadian participation, perhaps deliberately so. Moreover, the Memorandum to Cabinet represented the Center for International Development as something akin to Ward and Strong's "think-tank". Like Perinbam's Foundation, the Centre would be dedicated more to development, hence the name, and stressed the benefits to Canadians that the Centre would bring. Perhaps most important to the survival of the Centre for International Development, Pearson made a series of notes in the margins of Robertson and Nixon's submissions, none of which supported their position. For example, Pearson wrote the "emphasis on doing the work through Can[adian] univ[ersities] would prejudice the international character of the Center and the chances of getting UN and Int[ernational] support - money and men".\footnote{R. Gordon Robertson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister - Mr. Strong's proposal for a `Center for International Development'," 1.}

The analysis of Strong and Gaasenbeek of these criticisms is interesting. In a memorandum to Strong, Gaasenbeek interpreted Robertson's intervention thus, "Mr. Robertson's memorandum appeared to reflect a fairly strong negative bias."\footnote{Matthew Gaasenbeek to Maurice F. Strong, "I.A.M. - Nixon Memorandum", TM, 25 July 1967, Document #000373, File 23, IDRC Records, 1.} Gaasenbeek's own reaction to Robertson's criticisms was sharp.

Mr. Gordon Robertson seems to suggest what appears to amount to only a small federal program of assistance to graduate studies at Canadian universities. This program, of course, will be oriented towards international development and related matters. I fear, however, that this program would settle down eventually to just a method of financing graduate studies in the social sciences. Such a program, so highly desirable, would not have international impact, would not act as a focus
for Canadian aspirations, and would not fulfil the objectives we have set out for the Centre.\textsuperscript{249}

As the above quotation suggests, the reaction of those involved with the realisation of IDRC was not conciliatory. But the criticisms of the effects of the Centre for International Development on the Canadian academic community were not limited to the mandarinate, not surprisingly, Canadian universities voiced similar concerns.

The Canadian universities were, in fact, one of the first groups to express some alarm at the possible creation of IDRC. When Matthew Gaasenbeek made his first explorations into what the shape of the then Institute for the Advancement of Man/New Manhattan Project should be, the reaction of the Canadian university community was even hostile at times, and not favourable in general.\textsuperscript{250} But the criticisms of the PCO and the academic community had little impact. If they did have any effect, they simply helped to further distance IDRC from close cooperation with Canadian universities. However, subsequent statements by Ministers, in reports, in the press, cooed that there would necessarily be a close relationship between IDRC and Canadian universities. Other tactical moves were made to ensure that the bureaucracy and the universities were not overly resistant.

One concrete outcome of the 4 July memorandum and subsequent meeting of Cabinet in August 1967 was the setting up of a Steering Committee of Senior Officials, and eventually, a Task Force.\textsuperscript{251} The Steering Committee itself consisted of Strong, the

\textsuperscript{249} Matthew Gaasenbeek, 25 July 1967, 1.


Deputy Ministers or equivalent of seventeen federal departments and science related agencies. Kent does not recall there ever being one as large, nor one concerned with the initiation of a proposal. It included so many departments for a reason." The Steering Committee was used to diffuse opposition to the proposal. Other DMs were likely to support something opposed by External and Finance, as these departments were naturally disliked. According to Tom Kent,

> It was an attempt to dilute Finance and External Affairs, which you remember are not popular departments for the rest of the departments. . . . None of the others are going to be natural allies of External and Finance. Many of the Deputies individually would be people who would be naturally quite sympathetic.²⁵²

External Affairs officials were anxious that the viability of the proposal not be prejudged. Discussion of the IDC proposal by some Deputy Ministers took place at the External Aid Board at the end of June 1967. Cadieux "looked at [the proposal] in terms of alternative uses for the funds which would be required for such a project. If such an institution was to be formed perhaps it might be given to UNESCO and located in Europe." Most wanted it to be outside the country, some not associated with Canada at all. Cadieux was not present at the first Steering Committee meeting. In the absence of Marcel Cadieux, the main critics of the proposal were Bryce and Davidson of Treasury Board.²⁵³

Despite the apparently conditional nature of the acceptance of a need for a Centre, a Task Force was quickly set up, formally in April 1968, consisting mostly of university academics who pondered what the Centre might study and how it might be structured.

²⁵² Tom Kent, interview by author.

Notable among the Task Force was Irving Brecher and Geoffrey Oldham of the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at the University of Sussex.\textsuperscript{254} The choice of academics over any other group of analysts seems to have been deliberate. Lewis Perinbam had sent a letter to Strong suggesting that it might be wise to have some of the members of the Task Force from outside government. "It might strengthen the Task Force and also make its recommendations more widely acceptable, for instance in the universities."\textsuperscript{255} Strong responded to that letter by trying to find university professors of a high reputation. Douglas LePan of University College, the University of Toronto was approached in August 1967, but could not take the post. Strong held discussions with Prof. Grant Reuber at the University of Toronto.

Strategy was uppermost in Strong's mind.

My response to the bureaucracy was to search out, to try and coopt them, by searching out an establishment person who would command all of their respect, and get him to head up a task force to develop the proposal further. I settled on Wynne Plumptre who was a product of the establishment but also had flair and imagination.\textsuperscript{256}

Plumptre was at that time the Principal of Scarborough. A former DM of Finance with an international reputation, Plumptre was deeply embedded in both the mandarinate and the financial community. Plumptre accepted the position in October 1967.

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\textsuperscript{254} The full membership of the Task Force was: John Bene, Geoffrey Oldham, C.F. Bentley of the University of Alberta, Agriculture, Garnett T. Page then Pilot Projects Branch Manpower and Immigration, Irving Brecher, E.C. Pleva of the Department of Geology, University of Western Ontario, London, Tillo E. Kuhn, Professor of Economics, York, L.B. Siemens, Roy Matthews of the Private Planning Association of Canada, Montreal, L.B. Somins of the University of Manitoba, R.B. Toombs, Assistant Chief of the Mineral Resources Department Energy, Mines and Resources, and J.T. McCary of Integron Association Limited, Montreal.

\textsuperscript{255} Lewis Perinbam to Maurice Strong, TLS., 1 June 1967, File 70, Document #000956, IDRC Records, 1.

\textsuperscript{256} Maurice Strong, interview by author, 1987.
Scientists Gain Influence

Strong saw the IDC as a think-tank and a means to further the application of science and technology. So Strong made himself willing to bend his ear to people with backgrounds that might understand his ends. Two such people in particular were given places near Strong's tent, the biologist, Stuart Peters, and the British science policy expert, Geoffrey Oldham.

Oldham's association with the proposal began with a chance call to Oldham from the secretary at the Institute of Development Studies in Brighton, UK. Plumptre had arrived in Britain with his wife and was staying at the fashionable Athenée in London. He wanted to talk to various people about the Canadian initiative. Oldham was suggested. This random occurrence was to have a major effect on the subsequent shape of IDRC.

Oldham had set up the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) with Chris Freeman at Sussex University in 1966. It became a graduate school with half its students drawn from the physical and half from the social sciences. Plumptre was impressed. He suggested that Strong visit Oldham during his next trip to Europe. Oldham had done his graduate training in Geophysics at University of Toronto and then worked for Chevron Oil, going to Latin America for exploration purposes. Following his graduate supervisor, Tuzo Wilson's lead, Oldham went to Asia where he developed an interest in the application of science to development. His experience in Hong Kong and other parts of Asia induced Oldham to be interested in how society is "using science and technology as a tool in its economic and social development."257

Dr. Stuart Peters became the Coordinator of the Steering Committee to consider

257 Geoffrey Oldham, interview by author, 8 December 1993.
the proposal. Peters had been personally selected by Strong, and hired as a Special Advisor to the President of CIDA. However, Peters' self-described mandate was more ends oriented, it was to "pull this together. . . establish a budget . . . and get it through."258 Peters had worked for some time in the Newfoundland government. He had been the provincial government's chief biologist, and then acted for seven years as Deputy Minister of Resources. Before becoming Coordinator, he had been in charge of planning economic development in the rural areas of Newfoundland.

In the manner of Gaasenbeek, Plumptre, Peters and members of the Task Force conducted tours of various national and international institutions. All sought to canvass what support there was for the general idea. Plumptre submitted a feasibility study which replied that all were enthusiastic. Of course, some were enthusiastic. Indeed, when Peters visited the United Nations, he received a standing ovation.259 But as their predecessors discovered, a number of interlocutors were less than pleased at the prospect of the proposal, however tentative.

The Global Development Support Communications Centre

In September of 1967, another proposal surfaced which was to affect the future of IDRC. The Director of Communications of the United Nations Development Programme, Erskine Childers was at a Massey Ferguson sponsored International Youth Conference in Toronto in the summer of 1967. At this conference he said, casually, that there was a great need for a communications Centre which would support development efforts world-


259 Stuart Peters, interview by author.
Members of the staff of the CIDP were at the conference. His words were passed on to Wayne Kines, communications chief of the CIDP. Of course, this idea had something in common with Edmonds and Perinbam's foundation. Encouraged by Kines, Childers developed a proposal which called for an International Development Support Communications Centre, linked to the United Nations. The Centre would be built on the site of EXPO '67, just as other proposals had suggested the UNU and IDRC should be. Kines and Childers lobbied Parliament and Cabinet to have the Centre built. They succeeded in getting the interest of the Cabinet.

CIDP's benefactress, Judy Lamarsh, asked Prime Minister Pearson to meet with Childers. Pearson became very interested in the Childers proposal, so much so that he convened a special meeting of a modified version of the IDC Steering Committee to study the proposal. These officials were not well-acquainted with the details of the proposal, and what they knew of it they did not like. The officials did approve of Childers' call for the setting up of a world-class development data bank within the Centre, which echoed Strong's first ideas regarding the IAM. But the members of the mandarinate, were "especially skeptical [sic] of the international public relations facility suggested by Mr. Childers." Michael Pitfield suggested though that it be "put in the hopper." The officials resolved that the Childers' proposal was to be investigated by Plumptre and the rest of the Steering Committee (who had investigated the Childers' proposal already as members of the group of senior officials Pearson called together).

260 Erskine Childers, interview by author, 3 August 1987, tape recording, New York.


surprisingly, the proposal did not go far with such an audience. Cadieux thought it a "pure propaganda proposal." Plumptre was not favourably disposed towards it either, although in his investigations he dutifully asked those he met what they thought of the proposal. In the meantime, the Prime Minister dispatched Dr. Robert Thompson, leader of the Social Credit Party, to New York. Thompson had spent ten years working in Ethiopia, and was trusted in development matters by Pearson.

Pearson hoped to have Thompson investigate how well the United Nations would be able to receive the creation of such a communications organisation. Unfortunately, Thompson found the UN woefully disorganised and internecine. Nevertheless, George Ignatieff at the UN Mission sent notice that various aid officials such as Rehling and Hoffman were in favour. David Owen and Martin Lees approached Ignatieff to find out what the Canadian government thought. However, the effect of Thompson's report, the response of the Steering Committee, the report of O.G. Stoner, and later the report of Paul Martin to Pearson halted the creation of an International Development Communications Center. The idea of a development data bank was not recommended in Plumptre's own feasibility study which was first submitted on 22 December 1967. The Report of the Steering Committee became a position paper submitted on 3 September 1968. The Report did mention the idea of data banks in the work of IDRC in passing. But it resurfaced later.

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263 Marcel Cadieux, ANS, in P.M. Tait, Economic Division, to the Under-Secretary through Mr. Langley, TMS, 38-4-IDRC, Volume 2, Aid and Export Finance, Foreign Affairs Records, 1.

264 Wayne Kines, interview by author.

265 See various telexes from George Ignatieff in 38-4-IDRC, Volume 2, Aid and Export Finance, Foreign Affairs Records, 1.
Plumptre's Feasibility Study

Plumptre's feasibility study was submitted in its final form on 24 January 1968. He made a number of key recommendations besides declaring that there was "complete unanimity in favour of the proposal" and the "international basis" for a Centre. He made a number of key recommendations besides declaring that there was "complete unanimity in favour of the proposal" and the "international basis" for a Centre.266 He suggested sub-centres in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver.268

The apparent intent of this thrust was to appeal to the university community who were opposed to funds moving away from them. The long-run effect favoured Roy Matthews' position, that of conducting of most research outside the Centre, and the dispersal of operations across Canada and the world at large in the form of regional centres.

b) "unanimity in opposition" to the idea of a "think-tank" whose research would "proliferate aimlessly and endlessly." Instead Plumptre favoured "multidisciplinary" and "action-oriented" research. "It should relate to


development programmes, past, present or to come. Further, Plumptre defined that the "banner under which it could well go forward is your own proposal: the application or adaptation of the newly-evolving countries technologies of the industrialized countries to the problems and possibilities of the developing countries." Thus, Plumptre favoured the tendency in Strong's May memorandum that focused more on applied technology, which was also favoured by Gaasenbeek. Consequently, the proposal shifted away from Ward, Pearson and some of Strong's own preferences for a "think-tank." Also, the tendency that the Centre should have a global vision was weakened, and one oriented towards developing countries only was endorsed. Emphasis on the conducting of research as such is more evident in Plumptre's report and is reflected in the name he coined for the organisation. While talking about a "centre" he titled the report, the "Proposed International Development Research Institution" (IDRI). In combination, the terms come close to the final form, IDRC.

c) the idea that the Centre should be set up as an "international organisation" was declared by respondents as "strongly negative." It would take long to organise, cumbersome and,

Could not be endowed with the special advantages it seemed to attach to a research centre that was launched and supported by the Canadian government and rooted in Canadian experience and expertise.

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In other words, Canadians would not capture all the fruits of the Centre for themselves. Further, if the organisation was to be an international or inter-governmental agency it would be elephantine in the sense of slow and difficult to manoeuvre. This point was significant in that the argument was put in terms of Canadian interest, which the other senior officials respected. And importantly, the notion that IDRI not be international directly countered the suggestions of several Deputy Ministers on the Steering Committee who seemed anxious that the Centre be set up elsewhere.

Plumptre's position favoured the kind of top drawer, international institution that Strong and Ward desired. However, he opposed the idea of both an endowment, preferred by Strong and Perinbam, and nothing at all, as balanced against "other priorities," which would have been Cadieux and his allies' desired outcome. In the long-term, the conclusion favoured the Perinbam idea of an international board, and in the favour the future President Hopper's international and above Government of Canada rates approach to staff hiring and remuneration.

d) The "leadership must command international respect" and the centre must get "substantial" contributions "say $20 million rather than $2 million" over "a five or ten year period."\(^{274}\)

e) Finally, Plumptre's interlocutors in Canada, the US, UK and France were reported to have endorsed the notion that Canada had a mission of sorts in this field. Canadian biculturalism, lack of imperial past and own experience "in the way of 'development' in our own country" was cited.\(^{275}\)

Ward and Strong's idea that the proposal might become a national mission of sorts was affirmed. In the end, all of Plumptre's principal conclusions were upheld, but less so their application.

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The retirement of Pearson and the election of Trudeau slowed down the process of IDRC’s proposal. New officials and a new political group had to be convinced. Trudeau followed Pearson's lead and continued to increase funding to development assistance, contrary to the American trend. The new Minister for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp later remarked,

During those, the early years of the Trudeau administration, our aid was really going up just when the American interest was going down. There was an idealism that actually got translated into increased expenditures.  

Nevertheless, barring the general trend of increased development assistance funding, Strong still had to keep his particular innovation on the political map. Strong had backed Paul Martin in the leadership race in the Liberal Party. Pearson's public endorsement of the idea and Strong's drive seems to have kept the IDC proposal moving forward. He approached the new Prime Minister and the idea became part of the Party's electoral promises.  

But the final proof of Strong's success came in September 1968 when Governor General Roland Michener announced in Parliament the government's intention to press forward with a bill to create IDRC. The Steering Committee completed their work that same month, although the report was not discussed in Cabinet until December 1968.

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277 Geoffrey Oldham, interview by author, 8 December 1993.

278 House of Commons, Debates, Speech from the Throne, 12 September 1968, 8.
On the Merits of Being Action-Oriented

We have already noted that Strong sought Plumptre out in order to legitimate the proposal among the mandarinate. Plumptre did this admirably. Although resistance to the idea continued into mid-1968, it was more muted, if no less convinced. This was partly because Plumptre and Strong made efforts to respond to the concerns that they represented. Although by February 1968, lower-level officers in External Affairs were increasingly approving of the concept emerging regarding the IDRC proposal, there was no apparent will to permit the creation of an independent organisation.

Mr. Plumptre places great emphasis on the fact that a research programme should be "action-oriented" and not merely academic. If this is a valid approach, and we think it is, then to the extent that useful research is to be done in the field strikes us that the existing institutional arrangement is already to hand in the form of the External Aid Office.²⁷⁹

The emphasis on being "action-oriented" was greatly stressed by other officials to Strong's team. A letter from Jake Warren, DM at Trade and Commerce, may have helped convince Strong that a more applied research oriented organization, rather than a more academic structure would be preferable.

I fear that such an institution—perhaps particularly if a group of top academics were to be let loose on your broad canvas—would turn itself into a talking and debating society about the requisite courses of action and that this could become an end in itself at the expense of concentrated and specialized effort and of action-oriented endeavour.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁹ D.H. Kirkwood, Economic Division to Marcel Cadieux, the Under-Secretary, TMS, 12 February 1968, 38-4-IDRC, Volume 2, Aid and Export Finance, Foreign Affairs Records, 2.

This sentiment was echoed by W.B. Lewis, a scientist who had been involved with the Canadian nuclear program in India. In response to the proposal as penned by A.F.W. Plumptre he wrote that,  

The proposed institution is exposed to the danger of becoming a "secular church", an organisation of preachers deprived of the material power to achieve and not be fully integrated with a modern technosstructure.\footnote{W.B. Lewis, TLS, in reply to memo of A.F.W Plumptre of 23 May [1967?] n.d., Document #000565, IDRC Records, 1.}

Sylvain Clouthier of Treasury Board suggested to Simon Reisman, then Secretary to Treasury Board, cost-recovery to force the application of research. Its total costs should be recovered from its clients, amongst whom would be the External Aid Office. Besides enabling the Centre to remain independent this arrangement would also compel it to devote its attention to "action-oriented" and "problem-solving" endeavours that are entered into at the request of customers, rather than engaging in academic studies, which, necessary though they be, are best left to the Universities.\footnote{Sylvain Clouthier to Simon Reisman, "International Development Centre, TMS, 25 September 1968, RG 55, 86-87/3, Box 59, File 8073-01, Treasury Board Records, Public Archives of Canada, 2.}

These do not simply seem means to hobble the Centre's independence for Clouthier also noted a parallel regarding the troubled Company of Young Canadians. The experience of the C.Y.C. should demonstrate the difficulty the Government has in divorcing itself of responsibility for the activities of organizations which it and it alone finances. The Centre should, then if it is to fulfil an independent role be financed independently. Since, like the C.Y.C. and unlike the External Aid Office, the Centre must be prepared to support research that may advocate social and economic changes which affect powerful vested interests in Canada and abroad, the Centre should ideally be completely independent of the Government.\footnote{Sylvain Clouthier to Simon Reisman, "International Development Centre," 1.}

The experience of the CYC might have served as a cautionary tale for the drafters of the proposal. As IDRC was to be, CYC was a form of Crown Corporation, also with an
unusual form of board, in this case elected by its own members. However, the Board only operated in an acting capacity, and when the Company was perceived to be engaged in left-wing activities in some areas in Canada. Board members were removed and replaced with government appointees. These appointees did not object too strenuously when the organisation was disbanded.\footnote{Stuart Goodings, interview by author, 26 April 1994, by telephone, notes, Ottawa.}

Mitchell Sharp was convinced enough of the idea that in July 1968 he seems to have attempted to get the very newly appointed Trudeau to approve the proposal over the head of the Steering Committee. But the senior officials were not to let the proposal be politically sanctioned prior to the Steering Committee of Senior Officials reaching its conclusions, even if the proposal had been included in the Liberal's list of electoral commitments. Cadieux's language and viewpoint reigned. O.G. Stoner penned the following which Trudeau signed, "I understand [that the IDC proposal] will have to be vetted by senior officials. . . we will need to look at this item in relation to those other matters for which we have established some priority."\footnote{P.E. Trudeau to Mitchell Sharp, TLS, 16 July 1968, 38-4-IDRC, Volume 2, Aid and Export Finance, Foreign Affairs Records, 2.}

To convince the university community, more references were made to the inclusion of Canadian academics in the proposal process and CIDA generally. Academics met with Strong's officials and were included. CIDA mounted a study in part presided by King Gordon regarding the role of academics relative to CIDA. Below Cadieux in External, tentative voices were raised in August 1968 suggesting that the conceptualisation of IDC was now much clearer, but could still be filtered out if Cadieux wished.

It is much more substantial and convincing than some of the earlier material prepared on this subject, since it comes to grips in a meaningful way with some of the questions and considerations which have led a number of us, and I think
including yourself, to have reservations about the proposal. In this connection I would mention particularly the paragraph occupying most of page 8 of the report which reflects a clear recognition that it is not self-evident that the establishment of a centre of the type proposed would in fact be a desirable thing.\footnote{D.H. Kirkwood, Economic Division to Marcel Cadieux, the Under-Secretary, TMS, 14 August 1968, 38-4-IDRC, Volume 2, Aid and Export Finance, Foreign Affairs Records, 1.}

\textbf{The Steering Committee Report and Its Wake}

The work of the Steering Committee itself had several effects on the future shape of IDRC. The name of the Centre was still not resolved, at least in English. In French, the Centre was referred to at this time in very nearly its present form, that is, \textit{Centre de recherches pour le développement international}.\footnote{The present name is \textit{Centre de recherches sur le développement international.}} In English, the name had reverted to International Development Centre. This is significant in the sense that it shows the steady move towards a concentration on research, and on development. The intellectual groundwork for this shift was done by the Task Force of academics, most forcefully by Geoffrey Oldham of SPRU. Surprisingly though, the Steering Committee Report itself does not reflect this shift. Oldham's thinking is mentioned briefly on page 77 but does not figure in the main body. This may indicate that the purpose of the Report was not so much to refine the thinking about the Centre as to produce the assent or suspend the negative sanction of the powers at play in the land. Indeed, in Finance, concern was expressed that, "program priorities and a justification for the Centre . . . will not have been met before the Centre is well on the way to establishment."\footnote{V.J. Chapin to E.A. Oestreicher, "International Development Centre," TMS, 9 May 1968, RG 19, Box 5277, File 7810-03-4 Pt. 2, Canadian Development Assistance Centres, IDRC, Finance Records, Public Archives of Canada, 4.}
Plumptre suggested that Strong meet with Oldham on his next trip to Europe. He did. This led to a further meeting at Strong’s California-style house in the Alta Vista area of Ottawa which overlooks what become the first headquarters for IDRC. This meeting took place on Saturday, 8 June 1968. With the televised funeral of Robert Fitzgerald Kennedy as a backdrop, Strong and Oldham discussed the IDC proposal. Oldham argued for indigenous capacity building. He refined his thoughts the next month in a paper sent to Strong.

Without its own science a country must always be dependent on foreign assistance. An indigenous scientific capability will help the country to define and solve its own problems, help provide the ‘receiving stations’ for foreign technology, and will help to provide the social milieu which is so essential for modernization and development.\(^{289}\)

This is the earliest definitive instance in the history of the proposal which concerned indigenous capacity building, and the seed which was to blossom into the essential mission of IDRC for the first twenty years of its existence.

IDRC as proposed was to have a domestic role well into 1969. When Prime Minister Trudeau came to power he raised the question as to whether a separate domestic operation be created, a "Brookings Institute... Or should Sharp's center proceed on its own?"\(^{290}\) PCO was not sanguine about this possibility for reasons we can only guess at.\(^{291}\) Strong recalls he "didn't really mind" Further, Strong noted, "as we began to canvass more opinion, I began to be a little concerned that maybe the domestic idea would too heavily weight the whole thing."\(^{292}\) Seemingly encouraged by Gordon Robertson of the


\(^{292}\) Maurice Strong, interview by author.
PCO, the Steering Committee funded a study on the domestic role of IDRC. The analysis was conducted by Ronald Ritchie. Ritchie was a former member of External Affairs. He was a colleague of Strong and a public-spirited businessman, then Chairman of Imperial Oil. Ritchie agreed to do the study at least one month before Trudeau's query. This study did not lead to its recommendations becoming part of IDRC. Instead the consequence was the creation of the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP), an organisation that Ritchie later founded and became the head of. Robertson has also worked there.

The Steering Committee helped define the shape of the Centre's structure and purpose with a little more precision. With regard to the structure, the size of the Board of Governors was expanded to twenty-one from Perinbam's fifteen, with ten of the governors being non-Canadians. For the consumption of the bureaucracy, the universities and the Cabinet, the cooperation with Canadian universities, government and business was stressed. But it is interesting to note how similar this agenda was to Perinbam's Canadian Foundation for International Development. Perinbam met with Peters on several occasions.

The initial research programme . . . would take into account:
- the main areas overseas to which Canada's external aid programmed is presently directed;

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295 Lewis Perinbam, interview by author.
Within the Steering Committee Report itself, we find a section which deals with the kind of work which the Centre should do. As far as the proposed principles of the Centre's operations are concerned, they do not reflect very much the recommendations of the Task Force, and must therefore reflect the preferences of the Committee of Senior Officials.

1) Canada, as a relative newcomer to the business of intensive study of development problems, needs to bring certain strengths to the task if it is to sustain such a centre "in competition" with more experienced countries; and

2) In order to maintain the interest of the Canadian electorate, whose political and fiscal backing is essential to the undertaking, a fairly clear link with matters of importance to people in this country is obviously necessary.

Thus it seems sensible to suggest that the Centre should tend to concentrate its efforts in the following general categories:

(a) Agriculture and forestry;
(b) Mining and geological technology
(c) Water resources (including fisheries);
(d) Some aspects of manufacturing;
(e) Some aspects of banking and other tertiary industry;
(f) Transport and communications;297

Other points related to social development followed the recommendations above. How do we interpret this information? In the rest of the Report the domestic aspect of the Centre was rarely being considered except insofar as Canadian expertise was to be utilised. It


seems clear that the programme of the proposed Centre was principally to fund research in areas reflecting areas of Canadian expertise. Strong's vision clearly had made little dent on his fellow DMs. However, the DMs had little impact on the long-run preoccupations of IDRC's programme. A strong emphasis was made by the actual Centre on agriculture, and also fisheries and geological remote sensing, yet very little work came to be funded on the other points listed.

The Choice of Location

The logic of having IDRC in Ottawa is compelling. The fact of CIDA and Foreign Affairs' location in Ottawa is of no small importance to effective networking, not to mention the presence of all foreign embassies. But what became IDRC was originally proposed to be located in Montreal. Pearson was in favour of its location there, yet it did not come to pass. As we have noted, Maurice Strong wanted to use the enthusiasm, proposals and political energy that EXPO '67 generated to give the Centre momentum.298 Nevertheless, there was a discussion over where it should be located. And letters from several parts of the country were sent to Pearson, Strong and MPs to try to get the Centre located in their area.

Several communities were interested in having IDRC located near them. Montreal was the most active in this regard. Most of the areas with less chance of success complained about their relatively deprived status and said that the government should reverse the general trend and put the organisation in their town. Victoria belatedly proposed that IDRC be located there in 1970, long after the decision had been made. Deep River, Ontario asked that IDRC (which they imagined was a world university) be placed in their area. Leonard Hopkins, M.P. for Renfrew North, warned Prime Minister

Pearson of impending "bitterness." Fears abounded that C.F.B. Petawawa and the expansion of the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) facility was in doubt. Hopkins thought that if some economic development was not forthcoming then things will "be very antagonistic."\(^{299}\) Premier Walter Weir of Manitoba wrote a letter to Prime Minister Pearson requesting that IDRC should be located somewhere in Manitoba.\(^{300}\) Pearson favoured Montreal and it was the only other real contender. The final decision not to proceed came in the wake of traditional federal government-Provincial of Québec-City of Montréal wrangling over who owned the land. As a consequence, symbolically, the land has remained everafter abandoned and ruined, but for Buckminster Fuller’s burned geodesic dome.

The Steering Committee Report was mostly developed by Ottawa officials. Not surprisingly they came out firmly in favour of IDRC being located in Ottawa. Matthew Gaasenbeek came down decisively against the choice of the National Capital Region. He warned Strong, "The Centre cannot help but fall under the control and influence of civil servants."\(^{301}\) But his was a cry in the silent wilderness of Ottawa, broken only by the sound of disagreements in distant Montreal.

Following the report of the Steering Committee and the endorsement of the new government, the business that Peters had to attend to as Coordinator was to draft the


\(^{301}\) Matthew Gaasenbeek to Maurice F. Strong, TMS, 2 June 1968, File 70, Document #001014, IDRC Records, 1.
enabling legislation and position the Centre for its launch. Peters' publicising of the Centre was aided by the conclusions reached by the Pearson Commission on technical assistance.

The Commission's main recommendation in this regard, is that there should be established an international body such as the proposed Canadian international centre for development and research. Such a centre would need to link its work closely to existing international agencies.  

Peters also spoke at gatherings of such organisations as the Canadian Institute for International Affairs, and the Banff Conference on World Affairs. Whereas in the early period of his dealings with the public, some found him to be very committed to a Canadians first viewpoint,  

by the summer of 1969 he was converted entirely to indigenous capacity building.  

The drafting of the legislation was performed by a small team led by Peters. The team included Oldham and Brecher who had been on the Steering Committee's Task Force, Earl Doe from Energy, Mines and Resources and Drew Wilson from the Science Council. Brecher, Doe and Wilson were probably chosen to be institutional representatives. Wilson was also to build support in the scientific community. Peters was seen as Strong's emissary.  

Oldham was most influential, among the other members of the group only Brecher had had much experience with developing countries. Oldham indicates that the "first objective that we all adhered to was to the building of local  


303 D.R.F. Taylor, interview by author.


305 Drew Wilson, interview by author, 26 April 1994, by telephone, notes, Ottawa.
capabilities. Oldham and Peters spent time at the latter's cottage near Perth, Ontario writing various drafts. But other team members had their effect.

Strong was largely absent from these drafting discussions. However, he did instruct Peters to find a mechanism to link CIDA and IDRC. A Memorandum to Cabinet was sent that called for the setting up of a Triticale and Cassava program that would be a CIDA project administered by IDRC. As a result of this initiative, Canadian and developing country researchers worked together with the aim of alleviating protein deficiency in the tropics. Aspects of the project have continued to be funded in IDRC ever since.

The proposal had been spoken of by Strong and his team in official and press circles as something like a Rockefeller and Ford Foundation. But the drafters had no model. Oldham did think that experience of the Institute of Development Studies in Sussex, UK might be useful were IDRC to resemble a "think-tank." Oldham wanted the organisation to be called the International Institute for Science and Development. Brecher argued against this. Like Matthews before him, Irving Brecher, Very much wanted the idea of it being a Centre not as [an] Institute, because he wanted different nodes around. He thought [they would be placed] out in universities in Canada. He thought there would be much more money available for Canadian universities. Strong was very keen to have a section on information sciences and data banks.

306 Oldham, interview by author, 8 December 1993.
307 "Memorandum to Cabinet, Triticale and Cassava-Swine, Two Canadian Sponsored Agricultural Research Programs As a Contribution to Alleviating Food Protein Deficiency in Central and South America and the Caribbean," TM, 26 October 1970, Draft #2, Stuart S. Peters' Private Papers, Halifax.
308 Geoffrey Oldham, interview by author, 8 December 1993.
Oldham was himself not keen on the creation of a disbursed group of centres. He had found the Ford and Rockefeller regional offices spread around the globe "ostentatious," an experience not worth repeating.\textsuperscript{309} James Pfeifer was brought in with an open mind from the Department of Justice to help turn the ideas into a legal framework by Peters. Concretising the notions of the drafting team took place with some urgency when an American, Ruth Zagorin, was selected by President-In-Waiting Hopper to re-draft the legislation. He was displeased with the contents.\textsuperscript{310} Zagorin eventually wrote the bylaws with Pfeifer.\textsuperscript{311}

\textsuperscript{309} Geoffrey Oldham, interview by author, 22 December 1993.

\textsuperscript{310} Drew Wilson, interview by author.

\textsuperscript{311} Ruth Zagorin, interview by author, 31 July 1987, tape recording, Washington.
The Bill to establish IDRC, C-12, was presented to the House of Commons in January 1970 by Mitchell Sharp as "one of the most promising and exciting proposals to come before this House for some time." The Bill sailed through the Sub-Committee on International Development, the Standing Committee on International Affairs and National Defense, the House of Commons and the Senate with almost no opposition. To ensure that the Centre was received well in the Senate, Lester Pearson made his influence felt and spoke in favour of the Bill. Criticisms were substantive, but not substantial. Unusually, all sides of the House and Senate supported the Bill.

Former Minister of External Affairs, Sharp, has described some of the reasons why the Bill passed with no opposition,

My impression at the time was that the Ford and the Rockefeller Foundations had been spectacularly successful. And therefore the idea, this kind of idea was not an experiment. It was an experiment for government but not for doing research of this kind. . .

Those of us with responsibility for the administration of foreign aid of one kind or another had our own reservations about our own programs. I know that when we decided that we were going to increase the amount of our aid that we encountered difficulties in spending the money. We were always conscious of the fact that we were putting pressure on the Agency to spend it. And we were criticized for not spending it. . . Well in an organisation like IDRC that just can't happen. It was a better form of foreign aid. . .

At that time we were much more interested in expanding our operations in the field of aid to developing countries. We were in the upswing. And this was a good kind of thing to do. And therefore there was no real difficulty in getting it

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312 House of Commons, Debates, 12 January 1970, 2249.

313 Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs: No. 6, Tuesday, 6 May 1969, 122.
accepted.\footnote{314}{Mitchell Sharp, interview by author.}

IDRC was introduced in Parliament as an apparently neutral techno-scientific centre for assisting research in developing countries. Sharp presented the Centre in contradistinction to the Company of Young Canadians,

I think in terms of social change that there is an important distinction between this centre and the Company of Young Canadians in that the Company of Young Canadian perhaps assumed a mandate for social change in Canada. This institution does not assume or cannot assume that it has a mandate for social change anywhere. It is a provider of techniques, a centre for knowledge, a centre of resources, which developing countries will be able to draw on and use and adapt to their own processes of social change over which this institution will have no control.\footnote{315}{Mitchell Sharp, interview by author.}

Sharp was well aware of concerns that Strong's internationalist approach, rather than a "Canadians First" perspective, was raising some eyebrows.\footnote{316}{House of Commons, Debates, 12 January 1970, 2251.} Consequently, for those that feared that Canada was allowing foreigners to sign Canadian cheques, Sharp emphasised the Canadian nature of IDRC."The centre will be basically a Canadian institution with an important international dimension. The chairman and most of the members of the centre's board of governors are to be Canadian as well as the majority of its executive committee."\footnote{317}{House of Commons, Debates, 12 January 1970, 2251.}
deflect surfaced. One might have expected there to be more opposition to the idea that foreigners were to sit on the Board of IDRC. When the USA attempted to create its own version of IDRC a decade later, Congress refused to consider the proposal for an international board and amended the bill.\textsuperscript{318} No other attempted cloning of IDRC in other countries has been so bold in this respect. Remarkably, the question of the composition of the Board did not provoke any major nationalist response, only MP Hogarth demanded that all the Board should be Canadian. But he was given no support from his colleagues.\textsuperscript{319} David Lewis of the NDP thought that the majority should be from developing countries.\textsuperscript{320}

Opposition to the Bill was slight. David Lewis did fear that IDRC did represent a certain cultural chauvinism. "We appear to be saying that we a rich developed and knowhow nation will hand out to you, the poor ignorant developing nations which do not have it, all the wisdom we have and all the great things we have accepted in our kind of society."\textsuperscript{321} Lewis also criticised the bill for not having the majority of the members of the Board of Governors from developing countries, and simply putting more money into universities. In the final analysis, these were not substantial disagreements, neither Lewis nor any other MP voted against the Bill. But for one amendment the Bill would have passed through Parliament at speedily.

\textsuperscript{318} Eventually the entire bill was voted down.

\textsuperscript{319} House of Commons, Debates, 11 February 1970, 13:41.

\textsuperscript{320} House of Commons, Debates, 12 January 1970, 2257.

\textsuperscript{321} House of Commons, Debates, 12 January 1970, 2257.
Parliamentarians on the Board

Several modifications to the Bill were attempted in the House and Senate. Most dealt with the Board of Governors, which was one of the most novel, and controversial aspects of the bill. Bill C-12 was the first bill in the House of Commons, and perhaps the last, to include the possibility of Parliamentary representation on the Board of Governors. The precedent for this was the membership of Ontario MPPs in corporations of the Government of Ontario. To the surprise and consternation of the government, the Senate made an amendment to include up to two Senators and members of the House on the Board. When Bill C-12 first returned to the House of Commons the amendment to the Bill was accepted, moved by Gordon Fairweather. Yet the government's front benches were against it, and so was the bureaucracy.

Upon being informed of the inclusion of MPs on the Board in the committees of the House and Senate, the Minister of External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp requested that CIDA prepare a list of reasons why MPs should not be included on the Board of Governors. This long list Sharp recited in Parliament. We have included below a fraction of his comments.

What is his relationship to the responsible minister and to what extent does he relate and report to him in respect of the centre's activities? Will the M.P.'s views expressed at meetings of the board be regarded as the views of the government, the views of Parliament, the views of his party, his own views or a mixture of all these? Will he be expected to carry back to the board the views or guidance of Parliament on particular questions in which they may become interested from

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323 Strong; Hopper; Sharp; interviews by author.

time to time? But this tirade does not seem to be an example of a Minister being subverted by his officials. Given Sharp's background in the civil service, the distinction between the civil service and the Minister was blurred in any case. Sharp was against the inclusion of Parliamentarians on boards of governors, and so he remains.

Strong, and Hopper were against the inclusion of MPs on the Board. Peters was both a technocrat (as a biologist by training) and bureaucrat (he has spent much of his life as a bureaucrat). Significantly, he thought that the inclusion of a parliamentary representative on the Board would limit its autonomy.

Opposition to MPs being included in the Board of Governors also came from back-bench MPs. One MP feared that having MPs on the Board of Governors would turn the Board into a UN. The NDP, led by David Lewis, had been hitherto very supportive of the bill in Second Reading. Lewis would often telephone Stuart Peters to query "What kind of question would you like me to ask?" However, although initial voting in favour of the amendment, Lewis later threatened filibustering the Bill. Only the instability of the October Crisis and the fear that the bill would fail led the NDP to let the bill

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325 House of Commons, Debates, 20 February 1970, 3912.

326 Mitchell Sharp, interview by author.

327 Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Tuesday 17 March 1970, 10:22.


329 Stuart Peters, interview by author.

330 There is some possibility that this threat was suggested by Strong's team to Lewis.
The reaction of the MPs and Senators who supported the inclusion of Parliamentarians on the Board is of interest. Member of Parliament Roberts said,

> It seems to me, doubtful, that, a little bit like captive member passengers on the liner Oronsay, the other 20 members of the board are going to be infected, by this lone politician, with some kind of loathsome political disease.\(^{332}\)

The Conservative MP, Gordon Fairweather commented,

> Mr. Speaker, it is extraordinary how ministers of the crown are frightened by Members of Parliament. Today we learned we had powers that I think most of us never realized we had . . . I fail to see why a Member of Parliament should have to detach himself from the board because of membership in this House. He suddenly becomes a persona non grata on the board... I thought his argument was laboured. If I may say so, I did not think it was wholly his own.\(^{333}\)

Presumably precisely because the likelihood was that the government would not permit MPs and Senators to sit on the Board, Fairweather and Roberts attempted to move that the presence of Parliamentarians be mandatory.\(^{334}\) However, they did not succeed in convincing others that this was wise.

The arguments in the two Houses is revealing as some Parliamentarians commented as to where they perceived their real place in the government structure was.

\(^{331}\) Geoffrey Oldham, interview by author, 8 December 1993.


\(^{333}\) As we now know, his argument was not entirely his own.

\(^{334}\) House of Commons, Debates, 20 February 1970, 3913.
Echoing the views expressed in the House, Senator Macnaughton said,

We are not second-class citizens . . . Who is better qualified to look after the people's interest than either the elected or even the appointed representatives?\textsuperscript{335}

Clearly, the Senators felt that Parliament, as such, was not pre-eminent in the land. More importantly, some Senators perceived where they thought much of the power was, and therefore why their amendment should be included.

I think there is one element of dissatisfaction in Canada today, to the effect, and this is putting it in an exaggerated form, that it is being run by regulations and run by civil servants and not by people's elected representatives. That is one reason this is in here and also one reason why I am in favour of something like this staying there.\textsuperscript{336}

If we believe the traditional organogram of government, with elected representatives of the people at the apex, and the civil service below them, Senator MacNaughton's statement seems nonsense.

What was business' view of the inclusion of Parliamentarians on the Board of Governors of IDRC? Omand Solandt, head of the Science Secretariat and concurrently business executive of Electric Reduction Co. uttered business' perspective\textsuperscript{337} on the inclusion of Parliamentarians on boards when he was asked to speak during the Senate's deliberations on the Bill.

I, from business experience, share the misgivings that some people have about having a Member of Parliament on a board of this kind. It is the same problem

\textsuperscript{335} Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Tuesday, 17 March 1970, 10:22.

\textsuperscript{336} Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Tuesday 17 March 1970, 10:23.

\textsuperscript{337} It is perhaps overstating the case to simply say that Solandt represented business' perspective. One might say he represented the interests of technocracy. Many of the Senators listening could well be seen as representing the interests of business, and yet they supported the motion. Still, many of those with a more pro-business orientation supported Solandt's point of view.
that industry encounters in having employees on the board of directors.\textsuperscript{338}

Once again, this is formally illogical as the Parliamentarian is supposed to be sitting astride the horse of state. It led Senator Grosart to say. "In this case it would be the employers on the board of directors."\textsuperscript{339}

We know of no direct records which indicate the attitude of the Prime Minister towards the inclusion of Parliamentarians on the Board of Governors, although obviously he was in favour of the Bill as a whole. This was true too for the then Legislative Assistant to Prime Minister Trudeau, Ivan Head, although he relented.\textsuperscript{340} F. Dale Hayes, in a memorandum to David Hopper writes that Head opposed the inclusion of MPs on the Board of Governors.

I rang Mr. Ivan Head to inform him of the Senate Committee's amendments to clause 10.3 [which permitted the inclusion of Senators on the Board of Governors]. He seemed hopeful that this might be the stimulus needed to have the whole clause removed, thereby restoring the Centre's autonomy. However, he added that this would be a "slow process" which may mean a delay in obtaining Royal Assent until after the Easter recess.\textsuperscript{341}

If we examine the rest of clause 10 we note that it prescribed that the "Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and nine other governors must be Canadian citizens" and "at least eleven of the governors appointed must have experience in the field of international development

\textsuperscript{338} Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Tuesday 17 March 1970, 10:10.

\textsuperscript{339} Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Tuesday 17 March 1970, 10:10.

\textsuperscript{340} There is some assumption that Head's and Trudeau's opinions were one.

See F. Dale Hayes to W. David Hopper, "Bill C-12," TMS, 1 April 1970, File 72, Document #001142, IDRC Records, 1.

\textsuperscript{341} F. Dale Hayes to W. David Hopper, "Memorandum", TMS, 26 March 1970, File 72, Document #001143, IDRC Records, 2.
or experience or training in the natural or social sciences or technology.\footnote{342} It is important that Head was willing to dispense with the Canadian content rule entirely, indeed any content rule. The deletion of the first part might have added to the autonomy of the Centre. That is much less clear in the second part, for without these specifications, political appointments would be unrestricted. Among the other novelties of the Bill, the proclamation that some expertise was generally desirable was a political signal not to fill the Board with incompetents. And there was political acceptance that it should be followed. As the Minister of the time, Sharp, later recalled,

> The [Canadian] names that were accepted were people who could make some sort of contribution. They were political. They were not party hacks in the sense that many of these appointments are. I think that everybody realized that these people were going to sit down with some very distinguished foreigners and we wanted those people to be reasonably competent people, people who had some interest and some knowledge.\footnote{343}

Generally this was adhered to in subsequent years.


\footnote{343}{Mitchell Sharp, interview by author.}
Cabinet Committee to Final Passage

The closest scrutiny of the IDRC proposal came after First Reading of the bill in the Cabinet Committee on Science Policy and Technology. Fortuna smiled on the Bill in the shape of Trudeau's science advisor and Committee Secretary, Bob Uffen, who happened to be a former fellow geophysicist at University of Toronto with Oldham. As it has in times previous and since, the Gatineau Hills provided a location where discussions could take place on important matters. Oldham and Uffen conferred over how to get the Bill through in summer cottages near the community of Wakefield, Quebec. The Cabinet Minister for Science, Bud Drury, also lived nearby. As a result of the discussions with Uffen, the second memo to the Science Committee was more permissive, and less sanguine about Western solutions to Third World problems.

In the past, Canada and many other nations, in providing aid to developing countries, frequently assumed that the industrialized counties of the West had the "know-how" and that by providing money and expertise we could help underdevelop countries to develop. This attitude has been proven wrong. We do not understand all of the problems of development - especially the problems of societies with different social and political systems and values to our own . . . It will be the purpose of the International Development Research Centre of Canada to help discover this knowledge and to find out best how best it can be used to promote development. It is also the purpose to help developing countries to acquire their own problem-solving capabilities.\textsuperscript{344}

This memorandum was significant in that it shows Oldham's influence at a critical juncture, injecting a particular tone that had been missing before, countering a certain cultural chauvinism, often apparent in so-called transfer of technology thinking.\textsuperscript{345}


\textsuperscript{345} The spirit and indeed much of the text itself is drawn nearly word for word from a text Oldham had written four months earlier.
Indeed, earlier formulations of the proposal presumed that the work would be performed in Canada and transferred to developing countries. Lewis certainly thought it still extant when he rose in the House three months later. Most significantly, the notion of capacity building is made explicit and vital where it had been almost absent in previous documents of import. Part of that shift was clear when by January 1970, Mitchell Sharp rose in the House during Second Reading.

It [IDRC] will give high priority to programs that assist the developing countries to build their own scientific and technological capabilities so that they will not be mere welfare recipients.346

Uffen, via the Cabinet Committee, lent weight to Oldham's assertion that the president of IDRC should not be the DM of Finance, Bob Bryce which was Strong's preference. The Committee minutes record that the "choice of executive officers having a broad range of science and technology rather than primarily ability in corporation development or program economics could facilitate achievement of the Centre's goal of exchange of technical information." However, a Canadians-first over capacity-building thrust emerged when it was noted that, "expertise exists in the Canadian academic community with which to effectively attack the social problems related to the transfer of technology, and should be utilized to the maximum extent possible in laboratory and field research studies," and, "Canadian industrial competence should also be utilized to make best use of the scientific and technological community." However, these did not become recommendations, only consultation with the Science Council to solicit the support of the scientific community was required.347 Oldham recalls only one difficult but important

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question at the meeting. The Minister for Fisheries and Oceans brought up the point that his department came up with many solutions but fishermen didn't utilise them. He thought how much more difficult would it be in developing countries, where people had even less formal education. Oldham scribbled a reply with which Strong satisfied the questioner to the effect that IDRC would pioneer a new approach which would combine the talents of natural and social sciences so the real needs of fishermen would be taken into consideration in the research and application of the knowledge.\footnote{Geoffrey Oldham, interview by author, 22 December 1993.}

One of the advisors to the Task Force, who would soon join the Board of the Centre, Fred Bentley, made a vital contribution following the Committee hearing. The notion of the Centre was beginning to move in the direction of the "think tank" once more, although Oldham had argued for a mix of contract research, and in-house capacity consistently. The agriculturalist advisor to CIDA was particularly concerned that the Cabinet Committee minutes did not reflect "the orally made suggestion at that meeting to the effect that Canada's support for the International Rice Research Institute might be provided as a part of the International Development Centre activity." Bentley noted to Stuart Peters the difficulties of tied aid in the disbursement of funds to IRRI and other like organisations. He asked that the legislation include provision for "a foundation type of activity which could be our avenue of support for agencies such as those described above and without hampering degrees of "tying".\footnote{C.F. Bentley to Stuart Peters, TMS, 7 January 1969, "International Development Centre -- Foundation Aspect," TMS, Document #000588, IDRC Records, 1.} Bentley tipped the balance.

By May of 1969, Stuart Peters indicated the emphasis to be given in the legislation in a briefing note supposedly authored by Strong, [The Centre's] staff will help to define key problems which are recognized as
being of particular significance to the developing countries. It is then likely that most of the work required to solve these problems will be contracted out to universities, industry and government departments, not only in Canada but throughout the world. The Governors may also decide that it is desirable for the Centre to set up its own research laboratories, and they may decide to provide core budget support to other international research institutes in the developing countries.

The foundation was re-established, the "think-tank" weakened.

Royal Assent was not granted until 13 May 1970. The final approval for the opening did not come until Pearson put pressure on the government to open the Centre during the October Crisis that autumn. The Bill was not greatly changed during Second Reading, nor has it since then. By the time the government could amend the Bill in Committee the government was embroiled in a postal dispute. Trudeau was "under enormous pressure from the Cabinet" regarding the strife and "confronts chronically dissatisfied backbenchers." The Bill was let thorough as amended, presumably so as not to upset the situation more. There was another reason. Sharp said in the Commons that "Hon. members will recognize that the amendment in question is permissive." In other words, although it was now possible for the government to appoint Parliamentarians to the Board of IDRC, the government had no intention of doing so. But whether this section was applied or not, the Bill was remarkable. It was not just that C-12 passed unanimously. For the first time in world history foreigners would directly decide the policy of state development assistance organisations. IDRC is still the only organisation


351 F. Dale Hayes, 1.

of a national government to have that distinction. Further, the Bill gave great discretion to
delve into almost any subject in every manner, relatively untrammelled room to
manoeuvre. Moreover, the uniqueness of the organisation in the field of development
assistance was even more dramatic, the notion of funding developing country researchers
to seek methods to solve their own problems was practically unheard of.

The Selection of David Hopper — Background and Credibility

Several candidates sought the position of President of IDRC. According to Strong,
two that two other people than Hopper were considered, some more seriously than others.\textsuperscript{353} The then

Minister of External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp recalled no other serious candidate to Hopper

being presented when the selection process reached him. We noted above regarding the

post-Cabinet Committee discussion that Strong wanted the Deputy Minister of Finance to

be first president. It was felt that Bryce "would ensure that the money continued to
grow."\textsuperscript{354} Bryce may have campaigned for the position.\textsuperscript{355} J. René Whitehead, Chief

Science Advisor of Science Secretariat at the PCO was also considered. Oldham had

previously argued that a professional with legitimacy in the developing and developed

world was necessary as president.\textsuperscript{356}

\textsuperscript{353} Professor Irving Brecher was interested in the Presidency and was considered for

the post.


\textsuperscript{354} Geoffrey Oldham, interview by author, 22 December 1993.

\textsuperscript{355} Stuart Peters, interview by author.

\textsuperscript{356} Strong mentioned his name as president to Oldham a month later. Oldham didn't

know Hopper.

After the critical Science Policy and Technology Cabinet Committee meeting on 23 September 1969, Strong, Peters the biologist, Omand Solandt, the medical scientist, and the geophysicist, Oldham met for a celebratory luncheon drink at the Chateau Laurier. Solandt added his voice to the chorus singing the refrain that a professional scientist was needed to head IDRC. Perinbam first met Hopper in the month of November. Peters added his voice in paper form when he wrote a memorandum at the end of the month which stated in dramatic tone that the "appointment of a President from within the ranks of the senior Public Service will undoubtedly invoke fear from many strong supporters of IDRC legislation that government established administrative attitudes, operative practices and people would permeate the Centre and reduce its overall potential." The three natural scientists appear to have won the day because Strong decided to accept the proposition.

Joe Hulse, formerly at Maple Leaf Foods, and by that time a CIDA consultant, appears to have been a potential candidate. Strong sent both Joe Hulse and David Hopper to meet Oldham prior to the choice of the president. This may mean that Oldham's vision was the most in accord with Strong's and that Oldham was to present to these potential presidents his vision. However, by 18 December 1969, the field had narrowed almost entirely to a number of academics. The list sent to the Minister for External Affairs consisted of: Dr. Claude Bissell (specialist in Canadian literature and Canadian history), Prof. Irving Brecher (an economist), Prof. James Gillies, Prof. James M. Ham (an electrical engineer), Dr. David Hopper (an agricultural economist), Mr. Douglas N. Kendall, Prof. Cranford Pratt (an economist) and Dr. William C. Winegard (a

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metallurgical engineer). Of these, Hopper had the most applied scientific field experience in developing countries.

Before he became first President of IDRC, W. David Hopper was a Canadian agricultural economist who had spent much of his life in the United States and in Asia. He had received his BSc. at MacDonald College, done research in the villages of India. He completed his PhD at Cornell and had then taught at Ontario Agricultural College, Ohio State University and University of Chicago. Significantly, he had worked at both the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, and the World Bank.

Hopper was known to be bullish about most things but especially the possibilities of science and technology. While recognising that it had to be relevant to the local user, he had seen its marvels in the Green Revolution in India. Francis X. Sutton recalls him to have been used as a "hammer" by "Frosty" Hill of Cornell. Hill had played a vital role in the joint development of the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) by both Ford and Rockefeller. He was an agricultural economist, and then head of Ford's overseas development group. Hill was known as a great believer in the technical fix. "Frosty" Hill sought to make research more important, eventually creating, after considerable struggle, the Consulting Group for International Agricultural Research. Sutton first met Hopper in Mexico where the latter was used by Hill against those who favoured community development over technology.  

Maurice Strong met David Hopper in India in the spring of 1967 during the drought in Bihar. Hopper was then a visiting professor at the Indian Agricultural

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359 Francis X. Sutton, interview by author, 4 August 1987, tape recording, New York.
Research Institute, where he lectured in agricultural economics. In 1968, Strong met Hopper briefly and informed him that he was in the process of creating IDRC. In April 1969, Hopper met Strong for a third time at an Asia Development Bank meeting in Australia. At this point, Strong suggested that he might wish to become Director of Agriculture. Hopper procrastinated, being uncertain of the structure, etc. of the new Centre.\textsuperscript{360} Lewis Perinbam met Hopper later that year and shortly afterward suggested that Hopper or someone like him be President of IDRC.\textsuperscript{361}

In January of 1970, Hopper was in New York reporting to the Rockefeller Foundation for which he was working. Maurice Strong asked Hopper to come to Ottawa. In Ottawa, Strong asked Hopper to become President, although formally Hopper was merely a candidate being queried about the Presidency of an organisation that had not yet been approved by Parliament.

At the beginning of 1970, the bill to establish IDRC was still at Second Reading. Hopper was, in fact, present at the meeting where Strong gave testimony before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defense on February 11. We note that the President had been chosen long before Parliament had passed the bill to create it. Despite the ignoring of protocol, Hopper was not introduced to the committee as the heir apparent. Interestingly, Hopper does not recall meeting with

\textsuperscript{360} David Hopper, interview by author, 31 July 1987.

\textsuperscript{361} Lewis Perinbam, interview by author.

Perinbam's preference for Hopper is consistent with his hopes for the creation of a Canadian version of the Rockefeller Foundation. The Americanised Hopper was working for Rockefeller when Perinbam suggested his name. Hopper's close association with American aid may have also been attractive since the combatting of US aid weariness was part of the initial impetus for IDRC.
Members of the House of Commons or Senate, other than Sharp and Trudeau.  

After Hopper's acceptance of Strong's offer of the post, he met with members of the government as well as some of the mandarinate. Hopper saw Chairman of the Board to be, Mike Pearson. Hopper's family had known the Pearson family for years. The family had a summer cottage near the Pearson's summer cottage. Hopper was also known by virtue of his father by Minister of External Affairs Sharp, a key member of the mandarinate. Sharp was a strong family friend of Hopper's father, Wilbert C. Hopper. Sharp had worked in the grain trade until 1942. Sharp did not know Wilbert's son well, but was impressed by Hopper's work in the field. Sharp approved Hopper's appointment.

Sharp is something of a sociologically ambiguous figure, like Plumptre. Unlike most civil servants, although he has been a civil servant most of his life, he has close links with business. After leaving the grain trade he entered the Department of Finance. In 1951, Sharp became Associate Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, and then Deputy Minister in 1957. But Sharp did not spend all of his career in the civil service. In 1958, Sharp was named vice-president of Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Company, commonly known as Brascan. Like Pearson, after having become an MP, Sharp returned to his old departments as minister, namely Trade and Commerce, and later as Minister of Finance. In 1968, Sharp became Minister of External Affairs, a position that he held during the development of the proposal for IDRC, and of particular importance to us, at this juncture, during the period of the appointment and Presidency of David Hopper. As a

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youth he taught Sunday school.\textsuperscript{365} Sharp is a man with a public reputation for principles, and briefly held the position of first Ethics Counsellor early in the Chrétien government. It is perhaps not surprising that he approved IDRC Bill which limited the number of purely political appointments that could be made to the Board.

Although both Pearson and Sharp knew Wilbert C. Hopper, neither knew David Hopper himself to any great degree. Consequently, the younger Hopper was questioned as to his soundness by both Pearson and Sharp, and Trudeau. His political sympathies were particularly important to the officials of the Ministry of Finance and Treasury Board. The President Designate had lunch with Prime Minister Trudeau. Hopper was taken to the offices of several other members of the mandarinate. In particular, Hopper met with those individuals and Departments who had expressed the most concern about the shape of IDRC in 1967, including Gordon Robertson, still head of the Privy Council in 1970. According to Hopper, the worries of a number of departments of government had to be allayed, especially those of External Affairs. Naturally, Hopper spoke to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, A.E. Ritchie. Hopper also conversed with Michael Pitfield of the PMO, and others. External Affairs, the Privy Council, Pearson, Finance and Treasury Board all wanted to make certain that Hopper was "not politically unsensitive."\textsuperscript{366} Hopper's own impression was that Treasury Board and the Department of Finance's main worry could be summed up as, "Gee, are we going to have some kind of wild-eyed radical who is going to spend money right, left and centre and ship it out to all the wrong groups."\textsuperscript{367} Clearly, Hopper had to be seen as politically reliable.

The new Chairman of the Board of Governors of IDRC, Mike Pearson, also


\textsuperscript{366} David Hopper, interview by author, 1987.

\textsuperscript{367} David Hopper, interview by author, 1987.
sought to make certain that the Governors would not be "radical". Some of the first words that Pearson uttered to the Board were the following,

If there are abuses of this freedom and flexibility, the parliament of Canada can cut off the Centre's funds at the end of every year. I've no doubt we will all keep that in mind in our work.  

Hopper's comment to this statement by Pearson is useful for guiding our interpretation of the language.

DH: He had to say to the Board. Let's not, let's not. . A lot of radical proposals are going to come forth from you. Let's recognize that we have independence, but that if we are not aware of our public responsibilities . . .

One possible reason for Pearson's statement to the Board may have been Pearson's desire to avoid having IDRC become as politically controversial as the Company of Young Canadians. Pearson was aware of this problem from the press and had been kept informed of the Company's attempts to resolve their difficulties in letters he received from Stuart Goodings, the Company's Executive Director until 1969.

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The Board of Governors

The selection of the Chair of any Board is indicative of the prestige and political legitimacy of the organisation. The legitimacy of IDRC was firmly established by the fact that the first Chair was Pearson. The decision to try to have Pearson become the Chairman of the Board of Governors came early on in the formation of the structure of IDRC. In fact, as soon as Pearson announced his intention to retire in the autumn of 1967, Matthew Gaasenbeek wrote to Maurice Strong and suggested that they ask Pearson if he wished to head it. Of course, Pearson was not asked formally to become Chairman until 1970. However, suspicions were sufficiently aroused in Parliament that by 1 February 1968 then MP, Ed Schreyer asked this question regarding the proposed IDRC in the House of Commons. "Would it be in order to ask the right hon. Prime Minister if this is the kind of academic institution he has in mind for his retirement years?" To which Pearson replied. "There is nothing academic about this Mr. Speaker."\textsuperscript{371} This wistful response seems to indicate that Pearson was interested in the position of Chairman.

Lester Pearson was chosen as the first Chairman of the Board for several reasons. Strong assesses why Pearson was chosen. "I thought that would sit well with the bureaucracy, with Trudeau's desire to show some respect for his predecessor, and the whole history of Pearson first in it. [sic] That also politically helped to get the idea back again."\textsuperscript{372} Jim Pfeifer, the Secretary of IDRC for twelve years and drafter of IDRC's legislation, feels that Pearson's chairmanship gave IDRC legitimacy in the market, in the business community.\textsuperscript{373}

\textsuperscript{371} House of Commons, Minutes and Proceedings, 1 February 1968, 6238-9.

\textsuperscript{372} Maurice Strong, interview by author, 1987.

\textsuperscript{373} James Pfeifer, interview by author, 13 March 1987, notes, Ottawa.
Lester Bowles Pearson as Chair In Waiting, and the Early Days

One of Pearson's most significant effects on the future shape of IDRC came when he was asked by Maurice Strong to comment on the draft legislation of the Bill to establish the Centre. As the proposal passed from stage to stage the idea was progressively becoming more and more a technocratic affair. As such, the natural scientist seemed more and more bound to be dominant in the Centre. Pearson passed the document to Ed Hamilton, who worked for him on the Commission of International Development. Pearson backed Hamilton's comments and added and expanded in his own script. Hamilton noticed that the draft of the bill said that the purpose of the bill was to do research into "the means for applying and adapting scientific and technological knowledge" and defined research as "scientific and technical enquiry and experimentation." Pearson worried that "a narrow or negative-minded lawyer might use the qualifications against, for example, a project on the techniques of land reform or court reorganization." He found similar references in the draft bill which would prejudice the involvement of the social sciences. This intervention led to the broadening of the definition of knowledge to "scientific, technical and other knowledge." He also wished to ensure that the research would be applied. Peters had the legislation altered to permit pilot projects. In general, Pearson wanted IDRC to have as much room for manoeuvre as possible, even able to develop whole new institutions. However, Pearson also wished to have the notion of an underdeveloped country defined in static monetary terms, so as to restrict projects in "such countries as Israel". But because a developing country is difficult to define in monetary and other terms, and because those standards of measurement are fluid and not static, Pearson's request was denied.

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Pearson's first act as Chairman of the Board of Governors was to threaten to refuse to chair the first meeting. The Centre was to open in the dark days of October 1970. But this had to be approved by the government. The government was fixated on the FLQ crisis and the quotidian business of government came to a halt. Pearson balked at the idea of being the Chair of an organisation that had not been authorised. He forced the government to permit its inauguration, and it was formally sanctioned on the second day of the Board's meeting.\textsuperscript{376} Pearson had his own priorities too, he was dying.

Ivan Head credits Pearson with the decision to have the Centre in the downtown core of the city.\textsuperscript{377} The first location of IDRC was to be in an old school near Billings Bridge, eleven kilometres from the centre of the city. Soon after the building was sold to another government agency.\textsuperscript{378} IDRC was actually first housed in the Pebb Building in the same area. But Pearson felt that IDRC had to be near Parliament Hill, lest it become financially marginalised because it was spatially distant from power. So in 1972, IDRC moved to 60 Queen Street, only a few city streets from the House of Commons. IDRC has remained downtown ever since, changing addresses only once more in 1987 to 250 Albert Street.

One of Pearson's actions on behalf of IDRC was to attempt to get IDRC recognised as an international organisation so that staff would not be taxed. A letter to Mitchell Sharp dated 27 January 1972 stated that IDRC was having difficulty attracting good overseas staff because of the relatively low staff salaries, compared with other international organisations.\textsuperscript{379} In the end, it was not possible for Pearson's suggestion to

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\textsuperscript{376} David Hopper, interview by author, 1987.
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\textsuperscript{377} Ivan Head, interview by author, 18 August 1987, tape recording, Ottawa.
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\textsuperscript{378} David Hopper, interview by author, 31 July 1987.
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be incorporated. The Department of Justice and Treasury Board determined that IDRC could not unilaterally declare itself international as such despite the nature of the Board and international staff.\footnote{380}

Pearson was also called to respond to letters directed at him from the public which demanded that he defend Centre policies. One such case concerned letters from G.H. Beaton, the Chairman of the Department and School of Hygiene of the University of Toronto. Beaton complained to Pearson about the allotment of money to Canadian investigators. Beaton said that, "I feel that a rather arbitrary policy prohibiting the support of Canadian investigators on the basis of their nationality and geographic location alone is most unfortunate."\footnote{381} Pearson was given very specific advice regarding this complaint by David Hopper through Pearson's secretary, Annette Perron. "Hopper says that Beaton is a long-time trouble-maker. Hopper suggests that you [Pearson] should wait till the Board meeting then write him saying that the matter was discussed and the Board examined the Centre's financial capacity and the objectives set out in the Act and that you can do no more than reaffirm the general directives given to Beaton."\footnote{382} This advice Pearson followed very closely. The point of these two examples regarding tax and letters is to say that Pearson loyally acted as shield-bearer, when his priorities lay with his memoirs and saving his own life.

Pearson seems to have had some influence on the shape and style of the first Board. Some of those selected had been part of the Commission of International Development, such as Roberto Campos. Others had been present at the various meetings

\footnote{380}{David Hopper, interview by author, 1987.}

\footnote{381}{G.H. Beaton to W.D. Hopper, TLS, 24 May 1972, MG 26, N 5, Vol. 18, IRDC January 1972 - March 1973, Public Archives of Canada, 2.}

that Pearson attended in the late 1960s. But Maurice Strong made certain that few did not meet with his approval. Later, two months before his death, Pearson did intervene personally in the choice of at least one of the members of the Board of Governors. Pearson did not want a particular Indian included on the Board because of his stance in favour of nuclear proliferation. He does not seem to have taken many particular initiatives within the Board or, as Chairman of the Board, outside IDRC. As we shall see, of those on the Board, Pearson only appears to have shared his concerns about the direction the Centre was taking with Barbara Ward. Mike Pearson tried to perform his duties as Chairman of the Board even as his body was dying.

**Communists on the Board of Governors?**

Some wavering seems to have taken place over whether to include East Europeans on the Board of Governors. To have nearly half the Board from overseas was unusual, but to have had East Europeans prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall would have been extraordinary. Fifteen percent of those on the Board of Governors of the proposed Institute for the Advancement of Man were meant to be from China, Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. But the IAM was also to include 10% UN personnel, 5% Outstanding World Figures and 8% representatives from world religions. However, these suggestions did not survive past the first version of the what was to become the IDRC proposal. Yet the idea of having communists survived until at least mid-summer 1970. To understand this

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proposition it is probably worthwhile to recall, as we noted in the previous chapter, that the notion of having Communists on the Board of Governors was perfectly in tune with the Pearsonian Weltanschauung, to which Strong and many others were adherents. The initiative was Strong's. As we have already discussed, the justifications for increased emphasis on Canadian foreign policy activities and development assistance came from a belief in the necessity of international social peace and justice. We have seen that especially after 1957 Pearson thought that nuclear Armageddon might be avoided by increased contacts between socialist and capitalist states, and all countries generally. Pearson's, indeed Canadian foreign policy as a whole, was less in the French or American manner, and recognized de facto rather than de jure governments. The policy preference on the part of IDRC's President, Chair and creator for having Eastern Europeans in the 1970s was part of this particular stream of Canadian thinking. However, it was not until the late 1980s that Chinese Communists (at least in form) sat on the Board. Eastern Europeans remain excluded despite the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Canadian foreign policy is always limited by strong opinions in the United States.

As Minister of External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp would have made most of the final decisions on the choice of the Board. Sharp was quite unwilling to include East Europeans on the Board. When queried about the decision Sharp replied, "What did they know about operations like this, not very much. It was never considered seriously. Because they couldn't give us any advice."\textsuperscript{386} Whether this was the real, or a complete explanation of why East Europeans were not included in the Board is difficult to say. It seems unlikely. The principal list of recommendations for the Board of Governors included one Soviet, and a Pole, as an alternate. One of those suggested, G.M. Gvishiani, received the highest rating from those IDRC staff deputed to assess potential governors. He was then Vice-Chairman of the USSR's State Centre of Science and Technology, and had been recommended by the Canadian Embassy in Moscow, the UN Advisory

\textsuperscript{386} Mitchell Sharp, interview by author.
Committee on Science and Technology. Gvishiani was Kosygin's son-in-law, and well known as a specialist in science and technology issues.\textsuperscript{387} The alternate suggestion was J. Kaczmarek, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cracow. Kaczmarek was a Professor there, a member of the Polish Academy, and a Scientist by training.\textsuperscript{388} Maurice Strong had suggested both these names.\textsuperscript{389} Hopper himself appears not have been in favour of this initiative. His explanation for the decision not to have East Europeans on the Board was "security."\textsuperscript{390}

Despite this rebuff neither Pearson nor Ward were willing to be deterred by the refusal to have communists on the Board, they continued to make IDRC a symbol of a broader church. At the press conference following the inaugural meeting of the Board, Pearson said, "Soviet Bloc states are not excluded `in any way shape or form' from the activities of the centre," The Windsor Star reported,

\begin{quote}
Mr. Pearson says he hopes to get in touch with leaders from the area [Eastern Europe] before long' and try to interest them in the centre's work. He said the board would be happy to consult with Communist leaders on any ideas they might have pertaining to the centre.
\end{quote}

Pearson was as good as his word.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{387} Maurice Strong, interview by author, 1987.
\item \textsuperscript{388} `Board of Governors Candidates', TD, n.d., Pearson PMO, MG 26, N 5, Vol. 18, Public Archives of Canada, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{389} Maurice Strong supported the inclusion of both candidates. Maurice Strong, interview by author, 28 August 1987, tape recording, Ottawa.
\item \textsuperscript{390} David Hopper, interview by author.
\end{itemize}
After the creation of the Centre, in March 1971, Barbara Ward organised a conference under the auspices of IDRC entitled "Possible Priorities and Patterns of Cooperation in Development Research." Ward herself conveyed for Hopper and Pearson invitations to a number of foreigners including the Soviet Skorov, and the Hungarian Bognar. Well-known members of the centre-left such as Prebisch, Seers, Ghai, Islam, Chidzero, were invited from abroad. Canadians cut from the same cloth like Gerry Helleiner and Cranford Pratt were also asked to attend. What this indicated was the difference between the narrower, less bold and less internationalist vision of the new generation of the technocratic Hopper, chastened and polarised by the anti-Communist dirge, and that of Ward and Pearson. That dissatisfaction and difference in style and substance is encapsulated in a letter from Ward to Pearson.

I have a fear I share only with you that without some larger perspective - "grander" project, we may end up as a sub-Rockefeller putting lysine into wheat and doing jobs which a hundred other bodies less well-endowed and independent than IDRC might perform. . . I think we must be more than retailers of research and policy.


Crucible to Mould

Hopper Decides

Hopper's actions as President were decisive in the forming of IDRC. Despite the many meetings and reams of paper devoted to the definition of IDRC, the basic documents, Bill C-12, and the informal agreements etc. it was intended by the drafters that very much of the internal structure, personnel and activities of IDRC remained to be defined.

As is the fate of most such studies, the specific research proposals suggested by the various departments represented by the Steering Committee and those of the Task Force were ignored. Ever since the idea of IDRC was mooted in early 1967, Strong championed the notion that the Centre should become a "think-tank." While the idea had not been ruled out by the legislators into 1970, more and more the understanding of those involved with the drawing up of the proposal saw IDRC as doing little in-house research and decision-making itself. Rather, IDRC would support research elsewhere and be responsive to Third World needs, instead of directing research. Strong had lost the argument on this item. But as determined as ever, he tried to persuade Hopper of the value of a place for opinion leaders, established scholars and students to reflect on world problems. Hopper closed the issue and it was not seriously raised for two decades.\(^{394}\)

The common experience of Oldham and Hopper in different parts of Asia convinced them that indigenous capacity building with the maximum flexibility for indigenous researchers was the top priority. Oldham says,

\begin{quote}
We were the two people who had a lot of experience in the developing world . . . a lot of other people who had been deeply grounded in the Third World would have been coming up and saying "Look this is the thing that we ought to be doing
\end{quote}

\(^{394}\) David Hopper, interview by author, 1987.
Oldham was more willing than Hopper to have an organisation built in Canada for the purpose of indigenous capacity building in developing countries, so long as most of the research it conducted was contracted out and well-tested in the field. Hopper was more keen on all research being conducted there.

Once IDRC was created in law, David Hopper had to decide what the shape of the organisation would be. In January 1970, apparently in reaction to Hopper's expectations of the future shape of the Centre, Stuart Peters sought to convince Strong that the structure of IDRC should consist of a series of loose "groups" including a concept group (the "think-tank"), an information system group, administration group, and a research management group consisting of research teams. All these would be led by the Board and President. Peters suggested that,

- that the Centre's process of goal setting be adopted.
- that the . . . blocks to effective development activities lie closer to the stage of implementation of existing knowledge than near the basic research end of the spectrum.
- that the social sciences and behavioural sciences will probably be found to be as involved as the physical and natural sciences.
- that in some instances, unfavourable administrative climates, unidisciplinary and/or too restrictive geographical application may . . . inhibit . . . development activities.  

Peters' own model was the R & D team.

Hopper's models were the Rockefeller Foundation, "to bring in-house a top-flight

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professional group," Ford's regional offices, and the university. Sanctioned by Strong and Plumptre's vision, Hopper's general personnel policy was to hire the best staff and have appointed the best governors he could find the world over. Around those staff he built a structure based on the university model i.e. semi-autonomous colleges. In the case of IDRC, they were to be called divisions. Regional offices he made quite dependent, perhaps because Ford's regional offices had occasionally become satraps.

Hopper usually chose strong divisional directors. They developed their own practices, and areas of emphasis, hiring those they estimated to be the best in their field, just as Hopper had done in their case. Although a strong personality, Hopper chose to invest Directors with a great deal of autonomy within the Centre, a legacy that was to cast a long shadow on the subsequent history of the Centre. The first Divisions were: Administration, headed by E.J. O'Brien; Food and Nutrition Sciences led by Joseph H. Hulse; Population and Health Sciences directed by G.F. Brown, and Special Projects headed by Ruth Zagorin. A little later, Zagorin came to head the Social Sciences Division and John Woolston became head of Information Sciences.

In a sense, Hopper's new Centre and choice of divisions was not his own. A good part of the framework in which Hopper and his colleagues worked was suggested by Lewis Perinbam. The essential impulse came from Ward, Stulman and Strong via Rockefeller. The substance of the operation, capacity building, originated in the papers of Geoffrey Oldham. Bentley, Perinbam, Brecher and the universities assured research would be conducted on a foundation basis, rather than in-house. The Social Sciences Division had its origins in John Parker's proposal for a world university for the social sciences. The Information Sciences Division sprang from Burke Brown and Maurice Strong's vision of a "New Manhattan Project" and Erskine Childers' proposal for an International Development Support Communications Centre. But to suggest that Hopper

397 David Hopper, interview by author, 31 July 1987.
had little influence on the early IDRC would be simply untrue.

Hopper's own work on the problems of rural agriculture, and the obvious pressing needs of the rural poor in the South led to the Centre to concentrate over 40% of the budget on what came to be called the Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Sciences Division (AFNS), clearly, the largest and most powerful division. An emphasis on population and health had been mentioned by Matthew Gaasenbeek in the IAM proposal of April 1967, but this was very much one of Hopper's preoccupations. Moreover, it was Hopper who decided what of the legislation, what of the notions circulating would be emphasised and what to ignore.
Policy Threads Loom — the First Board Meeting

IDRC was inaugurated at Government House in the grips of the October Crisis. RCMP officers were assigned to protect Pearson, Strong and others. But the mood was confident, "a happening" for all this. Ottawa in 1970 could not be mistaken for New York City. This very provincial federal capital of Canada was not used to fleets of limousines carrying the Governors of the Centre around Ottawa. Rumbles from the fiscally-focused members of central agencies could already be heard.398

Hopper stated the basic purpose of the Centre as he saw it.

I see the Centre as being an instrumentality for the modernization of traditional or ancient peoples. I see it in terms of attempting to bring to bear through its own rationalities, the rationalities of science a better understanding of this modernization process and a better facilitation of its accomplishments.399

IDRC's activities were to be part of a general transformation of developing countries societies, from societies based on various traditions and folklore, to those based on science and industrial technology. Soon after Hopper concluded setting out his basic philosophy in speech, words of fundamental doubt and caution were raised by the American microbiologist and Board member, René Dubos,

He asked the Board to be aware that many problems of the world require not so much the application of more technology but a recognition that technology can involve us in channels that may destroy societies rather than helping them. Accordingly, he recommended the use of the term "knowledge". The Board must avoid starting developing countries in directions that have been destructive to developed countries.400

With the exception of the Australian, Sir John Crawford, who urged progress with

398 Jon Church, interview by author, 15 December 1993, tape recording, Ottawa.


common sense, most governors sided with Dubos's caution. Nevertheless, the majority believed in the general inevitability of the march of science. The Nigerian agricultural economist, H.A. Oluwasanmi accepted that technology would be introduced to the developing world. However, Oluwasanmi argued, it must be initiated with a consideration and awareness of the traditional patterns of the people concerned. The discourse among developmentalists regarding IDRC has ever since been between the Hopper view and the Dubos perspective, while Oluwasanmi's has prevailed in the Centre. The proposal had been poured from crucible to mould.

Chapter Three: From a Canadian Point of View

Among the leading channels or institutional vehicles of technology transfer are transnational corporations, think tanks, foundations, professional associations, academies of science, universities, labor unions, voluntary agencies, individuals, and public agencies of all types, including national governments and international. \(^\text{402}\)

Denis Goulet

This chapter examines how IDRC as a state-funded vehicle has related to its interlocutors on the Canadian scene since its founding in 1970. In the main, they are federal officials and academics. The data below shows that like Canadian development assistance as a whole, the Centre especially, has not fitted very well within the set of expectations of such organisations by government or academics. The technically neutral nature of IDRC as established in the 1970s may have made less likely the scrutiny of central agents of the federal government. But IDRC was seen as a culture of "pure development," alien and outside the control of the administrative regimes of the state, and the parochial motives of various Canadians. These factors combined with changing political forces led to the progressive weakening of the degree of autonomy of the Centre. Yet the Centre has managed to run the gauntlet by: a) by pursuing the art of political tactics, b) displaying itself as a culture representing internationalist and scientific values in an effective manner, c) having a leadership culturally and substantively in harmony with central agents and key politicians, and d) being responsive to Canadian academic concerns. Complementary and antagonistic relations have been established with CIDA over the terrain occupied by each organisation. CIDA provided IDRC with a convenient organisation to which parochial interests can be directed, so maintaining untied aid status. IDRC's untied aid character acts as an altruistic benchmark for CIDA. Reviews of the CIDA led to the Agency inevitably being compared to IDRC in these terms. This in turn assists in the maintenance of internationalist characteristics at CIDA. CIDA stewardship

of development assistance funding has led to the Agency taking on central agent characteristics relative to the Centre, producing chafing, especially in times of funding cuts.

If we take a marine metaphor, IDRC was born in Pearsonian seas. After 1975, the Centre found itself to be a small, highly specialised mudskipper swimming in increasingly small tidal pools. Those pools were inhabited by larger and hungrier mudskippers. All faced predation from terrestrial species of related but remote origins. The chapter which succeeds this one is a history of evolution, and examination of the transforming anatomy of the mudskipper in its habitat. This chapter reveals the murky struggle to survive in those pools and intertidal margins.

What the following chapter shows is that IDRC has not survived easily, or unscathed. The main reason that IDRC has achieved the high reputation in developing countries, apparent from the professional excellence of its staff and international board, is that researchers from those countries conduct the research themselves. While IDRC is unique in the world with its international board, it does exist, and therefore, is contrary to some of Goulet's more instrumental notions that "nations themselves are made to serve the interests of an international techno-structure". This is not to question the general rule, nor even that IDRC may be a means of expanding that technical constituency. Rather it is to say that at least, this notion just mentioned does not reveal anomaly, but homogeneity.

The main difficulty IDRC has faced for much of its history is the tug between Pearsonian internationalist impulses concretised in an organisational culture of researchers on the one hand, and Canadian parochial interests and federal governmental

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patterns, on the other. IDRC has had until recently little in common with the rest of the federal state and no substantial domestic institutionalised constituency inside or outside government willing to defend it. Despite having received a series of awards for excellence over a decade, even when it had bureaucratised, when the Centre faced being made into a departmental corporation in 1992, the files of Foreign Affairs, to which IDRC reports, contain only one letter of complaint from the President of the AUCC, Claude Lajeunesse.\textsuperscript{404} Goulet's principal insight in the context of this chapter is the viewing of the organisation as an embodiment of values, and channel for value exchange, in the case of IDRC, Pearsonian internationalist and scientific values.

The vision of IDRC as concretised by David Hopper had little to do with traditional defined Canadian interests. The share of money flowing to Canadians in its programs has risen from about 7.4\% per cent under Hopper, to fourteen percent during most of the Head presidency.\textsuperscript{405} That level began to sharply rise in the last years of the Head period and has now reached nearly twenty-five per cent of programme funding. While not untied aid, IDRC is clearly not very much tied either. Thus, unlike other organisations constituted by the Canadian federal government are almost wholly funded by federal funds, IDRC serves a clientele which does not fit well into a government system based on a conventional premise of serving Canadians. While the immediate beneficiaries of this Canadian largesse are generally academics in developing countries, the intended beneficiaries usually are the marginalised in those countries. Neither are particularly important to Canadian short-term interests.

CIDA seems fated to be pilloried in public and thanked in private. IDRC seems to


\textsuperscript{405} The comparability of the figures is unclear.
have the opposite destiny, praised in public for not being tied aid, while demands are made in the serenity of corridors, governmental or academic. Within the confines of the federal capital, IDRC is a fairly independent federal crown corporation that often funds overseas academics. It is not subject to many of the strictures of the Financial Administration Act which circumscribes the reporting and financial structures of federal organisations. That IDRC has this freedom has never sat well in central agencies of the federal government. IDRC's sense of being a stranger has been exacerbated by the nature of its personnel. Unlike much of Ottawa, the programme officer staff are largely technical specialists with an academic orientation, one-third of whom live in developing countries. So, while CIDA has been able to find a natural alliance in generalist officials in other federal agencies, often former CUSO alumni, IDRC has not. The attention of IDRC staff is very much outside Canada and highlight another persistent theme regarding IDRC, the tug between the international and domestic aspects of the Centre.

IDRC has not quite found its niche, its natural community in Ottawa. Within Canada, the Centre's natural community consists of a thin layer of academics and researchers interested in developing countries. A modest number of Canadian academics with concerns about the Third World are social scientists, many centre-left. During the foundational Hopper years, 1970-77, the emphasis was on the harder side of natural sciences, and in the social sciences, agricultural economics, population demographics and science policy, not traditional havens for the more socially inclined. This might have been appealing to the administrations of universities and the higher federal bureaucracy, among engineers and business people, and so lessened the likelihood of negative sanctions. But it was not conducive to constituting a favourable active national constituency.

Canadian academics, as a species, appear to be well-connected in Ottawa, if largely unimportant in its processes. Such professors are largely known to make their presence felt when they feel funding should be moving their way. In the case of IDRC, a
certain schizophrenia is evident. Academics interested in developing countries have traditionally favoured the untying of aid. Consequently, in Canadian development assistance circles, IDRC has been relatively lionised, CIDA shamed. Naturally, some scholars have pursued their own personal ends without reference to articles of faith. As other funding sources dried up, the Canadian economy seized and society turned more narrowly self-interested, IDRC became a door that was increasingly knocked upon. Its legitimacy at the level of belief has tended to fall as its support has risen to its main constituency in Canada. In short, as Canada has struggled with the nature of Canadian development and therefore the quality of life and the values of its civilisation, the aim of IDRC is to improve someone else's wealth. The Centre has survived because its officers and governors have lived by their wits, symbolic representations and less cash.

We have so far seen how IDRC was formed in a Pearsonian vision of the world, which was altered to fit the more rational scientific model of the sixties. Prior to tracing the patterns of internal discourse of the Centre and showing how the Centre is slowly reinventing itself, we need to look at the world outside IDRC. IDRC has been remarkably independent in comparison with other government organisations, but that does not mean it has not been influenced. Indeed, as we shall see, IDRC's very vitality, survival and success as a federally funded organisation has depended on its ability to demonstrate that it embodies the values upon which it was founded, and yet remains able from time to time to show its political relevance and compliance to government policies. In the following section we shall show how IDRC has related to its environment, domestic and global.
The Board As Aegis

I've always maintained that the independence of IDRC, its quality and strength, is from the board. 

- Ivan Head

According to the Act enabling IDRC, the Board of Governors of the Centre is the Centre, all authority flows from the Board. The Board is the aegis of the Centre, an important way in which IDRC legitimates itself. Given that IDRC’s social links have been weak in Ottawa the Board takes on extraordinary importance in the survival and success of the Centre. We will now examine the metal of which that shield is made, i.e. the characteristics of Board members in the last two and a half decades, delve into its

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406 Ivan Head, interview by author, 18 August 1987, tape recording, Ottawa.
The data for the following statistics have been collected from resumés of the ninety-three Governors appointed to the Board. Governors may be double-counted, if, for example, a governor classed herself as both an economist and professor on her curriculum vitae. In some cases, when the author noted that for example, Marcel Massé, was also an economist, but that it was not indicated, numbers were changed as appropriate. In general, only when more than two occurrences was noted was a statistic registered.

International Governors

Unique among organisations funded almost exclusively by a national government, IDRC has non-citizens as members of the Board. Nine of the twenty-one are not Canadian citizens. Originally one member of the Board would be from among the most powerful Western powers, certainly the USA, often France, and probably the UK. But as
conceived by Maurice Strong, IDRC should not follow the general pattern and simply be aid given without consultation with or participation by the recipients. To alleviate this, six or seven of the nine international governors come from the Third World. Usually, each Third World representative hails from a particular region of the Third World. Typically, there is a representative from Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, the Caribbean, and from East and West Africa. As we have noted in a previous chapter, this gives the Centre a very particular texture and signals that this is a different and important organisation.
Occupational Distribution

The Statutes regulating the selection of Governors of the Centre stipulates of the twenty-one governors, "at least eleven of the governors appointed must have experience in the field of international development or experience or training in the natural or social sciences or technology." Of the ninety-seven Governors that have been appointed since 1970, the most prominent statistic by far is the number of academics, or former academics on the Board. Forty-six of the Governors had been at one time or another a Professor, twenty-four, a Dean. Fifteen listed as one of their occupations, educator. (See Figure 9). These figures are borne out by performing a in a single and simplified count of

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the occupations of Governors when they were appointed. (See Figure 10). About half were academics, the next most significant group were civil servants, followed by donors (usually the Presidents of CIDA and IDRC). While this manner of counting gives a sense of the great importance attached to academics in the Centre, it masks the subtleties of the background by identifying major features. Occupation stands out as a characteristic, but other non-occupational features are important as we shall see. Also simply denoting that the Governor is an academic does not show what kind of scholar they may be. If we revert to double counting we can grasp the flavour of these appointments much better.

With regard to the subject of area of work, twenty-two Governors listed as one of their occupations, economist. What this shows is influence of economists in the upper reaches of the international developmental elite, and their perceived legitimacy. What is interesting is that only seven lawyers were among the Governors, which is unusual given their general numbers among the Canadian elite as a whole. We can presume that the developmental nature of the Centre's mandate tended to preclude their greater representation. Of these economists, five were agricultural economists. Ten governors named one of their occupations as engineer. These two categories appear to signify the more technical nature of IDRC’s past mandate and their presence in the organisation itself. It is not surprising therefore that with the rural pre-occupations of the developing world that fourteen governors have some associations with agriculture, six with nutrition. This compares with only three each of political scientists and sociologists.

The next significant occupational cluster is in their role in government. Nine governors had been deputy ministers or their equivalent. Eleven governors had served as ministers. What this indicates is that legitimacy within a given government apparatus was as important as political legitimacy as an indicator of suitability. Of different characteristics indicating suitability as a Governor, occupation stands out as most important overall. This may be explained by the statute and meritocratic and scientific notions which undergird much of the Centre's work.
International status is clearly important in considering an appointment. However, that international status seems circumscribed to the three metropolitan capitals of London, Paris and Washington. (See Figure 11). Sixteen governors had connections with London, the majority via education, but also with other activities. Thirteen had associations with Washington, most because of their work in the World Bank, IMF, or as ambassadors. Interestingly, Paris was also named by ten governors, the majority because of their presence at major conferences there, and at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation.

Table One shows that links with the United Nations are important, more than one-fifth of governors have links with it.
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<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<tr>
<td>All UN</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carnegie</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
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<td>Ford</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
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<td>Population Council</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
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<td>World Bank</td>
<td>7</td>
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Associations with the Canadian Government

Not surprisingly, the Canadian government organisations that have had most Governors on IDRC’s Board are CIDA and Foreign Affairs. (See Figure 12) Of Canadian government representation, most were CIDA Presidents. It reveals that of those, many have spent part of their careers in Foreign Affairs, some others began their careers there. Another important statistic of equal frequency to those previous is an association with the Centre itself. Many governors have been recipients of project grants, or Research Fellows. Of governors associated with other parts of the federal government, they come almost exclusively from financial sections of government, Finance, Treasury Board, The Bank of Canada, or the Privy Council. Most have been officials and not politicians. The number of finance related officials hovers around the three instances level per agency.

409 This may be underestimated as their status as IDRC recipients is not always evident on resumés.
Many of these people are also associated with Foreign Affairs, e.g. Wynne Plumptre.

**Association with Universities**

This category generally reflects either the location where a Governor taught or was educated. In some cases, it reflects where someone was given an honourable degree.

![Bar chart showing the association of IDRC Governors with universities](chart.png)

*Figure 13*

In terms of gross figures, the most noticeable clusters are in Governors associated with Harvard, several UK educational institutions and, to a lesser degree, central Canadian universities. (See Figure 13)
As a cluster, the number of Governors having associations with United Kingdom educational institutions stands out as most significant. Although the total number of governors associated with Canadian universities, sixty-three, is the greater number in total, nearly thirty Governors are associated with a small number of British institutions. (See Figure 14). The most prominent is Oxford with ten Governors, followed by London with eight, and Cambridge, seven. This number may also be explained by the considerable contingent of UK-trained professional staff in the Centre.
Of non-North American universities, two are remarkable, Paris and University of the West Indies (UWI). (See Figure 15). Paris is exceptional because only two indicate any association with it. The relative scantiness of the association may be relatively low prestige attached to Université de Paris in elite and developmental circles compared with other international universities, or as a consequence of the traditional rivalry with France for influence in the Third World. It could be that American and British educational institutions are considered more favourably in the more technical circles with which IDRC is generally associated. UWI is notable for the opposite reason that Université de Paris is, namely, four Governors have a connection with that university. No single factor seems to explain this anomaly. Canada's relatively close relations with the Caribbean and the importance of UWI within the West Indies academic community may be posed.
American universities are conspicuous in the uneven distribution of governors. (See Figure 16). Twelve Governors are associated with Harvard, the highest of all universities. Ivan Head received a degree from there, although this is not sufficient to explain the salience of the figure. The association is relatively spread between the School of Medicine (4), School of Law (3) and Business (2). Interestingly no other US university garners anywhere near such an association, the next highest being Cornell with four Governors. Three sociologists, beginning with Lila Engberg (and followed by Gelia Castillo and Alex MacDonald) were present at Cornell in the late 1960s.
Among Canadian universities, the gross distribution is fairly even among well established universities, with a tendency towards central Canadian ones. (See Figure 17). McGill, Montreal, and Toronto accounted for six each. Universities that had close ties with IDRC's work, Laval and Guelph, had respectively four and three Governors. Perhaps numbers from the University of Alberta are the most notable, with almost as many as the three central Canadian universities, five. One must imagine that Ivan Head's association with the university explains that anomaly. What seems clear though is, on the whole, a connection with a non-Canadian, i.e. US or UK university, still carries with it an aura of internationalism and therefore adds to the strength of the shield of the IDRC.
Another element in the choice of governor appears to be internationally recognised distinctions conferred. (See Figure 18). Almost all these marks of distinction were awarded prior to joining the Centre. Orders of Canada are have been granted to at least eight Governors. Five have had knighthoods, most granted in recognition of service, rather than hereditary. Rhodes Scholars are as numerous a distinction among governors as knighthoods.

To sum up, the governors reflect the mandate and vision of the Centre. It is perhaps not surprising that IDRC has suggested and the government has selected governors with academic credentials of distinction, of which many are economists, who have international associations. IDRC funds research. In contrast to other such appointments the governors are generally appropriate to the work of the Centre, indicating that successive Canadian governments have been willing to accept the premises of the Pearsonian vision.
How Are Governors Chosen?

In a general sense, the selection process is different for Canadians and non-Canadians. Of course, all are Governor-in-Council appointments and therefore subject to the political process as such. Many candidates for Governor, especially non-Canadians, are proposed by senior Centre staff. A list is then recommended to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Canadian missions are invited to suggest names of foreigners. Occasionally, Ottawa-based Foreign Affairs staff will too. Subsequently, the Minister's Office at Foreign Affairs sends an amended roll of names to PCO and PMO. These suggestions are discussed in Cabinet and the governing party's caucus. Non-Canadians are generally little scrutinised by Canadian politicians in general, whereas, Canadian appointments carry the same sort of significance as other political appointments. Nevertheless, IDRC Governors do not receive much more than the covering of their costs as remuneration. Further, the academic nature of IDRC ensures that Governors have much paper to review in preparation for each meeting. Foreign travel used to be an attractive aspect of an appointment to the Board. However, that has virtually evaporated after the embarrassment caused by the Ottawa Citizen in a September article 1993 concerning a Board of Governors meeting in an expensive hotel in Bangkok.\footnote{Frank Howard, "Research centre details costs of Thailand trip," Ottawa Citizen, 26 September 1990.}

In the early Hopper period, appointments were negotiated by the President of the Centre, directly with the Minister of External Affairs or heads of regional caucuses in the Liberal Party. Later on during Hopper's presidency and subsequently, they were negotiated directly with the Minister in consultation with the parliamentary party caucus and Cabinet. Following the historical pattern, many of the new foreign Governors seem to be have been proposed by IDRC itself. Minister André Ouellet's selections appear to represent a good opinion of the Centre. A recent appointment, Herb Breau, was the
Chairman of a House Committee during a critical period in the early 1980s. As we shall see later, the Committee recommended greater funding for the Centre.

Each Canadian member of the Board is the fulfilment of a quota, loosely applied. All Canadians are chosen as representatives from each region. Formally then, there are members who are picked from Quebec, Ontario, the Atlantic Provinces, the Prairies and the West. Again, the degree to which a Board member was a purely political appointee from the region, as opposed to someone who had particular merit for the post of Governor, often depended on how powerful MPs from the various regions, and especially the provincial heads of federal party caucuses, regarded the appointment. In general though, governors, Canadian or foreign do not seek to represent their region as such on the Board, although there have been exceptions. Their perspective, however, is known.

During past Liberal governments, Allan MacEachen was firm in his resolve to have his strong voice, while Minister, heard in the selection of Board of Governors' members from the Atlantic Provinces.411 MacEachen's influence was so decisive that Annette Perron, Lester Pearson's secretary suggested that he be invited for the launching of IDRC at Rideau Hall. She added in a note to the reception list, "MacEachen's name was added by IDRC because he was instrumental in having Board members changed in the Maritimes."412 David Hopper confirmed this in his interview.413 Particularly instructive are the reasons why the member from the Maritimes was usually selected. They are provided by the first member from that area, Ralph Medjuck. Medjuck was in 1970 President of Centennial Properties of Halifax, and was and is a property developer. He had no experience of development or international affairs. In a meeting of the Board


413 David Hopper, interview by author.
in New Delhi, Medjuck was asked by an unusually direct official how he had gained his post. In the High Commission in New Delhi, Medjuck revealed the reasons why he was invited onto the Board. According to Medjuck, he self-deprecatingly suggested that he had the 3 L's: he was a lawyer, land developer and a Liberal.\textsuperscript{414} But such choices have been, on the whole, rare.

The direct involvement of the President of IDRC at the political level in the choice of members of the Board of Governors has changed over the years. Under David Hopper,

The Governors appointments would go to the Members of Parliament who were kind of the heads of the Provincial Caucuses in their area. Some of them said, "Who would you like, who do you think is good?" That's how we got Bill Winegard on, that's how we got a series of others on. Some of them said, "Look, I'll give you two or three names." And I'd review them with the Minister. This is how we got Archie Micay on, who was a lawyer and interested in the social science side of it and so on. Some of them just said, "Look, that's the guy we want." And usually, not always, but with a higher probability, if we just got somebody he wanted, then we got somebody who was not very interested or very involved. They wanted to be. They enjoyed the overseas trips. But they just weren't very knowledgeable.\textsuperscript{415}

In the case of the Governors chosen during the Presidency of Ivan Head, IDRC would submit its preferences to the Minister, but Head would never meet with provincial heads of the federal caucuses.\textsuperscript{416}

None of the Governors selected have had a particularly radical reputation. The most radical was the Brazilian, Roberto Campos. A economist by training, and banker in state banks most of his career, Campos was on the radical right. Nevertheless, a number

\textsuperscript{414} Anonymous.

\textsuperscript{415} David Hopper, interview by author, 31 July 1987, Washington, tape recording.

\textsuperscript{416} Ivan Head, interview by author, 18 August 1987, tape recording, Ottawa
of Governors, IDRC's staff and the people that they funded have come from the centre-left. Of governors from Latin America, Jorge Hardoy and Victor Urquidi spring to mind. From the Caribbean, long-time governor, Rhodes Scholar, Rex Nettleford of Jamaica of the Trade Union Education Institute, University of the West Indies is notable.

A number of Governors might be described as the loyal opposition, on the left or the right. A number were placed under threat of detention or were placed under house arrest at various times. The American-trained economist in IDRC’s first Board, Puey Ungphakorn, was under such a threat. Hopper discussed the prospect with the Canadian Ambassador to Thailand. The Ambassador wrote home,

> Because of his opposition to the current regime, Dr. Puey is to some extent persona non grata, although I doubt that the former [the Thai military chief] feels sufficiently strongly, as has been suggested, to arrest him should he return to Thailand. Dr. Puey is internationally known and respected, and any move to detain him would likely give rise to widespread criticism, especially in the United States.\(^{417}\)

Among Africans, a member of the first board, Olesegun Oluwasanmi, was associated with General Gowon, and was wise enough to leave his post at Ife in advance of Murtala Muhammed's coup.\(^{418}\)

Among Canadian governors the tendency has been to have people more often from the centre-right represented. Donald Macdonald is perhaps the most well-known to the right. All governments have not been exceedingly partisan in their appointments, for example, Bill Winegard was appointed during the Liberal government, Gerry Helleiner during the Mulroney government.

\(^{417}\) Ambassador, Bangkok, to USSEA (ECD), 3 October 1972, 38-4-IDRC, Volume 12, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, Foreign Affairs Records, 1.

\(^{418}\) Lagos, High Commission, to External Affairs, Ottawa, Telex, 12 October 1976, TN, 38–4-IDRC, Volume 27, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, Foreign Affairs Records, 1.
Of foreign governors, only one seems to have been put with Canadian domestic political interests in mind, an Algerian. He was suggested by 1978 to the Minister while Allan Gotlieb was USSEA and re-appointed.\textsuperscript{419} The selection of non-Canadian members of the Board of Governors could also be based on Canadian foreign trade interests.

L'ambassade d'Algérie nous a signalé récemment tout l'intérêt que les autorités politiques à Alger portent à la réélection d M. Louhibi au siège du gouverneur du CRDI.

Vous connaissez l'importance de nos relations politiques et commerciales avec l'Algérie et le rôle central et durable que M. Louhibi y a joué dans les années 60 et 70. Plusieurs savent que l'Algérie est un partenaire important dans nos relations avec le monde arabe et africain mais peu savent qu'il s'agit de notre treizième partenaire commercial dans le monde et notre tout premier en Afrique.\textsuperscript{420}

However, when Governor Louhibi ceased to be useful to Canadian economic interests, the Canadian Embassy in Algeria suggested that External Affairs officers advise that he need not be reappointed to IDRC's Board.

Rappelons que Louhibi avait été nommé a ce poste compte tenu de son influence directe sur achats Algériens importants du blé au Cda. Dans sa nouvelle position, Louhibi n'est plus dans le circuit d'influence en Algérie et quand a ns croyons qu'il serait préférable a nos intéresss de rechercher nouveau candidat plus influent.\textsuperscript{421}

He was not re-appointed by the Mulroney government. However, Louhibi appears to have been the exception to the rule. Only during the Mulroney government does it appear that IDRC was used quite openly as a direct political instrument in the international arena.

\textsuperscript{419} A.E. Gotlieb to the Minister, "IDRC Board," TLS, 5 May 1978, 38-4-IDRC, Volume 31, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, Foreign Affairs Records, 2.

\textsuperscript{420} Jacques Bilodeau, Director, Francophone Africa and Maghreb, EA to EEA, "Candidature algérienne au bureau des gouverneurs du CRDI, TMS, 16 December 1985, Volume 52, 38-4-IDRC, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, Foreign Affairs Records., 1.

This is not to say that people have been selected who are without influence, especially Canadians. However, the presence of influential foreign Governors on the Board is rarely paid attention to, or put to use by other federal officials. Ivan Head wrote to Raymond Chrétien in 1989 that Joe Clark did not seem to have been briefed that a Jordanian member of the Board, Albert Butros was close to the Crown Prince. At the time, the member from India was Rajiv Gandhi's personal science advisor. Likewise, the Costa Rican governor was well-known to President Arias. The Japanese member, Sadako Ogata, was a member of their Prime Minister's three person economic advisory council.

One example from the Mulroney era demonstrates the changing way IDRC was being used with increasing frequency as an instrument, rather than what Ivan Head asserted the Centre was, an expression of Canadian foreign policy.

During discussions with Chinese Premier Zhao on May 9, PM Mulroney invited China to nominate a distinguished scientist to join Board of IDRC at an appropriate time. Premier Zhao welcomed idea and said the suggestion would be passed to appropriate agencies for study. . . once a nomination is made we assume that IDRC would automatically accept it as it would be awkward to refuse quote agreement unquote.

What this passage from the Canadian Ambassador to Beijing to Ivan Head also indicates is the nature of relations between IDRC and the Conservative government. Although the government had no right to make such a directive, the Board was sometimes put in the position of having to consider the consequences of refusing the Government's wishes. In effect, IDRC was increasingly being used as an agency of government. This also moved forward when IDRC was given a number of specific roles as an agency under the Conservatives, in particular, for part of the implementation of Agenda 21. It had

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422 Ivan (Head) to Ray(mond) (Chrétien), TLS, 20 October 1989, IDRC-38-4, Volume 63, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, Foreign Affairs Records, 2.

happened before, under an earlier Conservative government when Senator Asselin at the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD) in Vienna pledged that 1% of ODA, then around $12 million annually, would go to IDRC to "give developing countries access to the research and development capacity of Canadian institutions." Without reference to the Centre, the government determined that IDRC would be the organisation to play that role.

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A Few Patterns: When Opportunity Knocks for Domestic Concerns

In reviewing the relations between IDRC and the Canadian domestic arena, a number of patterns emerge. The first is that central agents have generally been unhappy with the independence and nature of the Centre and have used the opportunity afforded by an economic downturn to weaken its independence. The ends or beginnings of tenure of the President or Chair also appear to be seen as moments of vulnerability for various federal organisations to push for changes in the Centre's practices and focus. Periods when the number of governors drops far below its full complement seem to indicate the displeasure of central agents, especially in Foreign Affairs or PCO. As we shall see, such moments tend to coincide with periods when the Centre is under pressure from other parts of the federal structure. Secondly, as funding to university academics has lessened, IDRC faces rising pressures on it from different parts of the federal government, especially but not exclusively, from central agencies. What follows is a review of the first decade of the Centre which shows the establishment of a pattern of relationships and themes between a host of Canadian actors in the Centre's policy environment and the Centre's officers. Those relations show that the difficulty of maintaining space for elements of the Pearsonian tradition in a country increasingly pre-occupied by short-term parochial concerns.
After Pearson: The Chairs

Of IDRC's Chairs, Lester Pearson afforded the Centre the most legitimacy. Among federal civil servants, the Centre is closely associated with Pearson and his vision, and this association is still important in retaining the Centre's image in Canada. After Lester Pearson's death, a new Chairman had to be selected. The Minister of External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp suggested Louis Rasminsky to Trudeau. Rasminsky had worked in the League of Nations. He had a predisposition towards organisations like the Hopper era IDRC. Regarding the League, Rasminsky wrote to Norman MacKenzie, a law professor at the University of Toronto,

> I feel that it is precisely the technical work of the League that, removed as it is from political controversy and dispute, is best able to be conducted along scientific lines and to achieve results immediately useful.\(^{426}\)

For the bulk of his life he had worked at the Bank of Canada, another federal organisation, like IDRC, with an arm's length relation with government. He became the Bank's Governor in 1971 until he retired before the 1972 election. He had been important assuring the stability of the Special Drawing Rights of the International Monetary Fund. If Pearson had been the core of the mandarinate in External Affairs, Rasminsky was his counterpart in the Bank of Canada. Despite this, Trudeau's initial response to Sharp's suggestion was not favourable. Sharp reports that Trudeau said, "What do we owe him?"\(^{427}\) This comment certainly strengthens the supposition that government appointments are forms of the distribution of political benefits. However, Trudeau's hesitation faded and Rasminsky was appointed for the duration of Pearson's term, plus two years. He retired in August 1977, a period which was fraught with difficulty for the

\(^{425}\) Mitchell Sharp, interview by author, 10 August 1987, tape recording, Ottawa


\(^{427}\) Mitchell Sharp, interview by author.
Rasminsky only remained as Chairman long enough to complete Pearson's term. In October 1977, the main force behind the creation of IDRC, Maurice Strong, became Chairman of the Board. Strong became Chairman during the period of appointment of the new President. Hopper did not announce his intention to leave IDRC, and the next President Ivan Head did not indicate his desire to leave the Privy Council Office (PCO), until 1977. Strong's appointment as Chairman does not seem to have been linked to the appointment of a new President. As we are well aware, Strong fits well within the stereotype of a Chairman of the Board. Strong had a solid business background and connections with the Liberal Party. But as we know too, Strong is an internationalist, an environmentalist with a very a particular interest in IDRC; had been a member of the Board in his early capacity as President of CIDA; had worked in the civil service; and was a developmentalist.

Maurice Strong vacated the position of Chairman of the Board in July 1978 in order to contest (unsuccessfully) a seat in the federal election. From 1978 to October 1980, no appointment to the Chair was made, despite pressure from Ivan Head. In the interim, Roger Blais became acting Chairman. At the time of his special two-year appointment Blais was a Vice-President of the Centre, and Dean of Research of the École polytechnique de Montréal. He was the first francophone Chair of the Centre. He was geological engineer, and Dean of Research at the École polytechnique de Montréal, and well-connected in mineral and geological circles. He was founding President of the Canadian Geoscience Council, a Director of Eldorado Nuclear, and a consultant to Falconbridge Nickel and the Iron Ore Company of Canada. His international development profile was raised as Vice-President of the Association of Geoscientists for

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428 Ivan Head, interview by author, 18 August 1987, tape recording, Ottawa
International Development. Why no chair was appointed during this period of uncertainty is unclear. It may have been caused by the end and beginning of two Trudeau governments, and the short tenure of the Clark government. But the most convincing explanation is that the absence of a chair kept the Centre relatively weak. The letter to new Chair Maurice Strong proposing a change of status for the Centre in 1978 came only weeks before Hopper was leaving and when no President would be confirmed for months. Similar gamesmanship seems to have been involved around the time of the 1992 budget.

Liliane Filion-Laporte acted as Chair after Roger Blais, and occasionally during and after the tenure of Donald S. Macdonald. Filion-Laporte was the forerunner of a different group of Chairs. Filion-Laporte was a Montréal paediatrician. Like Blais, she was a francophone academic. Yet as a woman with no major connections to the business world she did not fit the profile of most of her predecessors. Subsequently, two of the Centre's next three chairs would be women, and most not particularly close to business. Those characteristics could not be ascribed to Donald Stovel MacDonald.

In May 1981, the well-known Liberal politician Donald S. Macdonald was appointed Chair. Ottawa-born Macdonald was a lawyer by training and became an MP in 1962. He was a Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministers of Justice, Finance, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Industry. Thereafter, he was Minister Without Portfolio; Acting Minister of Justice; Minister of National Defence; Energy, Mines and Resources; and Finance. Later, of course, he headed the Commission which recommended free trade between the USA and Canada. He was obviously extremely well-connected politically speaking, and judging from the portfolios he held, seen as a friend of business. Indeed, his connections with business were numerous. Macdonald has been a Director of Dupont Canada, Manufacturers Life Insurance, the Bank of Nova Scotia, and McDonnell Douglas. And just as Rasminsky had been connected with Boise Cascade, Macdonald
was a Director of that company.\textsuperscript{429} He had supported Canada's involvement in international development issues as Parliamentary Secretary of State for External Affairs during the crucial period 1966-68, and his support did not wane subsequently. As Ivan Head says,

\begin{quote}
When he was Minister of Finance he took a strong role in North-South issues. He was seized of them, to a degree. He was always aware. When he was in Cabinet he could always be counted on to speak up on behalf of ODA issues and North-South awareness. He had that reputation.\textsuperscript{430}
\end{quote}

We can say for certain that Macdonald was the most stereotypical of appointments, closely connected to the Liberal Party and closely connected to business. Unlike Chairmen of the Board of IDRC until that time, he had no strong connection with international affairs. He was a friend of Maurice Strong's.\textsuperscript{431} Strong was certainly consulted on the appointment, and supported him, but he "was not the decisive factor".\textsuperscript{432} Macdonald was the first Chairman not to be a long-standing civil servant, that is, serving for some period in a federal department as an official. Rather, he was part of the political establishment of the Liberal Party. At that conjuncture in IDRC's history Macdonald's selection was ideal for the post precisely because his influence in the business and higher public service community was great. Like the economy, and no doubt influenced by the shift towards central agent preoccupations, IDRC's grant had stagnated, its independence challenged. A well-connected individual was necessary. Donald Macdonald was so connected.

There are occasions when you need somebody in the Chair who can say, "Just a moment, the quality of the Governors is not up to scratch, the size of the budget is not what it should be, etc. etc. You should have somebody of that calibre and

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{430} Ivan Head, interview by author, 18 August 1987, tape recording, Ottawa
\textsuperscript{431} Wayne Kines, interview by author, 14 August 1987, tape recording, Ottawa
\textsuperscript{432} Strong interview, 1987.
\end{flushright}
Donald Macdonald certainly enjoyed a reputation as a guy who when speaking would be listened to.\footnote{Ivan Head, interview by author, Ottawa, 18 August 1987, tape recording.}

Consequently, during his tenure as Chairman IDRC’s annual grant rose out of its stagnation, unlike the rest of funding to foreign affairs and international assistance. (See Table 2 & Figure 19).\footnote{Ivan Head, interview by author, Ottawa, 18 August 1987, tape recording.}

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However, the favourable effects of the Parliamentary Task Force Report on North-South Relations, headed by Herb Breau, the 1982 Comprehensive Audit and subsequent nomination of Ivan Head as an Outstanding Public Servant by the Auditor-General, and last but not least the departure of Michael Pitfield and Allan Gotlieb from their respective posts can not be discounted. The details are included below.
Figure 19

Foreign Affairs and Development Assistance Expenditures vs. IDRC Total Vote
Women in the Chair

Liliane Filion-Laporte had been acting chair of the Centre since the early 1980s, but all fully charged chairs had been men. Two women followed Donald Macdonald, Janet Wardlaw and Flora MacDonald. Wardlaw also resembled Filion-Laporte, in that she was an academic, having spent thirty years based in universities, mostly as a nutritionist. She also had no major connections with corporations, was not a politician or present or former member of the federal civil service. She was an atypical chair, for a reason.

Janet Wardlaw began her career as a Dietician for the Canadian Red Cross School Meal Study in Toronto in 1947. For the next six years, she worked in the Michigan and Toronto Departments of Health. Thereafter, the subsequent and eventual Chair of IDRC joined the academic world. For ten years, she worked in the University of Toronto's Faculty of Household Science. Since 1966, Wardlaw has been at the University of Guelph, mostly at the College of Family and Consumer Studies. She has experience in international development work. She led an eight year CIDA-sponsored project which assisted in the development of the Department of Home Science, University of Ghana. Although she has not performed studies in the Third World, she worked as a consultant in developing countries on several occasions. Wardlaw has also been asked to advise on the state of various programmes, and organised conferences that deal with Nutrition and Home Economics in developing countries. What we see quite clearly is someone who does not fit so easily in the mould of Chair of the Board.

Why was Wardlaw appointed? She did not seem to fit in the pattern of political patronage, nor was she very much part of the Ottawa scene. This does not mean that she was suggested by IDRC itself. In fact, IDRC did not know until the announcement of her appointment on 22 March 1985 that she had been chosen. She did work in a bureaucratic setting in Toronto and Michigan, but she is not a career civil servant. She is not an
entrepreneur. Her appointment is explained by her contact with an important Conservative MP. The MP for Guelph was Bill Winegard, between 1984 and 1988, Chair of the House Committee on External Affairs and International Defense, a very influential member of the House in External Affairs matters. Winegard was a former member of the Board of Governors of the Centre, and was even considered for the position of first President of IDRC. Winegard was once the President of the Guelph University. The Centre has funded much research there.\textsuperscript{435} Winegard was a strong supporter of the Centre, but was keen to make IDRC more relevant, better at assessment and dissemination and implementation. Winegard told the author, "I had watched her [Wardlaw] change the college up here [Guelph] from the sort of diamond ring courses, we used to call it, to [a] real professional approach . . . so I knew what this gal could do. I pushed very hard with Joe to get [her}, to make sure she was made Chairman."\textsuperscript{436} Wardlaw's departure came in March 1992, only days after the status of IDRC was to be changed to a departmental corporation. Documents show that Flora MacDonald was appointed to replace her that month.\textsuperscript{437} However, despite this being a time of crisis in the Centre, Macdonald does not recall being asked by the government to head the organisation until around the time of Rio Conference on Environment and Development several months later, when the tide was turning away from the departmental corporation notion.\textsuperscript{438} This seems to be, once again, an example when PCO has used a hiatus in leadership to press home its point of view, the details of which we shall see below.

\textsuperscript{435} Winegard remains a Fellow there.

\textsuperscript{436} Bill Winegard, interview by author, 13 April 1994, Guelph, tape recording.

\textsuperscript{437} IDRC, curriculum vitae of Flora MacDonald, TD, IDRC Records, 1.

\textsuperscript{438} Flora MacDonald, interview by author, 29 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa
Early Relations with the Domestic Environment

We have seen that during the proposal stage prior to the creation of IDRC central agents were generally doubtful and even hostile about the value of the Centre. It did not fit into their thinking about the workings of the Canadian government. Their focus was much more domestic. Those central agents concerned with IDRC are members of a policy secretariats such as PCO, or parts of Foreign Affairs; or fiscal secretariats — like Finance, OAG and Treasury Board. Although IDRC has increasingly been interested in some sort of policy secretariat role, even when it has been, IDRC as a whole has not very often had much in common with central agents concerns. In short, until the Bezanson presidency, the Centre's officials have had little sympathy with central agents' viewpoints, and had difficulty in signifying the Centre's worth to these organisations. The mindset and pre-occupations of such federal secretariats have been quite at odds with thinking, and most officers on both sides have been unfamiliar with each others' opinions. Consequently, the relative independence and even the existence of IDRC has always been questioned. Until the Bezanson Presidency, the officers of IDRC have been unable and not enthusiastic about explaining its value in a manner understandable to such groups. This hampered IDRC's ability to prosper. What follows is a brief chronology of those relations, focusing on the 1970s when so many of the patterns of relationships and concerns emerged. These "failures to communicate" have been replicated between IDRC and other parts of the domestic environment, inside and outside government.

As early as 1973, a proposal to enhance Canadian interests in development assistance emerged in Ottawa. The International Financing Branch of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce asserted that,

The Canadian commercial interest in aid has consistently been given less than its appropriate prominence. At the very substantial levels of expenditure now represented by aid (and with further growth projected), it is evident that this makes the Canadian aid programme particularly vulnerable to "aid weariness" and the loss of public and business support experiences [sic] by certain other donor
countries. . .

Businessmen see the statement and policy trends to that diverge widely from the commercial interests acknowledged by the Policy Paper, and a serious credibility gap is developing. Perhaps most importantly, however, businessmen with international exposure form first-hand impressions of the difference between Canadian aid policies and practices and the blatant pursuit of their own interests by many other donor countries.\textsuperscript{439}

Certainly such perceptions impinged on the orientation of the whole of Canadian development assistance including IDRC. What seems to have been emerging in the early 1970s is rising disquiet with Canadian development assistance practices among the


This Branch of ITC,

Suggested . . a separation of the "pure" developmental programme and a new "commercial aid" programme. The latter would be appropriately directed to the growing number of developing countries which no longer require CIDA's usually highly concessional terms for "social development" projects. This programme would be consciously or explicitly directed as "seed money" to countries of high market-development priority for Canada."

"Aid-Trade Relationship," 2.

Such a suggestion was repeated two decades later by the Office of the Auditor-General.


One can argue convincingly that what was proposed was something like the further breakdown of Canadian development assistance in the same manner as IDRC and CIDA had been separated, one "pure", the other "commercial aid". However, clearly that Industry, Trade and Commerce proposed such a breakdown indicates that CIDA itself was seen as being too much a product of mixed motives.
business community. These concerns eventually found their way into financial and other circles in Ottawa. Most departments were fertile ground for such views at the time because,

There was a perception that CIDA was an agency that stood and lived on its own. That in many ways it was unassailable, that within the bureaucracy it was known as being inefficient and a waste of money. And that was based on the premise that they seemed to have an awful lot of money and they seemed to do an awful lot of travelling and they seemed to be pretty cavalier about it.\footnote{Anonymous.}

However, even in the early IDRC, federal organisations were represented in various ways. David Hopper remarked to the author,

One of these was appointing Hanley Bennett,\footnote{David Hopper, interview by author, 31 July 1987, tape recording, Washington.} who was an ex-Treasury Board guy as the Treasurer . . . There was no formal representation from External on IDRC Board when I was President, but there was an External advisor named by Ritchie to work with me.\footnote{James Pfeifer, interview by author, 11 November 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.}

But after a few years during the Hopper presidency the number of these representatives of other departments on the Centre staff waned. For the first two decades, departmental representatives were also able to give vent to their concerns at the Centre's Projects Committee. "What he wanted to assure the bureaucracy here that that was an open process, that they could look at anything that we were going to put up to our Board."\footnote{Anonymous.}

CIDA and External Affairs representatives were the most regular attendees, other parts of government, such as Treasury Board or PCO, sat in at times of tension.
Questions About the Vote

IDRC was originally funded as part of a five-year government commitment to provide $30 million from CIDA's budget. Discussion about the way IDRC should be funded began shortly after the Centre was created. In 1973, David Hopper was initially in favour of being separated from CIDA and dealing directly with Treasury Board. However, in the interim, IDRC was criticised predictably from those with the same more parochial standpoint, who considered a separate organization as unnecessary and a dilution of focused effort. However, the location of those criticisms was different, less in External Affairs and Finance and more in Treasury Board, at least during most of the 1970s. Some of the reproaches seem to have had some foundation. They were even being made internally by IDRC officers who felt that there had been too much overgenerous spending.444

The nature of the criticism seems to have circled around minor perks for the Board and some staff, rather than impropriety. IDRC's Governors main perk is recognition. They are obliged to perform considerable work in comparison with other such federal appointments. Travel costs to and from Board meetings and accommodation and modest per diems are provided. In the early 1970s, the Centre appears to have come under pressure for following international practice of allowing Governors to bring their spouses to Board meetings, often held overseas. Over a decade this particular advantage was first restricted to international governors, and eventually eliminated. Some IDRC staff had also been reproached for flying first-class. These issues appear to have been brought to the attention of the then Chair, Louis Rasminsky on several occasions.445

444 Geoffrey Oldham, interview by author, 8 December 1993, tape recording, Ottawa

445 See for example Executive Committee Meeting, IDRC BOG, September 20, 1973, 2.
The general policy for dealing with the world outside the Centre was established early in the Hopper presidency. Hopper believed that good works would be known because of their own virtue rather than active advertisement. This apparently technocratic view seemed wise counsel when to be noticed in the press meant becoming a target of criticism. Consequently, no Communications Division as such was established for years. When it was, the Division's activities were largely limited to science writing, which was certainly done with élan but not for political effect. As early as September 1971, CIDA President, Paul Gérin-Lajoie urged IDRC to engage in improving its visibility, which CIDA was seeking to do. Most governors agreed. This perspective, held for different reasons in different parts of the Centre for two decades was to lead to an inability both to disseminate, and sell to its Canadian constituency. Former staff contend that this view was held by the subsequent President, Ivan Head, although his personal view was that he had the reverse view. It is clear though that in the 1980s Head was clearly desirous of briefing the Minister when the opportunity arose, and chided Raymond Chrétien, among others, when it should have.

Criticisms of IDRC's spending habits may have led the Auditor-General to request that the Centre have a separate vote for fiscal year 1976/77. At Treasury Board Commission, President Bezanson has made major efforts to reverse this tradition in IDRC by creating a new division, Corporate Affairs and Initiatives, headed by former CIDA colleague, Pierre Beemans.

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446 James Mullin, interview by author, 14 June 1994, Ottawa, tape recording; Claude-Paul Boivin, interview by author, 1 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa

447 Ivan Head, interview by author, 18 August 1987, tape recording, Ottawa

448 Ivan (Head) to Ray(mond) (Chrétien), TLS, 20 October 1989, IDRC-38-4, Volume 63, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, Foreign Affairs Records, 1-3.

(TB) it was thought that such a change "implies central (TB) control."\textsuperscript{450} Negotiations took place and Centre officials were told that they could not expect marginal increases, and indeed suggestions were made that cuts were more likely.\textsuperscript{451} Paul Gérin-Lajoie indicated at a 1976 Board meeting that CIDA had proposed to Treasury Board that the Agency give part of its own budget to IDRC. Further, CIDA suggested that further rising overall expenditures be disbursed to IDRC in subsequent years. However, Treasury Board decided to consider IDRC's budget on its own merit, according to Treasury Board's views, and irrespective of CIDA's attitude.\textsuperscript{452} This led to IDRC having a separate vote. But its funding and that other federal development assistance organisations became managed by a secretariat presided over by CIDA. This continues today, CIDA makes funding level recommendations to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The committee includes representatives from IDRC, Agriculture Canada (which has a keen interest in food aid), Foreign Affairs, Treasury Board and Finance. IDRC now has a separate vote which is approved by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but does not negotiate directly with the Treasury Board.\textsuperscript{453} Consequently, given that CIDA had had difficulty spending its surpluses, and received relatively few cuts until the last five years, IDRC continued to grow, despite the evident disapproval of central agents. This does not mean relations with CIDA have always been smooth.


\textsuperscript{453} Attempts to make the Centre report to the junior minister responsible for development assistance during the Conservative government were rebuffed by Head.

Anonymous.
Rancour over International Agricultural Research

Another issue that emerged in the 1970s that was to have very serious long-term consequences was the desire of Treasury Board officials for IDRC "to take over core support of international research centres." In the early 1970s this was not the preferences of either CIDA or IDRC. As David Hopper said to the Board:

We [CIDA and IDRC] did agree in the early periods that IDRC would not provide money for core support of institutions. We agreed . . . our [IDRC] primary concern would be the development of technologies or the undertaking of research the results of which would have applications beyond the boundaries of one country, and the bilateral requests for projects uniquely focused on one country would be responded to by CIDA, as would the core support for institutions.

After discussions regarding Petro-Canada activities in Bangladesh, Bill McWhinney formed the opinion that CIDA would not get into research. When he was Senior Vice-President at CIDA there had been a tacit agreement that research activities would be IDRC’s. However, this changed after repeated approaches from universities, and the need, capacity or desire of CIDA staff to have some research conducted as part of Country Programme activities increased. Others assert that Massé’s move to making the Agency a knowledge-based organisation was the genesis of the change. Certainly Massé and then Catley-Carlson became more interested in ensuring cooperation and coordination between the two organisations. Catley-Carlson made arrangements with Ivan Head to create a half-time CIDA-IDRC liaison officer. The number of projects of joint or parallel CIDA-IDRC projects increased during their mandates. However, competition between the

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455 David Hopper, 13-14 March 1977, IDRC Records, 62.


457 Anonymous.
personalities of the Presidents of the two organisations, and over funding was partly prevented an increase in cooperation. Moreover, at the operational level, there was a question of mandate and focus. CIDA was more likely to be interested in funding large capital projects tied to Canadians, IDRC small projects run by groups of Southern researchers. Perhaps, helping to explain the increased interest of CIDA in IDRC was that over time CIDA became more like a central agency relative to Canadian organisations involved in development assistance. CIDA's NGO Division programme had expanded, and the number of quangos within the funding envelope administered by CIDA (including IDRC) had grown during the 1980s. In these terms then, the functional responsibility of CIDA as a secretariat during periods of budget constraints favoured the development of a control function. That Massé and Catley-Carlson had both worked in central agencies may also have contributed to a sense that CIDA-IDRC cooperation and coordination was necessary.

CIDA has provided the Canadian government's share of research funding for decades to the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), which is comprised of groups like IRRI. IDRC played a key role in strongly supporting, and indeed actively expanded this research network with the encouragement of David Hopper and Joe Hulse. However, IDRC's contribution to the total was relatively meagre, although its influence great. But IDRC staff's constant attention but minute funding grated on CGIAR staff.

In comparison to IDRC, CIDA's staff were generalists who provided as much money as countries like Germany, with few questions asked. IDRC's contribution was less than one-tenth of CIDA's. The Centre was providing essentially the same thing as


CIDA, funds, but was requiring much more than the Agency. IDRC funds though, were for labour-intensive projects. CIDA's funds were usually for general grants. Treasury Board and CIDA Multilateral Branch staff became aware of that both IDRC and CIDA were funding CGIAR. Treasury Board staff saw duplication of effort and sought to right it. IDRC's reply was that Canada effectively had two votes on the CGIAR, one as CIDA, the other as its "foundation" IDRC. Subsequently, that logic appears to have been accepted for some time at Treasury Board. IDRC and CIDA were encouraged by Treasury Board to consult to develop common positions. Members of IDRC's Board and the President Head in 1978 found the CGIAR an expensive system, which should be trimmed. However, this did not result in easier relations with the CGIAR and its partners. More importantly, this experience also seems to have soured staff members of Multilateral Branch of CIDA for decades on this subject, although the Branch rode to some extent "on IDRC's coat-tails," and personal relations were generally good. Douglas Lindores became CIDA Vice-President in charge of Multilateral Branch in 1979, and seems to have been influenced by this controversy in his thinking about IDRC. Indirectly, this episode appears to have contributed to the decision to make IDRC a departmental corporation a decade and a half later, as we shall see.

460 Ivan Head to Joe Clark, TLOS, 15 April 1986, IDRC Records, 3.


462 Anonymous.
Both David Hopper and Louis Rasminsky indicated their willingness to be re-appointed in early 1974. Hopper was reappointed in May 1975. However, only months before his re-appointment he campaigned to become Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). He failed in this effort. After the race, Hopper's tenure was confirmed as President of IDRC, but with less security. IDRC's first president did not seem interested in mixing with other leading members of Ottawa's Deputy Minister community. His interest was international. In one meeting of the Board, CIDA's President Gérin-Lajoie appealed to the Board of the Centre to ask Hopper for closer cooperation with CIDA. He said in March 1976 that co-operation had improved over a few years before.

I think that David and I, who have discussed this more than once, agree that CIDA has not derived significant advantage from the presence of IDRC in Canada, in Ottawa . . . I wanted to take advantage of this joint process of reflection to raise this question, share my concerns with the governors, and enable them to tell Dr. Hopper whether they agree on the necessity of closer links with respect to the general orientation of IDRC and CIDA.

In reply to the CIDA President, other Governors were silent. The question was not revisited with any seriousness again until the 1980s.

In September 1976, a few months after Gérin-Lajoie's suggestion to the Board of the Centre, Don Jamieson became SSEA. This helped permit a re-assessment of development assistance. A meeting took place on 30 August 1976 between Allan Darling of PCO and Gordon Smith of Treasury Board to discuss the rationalisation of ODA. PCO

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prepared for the change of ministers by sending a mandate letter to the new minister to "signal issues upon which it was wanted reflection." In PCO, the view was that the Centre "wasn't accountable in the way often generally wanted." Hopper was then asked to prepare a memorandum to Cabinet by Treasury Board, a demand that was later abandoned. At face value the memorandum was to have,

IDRC's proposals for its long-term growth pattern and financial requirements

It is expected that IDRC's conception of its future relationship between itself and CIDA would be included in the memorandum.

But David Hopper saw it as seeking Cabinet,

approval in principle: of the functions of IDRC, and a mandate for its continued existence. Such approval would provide assurance of Cabinet support which the Treasury Board desires in its relationships with the Centre

... Cabinet approval of the specifically quantified growth pattern is not the objective of the memorandum, and is not expected at that time.

This passage implies a very serious questioning by Treasury Board and the PCO of IDRC's status. That year, further questioning was evident in the size of the Centre's grant which rose only $2.5 million, when rises of $5-8 million had been commonplace hitherto.

Other questions seem to have been raised at that time which emerged later. First among these was the level of the Centre's overhead. It approached that of international organisations, 20-30% of the total funds. Efforts to bring this level down had already been made prior to 1974. An expectation that the level of overhead would drop down to 22% had been discussed at the Centre's Finance Committee as early as September

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465 Allan Darling, interview by author, 8 April 1994, by telephone, notes, Ottawa.


1974. Other major issues were the relative absence of policy and evaluation. To address the concerns about policy and evaluation a Policy Unit was erected, headed by a former Director of Health Sciences of the Centre, George Brown in late 1976.

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More Domestic Pressures: Academics, MOSST and the Science Council

By the mid-1970s, Canadian academics were openly complaining directly to IDRC staff about how little assistance the Centre was providing them. They also indirectly approached other officials regarding IDRC's policies. Hopper announced to the Board's Executive Committee in June of 1976 that,

I have been approached by scholars to say that this Board should announce that 1/3 of our research monies, if that is the minimum - they would prefer 50% - should go to Canadian researchers. . .

The social scientists, in general, I think, in Canada feel the dry-up of funds, particularly through the Canada Council and through the fact that the Social Science Research Council, which was promised a couple of Speeches from the Throne ago never materialized. We are under pressure from them, just as we are from some of the harder scientists, to come forth.\textsuperscript{469}

These pressures from academics were to be forced into other arenas in the federal government, and were powerfully asserted.

Prior to becoming Secretary of the Treasury Board, Maurice LeClair, as Deputy Minister for the Ministry of State for Science and Technology (MOSST), seems to have been alerted to the relative ease with which IDRC was able to garner funds for research, when money for domestic research was perceived to be difficult to come by. Academics seem to have complained to him. The Science Council which reported to LeClair at MOSST had not been overly favourable to the Centre. This may have been a legacy of Omand Solandt,\textsuperscript{470} who was not happy with the way the Centre had been run under Hopper. This general opinion was formed in 1970 in a meeting between Hopper and members of the Science Council. Solandt had been hopeful that IDRC would be a think


\textsuperscript{470} Solandt was head of the Science Council from 1968-72.
tank, providing advice to standing agencies, and not a granting agency. Solandt's view seems to have remained influential long after his departure. There was a feeling that Hopper's approach to development was to "discover how to solve problems," assuming that Third World problems were different from those in Canada. The implication of assuming that problems are different is that research was done overseas, and not performed in Canada. The Science Council approach seems to have preferred an approach more like other donors, a transfer of technology and scientific rationality more familiar to Goulet's general line. Another sore point was that funding went from IDRC to other developed country organisations, such as the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at the University of Sussex, instead of Canadian ones. Such a move was seen as "appointing the opposition." The completion of a population study on China in Hawaii did not help. As a result, Dr. LeClair took "a personal interest" and questioned the mandate and activities of the Centre.

**Maurice LeClair Shows a Personal Interest**

Omand Solandt's Executive Assistant until his departure from the Science Council was James Mullin. After the Scottish former AECL physicist left the Council in 1975 as Deputy Director of the Science he joined MOSST as Director General of International

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471 Drew Wilson, Science Council, interview by author, 26 April 1994, Ottawa, by telephone, notes.

472 Drew Wilson, interview by author.


Activities. At that time, the Deputy Minister of MOSST was Denis Hudon. While in EAO/CIDA, Hudon had represented an earlier pre-Strong, more Canadians first policy. He was preceded by Maurice LeClair who questioned why international science and technology research was growing faster than domestic science and technology. At MOSST, Mullin became aware of North-South issues of technology transfer. He joined the OECD Committee on Science and Technology Policy. He became Chair of the "Mullin Group," which prepared the industrialised countries for the 1979 United Nations Conference on Science and Technology in Vienna.

Mullin's section in MOSST of the federal government prepared the papers for the Canadian delegation and considered what initiatives the Canadians might offer. The MOSST group discussed ideas with government departments and academics. Perhaps influenced by Solandt, LeClair and Hudon's more domestic predispositions, MOSST decided to respond to the part of the Vienna protocol calling for better North-South collaboration, partly in terms of mutual benefit. Although IDRC clearly had a great interest in this matter, little discussion took place. This is reflected in the Board minutes. David Hopper said in March of 1977 that MOSST,

> Is beginning to speak quite openly about the possibility of its moving in to provide an increased linkage between Canadian scientists and developing country scientists. We are not quite sure yet as to who is going to finance this.

However, MOSST was, of course, to prepare the official Canadian response. As a non-

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476 The Conference also led to the creation of a very small United Nations Centre for Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD).

477 James Mullin, interview by author, 14 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa

agent of the Crown, mixed with Hopper's vision of an arms-length relationship with government, IDRC was comfortable that it was not consulted. MOSST officials settled on IDRC as the most appropriate vehicle for the furtherance of mutual benefit in technology transfer. As a result of the MOSST initiative, IDRC seems to have been forced to join with MOSST to fund preparations for the Vienna Conference (UNCSTD).

After he became Secretary of the Treasury Board, the opinion LeClair had developed at MOSST regarding IDRC seems to have been amplified and combined with those of academics per se. Moreover, there was "always concern at Program Branch of Treasury Board that IDRC had special status. Hopper had just left so the perception was that it [IDRC] was vulnerable." On 7 August 1977 a Cabinet decision was made in a memorandum concerning CIDA Bilateral Allocations. In that memorandum it said that as part of the review of the policy and programs conducted by the Aid Board, an evaluation of IDRC's activities as part of Canada's aid programmes and "a clarification of the status of IDRC and its relationship to CIDA and MOSST" should take place. A study of the overall mandate was to be conducted by PCO, and a more general detailed evaluation of the workings of the centre completed by the Treasury Board.

In September 1977 Hopper announced he would be joining the World Bank as Vice-President - South Asia in January 1978. The following month, Maurice Strong became Chairman of IDRC's Board. Strong's comment about Hopper's legacy is revealing,

David did a superb job of developing it, was not, he didn't become part, he didn't know the other Deputy Ministers much. [sic] I always felt there was a balance between being coopted by the bureaucracy, making IDRC simply another

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479 Steven Rosell, interview by author, 14 March 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

480 Cabinet Decision 337-77D excerpt in Jacques S. Roy to Ivan Head, TLS, 5 February 1979, IDRC Records, 1.
government agency, and having some relationships.\footnote{481}

Within government, a new sort of President was seen to be necessary, a diplomat able to move comfortably in Ottawa and respond to its priorities. Ivan Head was believed to be such a man.

Ivan Head was an Albertan law professor before he came to Ottawa to advise Minister of Justice Pierre Trudeau as a constitutional expert. He had an abiding interest in international development, a former serving officer in External Affairs. Head became Trudeau's chief foreign policy advisor from a new vantage point in the Prime Minister's Office. To the chagrin of his former department, his advice sometimes eclipsed External Affairs'. He served with distinction, notably during Biafra War and the crisis between India and Canada over their use of Canadian technology for its military nuclear programme. Even after he became President of IDRC, Pierre Trudeau used Head's good offices during the Iran hostage crisis of 1979-80. While Trudeau's advisor he rekindled the new Prime Minister's interest in the Third World, and advocated following Pearson's path of increased development assistance allocations.

Head indicated his desire to leave the Prime Minister's employ in the spring of 1977.\footnote{482} Maurice Strong suggested to him that he become a candidate for IDRC's presidency. Pierre Elliot Trudeau suggested Head's name to Strong.\footnote{483} After the selection process, Ivan Head became President of IDRC in March 1978. In the interim, pressure on IDRC increased. A review of crown corporations was under way. Michael Pitfield informed Maurice Strong in November of 1977 that IDRC status might be moved from "B" to "C" in the Financial Administration Act, implying greater Treasury Board control.

\footnote{481} Maurice Strong, interview by author, tape recording, Ottawa, 28 August 1987.

\footnote{482} Ivan Head, interview by author, 21 August 1987.

\footnote{483} Maurice Strong, interview by author, tape recording, Ottawa, 28 August 1987.
But Pitfield noted,

I should emphasize that the proposed revised Schedules have been composed from the perspective of financial management, control and accountability. We fully recognize that there may be overriding policy considerations that would dictate a more or less independent status for a particular corporation.⁴⁸⁴

This seems to indicate that whatever the outcome of the pending PCO and Treasury Board studies, the concern in government was to address a perceived lack of fiscal probity. Commenting on the proposed changes, Donald McPhail in External Affairs wrote to Allan Gotlieb, then USSEA, that the proposed change in status was "not unrelated" to these concerns.⁴⁸⁵

Maurice Strong's response to the December 1977 proposed changes was powerful and extensive.

If the Centre is now to be required to submit to a series of controls, submissions, and approvals; if its international Board is to be advised that it cannot, without approval, amend its budget or authorize contracts; if it is to be casually grouped with organizations deemed "constituted to advance the national interests of Canada"; if its operations are to be subject to the day-to-day direction of the Government, the very character of the Centre will be destroyed. More importantly, such changes would prejudicially affect the ability of the Centre to react quickly to the financial requirements of both the Centre's projects as well as its own operating requirements - a feature which has become a noted example of Canadian innovation.⁴⁸⁶

This intervention indicated that Strong would not stand idly by. However, his

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appointment was believed to be conducive to IDRC following policies which central agencies thought were more appropriate. The writer of the Program Branch, Treasury Board study of 1978, Robert Chartrand believed that,

Unlike his predecessor, he [Strong] is likely to be a truly active Chairman and is expected to bring [to] IDRC a style of management more related to business methods and principles. As well, his earlier vision of providing a dual role is likely to lead to a greater acceptance of the concept of mutual-benefit.

In summary, the new Chairman is likely to influence IDRC in the following areas; management style and participation of the Chairman, broadened IDRC perspective via programming, domestic role and closer ties with Canadian institutions and, a more direct association with U.N. programs.

Likewise,

Mr. Head's foreign policy thinking has been pragmatic in the past with its emphasis on national interest. In this regard, he is likely to support the need for a domestic IDRC role based on mutual-benefit.

Treasury Board officials believed that Michel Dupuy was expected to play an "active role." To some extent, such expectations of Head and Strong are surprising as Strong was the architect of Pearson's development assistance policy, and Head Trudeau's. Central agents had long been dissatisfied with many of the tendencies in aid during both governments.

Head's own view of his role as President was revealed during his first major meeting with Centre management. When asked what he thought his role as President was


488 Robert Chartrand, 18.

489 Robert Chartrand, 18.
he replied, "Fund raiser." His interlocutor said, "But you don't understand Mr. President, we have a budget. We don't go out and raise funds." Head replied, "You don't understand, you get that money because the Government of Canada is willing to give you that money." Head saw his role as the interlocutor with "governments plural." Head's domestic responsibility was to raise funds from the federal government.  

The PCO study was completed early. LeClair insisted that the Treasury Board study be sent to Head first and that he conduct negotiations with Head before documents went from PCO. The Treasury Board study was not sent to Ivan Head until November 1978. The main priority for discussion with IDRC were identified as,

1. IDRC's avoidance of its domestic role relative to objective 1a (use of Canadian researchers), and objective 1d (mutually beneficial projects).

Later that year, efforts to improve relations with Canadian academics were made by CIDA and IDRC providing funding for the creation of the International Development Office of the AUCC. Nevertheless, that underlying disgruntlement was not dealt with. The new CIDA president, Michel Dupuy, said to the Board at Ivan Head's first Board meeting,

In conversations I have had with Canadian university people over the past few months, I have been intrigued by what seems to be a feeling among quite a few people that IDRC is not interested in them, that IDRC is primarily pursuing the building of research institutions in developing countries. If I raise the point now, it is in relation to a remark Mr. Hulse made earlier, because it seems to me that should this feeling continue to prevail, it might affect the degree of support for the

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490 Ivan Head as quoted by James Mullin, interview by author, 14 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa


Centre by an important community in Canada.\textsuperscript{493}

Dupuy's observations were powerful and clear in their implications.

**External Affairs' McPhail Report**

While PCO and Treasury Board were re-assessing their fervour, a very confidential study was conducted in External Affairs for Allan Gotlieb, by his assistant Don McPhail. Gotlieb wrote to Minister Jamieson,

As the paper suggests, there is, I think, much to be said for
\begin{enumerate}
\item increasing the number of Canadian directors (beyond 11), and
\item going for a better mix in the Canadian component (business, labour, development experts, public service).
\end{enumerate}

If we follow the above approach to ICRC [sic] we accomplish two things:
\begin{enumerate}
\item We "Canadianize" it.
\item We increase the chances of fitting its activities into the framework of Canadian foreign policy.\textsuperscript{494}
\end{enumerate}

McPhail noted in the study and elsewhere that the implications of the PCO suggestions to reschedule the Centre under the Financial Administration Act (FAA) would mean that the "Board of Directors is usually composed, in large part if not totally, of public servants"\textsuperscript{495}


\textsuperscript{494} A.E. Gotlieb to the Minister (Jamieson?), 19 April 1978, TLS, 38-4-IDRC, Volume 31, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, Foreign Affairs Records, 1.

\textsuperscript{495} D.S. McPhail, DSM, to the Under-Secretary, "IDRC Board," 3 May 1978, TM, 38-4, Volume 31, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, Foreign Affairs Records, 2.
and ”all future Governors should be Canadian citizens.”

Gotlieb and Pitfield had a common vision of a more unitary foreign policy. According to Gotlieb, Pitfield agreed ”that there should be more extensive representation at the federal public servant level, by means of the inclusion of the Deputy Minister of Agriculture (Lussier), the Secretary of MOSST (Hudon) and myself.” Ten days after the above memorandum to the Minister, Allan Gotlieb was appointed to the Centre's Board. Up until that point the only Canadian official on the Board was the sitting CIDA President. Lussier and Hudon were not appointed, but at least one another person who was directly relevant to Canadian foreign policy concerns was. As we saw, Hadj Moktar Louhibi had apparently been helpful in getting Canadians grain contracts in Algeria. and was duly appointed the same month as Gotlieb.

As early as April 1978, Treasury Board and PCO officials sent signals to their leaderships that further detailed evaluations of the Centre ”could be interpreted as an unwarranted lack of confidence” in the ”new management team” and ”could create a climate of confrontation which would be detrimental to the evolution of an ‘open’ working relationship between IDRC-CIDA-MOSST-TBS.” In advance of the tops of

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496 Don McPhail to Allan Gotlieb, ”Memorandum for the Under-Secretary, I.D.R.C.” TMS, 18 April 1978, PCO Records, 9.

497 A.E. Gotlieb to the Minister, ”IDRC Board,” TLS, 8 May 1978, 38-4-IDRC, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, Foreign Affairs Records, 1.

498 Maurice LeClair became a member of the Board in 1981, the same year that Allan Gotlieb left. LeClair had by 1982 become President of Canadian National Railways.


500 R.L. Richardson to Maurice LeClair, ”Report on evaluation of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) - Briefing on Friday, April 28, 1978, at 9:30 a.m.”,
their respective organisations they had judged IDRC as running relatively well, especially with its new leadership. One can only speculate that the tone of the counsel indicates that they were somewhat trepidatious about tackling the formidable Strong and Head. However, more clear is that, just as were their predecessors had been more likely to accept the premises of IDRC during the proposal stage for IDRC than their leaders, so were they. As we shall see, this difference in view is repeated elsewhere and seems to indicate the existence of a particular Deputy Minister sub-culture.

That in the event the McPhail Study and the other studies did not go any further appears to have been the result of the diplomatic skills of the Board and President. In an interview with the author, Michael Pitfield suggested why most of these proposals stalled.

I would think the Minister was not anxious to put his naked hand into the middle of a hornet's nest. Who would thank him from the Canadian side, since he thinking about recognising two or three, when two or three hundred think that they should be. Whereas, think of all the other members of the Board with all their contacts worldwide against the initiative.\(^{501}\)

In other words, changes to IDRC would provoke the wrath of the well-connected international board. The political value of changing its character paled against the certainty of opprobrium.

Part of that diplomatic skill was demonstrated by the making of concessions, chiefly to make IDRC more Canadian in form and content. Don Jamieson was informed that "Canada" would appear on the base of IDRC's logo.\(^{502}\) Governors had been suggested

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\(^{501}\) Michael Pitfield, interview by author, 15 March 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

\(^{502}\) Ivan Head to Don Jamieson, TLS, 31 May 1978, 38-4-IDRC, Volume 31, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, Foreign Affairs Records, 1.

Although this was explicitly contrary to Parliament's wishes at the time of passage of IDRC bill.
and accepted by External Affairs. MOSST and the academics were getting IDRC participation in the Vienna Conference, which would lead to IDRC giving more funding to Canadians. Treasury Board also achieved changes in the Centre's policy functions and unofficial controls over financing. However, the rescheduling of the Centre did not take place. Some points of view do not waver. Even today, Michael Pitfield feels IDRC's international board makes the Centre less accountable because the Centre is remote from Parliament and its loyalty is divided between Canadians and non-Canadians. The person who prepared the PCO study at the time, Steven Rosell, recalls no desire on the part of the Clerk of the Privy Council to change the status of IDRC. Yet barely a year later during the Conservative government a bill would be laid before the House to change the status of the Centre and other organisations.503

The foregoing attempts to change the Centre show the Centre to be "very well-protected." Smallness has protected IDRC. The Centre is often seen as too small for big concerns to worry about, a "fly around the ankles." In the scheme of things of central agent's and large businesses, and universities, IDRC's relatively minuscule budget of $100 million, has served to keep it invisible. Furthermore, for much of IDRC's history, Centre officers have sought to keep the organisation invisible, and it has been described variously as a "stealth" organisation. In any case, this episode speaks well of the Centre's relative ability to be more independent, and the Board's ability to ensure that. However, changes were seen as necessary, central agencies and others remained interested in determining the Centre's future.

503 Steven Rosell, interview by author, 3 March 1994, tape recording, Ottawa

504 Michael Pitfield, interview by author, 15 March 1994, tape recording, Ottawa

505 Anonymous.

506 Donald Macdonald quoted by James Mullin, interview by author, 14 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Treasury Board study is not that it had little to do with fiscal matters per se. Rather, the fascinating aspect of the document's nature is that it crystallised a multiplicity of concerns that had built up regarding the Centre in various quarters inside and outside the Centre. The study revealed key aspects of discussions regarding what should be the correct nature of IDRC. In some respects, the discourse is reminiscent of discussion that took place when IDRC was still a proposal; elsewhere, similar to dilemmas yet to come. A number of aspects of the Pearsonian tradition seemed to have been held in abeyance during the Hopper years, but burst open upon his departure. As such the report seems to herald a new era, based on an admixture of elements of the Pearsonian tradition, but with the addition of more parochial concerns. The Treasury Board document, and subsequent IDRC texts, are more socially oriented, and politically sensitive. Maurice Strong encapsulated a number of the reasons why Ivan Head was a good choice to release this admixture and protect the Centre in one free-flowing thought,

Anything without a constituency in Canada is always in some danger. So that's why I thought that after David Hopper left then Ivan Head would be ideal. I also thought that Ivan could relate it far more. I thought that maybe it was getting over technical, that it needed to relate itself more to the broader political spectrum, and social spectrum in which development occurred.\textsuperscript{507}

In other words, IDRC needed to be politically relevant, in the right circles, with a constituency. Ivan Head could help answer the kind of concerns that Barbara Ward expressed about IDRC only "injecting lysine into wheat," placing IDRC's work in international and domestic politics, remaking it as something more than a "sub-Rockefeller."\textsuperscript{508}

\textsuperscript{507} Maurice Strong, interview by author, 28 August 1987, tape recording, Ottawa

The response of IDRC staff to the Treasury Board study was remarkably defensive, generally rejecting most points made. Yet many of the Centre's essential positions were approved of by Chartrand. Hopper's focus on indigenous capacity-building was endorsed. Further, the general approach was approved, "IDRC projects an image of uniqueness due to its structure, innovation due to its approach, and daringness due to its unparalleled autonomy." This perception was mirrored in the PCO mandate study performed by Steven Rosell. There is little doubt that the concurrence of both the Treasury Board and PCO studies regarding the general IDRC approach to development and its operations was vital for the future survival of the central vision of IDRC.

The Chartrand study concluded that CIDA/IDRC relations were generally acceptable. CIDA officers recognised that IDRC's staff provided useful technical advice. However, the report said that little more cooperation would take place beyond meetings of Senior Vice-Presidents unless more policy and programming coordination took place. In subsequent decades, cooperation seems to have been revolved around how far such meetings should proceed and how much coordination was feasible or necessary.

Regional Offices were seen as expensive. Either further authority should be given to them or they should be closed. In response, a three-tier system was set up in IDRC with different Regional Offices receiving varying degrees of responsibility. ASRO was assigned the highest level later in 1978. Nevertheless, this tier-system was of relatively little significance. Ottawa-based divisions continued to bear the responsibility for initiating projects, and the lines of control over officers.

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510 Rosell had performed a number of other similar mandate studies.

Steven Rosell, interview by author, 14 February 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.
Particular attention was paid to IDRC's lack of policy and evaluation. Chartrand found it difficult to determine whether IDRC was successful; IDRC had virtually no stated policies or goals. Policy had been determined by the approval and modification of each project. Thereby, each division determined policy. Integration was seen as necessary. (This theme has recurred for decades as we shall see in the following chapter).

The degree to which IDRC is now a responsive, rather than an initiating agency is considered extreme. Program objectives and priorities have not been identified to guide the operating divisions in an attempt to channel developing country interests in those areas offering the highest potential.\textsuperscript{511}

In response to this point IDRC posited that the Centre's credibility in the developing world was based on its responsiveness.\textsuperscript{512} However, Head subsequently created the Office of Planning and Evaluation. Nihal Kappagoda was changed from Vice-President - International to Vice-President Planning to reflect the new importance attached to the activity.\textsuperscript{513}

Another aspect of the Treasury Board study was that the Centre was seen to have not given enough emphasis to implementation of the results of the research funded. Planning and evaluation was believed to be one solution. More controversial in terms of the Centre's highly divisionally based internal politics was the notion that the research should be multidisciplinary in order to be effective. Such an idea was anathema to many in the Centre as we shall see in the next chapter. But the general thrust to make research interdisciplinary harked back to Strong, Matthews, Plumptre and Oldham's visions of what IDRC would be like. This view was contrary to the more narrowly technical view of

\textsuperscript{511} Robert Chartrand, "Evaluation of International Development Research Centre," 41.


\textsuperscript{513} Nihal Kappagoda, interview by author, 9 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.
Hopper and Hulse. In some ways their view paralleled those of the central agencies of the late 1960s who sought focused action-orientation. Chartrand suggested that the establishment of the Social Science Division of the Centre "may have been an error" and that "It is widely felt that social science expertise could have been more effective had it been injected directly into the "harder science" divisions." This suggestion seems to have arisen at a time when Joe Hulse, Maurice Strong and others were making similar proposals. One of Ruth Zagorin's last efforts as Social Sciences Director was to defend the Division as a legitimate entity and such study as an activity at a Board meeting in Bangkok in March 1978. At one level these proposals were a deepening of the technocratic "cure." They also extended the constituency to include the more marginalised social scientists. Chartrand wrote:

> Apart from assessing technical implications, the analysis of socio-cultural, political and economic factors affecting implementation would substantially enhance delivery prospects. It is for this very reason that, as suggested earlier, serious consideration be given to assigning social scientists directly to projects within each program division. Finally, more use could be made of pilot projects with the implementational experiences applied to generally similar areas. Feedback based on actual experience can be particularly helpful in formulating more complex and costly projects.

This was not participatory development, but nor was what had been proposed and practised generally in IDRC. One can see in these comments the same kind of tension between the natural and social scientists and the more technically-minded and socially-engaged that was to emerge more frequently in subsequent years in IDRC. Interestingly, Ivan Head had expressed a desire to give higher priority to communications for interdisciplinary research at his inaugural Board meeting.

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516 Robert Chartrand, "Evaluation of IDRC," 34.

The Chartrand study also judged IDRC's proper level of funding. As we have seen, Strong putatively suggested a level of 5% of ODA. CIDA was generally willing to provide just under 4%. Yet it was never set in anything more than a gentlemen's agreement. This discussion has continued for decades since. Chartrand seized on the Pearson's Commission statement that donor research endeavours should spend half of their 5%, in developing countries.\textsuperscript{518} The expected diversification of funds mentioned during the proposal stage of the Centre was also raised.

IDRC has indicated that it considered unrealistic expectations of any amount of foreign funding. Even domestic contributions from private sources have been avoided since attached conditions could compromise the Centre's untied style of operation. This position appears overstated and domestic contributions should be encouraged.\textsuperscript{519}

This question of non-Parliamentary grant funding has been raised yearly almost as a Treasury Board mantra since the creation of the Centre. It has re-emerged most powerfully since the stagnation of funds in the early 1990s and has brought to the fore questions about the degree of autonomy, and especially engagement with donors, notably CIDA.

Predictably, during the 1978 TB study overhead emerged as an issue. However, the conclusion of the study was less easy to foretell. While it noted that much streamlining could be done as 40% of person-years were allocated to general management functions in Ottawa, and only 69% of funding went to direct project funding, Chartrand recognised that, "It is difficult to determine whether this allocation is appropriate since both the quality and quantity of staff support for project formulation have directly contributed to IDRC's past performance."\textsuperscript{520} Being labour-intensive was recognised as a


\textsuperscript{519} Robert Chartrand, "Evaluation of IDRC," 25.

\textsuperscript{520} Robert Chartrand, "Evaluation of IDRC," 32-33.
virtue.

The matters raised by the 1977 Cabinet Committee meeting were concluded in February 1979. At this point, Steve Rosell of PCO concluded "the results of the review indicate no significant problems in this area and indeed in general reveal an organization operating effectively and successfully." Surprisingly, the longest item in this note did not concern IDRC/MOSST relationship, where it was reported there was "no difficulty." The most substantial entry concerned External Affairs, and was said to have been resolved by the presence of the USSEA and "revisions underway to the standard guidelines issued to IDRC staff on their relationship to Canadian posts abroad and to the Department of External Affairs." This last item had not been covered in any of the studies hitherto. Apparently, it was triggered by the embarrassment of the Canadian Embassy in Havana being invited to the launching of an IDRC-funded project in Cuba of which the Embassy was unaware. Unfortunately, the Department of External Affairs was not notified of IDRC projects under $50,000, which this project was. Other minor irritations of protocol were also to be rectified by travelling IDRC staff reporting to Canadian embassies as to their whereabouts and activities. To reinforce the notion of IDRC's independence, such niceties (that avoided the major diplomatic failing of causing embarrassment), had been eschewed during the Hopper presidency. Rosell's report noted that,

Those involved in the Crown corporations exercise have been involved to some extent in IDRC review and have concluded that no change in the degree of

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521 Steven A. Rosell to File cc. to Mr. Smith, Drummie and Darling, "Review of IDRC," TMS, 28 February 1979, PCO Records, 1.

522 Rosell, 1.

523 Rosell, 2.

independence presently enjoyed by IDRC is appropriate given its special role. Further consideration of this matter will occur in the context of the developing policy of the government towards non-departmental bodies.\textsuperscript{525}

While the Chartrand and Rosell studies and, indeed, the Crown corporations exercise concluded that no major changes were necessary, this did not appear to be the assessment of their superiors. As we have noted, during the brief Conservative government later in 1979, bills were introduced in the House of Commons where, once again IDRC was to have its status changed under the FAA, and so put under greater Treasury Board control. CIDA had been brought under tighter rein in 1977.

There was a perception in CIDA that there were two clients: 1) the Third World, and 2) the Government of Canada. But the fact of the latter did not become clear until 2 July 1977 when Treasury Board finance and control mechanisms were introduced into CIDA.\textsuperscript{526}

Only the briefness of the Conservative government prevented IDRC's staff from avoiding that fate. Yet the Centre did not emerge unscathed. The following year IDRC was obliged by the Treasury Board to complete Three-Year Operational Plans (TYROPs). In 1980, a budgeting exercise with Treasury Board requiring "A" and "B" base planning restricted change in divisional budgets.\textsuperscript{527}

\textsuperscript{525} Rosell, 1.

\textsuperscript{526}Anonymous.

Macropolitics and Microtactics

Beyond the micropolitics regarding IDRC and its relations with academics, and officials, changes were taking place in Canadian politics. In 1979, the Conservative Clark government briefly held power. Flora MacDonald was appointed Minister for External Affairs. IDRC was seen as particularly at risk in this period because of Ivan Head's close association with Prime Minister Trudeau. And indeed deep background efforts were made to seek his removal.\textsuperscript{528} Naturally, this did not bode well for IDRC's negotiations with federal departments. No decision was taken regarding IDRC's status under the FAA, and it was brought up again.

We have noted that although IDRC was endorsed by the Treasury Board and PCO studies, Centre management believed it wise to pay attention to the issues identified. In 1979, IDRC had to demonstrate that the Centre would not be hostile to the business friends of the Progressive Conservative Party. MOSST staff's preference for IDRC as the designated unit of the federal government responsible for ensuring greater connections between Canadian and developing country scientists ones for mutual benefit was helpful at a time of pressure on the Centre and its President. Head must have found the notion alluring for several reasons, Firstly, IDRC would be seen to be responding to pressures from the government and federal agencies. Secondly, Senator Martial Asselin's announcement at the Vienna Conference said that up to one per cent of Canada's ODA would go to such activities, at that time $12 million. This would be inherently attractive to IDRC's chief fundraiser. Commenting on the period, Nihal Kappagoda told the author,

\begin{quote}
The UNCSTD Conference and the preparations leading up to it gave the opportunity for the Canadian research institutions in some ways to get up the pole here. . I myself felt very strongly that this might lead to an erosion of the original mandate . we felt .the Ivan Head presidency sensed the situation that unless IDRC was to accept . more of this programme . (we could preserve the original
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{528} Bill Winegard, interview by author, 13 April 1994, tape recording, Guelph.
Head rarely seems to have shared with staff the details of IDRC's predicament relative to the government. Head was himself intensely sensitive to political signals. He sought to demonstrate to the leaders of Canada, political, academic and bureaucratic, IDRC's relevance to Canadian interests and engage them in the work of the Centre, while at the same time asserting independence. The manner by which this was done at the political level may be generally characterised as masterful, while at the bureaucratic level, much less so.

IDRC staff would attend meetings at which CIDA officials were present and "clearly make a little statement at the beginning of the meeting that `We want to dissociate ourselves from our friends from Canada here. They have to speak for the government. But, of course, we are independent.'" Assertions were certainly necessary for IDRC to forge a distinctive image. But the manner in which it was done deeply wounded the sensitivities of CIDA staff, who saw international development as much their pure vocation as officers in IDRC, even if they had no choice but to recognise the importance of Government of Canada priorities in their work. Yet in dealing at the political level Head and his staff were often brilliant. For example, Communications Division staff were able to ensure that glowing articles appeared on the front page of The Globe and Mail the day before meetings of the President in front of the House of Commons Committee on External Affairs and National Defense. Ministers of External Affairs were re-assured of the work IDRC was doing, that it was changing with the times.

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529 Nihal Kappagoda, interview by author, 1 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa

530 Anonymous.

We have noted that unlike other parts of the federal government, IDRC was not very much part of an interlocking series of cultures for most of its history. Notable exceptions were Ivan Head and his numerous connections in high government and political circles; and Joe Hulse and his contacts in business and the right-wing of the Liberal Party; and the Secretary and General Counsel, Robert Auger with various associations, principally in External Affairs and PCO. But deep interlocking connections were few and IDRC was compelled to rely on the technique of its leaders, more than interlocking culture to ensure short-term questions of survival. Nevertheless, at a broader level, that IDRC continued to be seen as a representative of a culture of scientific progress and internationalist values was of greater import to the long-term viability of the Centre.

IDRC Staff React to Trends Towards Parochialism

A note should be made at this point of internal politics in IDRC in the late 1970s because it affected the Centre's external relations. Inside IDRC, a minor reaction to the manifestation of external pressures took place. The notion of such collaborative endeavours suggested at Vienna were not well-seen by the Director of Social Sciences, David Steedman, and especially not by the Director of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Science, Joe Hulse. Consequently, both sides of the scientific divide were united in their opposition to this initiative. In 1979, many Programme Officers saw IDRC as an example of "pure development" and were appalled by the changes taking place. Programme staff saw the manifestation of these unwelcome influences in the Centre in Louis Berlinguet and his staff of ten including the veteran social democrat, "King" Gordon. Berlinguet had previously been the Centre's principal Quebec representative on the Board. Dr. Berlinguet and a small Laval University office under him were eliminated.

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532 James Mullin, interview by author, 14 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa
as part of a 2% budget cut. David Hopper had apparently hired Berlinguet to be his second-in-command, with the mandate he was pursuing, but not told anyone. Berlinguet had apparently been seen as steering the Centre towards more engagement with Canadian researchers, when he became Vice President - Canada and Donor Relations. As Vice-President his chief activity had been preparing for the UNCSTD Conference. Among programme staff, Berlinguet's team was not seen as "adding value." Marcel Massé advised Prime Minister Clark that "Indeed there is some suggestion of friction between the program branches and that of the Senior Vice-President, a situation which frequently occurs in Departments when a policy coordination role is super-imposed on operational branches." In addition to the Berlinguet group, IDRC's Nairobi Regional Office was closed as well as three minor ones in Delhi, Washington and London. However, the most lasting fallout of the decisions that flowed from the 1979 cuts was IDRC's reputation for employing francophones. It left much room for improvement under Hopper. The Prime Minister was informed of the elimination of the entire Senior Vice-President's office by Senator Asselin who had been the main government representative at the Vienna Conference. Long letters were exchanged which seemed to have touched on the effect of these changes to federal-provincial relations. Head subsequently made strong efforts to change the image. Despite this reaction, the President went ahead and created the Cooperative Division, initially as part of the President's Office, which was to develop programs that emerged from the spirit of the Canadian government's declaration at Vienna. Many staff remained unhappy at this change.

533 Raymond Audet, interview by author, 20 May 1994, tape recording, Ottawa

534 Nihal Kappagoda, interview by author, 9 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa

535 Marcel Massé to Joe Clark, "Layoffs at International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Memorandum for the Prime Minister," TMS, 22 October 1979, PCO Records, 2.

Gamani Corea, former Sri Lanka High Commissioner in Canada, was selected to head the new Cooperative Programs Division. Being a non-Canadian, Corea should have been less suspect as one delivering up the internationalist ideals of IDRC as an offering to the Canadian government. But his six-month tenure was not easy.\textsuperscript{537} Corea was a journalist and not well-received by the scientists of the Centre especially in Hulse's Division.\textsuperscript{538} Head felt compelled to write to the SSEA that he cautiously welcomed the new policy of the Conservatives, but sought to impress upon Macdonald the governors' desire to retain its existing character. The President recommended a slow development of the policy to a weak Conservative government. The less than overwhelming support is seen in the following ambiguous statement.

Governors welcomed the condition of additionality as consistent with their belief that the basic character of the Centre should not be altered and the Centre should not be subjected to fundamental restructuring to cope with the infusion of fresh funds.\textsuperscript{539}

If there was consensus in the Centre on the nature of the Collaborative Programme it was that it should be beneficial to developing countries' scientists. This required some retraining of Canadian scientists interested in the program.\textsuperscript{540} Canadian researchers had to show that specific colleagues in developing countries were interested in working with them on an issue deemed relevant to Third World needs. In other words, the programme was not simply to provide funds for Canadian researchers; the particular IDRC notion of partnership remained supreme.

In August 1981, James Mullin left MOSST and joined the Division that he had

\textsuperscript{537} Corea subsequently became Sri Lankan Ambassador to Washington.

\textsuperscript{538} James Mullin, interview by author, 14 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa

\textsuperscript{539} Ivan Head to Flora MacDonald, SSEA, TLS, 15 October 1979, 38-4 IDRC, Volume 33, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, Foreign Affairs Records, 1.

\textsuperscript{540} James Mullin, interview by author, 14 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa
advocated. Head had asked him "to put up or shut up." He says that the work of the Division did contribute to less pressure from Canadian researchers. Many programme staff remained suspicious of the aims of Mullin's division, believing that it distorted Hopper and Pearson's internationalist vision.

Relations continued to improve between IDRC and other parts of government during the 1980s, including Conservative governments. Shortly after his appointment in 1984, the last Liberal Secretary of State for External Affairs, Jean Chrétien, sent this glowing comment to the Centre. "I am well aware of the outstanding work and excellent reputation of IDRC." At the political level, Ivan Head continued to show that he was a player of international status. In the early 1980s, IDRC played a key role in funding the Brandt Commission. Further, Prime Minister Trudeau used Head's good offices during the Iran hostage crisis.

Under Conservative Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, support for IDRC continued. The Conservative Caucus did not support Head remaining President of IDRC. One informant says that the caucus spent one day "trying to cut off Ivan's head."

After the Conservatives came to power in 1984, the Quebec wing of the Conservative caucus composed a list taken from a government directory of organisations that might be eliminated. IDRC was on the list.

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541 James Mullin, interview by author.

542 Jean Chrétien to Ivan Head, 7 August 1984, TLOS, 38-4-IDRC, Volume 45, Relations with Developing Countries Division, Foreign Affairs Records, 1.

543 Re: Quebec caucus - James Mullin, interview by author.

Re: day of caucus concerned with removal of Head - I have found no confirmation of this event in other interviews.

Janet Wardlaw was appointed Chair of IDRC in 22 March 1985, for five years. She was re-appointed for a further two years on 22 March 1990. The month after Wardlaw's first appointment cuts began. In May of 1985 Treasury Board sought to cut $15 million of what they perceived to be surpluses from IDRC's budget. Wardlaw, and Governor Curry, (an accountant and long-time member of the Board), sought and received a meeting with Minister Clark. Wardlaw wrote, "we should be grateful for an opportunity to call upon you to ensure that you are fully seized of our very real anguish and worry." 

At a conference at the University of Waterloo that May, Ivan Head spoke in beleaguered manner, calling on scientists to actively support the Centre.

Independence requires more than a Board, however. It requires as well financial commitment, the sustained flow of funds from Parliament to the Centre to permit multi-year project funding without fear of interruption, and to permit IDRC to be a research donor organization, not a bureaucratic wrestling team constantly expending its energies in search of supplementary funding. IDRC statutes, and successive governmental decisions, have lent to the Centre a very special status in this respect. IDRC funds do not lapse, IDRC is not subject to many of the strictures of the Financial Administration Act, IDRC is specifically exempt from the general application of the Crown Corporations Legislation, (an exemption that extended from the outset only to IDRC, the Bank of Canada and the Canadian Wheat Board), IDRC employees are not members of the Public Service.

This extraordinary uniqueness is not by us taken for granted. It must be earned on a continuing basis . . . The Centre, however, cannot do this on its own. It requires the audible support of scientists in Canada and abroad. I count very much on each of you to make known to Parliamentarians that IDRC, while admittedly far from perfect, has been able to do what it has because it is not part of government, not subject to governmental rules and regulations designed for organizations with mandates immensely different from IDRC . . .

The current Parliamentary Grant of IDRC, after all, is only $86 million, scarcely more than 4% of Canadian ODA, less than one-fifth the budget of NRC and one-

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544 Janet Wardlaw, and Norman Currie to Joe Clark, TLS, 30 May 1985, 38-4-IDRC, Volume 49, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, Foreign Affairs Records, 1.
third the budget of NSERC.

One can hear the echoes of discussions of Treasury Board in these remarks, and very real frustration. According to Head, in the end the debate over surpluses was "largely won" by IDRC. The Centre remitted $7 million. But mainstream Tory and central agent displeasure with the Centre was not routed.

As previously stated, one of the periods in which pressure is often put upon IDRC most strongly is about the time of the appointment or re-appointment of Presidents. President Head was recommended by the Board of the Centre for a third term. The recommendation of Head by the Board reportedly made Mulroney furious. The Prime Minister consulted lawyers. They concluded that either the recommendation would have to be rejected, an unprecedented step, or they could simply lessen the length of the appointment. Clark was said to have felt that to reject the recommendation would be caving in to the truer blue side of the Progressive Conservatives, thereby weakening the Red Tories in one of their few bastions, foreign policy.

In contrast with other parts of Mulroney's Ottawa, relations were cordial with the Minister's Office at External Affairs under Clark. In 1987, President Head sent a handwritten note to Jodi White, Clark's Chief of Staff. He requested she send a letter to Australia to prevent the Labour government there from cutting the Australian Consultative Institute for Agricultural Research (ACIAR). The creation of ACIAR had been advocated by Sir John Crawford, former Governor of IDRC, and long-time associate

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546 Ivan Head, interview by author, 21 August 1987, tape recording, Ottawa.

547 Anonymous.
of both Hopper and Head.

Dear Jodi, . . .

I fear that the Australian bureaucratic establishment is bearing down on IDRC's Australian clone ACIAR. A word from one minister to another would do wonders to back them off! Thanks.

Ivan

In other words, that Head would make such a request seems to indicate that relations with the Clark-run Department of External Affairs were not contentious. Nevertheless, Bill Winegard says ambiguously,

I have no doubt that Joe and Ivan never got on all that well. No I don't know that, but I would be surprised if they were bosom buddies. "Let's go out for a beer Ivan."
IDRC and Foreign Policy

It was a do good thing, it was modestly... inexpensive, and yet had some long-term benefits. It appealed to the academic community who were generally [of the opinion] "Of course you should have these research things." They didn't like it that they weren't getting enough money, that was something else... It appealed to the... senior bureaucracy because they could brag about it. It appealed to the Prime Ministers of the day in that it gave them this little outfit that the Third World could have some sense that they too were helping to run. It was all the internationalism that was Canada and it didn't cost very much.550

During its early years IDRC was not seen to have any direct political function relative to the Canadian government. This is not the case today. The Centre's high standing is valuable to the Canadian government, even if it requires Centre officers to remind it. Nevertheless, the status of IDRC is tangible. As Flora MacDonald said to the author,

FM: The greatest contribution that IDRC makes is this great respect and awareness that people in developing countries have of it. When I was in India I got to see the Prime Minister, the Finance Minister and... the Foreign Minister... they knew more about IDRC than.

PS: They know about it here.

FM: Yes. Well, you can't buy that kind of goodwill.551

For a middle power like Canada, where power is not sufficient to alter an opinion, goodwill is undoubtedly a vital element in the diplomatic arena. The argument has not evaporated in the face of harder times in Canada, if the vision was weakened. Indeed, when Pearsonian multilateralism and interdependence are understood not just in Ottawa, but almost everywhere this value has been reinforced. What is interesting is that it is the Pearsonian notion of generosity and partnership with the rationale that the end is social

550 Bill Winegard, interview by author, 13 April 1994, Guelph, tape recording.

551 Flora MacDonald, interview by author, 29 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa
stability and progress that has produced goodwill in developing countries. Interdependence is accepted as a given, but the means for achieving it has been increasingly in doubt in Ottawa. The notion of a simple transfer of scientific progress from the North to the South, which featured in much of Pearson and Hopper's thinking has also come into question. This latter debate is of great import in the context of IDRC and will be explored at length in the next chapter.

IDRC is not bound by its statutes to act as an official agent of the Canadian government, unlike CIDA or Foreign Affairs. But IDRC is unlikely to want to incur the wrath of government unnecessarily. In questions of foreign policy, IDRC often follows closely the general guidelines of the government regarding Canadian foreign policy, but not always, and it has not always been so. Regarding Canadian foreign policy we can see keenly the tension between internationalist impulses and parochial instrumentalism. We can also see how IDRC's officers have created space for themselves by using the ambiguity of foreign policy to permit greater freedom of action. Even if priorities are set and doors closed by official policy, the establishment or maintenance of relationships by other national actors like the Centre, can, and has proved valuable. IDRC is willing to follow the guidelines laid down by the government, partly because it fears falling out of disfavour, and partly because it is not inconsistent with its perspective to do so. But the President may deem it necessary to resist these guidelines with the support of the Board when they seem too constraining. CIDA and Foreign Affairs may indicate if a project is not in line with government policy, but they will generally respect the independence of the Centre.

IDRC provides benefits for politicians, the upper reaches of the bureaucracy and foreign service in the sense that IDRC remains the only government organisation with an international board able to steer the organisation of a national government. IDRC can also serve as a testing ground for Canadian foreign policy, without the risks.

The idea of having a mechanism which went beyond the limits of that policy with
implicating the government seemed attractive in one way in some countries where in some future day we might want to be friendlier than we were, there would have been a Canadian presence. Or conceivably, if IDRC came up with a new idea then it could be adopted by Canadian international development policy. Or if you did try ideas that didn't work then you didn't bring any criticism of the government.\footnote{James Mullin, interview by author, 14 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa}

That was apparent in IDRC being involved in Cuba or China. David Hopper requested the support of the Minister to approach China. Yet despite official restrictions Hopper sought relations and in many cases placed projects in China, Burma, Taiwan, Israel, the West Bank and in Eastern Europe. The Burmese and Chinese initially rebuffed these overtures. Despite External Affairs disapproval, Hopper and even Head established projects in Cuba and Taiwan although one must say that the scale was relatively small, and therefore not requiring the review of External Affairs. In a 1977 dispute regarding whether IDRC should be involved in Chile with Chilean government representatives, Hopper went over the head of the Canadian Ambassador in Chile who expressed strong reservations about contacts with the Chilean government. Hopper's view was, I, frankly, cannot have the Ambassador setting our total policy with regard to activities in Chile. However, public disapproval did not mean private disapproval, IDRC was a useful mechanism in that respect.\footnote{David Hopper, IDRC BOG, Executive Committee, "Draft Notes of Proceedings," Executive Committee Meeting, TD, 18 June 1977, IDRC Records, 3.}

Occasional defiance of official policy was not just limited to David Hopper's presidency, Ivan Head was not averse to resisting the initial displeasure of External Affairs officials. However, Head was much more careful to ensure agreement or tacit acceptance of the government, passing through succeeding levels to achieve that consent. He also made certain that his staff followed diplomatic procedures, that they informed Canadian embassies of their movements and activities. This avoided diplomatic embarrassment and helped lessen suspicion or ignorance of IDRC in External Affairs. As such this provided a channel for valued exchange, and may have led to many glowing
reviews by External Affairs' field staff of the Centre's work.

IDRC was only the second development organisation after the World Bank to be permitted to operate in the Peoples' Republic of China, even though it had spasmodically worked with Taiwanese organisations. This was seen as a coup in foreign policy terms. Yet it is IDRC's involvement in South Africa that shows most clearly how IDRC provides a convenient dualistic government-non-government role in Canadian foreign policy. For example, for a decade, IDRC considered funding development activities in South Africa and consequently consulted with Foreign Affairs. Eventually, the Department, to which IDRC reports its finances informed IDRC that it must conform to guidelines which minimise contact with South Africa. However, the guidelines of the federal government permit the special waiving of these guidelines in certain cases, IDRC has been exempted from most of the restrictions placed on others. The result was that IDRC, although considerably behind the Nordic aid agencies, was well-established by the time of the 1994 elections. The visit by Keith Bezanson in 1992 to South Africa was keenly observed by Foreign Affairs. That Bezanson was warmly received by Nelson Mandela and others was noted. That the recommendations made by IDRC-funded reports were critical of ANC capabilities, but were accepted by the leadership after a fashion was admired. Communications from the High Commission to Ottawa also noted that, "Both publicly and privately, Bezanson stressed IDRC intention, [sic] within its mandate, to reinforce Canadian objectives in South Africa and to work in close collaboration with the Embassy." Although the PCO was informed of the visit of Bezanson it did not prevent the changes to the Centre that were announced in the 1992 budget. However, when Flora

554 Notable among these was the AVRDCC, an unofficial International Agricultural Research Institution, once headed by a Canadian.


MacDonald briefed Joe Clark and Prime Minister Mulroney's Chief of Staff, Hugh Segal, about IDRC's role in South Africa, it was seen as good evidence of the Centre's relevance, and may have helped reverse the budget decision.\textsuperscript{557}

During the Mulroney government IDRC served as a means on two occasions for the government to permit non-nationals to directly suggest potential members of the Board. The first occasion came when in 1986, the Prime Minister invited Premier Zhao Ziyang to have China "nominate a distinguished scientist to join [the] Board of IDRC"\textsuperscript{558} The second occasion was during the Rio Conference in 1992.\textsuperscript{559} The implication was that the autonomy of the Centre to steer the selection process of its governors was bypassed by the PM. IDRC could hardly refuse the fiat.

While one can consistently see questioning of the independence or value of IDRC at the senior management levels of government or in the central agencies, this does not appear to be so much the case in the Embassies or at the Director level or below at CIDA or Foreign Affairs. Such doubts seem largely limited to the upper levels of each organisation the Centre interacts with. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that when the freedom of action of the Centre is challenged, by part of a department or a section of government there is rallying to IDRC’s position. Lower-level Foreign Affairs officers have often supported IDRC against questioning of its room to manoeuvre, sometimes even from within Foreign Affairs. For example, in 1985 IDRC proposed to study the economic implications of funding the military in Southeast Asia. When staff of South and Southeast Asia Relations Division, Foreign Affairs, suggested to the link Division

\textsuperscript{557} Flora MacDonald, interview by author, 30 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa

\textsuperscript{558} Gorham, Embassy, Peking to External, Ottawa, Info to Ivan Head, IDRC, Ottawa, "Chinese Member of IDRC Board," Telex, TD, May 1986, 38-4-IDRC, Volume 52, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, Foreign Affairs Records, 1.

\textsuperscript{559} Further discussion of this takes place below.
between the Department and IDRC, Economic Relations with Developing Countries,
We would have no difficulties from a political perspective . . . however . . . Has IDRC reflected upon the impact this departure from the more traditional areas of concentration may have on other developmental bodies and institutions with Southeast Asia or within development circles generally? . . . In other words, is there any danger of IDRC's reputation being adversely affected because of the military focus of this study?  

The Arms Control and Disarmament Division countered, "We believe that this project is both useful and timely and the results will be of interest to the international community." Likewise, when a CIDA desk officer complained about IDRC's work in Guyana not fitting into CIDA's Country Focus, three separate sections of Foreign Affairs wrote to defend the policies of the Centre. Nevertheless, there is evidence that some officers in Foreign Affairs seeking greater IDRC adherence to Departmental guidelines. Such attempted interference became more frequent in Ivan Head's last term, (even if IDRC was following advice). In the case of projects on the West Bank an External Affairs officer wrote,

560 G. Wilson, Acting Director, South and Southeast Asia Relations Division, to EEA, "IDRC: Proposal on Defence and Development in Southeast Asia," TLS, 19 February 1985, 38-4-IDRC, Volume 47, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, Foreign Affairs Records, 1.


E. Martel, Director, Caribbean and Central American Relations Division to EEA, TMS, 11 October 1983, 38-4-IDRC, Volume 44, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, Foreign Affairs Records, 1.

Dean Browne, Director, South America Relations Division to EEA, TMS, 13 October 1983, 38-4-IDRC, Volume 44, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, 1.
A policy decision has apparently been taken to follow our views to the letter and to reveal those views in full to prospective recipients. . .

This episode raises the broader question of how suitable the present IDRC/External arrangements are for ensuring that our views on politically sensitive projects are taken into consideration while preserving IDRC's independence as well as our working relationships in some countries. It is clear that, at the very minimum, the formal approval procedure should be strictly adhered to in such cases. In addition, there may be a need to express guidelines on the use by IDRC staff of information or views expressed in confidence by this Department, there may also be a need to define the extent to which our posts should play a support role to IDRC operations where our view for IDRC not to proceed.

On the other hand, even in the policy groups of CIDA and Foreign Affairs, who are more remote from field links to IDRC, the Centre is often highly regarded by staff.

The following is taken from 1993 briefing documents for the President of CIDA. Since its inception, IDRC has established a reputation worldwide as a first-class centre of excellence. Sometimes called

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What these episodes may represent is an essential acceptance on the part of field staff of IDRC's internationalist values, the Pearsonian tradition, because they share them themselves. IDRC has the freedom of action which they do not have. Staff of Canada's foreign policy apparatus may defend IDRC because they see in it the core of the Pearsonian ideal. Indeed, CIDA staff were strongly attached to the internationalist tenor of their own work, and it showed in their tendency to remain in the Agency. As a former CIDA employee attests,

> An awful lot of people spent their whole career in CIDA, and that's unusual in government...the reason was that they liked their work and they were committed to what they were doing.\textsuperscript{565}


\textsuperscript{565} Anonymous.
CIDA Surpasses IDRC in Research Funding

We have noted that originally there had been a fairly strict agreement for CIDA not to be too involved with research. Yet during the period 1980-91, CIDA approved a total of $897 million in research compared with $803 million for IDRC. Over the period, 1986/7–1990/1 CIDA support to research averaged 4.5% of the ODA budget vs. 3.9% for IDRC. As a 1987 CIDA paper states,

Over the years, the distinction between the two organizations relative to research has become less clear due principally to the growth of applied research

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programming of CIDA (bilateral) and IDRC, and to the increased requests from
developing countries for research, as expressed in the growth of Consultative
Groups on International Agricultural Research (CGIARs) and university research
centres.  

Since the arrival of Keith Bezanson, IDRC is now being asked to administer far more
CIDA projects than in the past. The number of joint or parallel projects has also risen.
(See Figure 20). The research CIDA funds tends to be different, often an add-on project
to a development programme, rather than the continuation of support to an individual or
group in an institution. Also, "CIDA's programming priorities and policies differ in terms
of country eligibility, sectors, and the need to meet tied aid and Canadian content
guidelines." The question of whether CIDA and IDRC see the blurring of the
distinction helpful will be broached in the next chapter. However, that there is blurring
certainly begs the question,

What is IDRC's comparative advantage and niche if what CIDA spends in one
research project is equivalent to the budget of IDRC's economic research program
or a Division's entire training budget?  

567  N.a. poss. Policy Branch, CIDA, "Improving Coordination of Canada's Official
Development Assistance Program Involving Crown Corporations and CIDA," TD, 29
April 1987, CIDA Records, 1.  

568  Flora MacDonald, interview by author, 29 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa  

569  N.a. poss. Policy Branch, CIDA, "Improving Coordination of Canada's Official
Development Assistance Program Involving Crown Corporation and CIDA," TD, 29
April 1987, CIDA Records, 3.  

570  Françoise Coupal to Keith Bezanson, President's Office, TMS, 10 December 1991,
"CIDA Support to Research: Some Key Policy Issues for Discussions," File 151-00010,
IDRC Records, 1.
We have noted in a previous chapter that in 1981, Allan Gotlieb and Michael Pitfield had succeeded in making the Trade Commissioner Service and the overseas officers of CIDA part of External Affairs. It is not clear what prompted a review of IDRC's status, but by 1982, the Centre was once again being subjected to proposed changes. Cabinet discussions were followed up by conversations between Donald Macdonald and Don Johnston. This was the year when Ivan Head's re-appointment was to be considered. Once again, these efforts largely failed. A Parliamentary Task Force on North-South Relations headed by Herb Breau recommended that the Centre should receive increased priority in funding. That recommendation was accepted. Secondly, a Comprehensive Audit was made by the Office of Auditor-General in 1982. IDRC was given a clean bill of health, although the Centre was encouraged to strengthen its planning and evaluation functions, as Treasury Board had before, and it was suggested that the Internal Auditor should report directly to the President. Independent of the audit team, the Auditor General, Kenneth Dye, recommended that Ivan Head be considered for the Public Service Outstanding Achievement Award. In 1983, the SSEA wrote to Ivan Head,

The Centre is clearly pursuing its mandate with vigour, and in full conformity with the credo outlined in your Introduction that an equitable and rational application of scientific and technological advances is possible and can help

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571 Pierre Trudeau to Don [Macdonald], TLOS, 22 March 1982, PCO Records, 1.


573 He became a Governor of the Centre in 1994.


575 No change of reporting status of Internal Audit took place until President Bezanson joined the Centre in 1991.
humanity achieve well-being and possibly ensure its survival.\textsuperscript{576}

What we seem to see here is the acceptance and endorsement of IDRC values portrayed, when IDRC emerged from a series of difficulties. Further confirmation of that is that in 1983, the USSEA ceased to sit on the Board. Despite objections by Gotlieb and Pitfield,\textsuperscript{577} Gordon Osbaldeston, who had sat on IDRC's Board, moved to become Clerk of the Privy Council. In consultation with Marcel Massé, he decided that only CIDA needed to sit on the Board.\textsuperscript{578} Gotlieb's departure from External Affairs, and Pitfield's from PCO no doubt reduced the threat level to IDRC. As we previously cited by 1984, the new External Affairs Minister, Jean Chrétien, was moved to write, "I am well aware of the outstanding work and excellent reputation of IDRC."\textsuperscript{579}

In 1984, among the Red Tories in the new Conservative government the Centre enjoyed a high standing. Fortunately for the future of the Centre, two Red Tories, Joe Clark and Bill Wineard, were given foreign affairs responsibilities. In 1987, the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) found that IDRC has "enhanced Canada's International Reputation" and "is among the most effective development agencies in the world."\textsuperscript{580} In late 1989, the Auditor-General published a

\textsuperscript{576} Allan J. MacEachen to Ivan Head, TLOS, 23 August 1983, 38-4-IDRC, Volume 44, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, Foreign Affairs Records, 1.


\textsuperscript{578} Jean Chrétien, SSEA, to Ivan Head, TLOS, 7 August 1984, 38-4-IDRC, Volume 45, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, Foreign Affairs Records, 1.

document called "Well-Performing Organisations." IDRC was considered to be among a small number of such federal organisations.

IDRC is considered worldwide to be one of the best organizations of its kind. Its high performance is based on a number of elements: people who are competent, committed and value-driven; continuity of leadership; a clear and strong sense of mission and purpose; a strong client focus; autonomy and flexibility at all levels; risk-taking and innovation; freedom from political and central agency interference; tailor-made internal regulations and reporting requirements; and continual self-scrutiny of strategies and activities.\textsuperscript{581}

The Centre was identified by Treasury Board\textsuperscript{582} as such an organisation, prior to a review of its work. Also influential was that the Deputy Auditor General had happened to have been encouraged when in Nairobi to look at IDRC’s activities by CIDA officials. Meyers and other OAG officials, including the Principal for the External Affairs portfolio, Vinod Sahgal, and Principal Otto Brodtrick\textsuperscript{583} seem to have been favourably impressed by the design of the Regional Offices, namely that their location permits them to keep "their ears to the ground", in contrast to CIDA. Despite his favourable opinion of the Regional Offices, Sahgal, like almost every other central agent officer interviewed, does not know the reasons why IDRC has the particular status that it has under the FAA.\textsuperscript{584} Many do not believe that that status can be justified.

The good opinion of IDRC by Clark, Winegard and the Auditor-General seems to have silenced other central agent critics until 1988-90. In a context of shrinking ODA budgets, rising deficits, government unhappiness with quangos like the Social Sciences


\textsuperscript{582} Considering Treasury Board's frequent criticism it is interesting to note that the Centre was nominated by them.

\textsuperscript{583} Brodtrick was author of Well-Performing Organizations and was Principal for Organisational Effectiveness and Values.

\textsuperscript{584} Vinod Sahgal, interview by author, 2 February 1994, tape recording, Ottawa; Vinod Sahgal, interview by author, 14 February 1995, by telephone, Ottawa.
and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), the mushrooming of the Reform Party and the pending conclusion to Ivan Head's term, IDRC's position became more vulnerable to central agents doubts. In 1990, the Auditor General seems to have changed his position regarding the desirability of the exempt status of some federal organisations from TB and OAG controls, which included IDRC. Such a change of position would have been warmly received by the Conservative government. According to a key official in the Crown Corporations Directorate, a joint body of Treasury Board Secretariat and the Department of Finance, the Mulroney government seemed to see "the Crown Corporations, in some sense, as an unwarranted intrusion by the public sector into the private sector." A 1990 IDRC Board meeting in Bangkok at an expensive hotel caused a stir in the Conservative Party and among central agents when it became known in the press. Further, some unhappiness on the part of the Minister for External Affairs appears to have been expressed as to her inability to prevent such activities, which could not be done directly. Under the regulations governing the Centre, the Minister of Foreign Affairs can not issue a direct order to IDRC.

Apart from the particularities of the time, the main difficulty for IDRC was that under the second Mulroney mandate, the Canadian political landscape had changed and IDRC had only begun to respond to it. Don Mazankowski's December 1991 Economic Statement was a severe one calling for cuts within a neo-Reformist agenda. The 1992 Budget was proof of that determination. This change in tack did not just arise for fear of the Reform Party, but also the enfeeblement of the Red Tories after the 1988 election. Flora MacDonald had lost her seat. Joe Clark was in danger of losing his. Clark was shifted to the constitutional portfolio.

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585 Anonymous.

586 Anonymous.
While in External Affairs, Clark had not only protected development assistance, his influence was decisive in seeing the steepest rise in funding since Lester Pearson's 1966 and Trudeau's 1977 budgets. Ironically, this growth was at a much higher level, and for a more sustained period. (See Figure 21). Over the years as External Affairs Minister, Clark came back to Cabinet year after year with new development assistance initiatives, sucking up various contingency funds in the process. Irritated by the success of Clark's tactics, with a rising budget deficit, increasing pressure from the business community, plus the rise of the Reform Party, Mazankowski resurrected a version of the Envelope System initiated during the Clark government. Under this system, Departments were obliged to shift resources within a given budget, with no contingency funds. Cuts were begun at External Affairs. Unhappy with these cuts, officers there sought and succeeded in getting resources shifted from the CIDA budget to External Affairs'. For CIDA officers, the idea that these were two separate budgets was shattered. CIDA, in turn, shifted its fiscal attention to IDRC.

Bill Winegard, the former IDRC Governor, had been replaced in 1988 by John
Bosley as Chair of the Commons Committee on External Affairs and National Defense. Bosley was not known to be a supporter of IDRC, compared with Winegard, but was still on the left of the party.\(^{587}\) More decisive in the weakening of funding to development assistance was the shifting of Joe Clark from External Affairs to Constitutional Affairs. Clark had enormous influence in Cabinet,\(^{588}\) and was well respected internationally, particularly in the South over his stance on South Africa. His replacement, Barbara McDougall, "came into this with almost no international experience at all"\(^{589}\) She may have been more likely to listen to fellow Canadian economists in the central agencies. Certainly, she seems to have believed that CIDA was too big. McDougall generally accepted the recommendations of the Conservative consulting firm, SECOR, which recommended cuts.\(^{590}\) All foreign affairs items were cut after half a decade of considerable growth.

The vision that created IDRC was of Lester Pearson. That was not the same vision as what the Tories had. The Pearsonian view of government was pretty much dead by February of 1992 and the interest in, the belief in instruments of government of that nature was under very strong attack.\(^{591}\)

Under ordinary conditions the smallness of the Centre meant that financial officials of government would have had little to say, unless there had been major failings at the Centre. However, unhappiness in Cabinet with a number of the exempt crown corporations, including IDRC, assisted in getting the status of the Centre reviewed. That the press had been critical of the Board's 1990 meeting in Thailand created greater possibilities for central agency scrutiny. The source for the story is not known.

\(^{587}\) Flora MacDonald, interview by author, 29 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa

\(^{588}\) Flora MacDonald, interview by author, 29 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa

\(^{589}\) Bill Winegard, interview by author, 13 April 1994, Guelph, tape recording.

\(^{590}\) Anonymous.

\(^{591}\) Anonymous.
In 1989, the Auditor-General had pointed to IDRC as a particularly effective organisation. However, its international reputation was flagging, seen to be becoming more bureaucratic than CIDA. This may have contributed to the Centre's vulnerability. All independent agencies were especially unpopular in Cabinet in 1989-90. According to Bill Winegard,

The economy was turned right down and therefore no-one could protect anything.

Several members of the Cabinet who became very frustrated indeed at getting political flak for all sorts of things and yet having no control . . and that was particularly true, for example, at SSHRC . .

IDRC just got caught in a wave saying, "We're tired of taking flak from all these damn organisations that have been set up, in essence, independent, do whatever they wanted, and we have to answer for it."

. .

Governments, generally, for very good political reasons, not nasty reasons, but good political reasons, do not like independent agencies because they take a lot of flak and you have no say.

What these quotes show is that at the political level at least, while economic numbers may have provided the opportunity for central agencies, and changing political winds in the country made a change in IDRC more likely, the decision to proceed depended on the collective and individual experience of Ministers in their portfolios.

In 1986 a cursory investigation was made in Finance as to whether it should be privatised or made part of CIDA. Finance concluded that there should be no change but the gathering fiscal storms meant that central agencies had increasing influence in

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programmes of government. In 1989, following a conversation with Ivan Head, the Prime Minister requested information about the Canadian International Institute for Peace and Security (CIIPS) and IDRC. The conversation seemed to have been related to the two organisations' non-agent status.

Ivan Head initiated remarkable internal innovations during his last years as President (as we shall see in the next chapter). However, relations could have been better with the government and other federal organisations. To some extent, the end of Head's tenure paralleled Hopper's. That relations were difficult was of some importance as the President acted as the principal contact with the world of Ottawa. Head was clearly not going to be re-appointed. He did not have the ear, but the heel of the Prime Minister. (See below). His relations with the rank and file of External Affairs had never really recovered from being given pride of place as principal foreign policy advisor to Trudeau over that department. Relations with central agents had been cordial, but none were convinced of the value of the Centre's independence. The most dangerous aspect was that relations with CIDA, which managed the Centre's level of funding to the Minister were not good.

When SSEA, Joe Clark was able to suspend the cuts recommended by CIDA and even provide increases to the Centre at the Cabinet table. Over the years, as CIDA officers had done, Ivan Head also went to Clark with new initiatives. Clark often found the money to fund them. In the late 1980s, as funds dried up, CIDA and Treasury Board agreed to flat spending levels for the Centre, or cuts. Yet Head remained able to limit or reverse the severity of those cuts. In the battle over funds personal and institutional relations frayed.

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596 Anonymous.
Ivan Head was also reportedly increasingly sensitive to what he may have perceived as a Conservative vendetta. And indeed, according to a former high CIDA official, "There was no doubt that there was a very strong view in the Conservative ranks that IDRC was out of control." Many upper level central agent officials may have resented that the Centre was "an elitist organisation that may have had the ear of the Prime Minister." The opinion of high CIDA officials does not appear to have been much better. Some said that "they had looked at their staffing structure to the volume of resources. It had maybe evolved from a Cadillac to a Rolls-Royce operation." Within official circles, Ivan Head was mortally wounded, and was said to be regularly striking out at those with whom it was necessary to be friends of the Centre. The political reality of the period provided him with few options.

In late 1989 Foreign and Defence Policy Staff at PCO had written, and Paul Tellier signed a note of advice to Finance Minister Mazankowski who was to meet Ivan Head. By that time, Ottawa was rife with rumours that cuts were coming. On November 2, vigourous lobbying was begun by NGOs and others. The note concluded,

Mr. Head has in the past been publicly critical of the aid program and normally portrays IDRC as a more developmentally sound organization than CIDA. This view is not widely shared nationally or internationally by the development

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597 Anonymous.

598 Flora MacDonald, interview by author, 29 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

599 Anonymous.

This was not all illusion, although the Centre's approach is much more labour-intensive than a typical aid donor's. At its nadir in 1990-91 programme expenditures were only 56.7% of the total.


600 Anonymous.
The aim was to warn Mazankowski to discount Head's lobbying efforts. However, the view was weighed very heavily against IDRC and Head personally. According to a former senior official of CIDA, the memorandum may be "a reflection of the change in values set in government, making CIDA seem more attractive than IDRC.

I don't think the quality of their work and their prestige and their reputation were ever in question. But I don't think if you said, "Who would seem more relevant to Canadian interests?" Then clearly the answer would be CIDA. And, "Who is a better tool of government policy?" Then obviously CIDA. You could make, even though it took a while, you could get things to happen in CIDA where you couldn't get them to happen in IDRC.

Once again, the CGIAR issue emerged between high officials in CIDA and IDRC. Joe Clark appears to have been approached over the issue, with Douglas Lindores "playing hard ball." So sensitive an issue was this that after decades of support for the international agricultural research centres, in many ways the keystone to the Hopper and Hulse's strategy, IDRC funding for the CGIAR system briefly evaporated at the beginning of the Bezanson presidency.

By March 1990, IDRC's Board saw the precipice approaching, but kept their nerve. "At the in-camera session, the Chairman noted that Governors were supportive of management's desire to not fall prey to "crisis management" and make quick changes to the shape of the Centre." Discussions at the Board and among management at the time centred around further cutting staff, and following the US foundation model. The ratio of

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602 Anonymous.

603 Anonymous.

604 Anonymous.

funds per programme officer was much higher in those organisations. The aim of the discussions was to anticipate and preclude changes that PCO and Treasury Board might contemplate. However, the point was made that such a decision would mean the loss of the hands-on approach which was the practice of Centre officers, and the technical expertise that necessitated. The fear was expressed that the reputation IDRC had built up on that basis would be forfeit. The decision was taken to prepare the new President with a complete briefing so that changes could be put in place rapidly after the appointment. Which is what turned out to be what happened.

At the end of 1991, after Bezanson's appointment, a request seems to have come from Treasury Board and Finance to Marcel Massé for a review of the "crown corporations" under CIDA, including IDRC. Accounts of the facts vary widely among CIDA officers, perhaps indicating the sensitivity of the undertaking. However, an analysis of IDRC's programme to funding ratio appears to have taken place in Policy Branch, although no papers have been traced regarding this inquiry. However, certainly senior CIDA officers developed the opinion, if they had not it already, that IDRC was overstaffed. This and other perceptions seem to have been firmly entrenched by the end of 1990.

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607 Anonymous.
In the autumn of 1991 IDRC was listed among forty-six federal organisations to be eliminated. That IDRC was not cut was due to a number of factors, key among them the skill of its President and Chair. They remonstrated that IDRC had made deep staff cuts, and could be revitalised, recreated into something more familiar and more relevant to the Prime Minister's foreign policy requirements. Their work bore fruit. The Centre was removed from the list for elimination. However, it did not altogether escape.

Within Machinery of Government – PCO, a discussion about the contents of the list of those organisations to be eliminated seems to have taken place between David Baker, who later led the PCO-Treasury Board Working Group to implement the change of status, and his superiors, Deputy Secretary Nick D'Ombrain and Assistant Secretary J.A. Mitchell. These gentlemen, in consultation with PMO, political staff from the Department of Finance, and the Deputy Minister there, Frederick Gorbet, appear to decided have put IDRC on the list for elimination.\footnote{Anonymous.} We need to note here that PCO is not a monolith. Many officers come to hold more narrowly Canadian-centred values over time. Machinery of Government is probably the apotheosis of this with a control function most obviously exercised during restructuring and budget cutting. These are Eliot's "hard men" (males primarily). Those in sections of PCO such as Foreign and Defence Policy, who provide the Prime Minister, Cabinet and the Clerk and President of PCO with advice on these issue areas, are usually people who have been in the pertinent departments for ten to fifteen years.

In addition to the President's efforts, IDRC's removal from the list was also achieved via Janet Wardlaw's contact with Bill Winegard and thence with Joe Clark. In the wake of that removal, however, officials, possibly David Baker from PCO, Machinery
of Government approached Douglas Patriquin of the Joint Finance and Treasury Board Crown Corporations Directorate for advice. Patriquin's preferred option was to make IDRC a scheduled corporation with some exemptions. This advice was accepted and followed up after the budget by the head of Foreign and Defence Programmes Division of Treasury Board, Stephen O'Connor.

On 25 February 1992 the Budget tersely stated that IDRC would be made a departmental corporation bringing it into line with government administrative policies. The day after the budget, IDRC officials met with Foreign and Defence Programme staff from Treasury Board to determine how to implement the decision. Meetings with Machinery of Government staff from PCO were first held on 2 March.

The issues identified for attention by the Treasury Board were various. "Luxurious accommodation" and office sizes were a matter of concern. Some IDRC staff were also deemed overpaid. The engagement of foreigners in IDRC programme positions was an issue. Once again, the amount of travel was seen as excessive, although the focus had shifted from the class of travel (the decision to ensure that all staff and governors flew economy class had taken place almost fifteen years before), to the amount of travel. This was a familiar refrain by Treasury Board regarding CIDA. Although the Office of the Auditor-General had never found major irregularities in the running of IDRC, the mere fact that the Centre was outside the administrative policies of the government, like a few other federal organisations, had disturbed central agency officers for decades.

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609 Anonymous. 

610 Other federal organisations in the same category as IDRC include the Bank of Canada and cultural organisations like the SSHRC, and Canadian Broadcasting
With his responsibilities for the UN Commission for Environment and Development in his mind, Maurice Strong suggested as early as the spring of 1991 that IDRC be revitalised by being moved to Montreal, given to the United Nations, and downsized. Strong had suggested to Québec Premier Bourassa that IDRC might be moved to Montreal, who responded with a plea to Mulroney in March 1991. Strong was aware of plans to eliminate the Centre at this time and wanted to save the organisation he had created from extinction. Internationalising IDRC rekindled excitement about the Centre while giving the Canadian government an easy means of responding to the upcoming environment conference. Strong had become President of the World Federation of United Nations Associations and aimed to headquarter it in Montreal. Gathered around him were a series of Montrealarers and others including former Premier of Quebec Pierre-Marc Johnson, and diplomat Yves Fortier. They pursued the idea of internationalisation with some vigour. This proposal was part of a larger movement to bring international organisations to that city which arose in 1986. This movement was given formal expression in the Montréal International Conference Centre Corporation who helped organise the proposal. By late December 1991, Maurice Strong appears to have approached the federal government with the idea of internationalisation. IDRC and External Affairs' officers did not warm to the idea.


614 Maurice Strong, interview by author, 23 November 1994, by telephone, notes, Ottawa-Toronto.


Jim McNeill, former Secretary-General of the Brundtland Commission, in preparing the Foreign Policy Committee response of the National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy suggested that IDRC be given a new mandate, of sustainable development. He thought that IDRC which over the years had given Canadians a glowing reputation overseas, but had latterly become overgrown and was coasting. As an organisation of good character in need of revitalisation he judged the Centre a natural organisation to "quick start" Agenda 21. He also suggested that the number of international governors be increased and that the Secretary-General of the United Nations should nominate a governor to the Board. Pierre-Marc Johnson headed the National Roundtable, and advised Maurice Strong. He had been proposed by the Prime Minister to be President of IDRC in 1987, the year that the Board decided to re-appoint Ivan Head. An environmental focus looked increasingly likely for the Centre.

Two weeks prior to the Rio Conference, the departmental corporation as a notion began to be a less viable option. Advice was sent from François Arsenault in Foreign and Defence Policy – PCO to the Prime Minister to counter Strong's suggestion to internationalise the Centre by giving it to the United Nations. The memorandum suggested, drawing on a Finnish example, that if the Centre was given to the UN, Canada would get nothing in return. The memorandum was a "red flag" regarding the course of action proposed. In common with the National Roundtable, the document suggested instead of internationalisation the IDRC should shift its emphasis towards sustainable development. Notable too in the memorandum is a concurrence with McNeill's ideas in that the memorandum suggested that the UN nominate a member of the Board. But

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617 Arsenault had worked for twenty years in CIDA. He had been impressed by IDRC's research efforts in Cameroon.

619 Anonymous.
most important was that the memorandum signalled that Keith Bezanson had made, what were Arsenault thought were critical reforms, namely: cuts in staff; a change in management style to something more decisive; new blood in management; transparency in working with personnel; and moreover, making IDRC politically relevant e.g. regarding the environment and in its activities in South Africa. The document advised that making the Centre into a departmental corporation did not seem an effective way to save money. PCO sources indicate that Bezanson's efforts to publicise these changes were vital to the survival of the Centre. A version of this was subsequently announced at Rio. With some degree of coordination, Bezanson, McNeill and Arsenault had worked to renovate the focus of the Centre and fix it better in the organisational firmament of the federal government.

Despite the efforts of Arsenault and others prior to Rio, Mulroney was reported to be "mad" and "determined to kill that institution" until he was convinced otherwise by Pierre-Marc Johnson. At Rio, Johnson argued that IDRC should not be scrapped. He opined that it might be given to the UN, or given an Agenda 21 focus. Johnson, and Nicole Senécal, VP Policy at CIDA, a strong supporter of the Centre, also advised Environment Minister Jean Charest who, in turn, counselled the Prime Minister. Their advice was that IDRC should continue to exist and that a new environmental focus would make it more relevant.

Strong's advisor, Jim McNeill, was also counselling Charest, specifically on the Prime Minister's speech. McNeill reiterated his thoughts voiced at the Roundtable earlier in the year. All McNeill's ideas were, if in amended form, finally agreed to except one.

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620 Anonymous.
621 Anonymous.
622 Anonymous.
The notion of increasing the number of international governors on IDRC's Board, thus tipping the balance in favour of an international majority on the Board was not accepted. In some respects, that these ideas were being listened to, and most accepted, may have been an indication that in the last year of the Tory government, there was a slight return to Pearsonian ideals, even if this was a neo-conservative internationalism. Nevertheless, the suggestion to permit non-nationals, not just to participate in, but regularly nominate members to IDRC's Board was an extension of internationalism not seen before.\footnote{One might see the Prime Minister's 1985 suggestion to Premier Zhao to do the same as similar, although it may simply have been to invite the confidence of the Chinese in their permitting IDRC to work in China.}

On 12 June 1992, Prime Minister Mulroney announced at UNCED in Rio that IDRC's mandate would be expanded so that it might become one of the world's key organizations to make sustainable development a reality. A PMO press release subsequently stated,

> In the light of the welcome support of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) at the United Nations, Canada will formally broaden the mandate of the International Development Research Centre to emphasize sustainable development issues. In order to build the international network of expertise and contacts necessary for achieving sustainable development, the Canadian Government will invite the Secretary General of the United Nations and other key organizations like the World Bank to propose appointments to the Board of Governors of IDRC, thereby establishing a new partnership with the United Nations system.

The Prime Minister noted that greater access by the international community to the direct hands-on expertise of IDRC would help to ensure a quick start on implementation of the UNCED Agenda 21 program. The Canadian Government provides $115 million per year to IDRC and intends to maintain this contribution.\footnote{IDRC, \textit{IDRC: An Agenda 21 Organization}. Ottawa, IDRC, approx. July 1992, 3.}
Financial Administration Act into a departmental corporation would have made the Centre an official government agency. Officers of IDRC insisted that this was incompatible with the intention of the Prime Minister to further internationalise the Centre by inviting the Secretary General of the UN and other key organisations like the World Bank to propose appointments to the Board of Governors.

Subsequent to Rio the new Chair of the Centre had also been busy. Flora MacDonald was determined to prevent the hobbling of the organisation to which she had been appointed. She approached two people in the Conservative government to change the situation, Joe Clark and Hugh Segal. Flora MacDonald called the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff and arranged for her and Bezanson to meet with him. Segal was the chief PMO contact of the group hoping to internationalise IDRC and had approached the Prime Minister about the subject. What Segal found most persuasive about the internationalisation proposal was that it would have linked the Centre to things Canadian, "particularly the business world." As the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff, one would think that Segal would have been most impressed with the ideas proposed at Rio which called for the PM to permit others to make appointments to IDRC's Board. However, by the time of his meeting with MacDonald and Bezanson, those proposals were not being emphasised by IDRC, and, in addition, the United Nations found a formal role in the appointment of members of a nationally-funded organisation awkward. Reportedly, Segal was impressed that significant cuts in staff had been made and that the Centre enjoyed a high stature abroad. When speaking to Clark, one of MacDonald's closest friends, MacDonald felt it important "to bring Joe up to date on the work of IDRC and the way it was adding to Canada's lustre." MacDonald also brought key ministers Senator

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Lowell Murray and International Trade Minister Michael Wilson to the Centre for lunch.\textsuperscript{627} The result of MacDonald and Bezanson's activities was the ending of the process begun by the budget. However, part of the internationalisation proposal, regarding IDRC becoming an Agenda 21 organisation, was adopted. Most important was that the budget item to make the Centre a departmental corporation did not proceed. On 16 November 1992, Segal wrote in a note to the Prime Minister, "I'm not sure this has to proceed so quickly. May I remove [IDRC] from the present group [of federal organisations whose status should change]." Although unwritten conditions seem to have been attached to his assent, the written reply of Prime Minister Mulroney was a simple "OK".\textsuperscript{628}

On November 30, a letter was sent to President of the Treasury Board by the Secretary, Ian Clark. "Le Premier Ministre a en effet décidé que, suite aux annonces faites à Rio. Les changements ne seraient plus nécessaires."\textsuperscript{629} Only a telephone call was made from the Assistant Secretary, Machinery of Government, PCO, J.R. Mitchell to Keith Bezanson. That no written confirmation to IDRC was sent seems to indicate a certain bitterness on the part of central agency staff, or perhaps an expectation that the question would be revisited before long. Certainly Treasury Board officials were working up until just before the decision was made redrafting proposals. Their enthusiasm had not been stilled by Rio.\textsuperscript{630}

\textsuperscript{627} Flora MacDonald, interview by author, 29 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa

\textsuperscript{628} Hugh Segal to Prime Minister [Brian Mulroney], 16 November 1992, PMO, PCO Records, n.p.

\textsuperscript{629} Ian D. Clark to President of Treasury Board, "Note au Président, Centre de recherches pour le développement international (CRDI)," TMS, 30 November 1992, Treasury Board Records, 1.

\textsuperscript{630} John Denis to Christiane [Talbot-Horne], Treasury Board, AN, 6 November 1992, attached to "Clause by Clause Analysis, Part VIII - International Development Research Centre," TD, n.a. n.d., Treasury Board Records, 1.
1992: ICOD Sinks, IDRC Still Afloat — Why?

The 1992 budget was the greatest challenge to the autonomy and even existence of IDRC. President Bezanson was called in Hanoi by the Singapore office of IDRC and informed that the Centre would be made a "departmental corporation" and therefore fall under the rigours of the Financial Administration Act. In that budget, a host of quangos were eliminated including the International Centre for Ocean Development (ICOD), its structure modelled on IDRC's, and the Canadian International Institute for Peace and Security (CIIPS).\(^631\) The budget item did not come to fruition as regards IDRC. IDRC's founding legislation was not changed, nor did its budget receive an expected cut. Why did IDRC not suffer the same fate as ICOD?

ICOD was not as well-established as IDRC. It was first announced during the Trudeau government as a means of gaining Third World support for Canada's bid to establish a 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as part of the Law of the Sea negotiations.\(^632\) It was converted from a fledgling NGO by Clark in 1985 into what came to be known as a Government Owned and Operated NGOs (GOONGOs).\(^633\) Many observers of the changes that took place as part of the 1992 Budget see the elimination of these quangos as the Conservative Party eliminating the works of the Liberal Party under the guise of cost-cutting. One can imagine this to be partly true. However, ICOD was cut, and it was created by the Progressive Conservatives, although, granted, by the Red Tory wing of the party.

Most consultations with CIDA on the creation of ICOD were conducted in

\(^{631}\) We note that the Prime Minister had requested further information on CIIPS at the same time as IDRC in 1989.

\(^{632}\) Anonymous

\(^{633}\) Anonymous.
negotiation with Douglas Lindores, with less consultation with central agencies. President Gary Vernon of ICOD spoke many times with Ivan Head. However, CIDA drafted the legislation and "knew what was going to be allowed." This type of aid delivery mechanism was becoming more popular at CIDA because "1983-1984 they would start using more executing agencies to satisfy that private sector demand to get a piece of [the action] on the services side." In contradistinction the genesis of IDRC, "ICOD was formed because CIDA decided it was getting out of the business of executing its own projects, it was gonna dump its overhead," For example, in another arena, CIDA turned over responsibility for projects in El Salvador to a private sector consulting agency.

Elements of ICOD were modelled on IDRC, obviously including the name. The Board structure was adapted from IDRC, and the focus was on developing countries. However, there were differences. At the political level, it was felt that the independence that IDRC had was too great and so ICOD was mostly made up of Canadians. Only five of the fourteen ICOD governors could be from overseas, compared with nine of twenty-one IDRC Governors. But these overseas governors did not have the stature of those in IDRC. ICOD was not "a high flyer" or "activist" in the same way as IDRC. ICOD had other problems, the Centre was located in Halifax, far from the political centre, in an area of the country where the notion of government was synonymous with patronage. "There was a perception that we had not given enough to the boys." ICOD was a "disappointment to the consulting community in Halifax." This community suggested

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635 Anonymous.

636 Anonymous.

637 Gary Vernon, interview by author.
that the Centre be privatised. ICOD had "a lot of political interventions." ICOD's tenure was fragile in comparison to IDRC as events would bear out.

Limited Room to Manoeuvre

The Board of Governors of IDRC selects the President via a Search Committee. In 1990, however, other people were searching too. Douglas Lindores was approached informally by members of the Conservative Party, perhaps Monique Landry, to run for the position. We have already noted Lindores' knowledge of IDRC's involvement in the CGIAR system. Following the selection process, Alex McCullough was first approached by the Board to be President. He had been at University of Alberta contemporaneously with Joe Clark and Ivan Head. McCullough was similar to Hopper, a strong personality, and an agricultural economist. He felt that IDRC was too big and should be trimmed two to three hundred people. He refused the offer, perhaps daunted by the prospect of a presidency marked by cutting. Whoever was selected would be

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638: However, the only direct political intervention seems to have been a call from the office of John Crosbie, Minister for Fisheries and Oceans. Despite this, a new president of ICOD was selected in the spring of 1991, and approved in June, less than eight months before the February 1992 Budget that eliminated the Centre. As this appointment would have had to go to be approved in PCO and the political structure, it seems that by this time, the Machinery of Government section of PCO, had not, by the summer of 1991, begun to consider the delay of such decisions pending the next spending cuts.

Gary Vernon, interview by author.

639: Anonymous.

640: Bill Winegard, interview by author.

One can imagine that the desire to remove IDRC from involvement in the CGIAR lasted, as well as the sense in CIDA that IDRC was overstaffed

641: Anonymous.
obliged to cut staff, willingly or unwillingly.

The early decisions on downsizing, the scale of them, if not the identities, were all in place for his [Bezanson's] arrival. It was known that downsizing would take place, and roughly the proportions. And that had Ivan got another term, there would have been substantial downsizing.642

What emerges from this is that whichever President chosen deemed desirable would cut the size of the Centre's staff. Management was seen as a particularly ripe candidate for pruning, as it was seen as top-heavy.643 A former senior CIDA officer replayed for the author the scenario of the time.

You're the President of CIDA, four percent is coming off your budget, that envelope's in your control. What you're going to get is you're going to at least equal your share of the thing. That's my starting position if I'm negotiating. And if I over the previous two years have been dealing with your organisation as the President of CIDA, have felt somewhat uncomfortable, I'm in a powerful position, a very powerful position, to, how shall we, should we, say in a constructive sense, develop a new era of cooperation between our two organisations. That's how it works. There isn't somebody down there that's writing little pieces of paper that are budgetary analyses that talks about ratios. Everybody's got it in his own brain who's efficient, who's effective and who's isn't. But the only control that CIDA ever had in this process was that they were given the number, "Get there!" and they were given a large amount of autonomy to get there.644

The Centre's room to manoeuvre was limited even more by its junior position in the process. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that no orders were being received by IDRC from central agencies as such. Management had made a collective decision that they hoped would pre-empt direct interference.645 Indeed, the announcements at Rio provided temporary relief from the preferences of CIDA.

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642 James Mullin, interview by author, 14 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa

643 Anonymous.

644 Anonymous.

At the suggestion of Jim McNeill at UNCED, which was agreed to by Charest and Mulroney at Rio, the Centre's core funding would remain at $115 million, "for the next ten years." This was unlike the ten percent cut in the rest of International Assistance Envelope in 1992–93. PCO records record this exemption for IDRC and famine assistance as "dictated by the PM," perhaps indicating some despondency. In this context, the notion of diversification of funding re-emerged as an issue.

Finance officials at the Rio Conference were keen on the notion of the internationalisation of IDRC. Their perception was that whatever money was given to IDRC from abroad could be withdrawn from the Canadian contribution proportionally. Such a view may explain the persistence of Treasury Board, Finance and PCO officials' calls to the Centre to generate funding elsewhere. However, at Rio, Jim McNeill insisted, and apparently it was agreed, that the freeze would not be an opportunity to cut. Yet cuts to the Centre have continued during the Liberal government. However, the clear message of various central agents has been that shortfalls could be made up elsewhere, whether generated by the administration of CIDA funds or other monies "leveraged" from other organisations, or produced by other means.

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Selection of the Third President — Keith Bezanson

What was Bezanson's background? He received his first degree, a BA, from Carleton. Beginning his doctoral programme as a Ford Foundation fellow, he completed his PhD in education at Stanford. During much of his degree he was a CUSO officer. Bezanson worked in East and West Africa for thirteen years, joining CIDA in 1973. He then moved to Ottawa, first as Director-General, Multilateral Programs for three years. Then in 1981 he became Vice-President of Americas Branch. Bezanson then left CIDA for External Affairs to be Canadian Ambassador to Peru and Bolivia until 1988. Leaving External Affairs he joined the Inter-American Development Bank, in Washington, until he was called back to lead IDRC.

Keith Bezanson was strongly recommended for the presidency by Marcel Massé. Like Massé, he was strongly committed to development, had worked in an international development bank, and was well-known in PCO. Bezanson had worked for Douglas Lindores in Multilateral Branch. Bezanson does not appear to have been selected for links to the Conservative Party. In an interview with the author, Bill Winegard said, "There was nothing in it from the government point of view that said "Yes we want him."

Massé must have believed that he would be more likely to have a harmonious relationship with Bezanson.

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648 Anonymous.

649 Bill Winegard, interview by author, 13 April 1994, tape recording, Guelph.
What has been the character of the Bezanson presidency? Inside and outside the Centre, the decision to raise funding to Canadians and to cut staff, is taken to be a function of the Bezanson presidency. However, that does not bear the scrutiny of analysis. Looking at a geographical distribution of IDRC's programme funds 1987–1993, the most remarkable change is an increase in funding from fiscal year 1991-92 onwards to Canadians. Under Head, target funding levels were 14% of the total would be spent on collaborative funding, not necessarily in Canada. During the Hopper years the average of IDRC programme expenditures in Canada was 7.4%. Programme funding spent in Canada rose from 10.4% in 1990-91 to 30.9% in 1993-94. Likewise, looking at staffing

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650 Claude-Paul Boivin, interview by author, 1 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

levels 1989–1993, numbers began to drop in 1990. (See Figures 22 and 23). What is surprising is that the decision to implement most of these changes precedes the arrival of Keith Bezanson. The charts indicate that just as a number of changes in Centre policy that are associated with Ivan Head preceded his coming, "Bezanson-like" changes began prior to the third president's arrival. Policy changes seem to precede the actual change of personnel, whether this is perceived by the participants or not.

Taking office in April 1991, Bezanson presented his 1991 Strategy in October. Bezanson seems to have been a man in a hurry to achieve his targets prior to the 1992 Budget. Like Head in 1978, Bezanson seems to have moved to eliminate irritants with CIDA and central agents. As we noted earlier, IDRC funding of CGIAR temporarily evaporated. Most newly selected Regional Directors were Canadian citizens. One-hundred and twenty staff positions, (20% of the total) were eliminated. Fifty per cent of management positions were cut, the number of levels of management reduced to three.
The number of projects with CIDA increased and the diversification of funding was given greater emphasis. Dissemination was stressed. As Head had, Bezanson sent various papers to External Affairs, CIDA, and PCO (but not to Finance and Treasury Board) to signal that IDRC was responding to their pre-occupations. Eventually, between himself and Flora MacDonald, Bezanson succeeded in convincing the government that the Centre was renewed.
Canadian Foreign Policy and IDRC: Separate Cultures or Interlocking Communities?

The Pearsonian notions of: a) interdependence, b) aid with the aim of scientifically-based social progress and stability, and c) the fostering of international goodwill, are common beliefs in Foreign Affairs, CIDA and IDRC. We noted that late 1960s and 1970s Canadian development assistance was seen as part of a different culture by other parts of government. CIDA staff saw and see international development as a vocation. Many officers have remained in CIDA, not circulating in the rest of the federal government. But CIDA officers by the end of the 1970s recognised themselves to be servants of the Canadian government. The Centre is more specialised, and academically focused. Foreign Affairs is largely a central agency, a secretariat, consisting of a strong and distinct culture of generalists. The Agency is an operating agency, acting as a central agency relative to Canadian International Centres like IDRC, and its NGOs. Many of its officers generalists and former CUSO personnel. However, IDRC was a form of funding agency inhabited by internationally trained specialists committed to development assistance as a vocation, relatively independent of Canadian preoccupations. Although infused with the same Pearsonian enthusiasm as the early CIDA, IDRC is a separate culture from it. For most of its history, IDRC development officers have circulated among Canadians only in the field, hardly more involved with Canadian development assistance than with other international development organisations. The ambiguous identity of IDRC being an international organisation, which just happened to be founded nationally, seems to have been replicated in its actual pattern of social connections.

Over time, the separate cultures of IDRC, CIDA and Foreign Affairs have begun to become interlocking communities. We mean by this that the jurisdictional boundaries have softened by common work, social connections, and exchanges of personnel. These connections seem to have spread more easily where common functions are present and cross-boundary contact is necessary. Exchanges have therefore taken place in the upper
levels of these organisations, in the field, in policy, and services positions. Different levels often express common notions across boundaries. In the field, Foreign Affairs, CIDA and IDRC have much in common, and meet regularly, (although IDRC staff offices are not in Canadian government quarters). Likewise, some top officers in External Affairs developed similar perspectives as those found in central agency policy secretariats. At other levels, all these organisations, including IDRC, have specialised staffs in Ottawa, accountants, lawyers and secretaries who sprang from common Ottawa circuits. This helped create specialised Government of Canada perceptions and have tended to have a long-run homogenising effect in all these organisations. That such interchanges have taken place sometimes impinge on policy.

We noted in a previous chapter that over time the separateness of the upper reaches of CIDA was altered by the influx of staff from other parts of the federal government and vice versa. Maggie Catley-Carlson went from External Affairs to CIDA. Denis Hudon left CIDA and joined MOSST. In some cases, these interchanges seem to have policy implications leading to the insertion of perspectives dragged along from other organisations. However, there is a common perception among top managers that an exchange of personnel necessarily leads to changes in practice and values on the part of any given organisation. Clearly, changes have taken place in IDRC and they have been associated with changes of personnel. Nevertheless, we have also seen that external pressures caused alterations to the Centre in advance of those changes of personnel. In other words, changes of personnel may simply confirm rather than initiate exchanges of values, internationalist, parochial or otherwise.

Over time, and more resistantly, the separateness of IDRC from other parts of the foreign policy apparatus and central agencies has lessened. Ivan Head's selection was widely presumed to mean the end of separateness from the mainstream of the Government of Canada, just as Keith Bezanson's selection has been viewed. For the first twenty years, little exchange of personnel took place. Steve Rosell, who had evaluated
IDRC in 1978 for PCO, did work briefly in the President's Office in the 1980s. Other officers had or made contacts. But little more. Since the arrival of Keith Bezanson walls have dropped, but not entirely in expected ways.

The most notable change is the state of IDRC's relations with CIDA, which are much improved because of the presence of two former CIDA employees at the top ranks of the Centre. The selection of Bezanson has given more confidence to CIDA Senior Management about the CIDA/IDRC relationship. The recruitment of Pierre Beemans to head the principal Canadian recipient section of IDRC has had a similar effect. Beemans is a former CIDA officer and also worked in PCO. What is perhaps surprising is that during the Bezanson period many of the new Government of Canada personnel in IDRC are not from the foreign policy apparatus but recruited from other parts of the federal government. Maureen Law, recruited by Bezanson to be Director-General of Health Sciences, used to be Deputy Minister in Health Canada. The Vice-President – Programme, Caroline Pestieau, was Vice-Chair of the Economic Council of Canada. One would expect that these interconnections would lead to a long-term mutual exchange of values between the circuits these organisations represent, and that a less internationalist perspective might be adopted by IDRC. Yet the raiment of those concerned, and the precise filament of their garment may mean that for good or ill most need not cleave to a path blind to the deeper instincts of the Centre. Indeed, a number seem more likely to perceive a common purpose between their previous and present work, despite diverse backgrounds. In sketching much of the history of IDRC since 1970 the dichotomy between internationalist and parochial tendencies has been sufficiently severe to reveal almost tangible and opposing fields of values. As the 1980s were ushered in, that schism became less clear. Therefore, friend and foe have become more difficult to discern from the ramparts of the Centre.

In addition to the officers of the Centre, the chief shield-bearers on the ramparts of IDRC are the governors. Governors have been, overwhelmingly, former academics with
international associations. Their high status in the world, and Canada, has signified to those outside the Centre capable of changing its course to beware of the hornet's nest they represent. Erstwhile opponents have been pressed into service as governors, which has largely served to make critics more informed and more appreciative of Centre viewpoints. The International Centre for Ocean Development (ICOD) failed because its governors did not have the inclination, and nor did most have domestic or international credibility, to proclaim an open position contrary to the government policy of closure. That ICOD did not become a milch cow for the Halifax consulting community, as was expected locally there, was also key. IDRC did not have either of these characteristics, its governors and officers able and willing stand to preserve the Centre. To be sure, domestic criticism from outside the Centre has struck home, and the Centre changed. Yet the Centre's officers have often turned the hottest winds to their advantage, and have generally been able to interpret the entreaties of highly interested interlocutors according to the tradition of responsiveness to Southern concerns. Initiatives at variance from official Canadian foreign policy were explained to Foreign Affairs as well-counselled exploratory moves. And such confidence has provided dividends to good opinions of Canadians abroad, notably at the government level in the Southern Cone, and in South Africa.

In all this, that the Centre has been perceived as an example of internationalism unbound and put to good effect has been vital to the Centre's survival. Legitimacy has been constructed on the values the Centre has been seen to represent, rather than its functional structural authority relative to the Government of Canada. The Centre is not a mere dependent instrument of the federal structure and has not succumbed so readily to Canadian academic callers to its parlour. IDRC can not easily be forced to submit to the usual disciplines that central agents normally expect. Precisely for these reasons, those members of central agencies keen or obliged by exigencies to direct the parts of the Canadian state according to simpler and more narrowly conceived notions of interest have intermittently seen IDRC as a nuisance they could do without. In 1995, SAREC was folded into Swedish CIDA. The Swedish Government bill bringing SAREC and several
other Swedish quangos into SIDA stated that "Swedish development assistance is seen as disunited and unclear" and that the changes were intended to provide "flexible, effective and clear organization and combined the advantages of a cohesive organization with the need to give different types of activities a clear profile." That such central agent language is common across international borders must be viewed as a cautionary tale for supporters of IDRC. While much is particular, the unreconstructed centralising tendencies of bureaucracies are not.

The Scylla for the leadership of IDRC is—how far must it go to satisfy central agents in Ottawa and increasingly squeezed academics across Canada, and risk becoming indistinguishable from other development agencies—the necessity of IDRC being a separate organisation would be superfluous. The Centre's Charybdis is—how far can IDRC cater to its supporters in developing countries and interested academics in Canada, without being perceived as beyond the pale by the Canadian government—and so becoming a candidate for rescheduling under the Financial Administration Act, or worse, elimination.

Relations between IDRC and CIDA have always been uneasy. The Centre has served as a stick for PCO and Treasury Board to beat CIDA with, since IDRC is perceived to have been more action-oriented and effective. Internationalists have pointed to the Centre as an example of international partnership, and proof of the benefits of untied aid and autonomy from government dictates, again in contradistinction to CIDA. IDRC officers have themselves made much of their autonomy relative to CIDA. As we have noted, the specialist nature of IDRC, and a desire to maintain that independence, led Centre staff to favour connections that were not Canadian ones. CIDA's control of the recommendations for development assistance funding and vast and easily tapped

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resources, turned it into a central agency relative to IDRC, as for other development assistance quangos and NGOs in search of funds. The common cause that Barbara Ward sought, and the cross-fertilisation between CIDA and IDRC that Maurice Strong hoped for, may have existed but was rarely mutually recognised. As CIDA took on more and more the character of a central agency, the greater lustre of the Centre rankled in the Agency. As cuts bit hard into CIDA, IDRC's success in receiving shallower blows than the Agency were seen as either: an unfair sharing of the burden, or worse, the indiscipline of a miniscule subordinate. The various central agencies found IDRC too fast to hit or too small to bother about. The arrival of Keith Bezanson and Pierre Beemans in IDRC from CIDA was looked on very favourably in most of the Government of Canada concerned with IDRC, as had the selection of Ivan Head before them. However, similarly, although some change of opinion had taken place in other central agencies, keys parts of PCO and Treasury Board and elsewhere retained their general opinion that the Centre was expendable and certainly in need of being brought more closely into their orbit. Such a viewpoint has been relatively constant since the inception of the Centre. Other critical parts of government expressed their neutrality. Key throughout the Centre's history has been to gain the ear and support of politicians and their staff, as well as some officials in central agencies. What the Centre, and indeed CIDA, has been unable to do is to change the culture of central agencies and their affinity groups to see that development assistance is not as Porgy would say "a sometime thing." An important question is whether the presence of two former CIDA Presidents in the top two positions in PCO, Jocelyne Bourgon and Marcel Massé, official and political, will help change central agent culture such that development assistance will be seen as an essential emanation, reflection, projection and moreover, safeguard of the Canadian model.
A Return to the Pearsonian Tradition?

The end of the ten-year Conservative government in 1993 led to a Liberal government explicitly built in the mould of Pearsonian government coming to power. However, a shift had taken place in the country, which signalled an acceptance of many of the values that the Conservatives had placed on the agenda. Little has changed in real terms since the end of the Conservative government in the development assistance industry in Canada. Canadian development assistance remains prone, despite the recent Foreign Policy Review.

What federal development assistance organisations and the NGOs that depend on them have generally failed to do is to tie themselves clearly, publicly and firmly to the mast of values to which Canadians as a people subscribe, and which Pearson helped both reflect and define. The priesthood, secular or spiritual, that so fervently supported development assistance in the past has largely either passed away or grown more interested in Registered Retirement Savings Plans. Further, the legitimacy and vigour of these non-business elites has lessened. Canadian development assistance has appeared especially peripheral to Canadians' self-definition, and only relevant to the vital interests of those Canadians interested in sources for agricultural or industrial contracts. While, as we shall see, the Foreign Policy Review provides intimations of the turbot and mast that might make development assistance relevant, the captains have yet to set a common course in a Pearsonian sea whose waters might yet be refreshed, were the fixed star consulted.

We have so far seen how IDRC's policies were determined by the historical context in which it evolved, the changing circumstances and key people involved in the Centre's creation, growth and survival in Canada, and provided some idea of the organisational relationships of Ottawa. We now turn, with the past chapters as prologue, to the next chapter which looks at IDRC as a development organisation as such. We will
delineate the course of the internal discourse in the Centre and its relation to changes in the world at large. We hope, thereby, to show IDRC's location in the discourse about the development of development.
Chapter Four: Science & Values

The Centre has concentrated on micro development problems. . . In essence, it reflects a belief that the persisting factors constraining development are not to be found in the rapidly changing kaleidoscope of international political and economic relations, but in tens of thousands of small, local decisions that must match and mesh in time and space to build a modern economy. . . The plight of low-income countries may be eased somewhat by the workings of international negotiation. But lasting development depends . . . on [the] transforming of traditional economies and societies from a technological base of lore and folk practice to one of applied science, social, physical, and natural.653

— President David Hopper in 1976

For the better part of 200 years, a large part of the secular faith of western civilization has rested in the inevitability of "progress" through science and technology as the instruments that would solve all problems, cure all ills and lead us to the promised land. . .

What is involved is a fundamental shift in the secular confidence of the West, in our faith in the inevitability of "progress" through science and technology. . .

For the better part of the last five decades, the post-war period, the "philosophy" and the instruments of international development have derived from and depended upon our Western faith in progress through science and technology. The development model or —let me use the infamous "p" word "paradigm"— the development paradigm has been built on an essentially technocratic view of the world. Not surprisingly, therefore, "development" has essentially been a matter of getting the right combination of capital, natural resources, technology and know-how.654

— President Keith Bezanson in 1994


The two statements above by David Hopper and Keith Bezanson reveal a fundamental shift in the perception of the leadership of the Centre as to the relationship of IDRC activities to science and development. Hopper's statement affirms a modernisation approach, tradition is replaced with modernity. Bezanson's statement is clearly a break from a fulsome belief in science and development, as scientific remedy for Southern ills, even if adapted to local needs.

In this chapter, we will see how those two statements represent the evolution of an internal discourse taking place inside IDRC, and indicate how they are part of a global debate in the relationship between society, development and science. We have seen in previous chapters how internationalist and scientific values were placed in the structure and by-laws governing the Centre, and in particular, the Board. Here we will elaborate how values associated with scientific rationality were embedded in the policies and *esprit de corps* of the organisation. These technical values were for some time complementary to more socially-oriented currents in the Centre. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, an altered social orientation emerged and came to focus on participation and some of Pearson's last concerns, culture and the environment. Finally, we will look back over the quarter-century since IDRC was founded to see whether particular patterns emerge in the interplay between the internal discourse and the international environment on the one hand, and diverse Canadian influences, on the other.
First Principles - Partnership and Influence

Any account of IDRC requires seeing this development organisation as very much about offering, and a desire to construct an international partnership, based on responsive listening. According to Maurice Strong, partnership was "the whole idea" behind IDRC. At first, it was the offering of indigenously determined scientific transformation, of one partner giving the other the opportunity to fashion the tool of scientific rationality with their own hands for their own needs. Over time, it became clear that all partners had an offering in their hands, and that the smoke from the offerings combined, knowledge, might inspire and sustain all.

Although IDRC has often worn the value-free mask of science, its staff have always recognised a value-laden purpose, equitable (and increasingly) sustainable development. Among the leviathans of the donor universe, the Centre is a mite. Therefore, the Centre's staff know that only by achieving influence for the Centre and the researchers they fund can the activity undertaken mean anything but money spent. To be sure, with influence bearing a particular vision, the end, self-conscious responsiveness can not be completely self-effacing, but it has led recipients to say that they would prefer $60,000 from IDRC over $600,000 from other donors because they are listened to, have a sense of ownership, and perform the research themselves. The means by which influence is achieved contain 3 Ps and 2 Ts: people, policies, practice, and technology and technique. We will see how the essential vision has remained, but a modified debate between internationalism and parochialism continues; how the means have stayed constant, but the mental vessel in which it is contained has transformed.

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655 Maurice Strong, interview by author, 23 November 1994, by telephone, notes, Ottawa-Toronto.

656 Joachim Voss, interview by author, 9 September 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.
The Hopper Vision - Indigenously Determined Scientific Transformation

The architects of IDRC concluded that if "Southern" problems were to be solved they would have to be unravelled by "Southerners" themselves. To create solutions would require the creation of, and fostering of, researchers to complete the task. David Hopper's special vision of IDRC was of a research organisation dedicated to funding research for developing countries conducted by developing country researchers. This was an internationalist vision in which Canadian pre-occupations did not figure. For Hopper this was a significant task of modernisation, of transformation and rationalisation. Hopper told the inaugural meeting of the Board of IDRC, chaired by Pearson,

The alternative to scientifically derived technology is not a society free of the effects of technology, it is a stagnant society built upon older means of fashioning tools and organizing and practising the arts of production. Eschewing modernity can stay the familiar only temporarily, the power of science and its technical spawn for altering irreversibly the patterns of cultures and civilizations cannot be countered by a wishful asceticism or the vigourous proclamation of the virtues of the peasant nobility. All human cultures rest on some form of technology and within the short span of a few generations will be founded universally on the rationality of applied science.

One path to the future adapted to local conditions. A few weeks later Pearson said,

No country, not even the mightiest, can reverse certain forces of technological or scientific change and development with their inevitable social and political consequences, both national and international. Every political society has to adapt its life, its institutions, and its political and economic ideas, to these changes or be thrown into the dustbin of history. 657

The similarities were clear, scientific change and development were inevitable. What was different between them was that while Hopper expected the replacement of existing cultural patterns by scientific rationality, Pearson urged that societies must adapt their cultures to these changes.

That IDRC was to foster development research in developing countries at all was important. In many cases, research on Southern problems had become more or less moribund after the end of the colonial era. For example, tropical disease research largely ground to a halt with decolonisation. Responsibility for this may, arguably, be laid at the feet of the retreating colonial powers, as well as the nature of the post-colonial state and its limitations. IDRC's support to research in this area, as elsewhere, had a considerable effect regarding the study of tropical diseases whether that research was performed in developing countries or not, or performed by expatriates or not. John Gill, Director of Health Sciences noted the effect of IDRC on the World Health Organisation's Tropical Disease Research (TDR) Programme in 1981,

TDR would probably not exist today if it had not been for the inputs that we put in to catalize, bring the committee together, get the groups together and get the planning together.\footnote{John Gill, IDRC BOG, "Notes of Proceedings," 30-31 March & 1 April 1981, 94.}

IDRC went further to develop Southern capabilities that had ever been done before, funding developing country researchers and giving them the right to define and carry out research according to their own priorities, instead of, at best, being assistants to Northern researchers. Prior to the arrival of IDRC on the development research scene, developing country researchers had rarely been funded by outside sources to pursue their own research. This was particularly true for young researchers, who were often the focus of IDRC's attention in the early years of the Centre.\footnote{Patricia Rozenfield, interview by author, 3 August 1987, tape recording, New York.} Those researchers able to garner funds generally tailored their research towards the interests of the North, where the vast bulk of the research establishment was located. Consequently, their research was often irrelevant.

Those researchers able to garner funds generally tailored their research towards the interests of the North, where the vast bulk of the research establishment was located. Consequently, their research was often irrelevant.
to the needs, and inappropriate to the conditions of developing countries. IDRC identified
a niche, filled a gap. Under President Hopper IDRC was a means to the end of the
modernisation of developing countries, and the transformation of those societies based on
a model of Western rationality. The form of partnership was to offer developing country
researchers the means to foster a scientific establishment, that edifice would be
constructed so as to be relevant to the rural poor of developing countries.

Governors chosen during the Hopper era tended to share a similar perspective.
Louis Berlinguet, a Governor who later became Senior Vice-President, also saw IDRC as
helping lay down the foundation of the scientific establishment in developing countries.
This was made clear in a comment he made about a project funding the Institut du Sahel.

Un des grands problèmes en Afrique de l'ouest et dans les pays du Sahel qui
regroupent une population de peut-être 70 millions répartis dans huit pays, c'est
l'absence d'infrastructure scientifique et de personnel entraînés à faire de la
recherche et à choisir les technologies qui sont les plus appropriés à leurs besoins. Alors, nous avions convenus, au Centre, il y a trois ans, que le CRDI essayerait
d'établir un genre de "beach-head" dans ce désert scientifique, en aidant à créer
l'Institut du Sahel qui est un institut qui devrait pouvoir mener la formation
d'hommes de science et qui devrait faciliter les échanges d'informations
scientifiques entre les diverses institutions de recherche qui existent dans ces pays.  

In a slightly different vein, veteran Governor Rex Nettleford urged at the same meeting in
1979 that the leadership and broader population of developing countries be re-oriented
towards science.

The truth of the matter is that in developing countries, to many of us science
means higher science, which is akin to magic. There needs to be a whole
reorientation, and a honing of people's sensibilities to science, so that they can
indeed use the material which they have in order to inform the decision-making
process.  

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Critics of such viewpoints like Denis Goulet parallel but counterpoise such arguments. For Hopper, Berlinguet and Nettleford in the early 1970s, the essence of organisations like IDRC was the uprooting of tradition and its replacement by Western rationality. "These alterations render obsolete many functions of social integration formerly performed by old social units—tribes, castes, extended families, and villages."662 Their analytic framework was prevalent in development theory and practice. Francis Sutton of the Ford Foundation saw science as a movement from particular norms defined by custom, the prescriptive to ascriptive universal notions.663 Talcott Parsons saw the schism as the path from tradition to modernity.664 In the period few saw this as a form of ethnocentrism.

While responsive, the philosophy of the Centre has not been "value-free" as we have seen, and fits into an internationalist framework with a concern for equity. In Hopper's terms,

> The peculiar neglect of human vitality and the urgent authenticity of human poverty . . . demands now that allocative efficiencies be sought within a framework of distributive justice; that the quest for the levers of growth be tempered by an equally assiduous search for the fulcra of welfare; and that progress be measured as the means of satisfying real human need, not as an end product of an heroic accounting exercise.665

This aspect of Hopper's thinking seems to have been sympathetically received inside and outside the Centre by those more focused on seeking to rectify global and national

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inequality. Notions of Southern technological dependency upon Northern technology became widely accepted during the 1970s, as exemplified by writers such as Canadian dependency theorist Lynn Mytelka, who has maintained links with the Centre until today. Hopper's perspective had practical consequences in terms of the kind of activities IDRC officers funded. The tendency was to redress marginality in a myriad of ways. It might mean funding small-scale research into technologies like hand pumps or hand dehullers or activities on marginal lands like sorghum, or marginalised people like rickshaw drivers or hawkers. There was an acceptance that any development activity would have winners and losers, but the aim was that as much as possible, equity would be built into the activity.

Governors and some staff chosen during the Hopper era tended to have productionist approach to equity. Such a view was expressed by one of the first Governors of the Centre, the Nigerian agricultural economist Olesegun Oluwasanmi. His view was predominant in the Centre in the 1970s, equity would be made through expanding the means of development for the people in developing countries. Oluwasanmi said that,

More attention should be paid to increasing income and the quality of life of the ordinary man. While distributive justice is an appealing concept, it could lead the Centre into an area that is political and explosive. Some inequality is essential to growth and perhaps there must be a system that rewards the industrious more than the indolent.  

While being rather extreme, Oluwasanmi's general focus on the ordinary man and the industrious was common in the Centre.

Pearson titled his 1969 report for the World Bank Partners in Development. For practitioners like Denis Goulet and Michael Hudson "the language of partnership employed by the stronger partner in the dialogue is sheer mystification, because there can

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no valid partnership without reciprocity. And reciprocity can only be established if the stronger partners are themselves made vulnerable in their relationships with weaker partners.” Goulet and Hudson seem to see this as similar to a master/slave dialectic. To be sure, Pearson's view was formed by his experience among the elite of the Commonwealth, his meetings with Indira Gandhi, Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda. This was elite to elite support as colleagues. Nevertheless, the aim of all was equitable development not merely the propping up of corrupt regimes. Indeed, it is fair to say that similar values underpinned the actions of such men and women. Those values were not so far away from the deeper and more thorough-going notions of partnership that would become common in the 1980s. Nevertheless, at this time, the partnership was by its nature skewed.

According to Geoffrey Oldham, Hopper was probably influenced by the notion of "leapfrogging." This idea was popular during the time of the Green Revolution, with which Hopper was inextricably linked through his work in India. The prevailing view was that with Green Revolution technology and techniques,

We bought time. We recognise that some people would be going to be hurt by it, that it wasn't the answer to all the problems. But the prospects for famine in India were so great. If we weren't able to leapfrog and make this radical increase in productivity, many, many more people would die. There could be fine tuning, to ensure that people who survived lives' could be made better subsequently.668

Pearson would have echoed Hopper's interest in providing the benefits of modernity, but not the transformation of the past and their complete replacement with Western rational scientific culture. As Pearson said when he received the Victor Gollancz Humanity Award at St. Martin–in–the–Fields, London, only months before his death in 1972,

While so much of our co-operation for development is necessarily designed to help the poorer, developing countries enter the modern technological and scientific age, and while they have a right to share in the benefits of progress that has been made, we must also assist them to secure these benefits while avoiding the threats to their own tested values and traditions; to their own environment and culture, from uncontrolled technological progress.\footnote{669}

Hopper himself, and the people that were selected as staff of IDRC were not ignorant of the developing world. If they were not from the developing world themselves, many had spent time at the village level and were aware of their realities. Staff were chosen who recognised the human dimension of projects.\footnote{670}

Hopper was hardly anti-social in his focus. As he said to the Board, his approach to development was that,

One could begin to say that in the developmental field, we can start with basic human needs such as food, health, education, a social environment in which people have to function and some degree of economic opportunity and stability that has some predictability. . . I think the answers lie in a combination of examining economic and social environments, technologies in the physical and social orders of society, of law and social control with questions of both static and dynamic human behaviour, problems of family life and so on.\footnote{671}

However, the view of the first President of IDRC was more of development as global management and control of population, less a thorough-going social enterprise leading to change.


\footnotetext[670]{Andrew D.R. Ker, interview by author, 25 July 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.}

President Hopper affirmed the basic outlines of Centre policy to the Board in his "Eleven Issues" speech of 1973.

**Policy Issue 1:** The balance between Centre support for research workers indigenous to the developing regions and support for Western scholars and scientists from developed countries.

**Policy Issue 2:** The balance between Centre acceptance of, and support for, research projects focused on problems as perceived, given priority and defined by scientists, policy makers and administrators in the developing countries, and the exercise of Centre judgement about the "proper" research priorities and problems in developing countries, coupled with a channelling of support for development research objectives enunciated by the Centre.

**Policy Issue 3:** The balance between Centre assistance for improving the innovative research skills of LDC research scientists and technologists by providing "on the job" research opportunities, and Centre assistance to the finding of solid research results that are of the quality most useful for guiding or furthering the process of development.

**Policy Issue 4:** The balance between Centre support between problem-oriented or applied research, and assistance for phenomenon-oriented or basic research.

**Policy Issue 5:** The balance between institution building, research training, and research support.

**Policy Issue 6:** The balance between project support and assistance to core, or general, administrative costs.

**Policy Issue 7:** The balance between Centre support for research projects and direct support for post-secondary or post-graduate training.

**Policy Issue 8:** The balance between Centre support for specific projects and non-specific grant support for research associations and networks in developing countries to permit them to solicit and directly finance research proposals from their region of operation or their membership.

**Policy Issue 9:** The balance between Centre assistance for analytical research, and support for direct, comprehensive action development projects.

**Policy Issue 10:** The continuation of the Centre's dominant focus on research to improve the well-being of peoples living outside large metropolitan areas.
Policy Issue 11: The balance between Centre support for research on uniquely national problems, and assistance for research that has global or multicountry implications.\textsuperscript{672}

This statement served as the principal policy statement until the arrival of Ivan Head as President. It is still seen in the Centre as a significant guiding work. With the exception of Issue 11, the statement shows little reference to the dilemma of the parochial versus the internationalist approach. The rest is largely focused on the narrow research concerns of the Programme Officer, which as the author was told repeatedly, is the heart of the Centre.\textsuperscript{673} For that, the focus seems appropriate to their concerns, and reveals the scope of Hopper's own interests and preferences.

Hopper's vision of the mission of the Centre was revealed to the Board in 1975. He saw IDRC as helping expand and extend the agricultural research institutes such as IRRI and suggested the model be extended into non-agricultural areas. In his speech, the President explicitly mentions "Frosty" Hill. We noted in a previous chapter that F.X. Sutton related to the author that Hill used Hopper as his "hammer" in the promotion of the technical fix.

The international network of agricultural research centers [IARCs] - now numbering nine - was begun in 1962 with the opening of the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines. . . IDRC was one of the agencies that participated in giving these institutions an international status larger than could be provided by the founding Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. . .The Centers were built on the vision of one man, Dr. F.F. Hill, then Vice-President of the Ford Foundation. His legacy is the most effective instrument we have for anchoring international, national, and IDRC activities in agricultural research. This year, IDRC will contribute approximately $2.0 million to the activities of the IARCs and appreciably more to regional and national research programs that are linked in one way to the work of the Centers. Indeed, the IARCs are a central factor in the activities of the AFNS [Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Science] Division.\textsuperscript{674}

And AFNS was very much central to Hopper's notion of IDRC.


\textsuperscript{673} e.g. Chris Smart, interview by author, 4 July 1994, notes, Ottawa; Daniel Morales-Gomez, interview by author, 21 December 1993, tape recording, Ottawa.

The First Divisions' Directors

Hopper's Directors were generally cut from the same cloth as himself. The Director of the largest Division, Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Sciences (AFNS), Joe Hulse, (like James Mullin),\textsuperscript{675} grew up in northern British baker's shops. Hulse demanded and obtained a highly professional staff, was rigorous, knowledgeable and thorough in his argumentation with management, governors and staff. His view though tended towards a more conservative and technical orientation that,

Most of our recipients are neither organized nor are they equipped to pursue vast multi-disciplinary programs. Multi-disciplinary has become an unfortunate "buzz-word" which many who use it are not entirely clear of what it means. What we are prepared to encourage is a systematic approach to applied research in which the recipient is conscious of the total production or total post-production system in which the projects exist and is conscious of the social, economic, technological and physical environment in which the project exists and more particularly of the beneficiaries who are to benefit from the results of the project. The question we continually ask of all project recipients is: "Whom does this research seek to benefit and how is that benefit going to be realized?"\textsuperscript{676}

For recipients only to be "conscious" of their research environment meant only a limited conversation with the rural poor, but it was a step forward. As we have seen, in the US, it was believed that the ills of the South would be solved by the injection of capital with a second Marshall Plan. In agricultural sciences in the 1950s, plant breeding was seen as a panacea. Hopper's generation of agricultural economists in the 1960s was believed to be a sort of second approximation towards solution. Even the softer social sciences had a place in development, but it was to see that technical innovations were implemented. This view largely prevailed into the early 1980s. However, consultation with farmers by researchers regarding innovation was championed by the Centre with increasing vigour in the 1970s and 1980s in the form of farming systems research. This was to be multidisciplinary in the sense that multiple disciplines would be

\textsuperscript{675} Although Mullin was appointed by Ivan Head.

brought to bear on a given research problem.

Health Sciences Division was judged to be "very, very conservative" in its orientation, even by Tory Bill Winegard. In the 1970s, the Health Sciences Director, John Gill, strongly supported Drs. Talwar, and Dr. Ramalingaswami, now an IDRC Governor, then Director of the All-India Institute of Medical Sciences. IDRC supported these researchers' investigation into contraceptive vaccines and later the contraceptive implant Norplant in India. President Hopper was very strongly interested in the promotion of contraception, which continued when he joined the World Bank.

The first Director of Information Sciences, John Woolston, was an internationally recognised British-born expert in information management. He was seen as "avant-garde." The Division's work focused on the setting up of international data bases and national information systems. Many of these data bases came to form the backbone of the United Nations' information systems.

Some understanding of the first Director of Social Sciences can be gleaned from the nature of a heated argument that then took place between Social Sciences Programme Officer Geoffrey Oldham and his director, Ruth Zagorin. The discussion concerned a modern and traditional technologies project which would attempt to meld a more scientific approach with knowledge of traditional technologies. Zagorin's initial response to the project proposed was, "That's not the role of the modern scientist." Oldham says she was very deeply based in the Green Revolution tradition, "people working in their laboratories, leapfrogging." She said "All you can expect to get by this is incremental improvement in what exists. We don't have the time..."

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677 Bill Winegard, interview by author, 13 April 1994, Guelph, tape recording.


679 Bill Winegard, interview by author.
for incremental leapfrogs.” Although the impasse was overcome, this demonstrates Ruth Zagorin's essential view at the time.

Although David Hopper set the tone of the Centre, each Divisional Director was given a great deal of authority to set the course of each Division. Within each Division, often renowned experts in their fields were made Programme Officers. Each officer had extraordinary latitude to develop projects according to the general wishes of their Associate Directors. It was this expertise and flexibility, unencumbered by Treasury Board procedures, which permitted the rapid construction of the Centre officers' formidable reputation in the development community as people with intelligence who knew what was important and had the authority to set the pace. That flexibility aided in fostering of the most essential brick in the edifice of that reputation as far as developing country researchers were concerned, responsiveness.

**Responsiveness**

One of IDRC's key policy cornerstones has been the tenet of responsiveness. Hopper made it a fundamental feature of the Centre, which continues today. This responsiveness has been demonstrated: by the nature of the Board, many of whom are developing country researchers; international staff of capacity and repute, such as Pierre Sané, present Executive Director of Amnesty International, IDRC's former West Africa Regional Office (WARO) Director; the location of Regional Offices in developing countries; and most of all, that the vast majority of the funding goes to developing country researchers. To be responsive meant giving researchers "ownership" of the research undertaken. Doug Daniels has summarised it thus, "What are your problems? You have the responsibility to solve those problems. We will support you."

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681 Doug Daniels, interview by author, 11 January 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.
It is not within the province of this thesis to survey with any accuracy the recipient's views of the Centre. But some very independent-minded researchers that were interviewed by the author felt that they were in control of the process. It seems clear they would not have had it any other way.\textsuperscript{682} Assessing the whole history of IDRC, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the practice of responsiveness has made the Centre's reputation.

Nevertheless, responsiveness was restricted, especially by the range of topics the Centre was willing to support.

Dr. Hopper used to refer to the "smorgasbord" it puts on the table. In other words, while still not telling prospective recipients outright what it wants to support, it only puts certain "dishes" (disciplinary areas) on the table from which they may select their fare.\textsuperscript{683} Jepperson's insight that "Institutions are not just constraint structures; all institutions simultaneously empower and control."\textsuperscript{684} seems relevant here.

IDRC was limited in a number of respects by the nature of its clientele and the structure of the Centre. To serve their research community responsively required, to some extent, that IDRC staff fall into the patterns familiar in those organisations. According to David Hopper, IDRC was organised on a disciplinary basis "primarily to permit high level discussion between Centre personnel and the research workers in the developing countries who follow pretty generally the classifications we use in our own disciplinary institutes and universities."\textsuperscript{685} The

\textsuperscript{682} Anil Gupta, interview by author, 15 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa; Norman Girvan, interview by author, 18 May 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.


replication of this disciplinary structure had consequences which limited the degree to which effective solutions could be achieved, as so many require an interdisciplinary approach. Unless each division retained staff from a variety of disciplines willing to communicate with each other, it would prove to be, as Hopper admitted himself, "more difficult to get a multi-disciplinary focus or interaction when organized into a division." However, interdisciplinarity within Divisions was assisted because it was not named, for example, Economics, but Social Sciences. Nevertheless, depending on the circumstances, disciplinarity continued inside divisions. For example, in AFNS in the 1970s, breeders often felt they had little in common with economists. One other factor that contributed to multidisciplinarity was the applied emphasis of research funded by the Centre. Applied research required the utilisation of a range of disciplinary approaches in order to work on the research problem, especially research involving technology or technique.

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687 Doug Daniels, interview by author, 11 January 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.
IDRC’s Effect on the Research for Development Niche

According to Goulet, "modern technology is simultaneously the bearer and destroyer of precious human values," a two-edged sword. In his review of technology transfers, Goulet identifies a group which he calls the "world knowledge specialists." These consist of a loose, at times barely visible, consortium of universities, scholars, foundations, research institutes, assorted "think tanks," and international federations of study institutes. Their loyalties are global, as are their arenas of action, patterns of expenditure, and travel habits. This cosmopolitan flavor is most evident in the "scientific community."

The cosmopolitan and internationalist *esprit de corps* at the scientific IDRC is part of this system of knowledge specialists. Perhaps one reason that the Centre has been so well appreciated is that it has served as a bridge between the largely Northern world knowledge specialists and Southern researchers. As such, IDRC has helped play a particular role.

Throughout academia, research institutes, and foundations can be found certain niches where individuals or teams use their organizations as bases for "keeping in touch" with international conferences, seminars, workshops, ideas, peers, loyalties, and new funding opportunities. Taken collectively, these people and groups gain an "inside track" along with other powerful actors on the world scene: international agencies, transnational business, governments, and a host of "public interest" groups each having its "private" agenda. The important point is that their ideas are listened to by influential decision-makers. In addition, members in good standing of the international intellectual club recruit and screen new members of transnational professional associations in science, the social disciplines, and the multidisciplinary studies. IDRC’s staff have been deeply involved in this structure by fostering networks, especially South-South ones, where none existed before. In 1982, staff even delineated two types of network, vertical and horizontal.

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689 Denis Goulet, *The Uncertain Promise*, 204.

690 Denis Goulet, *The Uncertain Promise*, 204.

691 Denis Goulet, *The Uncertain Promise*, 205.
The first type is a "horizontal" network in which a number of researchers from different countries work within one project on the same problem, sometimes within one project or on a number of separate but similar projects. Usually the different research teams have a similar disciplinary composition, and similar or identical research objectives and methodology. An example would be a number of research projects all examining urban transportation or sites and services housing programs in different cities. . .

A second type could be called a "vertical" network involving a number of quite separate projects in different countries, all of which are working on different aspects of a common subject such as development of a specific crop.692

"During the first nine years of IDRC operations, in the period until December 31st 1979, over 35% of its projects and 43% of its program budget related to activities associated with networks."693 The fact that IDRC staff have defined such networks694 and finance the creation and maintenance of such networks shows their importance to the work of the Centre. Indeed, as one member of IDRC's Board put it in 1990, the business of the Centre could be characterised as "generating, sharing and utilizing knowledge."695 IDRC is a small organisation attempting to assist developing country researchers have a voice of their own and in the global community. Networks provide a means of building consensus and influence for both developing country


694 Peter Haas might describe this group as a sort of epistemic community.

An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.

research and the Centre itself.

In general, although imbued with internationalist values, IDRC's staff do not see themselves as internationalists pursuing an internationalist vision, or supporting or spreading those values. Rather they tend to seem themselves as narrower technical specialists or cadre of developmentalists. To be sure, the soul and ethics are extremely important to the Centre's programme officers. It is an ardent, but private, belief that by supporting developing country researchers do good research for development they may make the world a little better. Nevertheless, values are exchanged and these have historically been that, to coin a phrase, science makes the world go around. Clearly such a view is very much in keeping with Hopper's scientific vision in which one does good quietly through one's works. It is a quite Canadian, quite manse, quite natural science perspective. It also transmits the notion to researchers in the South, and so to their elites, that change should be achieved through technical and not political means. At the same time, the Canadian value of self-reliance, which happens to coincide with principal message of the dependency school, is another important signal sent, seen clearly in the South-South networks the Centre funds.

One claim of organizational analysis is that the particularity of the niche or issue-area that an organization is located in, and the institutional arena in which struggles over policy direction are made, have a powerful effect on the possibility of innovation.\footnote{696} From this perspective organizational entrepreneurs seek the exploitation of free space in the institutional environment.\footnote{697} Strong, Oldham and Hopper were certainly the first of IDRC's entrepreneurs, followed by many others, from Programme Officers to Presidents. Returning to the early IDRC, IDRC represents an amalgam of something borrowed and something new. As to the former, IDRC resembles the American foundations. IDRC gives grants to universities. But the Centre


\footnote{697} Brint and Karabel in DiMaggio and Powell, 349.
also seeks out top-flight international staff in the manner of Rockefeller, and created Regional Offices like Ford. However, IDRC is substantially different from both, funding developing country rather than expatriate researchers. The Centre is a state organisation, but operates like a Crown corporation. In other words, IDRC is forged from elements in its environment. As that environment changed so did IDRC. For example, the Centre remained independent from government, but senior management were aware of how far that independence could extend. As academic and governmental pressures rose, funding to Canadian academics swelled, and planning and evaluation units were established in the Centre to resemble other federal organisations. As we shall see, as the research environment changed and pressures to produce measurable outputs increased, programme structures changed and policies were altered to reflect those new priorities. Thus, niche analysis seems useful to describe a number of aspects of the changes taking place.

The effect of IDRC on the niche of development research was substantial and measurable. The governments of a number of countries attempted to replicate IDRC. Some, like the Austrians, explicitly announced their intention, others, like the Swedes actually created similar organisations. However, few of these countries' governments were bold enough to even try to adopt IDRC innovation of having overseas governors on national boards. The United States attempted to create an Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation (ISTC) in the US during the Carter Administration.\textsuperscript{698} It was approved but never funded by Congress. Instead, the Board on Science and Technology for International Development (BOSTID) was created in the 1980s, funded by USAID, but attached to the National Academy of Sciences. IDRC staff most often see European organisations as being closest in form and sentiment to the Centre. At least one organisation has managed to have an international board. The International Academy for the Environment is funded by the Swiss government and Canton and University of Geneva. It was founded in 1991 to conduct interdisciplinary training and research and the management of the environment and development. The Academy has been influenced by its contacts with IDRC.

\textsuperscript{698} IDRC BOG, "Draft Notes of Proceedings," 10-12 October 1979, 1.
Some governors sit on the board of both the Academy and IDRC. Former IDRC Director-General, Anne Whyte, is also a Board member.  

Closest in thrust and sentiment to IDRC was the Swedish Agency for Research Co-operation with Developing Countries (SAREC). SAREC was established in 1975 "to assist in the development and strengthening of the scientific and technological infrastructure in developing countries in order to lessen their dependence on developed countries and increase their capacity for the establishment of economic and social justice." However, SAREC had no international board, and was principally run through Swedish universities, although researchers and other partners from the South were very much implicated in the research and capacity building funded. SAREC was folded into the Swedish International Development Agency in 1995.

The German Appropriate Technology Exchange (GATE), a technology clearing house, began in 1978 in the 1990s. GATE identified the technological needs of recipients, looked for solutions and initiated R & D projects. The Dutch Advisory Council for Scientific Research in Development Problems (RAWOO), International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR), the Swedish-based International Foundation for Science (IFS), Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Co-operation (NUFFIC), and some activities on the part of the Norwegian Ministry of Development Cooperation (NORAID) are usually considered as like-minded organisations. In the 1980s, meetings led to the creation of an informal network

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699 Anne Whyte, interview by author, 4 November 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

700 Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Co-operation (NUFFIC) and the Inter-University Council (IUC) are two other organisations usually included among the like-minded organisations of IDRC, although they were founded without any apparent reference to the work of the Centre. NUFFIC was set up in 1952. It is active in training, facilitating links with universities, and development education. The IUC of the UK sends expatriates abroad. People from developing countries are also sent to the UK for training.
and a common computerised information network of like-minded organizations called IDRIS.\footnote{IDRC BOG, "Notes of Proceedings," 23-25 October 1985, 9.}

Ivan Head actively sought to induce the creation of other like-minded organisations, especially in Japan.\footnote{Robert Auger, interview by author, 7 November 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.} We have already noted the existence of the Australian organisation, ACIAR, founded by Sir John Crawford. Other international centres with elements resembling IDRC were created, often funded by the Centre and organised by IDRC's staff. Many IDRC staff have left the Centre to join the international centres. The International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) and International Council for Research in Agro-Forestry (ICRAF), for example, can also be included among the like-minded organisations for these reasons.

Among Canadian organisations, we mentioned that the International Centre for Ocean Development's (ICOD) structure was modelled on IDRC's. Until the demise of ICOD in 1992, contact between ICOD and IDRC was quite close.\footnote{Gary Vernon, interview by author, 17 March 1994, by telephone, notes, Ottawa.} The Winnipeg-based International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) was explicitly modelled on IDRC. Like IDRC, IISD has an international board.\footnote{Anne Whyte, interview by author, 4 November 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.} The structure of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, (ICHRDD), located in Montreal, was also partly based on that of IDRC.
Beyond causing or promoting the proliferation of donors in the research for development niche, the existence of IDRC, led to other changes in the niche during the 1970s. By 1976, Ford, Rockefeller, USAID and the World Bank were giving more money to indigenous researchers, as well as many bilateral agencies. Hopper noted that year that "there has been increasing competition among donor agencies to follow the pattern that IDRC pioneered from its beginning." "USAID has shifted the proportion of its resources to developing [country] scientists from about 15% to almost 35% of its program."705 Because of IDRC's activities, CIDA also pursued initiatives in areas of population, agriculture and forestry.

IDRC has played an important connective role between donors. The Centre served as a bridge between the European and American donors in multilateral fora. Often in such fora, Americans and Europeans have opposed the placement of each others' representatives, and their initiatives. IDRC has fostered joint projects between the two North Atlantic solitudes. In particular, IDRC worked in close cooperation with SAREC. Little common European-North American work was customary before.706 As a general principle, joint activities can serve to legitimate more politically difficult projects. Of the joint projects the Centre has pursued with Rockefeller, Ford and SAREC, those with the Swedish organisation were the more politically risky. However, a greater abundance of projects have been conducted with Ford, over 150, compared to Rockefeller, over 60, and SAREC, over 30.707

The existence of other agencies has also served to strengthen niche members when they support each other. We noted in a previous chapter that Ivan Head prompted the Minister's Office at External Affairs to write a letter in support of ACIAR. This type of activity is not an isolated event. For example, the existence of IDRC has meant that when SAREC activities were reviewed


706 Doug Daniels, interview by author, 11 January 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

707 Source: IDRIS data base, 1 September 1993.
IDRC officers were able to comment favourably on their Swedish counterpart's activities. Such mutual aid has been extended to CIDA and Foreign Affairs by IDRC, as in 1985 when the Conservative government appeared ready to make substantial changes to foreign aid mechanisms. Ivan Head encouraged CIDA and External to "represent their interests" at a food security seminar to which IDRC had been invited to make a presentation and that promised to be used to herald a change of policy.\textsuperscript{708}

**IDRC's Effect on Developing Country Researchers**

The mere fact of an IDRC grant to a researcher raises the status of the person in the organisation in which they work, the country in which they live, and the research community they inhabit. As the late Yelavarthy Nayudamma said,

> The "IDRC support" label has greater significance for him [the researcher] than support from an Indian institution. He receives international acclaim and therefore becomes a growth pole around whom a few more scientists will join together.\textsuperscript{709}

Certainly in the 1970s, IDRC funded many Southern researchers who had never before been

\textsuperscript{708} Robert Elliot, Director General, Middle East Bureau (GMD), to USS, (Distribution: GGB, GAD, EED, EEA), "IDRC Seminar on African Food Security," TMS, 9 August 1985, Volume 50, 38-4-IDRC, Economic Relations with Developing Countries, Foreign Affairs Records, 1-2.

\textsuperscript{709} Nayudamma went on,

> So the direction of your project funding, in my view, is not necessarily based on whether it is seed money or institution building. It must be relative to excellence. Are you building a growth pole around whom something will develop tomorrow? If so, put more money into it. . . Also, provide him with the intellectual stimulus by putting him in touch with other intellectuals. That is what he needs to grow.


Nayudamma was killed in the Air India bombing of 1985.
funded. An evaluation of the Latin American Research Program in Human Reproduction (PLAMIRH) jointly funded by Ford and IDRC revealed that 77% had not received prior funding for research.\footnote{IDRC, Bogota, "Evaluation of the Latin American Research Program in Human Reproduction, PLAMIRH," July 1979, RG 55, 93-94/043, Box 66, OCG 8057, I0076/L0001, Treasury Board Records, Public Archives of Canada, 15.}

The arrival of IDRC in the development community was a time of excitement and discovery for IDRC staff. The enthusiasm of the staff was extraordinary in the early years, and spread out to recipients and donors alike. During the time he was an IDRC Programme Officer, Geoffrey Oldham founded the Caribbean Technology Policy Studies Project. He related to the author his experience with the left-leaning advisor to Michael Manley, Norman Girvan.\footnote{Girvan was an Associate Fellow of the Centre during 1994.} Girvan saw IDRC as just another Northern donor with venial designs, he was very suspicious of the Centre's motives. But over the course of a day of explaining the nature of IDRC, and later through his personal experience, Girvan came to accept that IDRC really wanted him to build a project of his choice.\footnote{Geoffrey Oldham, interview by author, 22 December 1993, tape recording, Ottawa.} This was confirmed by Girvan himself.\footnote{Norman Girvan, interview by author, 18 May 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.} Apparently this pattern was repeated many times with other recipients.\footnote{Geoffrey Oldham, interview by author, 22 December 1993, tape recording, Ottawa; Norman Girvan, interview by author, 20 May 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.} Certainly this was partnership, even though constrained within certain unspoken technical bounds. The project concerned science and technology policy instruments, an apparently politically neutral subject. This was not a work lionising the life and work of Michael Manley. Yet within those bounds, or perhaps because of them, word of the genuine desire for partnership by IDRC's staff came to be known by family members of recipients, even crossing genders. The sister of a former Korean partner in the STPI Project took up scientific development work because of seeing her own brother's enthusiasm for...
his IDRC-funded work.\textsuperscript{715}

The wisdom of selecting particular individuals and the positive effect of a validating IDRC grant has probably contributed to researchers' promotions in their own countries and within the community of world knowledge specialists. Illustrating from the case of the STPI Project, of the ten team leaders, seven rose very highly. Eduardo Amadeo became President of the Bank of Buenos Aires, Argentina's largest bank. He is now Minister of Social Affairs. Nicola Klujsev became Prime Minister of Macedonia. Dulce Amao de Uzcategui of Venezuela became minister of science in her country, as did the Korean Kun-Mo Chung. Francisco Sagasti became head of strategic planning at the World Bank and a potential Peruvian Presidential Candidate. Mauricio Campos became Director-General of UNCTAD. Such cases are not rare, particularly when IDRC support has been in risky hostile environments, such as the Southern Cone. In 1991, Head pointed out, "No less than 4 ministers in Chile's Aylwin government, and some individuals in senior positions, are all long-time recipients of IDRC assistance. Goulet's notion of world knowledge specialists seems relevant to a deeper understanding of the role of IDRC in its niche. The fact of an IDRC grant does seem to help legitimate individuals locally and globally. That the Centre's grants can have this effect on these individuals should not be taken that IDRC is merely a form of recruitment agency. It is in the business of knowledge generation and dissemination. "\textsuperscript{716} IDRC has clearly had an impact on the promotion of particular researcher and so gained influence, an ear in the court in the countries it operates in. Yet officers have not appreciated that this effect may, in fact, be one of their most telling effects. Having former recipients in top positions is bound to affect the policy in developing countries. The shape of development may therefore become more equitable and sustainable if IDRC picks its recipients well.

\textsuperscript{715} Geoffrey Oldham, interview by author, 22 December 1993, tape recording, Ottawa.

Policy Shifts During the Hopper Era

The general philosophy affirmed or laid down at the inception of the Hopper era lasted long beyond that presidency. Key elements of its tenets have been the credo of Centre staff for most of the Centre's history: a) responsiveness, b) indigenous capacity building, c) the disciplinary character of the Centre, and d) the technical orientation of its staff.

During the Hopper era, and beyond, the main divisions were largely left untouched, the spreading of the Regional and Liaison Offices continued, but a number of accommodations to the Canadian environment were made. In 1972, Canada and Donor Relations Division headed by Vice-President Louis Rousseau was formed to deal with Canadian academics and donors in general. In 1976, in the year of the ODA review, a Policy Unit was formed.

We should not conclude that IDRC only responded to Canadian pressures. A Vice-Presidency–International, first held by a Nepalese, Bhekh Thapa, was created at the same time as the one for Canada and Donor Relations. Most of the Regional Office network was laid by the end of Hopper's presidency. After the opening of the Asian Regional Office (ASRO) in Singapore in 1971 and Latin America Regional Office (LARO)\(^7\) in Bogota in 1972, Liaison Offices were unveiled in London, Washington, and Paris. The West Africa Regional Office (WARO) in Dakar was opened in 1973, and the Middle East Regional Office (MERO) in Beirut in 1974. The East Africa Regional Office (EARO) was inaugurated in Nairobi in 1976. In sum, during the Hopper era, structural change responded to the internationalist vision of the Centre first and foremost, but also to domestic pressures.

Later published versions of "Eleven Issues" do not include a twelfth issue that was included at the time in 1973. The missing issue was, "The balance between the growth of Centre resources from the Government of Canada and the maintenance of present Centre policies and

\(^7\) Now LACRO, a "C" for Caribbean was added in 1993.
character of operation.\textsuperscript{718} Naturally, this latter was seen to be of great importance to President Hopper at the time, and the 1978 Treasury Board and External Affairs studies detailed above both asserted that the Centre was reaching an optimal size. Following "Frosty" Hill's vision, Hopper found creative means of spending the increased levels of funding. IDRC helped forge a number of international centres, such as the International Food Policy Research Centre (IFPRI) in Washington, ICRAF in Nairobi, ICARDA in Aleppo, International Irrigation Information Centre (IIIC) in Israel, and also special support to the International Foundation for Science. IFPRI was also funded by the American foundations, and following a pattern that was to repeated in the other Centres, present or former IDRC staff or governors played a leading role in the new organisations. Sir John Crawford had championed the notion of IFPRI and became its Chairman. Crawford was Hopper's close ally on the Board.

In 1976, President Hopper suggested that the balances between various poles suggested in the "Eleven Issues" be shifted towards the funding of research that included more on-the-job training and basic research. In some areas, especially in Africa, research skills were seen to be weak. Training was seen as necessary in order to ensure useful results. Regarding the shift towards basic research, Hopper said that, "some of these problems can only yield to deep fundamental research being undertaken before we can move to the applied or problem-oriented area."\textsuperscript{719} However, Hopper's tenure was almost at an end. Training was revisited and strengthened as part of projects, but a shift to basic research did not take place, perhaps because it conflicted with the notion of the Centre's activities being more directly relevant to the needs of the poor.

\textsuperscript{718} David Hopper, "Outline Statement by the President to the Board of Governors," Bogota, Colombia, TD, 19 March 1973, RG 55, 86-87/359, Box 58, File 8071-04-4 Pt. 2, Treasury Board Records, Public Archives of Canada, 14.

\textsuperscript{719} David Hopper, IDRC BOG, Appendix G, "President's Statement to Board of Governors - March 1975," 16.
The Head Era — Building Quality of Life and Dignity

Ivan Head always called IDRC an expression, not an instrument, of Canadian foreign policy. But President Head also located IDRC relative to a revolution,

A new kind of revolution which in terms of impact is perhaps of greater scope than any since 1300. This revolution is scientific and technological in nature . . . This scientific and technological revolution also has a negative dimension. It has done little to remedy the imbalance between the rich and poor nations and has often widened the gap between the haves and the have-nots, the urban rich and the rural poor of the same nation. The founding philosophy of IDRC is to help find the way to remedy the paramount negative impact of this revolution.

Like Hopper, Head saw the Centre not as part of a scientific transformation of the South, but more as a corrective to the kind of development technological change has wrought.

Ivan Head became president of IDRC in March 1978. As we have seen, the first few years of his presidency, were marked by a series of external interventions by Treasury Board, PCO, MOSST, and External Affairs officials. They really did not ebb until the early 1980s. His gaze was necessarily on domestic affairs. Head's thinking as regards the roots of social disorder in developing countries very much paralleled Pearson's. In the context of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage crisis Head told the Board,

It is therefore important for all of us, in our outward activities, to attempt to communicate the message that the hot spots in the world today are in the developing countries and are not there necessarily because of Communist intervention, but because these are the areas

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720 Most present or former staff alluded to this quote when interviewed by the author. One example was former Executive Assistant, Claude-Paul Boivin.

Claude-Paul Boivin, interview by author, 1 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

where there is such disparity, such an absence of human dignity, and such despair, that the adventurers and the opportunists have easy access for their own purposes. Somehow or another, we must springboard beyond the immediacy of the events of the day and deal with the underlying causes. That, of course, is what IDRC attempts to do.\textsuperscript{722}

Human dignity and IDRC's role fostering it was a key theme of Head. Addressing President Carazo of Costa Rica during a 1982 Board meeting there he said that the Centre is:

\begin{quote}
Dedicated in its belief that human well-being is the significant element of international security, and that indigenous scientific and technological competence is an essential key in the attainment of that dignity. Since its inception, the Centre has attempted to respond to the requests of scientific institutions in the developing countries, providing funds and counsel to research projects that are designed, conducted and managed by local researchers.\textsuperscript{723}
\end{quote}

Some idea of the kind of Centre Head preferred could be discerned in the choice of David Steedman, Social Sciences Director from 1978–85. Steedman sought to foster a more cross-disciplinary (see definition of cross-disciplinary below)\textsuperscript{724} orientation in the Centre and longer-term institutional funding By the Centre. He felt that the Social Science Division tended towards the quantitative. "Traditionally, the Division had been reluctant to award grants to sociologists, ..."
anthropologists and other people working in rural organizational issues who were not hard economists.\textsuperscript{725} The notion of engagement was seen as risky, as a senior manager of the Division said to the author, their work was "policy," interdivisional cooperation was virtually nil.\textsuperscript{726} In the late 1970s, Treasury Board had suggested that many if not all social scientists be relocated in the "hard science" divisions. The idea held a particular horror for the social scientists of the division because they felt that they would become a mere technical add-on.

It was also during Head's term that contrary to the wishes of the then Chair, Donald Macdonald, institutional funding to the Southern Cone was established. Such funding had taken place under Hopper, but it was more the ad hoc funding of individuals. Elizabeth Fox led this particular initiative with the strong support of Ivan Head, Tony Tillett and Daniel Morales-Gomez, when for differing reasons the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations were withdrawing their funding. Naturally, such activity carried the risk of political danger for the Centre. But it was pursued. This was a period of retreat on the part of the social sciences as a whole, and many of whose members had been intellectually or politically exiled.

Head also believed that IDRC's image had to be better at communications, in the sense of first, public relations, and secondly, scientific dissemination. Head selected Sri Lankan Ernest Corea as Director of Publications Division.\textsuperscript{727} Corea was replaced with Reginald MacIntyre whose mandate as Director of Communication was "to firmly establish its credentials as a first-rate scientific publisher, and information disseminator."\textsuperscript{728}

\textsuperscript{725} IDRC BOG, "Draft Notes of Proceedings," 10-12 October 1979, 80.

\textsuperscript{726} Anonymous.

\textsuperscript{727} Although he was briefly VP Planning, the Sri Lankan journalist left IDRC to become Ambassador to the United Nations and Washington. He later joined the CGIAR Secretariat.

Ivan Head strove for larger budgets. He doubted that the Centre had reached an upper level and noted in 1978 to the Secretary of Treasury Board when the issue came up that the proposed American organisation, ISTC, was to begin funding at $120 million (1978 dollars). At that time IDRC received $34.5 million from the Government of Canada. Certainly this was seen as an issue by Bill Winegard who preferred a smaller Centre. One can assume that was why the Winegard Report, although it highly praised the Centre, did not recommend any growth of the Centre. Bureaucratisation with growth certainly became a fear and a reality as the Centre expanded during the 1980s.

Precisely to increase effectiveness, dissemination and the marketing of research funded by the Centre was emphasised. However, several obstacles stood in the way. The first was that concerted efforts on a product or theme might require millions. Centre officers typically had available to them tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars. Small budgets limited the degree that the Centre's officers could remain interested in any given project after the final phase. Either large donors like CIDA had to become interested in promoting IDRC's foreign technologies and notions, or the ideas lay dormant. Often they did.

Changes of the 1980s — Prelude to the 1990s

We have noted in previous chapters how the pressure of the central agencies brought about changes in IDRC's structure, with fewer activities, excepting the collaborative programmes in the 1980s. A number of attempts were made by upper level managers of IDRC to initiate centre-wide coherence and reform. Change was slow and inching. Outside IDRC, the gathering pace of change at almost all levels would help facilitate an atmosphere for change in IDRC itself in the 1990s.

729 Ivan Head to Maurice LeClair, TLS, 8 December 1978, PCO Records, 2.

730 Bill Winegard, interview by author, 13 April 1994, tape recording, Guelph.
A series of themes emerged in the early 1980s that slowly came to dominate the discourse in the Centre over the next decade and a half. The 10th Anniversary Board meeting in October 1980 was particularly important in this regard. President Head re-affirmed Hopper's emphasis on applied research which would "improve the rural areas of the developing countries." However, he questioned the actual practice of the Centre as regards institutional capacity and research networks, and suggested that they should be investigated and guidelines put in place. He also asked, "Has the Centre now gained a maturity which will permit it to engage more frequently in project activities of a multi-disciplinary character?"  

The Vice-President of Planning, Nihal Kappagoda, presented a paper on networks and noted common needs and problems,

(a) The issue of network development and the need to give it more emphasis;
(b) The need to go beyond support for research activities and to look at other requirements such as the development of financial and administrative capabilities of research institutions;
(c) The need for longer term support for projects and institutions;
(d) Staff development and training, including more communications within the Centre.

David Hopper appeared at the 10th Anniversary Board to reinforce the importance of utilisation. Yet when both international and Canadian governors strongly called for more emphasis on utilisation in October 1981, and James Mullin became Director of the Cooperative Programme Division, Head feared that the mandate of the Centre was under threat. For Head, IDRC's mission was the "enhancement of the indigenous research competence of the developing countries." Head stated flatly that if the Centre's purpose was to be re-directed to "solve problems and to make sure that the results become utilized or implemented, we, in Centre management, need a very firm direction from this Board." That direction did not come, although increasing emphasis on utilisation was pressed for by governors, some staff and federal officials.

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732 Nihal Kappagoda, IDRC BOG, 29-31 October 1980, 78

733 David Hopper, IDRC BOG, 29-31 October 1980, 52.

Nevertheless, Head's 1980 Presidential Statement was a signal of a series of changes in the Centre's discourse towards more interdisciplinarity, networks, institutional strengthening, utilisation, and interdivisional cooperation or coherence.

Coherence was also facilitated by the 1981 request by Chairman Donald Macdonald that ideas generated by the Board be investigated. The creation of the Office of Planning and Evaluation (OPE) in 1979 under Doug Daniels became the principal engine in the Ottawa office to attempt to change the policy discourse of the Centre. A University of Alberta-trained economist, Daniels joined AFNS in 1973. In his new position, Daniels and his group did change the policy discourse of the Centre, laying the groundwork for much of its 1990s landscape. However, power was largely exercised by Divisional Directors and Programme Officers whose practices only slowly came to resemble policy statements.

OPE was most successful when their staff sought to strengthen trends already afoot in Centre divisions. Daniels promoted further the notion of networks, which was successfully pioneered in the Divisions. Other reforms were attempted with varying degrees of success. We noted that David Steedman felt that longer-term institutional capacity-building was preferable to short-term project based building. This was also concluded by Daniels and members of his staff. Clearly, different strategies were seen as necessary in different regions. The progressive collapse of African economies and societies brought this home to IDRC staff as nothing else could. Daniels and Steedman fostered co-operation with Regional Directors to develop long-term funding to research organisations in East and West Africa.

We noted that under Chairman Donald Macdonald, the Board began to assert itself more

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than in the past. During the previous ten years, governors had intermittently complained that they were swamped by project dockets, and could never outline or discuss policy as such. The earlier approach appealed to members of the Board like Winegard, who spent long hours over this material. However, other governors held to a different perspective. During the 1970s, the role of social scientists in development was seen to be "under-estimated" in the Centre as a whole. Their emergence was facilitated by the arrival in the late 1970s of governors who were more interested in a less narrowly technical Centre, such as Gelia Castillo, Alan Gotlieb and Carl-Göran Hedén, and the passing out of governors not favouring multidisciplinary approaches such as Rex Nettleford in 1981, and Sir Geoffrey Wilson in 1984. In 1987 Castillo pushed for the creation of a Programme and Policy Committee of the Board. Screening of projects was undertaken by a Screening Committee chaired by Gerry Helleiner. Peter Larkin screened alone until the disappearance of the two committees in 1991. What this did was shift the balance of scrutiny to discourse over project details to broader policy issues. These issues were important in legitimating the language which was produced in OPE, and Governors' own concerns, especially as regards utilisation. However, these changes also facilitated various strategies of avoidance by staff. Rising levels of authority were given to the President on down and they partially hid projects which would be less acceptable to some governors. Divisions became famous for proposing projects just under the level to which they would be scrutinised, especially if they were deemed politically sensitive. Eventually, governors moved to demand that if they were seeing few projects, then something was amiss. Nevertheless, the shift from project detail to policy served to change the discourse of the Centre, and although the Committees no longer exist, the focus at the Board level remains policy.

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740 James Mullin, interview by author, 14 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.
An important part of the difficulty lay in the Divisional solitudes. As part of the Ten-Week Seminar in the Centre in 1986 (see below), Social Sciences Division reaction to calls for inter-divisional cooperation were less than fulsome.

We suspect that pressure for collaboration with the Social Sciences Division is building up in other divisions where research typically produces a product -- such as a new strain of sorghum, a new vaccine or a new package of practices -- which, to have an effect, must be used. Whether and how their product will be used will be determined by social, economic and cultural factors. . . the collaborative projects are very time-consuming to develop and sometimes come to an unhappy end, we are worried that a massive diversion of our resources into this kind of service activity would trivialize our Division.  

Clearly, the reaction to such entreaties indicated fear of subordination and marginalisation. In January of 1986 an Ad Hoc Board Committee divisional review had been completed. As in other such reviews, it consisted of a study of Divisions by governors, assisted by consultants and OPE. Yet even Joe Hulse, seen to be the most sceptical of social scientists, said to the Board in 1984, to the surprise of some governors,

> It has been my concept since the outset of the Centre that the Social Sciences Division ought to be the leading edge of the Centre. After all, most of the problems we are dealing with are social and economic problems. They are not technological problems; the technological must come in behind the definition by the social sciences of what is wrong and what is needed. I think we have far too much technology push and far too little human demand in our planning and I find this throughout the world.

Governors such as Bill Winegard tended to encourage the Division to become "harder." After the

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741 Social Science Division, IDRC, "Interdivisional Cooperation, Some Thoughts," "Module 1, General Reaction," TD, 1986, PO-180-00040 VO2, Presidential Executive Series, Plans & Programs - General, Policy & Management Seminar, A999, IDRC Records, 3.

742 These divisional studies were first called Ad Hoc Board Committee Reports and later, In-Depth Divisional Reviews (IDDRs). They had been initiated in 1978 with a study of Information Sciences Division. This form of Board scrutiny ended with the Bezanson presidency.

743 Joe Hulse, IDRC BOG, "Notes of Proceedings," 17-19 October 1984, 44.
The nettle of interdivisional cooperation was grasped but not overcome in the 1980s. The clear end was greater cross-disciplinarity. Ivan Head instituted a series of structural changes and exercises to facilitate interdivisional cooperation. Of course, the establishment of OPE and the Vice-President of Planning were the first structural means of improving the cohesion or coherence of the Centre. In 1983, a new series of Vice-Presidents was announced. In theory, the four Vice-Presidents would be able to promote greater inter-divisional cooperation because they were above the divisional structures, commonly seen as "fiefdoms." Governor Stuart described the situation thus,

The strength of the Centre is programs and the most powerful people in the Centre, in functional terms, are the Program Directors. These are heads of, quite often, not independent principalities but, certainly, fiefdoms of great authority.

That Stuart said so four years after the creation of the Vice-Presidencies indicates the success of the reform in strengthening interdivisional coherence. In practice, what these alterations largely did was to remove those who had previously operational authority, and made them influential gatekeepers. Several interlocutors in the Centre saw the changes as the equivalent of being

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745 Claude-Paul Boivin, interview by author, 1 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

746 Coherence is the term that has tended to be used in the place of cohesion, implying a desire to have Centre activities to be less disparate.

747 Joe Hulse, became Vice-President (VP) of Research; James Mullin, VP—Collaborative Programmes; John Woolston, VP—Information; and Raymond Audet, VP—Resources.

South Asia Regional Office (SARO) opened in 1983.

"kicked upstairs" to the British House of Lords.\(^\text{749}\) As former directors became Vice-Presidents, new Directors were required. Thus was provided the opportunity for the infusion and consolidation of a new management team at the Director level in the shape of: Anne Whyte in Social Sciences, Martha Stone in Information Sciences, Hubert Zandstra in AFNS, David Nostbakken in Communications, and Richard Wilson in Health Sciences. All of these Directors were far more socially oriented than the previous managers. However, most followed in IDRC tradition of being strong, independently-minded managers. To many in the Centre, managers and Programme Officers, the forging of inter-divisional cooperation seemed forced and time-wasting. There seemed little reason to do so. IDRC was praised in Canada as a model the world over. In 1988, Sigma Xi, the International Scientific Research Society based in America chose IDRC to be first recipient of its 21st Century Award given "to individuals or institution helping to best prepare society for the next century."\(^\text{750}\) Their principal interlocutors in the research community, university professors, were largely grouped on a disciplinary basis, and were not much interested either in cross-disciplinarity or the marketing of their research. Many were not interested in dissemination either. There was autonomy to risk and little incentive to change.

With the aim of creating a greater sense of coherence and common purpose, a mission and objectives exercise was launched in 1985. The mission was written in OPE and reflected a desire to affect divisional activities. However, Governors, notably Jorge Hardoy, shrank from too much specificity of objectives, fearing a loss of flexibility. Instead, a pre-amble was written which provided an affirmation of much of Hopper's credo, but also reflected changes in direction.

In the view of the Centre, development is a process for the benefit of people and should be consistent with human dignity, which is best fostered in conditions of adequate nutrition, sound health, independence of spirit, pride in indigenous culture and respect for human rights.\(^\text{751}\)

\(^{749}\) Nihal Kappagoda, interview by author, 9 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.


The new emphasis on human dignity and human rights was very much the stamp of Ivan Head on the Centre's self-perception. The focus on poverty, and not the rural poor, which had been Hopper's target, was further confirmation of change under Head's presidency. That culture was mentioned, and science was virtually absent in the pre-amble and the rest of the statements seems to indicate a deeper shift in policy. While research remained central to the document, scientific transformation as such did not.

**A Prodding: The Ten-Week Seminar**

In order to make managers across divisions talk to each other a so-called Ten-Week Seminar began immediately after the March 1986 Board Meeting. In essence, managers were locked-up and forced to speak to each other.\(^{752}\) Perhaps using a common central agent tactic of creating a small arena in which conflicting departments could resolve conflicts by themselves, Head did not intervene and force cohesion but stepped back.\(^{753}\) A series of Working Groups were established which were to deal with outstanding weaknesses. These Working Groups and others that were established, especially those on pesticide, and participatory research became a mechanism to create interdivisional links. The Seminar led to inter-divisional friendships where few had existed before. The Centre as a whole started to become an interlocking community. The Ten–Week Seminar also served as a means of recognising the lack of cohesion.

Lack of cohesion was recognised as a problem, as an AFNS response outlined, This is not only perceived by the Board but also by the Centre's clientele. Fragmentation, and inconsistency in policies among IDRC divisions are frequently remarked upon.\(^{754}\)

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\(^{752}\) Fawzy Kishk, interview by author, 2 November 1994, notes, Ottawa.

\(^{753}\) Doug Daniels, interview by author, 11 January 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

The recognition that the Centre's clientele were aware of IDRC's fragmentation was serious indeed. Vice-President James Mullin had encountered this the first time he met a recipient in the field. While in Alexandria, Mullin met an Egyptian researcher who said,

I have discovered that one of your Divisions will not pay overhead to the university, but tops up academic salaries. And another Division refuses to pay overhead but tops up salaries. He said, I assume that you're going to give me some of mine [sic] and pay overhead to my university and top up my faculty's salaries.755

These varied but fixed procedures were "adopted as firm lines to get over the hassle of negotiations" which Centre officers found distasteful.756 That they were adopted without reference to other divisions shows how independent the Divisions were.

IDRC had been growing apart, not only because of Divisional barriers, but simply its size had grown considerably over the previous decade. Its staff grew from 194 programme staff and total expenditures of $36.4 million in 1977, to 286 staff and expenditures of $63.7 million in 1985.757 What the 1986 exercise achieved was the creation of friendships and the beginnings of the use of a common language among managers, staff and the Board at the level of policy, even if project practices remained largely divisionally determined.

755 To which Mullin replied, "I'm a Scotsman and I will give you neither." James Mullin, interview by author, 14 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

756 James Mullin, interview by author.

757 IDRC, Program of Work and Budget 1979-80, IDRC Records, 257; IDRC, Program of Work and Budget 1986-87, IDRC Records, 38.
Global Change — Centre Response

During the 1980s, in Canada and the world at large major changes were taking place in a variety of arenas. African and Latin American countries groaned and stumbled under the weight of debt. The importance of economics, which Gerry Helleiner as Governor stressed, were painfully obvious. In the 1980s, the Centre funded capacity-building and research for state and university researchers so that national governments would be able to deal with greater skill with the IMF or the World Bank. Helleiner was called upon to set up an IDRC team to advise the new Museveni government in Uganda on economic matters. This later led to the creation of a new research delivery mechanism, the consortium. Jeffrey Fine pioneered the African Economic Research Consortium. A Latin American Economic Research Consortium followed. Another example of Centre responsiveness to global change was the funding of the Debt Recording Management Information System (DRMIS). Former IDRC Vice-President, Nihal Kappagoda, then at the Commonwealth Secretariat, convinced IDRC to jointly fund DRMIS. As of 1994, thirty-three Commonwealth countries use the system to better manage their debt burden. The earlier version has spread outside the Commonwealth including Laos, and Bulgaria.

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758 The consortium was similar to a 1970s experiment, PLAMIRH, which also provided small grants to researchers.

759 This has now been translated to French by IDRC.

Changing Notions of Partnership

In Asia, momentous changes were taking place. The new High-Yielding Varieties of foodgrains had helped to vastly increase the agricultural productivity of land in Asia. Less well-known, but probably as significant, was a shift to the growing of more than one crop per year, multicropping. IDRC had been important in contributing to this by funding research on rice multicropping at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines and elsewhere. The notion spread throughout much of Asia and beyond. This innovation combined with others meant that major Asian countries like India became net exporters of food. For the first time in history, the notion of absolute scarcity of foodgrains in some developing countries was overcome, even if the more socially difficult question of relative deprivation was left largely untouched. The Centre responded by shifting research to oilseeds, of which there was a shortage in developing countries, while continuing to fund aquaculture and diverse foodstuffs more likely to be eaten by the poor.

Other changes were taking place in Asia. The Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) were emerging and breaking down the stereotypical role of the division between the First World and Third World. At first, the countries that appeared to undergo such transformations seemed to be special cases, many bankrolled as bulwarks against communism, like South Korea and Taiwan. Later in the 1980s, it became evident that additional parts of the South were industrialising, if unevenly. Meanwhile, traditional Northern industrial belts de-industrialised as industry moved to developing countries.

In the 1980s, the notion of the South as helpless supplicant was at once reinforced in


Africa, and negated, in parts of Asia. Indonesians, for example, came to CIDA with a list of items they wanted. They had determined what Canadian goods they wanted and sought them out. CIDA staff had not determined the list. Further, if the Indonesians were offered goods they did not like, they refused aid. This was quite unheard of hitherto and reflected a change in the nature of the partnership which critics like Goulet had rightly decried in the 1970s. In some cases, the partnership was equal, or even more than equal. Certainly, vulnerability was evident on both sides, thus, at least in some cases making the possibility of an equal partnership more certain. We noted that within the Centre a great deal of resistance had been held by staff regarding collaborative projects with Canadians. We will now briefly discuss the progress of that debate and how it changed in the face of the weakening of the definition "developing country."

Collaboration with Canadians

Prior to the arrival of James Mullin and the Cooperative Programme in the Centre, staff and governors were unhappy at the change. We noted that Vice-President Louis Berlinguet was seen as representing "Canadianisation" and was pruned during the two percent cut of 1979. The attitude of Governors in 1979 was strongly represented by veteran Governor, Rex Nettleford.

In a way, we have been made "an offer we cannot refuse". . . I feel it is likely to compromise IDRC's position. It certainly compromises the position of Third World people on a Board like this, because we are being asked to comment on something in which we really have no confidence. . . I don't think we can fool ourselves, however, that this particular grafting onto IDRC could lead to other than a total Canadianization of what is supposed to be an international body.

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762 Peter Morgan, interview by author, 24 March 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

763 This was, however, a more equal partnership at the level of elites. Nevertheless, it was a radical change from the past.

Others, such as Governor Stewart suggested that this "should be regarded not as a threat but as an opportunity." By 1981, concerns were lessened but the notion of partnership and IDRC as an instrument of Southern concerns was placed in the centre of discussions. As Governor Castillo noted,

> It looks very vertical to me—from Canada to us. At times, you may learn something from us too. We must build a mutuality in terms of thinking about the research project that will be addressed.  

Verbatim Board minutes record that in the period after Mullin's arrival there was very little open opposition to the Cooperative Programme's activities, although many officers were less than keen on the change in emphasis. Mullin received little criticism at the Board level, and perhaps from other staff because he insisted that developing country researchers define their projects and choose their Canadian collaborators. Interested Canadians had to find a developing country partner and make the collaboration substantive. Yet clear concerns were registered. Head pointed out in 1981,

> This new program is distinct. It is responsive to UNCSTD [United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development]. The request was "access to developed country capacity." My concern was simply that in our zeal to deal with this program as efficiently and effectively and as well as Jim Mullin has arranged it, matched with our zeal to ensure some utilization, we do not allow the philosophy of this program which is somewhat distinct to wag the IDRC dog.

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767 James Mullin, interview by author, 14 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.
The earlier world-view of most IDRC staff seems to have been that they were to respond to developing country needs, only. The task of IDRC was an internationalist endeavour, and contact with Canadians, in government, business or academia was to be controlled and resisted for fear of simply becoming an instrument of parochialism. This was a danger. Equally clear was that those pressures demanded a response. However, a more craven reaction was largely avoided which squared the circle. Nevertheless, even this response was seen by many as giving in, and affecting the purity of the vision of IDRC as an independent international agency not driven by the more selfish pre-occupations of Canadians.\footnote{James Mullin, interview by author, 14 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.} There was certainly a fear of being sullied, but the fact that the hot breath of parochial interest was reaching into IDRC's corridors gave IDRC managers and staff more in common with staff in CIDA, and other like-minded agencies and recipients for whom such concerns were more quotidian and insistent.
IDRC's research environment had changed too. Partially as a result of the efforts of IDRC and like-minded organisations, the massive expansion of formal education in the South, the industrialisation of the South, and the relative de-industrialisation of the North, the number of scientists in the South grew. Projections indicate that are now more agricultural scientists located in the South than in the North. (See Figure 24) On top of the massive rise in the number of scientists in the South, expenditures on scientists per person in the North and now are closely parallel to those in most parts of the South in dollar terms. (See Figure 25)
Considering that overall costs are lower in the South, the quality of research that can be afforded is even closer to par. Nevertheless, we should not forget that funding to research institutions in the South has also been major. For example, the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research's funds have dropped considerably as has funding to Indian research institutes. However, the relative rise in the research establishment and its spending power in the South is significant. IDRC staff, especially in OPE, became aware of these changes in research published by ISNAR around 1985. Consequently, even for the most technically-minded, with the exception of Africa, building a scientific bridgehead in the South became less relevant. Continuing to fund the networks which IDRC had always nourished, so building a Southern discourse, and a knitting it into a global discourse remained more valid.

We noted that the definition of "developing country" began to break down. It became apparent that IDRC was not supporting modernisation per se, but seeking to affect the nature of the development itself. This is evident in Board-level discussions over the continuation of funding to South Korea and to Nigeria. In other words, IDRC sought to instill equitable development practices, the degree to which the country was developed was less relevant. In the 1980s, large swaths of the First, Second and Third World melted into one world economy. The democracy and human rights were accepted as part of the agenda by most donors (including IDRC), and its value-laden implications. Rethinking the state was no longer the province of the lunatic left or right, and re-awakening civil society and empowering stakeholders became a lingua franca inside and outside development circles. Further, the electronic global village became a reality. As the Berlin Wall fell, so in a like manner did the language and method of science change.

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770 Anonymous; Anil Gupta, interview by author, 15 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

771 IDRC, Searching, IDRC - 245e. Ottawa: IDRC, 1985, 12.
Changes in Thinking about Development, Information, and Science

During the 1980s, general thinking about development, science and information underwent major shifts. New fields of research, such as the informal economy, the role of cultural values, indigenous knowledge and the environment began to show that other factors, hitherto seen as impediments or externalities had a real and necessary place in development practice. It was noticed that those most easily able to "develop" were often relatively homogeneous societies, with national cultures and a strong state tradition. Aspects of the kind of "universal" cultural values that Ford Foundation's Francis X. Sutton had delineated in the 1950s did embed themselves in these industrialising societies. However, equally clear was that the Korean and Japanese cultures, for example, retained cultural values vital to their development, which, contrary to modernisation theory, were "functional" although sometimes contrary to "universal" norms.772

"Sustainable development" burst onto the international development stage in 1987 in the form of the Brundtland Commission. Canadians sat in key positions. Maurice Strong was a member of the Commission, and would soon head, for the second time, the global Conference on Environment and Development. Canadians Jim McNeill was the Commission's Secretary-General, "Chip" Lindner became his chief assistant. The Brundtland Commission was embraced by Ivan Head with the same enthusiasm he felt for the Brandt Commission. IDRC came to house all the Brundtland documents. In May 1987, the World Bank announced the creation of an Environment Department. These changes and the location of Canadians in these processes had consequences for IDRC.

Changes in the way information was being perceived was also important for the Centre.

During the 1980s, information became an international commodity of value as fast as lightning. While New York slept, money was shifted to Tokyo to accrue interest. Information, and its more valuable form, knowledge, came to be seen to have value wherever it could be found.

Consequently, the environmental claim that rainforests had inherent value was realised by more than plant breeders secreted in multinationals and the CGIAR centres. Biochemist and IDRC Governor Carl-Göran Hedén encouraged Centre staff to recognise the importance of his two passions, biotechnology and information management. As a result, IDRC-supported computer conferencing became more frequent after Hedén's 1980 suggestion.773 The information networks that IDRC had supported began to take on a clearer value. Yet the realisation of information as knowledge or something more tangible became more urgent as Northern budgets slimmed.

Changes in Scientific and Management Discourse

The 1980s also brought changes in the language and method of scientific inquiry. In information sciences, for example, the technocrat Von Neumann's more hierarchical digital technology, began to give way to neural networks. The metaphor for science changed.

A typical computer moves methodically from step to step, passing information along a chain of logical decisions in a process not unlike decision making in a typical business hierarchy. Each worker makes a recommendation to his or her immediate supervisor; the supervisor tallies those opinions, makes a decision, and then feeds it up the line. By the time the information has reached the president of the company, it has all come together, and a final decision is made.

But in neural networks—and the brain—information flows back and forth as different elements in the system work together. The workers, or neurons, tell one another how strongly they feel on the issue. As they listen to the discussing, the workers change the strength of how they feel. Gradually the opinions of the workers polarize and the group comes to a decision.774


774 William F. Allan, Apprentices of Wonder: Inside the Neural Network Revolution, Toronto: Bantam, 1989, 94.
The shift in the metaphor for the computer revolution, from hierarchy, to consultation and compromise seems indicative to changes in the broader scientific and social fabric. The mechanistic view of the universe of Spinoza and its monist atoms began to fall to the plural quarks. In 1984, Murray Gell-Mann, one of the main proponents of quark theory said,

"There's a striking phenomenon of convergence in science and scholarship that has been taking place, especially in the forty years since the Second World War, and at an accelerated pace in the last decade. New subjects, highly interdisciplinary in traditional terms, are emerging and represent in many cases the frontier of research. These interdisciplinary subjects do not link together the whole of one traditional discipline with another; particularly subfields are joined together to make a new subject."

Hierarchical method, subject-object divisions, Cartesian disciplinary barriers were not only being questioned, but being replaced in the scientific world. Reductionist rationalist techniques were displaced by non-linear chaos theory and "soft and fuzzy" logic. Practising scientists,

More and more felt the compartmentalization of science as an impediment to their work, More and more felt the futility of studying parts in isolation from the whole. For them, chaos was the end of the reductionist program in science.

Perhaps surprisingly, participation and restructuring was also on the lips of corporate executives. Mission exercises, improved internal communication, flattened or overturned hierarchies, and an end to corporate boundaries were declared the order of the day. For example, business guru Tom Peters wrote in *Liberation Management*:

Roald Nomme, a former Scandinavian Air System executive, comments that a customer experiences the airline "horizontally"—a baggage handler at the front entrance to the airport, then a gate person. . and so on. . While the customer's view is completely horizontal, the functionally conceived organization goes about most of its work via vertical, often non-communicative "departments" (baronies, fiefdoms, imperial states). . .

Customer perceptions are "horizontal." Fast product development is "horizontal." Partnering and networking are "horizontal" (the spider web versus the pyramid imagery). Learning is "horizontal." . .

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"Horizontal" versus "vertical is a highly abstract formulation, I admit. But no idea—not one—in this book is more important. Flip that axis.777

With the exception of mission exercises, these particular changes in the global policy environment were generally little part of the discourse in the programme divisions at IDRC in the 1980s. This was to change in the 1990s. However, during the former decade the gaze of IDRC staff remained fixed on the Southern research environment, part of which was collapsing.

IDRC's Response

At its foundation, IDRC was to be cross-disciplinary. We recall that the only difficult question at Cabinet Committee in 1969 concerning the application of the research the Centre would fund was answered with an assurance that IDRC would be cross-disciplinary.778 Ventures into funding more participatory and interdisciplinary research began in the 1970s with AFNS support to farming systems research and some Social and Health Sciences work. The former brought a non-professional, the farmer, part way into the research dialogue. The first substantial Board discussion of participatory research took place in 1987779 when the new Director of Social Sciences, Anne Whyte presented a paper. Whyte and her staff members Sheldon Shaffer and Anne Bernard were very interested in this kind of research. Exploratory forays into this type of approach in the early 1980s. Participatory research was strongly supported by Governors Gelia Castillo and Gerald Helleiner.780


778 At the time, the word used was "multidisciplinary," but the notion was not so nuanced at that time.


780 Anne Whyte, interview by author, 4 November 1994, tape recording, Ottawa; Gerald Helleiner, interview by author, 3 May 1994, by telephone, notes, Ottawa-Toronto.
Divisional walls weakened and the Cartesian disciplinary walls began to collapse inside the Centre in the 1980s. In AFNS, Hubert Zandstra and Geoffrey Hawtin recognised the value of dialogue with social scientists and farmers. Under the Director of Health Sciences, Richard Wilson, the Health Systems programme, brought a broader range of health professionals, including barefoot doctors into the development research process. Interdivisional cooperation began between Social Sciences and Health Sciences, if uncomfortably, in the population and development research programme. The developing trend across divisions can be sensed from part of IDRC’s Annual Report 1985-86 concerning the Information Sciences Division,

To summarize: an increasing number of the Information Sciences Division's projects are designed to supply information directly to users — doctors, extension workers, farmers, farmers, farmers, this changed focus was bound up with a compulsion to ensure that the research generated was used.

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Dissemination and Utilisation

You find sometimes that a Thing which seemed very Thingish inside you is quite different when it gets out into the open and has other people looking at it.

- Pooh

Unlike Pooh, IDRC has not suffered the indignity of scrutiny revealing a lack of substance of the research it funds, but Centre staff and its partners have shown a marked reluctance to get their funded research out into the open with the aim of utilising it. Under pressure from a variety of sources in the late 1970s, IDRC published the first major retrospective of Centre activities, Give Us the Tools. The process of gathering the projects revealed that the Treasury Board's criticisms regarding utilisation were somewhat justified. Despite the research often being relevant to the needs of developing countries; despite it responding to the identified needs of developing country researchers; and even if it was "hard" applied research, relatively little of it was disseminated and marketed. This created a political problem for IDRC managers in that there was little product to show. One of the very attractive aspects of the Centre was that was assumed that it would produce relevant usable goods for developing countries, especially the rural poor. Politicians need to show that they have responded to the public's needs. Many hospitals have been built as tangible proof for this reason. Likewise, IDRC managers needed to have proof of their effectiveness. Research could not be left to be an end in itself. In the early 1980s, discussions began in earnest regarding the question of dissemination, and the marketing of technologies.

A policy and utilisation oriented approach began to be practised by the innovative Singapore Office of the Centre in 1981.

ASRO is following an approach which is new to IDRC and focuses on "policy-oriented projects." Research projects are expected to be translated into concrete actions, rather than simply be added to the library's collection or merely being mentioned in the

researcher's curriculum. In order to achieve this objective, IDRC has been encouraging the formation of research teams comprised of both researchers and policy makers.\footnote{Jingjai Hanchanlash, "Information in the Service of Development: IDRC in South-East Asia" in Cohn, Theodore, Geoffrey Hainsworth and L.J. Kavic (eds.), Canada and South-East Asia, Coquitlam, B.C.: Kaen, 1982, 55.}

Among the Governors the pressure for the dissemination and utilisation of research came from two sources. Bill Winegard was the most keen in this regard. In general, engineer Winegard was anxious that IDRC's projects be "hard," he shared the disdain of the more technically-minded towards the social sciences. His influence continued when he became Chair of the House Committee on External Affairs and National Defense in 1984. His most telling effect was the selection of Janet Wardlaw as Chair, whom he judged would push IDRC to be more effective.\footnote{Bill Winegard, interview by author, 13 April 1994, tape recording, Guelph.} Interestingly, however, the most audible presence on the Board pushing for dissemination and utilisation was not Canadian, and not a "hard" scientist. Sociologist Gelia Castillo, a Filipino governor, was well-aware of the virtues and dements of the Centre as a former IDRC recipient.

I sit here as someone from a developing country. I want to get as much as I can from Canada but, in order to continue doing that, I must also take the place of a Canadian taxpayer. If I see this expansion in our budgeting, at some point, somebody is going to ask: Who has benefitted from all of these projects?\footnote{Gelia Castillo, IDRC BOG, "Notes of Proceedings," 28-30 March 1984, 35.}

By 1985, IDRC management and Governors came to the realisation that an orientation towards the poor and equity was not sufficient to ensure equitable development. The Annual Report of that year stated "research projects must address real problems and research results must be utilized for the benefit of those most in need."\footnote{IDRC, Annual Report 1985-1986, Ottawa: IDRC, 1986, 6.} Five years, before the writers of an IDRC training policy study had identified a number of obstacles.

There is a research mentality which might be considered the ultimate goal of the Centre's research and training activities. The aim might be a generation (and in some countries a re-generation) of a cadre of scientists who consider research a profession and a vocation.
and apply themselves systematically over time.

But the inherent biases of the research IDRC funds seems urban biased and not related, and not vitally connected to the needs of the poor. In most areas of IDRC programming, research is meant to produce knowledge of technologies applicable to the needs of the LDCs -- particularly those of the poorer, more marginal communities. Much of this new knowledge, however, is generated by researchers and planners at the national level and thus neither relates to the actual conditions or needs of the poor nor is easily transmitted to those meant to be the ultimate beneficiaries of the research.787

Clearly, the gap between researchers and the poor required effort to overcome it. Some Governors were both cognizant and impatient about this issue. In 1985, as part of the mission exercise, OPE officers distinguished between "clients" more often than not researchers, and "beneficiaries"788 usually seen as the poor of developing countries.789 Also in 1985, Governor Sir Kenneth Stuart insisted that,

Every project should have . . . a clear statement of the instruments and mechanisms by which the clients are going to be associated with the beneficiaries. . . Too much of the work that I have seen in these projects have been mediated . . . through the universities . . . universities tend to . . . like to produce high degrees PhDs, etc., and connecting up their

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788 These terms had been used loosely in the Centre for years but had not become codified objects of interest at the Board-level.

789 Although each Division subsequently wrote its own definition, the general definition was as follows:

Beneficiaries - "those to whose well-being the Center wants the activities it supports to contribute - the peoples of the Third World..."

Clients - "those who are the direct recipients of Centre support - research and research-supporting institutions and the people within them."

findings with the concerns of people is not usually one of their prime concerns.\footnote{Sir Kenneth Stuart, IDRC BOG, "Notes of Proceedings," 23-25 October 1985, 126.}

The year 1987 was a particularly important one in signifying the need for a change of direction. This was the year that Brundtland's \textit{Our Common Future} was published. It was also the year that Ivan Head was to be re-appointed, or a new President found. Thus, the nexus between research and development became a matter of greater interest. In 1987 too, the Board became seized with utilisation, and had the instruments of the Policy and Programme and Screening Committees to insist on them.

Early in 1987, Bill Winegard, then House Committee Chair for External Affairs and National Defense, made a presentation to the Board specifically on the utilization of research results.

Most significant, is a sense that the research is there, there is no question, it is in the books, but then what? The Committee somehow feels that IDRC has got to go further. \footnote{Bill Winegard, IDRC BOG, "Notes of Proceedings," 17-20 March 1987, 34.}

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In terms of dissemination of information, in some sense, we are saying it is too formal and not applied enough to get it out there.\footnote{Ivan Head, IDRC BOG, "Notes of Proceedings," 14-16 October 1987, 119.}

One can imagine that this presentation, made months before the selection of the President, was intended to have some weighty effect. President Head noted that,

\begin{quote}
We are fully cognizant of the importance of the utilization of research results. Unless they are implemented, we, inside, have said for a long time, capacity building aside, research results are of little value sitting on a shelf. They attract honour to the researcher and dust to the volume, but nothing at all to the beneficiaries that we all had in mind.
\end{quote}

Over the succeeding years, especially during the Bezanson presidency, the Board and management have taken a number of steps to make utilisation a reality. However, the Kirby-Herzka Report on Regional Offices, which was penned during the Bezanson presidency, and most interviews with staff, seem to indicate that unless Programme Officers and Directors are
Another way of tackling the problem of utilisation has been the investigation of the notion of knowledge broker," which is being conducted by Geoffrey Oldham in the President's Office. The core of the idea is that most important research is that which is picked up by policy-makers, but they are not often well-informed. In pursuit of this he has investigated policy-making in the UK, China, Venezuela and Western Australia. In Sri Lanka, he found that the "half-life for a researcher was fairly short, the half-life of a policy-maker is even shorter . . the bridges that you have put in place at one point in time therefore collapse very quickly." His studies suggest that policy-makers could be better informed with knowledge (vs. information) "find better ways of accessing knowledge" following "some sort of knowledge broker intermediary between those who have knowledge and those who need to make decisions." The delineation of the necessary qualities and the fostering of a new form of intermediary may be important to the likelihood of the future utilisation of research in general and Centre research in particular.


794 James Mullin, interview by author, 14 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.
real benefit for communities, for populations, for states.⁷⁹⁵

A New Commons, the Re-Emergence of Culture

While the NICs of Asia development called into doubt the notion that development swept away all ascriptive culture before it, some in Latin America and Africa questioned the relevance of development to most people. The Mexican thinker Gustavo Esteva has spoken about an explosion of participation by Mexicans in the wreckage of the debt-ridden 1980s. Esteva says that most Mexicans,

Saw that the middle classes were receiving a lot of things but nothing of this was for them. For them usually development represented more the police or the bulldozer, not really some kind of benefit. They, of course, many of them kept the illusion that one of these days I will be fortunate enough to have access to all these things, but in practical terms they started to react, trying to build another kind of thing. For me, it's not the reconstruction of the traditional society, but they used some of the traits of their tradition, for example, co-operation, solidarity among themselves, the kind of informal organization they usually have, these kind of things—they used part of the tradition, they used part of the skills they learned with modernity, and then they created something that for me is a new form of organization, a new way of life . . . [a] new commons [sic].⁷⁹⁶

This new diverse commons had two important defining elements, namely a different approach to time and space.

Common man tried to learn what the schools taught him and what the developers taught him—that he must plan his life and really master his time, he can define his destiny and he can work now and think now for the future. He must be this kind of bridge between the past and the future where the economic man is all the time—following my experience, he is never here. He is always going to some place . . . The common man discovered something that is really of [sic] common sense, that we have the present we don't have the future. . . But we can master our space. . We can be here, rooted here, taking an attitude in relation with our immediate environment, with our

⁷⁹⁵ Keith Bezanson, interview by author, 2 December 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

barrio or our town or our street [sic]. \textsuperscript{797}

IDRC staff were aware that broad new patches of this and other varieties of space were opening up outside traditional forms of development. For example, IDRC funded research into the informal economy, such as hawkers, rickshaw drivers and civil society. Likewise, one of the first Centre-wide units was the Gender and Development programme, advocated, and in 1988, established by Eva Rathgeber.\textsuperscript{798} Nevertheless, accounting for all this new space was difficult, including cultural space. Governor Liliane Filion-Laporte remarked in 1987,

Dans le papier rédigé par Mme Whyte, j’étais très heureux de voir à plusieurs reprises le mot "culture". J’ai regretté l’an dernier ou il y a deux ans de voir que ce mot n’était presque jamais utilisé dans un Centre où les cultures du monde doivent être présentés chaque fois qu’on prépare un papier... Si on ne s’engage pas... je crois que nos résultats seront en deça de ce qu’on devrait faire.\textsuperscript{799}

Certainly these new spaces represented a challenge to more traditional forms of development and research, inside and outside IDRC.

The environment was another research space to be funded. IDRC’s ventures into this area first began in the 1980s when research into environmental technologies was funded by the Cooperative Programme. It continued later in the decade with the blessing of Helleiner and Hardoy, in Social Sciences, championed by Anne Whyte.


\textsuperscript{798} Eva Rathgeber, interview by author, 6 November 1993, tape recording, Ottawa.

IDRC as Teenager

Despite responses to changes in the research environment, the OAG's inclusion of IDRC in the list of Well-Performing Organizations, the Sigma Xi Award, the evident transformation in language at IDRC, and the addition of Centre-Wide Units, staff, donors and recipients sensed a certain immobility in the Centre in the late 1980s. This stillness was partly the result of the President not being overly popular in mainstream Progressive Conservative circles. His abbreviated term was ending. Plans were being made by Centre staff for the future. A somewhat unusual calm reigned. The Centre had also simply grown and matured. It was not so nimble. Likewise, shortcomings which might be forgiven as temper and drive in the young were less adorable in an older organisation in changed circumstances. IDRC had grown. In CIDA, IDRC was seen as becoming "more bureaucratic than CIDA." And this reputation was extending outside Canada, for example into the World Bank. We noted that although IDRC was invited to create international centres and that IDRC staff have been welcomed by them, the CGIAR had long had misgivings. However, this was not a simple matter of the more established, or more conservative and parochial voices being critical of the Centre's internationalism. A Decima elite interview showed that Canadian NGOs, usually guardians of internationalism, were the most outspoken of interested elites regarding the Centre.

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800 Anonymous.

801 Anonymous.

802 Although NGOs tend to be outspoken on most issues, that is their role.

Regionalisation in the 1970s and 1980s

One of the elements most resistant to change was the Divisional structure of the Centre. For the last twenty-five years, within that structure, IDRC has been characterised by relatively powerful lower-level management and programme staff, and influential administrative senior managers. Until the Bezanson presidency, senior managers served as gate-keepers rather than decision-makers. Intermediate structures, including non-programme divisions, attempting to change Centre-wide policy succeeded in changing the language but had little ability to ensure changes in practice. Most Ottawa-based managers, and a number of staff were unwilling to decentralise authority to the Regional Offices, especially to Regional Directors, or at least no consensus had been built. However, Regional Programme Officers had as much authority as Ottawa-based ones, and did not come under the authority of the Regional Director. The relative smallness of Regional Offices permitted some sense of "team" developing, yet the divisional and more technical reflexes of the Centre prevented them from becoming very strong.803

Calls for the decentralisation of authority to Regional Offices had been made for over a decade, whether from within IDRC or by Treasury Board. The Singapore Office Director, Jingjai Hanchanlash, had been the most visibly active in seeking decentralisation, especially in the form of increased spending authority. Such initiatives were encouraged by Bill Winegard when he appeared before the Centre's Board as Chairman of the House of Commons Committee on External Affairs and National Defense. Winegard said at that meeting, "We'd like to see if you can show the way in terms of getting things out of Ottawa... It may be that you can move that authority level out and down."804 CIDA staff were decentralised as a result of Winegard and others' efforts. However, decentralisation of CIDA was opposed by business who didn't want

803 Anonymous.
CIDA staff far away in the field, distant from their influence.\textsuperscript{805} External Affairs was not happy at the re-appearance of a "CIDA Foreign Service."\textsuperscript{806} These forces were "asleep at the switch" when For Whose Benefit was launched and accepted.\textsuperscript{807} But as we saw, not for long, although they remained somewhat restrained while Clark and Winegard were in place. However, when those interests were given vent during the cuts to development assistance in 1989–90, decentralisation was reversed. The considerable costs involved was cited as the main reason why decentralisation at CIDA should be stopped.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{RegionalOfficevsOtherExpenditures.png}
\caption{Regional Office vs. Other Expenditures}
\end{figure}

In IDRC, staff had long been physically decentralised outside Ottawa, especially in Regional Offices. Authority was somewhat dispersed, especially in AFNS. Some AFNS staff,

\textsuperscript{805} Peter Morgan, interview by author, 24 March 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

\textsuperscript{806} Bill Winegard, interview by author.

\textsuperscript{807} Peter Morgan, interview by author, 24 March 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.
including Associate Directors, had been based at Canadian universities. With the passage of time, many moved from those Canadian offices to developing country Regional Offices. The last such example was Geoffrey Hawtin, who left the Vancouver office in 1989.\textsuperscript{808} In the late 1980s, a number of non-programme staff moved to regional offices,\textsuperscript{809} as did some divisional staff, but authority remained in the hands of Ottawa-based Divisional Directors. Despite Winegard and Hanchanlash's prodigious influence, the decentralisation of authority to Regional Offices did not proceed beyond an increase in spending power to Regional Directors.

The cost of IDRC's Regional Offices has been raised from time to time in Parliamentary Committees. Regional Offices are a considerable expense for the Centre, a Regional Office-based Programme Officer costs $100,000 more to maintain than an Ottawa-based one.\textsuperscript{810} Nevertheless, the rate of rise of Regional Offices operational expenditures has been consistently lower than other measures of overhead and overall Centre expenditures over the history of the Centre. However, during the late 1980s the costs were beginning to approach total general management expenditures. (See Figure 26) Since 1992, they have dropped from 18\% to 13\%.\textsuperscript{811} Auditors from the Office of the Auditor-General and recipients judged then, and today affirm, that the Centre's dispersed operations closer to the actual recipients are one of the Centre's major

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Regional Offices are felt to be an affirmation of the Centre's Southern orientation and internationalist essence.

We pointed out in an earlier chapter that the 1978 Treasury Board study suggested that "the regional office structure has never been fully rationalized in terms of clarification of reporting relationships, degree of delegation, and responsibility." Clearly there was some disquiet about the role of Regional Offices, and it went further than that. A margin comment on IDRC's response to the Treasury Board study queries "are other 4 Regional offices essential?" Long-time ASRO Regional Director, Jingjai Hanchanlash, has said,

Retrospectively the mandate of IDRC-RO has gone through three major stages coinciding with the three Presidents:

- **Post-Office Period** emphasizing on being the eyes and ears of the Centre.

- **Diplomatic Mission Period** with decentralized operational authority and a certain amount of delegated authority for programming.

- **Mini-Mart Period** with full operational authority and regional programming mandate.

The Treasury Board study was helpful in helping change Regional Offices, especially ASRO, into IDRC diplomatic missions. A draft 1984 Regional Office study by Joe Hulse suggested increased signing authority, and Regional Project Review Committees. In the final form of the study this flex in authority was only given to ASRO offices with more than a million assets.

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812 Vinod Sahgal, interview by author, 2 February 1994, tape recording, Ottawa; Anil Gupta, interview by author, 15 June 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.


paper these were deleted.816 A 1988 study by Steven Rosell, who ten years before had conducted the PCO study of the Centre, recommended further decentralisation, that authority be delegated not just to the Regional Director, but also to the Regional Programme Officer.817 "Program staff generally should be located as close as possible to recipients (in Regional Offices)."818 The Rosell study was influential in laying the intellectual groundwork for initiatives regarding Regional Offices that would be adopted during the mandate of the new president in the 1990s.819

Second Prelude — 1990 Search Conferences

In 1990, a long series of discussions took place to reinvigorate the Centre, and, moreover, to prepare the ground for the new President. What is remarkable about these discussions is the degree to which they show the policy discourse had changed, and indeed, to a lesser, but significant extent, the actual practice of IDRC staff. Also interesting is the degree to which the discussions foreshadow changes to come during the Bezanson presidency. A series of Working Groups was struck and the members selected by President Head. In addition, Staff Search Conferences gathered the ideas and preferences of all staff, although in practice, programme staff were the most likely to participate.

According to the Report of the Working Group 1: Program Structure, Planning and Implementation (chaired by Anne Whyte) "the [top ten] key structural problems which need to be


818  Steven A. Rosell, 15.

819  Jingjai Hanchanlash, interview by author, 2 November 1993, tape recording, Ottawa.
addressed are the following:

1. the ratio of staff to appropriation dollars;
2. the ratio of managers to staff;
3. the number of layers of management;
4. the size of the senior management group;
5. the small size of programs in both technical support and appropriations;
6. the higher cost of collaboration across a fragmented structure;
7. the mix of research and non-research functions within single administrative units;
8. the program planning and evaluation function;
9. the training function;
10. the dissemination and utilisation function.\(^{820}\)

As we shall see, President Bezanson made major alterations to the Centre's structure in most of these areas. The Working Group recommended reductions in the numbers of managers and programme officers. What is interesting is that the Working Group seems to have been aware of the principal complaints about the Centre by central agents and CIDA, and saw them as the most pressing questions to be addressed. The Working Group recommended different scenarios. A verbal preference was shown for three divisions. However, in most scenarios presented Health Sciences, Communications and Social Sciences were untouched. Various combinations of AFNS, IS and Earth and Engineering Sciences\(^{821}\) were proposed. One option included the creation of Research Systems and Innovation. All recommended the creation of a Natural Resources Division.

President Head also struck a Program Delivery Working Group. The conclusion was that

\(^{820}\) Program Structure, Planning and Implementation Working Group Members were: Adzei Bekoe (RD, EARO), Fernando Chaparro (RD, LARO), David Nostbakken (Director, Communications), Allan Rix (Director, HR), Anne Whyte, (Chair), Director, SSD.

\(^{821}\) The Cooperative Division was renamed Earth and Engineering Sciences and integrated with other divisions in 1987.
"two fundamental premises concerning research policy on which there is clear consensus (are):
1) the need to move to interdisciplinary, problem-oriented approaches to research support
2) the need to establish decentralized planning and decision-making."

No decision regarding decentralisation of authority to Regional Offices emerged, although the trend was certainly in that direction, especially since it was proposed that planning occur on a regional basis. Regional Office staff also wanted the creation of sub-regional liaison offices. These had appeared during the Hopper period in some numbers. Like Regional Offices, Liaison offices tended to appear in times of plenty, disappear when times were lean, or when strong criticism expressed by Treasury Board. Nevertheless, the Working Group noted several comments from the Search Conferences, namely:

1) By far the strongest wish of the staff is to see program priorities set by the groups who live with the day to day problems of development.
2) The majority view is to move away from disciplines to selecting programs by issues/themes/development problems, or on a geographic basis.
3) Most staff favour "a greater concentration on countries and/or regions."

Taken together these replies seem to indicate a desire to remove layers of management. This would mean in practice greater autonomy for Programme Officers and clients, especially in the regions.

Staff consensus had developed on a number of issues representing a considerable change from past preoccupations. When asked, "What does the Centre want to achieve with its own resources?" the bulk replied,

Staff wish more Centre effort devoted to the utilization of results. There is little

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Working Group 2 members were: Geoffrey Hawtin, Robert Auger, Chris MacCormac, Pierre Sané, Mousseau Trembley.

specific mention of building indigenous research capacity.

- wide dissemination of results with new inventions patented or sold for income or to produce income generating activities
- more discussion on the impact of projects and how to disseminate them to other regions and promote utilization, with possible collaboration with the private sector, or linking research to integrated development projects
- one third of operations devoted to post-project applied technology
- projects will have direct impact on the well-being of people (an impact that is perceived as desirable by the people)
- promote more co-op projects. 

These replies appear to represent a sea change among staff that utilisation, and dissemination should become a much greater part of Centre activities. Of equal significance was a desire among staff to change the scope and nature of the scientific method used by Centre-supported researchers. When asked, "What kinds of research should the Centre support?" the replies were,

- greater use of participatory research techniques to ensure usefulness
- funds to innovators for practical uses ... not to support theses
- IDRC leads in the promotion of effective interdisciplinary research
- use a greater definition of "research"

Interestingly, staff were willing to contemplate the reduction of staff, especially at Head Office, recognised the overall problem of coherence, and funding diversification:

Many staff express the view that headquarters would be reduced in size with a simplified divisional structure and greater focus. A few advocate abolition of divisions and some feel that the centre-wide unit model should be further pursued as a means of achieving coherence. The latter gained high desirability and feasibility ratings. Coordinating, advisory or "think tank: roles were also suggested for head office.

Programme Officers had long wanted to pursue their own research interests, outside their rather self-effacing role of funders of other people's research. Some former officers felt that working at

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IDRC stood firmly in the way of their personal growth as researchers.\textsuperscript{827} Also, IDRC was now an organisation with considerable capacity and credibility of its own. Consequently, Ward and Strong's notion of "think tank" re-emerged.

The Head Years: A Retrospective

Ivan Head's presidency saw considerable change. Although Head inherited "somebody else's baby",\textsuperscript{828} he took the babe and endeavoured to bring it up. Head sought to make IDRC more cohesive and reflective with a series of reforms. His most successful reform in this regard was the creation of the Office of Planning and Evaluation (OPE). Doug Daniels and his staff used different methods, most effective was building "momentum in the Board." and suggesting and supporting divisional initiatives.\textsuperscript{829} The 1980s saw a marked shift in the discourse of the Centre towards utilisation, dissemination, longer term institutional funding and coherence. The selection of more socially oriented Directors helped shift IDRC away from its more technical orientation. And Head's effect on these processes was measurable, as he pointed out at his last Board meeting, a comparison of the project dockets of March 1978 and October 1990 showed,

The differences in the form of projects revealed inter-divisional collaboration; in March 1978, none did. Again, in 1990 a number of projects revealed an IDRC coordinating role for multidonor initiatives whereas in 1978 none did. Another contrast is found in the strong bias now evident for projects with likely-to-be utilized results. Finally, the involvement of Canadian institutions as research partners increased from 0 in 1978 to $\frac{1}{4}$ in 1990 as a result of the UNCSTD policies of 1979 adopted by the Board that same year.\textsuperscript{830}

\textsuperscript{827} Geoffrey Oldham, interview by author, 17 December 1993, tape recording, Ottawa.

\textsuperscript{828} Jon Church, interview by author, 15 December 1993, tape recording, Ottawa.

\textsuperscript{829} Doug Daniels, interview by author, 11 January 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

Head increased the size of the Centre in both budget and personnel terms. The President also made IDRC relatively immune from external attack by maintaining high-level contacts inside and outside for much of the history of his tenure, despite the clear antipathy of the mainstream of the Conservative Party, and the anger of Prime Minister Mulroney. He often limited the damage by being willing to have critics like Gotlieb, LeClair and Helleiner on the Board, thereby adding to the lustre of the Centre. And IDRC had influence. The mantle of IDRC was seen as legitimate enough that it was invited to operate in China, Cuba, Museveni and Amin's Uganda. In the 1970s, IDRC was tolerated in the dictatorships of the Southern Cone. In the 1980s, the Centre was lionised by the new leaders of the democratic governments there, many of whom were able to continue working in the Southern Cone during the period of dictatorship because of IDRC grants. For example, in Argentina, Alfonsin's Radical Party government included former IDRC recipients Dante Caputo who became Foreign Minister; Jorge Sabato, Under-Secretary in the Ministry of External Relations; Oscar Ozlak, Under-Secretary for Public Office; Adolf Canitrot, Secretary of Planning and Oscar Yujnovsky, Under-Secretary in charge of International Cooperation.\footnote{Head had personally supported such funding.} Representatives of Deng Hsiao-Ping even entreated the Centre to investigate scoliosis. Deng's son suffered from this debility because he had been thrown out a window by Red Guards.\footnote{IDRC had influence and reputation in the Third World vastly larger than its size. Head had also laid the groundwork for a refashioned Centre.}
The Bezanson Presidency —
In Search of Relevant Knowledge, International Partnership, and Values

Keith Bezanson washed into IDRC like a wave from the North Pacific, at once, cool, strong and exhilarating. As we have noted, key elements of his mandate had emerged prior to his appointment, just as had been the case for Ivan Head and David Hopper before him. This was even more so for Bezanson. Staff cuts and a shrinking of management were clearly going to take place, on the order of 20%. The Staff Search Conferences and Working Groups had established a certain tone in the organisation towards decentralisation of authority to the Regional Offices. Some ideas had been formed about the future structure of the Centre and the way it was to be funded. Nevertheless, many details were to be worked out and a path chosen. As we noted in the last chapter, Keith Bezanson moved to secure a future for the Centre, by removing irritants with federal agencies, and creating evidence of change.

Evidence of change at the Centre was included in the Board-endorsed "IDRC Strategy 1991," finalised in October of that year, and a subsequent statement in a small publication, Empowerment Through Knowledge, published in November. Unusually, the October document was sent directly to Paul Tellier, Clerk of the Privy Council. The second sentence of the one-page letter to Tellier accompanying the text notes, "The strategy involves restructuring of Centre divisions and overall staff reductions by about 20%."  

The transition was to be produced over twenty-four months. However, with the 1992 budget promising to change the Centre into a departmental corporation, most of the transition programme was compressed into several months.

In addition to staff cuts, the Executive Summary of the 1991 Strategy provided to Tellier

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stated that IDRC mission would be "empowerment through knowledge" and the "Centre should strive to consolidate and reinforce a vision of itself as: a results-oriented 'research for development' organization." The number of programme divisions was to be reduced from seven to five, and management levels to three, including the President. The new divisions announced were: Natural Resources (later changed to Environment and Natural Resources [ENR]), Social Sciences (SSD), Health Sciences (HS), Information Sciences and Systems (ISS) and Corporate Affairs and Initiatives (CAID). Resources Division became Finance and Administration. The Strategy included "operational principles,"

- improved performance as measured by standard efficiency indicators (e.g. administrative overheads as a percentage of total budget);
- streamline administrative procedures
- concentrate fewer resources in fewer program areas
- focus on a smaller number of institutions over longer periods of time
- emphasize the evaluation of what is undertaken; and
- ensure that research results are utilized and applied in practical, efficient ways.

Clearly these points responded to internal discussions and especially the views of Treasury Board and CIDA. Also significant was the statement that,

IDRC will seek out new partnerships and enhance existing ones, including Canadian organizations such as CIDA, and linkages with the private sector, as well as the educational and research communities. This will include co-financing large-scale projects.

What we see here is a response to central agent and CIDA preferences. A marked departure from the past was the decisive nature of the changes and some preference for market solutions.

The most evident change in locus of authority emerged as regards Regional Offices. They would "become ‘responsibility centres’ for region-specific programs, including planning

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836 IDRC, "Executive Summary," 2.

837 IDRC, "Executive Summary," 3.
execution, and evaluation."\textsuperscript{838} Over the following year, this shift was consolidated by giving Regional Offices authority to spend 50\% of total programme funding. The Regional Director most consistently in favour of more autonomy for Regional Offices, Jingjai Hanchanlash, was given responsibility for writing the job description for Regional Directors.\textsuperscript{839} Other changes included a 39\% reduction in management. Of 199 positions declared redundant, only 4.8\% were Programme Officers, versus a 17.6\% reduction in administrative support.\textsuperscript{840}

Prior to the Bezanson presidency, only relatively sporadic or diffuse responses were made to the more self-interested parts of the Canadian environment. In the months following his appointment, President Bezanson took a series of initiatives to show the Centre's relevance to Canadian, and especially federal government pre-occupations. Prior to 1991, specific Centre programmes rarely resulted from the evident intervention of the President. In 1992, \textit{101 Technologies} was published by the Centre, so providing proof that funding by the Centre had produced useful and appropriate knowledge.\textsuperscript{841} In our last chapter, we showed that Bezanson was particularly active in trying to demonstrate the relevance of IDRC regarding foreign policy. Eastern Europe had become the responsibility of External Affairs in the International Assistance Envelope, and no longer CIDA. Many Ukrainian-Canadians live in what was then the heartland of the Progressive Conservatives, the Prairies. A considerable amount of funding was available from External Affairs coffers for a project in the Ukraine. Doug Daniels was re-assigned to develop a five-year multidisciplinary programme in the Dnipro (Dnieper) River Basin to take steps that would help improve the river's health. The first proposal to the Board regarding the Dnipro Basin coincided with a series of initiatives to reinforce the political relevance of the

\textsuperscript{838} IDRC, "Executive Summary," 3.


\textsuperscript{840} IDRC, "Slide Presentation to the Board of Governors," "Results of the Restructuring," TD, 20 October 1993, IDRC Records, 1.

\textsuperscript{841} IDRC, \textit{101 Technologies: From the South to the South}, Ottawa: IDRC, 1992.
Centre. Keith Bezanson met with Nelson Mandela. The meeting was warmly praised by External Affairs officials reporting the events in 1992. The Centre had funded South African groups, especially the Confederation of South African Trades Unions (COSATU) since 1988, but shortly had been declared *non grata* by the Republic of South Africa (RSA) government. The mechanics of funding became difficult but not impossible. With the unbanning of groups in 1990, IDRC's activity could flourish. A new Regional Office for Southern Africa (ROSA) was established in 1993.

David Hopper had sought the assent of the Minister of External Affairs to embark into sensitive areas but rarely stressed the Centre's relevance to the government. Ivan Head made efforts to inform MPs and especially the Minister of External Affairs about the work of the Centre. He had also kept Canadian prime ministers informed of such IDRC activities as involvement in the Brandt Commission. On appropriate occasions, such as parliamentary hearings, Head might show that collaborative funding was relevant to Canada, for example, that IDRC-funded research between the Chinese and the University of Guelph had found a Chinese wasp that would feed on that scourge of the Canadian forests the spruce budworm. Under Ivan Head, programme funding related to Canada began to rise again before the end of his presidency in 1991. By 1994, that percentage had roughly doubled again to almost 30%. Never before the Bezanson presidency had such a flurry of activities taken place to persuade the federal government of the Centre's relevance to government and academic priorities. Clearly these were

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843 Ivan Head to Pierre Trudeau, TMS, 2 June 1980, PCO Records, 1-2.

844 These figures are soft, however. About one-third of the figure of 30% includes Within-Centre Activities (WCA), principally, the programme budget for the Public Information Programme and the Library.

desperate days, as the scheduling of the Centre for first elimination, and then the making of the Centre an agent of the Crown and a departmental corporation were to bear out.

Organisations that go through substantial redirection often undergo a crisis of morale. IDRC was one such organisation. Unlike most organisations, prior to the Bezanson presidency many of the Centre's staff were largely unaware of the external pressures on the direction of the Centre. IDRC's presidents and supporters had snuffed out external flames directed at the walls of the Centre before they reached staff. The credo of staff had little reference to the vagaries of Canadian political whims, and the necessity of appealing to them in order to survive. Unlike federal departments, with the exceptions of the presidents, most of IDRC's officers had been protected from the being aware of the necessity of obedience to central agents and politicians. Further, many officers saw their aim as trying to carry out the internationalist Pearsonian vision and "the championing of science" [bold in original] in developing countries. Responding to government, and especially Tory, preferences was not received favourably. The Centre had generally received good official reviews, at least from Parliamentary Committees and the Auditor General. We must not forget that prior to the Bezanson presidency, the President and Vice-Presidents had generally not affected the work of divisional managers and officers. Clearly, Keith Bezanson felt that it was both necessary and within his mandate to make changes. In some ways, fortunately, the Centre was in a mood to change, and were aware that they would have to. The Search Conferences had exhausted the staff. They wanted someone to decide.

Nevertheless, the Conferences revealed that in the opinion of staff even less involvement by higher levels was warranted. In a section called "Decision-making" it read "Decision making should be delegated to the lowest possible level and be less centralized in Ottawa. There is also

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846 Allan Rix, interview by author, Ottawa, 13 December 1993, tape recording, Ottawa; Doug Daniels, interview by author, Ottawa, 11 January 1994, tape recording.
some feeling that the Board should only look at policy matters.” Other areas of friction emerged that were to mark Bezanson's presidency, for example, the rising size of projects per Programme Officer and location of projects within themes (discussed below). Interviews by the author with staff reveal that the duality of vision between the technically and socially-minded has not remained intact, but is evident in modified form. Their new vision was not clear, but as the Search Conferences revealed, they sought expanded autonomy. However, changes were taking place which made separate intellectual, and Divisional fiefdoms less possible. Indeed, Bezanson decentralised to the regions more than any previous president, and eliminated layers of management. Keith Bezanson is an interventionist leader whose presence makes an clear footprint at the programme level. IDRC seems a little like the recently divorced, in the market, trying to be appealing, forcing on tight clothes against which the body chafes. President Bezanson seems to have decided that IDRC had two choices, either display its evident charms, or end up alone, or worse.

**Making One IDRC**

In the 1980s, staff displayed greater interest in more cross-disciplinary work grew, and pressures for it increased. The pace was forced in the 1990s by a number of circumstances. Chief among these was that the Centre was being remade as "an Agenda 21 organisation." The "Agenda 21" moniker of the Centre crafted for the Centre at the Rio Conference for the Environment and Development provided the Centre with a new focus. Consequently, divisional programmes came to take on an environmental flavour. And the adoption of an environmental perspective tended to promote a more holistic view of development and development research. Certainly, the inclusion of a broader and deeper church in project activities was required. The

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notion of multi-stakeholders entered the lexicon of the Centre's staff.\textsuperscript{848} This meant that more and different partners within the Centre, in Canada, and in developing countries now had a legitimate place in the project process.

More frequent cooperation between social scientists and natural scientists occurred in the 1990s. This was greatly assisted by Bezanson's decentralisation of authority to the Regional Offices. Hitherto, despite the relatively small offices, Regional staff were still responsible to their Ottawa Divisions, and regional programme activities were minuscule. After decentralisation, although staff were affiliated with Divisions, they were jointly hired by the Region and the Head Office, and they became responsible to the Regional Director. Furthermore, Regions had substantial funding of their own. Reference to Centre-wide and Divisional priorities was maintained by grouping activities according to themes, and by retaining half the funding and much of the authority structure in Ottawa. Nevertheless, interviews by the author with Regional Directors reveal that a regional, cross-divisional team approach has emerged in the confines of the small Regional Offices.\textsuperscript{849} At Head Office in Ottawa, the "Better Way" Project fostered team building.\textsuperscript{850} In 1993, the first Annual Programme Meeting was held in Ottawa, to which all programme staff came, and all Head Office staff were invited. This was the first time in the history of the Centre that all programme staff had met together. Not surprisingly, the closing message of the President was,

\begin{quote}
There has been a lot of talk about Ottawa and Regional Office communications, ways of doing things, working together -- that is the message. This is a message that it is time for \textbf{ONE} IDRC not 5, 7, 12, 15, or 25. It is a strong reaffirmation that we are on the right
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{848} Jingjai Hanchanlash, interview by author, 2 November 1993, tape recording, Ottawa.

\textsuperscript{849} Vijay Pande, interview by author, 4 November 1994, tape recording, Ottawa; Fawzy Kishk, interview by author, 4 November 1994, tape recording, Ottawa; Eva Rathgeber, interview by author, 6 November 1993, tape recording, Ottawa; Randy Spence, interview by author, 2 November 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

"TD, April 1994, IDRC Records."
track and that we have to work further and intensify that process of integration of the cultural values of one IDRC, not several.\textsuperscript{851}

Despite the more unified team-centred approach in the Centre, the link between research and development, and, especially, dissemination and utilization, remains problematic for Programme Officers. This is quite clearly seen in the Regional Office Review, the "Kirby-Herzka Report," which showed these two goals continued to be an enigma.\textsuperscript{852} To cut the Gordian knot, the Programme for Innovation Systems Management (PRISM) was formed in 1993. PRISM is quartered in Corporate Affairs and Initiatives. The programme aims to help "strengthen the capacities of developing countries, and agencies such as IDRC, to understand and engage in and support innovation processes more effectively."\textsuperscript{853} PRISM now has staff in all Regional Offices.

Another factor facilitating interdivisional and interdisciplinary projects has been the presence of thematic rather than divisional overtones to funding.\textsuperscript{854} The Corporate Programme Framework (CPF) of 1993 brought forward six themes: Integrating Environmental, Social, and Economic Policies (INTESEP), Food Systems Under Stress (FSUS), Technology and the Environment (T & E), Information and Communication for Environment and Development (ICED), and Health and the Environment (H & E). Each of these themes was to have a Working Group usually chaired by a Director-General. About half of programme funds are to fit into these specific themes, which helps re-orient the Centre towards developing projects focused on sustainable development. Thirty percent of the rest is ear-marked for New Initiatives (over 10%)


\textsuperscript{854} Consensus that the Centre should organise itself on a thematic basis emerged during the Ten-Week Seminar in 1986.
and a range of projects under the title Sustainable and Equitable Development (SED) (30%).

The changing nature and size of the Divisions also contributes to the adoption of interdivisional and interdisciplinary approaches. Previously, AFNS "set the pace." After 1983, when Joe Hulse was the Vice-President in charge of programme research, and following him in 1988, James Mullin, AFNS' share of the budget blossomed, Social Sciences stagnated, others grew at a slower rate. In the late 1980s, AFNS accounted for twice the budget of the next largest Division, Social Sciences. In contrast, the first mandate of the Bezanson presidency was characterised by five relatively equally sized Divisions, the two largest, Environment and Natural Resources (ENR), and Corporate Affairs and Initiatives Division (CAID) received about equivalent funding. Both ENR and CAID were about one-third larger than other divisions. (See Figure 27) Each set a particular pace.

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856 Doug Daniels, interview by author, 11 January 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.
The creation of ENR was especially interesting in a number of respects. Anne Whyte had been the Social Science Director hitherto, and brought a number of social scientists into a Division largely made up of former AFNS and Earth and Engineering staff. Whyte had shown an early interest in the Centre in participatory techniques, and in the new division, Indigenous Knowledge (IK) too. Consequently, ENR became a meeting point for the socially and technically-minded of the Centre. One can gain a sense of the result of the intermingling by reviewing the kind of projects ENR funded. If a typical AFNS project might have involved sorghum improvement (and often did), a 1994 ENR project was titled "Local Knowledge of Wild Species in Rio San Juan." It took on a similar role to its predecessor (AFNS) as the "leading edge" of the Centre, in programme terms.

The shift by ENR away from agriculture and technocratic flavour was justified by the great failure and enormous success of the Green Revolution on the Indian subcontinent. On the one hand, for the first time in history there was an absolute surplus in food grains, and they were being exported. Consequently, except in cases of environmental catastrophes or civil war, famine was much less likely. On the other hand, the Green Revolution was not successful at redistributing wealth. Mechanisation meant that youth and imported farm labour were much less needed. Richer farmers tended to get richer. Changes in farm practices caused land degradation and environmental pollution. A more holistic approach to development incorporating the insights of environmentalists and social scientists therefore became more attractive.

The creation of Corporate Affairs and Initiatives (CAID) headed by Pierre Beemans led to the consolidation of most Centre-wide activities in one unit. In addition to PRISM, CAID includes the Evaluation Unit, the Public Information Programme, the Library, and Special

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857 Nevertheless, semi-arid agriculture continues in the Food Systems Under Stress theme.

Special initiatives includes Canadian partnerships, gender and development, and human resource development.


Despite these changes, interdivisional and interdisciplinary cooperation remains a challenge as it does in most large organisations. Although the President has emphasised the importance of risk-taking, a number of factors favour risk-avoidance. Interdisciplinarity and interdivisional activities are clearly encouraged. Set against this is fear of making a mistake in an era of contracting budgets and organisational change. Collaborative exercises tend to require more work than mono-disciplinary, single administrative unit projects. But officers are prompted to increase the size of projects and minimise overheads. Embarking into time-consuming uncharted waters competes against the former preferences. Nevertheless, the size of projects has risen, and overheads have dropped. In the summer of 1994, the President reserved 10% of funds, (that were to be used for new initiatives), for weathering the impending storm. Interdisciplinarity and interdivisional cooperation has increased, although the tracking of it is difficult to perform. Nevertheless, jointly funded projects are common between Regional Offices and Divisions, (a quarter to a half of all projects) but rare between divisions, and very rare between Regional

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859 Special initiatives includes Canadian partnerships, gender and development, and human resource development.

President Bezanson has focused on policy for decision-makers. It had long been championed by Ivan Head and some sections of the Social Sciences Division, and criticised by the more technically-minded as not being sufficiently applied or relevant. This debate continues. The shift to policy has provided a notable change in discourse from that of fifteen years before. Geoffrey Oldham returned to IDRC after an absence of over ten years. According to him, during that earlier time, any attempt of interdivisional discussion would be difficult in the extreme.

You would have been speaking different languages and there would have been much polarisation. There would have been the natural scientists and the social scientists. . . The thing that had struck me about those [divisional] themes, when you weed through them all, was the number of times the theme is "the policy for" . . . or "the management of" . . . They weren't dealing with the natural science or engineering dimension.\(^{862}\)

For Oldham, this "social science dimension" creates a much more "homogenous organisation." On balance sheet of the present period, this would seem on the plus side. Oldham is pleased with this positive aspect. His fear is that while having a common language, IDRC will become remote from doing things that make a difference.\(^{863}\) Funding the generation and application of relevant knowledge is certainly the challenge for staff in the Bezanson presidency.

Perhaps most remarkable about the Bezanson presidency is the degree to which options presented by currents of thought present in the Centre have been acted on. Interdisciplinarity has been an issue since the time when the Centre was only a proposal. The question of forging Canadian partnerships and their relation to the whole of the Centre's work has forced the attention of the Centre since the mid-1970s. Dissemination, utilisation and marketing have all been recognised issues in IDRC since the early 1980s. Decentralisation of authority to Regional Offices.\(^{861}\)

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\(^{861}\) Sources: 1993 IDRC project in the IDRIS data base as at 22 July 1994, and data provided by Louis Saumure, Management Information Services, IDRC, as at 23 September 1994.

\(^{862}\) Geoffrey Oldham, interview by author, 17 January 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

Offices had been discussed for over a decade. Action was taken in all cases. But more extraordinary was that the deepest change in discourse yet has been initiated, led by the President.

In a February 1994 speech, Bezanson commented on a speech by Jacques Cousteau. Cousteau called for the abandonment of the dominant paradigm and its replacement with the values of understanding, compassion, and love. The President noted that,

IDRC is made up of PhDs and research is serious business, it being the stuff of science. And to talk of understanding, compassion and love is to talk, not about the stuff of science, but about the stuff of philosophy, the stuff of enlightenment. When social and economic thought, when development thought, expresses itself as Cousteau would have us do, it begins to sound more religious than secular, more intuitive than rational, more qualitative than quantitative and far more existential than scientific. In those shifts lies a lot of discomfort for scientific and professional organizations.864

This passage seems to indicate that some Centre staff are hesitant about abandoning their constants in favour of this uncharted territory. Certainly the more technically-oriented or "realists" might find such statements difficult.

President Bezanson went further in his speech on values. He set the course away from technocratic solutions.

Most conventional western discourse on development has been rooted in technocracy and this has led us to ignore or even to dismiss the cultural, moral and indeed spiritual dimensions of human well-being. We have dismissed as irrelevant to development or so intractably subjective as to be unamendable to our universal model, the continuum on which all nations and all peoples were placed. Undeniably, major advances have derived from applying to development the dominant technocratic and "scientific" model of Western society. What is now increasingly recognized, however, is something that is not all that new, something that we always knew: that most people in most parts of the world, basic attitudes and behaviour, and attitudes towards change, whether these be individual or societal, are not motivated—at least not exclusively—by economic or political interest beyond bare levels of survival or security. Most people and most cultures start at the other level of Maslow's scale. They are moved by deep underlying moral, spiritual assumptions about the reality they live in, and they reflect these in moral and spiritual assumptions. It

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is in these realities—realities that are manifest in myth and in ritual—that provide values
that guide decisions about whether to change or not to change. At one level, all of this is
easy to acknowledge; at another, it creates dissonance because it is at substantial variance
with our science, our institutions, the reward systems in which we work and the way we
have approached development over the past five decades.865

We see here the beginning of a fundamental questioning of the technically-minded projet and
even some of the pre-occupations of the socially-minded. These thoughts most closely resemble
the personal motivations and final concerns of Pearson. Indeed, so long as sophistry does not
muddy its internationalist principles, the IDRC of today, politically astute, abroad in the world,
and vitally concerned with partnership, culture and the environment, is probably closer to what
Pearson and Ward hoped for the Centre than it has ever been in the past.

The calculus involved includes a subjective weighing of the significance of events and documents listed in the Table 3 appended at the end of the thesis, as well as assessment of the information revealed in interviews conducted by the author and other documents. Influence or pressure was measured on a scale of 0-3, 3 being the most weighty.

To our surprise, despite earnest attempts to find such evidence, we found no indication that particular non-Canadian organisations persistently and considerably effected the structure of the Centre or content of its programmes since 1970. This may be partly explained by the fact that IDRC has led the research for development niche for much of its history and in many of its research activities. We should say that this study is biased in favour of recognising domestic events, the vast majority of research was conducted in Ottawa and among Canadians.

Nevertheless, interviews with IDRC staff, donors and recipients did not reveal contrary patterns. This is not to say that they do not affect IDRC, they do, especially organisations similar to IDRC. However, perhaps with the exception of the Brundtland Commission, organisations (however temporary) appear to affect IDRC as a general environment serving to alter the course of the Centre in slower programmatic shifts, rather than producing simple cause and effect decision chains. Likewise, other global shifts in research, science and development can have similar effects. Nevertheless, the Centre tends to absorb trends early, even if their spreading across the

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866 The calculus involved includes a subjective weighing of the significance of events and documents listed in the Table 3 appended at the end of the thesis, as well as assessment of the information revealed in interviews conducted by the author and other documents. Influence or pressure was measured on a scale of 0-3, 3 being the most weighty.
Centre has historically been bridled by Division, and Programme.

Figure 28

Levels of External Pressure or Influence on IDRC
Structural Change

Between 1971 and 1991, relatively little structural change took place in the Centre. The most obvious was the proliferation of Regional Offices. Nearly all Regional Offices seem to have appeared without being a response to particular events, but a filling in of the global map. Clearly the greatest attention in these terms has been given to a continent in the greatest need, Africa, where there are four offices. Regional Offices are the most tangible proof of the Centre's international roots and Southern concerns. The most recent office in South Africa has been used as a clear signal of the Centre's political relevance to the Canadian government.

Most other structural changes taking place seem to be clear responses to Canadian pressures. The opening of the Policy Unit in 1974 seems to be a response to increasing pressure from central agents. The chart for that year shows a steady rise of external influence around that time. It is arguable that as IDRC grew it required more planning, procedures and evaluation. Being reflective on the wisdom of deeds certainly requires that deeds have been done. So certainly evaluation would be more relevant later on in the creation of an organisation. Present management literature favours the abandonment of the planning department but it was certainly popular in central agencies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. CIDA President Michel Dupuy told the Centre's Board in 1981, "evaluation is a fashion, . . . central agencies . . . are a

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867 Tom Peters in Liberation Management quotes an Economist article,

Abolishing its planning department might be the best thing a company could do for its shareholders— or so says a report from management consultants at . . . Deloitte Haskins and Sells . . . the report shows that firms without central planners tend to produce higher returns.

little taken in by the fashion.\textsuperscript{868}

A steady increase of pressure was evident in the late 1970s. Organisationally, this pressure appears to have culminated in the creation of the Vice-Presidency of Planning, and Office of Policy and Evaluation (OPE) in 1979, and in the early 1980s with the creation of the Co-operative Division. Gotlieb, and LeClair joined IDRC as Governors during this time. The arrival of the Cooperative Division and shortly of James Mullin as its Director seems a response to pressure from MOSST and Treasury Board, themselves partly responding to pressure from academics.

During periods of organisational change there is a general increase of pressure from different external sources. Considerable rises of pressure or influence seem to be seen as an opportunity for others to bring to bear their own worries. This is seen more clearly if we refer to the chart for the year 1978, when Treasury Board and PCO studies were followed by the McPhail Study at External Affairs. Moments of higher pressure of influence also tend to coincide with selection or re-appointment of the President or Chair. Following moments of higher external pressure, the President has greater influence in Centre affairs as he attempts to respond to those external pressures. Changes to the Centre also seem to precede and follow re-appointment and selection of the President. PCO and especially Treasury Board pressures seem to be the most decisive in changing the structural, the visible, shape of the Centre, particularly following pressure from academics.

Domestically inspired changes to IDRC frequently coincide with other changes. Economic declines seem to trigger changes and these coincide with the selection of central agent leaders with a stronger domestic focus. Not surprisingly, reviews of official development assistance (ODA) appear to spring up at these times. However, when parliamentary committees become involved in reviews, a re-assertion and increase of development assistance funding to the

\textsuperscript{868} Michel Dupuy, IDRC BOG, "Draft Notes of Proceedings," 10-12 October 1979, 61.
Centre has usually resulted, as was the case following the Parliamentary Task Force on North-South Relations led by Herb Breau. Similar effects have followed audits or studies by the Office of the Auditor General. What we seem to see here is once again evidence of a conflict between organisational powers, who often hold more parochial values, and the more internationalist elements in the political leadership who tend to find themselves involved in foreign affairs issues. The legitimacy of IDRC in the politicians eyes, and evidently the greater legitimacy of the Centre relative to CIDA in the case of the Office of the Auditor General, has slowed or halted slides towards making the Centre more accountable to narrower interests.

The Research Environment and the Internationalist Impulse

Some readers may feel that the development assistance or research aspects of this history of IDRC are muted. This is partly explained by the author's conclusion that a history of the Centre, indeed, Canadian development assistance as a whole, cannot be understood without reference to the tension between Canadian-centred, more parochial values versus more internationalist impulses. For Lumsdaine, these are international conflicts coterminous with conservative versus more liberal views, especially regarding welfarism. Nevertheless, IDRC burst out of a particular Canadian context which requires explanation. However, sufficient similarities exist between Canada and other countries, notably Sweden, that other IDRC-like organisational forms sprang up, even if diluted in internationalist potency.

What emerges from the first two chapters is that without the expression of a strong internationalist impulse in Canada, and manifested in the Pearsonian vision and government, the innovation that IDRC clearly represents would not have been created. In that vision, IDRC might be described as the sun room in the house that Lester built. The sun room faces South.

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the light from outside the room loses its meaning. Without the house, the sun room is a hothouse likely to be abandoned if the occupants lose an interest in gardening. The sun that sustains it is the internationalist impulse and the light comes from the South.

Non-Canadian development research and internationalist influences are evident in the nature of the Centre, its programme, and the way that it has been sustained. The international commissions, foreign events and some conferences seem to have an effect on the programme, funding and occasionally structure of the Centre. The interplay of external changes in the research environment and the internal discourse can be gleaned most clearly in changes to the Centre's programmes. A review of the categories employed by the Social Sciences Division in the Programme of Work and Budget provides one such measure of these alterations. (See Figure 29).  

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870 This figure displays the percentage of Social Science Divisional programme funds going to thematic categories.
Figure 29

Social Science Division Thematic Changes

- Integrating Env. Soc. & Econ. Policies
- Sustainable & Equitable Dev.
- Technology & Env.
- Info. & Comm. for Env. & Dev.
- Econ. & Rural Mod.
- Education
- Pop. & Dev. Res.
- Sci. Tech. & Energy Policy
- Sci. & Tech. Policy
- Applied Social Science
- Modernisation
- Internat. & National Res. Networks
In some respects, these categories may obscure more than they explain. They are, after all, catchment areas. However, that they exist indicates change in these directions. Centre-wide, holistic, and thematic integration is also apparent elsewhere in that where in the past each Division had its own completely unique themes, now all Divisions and Regional Offices have six common themes accounting for about half the funding. The second major catchment area of programme funds, Sustainable and Equitable Development (SED), also includes the notion of environment in them.871 Most Divisions and Regional Offices spread their money in most of the different themes. But what are the roots of these changes?

The Social Science Division's shift away from funding research during the 1970s and 1980s into the modernisation process and applied social science reflects changes in the global social science agenda, as indeed it does towards economics and the multiplication of development perspectives. The lessening of funding into science and technology policy does not seem to have resulted from the World Bank's abandonment of interest in this area. Apparently, personnel changes largely determined the shift in IDRC's focus.872 A near constant feature of

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872 A Board study of Social Science Division led by Governors Gerry Helleiner and Jorge Hardoy encouraged IDRC-wide thrusts in Women-in-Development, Public Policy, and Nutrition and urged "their cautious expansion into new areas like Environment and Resource Management, Science and Technology Policy, Human Settlements and Habitat, and specific Regional initiatives." The Board did not endorse such a broad range of research areas and only endorsed "a process of development of programs within the following fields of activity: Economic Policy, Human Resources and Social Development, Regional Development."
Social Science Division and indeed Centre activities has been support to research networks.

Some international events or conferences gave, or provided, impetus to programmatic and later also structural alteration of the Centre. The UNCSTD Conference served to justify a response to Canadian parochial concerns. Few other donor attendees followed up their commitment at that conference, to increase funds going to science and technology for development, whether for mutual benefit of scientists in the North and South or not. Pledges of money were made but not delivered. In some cases, such as the Brundtland Commission and the Rio Conference on Environment and Development, in which Maurice Strong and other Canadians played important roles, served more internationalist ends. During the 1980s a shift in interest towards the environment was clear in Canada, including the Red Tories upon whom the Centre relied for survival during the Conservative government. The Brundtland Commission and the Rio Conference on Environment and Development served as major indicators to the federal government as a whole, and to CIDA and IDRC in particular, that a change of focus would be timely. IDRC's assistance in the creation of International Institute for Sustainable Development, and the adoption of the Agenda 21 focus by the Centre's leadership provided proof that IDRC was capable of changing with the times.

The Centre's research clientele do not seem to have changed so dramatically as the


873 Anne Whyte, who has a doctorate in Environmental Engineering, was selected to head the Social Sciences Division in 1986, the year of the Brundtland Commission hearings. Certainly, it was implicitly or explicitly recognition of the growing importance of the environmental research and its social dimension although Whyte is not certain as to how important the hearings were. Indubitably, the profile of the environment had been rising in the Centre at the time.

Anne Whyte, interview by author, 4 November 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

Centre. The Western disciplinary structure spread and has endured in developing countries. Not surprisingly, in periods of economic downturn in many developing countries, when in some regions academic salaries have come to account for only a part of the scholar's personal income, changing one's research focus is only desirable if it will bring in new and secure income. There is a certain tension, therefore, between the tenet of responsiveness and the shift towards environmental concern. What we may be seeing here is a gap between actual changes in the environment, policy and physical, and the organisations with which the Centre deals. Both inside and outside Canada and IDRC such a tendency towards stasis is apparent. Decima elite interviews conducted for IDRC found that Canadian development assistance groups were not looking for new thinking, but saw a "need for a reorientation away from certain current approaches and towards other existing approaches which are underutilized or unutilized at present."

If the occupants of Lester's house are unaware of the existence or value of the sun room then it risks being sealed from the house. Indeed, changes and additions to Centre programmes can be seen as positive efforts to induce Canadian interest in the Centre. For example, the Communications Division broadened its focus in the late 1970s so as to increase funding.

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875 Joachim Voss, interview by author, 9 September 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

876 In this respect, the shift in Centre policy towards longer-term funding of institutions may lead to sustained re-orientation of a number of Southern organisations.

877 Decima Research, "Decima Research Report to the International Development Research Centre, Elite Interview on Development Assistance," TD, October 1993, 7. Interestingly, according to the pollsters, the media and private sector "expressed the most sincere and relatively urgent desire for new thinking, 'We need new thinking because no one is explaining that the donor-recipient model is dead'" one respondent said.


878 David Spurgeon, interview by author, 23 September 1994, by telephone, notes, Ottawa-Mont Tremblant.
Some have argued that the shift towards seeing research for development in terms of mutual benefit would lessen aid weariness and lead to increases in funding. Certainly mutual benefit was accepted as being the tenor of the times.\footnote{Geoffrey Oldham, interview by author, 24 January 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.} At least in Canada, the Vienna Conference did lead to dollars being disbursed to IDRC's new Cooperative Division. In this respect, while representing a response to parochial pressure, it also had a salutary effect on IDRC as an essentially internationalist enterprise. We may see increases in funding on Canadian programmes in this light. Both public information programmes and the funding of Canadian researchers are mechanisms for inducing support for IDRC. Such arguments have been put regarding CIDA's tied aid and development education policies. So here we may be seeing the adaptation of IDRC, taking on CIDA-like qualities. Certainly CIDA presidents have encouraged the Centre to do so while sitting on IDRC's Board. Clearly, this is a two-edged sword. Much of IDRC's reputation is based on its internationalist nature and practices. Programme staff seem motivated by the belief in IDRC as an internationalist enterprise. Therefore, their modification in the face of personal or institutional self-interest puts in jeopardy morale and reputation even if it secures approval in the panelled rooms of the federal government and Canadian universities. Legitimacy, the ultimate safeguard of the Centre, may thereby be jettisoned and the organisation founder. IDRC must clearly be able to respond to its environment, whether that means the Rio Conference or Treasury Board. It has. Of greater concern is that, as with much of the democratic movement, seeing its way clear to accept a new vision which rings true to its best traditions remains a challenge.
Conclusion

This thesis has looked at IDRC in terms of two polar sets of cultural dialectics, internationalist-parochial tendencies and social-technical impulses. The internationalist-parochial theme has helped delineate the shape of the tensions in which IDRC has been located in Canada and from a broader global perspective. The internal discourse within the Centre has been particularly illuminated by the social-technical dialectic. However, in these concluding remarks, we posit that in the last decade we have seen the increasing meshing of these two dialectics in synthesis at both the Centre and global level. The technical-social dialectic is fusing in holism, and may, indeed, be starting to re-emerge in a new form within IDRC itself. Further, we contend that Pearson's notion of partnership is of vital, and not diminished, relevance today and may prove to be key to the survival of Canadian values and society in cruel global seas.

The synthesis of the internationalist-parochial dialectic can be found in a word which Lester Pearson used fifty years ago—interdependence. At that time, the notion seemed much less real. The industrialised countries were vastly more powerful than the still colonised South. And so it remained for forty years, and still remains in many cases. However, the walls between the different Worlds are more porous or collapsed. In some cases, we have simply been blind to the implications of anomaly. The similarities of conditions in aboriginal communities in northern Canada and the Brazilian Amazon are harder to explain away as mere aberration in the sureties of North and South. While scholars may have difficulty grasping the conceptual subtleties, such communities see their interrelatedness and have begun to forge ties of solidarity.

Pearson wrote *Partners in Development* in 1969. At the time, critics found the notion that

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880 The poles of these tendencies impulses are related. A concern for social questions may foster a broader internationalist perspective, but they are not coterminous. David Hopper, for example, is associated with a technical orientation, but was the most insistent on defining and preserving IDRC as an internationalist bastion.
any real partnership might exist between Northern donors and Southern recipients sophistry. And
there was ample reason to doubt. Today, an interdependent partnership is more apparent, and
Pearson's predictions have come true. Development assistance donors are no longer invulnerable
symbols of Northern power. We related above the case of the Indonesian aid recipients who have
been willing to pick, choose and refuse Canadian development assistance. In these cases, it is not
so clear who is dependent on whom. As purely self-interested forces have gathered in Canada,
IDRC has relied on its partners, donors and recipients, and Governors to prove the Centre's
continued relevance in parochial terms, but also to rally supporters of the internationalist
perspective. Once again, this indicates the interdependent nature of the partnership, particularly
when IDRC and the internationalist perspective it represents is under threat.881

Along the social-technical dialectic, we have seen that in structural terms, much of the
history of the Centre has been dominated by a more technical orientation, although a strong
concern with equity has always been present and active. The orientation of staff has quite
properly been focused on academic clients. However, limited resources, lack of inclination of
clients and staff, and the disciplinary and Southern focus of the Centre has meant that only in the
last ten years has a more holistic view begun to take root as to the effectiveness of the valuable
research conducted. As in academia, an alliance of sorts took place between some of the
technically and socially-minded, each for their own reasons. The technically-oriented were often
disinclined to engage other professionals, far less others, in a deep social conversation. Many of
the socially-oriented were in retreat in the 1970s, and fearful of subordination. Consequently,
greater contact with other professionals and the Centre's intended beneficiaries, the poor of the
South, was precluded. Although the applied nature of the research and the multidisciplinary
characters of Divisions did facilitate some cross-divisional interchange, the disciplinary and
divisional nature of staff and relationships with researchers in developing countries restricted the
formation of the Centre as a whole into an interlocking community, or series of communities,

881 The Centre has recently been forced to consider ways of generating revenue. The question
has not been answered as to how fundraising might bolster the Centre as a projet de société and
international partnership.
until the Ten–Week Seminar in 1986. Global movement in the direction of multidisciplinary, participatory and environmental holism had a powerful effect on IDRC's discourse and practice in this regard. However, for a variety of reasons, such changes have taken place more slowly among the Centre's academic and even NGO clients. Decentralisation to the Regional Offices, and the re-orientation towards more holistically oriented divisions appears to have caused a marriage between the technically and socially-minded in most parts of the Centre. The degree to which a dialogue develops beyond non-professional bounds naturally depends on the specifics of each project. Staff appear familiar with participatory techniques, but funding of its application is still in its infancy in many sections of IDRC. Holism may cement a synthesis of the technical and social impulses which are so much part of IDRC's policy stream and develop a reflex for deeper social conversations.

Although in his last years Pearson seemed anxious to marry culture and environment with scientific transformation, clearly David Hopper was more interested in the latter. Pearson, Strong, Hopper, Head and Bezanson share an orientation towards equitable development. In this respect, social concern has always been a legitimate part of the research the Centre funds and the values which officers hold dear. However, as in the global debate, the question has been whether the solutions to development problems would be provided by professionals with a variously social to technical bent, one the one hand, or whether the dominant dialectic would be between deeper social conversations, and technical professional cures, on the other. We must conclude that thus far the Centre's socially-oriented discourse has largely been about professionals with a variously technical or social bent. Yet, we have no reason to play the last phrase as a lament. For certainly, the general trend has been strongly in the direction of a social bias. And with that shift towards the social pole, in the last decade, holistic environmental perspectives and participatory approaches have appeared in the Centre's discourse and increasingly in its practice. This is not to say that IDRC will build the New Jerusalem tomorrow, even if such visions may have motivated men and women like Pearson and Ward. However, there are greater possibilities, and fewer barriers to leap for IDRC to help build a deeper and broader global social conversation than ever before.
Ivan Head articulated the view that IDRC was not as an instrument of Canadian foreign policy but an expression of it.\textsuperscript{882} We can conclude that just as the hundreds of millions spent by Scandinavian and Canadian donors in Tanzania cannot easily be explained by self-interested motives; neither can the origins of IDRC, nor the vast majority of the funding provided by the Centre to Southern researchers. Indeed, the origins of Canadian development assistance itself are not to be found in export promotion. The reasons for its growth are not to be found there either. IDRC is an untied anomaly, but reflects the essential origins of development assistance. It is fair to say that of federal organisations involved in development assistance in Canada, the Centre is the highest expression of Pearsonian internationalism, and perhaps internationalism in state aid, full stop, in the world. IDRC is a product of the better angels of Canadian culture. As we shall draw out more clearly below, IDRC may provide a means to show that such works are not artifacts of nostalgia or self-delusion.

Our original question was "Why was IDRC created?" We have replied that to answer the question we must look at the values of the manse which were held by Pearson and others and turned into state policy. Similar values were held in modified form in the Atlantic World, and more widely still, as liberal social values and internationalism. Pearson carved out space in Canada to give expression to these beliefs. The least self-interested of these two forms was internationalism which jarred with the more instrumental and parochial values and rituals of the Canadian federal government. Pearson's thinking on the inevitable march of science and the need to assist developing countries to adapt to it found ready allies in the internationalist and the Christian beliefs of Barbara Ward and Maurice Strong. Strong set out to develop means to create an internationalist expression of communion and innovation that would be capable of applying modern technological means to the developing world. The ideas of Geoffrey Oldham regarding the importance of indigenous research capacity building coincided with those of the first President, David Hopper. Hopper attached a mission to the Centre, assisting developing countries to build equitable means for their own transformation according to applied scientific rationality.

\textsuperscript{882} James Mullin, interview by author, 14 June 1994, Ottawa, tape recording.
We delineated in detail, that state, academic or corporate interests intrude in the work of the Centre and have been increasingly insistent. Nevertheless, Centre staff have fought and continue to fight with great determination to ignore such siren calls, when at all possible. Theirs is an internationalist vocation of professionals to which many have fully dedicated decades of their lives. Many were born Canadians, others were born elsewhere, but the *katharos*\textsuperscript{883} quality of their commitment to internationalist values was exceedingly evident in interview after interview conducted by the author. So IDRC is the embodiment of internationalist values as such, and the Pearsonian version of that world-view. From this point of view then, IDRC is seen as a symbolic representative of a construct of belief, rather than a technical instrument. The Centre is the bearer (*Träger*) of values. If IDRC was initially the bearer, and expression of Northern internationalist, particularly Canadian values, this changed over time. The expectation was that the Centre's officers would find the discovery of the means whereby developing countries could find their own solutions to their own pressing problems. If IDRC was seen at the beginning as the builder of an indigenous scientific community and world-view in the South, by the late 1980s it became clearer that the Centre was part of an international, North and South perspective on development. IDRC was no longer, if it had ever been, merely a North (Canada) to South (recipient) exchange but an interchange of global proportions.

\textsuperscript{883} Crystal, pure in Greek.
We charted the course of the internationalist impulse in Canadian foreign and development assistance policy with some precision. We saw that internationalism found a home in parts of External Affairs, led by Lester Pearson. That world-view seems to have migrated into various parts of the Canadian government, especially CIDA and IDRC. The weakening of External Affairs' central authority over foreign policy-related subjects in the late 1960s favoured the creation of fairly autonomous federal organisations, including IDRC. Such decentralisation permitted the expansion of development assistance. This autonomy facilitated the growth of a development assistance programme that was more clearly an expression of Canadian values of generosity and self-help. Nevertheless, Maurice Strong did not ignore more parochial concerns, and his successors, willingly or unwillingly, were pushed to respond to them. There is no doubt though that a chorus praising narrower views of the utility of aid could be heard more clearly as economic troubles proliferated. The stagnation of the mid-1970s provided an opportunity for central agents and others to assert that narrowly self-interested calculation was more important than internationalist impulses, that foreign policy had to be re-centralised. One must not take such statements too far. Even among the chief architects of such centralisation, such as Michael Pitfield, parochial calculation did not blank out all other thought. Nevertheless, parts of CIDA's officer corps were replaced by former central agents. Treasury Board rules were brought to bear with greater rigour. Periodic assaults were made to make IDRC malleable to parochial concerns and become an agent of the federal government, and less an expression of internationalism.

The most fraught of tightropes for the Centre leadership to walk is between independence

884 Earlier in his career, Pitfield praised Strong's ability to increase the quality of development assistance and counselled Prime Minister Trudeau to untie aid and restrictions on it, even if he suggested this as a counter to expected criticism for not increasing the volume of aid.

and dependence vis à vis the federal government. On occasion, the Centre has been made "offers it cannot refuse". Governor Nettleford used that phrase when the Centre felt obliged to initiate the collaborative programme.\textsuperscript{885} Invitations to respond to federal initiatives can hardly be refused, for fear of provoking the wrath of ministers and their deputies. Yet although increased planning and evaluation procedures, and a cooperative programme were installed in IDRC as a result of these pressures, they were fashioned according to Hopper's doctrine of being responsive to the priorities of developing countries, and not developed ones. They remained relatively appropriate despite their origins. CIDA, however, began to take on the instrumental roles demanded of it by other parts of government, especially Treasury Board and External Affairs, but also parts of Canadian society, notably business and academics. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, IDRC remained the beacon of largely untied, flexible and responsive aid, gaining its reputation in development circles in Canada because of favourable comparisons of the Centre to the Agency.

Squabbles over cuts and slowdowns to development assistance in the late 1980s revealed tensions between CIDA and IDRC, previously obscured by rising allocations. Moves were made by successive leaderships in CIDA to ensure that IDRC accept the \textit{pro rata} cuts which the Agency had to endure. This continues today. CIDA officers had long felt that IDRC had received special treatment and this had to stop, whatever the relative merit of the two organisations. That two former CIDA officers, Keith Bezanson and Pierre Beemans moved to IDRC certainly helped improve CIDA/IDRC relations and increase the confidence of PCO staff, to whom both were well-known. This did not prevent IDRC being caught in the wave of the 1992 Budget, but it clearly helped in the reversal of the decisions, first to eliminate and then change the status of the Centre. The role of the Red Tories was vital in this particular affair. Bill Winegard had been on the Board and was dedicated to its survival, as was the new Chair, Flora MacDonald. When the long-held predilections of central agents to centralise were let loose in the 1992 Budget, the diligence of Bezanson and MacDonald, and the internationalist Red Tory circuit headed by Joe

Clark, helped stave off the onslaught, at the cost of a frozen budget and a new environmental focus.

What Influences

Organizations tend to take on the characteristics of other organizations surrounding them, a phenomenon called organizational isomorphism. The success of IDRC as a development assistance organisation depends on the existence of such a process. The relatively small budget of the Centre constrains the establishment of research and development trends by itself. Centre officers must be able to determine significant trends in research, and signal them in order that other bodies fund such trends. Consequently, IDRC has very often been a leader in the research for development niche. Many programme activities have been adopted by other donors. We saw that IDRC caused CIDA and other donors to adopt programme activities originated in IDRC. For example, IDRC officers introduced CIDA staff to the academic networks they had been funding in Asia. This kind of activity and other trends in CIDA have led the Agency to fund more of what is broadly called research than the Centre itself, though this is often of a more tied variety than the norm at IDRC. Certainly a blurring of the lines between the two organisations has taken place. As architect of the Centre, Maurice Strong hoped that it would have this kind of catalytic role relative to CIDA. As we saw, Bill Winegard actively encouraged IDRC playing such a role when he was Chairman of the House Committee of External Affairs and National Defense. Nevertheless, persistent differences remain, IDRC's staff are development specialists, CIDA's generalists. Indeed, the general legitimacy of IDRC rests in part on being able to distinguish the Centre from CIDA. That CIDA exists facilitates the maintenance of the special character of IDRC. More parochial interests can always be sent in the direction of the CIDA headquarters across the Ottawa River in Hull.

IDRC does not fit well into Ottawa organisation charts and lists. Nor does its mandate appeal to narrowly-conceived Canadian self-interest. The organisational survival of the Centre has been a periodic but persistent challenge. We saw that the creation of the Centre required the clear support and tactical strategy of Prime Minister Pearson and the dynamism of Maurice Strong. Without it the proposal would clearly have still-born after the clear opposition, or at the least, the scepticism of the most powerful central agents of Ottawa and the academic community. With Pearson and then Rasminsky as Chairmen, the legitimacy of the Centre could not be seriously questioned. However, the departure of Rasminsky and Hopper in 1977 provided clear opportunities to question the legitimacy of the existence, or at least, the configuration of the Centre. And opportunities were taken then and again during both the Clark and Mulroney governments.

The role of central agents has loomed large in this history of IDRC. They appear to be the organisations most persistently affecting the direction of the Centre, although some programmatic changes are perceptible from donor or recipient interaction with the Centre. Attempts at intervention by central agents tend to coincide with changes in other areas of foreign policy and shifts towards more parochial concerns in the body politic. Only in a general way, though, are these shifts a function of changes in economic circumstances. They are only vaguely correlated to levels of government revenues.

Other opportunities for intervention in the case of IDRC have also emerged at times of changes or the re-appointment of senior officers. This is particularly true of the President. Central agents, particularly PCO, seem to take advantage of these watersheds to seek changes of direction. The appointment of governors or the Chair seems to be delayed in order to weaken the Centre and indicate the displeasure of the central agencies concerned, namely, Foreign Affairs, PCO and PMO. Two key elements in the defence of the Centre have been the offices of Chair and President. Often changes to the Centre were proposed, by design or by accident when Chairs or Presidents were being selected, or in periods of hiatus. A proposal to re-schedule the Centre came in the last fortnight of Hopper's presidency, only two months after Strong became
Chairman in December 1977, prior to Head's selection as the new president. The appointment of a Chair after Maurice Strong's resignation in 1978 was postponed for three years. The replacement of Janet Wardlaw as Chair coincided with the 1992 Budget. In the late 1980s, CIDA began to act more like a central agency itself. This may have been partly due to Maggie Catley-Carlson and Marcel Massé having spent much of their working lives in central agencies. However, CIDA had also expanded and created or bolstered a series of organisations with varying degrees of autonomy, from NGOs, to ICOD and IDRC. In practical terms, CIDA became the development assistance central agency, as large as its central agency, Foreign Affairs, and with more programme delivery responsibility. A central agent outlook followed.

The accountability of the Centre has long been an issue with central agents. They have consistently been suspicious of organisations like IDRC because they are at arms-length from government. This is particularly true in the case of IDRC which has an international board and receives funds from a variety of sources. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is not permitted to issue directives to the Centre. This creates a political tension. The Minister tends to be more internationalist than their colleagues in Cabinet or officials, and therefore generally more willing to give the Centre its autonomy. Nevertheless, the Minister wishes their will to be done. Acting central agents, the management in Foreign Affairs, especially its top leadership, seeks greater coherence. Unlike the American system, Parliament has no real capacity for oversight, which therefore leaves that responsibility in the hands of central agents, chiefly Treasury Board and PCO. Central agents clearly interpret that lack of accountability as a lack of accountability to them. In the case of IDRC, we have seen that even when Parliament has expressed an opinion about the Centre, generally positive, this has often not stopped the leaderships of central agencies from pursuing their own policy trajectories. Consequently, federal organisational tendencies are in many ways tipped against the maintenance of the independence of IDRC.

Returning to the issue of accountability, it is clear that when the Centre has been scrutinised by Parliament, particularly during Foreign Policy Reviews, favourable opinion of the Centre by the Parliamentary Committee members has usually caused some central agents to stay
their collective hands, at least for a time. Comprehensive Audits seem to have had a similar effect. The 1994 Audit continued in that vein, also calling for greater accountability to Parliament. For central agents this has always meant a change of status under the Financial Administration Act (FAA). So, even after the unsuccessful attempt of only two years before, the fate of IDRC seems like the king of Corinth, Sisyphus, condemned to push the rock of autonomy eternally up the hill, its station at the top never secure.

A more positive value encouraged by central agents in the character of the Centre was that the work funded by the Centre would have a practical effect on the lives of the poor in developing countries. The likelihood of university research leading to development is as problematic in developing countries as Canada. Consequently, while IDRC was able to have a major effect on the nature of research for development, its discourse, and the kind of leaders promoted in developing countries, generating development from research conducted remained more of an enigma. In the last decade though, we have seen the shaving down of the barriers between academe and society to the thickness of Chinese walls in all parts of the globe. In this IDRC was not unique. In the 1970s, results were more a promise and a murmur. By the 1990s, they became an international mantra. In the Centre, as elsewhere, tangible results were recognised as a political necessity.

**Prestige, Utility and Survival**

We noted that distinct cultures developed in each of the main federal organisations that deliver or regulate Canadian development assistance policy. We saw too that over time increasing interconnections between these organisations took place. Sometimes these links apparently came as the result of positive efforts to install senior officers who would be expected to be sympathetic to their views. The arrival of senior personnel of one organisation in another often caused the lowering of antipathy between them. Such senior officers do not often carry lit torches with them from one organisation to another. Yet, it does happen, as when Marcel Massé
went from CIDA to External Affairs. IDRC's Presidents have known, or rapidly come to know of the kind of changes that their environment expects of them. Yet a surprising finding of this study is that, in the case of IDRC, incipient but significant organisational change usually precedes the installation of the President who comes to be associated with that shift. In other words, IDRC Presidents, and indeed other officers, seem less composers, and more arrangers and conductors. Despite changes in leadership, we have seen how IDRC has maintained a strong culture based on its beliefs, foundation and functional characteristics. To be sure, changes of personnel, especially in large numbers, and structural and administrative changes do affect programmatic behaviour, but their effects on organisational culture are less clear.

Regarding function, naturally central agencies operate as secretaria, and their personnel often seek to centralise power in order to create coherence. This seems to be an institutional tendency. We have seen that they were often restrained from doing so by internationalist elements in the political leadership. While central agents' officers have frequently been extremely capable and mentally flexible, in the end, pressures to set priorities according to more parochial standards have usually led to their becoming locked in eternal struggles with other federal organisations, including IDRC. Those struggles seem based on assumptions that coherence and accountability are determined by smaller organisation charts and exchanges of senior personnel. Internationalist arguments are particularly difficult to accept in central agencies since their benefit to Canadians has historically seemed uncertain. Domestic federal agencies with a taste for equity can always argue that the programmes they fund can promote social order or economic growth.

In the 1970s and 1980s, Neo-Marxist analyses of Canadian development assistance emerged which posited that development assistance was subordinated to corporate, especially American interests, and emerged from the views of the dominant class. Business has always been represented in different ways on the Board of IDRC. In the Centre's programme activities, periodic proof has been proffered, usually to the Minister of Foreign Affairs to whom IDRC must report, that the Centre has helped Canadian business to receive orders. Yet historically little
effort has been made by Board members to encourage engagement with Canadian business as an end in itself. And business has expressed little interest in such a small organisation. Our statistical survey noted that, overwhelmingly, governors have been composed of present or former university professors. An economics degree, associations with London or Washington, and education at prestigious British or American universities figure highly as characteristics of past governors. They represent the top of the international research and power elite. Such a group, as Michael Pitfield noted can become a "hornets' nest" to the "naked hand" of the Minister of Foreign Affairs when the autonomy of the Centre is questioned.887 Where IDRC does have a utilitarian value in this respect is in having access to the most influential of the dominant class in developing countries. Nevertheless, those fractions of the dominant class with which the Centre tends to be linked are academics and Dennis Olsen's state elite, less the economic elite.888 In this sense, IDRC is well-connected to the bourgeoisie, in the older sense of the word. Consequently, access to the extraordinary network of contacts of Centre staff makes IDRC more useful to officials of Foreign Affairs and CIDA. That access may become relevant to business in the future as new Canada-developing country research and industrial networks are formed.

In the last decade, quasi-public choice models have been used in the study of Canadian development assistance. Although rather more complex than most public choice models, like other public choice writing Nossal focuses on the interest of federal bureaucrats in the determination of aid policy. He has identified the important role prestige plays. We too have identified the role that prestige helps ensure the independence of the Centre. The Centre's independence has reflected well on the reputation of Department of Foreign Affairs, the government of the day, and federal officials overseas. Most federal officials we had discussions with had personal misgivings about that independence. These doubts are crimped by the fact that the Board attracts luminaries like Sir Sridath Ramphal and Lady Barbara Ward. This, and positive comments from important foreigners, helps preserve the independence of the Centre.

887 Michael Pitfield, interview by author, 15 March 1994, Ottawa, tape recording.

Consequently, the maintenance of prestige is important to the survival of the Centre. Nossal concludes that federal officials are anxious to achieve maximum prestige for small beer.\textsuperscript{889} Certainly the funds provided the Centre are relatively small in absolute terms and that has been part of its attraction. Yet IDRC's officers have generally not conformed to the assumption that bureaucrats are maximisers.

Until recently, at the level of officers, there has been an undercurrent that they have generally had sufficient funds to pursue the relatively modest projects which Programme Officers individually distribute. Indeed, over the years many officers have resisted efforts to make them disburse larger volumes of funding per person. Ivan Head always sought larger slices of funding, not least because although Centre funding kept pace with total foreign affairs funding, cuts or a stagnation of funding in real terms frequently took place. Further, the base was not enormous in any case. During the Hopper Presidency, opinion in the Centre seesawed between a feeling that officers had inadequate funding, to a surfeit. In this respect, IDRC staff, past and present, do not very well fit in the public choice scenario of individuals as self-interested maximisers. Doubts about the usefulness of the maximisation assumption are congruent with the findings of Philip Rawkins, Cranford Pratt, and Mark Charlton as regards CIDA, and Donald Savoie regarding the Canadian federal civil service as a whole.\textsuperscript{890} They conclude that a search for stability, rather than maximisation, is a more prevalent feature of Canadian bureaucratic behaviour.

Centre prestige is not only based on the expertise of its staff or the eminence of its Governors, which, to be sure, are important. Internationalist values continue to be cherished in the international development assistance and foreign policy community, and IDRC continues to be perceived as exhibiting those values. Were IDRC to cease to be perceived as representing

\textsuperscript{889} Kim Nossal, "Mixed Motives Revisited," 50.

them, then that support would lessen, having the knock-on effect of diminishing IDRC's prestige. Untied aid is still an important litmus test of attachment to those values. This might not affect the calibre of its staff immediately but it would affect the eminence of the governors it would attract. The decision to make the Centre a departmental corporation certainly raised doubts in Governors' minds as to whether they should consider continuing to sit on the body, as did the creation of the relatively tied aid of the Collaborative Programme. IDRC is the only quasi-state organisation construed as a fulsome expression of internationalism in Canada. Expansion of the percentage of funding going to Canadians would likely not only sap the morale of the Centre's largely internationalist governors and staff but cause the Centre to lose its prestige and niche, the only real sureties of survival.

We have examined the progress of the technical-social dialectic through the history of the Centre. In general, a technical "hard science" bent has been associated with those holding more conservative beliefs, even among internationalists such as Bill Winegard. Central agents have generally encouraged application, and the prospect of the application of knowledge, being "action-oriented" was seen as a great virtue during the proposal stage. The more socially-oriented professionals of the Centre have traditionally tended to devote few resources towards direct application. Cost is usually cited as the reason why, certainly a consideration when the costs of development might typically cost a score of times the budget available to a Programme Officer. There may be other reasons, perhaps application might require the leading role of the more conservative elements typical in engineering and natural sciences, and capital. The present is a time when policy has become the lingua franca of IDRC. Those in the Centre with a more technical bent have difficulty seeing policy as a result of any significance, and it is true that such wares are hard to display. Policy has long been a preoccupation of social scientists in the Centre, and, of course, at large. That policy has taken center stage is one sign of the increasing authority of socially-minded views in the Centre. There are others: the increasing emphasis on holism, the environment, the funding of NGOs and dialogues with communities. The combination of holism and an emphasis on application means that in-Centre teams will be more important, but also upstream and downstream linkages. President Bezanson told the author that the reward system is
now determined on the basis on "whether it works at the village level, whether it works for the farmer, whether it works for the community dweller in a deprived area in some city in South America."  

The fact that trends associated with both the technically and socially-minded in the past are apparently both moving forward simultaneously seems to indicate that the old barriers are coming down. The melting of walls is evident in the practical life of the Centre. Today, the hitherto technically and socially-minded often work together in a single division in team activities. Although divisional boundaries remain important, they have been superseded in Regional Offices. There Regional team approaches by staff have become common, although still nominally attached to Divisions. Even in the Ottawa Head Office Divisions, such boundaries may drop. Keith Bezanson suggested to the author that "There won't be Programme Divisions in five years time. That's a guess now."  

The dropping of these barriers seem to signal the beginnings of an apparent synthesis of the technical and social, and seen in a more holistic approach to development. Such an approach is leading the research funded to articulate a second technical-social dialectic. This dialectic lurches between, on the one hand, a tendency towards technical cures devised by professionals, if concerned by equity questions, and, on the other, a social stream in which diverse stakeholders from society, sometimes in developing countries, sometimes in Canada, are strung together in the project process. We expect this dialectic to become the dominant one in the second quarter century of the Centre.

IDRC was founded on the proposition that the application of knowledge to the poverty of the developing world was best generated by Southern academics themselves. Such an idea presupposed a partnership based on generosity, self-help and mutual respect, all deeply held Canadian values. Although founded to be interdisciplinary, the spirit of the times and divisional boundaries largely restricted the degree of intellectual interchange until 1986 when IDRC itself

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891 Keith Bezanson, interview by author, 2 December 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.

892 Keith Bezanson, interview by author, 2 December 1994, tape recording, Ottawa.
became less separate communities, and more a series of interlocking groups. This shift coincided with greater interlocking in other parts of the development community. Indeed, the nature of science and knowledge generation was itself becoming increasingly interconnected, vertically and horizontally. That IDRC was founded on the assumption that the research it funded would be interdisciplinary, and touch the lives of the poor of developing countries, seems to indicate that IDRC in speech was a forerunner of methodological changes in the nature of science. When the work funded was applied, it did require that a multiplicity of disciplines be involved. Both elements, partnership and interdisciplinarity were evident when the researchers IDRC funded pursued certain projects—as for example, when researchers spent time in the fields with farmers using a farming systems research approach; studied hawkers; tried to make information systems relevant to a broad range of occupations; or examined the role of barefoot nurses.

What Matters, What Endures

The arrival of the Centre on the development research scene in 1970 provoked not only the copying of IDRC's organisation structure, but equally its philosophy and programmes. By 1976, David Hopper noted "there has been increasing competition among donor agencies to follow the pattern that IDRC pioneered from its beginning." As in CIDA, rising appropriations during some periods led to difficulty in disbursing the funds. During the 1970s this led to the creation of more international centres like IFPRI, founded by IDRC funds, governors and staff. Indeed, David Hopper came to see the extension of this organisational model as one of IDRC's missions. Such efforts continued during the Head Presidency. More explicit adaptations of the IDRC organisational model of state-funded research for development followed, like BOSTID and SAREC. Other elements of IDRC were modified and incorporated, as in the recently created Swiss-based International Academy for the Environment. In Canada, the Centre served as a model for organisations like ICOD and IISD.

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Perhaps more significant than the replication of IDRC's structure was that the essence of the Centre, the principles of partnership and responsiveness, also spread. The Centre generally gave more authority to its partners than its fellows. Yet the fulsomeness of that internationalist ethic certainly infused the development assistance community in the 1970s, in particular, with a desire to trust Southern partners more than ever before. Such evidence was seen structurally in the attempt by American legislators to create a forerunner to BOSTID during the Carter administration. The Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation would have included among some of its governors non-Americans. Such a novelty was too much for most Northern donors and indeed the American initiative faltered, but re-emerged in BOSTID. Nevertheless, the notion of partnership between South and North survived and, indeed, prospered. Further, the notion of generosity that IDRC represented so well probably contributed to the lowering of tied aid restrictions, certainly the autonomy and non-tied nature of IDRC was held up as a luminous example in Canada and elsewhere.

The further influencing by IDRC staff and governors of the direction of the new organisations that incorporated aspects of IDRC was facilitated by the high turnover and non-specialist nature of the larger donor agencies' staff. This was especially true of the agricultural centres that the Centre had played such a key role in founding. The specialists of IDRC were interested in affecting the content of the programmes of the Centre, yet had only very modest resources to provide. The presence of perceptive prospectors in IDRC meant that the Centre was often first to fund a promising new research niche, or acted jointly with other donors like the American foundations. The larger donors were encouraged that if IDRC and its like-minded fellows were funding a programme or organisation then it must have legitimate merits and part of a up-and-coming trend. Generally they were right. The result was greater funding to these organisations and these themes. However, the large donors did not have the time or expertise to guide their course. But IDRC had benefit of such expertise and so continued to shape the content of the programmes funded. Thus the trajectory of development assistance, and especially development assistance for research, was influenced by the Centre's staff out of all proportion to the size of IDRC's financial resources. Benefit of the expertise of such specialists certainly has
been key to the Centre's success.

Since its inception, part of the basis of the reputation of IDRC has been the establishment of a real partnership between Programme Officer and recipient. That relationship is a source of deep pride on the part of programme staff. This is still the key relationship to be coveted. It has generally been recognised in the Centre that in the proper circumstances other partners can and often should be introduced, sometimes in a team approach. Results and outcomes have been ever more stressed, most recently by the Audit, Foreign Policy Review, and PCO Programme Reviews. In order to achieve results, the roles of entrepreneurs, communities, cooperatives, and various communications officers in the project process has become more vital. Nevertheless, the essential research relationship between the Southern partner and IDRC Programme Officer will remain the most critical element in the project process.

For the first two decades of IDRC's existence, the stewards of the Centre long protected Centre officers from paying attention to the vagaries of Canadian politics. IDRC Programme Officers gaze was fixed on the South. By the 1990s, not knowing, or wanting to know, about the pressures on the Centre potentially threatened the chances of the Centre's survival. Although IDRC was Lester Pearson's sun room, South facing and attached to the home, Centre officers, especially those returning from the Regional Offices began to feel more like hot house flowers. Despite these challenges, Centre officers have remained deeply committed to their work. The workaholic atmosphere is not just the product of the 1992 and 1995 cuts, but the continuance of a long-standing tradition.

IDRC's Act permits enormous flexibility, virtually providing the means for the remaking of the Centre's mandate. In a programmatic and structural sense, the Centre is remaking itself. It has a new environmental focus, authority has been decentralised to the Regional Offices. A new regional model experiment is beginning in the form of the Asia Programme, which may lead to further decentralisation to Asian partners. This is now being considered for Africa. Decentralisation has largely been seen indicative of the strength of an internationalist impulse.
There are indications that greater priority is now given to appealing to Canadians, whether federal officials or academics, by being more visible, by being more responsive to their priorities. The present decommissioning of half the Regional Offices, while historically a cyclical activity, and the move to diversify funding, could be interpreted as bowing to these pressures. The question is whether such flexibility puts the essential nature, impulse and values of the Centre at risk.

In the past, there have been strong fears that more narrowly-conceived Canadian priorities might swamp the internationalist ethic. It remains a pitfall. However, over the history of IDRC, officers have largely been able to temper more parochial tendencies in accordance with internationalist precepts. Certainly the Collaborative Programme might have subverted the essential aims of the Centre. Yet when interpreted according to IDRC traditions, the programme did not transform the Centre into a mere milch cow for Canadian researchers. One should not go so far as to think that the Centre's long-standing doctrine of responsiveness is blind to preferences, especially with the considerable expertise to hand in the shape of programme staff. Funding was provided in the form of a set menu, even if the choice within it was broad enough to be a "smorgasbord." Cuts and a desire for coherence have limited the menu, although even now greens (environmental-soundness) are not obligatory. Nor has involvement in the West Bank or South Africa turned the Centre into a mere instrument of Canadian policy, though its actions have been applauded by Canadian diplomats because they were well-received by the authorities behind the recipients concerned. Certainly the change in programme focus towards Agenda 21 has altered the previous basis of the Centre and many of the partners with which the Centre works. However, the change broke a number of policy logjams that had been building up. In particular, the disciplinary and technical tendencies in the Centre prevalent in the early days of IDRC were weakened, helping put the Centre on a more contemporary intellectual footing for the 1990s. Such a change was vital to the survival of the Centre, and aided in the Centre's legitimation at home and abroad. There is room, therefore, for confidence that the robust culture of IDRC is capable of adapting to change while retaining what is valuable about the organisational culture.
New partners, such as NGOs, as well as more Southern entrepreneurs, have become part of IDRC's project process. They are naturally enthusiastic about these changes to the Centre. Environmentalists and other new interlocutors see the Agenda 21 focus of the Centre as welcome because they see it as evidence that the new partnership evolving in the Centre includes them. That IDRC has taken this focus has created the general opinion inside and outside Canada that the Centre has updated its image and substance. This is generally applauded, though some partners see it as a fad, especially those who do not have an environmental component to their activities.

The shift towards a team approach may be seen as a matter of democratising the project process, or, at the least, the broadening of the number of constituencies represented. The more socially-minded of the second social-technical polar set recognise intellectually that the partnership with NGOs, the team approach and the environmental focus as good, especially when these changes involve their own projects. But as IDRC officers have always done, they see challenges to their autonomy as a shift to the right. That Treasury Board, PCO and the Auditor General's have pushed IDRC in many of the directions the Centre is presently pursuing confirms this perception. Indeed, the right, whether technically or socially-minded within the second dialectic, see themselves as in the ascendant in the Centre as a whole. However, as we show above, analysis of the characteristics of the adjustments made, and indeed the new partners of the Centre, do not support such a simple conclusion. In parts of the Centre that have broken down several of the barriers which separated officers in the past, as in the Regional Offices or ENR, a more fulsome, if still qualified, enthusiasm for the emerging new partnership is unmistakable.
The Synthesis of New Virtues

We posited in Chapter Four that changing international circumstances and currents of thought are causing the fusing of the international and the parochial in interdependence. We do not imply here that the synthesis of the internationalist and the parochial eliminate differing interests. It is rather that common interests are becoming more significant than the differing interests so stark before. We likewise proposed that a similar process was taking place as regards the technical and social dialectic in the form of holism. The Centre is now in the throes of weaving together the technical and social, the internationalist and the parochial into a synthesis of new virtues. The synthesised resultants, interdependence and holism, are providing a new array of research areas and strategies for internal policies. For example, the interdependence of the North and South and holism might be seen in research currently being funded to investigate the local knowledge of the biodiversity in Rio San Juan. The resulting information, itself the product of diverse partners, might be used by both North and South. Research into a simple water quality test is already being used in indigenous communities in Canada and Chile. Joint research by Chinese and Canadian scientists has resulted in new varieties of canola. Such activities demonstrate in a concrete way Barbara Ward and Lester Pearson's assertions as to the common unity of humanity. Such research shows that international partnership can be credible. Further, the notion of development assistance as charity is pushed to the side. The partnership between indigenous communities in North and South demonstrates that the North and South are not so separate. To be sure, this work is fraught with questions about the distribution of benefits and equity as a whole. But that these questions can now be posed shows their relevance, and the importance of the work undertaken. Moreover, such research raises the issue of how to organise equity and forces one to consider equity in development as an international process that begins at the research stage \textit{a posteriori} rather than activity that is remedial work performed by a national state. While international production processes are now well-entrenched, the forging of the organisation of equity as an international research and development partnership is only in its infancy. Given IDRC's history of partnership in research, it would be well-placed to encourage the concretisation of Pearson and Ward's belief in the common unity of humanity in yet another
At the outset of the thesis we linked the expansion of development assistance to internationalist values. Aid fatigue was very much part of the lassitude of the values underpinning it. That exhaustion was deepened by the facile conclusion that funding development assistance meant a turning away from people in Canada. Aid fatigue has grown, certainly in Canada. Yet the Committee members of the recent foreign policy review stated that despite this Canadians "want a values-based foreign policy, as witnesses told us repeatedly. These values can serve as criteria for consistent policies." Further, the resulting report said, "the self-interested justifications (e.g. trade promotion) for aid have never cut much ice with Canadians. Help to those most in need expresses the basic moral vision of aid and corresponds closely to what the vast majority of Canadians think development assistance is about." Such a position is not to argue for development assistance without results, or even benefits to Canada. What these statements do show is that Pearson's values-based development, rooted in manse, Canadian and egalitarian notions of generosity, tolerance, and self-help continue to resonate or guide Canadians in their self-definition in national and international terms.

Pearson asserted that development assistance should be about international partnership. His rationale was based on moral imperatives and a desire for global stability. As we have seen, it was also based on an assumption that national sovereignty did not assure local stability. We have learned in our national societies, or I hope we have, that residential suburbs

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894 Even if Denmark beat the trend by actually achieving the one percent UN target in the 1990s.

895 Canada, House of Commons and Senate, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, Canada's Foreign Policy, Volume 1, Principles and Priorities for the Future, Ottawa: Publications Service, Parliamentary Publications Directorate, 1994, 8.

896 Special Joint Committee, Canada's Foreign Policy, Volume 1, Principles and Priorities for the Future, 48.
surrounded by ghettos and slums are intolerable and can only lead to bitterness and violence. We should learn that lesson for the world before it is too late. But we will never learn it if our vision is obscured and distorted by national egoism and prejudice; if we are exclusively preoccupied with our domestic problems and interest; if we beggar our neighbours by short-sighted policies designed to enrich ourselves; in short, if we cling to old and traditional concepts of national policy, national interests, national sovereignty long after technological progress has made them almost meaningless. . .

If, as we have learned by now, national sovereignty is no guarantee of security or even adequate protection for national rights in a world of international anarchy, then there must be developed some better method for protecting those rights and guaranteeing security and progress. For this, international co-operation, international organization, and collective action is essential.\textsuperscript{897}

It is clearer now in the era of the 500 channel universe that a national vision must somehow be anchored in an international sea, and strung together with others. When Pearson proposed partnership it was criticised rightly for being a partnership of unequals. Nevertheless, IDRC represented an honest attempt to forge an international partnership with Southern academics with a taste for questions of equity. In the last decade, the notion of a less lopsided internationalist partnership is more credible because parts of the South are stronger than before.

Development in the South coincided, for related reasons, with attacks on the validity of internationalism and equitable development. Elements in the North supporting internationalism came under fire at the same time that equitable development did. Those elements have now come to need the assistance of Southern partners in order to continue the argument in the North for North-South partnership as a global vision of equitable development.

One option facing Canada and other societies is to predicate the entire edifice of foreign policy and development assistance on the basis of realist statecraft, where each state entity must relentlessly compete with every other, grinding down their people to a lowest common denominator of poverty, and indeed pushing all to a Pareto minimum point below any sustainable

level. French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur articulated such a view of international anarchy in trade in November 1994, saying that in the arena of the global market the law of the jungle prevailed. Of course, the acceptability of the ghost town will not vanish, nor will international partnership abolish the fickle abandonment of the inconvenient. But what of the other option? It is the strengthening of means to support the quality of life of the common future of all people on a shrunken globe in the South and the North. Those means must be chosen so that people may touch them, in a manner fostering "international co-operation, international organization, and collective action," recognising common cause. Marcel Massé and Jocelyne Bourgon, two former CIDA Presidents are now in the top two positions in PCO, official and political. Perhaps key to the future of development assistance in Canada is whether they and Keith Bezanson will find ways of anchoring central agency culture to a perception of development assistance as an essential emanation, reflection, projection and, moreover, safeguard of the Canadian model, and not a costly distraction.

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898 British Broadcasting Corporation, World Service, Service to North America, 5.975 MHz, 27 November 1994, 0445 GMT.
As inheritors of Pearson's ethos, the staff of IDRC have sought to cement, consciously or unconsciously, an international partnership of generally shared values based on a concern for equity and mutual respect. IDRC is now more structurally cohesive than at any time in its history. It has gone further than ever before to synthesise the internationalist-parochial and technical-social tensions that have been evident for twenty-five years. Despite the pressures of central agents and funding constraints, the Centre now has far fewer internal and external barriers to breach in order to build a broader and deeper global social conversation.

The hopes for IDRC that Ward, Pearson and Strong had, of a Centre abroad in the world, acting as a catalyst to forge a global partnership in research to assist societies to adapt to scientific change is now closer to being realised. However, this author concludes that the future success of the Centre will rest on the collective use of the instinct for survival as a mechanism for reflection, insight and propulsion. Such insights must provide means to sustain internationalism within an international coalition which recognises its frailty, the reality of interdependence, the necessity of partnership, that the unslaked mouth has a voice, bears knowledge, deserves listeners when it speaks of bread and music.
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<td>EARO opens, Policy Unit created</td>
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<td><strong>Internal Themes</strong></td>
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<td>Scientific transformation</td>
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<td>Responsive -ness, Applied research</td>
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<td><strong>Research Themes</strong></td>
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<td>Indigenous capacity, Disciplinary</td>
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<td><strong>External Events</strong></td>
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<td>Gerin-Lajoie to CIDA</td>
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<td>Increased CIDA/IDRC cooperation</td>
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<td>CIDA Strategy</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td><strong>IDRC Structural Change</strong></td>
<td><strong>Key IDRC Document</strong></td>
<td><strong>Internal Themes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Research Themes</strong></td>
<td><strong>External Events</strong></td>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>Strong chair</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>Head joins, Steedman to SS, Gotlieb to BOG</td>
<td>OPE created, VP Planning created, Laval, London, Paris, EARO close</td>
<td>Give Us the Tools</td>
<td>Planning &amp; evaluation</td>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>PCO, TB and External Affairs Studies</td>
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<td>1979</td>
<td>Blais A/Chair, ROs report to OPE, Castillo to BOG, First VP Berlinguet exits</td>
<td>Fellows, Coop, OCG opens</td>
<td>Collaborat-ion with Canadians</td>
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<td>Funding in hostile environments</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>Macdonald chair</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>Mullin to Coop</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>Head re-appointed</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>Internal Audit, OSGC, and HR opens. New VPs created, ROs report to President, President's Committee</td>
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<td>Year</td>
<td>Internal Events</td>
<td>Structural Change</td>
<td>Research Themes</td>
<td>External Events</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>Filion A/Chair, Wilson to HS</td>
<td>SARO, MERO closed, EES opens, PPC &amp; Screening Committee begin</td>
<td>Decentralisation, Cross-divisional integration</td>
<td>Conservative gov’t, African famine</td>
<td>Liberal bill excludes IDRC from change of status</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>Mission Exercise, Wardlaw chair, Helleiner to BOG</td>
<td>PPR VII With Our Own Hands</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>10 Wk. Seminar, Whyte to SS</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>Nostbakken to Communications, Head recommended, Cooperative integrated with regular programme</td>
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<td>1988</td>
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**Key IDRC Events & Documents (Page 3/4)**

Search for President Begins, Hawtin to AFNS Search Conferences

- **Research Themes**
  - Dissemination
  - Utilisation
  - Limited focus. Gender
  - Sustainable research

- **External Events**
  - ODA cut, Massé joins CIDA

- **Key External Document**
  - Liberal bill excludes IDRC from change of status
  - Winegard Report, Sharing Our Future, Brundtland Commission
  - Well-Performing Organisations
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDRC Internal Events</strong></td>
<td>Bezanson, Beemans joins, Whyte to AFNS, Transition</td>
<td>Law to HS, Pestieau to SS</td>
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<td>APM</td>
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<td><strong>IDRC Structural Change</strong></td>
<td>ENR, CAID opens</td>
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<td>ROSA opens</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Key IDRC Document</strong></td>
<td>Empowerment Through Knowledge, IDRC Strategy</td>
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<td>CPF, Meeting the Global Challenge</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Themes</strong></td>
<td>Partnerships with Canadians, Knowledge brokers, Limited Focus</td>
<td>Agenda 21, Diversification of funding</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Research Themes</strong></td>
<td>Empowerment, Utilisation, Gender capacity</td>
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<td>Interdisciplinarity, Themes</td>
<td>Values, Patents</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>External Events</strong></td>
<td>Elimination? Departmental corporation?, Rio Conference</td>
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<td>Liberal gov’t, Massé to PCO</td>
<td>Bourgon, Labelle joins CIDA</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Key External Document</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>CIDA Audit</td>
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<td>IDRC Audit, ODA Review begins</td>
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